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<td>FROM: confidential</td>
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<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
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<td>TO:</td>
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<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>AUTHORITY</td>
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<td>AGO D/A ltr, 23 Jan 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 23 Jan 1976</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and
can be adapted for use in developing training material.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

[Signature]

KENNETH C. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
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1. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.


(1) During the reporting period, there were two major changes in the command group.


(b) On 30 March 1970, Major General James W. Sutherland assumed the position of Deputy Commanding General, II FFORCEV.

(2) During the reporting period, there were seven major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV.


(b) On 25 February 1970, Colonel Joseph E. Collins became ACofS, G1, replacing Colonel Walworth F. Williams.


(e) On 15 March 1970, Major Leo N. Childs became Acting Deputy Signal Officer.

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(g) On 4 April 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Charles P. Gallagher became Deputy Provost Marshal.

(3) During the reporting period, there were three significant personnel changes in II FFORCEV Artillery. Colonel Joseph N. Memin assumed the position of Deputy Commander on 4 April 1970. Colonel John E. Baker assumed the command of 23d Artillery Group on 4 April 1970. Lieutenant Colonel Crover H. Lewis, Jr., assumed the position of S4 on 16 March 1970.

b. Personnel, Morale, Safety, Discipline, and Base Development.

(1) The morale of the command remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued by this headquarters are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>Nov 69 - Jan 70</th>
<th>Feb 70 - Apr 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>2,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>5,277</td>
<td>4,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAAL** 9,866 7,443

(3) The following awards were presented to assigned and attached personnel of II FFORCEV Artillery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>Feb 70 - Apr 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>1,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAAL** 2,069

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(4) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORCEV increased substantially during the quarter as a result of the assignment of the 23d Artillery Group on 15 March 1970. Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry, was deactivated on 10 April 1970 and Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC) was deactivated on 15 April 1970. A comparison of the last four reporting periods follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 69</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 70</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 70</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>6,149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Postal activities, 44th Army Postal Unit. During the period 1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970, the 44th APU sold 9,776 money orders with a value of $790,440. The postal unit processed 110.1 tons of incoming mail and 32.23 tons of outgoing mail during the same period. Due to the increasing amount of contraband being intercepted in CONUS, it has become an area of growing concern among postal officials. The APU is utilizing a mine detector to locate metallic items in parcels not indicating any such object on the customs declaration tag. The inspection of fourth class mail has been increased and postal clerks have been instructed to bring to the attention of the postal officer any suspicious parcels. Personnel mailing parcels are now required to present their military identification card for identification purposes. Persons mailing parcels for someone else are now required to show their identification card and place their signature and return address on the parcel.

(6) The military personnel injury rate for 3d quarter fiscal year 1970 is 53.6 percent higher than the 2d quarter rate, as shown on the chart below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>2D QTR FY 70</th>
<th>3D QTR FY 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel Injury Rate</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Injuries per 1,000,000 mandays)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Motor Vehicle Accident Rate</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Accidents per 1,000,000 miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(7) Weapons accidents involving individual weapons resulted in 56 injuries and 12 fatalities, and army motor vehicle accidents accounted for 34 injuries and six fatalities. Driving too fast for conditions, following too closely, and improper passing were the primary causes of army motor vehicle accidents, and failure to clear weapons upon entering a secure area was the major factor in weapons accidents.

(8) Quarterly statistics for the 3d quarter fiscal year 70 indicated that offense rates for II FFORCEV assigned, attached, and OPCON units have shown an increase since the 2d quarter fiscal year 70. The largest increase was in military offenses. This can be attributed to the upsurge in off limits, curfew, weapons and uniform violations. Narcotics and black-marketing caused the sharp increase in the miscellaneous offense category, while the increase in assault and larcenies over $50.00 accounted for the increase in crimes against persons and property. Speeding and other moving violations were the main factor contributing to the increase in traffic offenses. The last quarter fiscal year 69 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 70 comparative rates computed on the basis of 1,000 troops are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II FFORCEV ASSIGNED, ATTACHED, AND OPCON FY 70 OFFENSE CATEGORY</th>
<th>4th Qtr 69</th>
<th>1st Qtr 70</th>
<th>2d Qtr 70</th>
<th>3d Qtr 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimes against persons and property</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous offenses</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>7.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military offenses</td>
<td>19.16</td>
<td>17.53</td>
<td>23.78</td>
<td>32.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic offenses</td>
<td>21.35</td>
<td>17.53</td>
<td>15.04</td>
<td>20.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Improvement of the base camp continued satisfactorily.

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection:

(a) The daily briefing of selected agent reports was continued by Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing was to inform the C2 of

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enemy movement, supply, subordination, strength and intentions, as well as
to evaluate better the intelligence produced by agents and to determine the
reliability of the sources. This, in turn, enabled the agency which employed
the sources to decide which agents warrant retention and which should be
released.

(b) Collection Division was also responsible for insuring that all
necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) were pub-
lished and levied on the appropriate collection agencies. In addition,
Collection Division coordinated the collection of intelligence on specific
subjects and informed subordinate units which SICRs were current by pub-
lishing a quarterly II FFORCEV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements
Registry. The Registry indexed all SICRs by number and by collection agencies.
During the past quarter 14 MACV SICRs were cancelled, while 11 new MACV and
2 new II FFORCEV SICRs were levied. No new collection plans were received
from MACV for implementation and none were written by II FFORCEV.

(c) During the period 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970, Collection
Division continued analyzing agent reports for more complete exploitation
of all reported information. Specific areas of interest being examined were:
enemy sanctuaries and base areas, movement of regimental and divisional
forces, caches, and intelligence which would contribute to the identification
and selection of targets by the C2 Targets Division.

(3) Counterintelligence/PHOENIX

(a) Documents captured during the reporting period continued to indicate
that pacification is a major objective of the current communist effort.
The impact of the Phoenix program can be measured, in part, by the fact
that this operation was specifically targeted by the communist forces. On
23 March 1970, leaflets captured by the 33d Ranger Battalion read "VC will
disrupt all Phoenix programs". The Phoenix program is apparently beginning
to achieve the desired effect. A most encouraging trend during the month
of March was the very notable qualitative and quantitative improvement in
Viet Cong infrastructure neutralizations. It appears that the particularly
strong infrastructures in Hau Ngia and Long An Provinces are finally be-
inning to weaken. Long Khanh Province surpassed its neutralization rate
for the previous two months. Thirteen of the neutralized VCIs in the province
were district level or higher. This record is an excellent example of
results obtained by a combined effort of military units and District
Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers/Province Intelligence Operations
Coordinating Centers (DIOCC/PDOCC) resources. Excellent results have also
been obtained by a well planned and coordinated Phoenix/psyops effort. In
February, Phuoc Long Province reported 35 VCIs neutralized. This marked a
new high in the province and can be directly attributed to an effective
psychological operation (PSYOPS) program, increased emphasis on the Phung Hoang program by the Province Chief, and US/ARVN military pressure. In Binh Duong Province, a VC village chief was neutralized as a direct result of a "wanted" poster the first day after its dissemination.

(b) Response to the Volunteer Informant Program continues to vary widely between units. The variation can be attributed, in part, to different emphasis and priorities given to intelligence funds. Lack of publicity of the program is a major factor in the apparent lack of success in many areas. In those areas and units where the program received emphasis, a greater degree of success has been achieved.

(c) The number of terrorists incidents reported throughout III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ) continues to vary widely from week to week. During the week 20 to 26 February, a total of 22 incidents were reported. The week of 2 to 9 April, however, saw a total of 114 incidents reported. During the past 13 week period the average number of incidents reported per week was 54. There was an apparent increase in abductions in III CTZ. During February there were 38, and in March, 73 persons were abducted. The increase is not alarming when compared with the past 12 months' average of 81 abductions per month. Of interest is the II Corps figure of 529 and 585 persons abducted during February and March respectively.

(4) Operations: Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry was deactivated on 10 April 1970. During the months of February and March, Company D operated in an area in southwestern War Zone "D" and eastern Catcher's Mitt and inserted a total of 215 teams resulting in 19 contacts, 20 sightings and 29 enemy KIA. From 8 February 1970 to 18 March 1970, the company was placed under OPCON of the 199th LIB and continued operations in southwestern War Zone "D". On 18 March 1970, Company D returned OPCON to II FFORC and initiated operations in Nhon Trach District while continuing operations in southwestern War Zone "D". During their two final months of operations, the ranger company continued to supply II FFORC with a comprehensive intelligence picture of their area of operations. Through their aggressive program, information was gained regarding enemy supply routes through War Zone "D".

(5) G2 Air

(a) There was a significant reduction in aerial reconnaissance and surveillance throughout the corps during the reporting period. This was primarily due to the redeployment of an Air Force squadron and the deactivation of the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoons (ASTA) of the 1st US Infantry Division and 1st US Cavalry Division. This reduced the OV-1 Mohawk assets from 31 to 18 aircraft.
(b) The Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) reconnaissance plan has been revised to provide coverage over the border and delta areas only. A detailed analysis of previous SLAR results revealed that most of the potential enemy targets were being detected on the waterways in Long An and Hau Ngia Provinces, in the Parrot's Beak, and along the Cambodian border. It was determined that these areas could be effectively covered by using only three aircraft each night. Only five OV-1B aircraft are required to support this concept.

(c) On 24 March 1970, special infrared (REDAZE) coverage was implemented in the 25th US Infantry Division and the 3d Brigade of the 7th US Infantry Division area of operation on an experimental basis. Instead of flying 600 square kilometers at an altitude of 2500 feet for general surveillance, point and strip targets are being flown at a lower altitude (1000 feet) in an attempt to gain better resolution on the imagery covering special target areas. At the present time, no conclusive results have been obtained. The major limitation has been the lower altitude, which has increased the threat posed by automatic weapons and small arms fire.

(d) III CTZ continues to be the largest single requestor of Air Force tactical reconnaissance in Vietnam. During the quarter the 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron was moved from Tan Son Nhut Air Base to Misawa Air Base, Japan, resulting in a loss of eighteen RF-4s from the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. With the reduction of reconnaissance aircraft, III CTZ Air Force Red Haze missions have dropped from an average of six sorties to three sorties a night. A Red Haze alternate mission plan has been devised in case the planned sorties cannot be flown due to weather, artillery, etc. The alternate target area has prevented what would otherwise be the loss of several missions.

(e) The G2, III Corps, is now requesting USAf and VNAf photogaphy directly from JCS instead of through G2 Air II FFORCIV. This is an important step in the Vietname1ization of aerial reconnaissance efforts as it eliminates ARVN dependence on US forces for aerial photography. A mutual exchange of information on target requests exists between G2 Air, III Corps, and G2 Air, II FFORCIV, to avoid duplication of effort and conserve assets. The program, as viewed by II FFORCIV, is quite satisfactory.

(6) G2 Targets:

(a) The G2 Targets Division's primary function continued to be the development and evaluation of targets for B-52 strikes within III CTZ. During the reporting period, the division continued to develop an extensive data base of hard installations, including enemy bunkers, base camps, fighting positions, tunnels and trench works, which are reproduced on acetate maps.
During the quarter 117 B-52 strikes were targeted against lucrative base and staging areas within the III Corps area. The most intensive targeting activity was against elements of the 9th VC Division located in northern and western Tay Ninh Province. This area received 74 percent of the strikes that were allocated to II FFORCEV by MACV. The remainder of the strikes were in Phuoc Long (14 percent), Long Kanh (3 percent), Phuoc Tuy (2 percent), Bien Hoa (2 percent), Binh Duong (1 percent), Hue Nghia (1 percent), and Binh Tuy (3 percent) Provinces.

Radio Research: The 303d Radio Research Battalion provided timely and sustained support for the combat operations of II Field Force. A direct support unit provides radio research support to each US division and separate brigade or regiment and immediate tactical reports are provided down to brigade level. The 303d Radio Research Battalion was responsive to the tasks of this command and performed in an outstanding manner.

Weather Support for II FFORCEV: Weather support to II FFORCEV is provided by Detachment 32, 5th Weather Squadron. This support consists of a daily weather briefing to the Commanding General and his staff; specialized weather briefings given daily to G2 Air, G3 Air and C4 Airlift; special winds aloft forecasts to G5 Psyops; and enroute and terminal forecasts for Army aircraft departing Long Binh Plantation area. As a general rule, the weather this quarter has been favorable for our operations in III CTZ, however, on two occasions preplanned close air support missions were rescheduled for a later time due to forecasts of low ceilings in the target area. On both occasions the forecast weather occurred and the missions were able to be completed at the rescheduled time. A special wind study conducted by Detachment 32 proved that a planned psyops leaflet drop by G5 into a classified area was not feasible and the entire operation was cancelled, saving many man-hours of work and several hundred dollars. There were no operations hampered due to poor weather or lack of weather forecasting support.

Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle,

Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remained the supreme political military headquarters controlling all Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) activities in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in III CTZ were subordinate either directly to COSVN or to one of the six secondary level headquarters in III CTZ (See Inclosure 8). There were no significant changes in the enemy's military - political boundaries during the quarter, and the area of III CTZ continued to be divided into 13 major subdivisions. There continued to be a shift in enemy tactics toward decentralization and small actions aimed at sustaining a steady attrition of US and allied forces and disruption of the pacification program.
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(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

A few significant changes in the number and effectiveness of enemy units were noted in the II FFORCIV TAGI. The table below shows the combined effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the beginning and end of the period.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Feb 70</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>30 Apr 70</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>NCE</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>NCE</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Regt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Regt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Bn</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4(1)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Bn</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapper Regt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapper Bn</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FCE - Fully Combat Effective (none)    MCE - Marginally Combat Effective
CE - Combat Effective                   NCE - Non Combat Effective

Units in parentheses are carried as possible by II FFORCIV OB.

2. 33d Regiment resubordinated to the 5th VC Division: Prisoners of war captured on 13 February in the vicinity of Vo Dat identified their units as the 33d Regiment and reported that it had been recently resubordinated to the 5th VC Division. Further identification of the 33d Regiment was made on 27 March when documents referred to the regiment as being subordinate to the 5th VC Division and mentioned the 31st Training Battalion, 5th VC Division. This information coincides with the disappearance of the 95A Regiment and its possible resubordination and relocation. The 95A Regiment has not been identified in contact since July; it was then believed to be located in the Duc Phong area. Although the 33d Regiment has been resubordinated to the 5th VC Division, it has remained in its old area of operations and has retained the mission of disrupting allied pacification in the area.
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3 The Re-Formation of the Quyet Thang Regiment of SR-1: On 31 January 1970, Nguyen Van Dong, Chief of Staff of the 268th Regiment, rallied and revealed that in November 1969 the Quyet Thang Regiment had been reformed, consisting of the Quyet Thang I and II Battalions and the Gia Dinh 4th Sapper Battalion. Documents captured on 9 February 1970 confirmed Dong’s statement; however, later contacts and reports from prisoners have indicated that the regimental headquarters does not contain any support companies. The headquarters element is simply a staff unit consisting of approximately ten men, whose mission is to coordinate the activities of three battalions.

4 Inactivation of the 525th Engineer/Sapper Battalion of MR-7: Documents captured on 1 April 1970 have revealed that the enemy has realigned his engineer/sapper elements in MR-7, particularly where the 525th Battalion is concerned. The documents revealed that in the fall of 1969, MR-7 headquarters ordered the inactivation of the 525th Battalion. This action was apparently accomplished on 1 October 1969. At that time the battalion had C-25, C-26 and C-27 as subordinate companies. The 525th Battalion headquarters staff and the C-26 Company was transferred to the D-67 Engineer Battalion of MR-7. Sometime in October 1969, the C-27 Company also became part of the D-67 Battalion, probably as a replacement company in the D-67 Battalion. The transfer of men from the 525th Battalion brought the strength of the D-67 Battalion to approximately 240. The C-25 Company (formerly part of the 525th) is probably now subordinate to the engineer section of MR-7 headquarters.

(c) Recapitulation:

1 The VC regions, provinces, and special zones in III CTZ controlled 20 local force companies and 36 local force platoons (Note: local force companies and platoons with a strength of 40 or less are considered platoons).

2 The battalions and regimental sized units located within III CTZ were as follows (Units in parentheses are carried as possible by II FFORCE OB):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>275th VC Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174th NVA Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d NVA Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.5th NVA Infantry Regiment)</td>
<td>(5th VC Division)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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165th NVA Infantry Regiment 7th NVA Division
141st NVA Infantry Regiment 7th NVA Division
209th NVA Infantry Regiment 7th NVA Division
271st NVA Infantry Regiment 9th VC Division
272d VC Infantry Regiment 9th VC Division
95th NVA Infantry Regiment 9th VC Division
66th Base Security Regiment COSVN
101st NVA Infantry Regiment SR-1
268th VC MP Regiment SR-1
Quyet Thang Regiment SR-1
1st NVA Infantry Regiment SR-3
Dong Hai VC Infantry Regiment SR-5
274th VC MP Infantry Regiment MR-7
16th Armee Office COSVN
96th NVA Artillery Regiment 69th VC Artillery Command
208th NVA Artillery Regiment 69th VC Artillery Command
74th NVA Artillery Regiment MR-7
Trang Bang LP Battalion SR-1
6th VC MP Infantry Battalion SR-2
668th NVA MP Infantry Battalion SR-2
666th NVA Infantry Battalion SR-2
267th VC MP Infantry Battalion SR-2

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for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R2) (U)

269th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
308th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
2642d NVA LF Infantry Battalion
(265th VC MFI Infantry Battalion)
506th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
508th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
520th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
Dong Phu NVA Infantry Battalion
Thang Loi Battalion
11 VC LF Infantry Battalion
124 VC LF Infantry Battalion
2d VC MFI Infantry Battalion
4th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
D640 VC LF Infantry Battalion
D645 VC LF Infantry Battalion
Doan Song Be NVA Battalion
D368 VC LF Infantry Battalion
D168 VC LF Infantry Battalion
22d VC Artillery Battalion
24th NVA AA Battalion
24th NVA AA Battalion
22d NVA Artillery Battalion

269th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
308th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
2642d NVA LF Infantry Battalion
(265th VC MFI Infantry Battalion)
506th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
508th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
520th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
Dong Phu NVA Infantry Battalion
Thang Loi Battalion
11 VC LF Infantry Battalion
124 VC LF Infantry Battalion
2d VC MFI Infantry Battalion
4th VC MFI Infantry Battalion
D640 VC LF Infantry Battalion
D645 VC LF Infantry Battalion
Doan Song Be NVA Battalion
D368 VC LF Infantry Battalion
D168 VC LF Infantry Battalion
22d VC Artillery Battalion
24th NVA AA Battalion
24th NVA AA Battalion
22d NVA Artillery Battalion

Tay Ninh Province
Ba Binh Province
Ba Binh Province
MR-10
MR-10
MR-10
5th VC Division
5th VC Division
7th NVA Division
7th NVA Division
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion Name</th>
<th>Division/Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22d VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th VC AA Battalion</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th VC AA Battalion</td>
<td>69th VC Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>SR-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th VC MF Heavy Weapons Battalion</td>
<td>SR-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th NVA Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>SR-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st NVA Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th NVA Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th VC Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bach Dang Sapper/Recon Battalion*</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th VC MF Sapper/Recon Battalion</td>
<td>SR-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211th NVA Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N10 VC Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N13 VC Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th VC MF Water Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan 10 MF Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1 VC LF Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>M7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2 VC LF Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>M7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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67th NVA Engineer Battalion  MR-7
66 VC LF Sapper Battalion  MR-7
46th VC MF Recon Battalion  COSVN

(d) Summary of Recent Activity:

1 Enemy level of activity during the quarter remained essentially the same as that noted in the previous quarter. The low level was punctuated by occasional increases in activity. During the first week of the month, a large quantity of signal equipment, arms and munitions was taken from a number of caches near Rang Rang by the 3d Mobile Strike Force. By the end of the second week of the month, it was clear that this complex of caches was one of the largest single logistical finds to be made by allied forces in III CTZ. In retaliation, the enemy struck the surrounding cache area with particularly intense attacks by fire. Activity in March was characterized by a number of attacks by fire and ground attacks resulting in substantial enemy losses. Action remained relatively scattered until near the end of the month. During the night of 31 March - 1 April, a highpoint in enemy activity was noted as the number of attacks by fire increased significantly. Enemy initiated activity remained slightly above normal throughout the first half of the month with the most significant activity being reported in the northwestern portion of the TAOI. The second half of the month saw enemy level of activity remaining about the same with the preponderance of attacks occurring in MR-10 and War Zone "C".

2 5th VC Division: At the beginning of the quarter, the divisional headquarters was located in eastern Phuoc Long Province, the 275th VC Infantry Regiment was positioned northeast of Song Be, the 174th NVA Infantry Regiment northwest of Duc Phuoc and the 33d Regiment was located in MR-6. During an interrogation, 2 prisoners captured on 13 February east of Vo Dat identified the 33d Regiment, providing the first indication that the regiment has been reorganized to the 5th VC Division. Activity remained light throughout February and March while allied operations discovered significant enemy rice caches southwest of Bo Duc and near Bu Gia Map. Captured documents indicated that rear service elements from the 70th Rear Service Group were attempting to improve the upper portions of the Serges Jungle Highway and keep enemy trail networks open. During the initial phase of the enemy's "General Uprising" week of 31 March, the 5th VC Division was only lightly committed although the 33d Regiment was identified a number of times during the period. Action in the 5th VC Div area

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Of operations was marked by a 6 April company-sized attack against ARVN elements at Fire Support Base Mary which resulted in 18 enemy KIA and the identification of the 3d Battalion, 174th Regiment. Regimental support elements were contacted south of Vo Dat on 6 April in an engagement which resulted in 49 enemy KIA. Enemy initiated activity in the 5th VC Division's area of operations remained at a low level throughout the remainder of the period. The 5th VC Division's area of operation includes Phuoc Long and Binh Tuy Provinces, with divisional forces primarily concentrated and targeted against allied installations in the Bu Dop - Bo Duc area, in northern Phuoc Long Province, near Bu Gia Map, Song Be and along Highway 14 between Bunan and Duc Phong. The 33d Regiment is located in Binh Tuy Province and operates in and around Vo Dat and Tan Linh. The strength of the division at the close of the period was 3,955.

7th NVA Division: At the beginning of the quarter, the headquarters and 165th Regiment were located in the vicinity of Bu Dop, the 141st and 209th Regiments were north of Loc Ninh with the 22d, 24th and 95th Battalions also in the vicinity of Bu Dop. Activity remained light during the first two weeks of February. During the third week, each of the division's three regiments were identified in contacts. At this time documents indicated that a division support company, with a "B-20" (200mm) rocket capability, was working with the 165th Regiment. Documents taken following a 2 March contact southwest of Loc Ninh, which resulted in 23 enemy KIA, identified the 3d Battalion, 209th Regiment and other 7th NVA Division elements. The 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment was also identified in the area on 10 March following a contact with resulted in 52 enemy KIA. Actions in the 7th NVA Division's area of operations were highlighted on 15 March by the identification of the divisional headquarters and support elements southeast of Bo Tuc. Activity initiated by the 7th NVA Division remained at a low level throughout the month of April. The divisional headquarters is located north of Loc Ninh as is the 141st Regiment. The 165th and 20th Regiments are in the vicinity of the Fishhook. End of period divisional strength is held to be 4,425.

9th VC Division: The period opened with the 9th VC Division headquarters located in the vicinity of the Fishhook, the 271st VC Regiment southeast of Bo Tuc, the 272d VC Regiment southeast of Tien Nhon and the 95C NVA Regiment east of Prek Klok. The 95C Regiment was identified by documents captured on 3 February southeast of Bo Tuc following a light contact. The 795 Sapper/Reconnaissance Battalion, 9th VC Division was identified in the same area, and it was believed that the 95C Regiment and the 795 Sapper Battalion would be coordinating efforts in future operations. The 95C Regiment was identified by a PV captured on 4
February following an attack on Fire Support Base Tina. On 14 February
northwest of Fire Support Base St. Barbara, the 1st and 3d Battalions,
272d Regiment and the 24th AA Battalion were identified by documents
captured following a contact which resulted in 45 enemy killed. The
271st Regiment remained out of contact during February and was believed
to be resupplying in the Fishhook area, while some elements were taken
with securing the logistical corridor in eastern War Zone "C". On 10
March, northwest of Fire Support Base Tina, the 3d Battalion, 95C Regi-
ment was identified by documents captured following a contact which re-
sulted in 32 enemy killed. The 95C Regiment was identified on 12 March,
northwest of Fire Support Base Tina in a contact which resulted in 29
enemy killed and 1 PW. On 10 March southwest of Fire Support Base Jay,
the 271st Regiment was identified by documents captured following a
light contact. This was the first report of an element of the regiment
moving to western War Zone "C". On 29 March the 271st Regiment was iden-
tified by PWs following an attack of Fire Support Base Jay which resulted
in 74 enemy killed and 3 PWs. These identifications indicate that the
271st Regiment is operating in western War Zone "C" targeted against
allied fire support bases. During the week of 21 March, enemy activity
was heavy in the 9th Division's area of operation, as divisional elements
were heavily committed in ground engagements marking the start of the
communists' "X" Campaign or "General Uprising". The 271st and 272d Regi-
ments were both identified in engagements during the week in western
War Zone "C", indicating a shift in the 9th Division's area of operation.
On 3 April, 6 of 9 PWs captured north of the Angel's Wing identified the
2d and 3d Battalions, 271st Regiment. Activity was low during the
first week of April as elements of the division were apparently
still in the process of relocating. The second week of April saw an in-
crease in the level of activity. A 14 April assault against the An Thanh
Border Station, which resulted in 96 enemy killed, identified the 2d
Battalion, 271st Regiment. Two captured documents mentioned "highlighting"
1 May (International Labor Day), 7 May (Dien Bien Phu Victory Day), and
1 May (Ho Chi Minh's Birthday). The activity level dropped off consid-
erably throughout the remainder of the period while 9th Division elements
received supplies and replacements to offset losses suffered in the past
few weeks. The divisional headquarters is located in the vicinity of the
Fishhook, the 271st VC Division in the vicinity of the Angel's Wing, the
272d VC Regiment northwest of Thien Nhon and the 95C NVA Regiment in
western War Zone "C" with a combined strength of 3,750.

5 Subregion 1: At the beginning of the period, the headquarters was
positioned in the southern Trapezoid. The 101st NVA Regiment in the
vicinity of the Michelin, the 26th VC Regiment in the Boi Loi - Ho Bo
Woods area. The month of February was spent primarily conducting logistical resupply activities while avoiding major contacts. Documents captured south-west of Tong Le Chon on 25 March identified the 101st NVA Regiment and revealed the regiment's mission is to reopen the upper Saigon River Corridor. Documents captured during the period indicated that the regiment is experiencing food shortages as a result of allied operations which are cutting off the unit's lines of communication. Documents further revealed that SP-l elements are facing difficulties due to the presence of Cambodian troops near base areas, as well as allied presence in the subregion. The mission of the subregion units is to wear down allied support elements, inflict heavy casualties, intensify guerrilla warfare movement and motivate the people to increase food production. The closing strength for subregion elements is estimated at 2,260.

6 Military Region 7: Military Region 7 Headquarters was located south-east of Gia Ray, while the majority of the MF Battalions remained in the Hat Dich - Nhon Trach area. Activity increased noticeably on the night of 26 - 27 February. The 274th Regiment was engaged in three 19 and 20 February contacts which resulted in 46 enemy killed and the capture of large quantities of munitions. Documents captured during the week of 21 March indicated that the 67th Engineer Battalion and the 525th Sapper Battalion reorganized to form the 65th Sapper/Engineer Battalion, MR-7. Contacts with HTAVF forces along Highway 15 appeared to have preempted attacks which were to have coincided with country-wide efforts on the night of 31 March. On 14 April, a PV captured northeast of DaNang identified himself as the CO of the 76th Artillery Regiment. A large quantity of documents also captured in the contact indicated that the regiment was targeted against Saigon, Bien Hoa and Long Binh. Throughout the reporting period, the level of activity remained light to moderate as enemy forces concerned themselves with avoiding allied operations and preparing for the next action phase. End of period strength was 3,000.

10 VC/NVA Battle losses:

(a) Overall personnel and matériel losses inflicted by allied forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>FV</th>
<th>NC</th>
<th>VCI</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>RBST (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2725</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>2177</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>115.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3741</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>291.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2564</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>200*</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Projected figure

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(b) Losses in Caches: A major factor which continued to lower enemy morale and blunt large scale enemy offensives was the discovery of caches by allied forces.

MATERIAL CAPTURED IN ENEMY CACHES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122mm rks</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107mm rks</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG rds</td>
<td>4,731</td>
<td>2,278</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>7,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar rds</td>
<td>9,501</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>12,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoiless rifle rds</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>1,662</td>
<td>3,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA ammo</td>
<td>3,776,356</td>
<td>25,510</td>
<td>504,826</td>
<td>4,540,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>8,940</td>
<td>1,317</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>11,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines/booby traps</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual wpns</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew served wpns</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (tons)</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>282.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>430.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(l) Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.

(a) The enemy is capable of:

1. Launchingapper attacks throughout the III CTZ. This capability is extremely limited in SR-3 and SR-5.


3. Conducting attacks by rocket, mortar, and direct fire heavy weapons throughout III CTZ, and increasing the intensity and frequency of his attacks against major population centers.

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Replenishing his munition expenditures at the present or slightly increased level of activity.

Conducting small scale ground attacks against the periphery of the Capital Military District (CMD) and throughout III CTZ.

Intensifying lines of communication (LOC) interdictions and ambushes throughout the III CTZ for limited periods of time.

Continuing the high level of terrorist, sabotage and assassination activities in the CMD and throughout III CTZ.

Avoiding contact for limited periods of time, contingent on the extent of allied efforts and operations.

Conducting propaganda, subversion, sabotage, espionage and political efforts throughout III CTZ.

Positioning main force units in forward areas to support local efforts to subvert the population.

Detecting changes in the disposition of allied forces and of developing limited knowledge of allied intention through a sophisticated intelligence organization.

(b) Vulnerabilities: The nature of the enemy's activities requires that, in populated areas, he live among the people and depend upon them for financial support, concealment and food. This dependence makes the enemy forces vulnerable to any psychological operations which would result in the removal of the support of the population. The extended supply system which the enemy uses in the unpopulated areas is vulnerable to allied interdiction, and the base areas which feed these supply lines are vulnerable to allied tactical operations. Enemy offensive operations are characterized by extensive planning, reconnaissance, route selection and rehearsal. These activities tend to make his offensive operations inflexible and subject to allied preemptive operations such as vigorous reconnaissance and surveillance.

(c) Assessment:

The enemy is expected to prosecute his "X" Campaign during the next two months, after which he may review and alter his strategy as he did in 1969. The current campaign is an extension of the Winter-Spring Campaign, which sought to force a US withdrawal, frustrate the improvement of I/DAR and disrupt the pacification program. The COVSPVN goal remains unchanged.
but emphasis has now been placed on defeating the pacification program and disrupting SVN control through increased military and political proselytizing activity. He will probably continue to plan cyclic periods of "highpoint" activity, but despite his stated ambition to achieve sustained levels of activity, it is doubtful that he can sustain a high to moderate level of actions for more than a few days. The reception of NVA replacements during the dry season infiltration cycle will enable him to conduct more intense coordinated ground attacks in the outlying areas. However, these will probably be of short duration, and the majority of his actions will again consist of attacks by fire, sapper attacks and stand-off attacks. The majority of his attacks will be directed at ARVDP, CIDG and ARVN as the key to disrupting pacification, while his heaviest attacks will probably be directed at US and ARVN units to exact allied casualties. He may attempt to defeat selected ARVN units in order to erode ARVN confidence. However, heavy actions will offset personnel gains from the infiltration cycle, and it is likely that he will return to stressing personnel conservation measures by the end of the quarter.

2 In the execution of the "X" Campaign, the enemy's divisional forces are likely to attempt the reopening of the logistical corridors for supply of the subregions around Saigon. However, friendly operations conducted in enemy base areas along the Cambodia/South Vietnam border may alter these plans. The enemy will probably shift some emphasis against those friendly units which most threaten his base areas and resupply routes, but he will still retain a significant capability to strike allied bases and pacification centers in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces. The actions will normally be indirect fire and sapper ground probes, with the severity and duration being contingent upon the availability of reliable resupply.

In the populated areas, subregional forces will conduct attacks by fire and sapper actions, with particular emphasis on supporting local force actions against pacification elements. Activity in the CMD will consist of terrorist and sapper actions probably coordinated with increased activity phases outside the capital. A ground assault on the city is considered unlikely, although occasional rocket attacks remain probable.


(1) General.

(a) Phase IV of Campaign Than Thang which began on 1 November 16 continued with no change in mission or area. Operations throughout II: Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) to locate and destroy enemy forces, to intercept infiltration routes, and to deny base camp areas continued preventing
the enemy from achieving any significant tactical success. Although the
application of resources to various tasks required some changes, the emphasis
during the period remained in upgrading ARVN/RF/PF through improvement and
modernization, in supporting pacification by keeping enemy local and main
force units at arms length from the population, and in conducting military
operations to locate and engage the enemy. The period was characterized
by the enemy continuing to avoid major contacts with few exceptions.
During February, the level of enemy activity declined from the Corps-wide
level experienced in the latter part of January. A corps-wide high
point occurred on the last day of March and involved indirect fire attacks
against fixed installations and fire support bases. In only one instance
was the indirect fire attack accompanied by a ground attack. Additionally,
slightly over 30 percent of the indirect fire attacks were launched against
Regional and Popular Forces. On 191200H March 1-70, the lst Infantry
Division was released from OPCON II FFORCEV for subsequent redeployment to
CONUS. The tactical area of responsibility (TACR) previously assigned to
the lst Infantry Division was assigned to the 5th ARVN Division without any
overwatch responsibility given to a US unit. The only exception to this
was the Michelin-Trapesoid area which was assigned to the 25th Infantry
Division (US). As previously planned, on 1 April 1970, the Capital Military
Assistance Command (CMAC) was converted into the Capital Military Assistance
Team (CMAT) giving complete responsibility for CMD to GVN forces. The 3d
Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division,
and continued conducting combined operations with ARVN/RF/PF in Long An
Province, pursuing a detailed and systematic war of attrition against local
and main force enemy units in the area of operation. In line with GVN
military forces assuming more of the war effort, a major portion of this
province, east of the Van Co Dong River, was placed under the complete
control of GVN forces with elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry
Division shifting operations to the western portion of the province. One
mechanized battalion from this brigade was moved to Bien Hoa Province and
placed in direct support of Nhon Trach District to apply additional pressure in
grinding down SR-4 elements in close proximity to Saigon. During the re-
porting period the 25th Infantry Division saw a major shifting of forces
in the Corps. With the withdrawal of the lst Infantry Division, the 2d
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division deployed to the Hat Dich area in the extreme
southeastern portion of Bien Hoa Province and the western portion of
Phuoc Tuy Province, to replace the 2d Brigade, lst Infantry Division. The
lst Brigade, with two battalions, moved to Bau Tieng to assume responsi-
bility for the Michelin-Trapesoid area. In Hau Nghia Province, the 3d
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division continued operations against SR-1 elements
and the 268th VC Regiment while two regiments of the 25th ARVN Division
assumed a greater share of responsibility by assuming separate and
independent areas of operation. The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division remained in Tay Ninh Province. In the northern tier, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment OPCON, continued to block the main enemy infiltration routes and keep Main Force Communist units from the more populous central portion of the Corps. Two brigades of the ARVN Airborne Division, previously conducting operations in adjacent areas of operation, assumed separate and independent areas of operations in the central portion of War Zone "C" and in the western portion of Phuoc Long Province astride the Serges Jungle Trail. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment deployed its maneuver elements into northeastern War Zone "C" to interdict enemy infiltration in the Saigon River Corridor with the 9th ARVN Regiment assuming responsibility for the greater portion of Binh Long Province. To assist the 5th ARVN Division in the assumption of this new responsibility, one infantry battalion from the 1st Cavalry Division was placed in direct support of the 5th ARVN Regiment while one armored cavalry squadron from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was placed in direct support of the 5th ARVN Regimen while one armored cavalry squadron from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was placed in direct support of the 5th ARVN Division at Lai Khe. Additionally, elements of the 1st Cavalry moved into the area of the Dog's Head in extreme western War Zone "C" to destroy and disrupt NVA base areas, training sites and logistical installations. In Phuoc Long Province, the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division launched a combined operation with elements of the ARVN Airborne Division in the Bu Cia Map area against elements of MR-10 and the 5th VC Division known to have major bases in that area. The 1-9th Light Infantry Brigade continued to be paired with the 18th ARVN Division in the eastern portion of the Corps. To counter the actions of the 33d NVA Regiment operating out of bases in Binh Tuy Province, two battalions of the 1-9th Light Infantry Brigade were deployed to that province to locate and grind down the enemy's effectiveness. The Australian Task Force continued to operate in Phuoc Tuy Province maintaining increasing pressure on MR-7 Forces. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, operating in central Bien Hoa Province, continued operations against elements of SR-4. During this reporting period elements of an armor battalion from the 25th Infantry Division were placed in direct support of the Royal Thai Army to increase the mobility and combat power within this area of operation. The 3d Mobile Strike Force terminated operations in War Zone "D". On two occasions during the reporting period, the Delta Force was deployed in eastern Phuoc Long Province astride the II/III Corps boundary to interdict enemy activity moving down the Jolley Trail complex from the Bu Cia Map area into War Zone "D". Operation Giant Sling-Shot and Ready Deck, an effort by US and VN Naval elements to interdict enemy movements on Inland waterways, continued denying these routes for infiltration of troops and supplies to the enemy. II FFORCEN combat operations, placing emphasis on small unit operations to search out enemy forces coupled with quick reaction
to intelligence, hurt and hampered the enemy's ability to wage large scale operations. During the last few days of the quarter several changes were made in positioning of maneuver and combat support elements in preparation for future operations. The task organization at the beginning of the period was as follows: 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 1st Brigade: 2-5th Cavalry, 2-7th Cavalry, 2-8th Cavalry; 2d Brigade: 1-12th Cavalry, 2-12th Cavalry; 3d Brigade: 1-5th Cavalry, 1-7th Cavalry, 1-9th Cavalry, 1-13th Cavalry; 5-7th Cavalry; Company H (Ranger), 75th Infantry; 1st Infantry Division (1st Brigade: 1-28th Infantry, 2-28th Infantry, 2-2d Infantry; 2d Brigade: 2-18th Infantry, 2-16th Infantry, 1-16th Infantry (M); 3d Brigade: 1-18th Infantry, 1-26th Infantry, 1-44th Infantry; Company I (Ranger), 75th Infantry; Company B, 34th Armor); 25th Infantry Division (1st Brigade: 3-22d Infantry, 4-23d Infantry (M), 4-5th Infantry, 2-34th Armor (-)); 2d Brigade: 1-5th Infantry (M), 2-12th Infantry, 3-4th Cavalry; 3d Brigade: 1-27th Infantry, 2-14th Infantry, 2-22d Infantry (M), 2-27th Infantry; Company P (Ranger), 75th Infantry); 9th Infantry Division (3d Brigade: 2-47th Infantry (M), 2-60th Infantry, 5-60th Infantry, 6-31st Infantry; B/3-17th Cavalry; Company B (Ranger), 75th Infantry); 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (1-11th Cavalry, 2-11th Cavalry, 3-11th Cavalry); 1-17th Infantry Brigade (2-3d Infantry, 3-17th Infantry, 4-12th Infantry, 5-12th Infantry, 6-17th Infantry, 0/3-17th Cavalry; D/17th Cavalry; Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry); D/3-17th Cavalry; Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry; Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (1st Brigade: 1-1st Infantry, 2-1st Infantry, 2-1st Infantry, 2d Brigade: 1-2d Infantry, 2-2d Infantry, 3-2d Infantry, 1 armored cavalry squadron); 1st Australian Task Force (5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment; 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment/New Zealand 'ANZAC); 8th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment; B Squadron, 1st Armored Regiment; B Squadron, 3d Cavalry Regiment; 3d Special Air Service Squadron).

(b) Results of Operations In III CTZ. Significant results of Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMUF) participation in Campaign Toan Thang Phase IV, during February, March, and April were 4,915 FMUAF killed (366 US, 25 Australians, and 44 Thai); 3,924 wounded (3,374 US, 12 Australians, and 358 Thai); 6,280 enemy killed and 1,606 prisoners. In addition, enemy losses included 2,238 individual weapons, 253 crew served weapons, 71 107mm rocket launchers, thirty-four 107mm rockets, twenty-four 122mm rockets, 2,387 rockets, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds; 445,722 rounds of small arms ammunition; 234,52 tons of rice, 1,020 mines and booby traps; and 3,044 grenades either captured or destroyed. (Results by RVNAF not included in these totals).

(2) Summary of Combat Operations.

(a) 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Infantry Division continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang Phase IV) with operations in two areas
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in III CTZ. The 1st and 3d Brigades continued to conduct intensive operations in the Saigon and Song Be/Dong Nai River corridors to interdict infiltration routes into Saigon and the heavily populated rice-growing areas of southern Binh Duong Province. Emphasis on combined operations with the 5th ARVN Division and Territorial Forces to upgrade combat capabilities, particularly at the small unit level, continued in anticipation of redeployment of the division. The 1st Brigade began the period with four battalions operating in northwest Binh Duong and southwest Binh Long Provinces. On 15 February the 1st Brigade relinquished responsibility for its area of operation to the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and assumed responsibility for security of Lai Khe and the areas to the north and northeast of Lai Khe, which had previously been a portion of the 3d Brigade area of operation. The 3d Brigade began the period with 2 battalions and an armored cavalry squadron conducting operations along the Song Be River Corridor and eastern Binh Duong Province until the 15th of February when responsibility for its area of operations was turned over to the 5th ARVN Division, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and the 1st Brigade. On that date the brigade began standdown in Di An in preparation for redeployment to the United States. The 2d Brigade continued operations in Phuoc Tuy Province beginning the period with 3 battalions conducting operations to interdict enemy infiltration routes and target elements of the 274th NVA Regiment. On 26 February, the 2d Brigade moved to Di An for standdown in preparation for redeployment; On 14 March, the 5th ARVN Division assumed responsibility for route security of Highways 13, 1A, and 7B, and by 19 March the last combat elements of the 2d Brigade began standdown in Di An. At 16120H March the division was released from OPCON II FFORCEN and returned to OPCON of USAV for subsequent redeployment to the United States.

(b) 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The 1st Cavalry Division continued operations to interdict enemy infiltration routes through Tay Ninh, Phuoc Long, Binh Long, and Binh Duong Provinces, and to neutralize enemy forces operating within the area. Together with the division, elements continued to conduct the pacification program and to conduct Dong Tien Operations with RVNAF forces operating within the division's area. The 1st Brigade continued to interdict and neutralize enemy forces and to locate and destroy enemy cache sites in the western and central portions of War Zone C, south of enemy base areas 353 and in base area 355. The brigade supported Rome Plow operations along TL-6 from Prek Klok (XT273786), north to Katum and along Route 246 vic Katum (XT309955). The 1-11th Armored Cavalry Squadron, OPCON to the brigade, conducted tactical Rome Plow operations along Route 246 from approximately 5 kilometers southeast of Katum (XT273786) and land clearing operations along the Mustang Trail in central War Zone "C." Throughout the period the brigade conducted combined operations with the 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade in War Zone "C." The 2d Brigade continued to conduct operations to interdict and neutralize enemy forces operating in
central, northeastern and eastern Phuoc Long Province and to support pacification efforts for the villages and hamlets in the Song Be area. The brigade conducted operations in the Bu Gia Map area targeted against enemy elements along the Dong Nai River and the Jolley Road complex. The 3d Brigade continued operations in eastern Bin Long and western Phuoc Long Provinces and along the Serges Jungle Highway with emphasis on the Quan Loi Rocket Belt and enemy infiltration from enemy base areas 350 and 352, east of the FRC. The brigade provided overwatch of allied forces in the Bo Duc District in northeastern Phuoc Long Province. The elements of the 121st Armored Cavalry Regiment continued operations in the An Loc and Loc Minh areas and southwest of Quan Loi. The regiment conducted Rome Plow operations along Route 24 in eastern War Zone "C", west of Tonie Char (XT67987) with the 84th Land Clearing Company and south along the Mustang Trail with the 50th Land Clearing Company. The regiment teamed up with the 2-7th Cavalry in operations in the Minh Tranh area targeted against elements of the 101st and 165th Regiments. On 15 March the 3d Squadron was placed under the tactical control of the 5t ARVN Division for operations in the Lai Ke area in central Bin Duong Province. On 24 April the squadron returned to the regiment for operations with the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division in the Bu Duong area. On 1 February at 1045 hours the 1-7th Cavalry while on an aerial reconnaissance mission west of Fire Support Base Rut: (XU922240) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in 30 enemy killed and 1 truck destroyed. There were no friendly casualties. On 3 February at 1305 hours the 1-7th Cavalry while on an aerial reconnaissance mission north of Fire Support Base Tim: (XU922222) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in 33 enemy killed with no friendly casualties. On 1 February at 1045 hours the 1-7th Cavalry while on an aerial reconnaissance mission west of Fire Support Base Rut: (XU922240) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in 30 enemy killed and 1 truck destroyed. There were no friendly casualties. On 3 February at 1305 hours the 1-7th Cavalry while on an aerial reconnaissance mission north of Fire Support Base Tim: (XU922222) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in 33 enemy killed with no friendly casualties. On 4 February at 0427 hours the 2-7th Cavalry at Fire Support Base Tina (XT41562) received an enemy rocket and ground attack from an estimated 2 enemy platoons. As a result of the contact there were 44 enemy killed, 28 individual weapons, 19 crew served weapons, 256 high explosive rounds, 180 grenades, 140 pounds of C-4, 2 claymore mines, and 3,513 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly casualties were 4 US killed and 3 US wounded. On 17 February at 1135 hours the 2d Brigade Scouts and D2/27th AMH while on an aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations northwest of Fire Support Base Margaret (XT2322-2) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in 45 enemy killed. On 2 March at 1115 hours the 3-11th Cavalry Squadron while on a ground reconnaissance operation west of Fire Support Base Mara (XU666082) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The results of this contact were 29 enemy killed, 16 individual weapons and 2 crew served weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 1 US wounded. On 3 March at 0615 hours the 2-3th Cavalry while in a night defensive position northwest of Fire Support Base Heath (XT178968) received 50-60 rounds of 60mm mortar, small arms, and B-40 rocket fire and a ground probe from an estimated 50 enemy
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from the southwest. The enemy was engaged with artillery, aerial rocket artillery and with organic weapons. The contact resulted in 32 enemy killed, 12 individual weapons and 20 grenades captured. On 6 March at 0945 hours the 1-11th Cavalry while on a ground reconnaissance operation northeast of Fire Support Base Cindy (XT415945) made contact with enemy forces. The contact ended with 31 enemy killed and 2 US wounded. On 8 March at 1625 hours the 2-8th Cavalry made contact with enemy forces northwest of Fire Support Base Flasher (XT17482). The contact resulted in 3 enemy killed, 3 US killed and 15 US wounded. On 10 March the 1-7th Cavalry discovered a cache while sweeping a contact area northeast of Fire Support Base Cindy (YT444324). The cache contained 97 individual weapons, 93,906 small arms rounds, 2,789 high explosive rounds, 1,000 pounds of rice, 304 anti-tank and rifle grenades, 51 cases of TNT, 35 cases of plastic explosive, and other items of enemy munitions and equipment. On 10 March at 0835 hours the 1-11th Cavalry made contact with an estimated enemy battalion northwest of Fire Support Base Sharon (XT053945). The contact resulted in 15 enemy killed, 1 crew served weapon and 2 individual weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 4 US killed and 13 US wounded. On 10 March at 1010 hours the 1-11th Cavalry in a ground reconnaissance operation west of Fire Support Base Cindy made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in 53 enemy killed, 10 crew served weapons, and 1 individual weapon captured. Friendly casualties from the contact were 4 US killed and 17 US wounded. On 10 March the 1-7th Cavalry while on an aerial reconnaissance mission northeast of Fire Support Base Dragon (XU62-213) made contact with an estimated 50-100 enemy. The enemy force was engaged with organic weapons resulting in 5 enemy killed. On 12 March at 0620 hours the 1-11th Cavalry teamed up with the 2-7th Cavalry in a night defensive action north of Fire Support Base Sharon (XT415945). The enemy attacked with 14 rounds of B-40 fire and a ground probe. The action resulted in 27 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 13 crew served weapons and 6 individual weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 4 US killed and 17 US wounded. In a sharp contact on 13 March at 1110 hours the 2-7th Cavalry on a ground reconnaissance operation north and northeast of Fire Support Base Dragon (XT04533) killed 39 enemy. Friendly casualties were 10 US wounded. On the next day, 19 March, at 1215 hours the 1-7th Cavalry in an operation west and southeast of Fire Support Base Lingworth (XT77-177) made contact with enemy forces. The contact resulted in 3 enemy killed, 5 individual weapons captured and 7 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon destroyed. On 29 March at 0415 hours the 2-7th Cavalry at Fire Support Base Jay (XT037949) received an intense attack by fire from the west and southwest coupled with a ground probe by an estimated company size force from the south and southwest. Enemy fire consisted of 122mm rockets, 107mm rockets, B-40 rockets, 20mm cannon, 20mm cannon, 75mm recoilless rifle, small arms, and B-40 rockets. In addition, supporting aircraft received .51 caliber fire from at least 3 positions. No
the south. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, aerial rocket artillery, armed C-119 aircraft with a flareship in support. Heavy enemy fire ceased at 0550 hours although sporadic sniper fire continued until 0630 hours. A sweep of the area discovered 74 enemy killed, 3 prisoners and 12 individual weapons. Friendly losses were 13 US killed, 30 US wounded and four howitzers moderately damaged. On 31 March at 1230 hours the 1-11th Cavalry while on a ground reconnaissance northwest of Fire Support Base Camp Hazard (XT027867) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in 30 enemy killed, 16 prisoners, 6 individual weapons, 3 crew served weapons and miscellaneous enemy ammunition captured. On 1 April at 0218 hours the 2-8th Cavalry at Fire Support Base Illingworth (XT039722) received 15-20 rounds of 107mm rockets, 100 rounds of 82mm mortar, 100 rounds of 120mm mortar and an unknown number of 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. Following the rocket and mortar attack the fire support base received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire followed by a ground attack by an estimated 2 reinforced companies from the woodline to the south of the fire support base. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, light fire teams, aerial rocket artillery, Nighthawk, armed C-119 aircraft and tactical air strikes. The enemy was repulsed and all enemy fires ceased at 0630 hours. A sweep of the area around the fire support base disclosed 54 enemy killed, 28 individual weapons, 1 107mm rocket launcher. Friendly losses were 24 US killed, 54 US wounded and 1 howitzer destroyed. On 5 April at 1050 hours the 1-12th Cavalry discovered an ammunition cache while conducting a ground reconnaissance operation north and northwest of Fire Support Base Scuffy (YT03412). The cache contained 315,360 rounds of small arms ammunition, 46 mortar rounds, 1,090 pounds of TNT and 13 pair of wire cutters. On 13 April at 1210 hours the 2-11th Cavalry while on a ground reconnaissance operation northwest of Fire Support Base Fort Defiance (XT478872) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Contact was lost at 1600 hours as the enemy retreated in an unknown direction. The results of the contact were 31 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 1 generator, 2 crew served weapons and 1 individual weapon captured. Friendly casualties were 2 US wounded. On 15 April at 0231 hours the 1-11th Cavalry at Fire Support Base Kramer (XT020728) received 2 B-40 rockets, 2 107mm rockets, 5 rounds of 82mm mortar and 2 rounds of 60mm mortar from an unknown size enemy force. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, armed C-119 aircraft and Nighthawk. All enemy fires ceased at 0315 hours. A sweep of the area around the fire support base disclosed 20 enemy killed, 5 crew served weapons, 11 individual weapons and miscellaneous ammunition and equipment. There were 3 US wounded as a result of the attack. On 16 April at 2143 hours the 2-7th Cavalry at Fire Support Base Atkinson (XT010788) received 100 mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds, 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 107mm rockets, B-20, B-40 and small arms fire. The rocket and mortar attack was followed by ground probes by platoon size enemy forces. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, aerial rocket artillery,
tactical air strikes, Nightawk and flareships and shadow aircraft. The results of the contact were 55 enemy killed, 3 crew served weapons, 17 individual weapons and an undetermined amount of ammunition captured or destroyed. There were 6 US killed and 20 US wounded as a result of the attack.

(c) 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Infantry Division continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang by promoting all unit combined operations with emphasis on upgrading ARVN and Territorial Forces. The 1st Brigade began the period with 4 battalions in the Tay Ninh City area with the missions of combined operations in the vicinity of Tay Ninh City and the Nui Ba Den Mountain and security of Highways 22 and 26. On 26 February, with the redeployment of the 2d Brigade to Phuoc Tuy Province, operations were expanded to include more of Tay Ninh Province and a portion of Binh Duong Province including Dau Tieng and the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Road security missions were expanded to include Highways 4, 13, 22 and 26. The 2d Brigade began the period with 2 battalions and 1 cavalry squadron conducting combat patrols, ground reconnaissance, mounted reconnaissance, and combat assaults in northern Hau Nghia and southern Tay Ninh Provinces. On 15 February, the brigade assumed portions of the area of operation of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division including Dau Tieng and the Michelin Rubber Plantation. During the last week of February the brigade moved to Phuoc Tuy Province where it began combined and coordinated operations with other FFMF forces and ARVN/RF/PF forces to attrite the 274th NVA Regiment. The brigade became OPCON to II FFORCEN on 2 March. The 3d Brigade began the period with 4 battalions in southern Hau Nghia Province supporting the pacification program, conducting offensive operations, and securing Highways 6A, 7A, 8A, 10, and 1. With the redeployment of the 2d Brigade to Phuoc Tuy Province under the operational control of II FFORCEN Headquarters, the 3d Brigade expanded operations to include all of Hau Nghia Province. Road security responsibilities were expanded to include Route 253. At 5 minutes after midnight on the 6th of February, 10 kilometers northeast of Trang Bang (XT558262), Company A, 1-5th Infantry (Mechanized) engaged 10 to 20 enemy resulting in 10 enemy killed, 1 PW and 2 individual weapons captured. There were 2 US killed and 2 US wounded in the action. At 0620 hours on 8 February, elements of the 4-9th Infantry and 2-34th Armor engaged an estimated 200 enemy approximately 16 kilometers northwest of Nui Ba Den Mountain in southern War Zone "C" (XT-156686). Army air, US Air Force Tactical Air, and artillery were called in to support resulting in 14 enemy killed, 2 prisoners, 6 individual weapons, 1 crew served weapon, and 8 high explosive rounds captured. There were no friendly casualties. In a contact on 12 March, 8 kilometers southwest of Nieu Thien in Tay Ninh Province (XT326186), 2-27th Infantry killed 12 enemy with no friendly casualties. On 15 March, 1 kilometer northeast of the base
of Nui Ba Den Mountain (XT282612), 4-23d Infantry (Mechanized) received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The contact was supported by organic weapons, Army air, Air Force Tactical Air, and artillery. Results were 31 enemy killed and 10 US wounded. On the next day, approximately 2,000 meters away, on the face of Nui Ba Den (XT280600), the 3-22d Infantry with the 4-23d Infantry (Mechanized) teamed up in a contact with an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in 10 enemy killed. There were 5 US wounded and heavy damage to one helicopter. Also on 16 March in the same vicinity (XT281615), the 4-23d Infantry (Mechanized) engaged an unknown size force resulting in 2 US killed and 6 US wounded. During a sweep of the contact area the next day 15 enemy bodies were found. On 1 April, 13 kilometers south-southeast of Dao Tieng in the Boi Loi Woods, 3-4th Cavalry captured 17 enemy soldiers. At 0845 hours on 2 April, 11 kilometers northwest of Hieu Thien (XT291316), Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry and 2-27th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned with organic weapons and Army and Air Force air support, resulting in 22 enemy killed, 9 US were killed and 22 wounded. Following this initial contact, 2 more days of contacts by 2-27th Infantry and 3-4th Cavalry netted an additional 42 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 1 Ho Chi Minh, and 3 small arms, 1 crew served weapon, 4 claymore mines, 17 grenades, 360 high explosive rounds, 2,560 small arms rounds, one field telephone switchboard, and one ton of rice. There were 2 US wounded during these contacts. On 14 April, 12 kilometers south of Blackhorse in Phuoc Tuy Province (YT433858) an aircraft working for the 2d Brigade found 5 enemy killed by an airstrike and engaged 5 more enemy killing them. On 14 April, 8 kilometers west-northwest of Cu Chi, the 116th AHC with the Scouts and Company A, 2-22d Infantry (Mechanized) engaged an unknown enemy force resulting in 13 enemy killed and 4 individual weapons captured. There were no US casualties.

The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, The brigade continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang, OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. The brigade began the reporting period with four battalions and operated in Long An Province, with responsibility for the security of Highways 4, 18, and 23. It conducted multiple airborne, reconnaissance, checkerboard, bushmaster, and riverine operations. The brigade conducted operations against enemy local force units and elements of SR-1, SR-2, and the 1st NVA Regiment. The pacification program was also emphasized. In a contact on 25 February, approximately 4 kilometers north-northeast of Tan Tru (YS6466), the 2-60th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons, air and artillery, resulting in 13 enemy killed. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons resulting in 2 US killed and 4 ARVN wounded. At 1:40 hours on 1 March, 5 kilometers east-northeast of Tan Tru (XT711638), the 2-60th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 13 enemy killed. There were no
friendly casualties. At 1:50 hours on 4 March, 25 kilometers south of Tan Tru (XS654520), 2-47th Infantry (Mechanized) engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 12 enemy killed with no US casualties. At 1040 hours on 14 March, 5-60th Infantry with elements of 3-17th Cavalry and the 118th AHCB engaged an unknown size force approximately 6 kilometers northeast of Tan Tru (XS6666). Results were 14 enemy killed and one AK-47 rifle captured. There were no US casualties. On 22 March at 0125 hours the 5-60th Infantry with the 1 Ot: AHC in support engaged an unknown size enemy force approximately 10 kilometers north-northeast of Thu Thua (XS506800). Results were 13 enemy killed, 6 individual weapons, 2 crew served weapons, 47 high explosive rounds, 7,750 small arms rounds, assorted mines and grenades, and 75 pounds of explosive captured. There were no friendly casualties. Then on 1 April, A Troop, 3-17th Cavalry Squadron with its Aerial Rifle Platoon, and elements of 2-60th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force 8 kilometers north of Thu Thua (XS565757). Thirteen enemy were killed, 1 US was killed and 3 US were wounded.

(e) 103rd Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). The brigade continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV), conducting combined and coordinated operations with FMNIF, ARVN, and Territorial Forces. The 2-3d Infantry, in coordination with the 48th ARVN Regiment and the RTAVF, conducted combined and coordinated platoon size ground reconnaissance and platoon and squad size ambushes as concurrent combat and upgrading training for Territorial Forces in southwest Long Khanh Province, emphasizing the use of intelligence to locate enemy local force elements and the 274th NVA Regiment. The 2-3d Infantry participated in Operation Friendship III until its termination on 1 February. On 26 February, the battalion began participating in Operation Tu Ho with the same mission. The 3-7th Infantry in coordination with the 52d ARVN Regiment, conducted combined and coordinated platoon size reconnaissance and platoon and squad size ambushes and concurrent combat and training for Territorial Forces in central Binh Tuy Province. Emphasis was placed on the use of intelligence to target locations of local force enemy elements of the 33d NVA Regiment. The 4-12th Infantry moved during the last week in April from western Long Khanh Province where it conducted operations with the 43d ARVN Regiment to west and central Binh Tuy Province where in coordination with the 52d ARVN Regiment and Territorial Forces it conducted platoon size ground reconnaissance and platoon and squad size ambushes using intelligence to target local force enemy elements and the 33d NVA Regiment. The 5-12th Infantry, in coordination with the 43d ARVN Regiment, conducted similar combined and coordinated operations with Territorial Forces as concurrent combat and training in western Long Khanh Province. Operations were intended against enemy local forces and the 2d Battalion, 274th NVA Regiment. The 5-12th Infantry began participation in Operation Tu Ho on 26 February and
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continued to participate at the close of the period. During the period, fighting was characterized by many sporadic contacts involving small numbers of the enemy with a few exceptions. On 18 April, at 0300 hours, Fire Support Base Don (YT8136) was attacked by an estimated 2 enemy companies and sapper elements employing small arms, light and heavy machinegun, rocket propelled grenade, mortar and recoilless rifle fire. During sweeps conducted during the next two days, 28 enemy killed during the contact were found. In addition, 2 prisoners, 2 crew served weapons, 4 individual weapons, and 48 high explosive rounds were captured. US casualties from the attack were 1 US killed and 1 wounded. Two trucks were also damaged. On 24 April, approximately 15 kilometers south-southeast of Tanh Linh (ZT01129) the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3-7th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force. The contact resulted in the capture of 9 prisoners and the apprehension of detainees. On 30 April, 13 kilometers east of Bearcat (YS279958) the 2-3d Infantry engaged enemy forces in two related contacts supported by air and artillery. The contacts resulted in 16 enemy killed, 1 individual weapon captured and 1 US wounded.

(f) 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was deployed to Phuoc Tuy Province for operations in the Hat Dinh area in the extreme southeastern portion of Bier Hoa and the western portion of Phuoc Tuy Provinces. The brigade was placed under CFCON of III FFGCEV on 2 March. During the period the brigade conducted squad size night combat patrols and day reconnaissance operations to interdict enemy movement into and out of the Rung Sat and population centers along Highway QL-15. Combined operations, conducted with Regional and Popular Forces in Long Thanh, Long Le and Duc Than Districts emphasized pacification and upgrading of contested hamlets. The period was generally characterized by small and scattered contacts.

(g) 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF) continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang Phase IV) in its assigned area of operations in Phuoc Tuy Province. On 26 February the 5th Battalion returned to Australia and was replaced by the 7th Battalion. The 7th Battalion completed in-country training and was deployed in an area of operations northwest of Nui Dat (TS940770) during the second week of March. The three battalions, along with the armor and cavalry squadrons conducted reconnaissance and ambush operations throughout the province with emphasis placed on key areas of enemy activity such as the Long Hai Mountains, along Route LTL, and in the northeastern portion of Phuoc Tuy Province southeast of Courtenay. The 1st ATF continued to conduct combined operations with elements of the 18th ARVN Division and with Regional and Popular Forces. The period was generally characterized by small and scattered contacts by the battalions operating in various independent areas of operation. A notable exception was during the period 10 February to 3 March when the 5th Battalion and 3 Regional Force companies teamed up for an operation in the northern Long Hai Mountains.
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mission was to protect quarry operations vicinity YS45535 and to search for and destroy enemy elements. On 18 February a contact resulted in the capture of a prisoner from the D445 Battalion. Information gained from the prisoner revealed that a major enemy troop concentration of the D445 Battalion was located in the Minh Dan Secret Zone in the northern area of the Long Hai Mountains. The information was confirmed when elements of the 8th Battalion made contact with an estimated 30-40 enemy vicinity YS475524 on 18 February. The operation continued, supported by B-52 strikes, tactical air and artillery, through 3 March. Enemy losses during the operation were 40 confirmed kills and an estimate of over 100 enemy killed has been reported by reliable sources. Friendly losses from contact with the enemy and by mines and booby traps were 11 killed and 4 wounded.

(h) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (HTAVF). The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force conducted combat operations and combined operations throughout its area of responsibility to interdict enemy infiltration routes through Long Thanh and portions of Duc Tu and Xuan Loc Districts. The replacement of major elements to the 2d Brigade was completed on 1 February. Following in-country training the newly arrived brigade elements were deployed in Long Thanh District, north and west of Highway 0-15. The Thais began the period with continued participation in Operation Friendship I along with the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division; 2-3d Infantry Battalion, 19th Infantry Brigade; and 1st Battalion, 48th ARVN Regiment until its termination on 17 February. On 26 February the force began participation in Operation Tua with essentially the same mission. The period was characterized by the conduct of reconnaissance and ambush and cordon and search operations resulting in scattered contacts and discovery of small caches. On 16 February elements of the 1st Brigade while on a reconnaissance operation vicinity Bien Son Rubber Plantation (YS253158) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons. The contact ended with 8 enemy killed. Friendly losses were 2 Thai killed and 13 Thai wounded. On 6 March vicinity Ap Tam Phuoc (YS216852) elements of 2-2d Infantry were reinforced with an armor cavalry platoon. The contact ended with 12 enemy killed and no friendly casualties. On 15 March elements of the 1st Brigade made contact with an unknown size enemy force on the southeastern edge of the Bien Son Rubber Plantation (YS265777). The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons. The contact was supported by both artillery and organic weapons resulting in 4 enemy killed, 4 AK-47, 15 AK-47 magazines and 4,500 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. There were no friendly casualties. Then, on 16 March in the same general vicinity (YD55-156) elements of the brigade located a cache containing 2 M-1 rifles, 1 BAR, 8 SKS rifles, 1 M-1 carbine and 1,500 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. On 20 April, 6 kilometers southeast of Long Thanh (Y515850) elements of 1-
Infantry, while on a night ambush patrol made contact with an estimated 20 enemy. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons and supported by a LPT and artillery. The contact resulted in 6 enemy killed, 2 AK-47s and 1 carbine captured. One Thai was wounded in the action.

(3) Air Operations.

(a) Resources: The following non-divisional resources of the 12th Aviation Combat Group were under the control of II FFORCEN during the reporting period.

1 Helicopters.

10 assault helicopter companies
  1 aerial weapons company
  3 assault support helicopter companies (medium)
  1 assault support helicopter company and 1 platoon (heavy)
  1 aviation company (corps)
  1 air cavalry squadron (−). The air cavalry troop placed in support of IV Corps Tactical Zone on 5 January returned to the control of its parent unit on 10 April 1970.

1 air cav troop (separate). C Troop, 16th Cavalry (Air) was activated 20 March 1970, organized and trained from 20 March through 9 April, and was then assigned to the Delta Military Assistance Command effective 10 April 1970.

2 Airplanes.

1 utility airplane company
1 surveillance airplane company
2 reconnaissance airplane companies

(b) Eight of the ten assault helicopter companies continued to provide 2,700 hours of support time per month. Companies are allocated daily as follows:

2 companies of 12 slicks, 4 gunships each. Special classified missions and general support missions.

1 company of 12 slicks, 4 gunships. General support.

5 companies of 1 C&C, 8 slicks, 4 gunships. Combat assaults plus 2 slicks for general support.
(c) Two of the ten assault helicopter companies and one air cavalry troop continued the 90-day evaluation, terminating the test on 5 March 70. Test results based on a 100 percent fill of personnel and equipment, priority of maintenance repair parts, priority of replacement aircraft and intensively managed maintenance program closely supervised by unit commanders indicated the following monthly flying hours could be sustained with anticipated percent of availability as listed.

### Assault Helicopter Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Hours</th>
<th>OR Rate</th>
<th>Monthly Hours</th>
<th>OR Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2400 (DA Base)</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>66%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2800</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>61%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2900</td>
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<td>3500</td>
<td>57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3100</td>
<td>73%</td>
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### Air Cavalry Troop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Hours</th>
<th>OR Rate</th>
<th>Monthly Hours</th>
<th>OR Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DA Base Not Established)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>72%</td>
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<td>79%</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>67%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2200</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Limitations.

Requests for UH-1 helicopters for air mobile operations and general support continues to exceed assets available. The continuing positive management of these assets provides maximum utilization consistent with operational resources.
Support requests for CH-47 helicopters steadily increased throughout the reporting period, and exceeded available support capabilities. A daily blade hour allocation was established for supported units considering current tactical operations. Allocations are reviewed and adjusted when special operational requirements exceed normal programmed support. Timely coordination by supported units in planning moves and forecasting their requirements to G3 Air well in advance, permits maximum utilization of available resources. Incorporation of a small general support reinforcing blade hour reserve in the daily allocation permits additional flexibility in day to day scheduling.

(4) Force Structure.

(a) Gains.

1. 7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment on 27 February 1970.


3. 23d Artillery Group was changed from OPCON to assigned on 5 February 1970.

(b) Losses.

1. 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment on 27 February 1970.

2. 1st Infantry Division on 19 March 1970 (released from OPCON II FFORCEV and reverted OPCON to USARV 19 March 1970, redeployed 7 April 1970).


4. 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery on 1 April 1970.

5. Battery F, 16th Artillery inactivated in-country on 1 April 1970.

6. Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry inactivated in-country on 1 April 1970.
76th Field Artillery Radar Detachment inactivated in-country on 1 March 1970.

26th Field Artillery Radar Detachment inactivated in-country on 1 March 1970.

(c) Reorganization. The following units were reorganized and reduced in size in order to meet Phase III redeployment requirements:

3. 9th Transportation Car Company.
5. 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BNTAC), authorized under augmented MDTA II Field Force Vietnam, was reduced to zero military strength effective 25 March 1970.

Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) reorganized as Capital Military Assistance Team (CMAT), assigned to MACV, OPCON to II Field Force on 1 April 1970.

(5) Training.

(a) The emphasis on II Field Force Vietnam training assistance to RVNAF has shifted from refresher training for battalion sized units to on-the-job training for small units and individuals.

1. II Field Force Artillery is conducting a program to upgrade ARVN artillery. The program involves pairing of US and ARVN units and conducting combined training with heavy emphasis on practical exercises and on-the-job training. This program is being implemented by artillery units assigned to the Field Force as well as in the divisions and separate brigades.

2. The 1st Australian Task Force has increased its military assistance teams in Phuoc Tuy Province in order to provide additional leadership training to Regional and Popular Force units.
Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted a nine day course of instruction in long range patrol and ranger tactics for 10 students of the 18th ARVN Division. The instruction was followed by combined long range patrols.

The 1st Cavalry Division has implemented a program of on-the-job training for graduates of the 5th ARVN Division Leadership Refresher Course as well as numerous other on-the-job training programs.

On-the-job training has been conducted by II FFORCEV OPCON units in many areas. This training has included:

- Squad and platoon tactical operations,
- Mechanical ambush techniques,
- Mortar crew proficiency training,
- Automotive mechanics,
- Driver training,
- Preventive medicine and nurses training.

DEPCOM is assisting the 5th and 18th Infantry Division Training Centers with three man military assistance teams (MAT) to work with the advanced training courses for Regional Force company commanders and platoon leaders.

Reports indicate that the training assistance being provided has been beneficial to the students and that the RVNAF units have responded favorably to the programs.

II FFORCEV continues to allocate quotas to the MACV Recondo School. During the reporting period 74 allocations were received, 59 students entered training and 36 students successfully completed the course. Failure to use all allocations was the result of the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division and Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry during the period. The number of graduates is improving as commanders place greater emphasis on screening prospective students to insure they meet all prerequisites for attending the course. The RTAVF enrolled 10 students during the period with all 10 graduating.
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(1) Programs and Projects:

(a) Command control of sandbags and small sized lumber continued in effect. During last month's preparation for the rainy season, the monthly allocation was most insufficient for the heavy artillery battalion.

(b) CONINX inventory for II FFORCEV assigned and attached units. II FFORCEV Artillery units is now 16 each Type I, 61 each Type II and 4 each Type II (CH). The total is 39, down 21 from the last quarter.

(c) The Report of Survey backlog has been eliminated. Units have been reminded that surveying officers must perform an extensive and complete investigation to bring to light all pertinent facts and help make the system work properly.

(d) Logistics Readiness Program.

1 The third quarter FY 70 Logistics Readiness meeting for II FFORCEV assigned and attached units was held on 4 April. Topics discussed included: Revised Reportable Items list; TM 38-750; Maintenance 1; USAV; Change 4 to USAV Regulation 750-1; USAV and 1st Logistics Command Special Criteria for Retrograde Army Material (SCRAM) procedures; recovery of 4301 aircraft carry pallets; submission of high priority requisitions; standardized supply item report of survey transportation requests; CMMI and roadside inspection results; Quarterly Material Readiness Reports and Weekly Command Deadline Repor.

2 During the quarter, the USARV CMMI Team inspected 9 units, rating 8 units unsatisfactory. The two categories receiving low scores were tactical and support vehicles and maintenance management operations. Increased emphasis and interest is essential in reducing or eliminating unsatisfactory results in future inspections. Roadside spot check inspections during the past quarter indicate that pre-dispatch inspections should be investigated to preclude unsatisfactory scores.

3 The average II FFORCEV operational readiness rates showed a slight across the board decrease for all major helicopter categories to include the AH-1C, UH-1D/H and OH-58. Factors contributing to this trend include:

4 The extended retrograde times for these aircraft.
The increasing shortage of qualified maintenance personnel (the tour
curtailments associated with the Phase III redeployment had a major impact
on the personnel situation).

Continued high flying hour commitments well above USAHV averages.

The issue of OH-58 aircraft to TFORCE units has continued
according to the USAHV schedule. The 23d Artillery Group and the 199th Light
Infantry Brigade have been issued OH-58s to completely fill their light
observation helicopter (LOH) authorizations. The 12th Combat Aviation Group
is still replacing OH-6s with OH-58s. From the maintenance standpoint, the
OH-58 is not presenting any unusual problems with the exception of a require-
ment for frequent and thorough engine cleanings. In several instances it has
been found that engine cleaning is required as often as every 25 hours.

(2) Ammunition.

(a) Ammunition items in short supply continued to be managed through the
use of available supply rate (ASR) allocations to insure equitable
distribution of available ammunition to all TFORCE units. Expenditures
of certain high cost, high tonnage items also continued to be controlled through
the available supply rate system.

(b) During the quarter, the number of conventional munitions under
available supply rate control were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Transportation.

(a) United States Air Force C-123/C-130 sorties flown from the Common
Service Airlift System in support of TFORCE are summarized in Enclosure 7.

(b) The NAOC allocation of C-7A aircraft dedicated to TFORCE was
reduced to 12 aircraft during the reporting period. During the reporting
period the total number of emergency airlift requests was significantly lower
than the previous quarter. This was due primarily to increased emphasis on
management of units airlift requirements.
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(4) Base Transfers,

(a) During the quarter emphasis continued on the transfer of excess U.S. facilities to RVNAF in support of the Improvement and Modernization Program. Transfers of Dau Tieng and Lai Khe, both made partially excess due to the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, were in the process of being transferred.

1 Dau Tieng (Camp Rainier) was reduced to one-third its former size and the area declared excess transferred to RVNAF in support of the Improvement and Modernization Program. Transfers of Dau Tieng and Lai Khe, both made partially excess due to the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, were in the process of being transferred.

1 Dau Tieng (Camp Rainier) was reduced to one-third its former size and the area declared excess transferred to RVNAF in two increments during the period 21 January to 23 March 1970. The area transferred contained a total of 370 facilities at a cost of, when new, $365,623. All of the facilities transferred were dismantled by RVNAF personnel and the salvaged material introduced into the RVNAF logistics system.

2 Approximately 60 percent of the Lai Khe Base Camp was officially transferred to the 5th ARVN Division on 25 March. This was a total of 654 facilities at a cost of, when new, $1,481,184. The remaining 40 percent houses elements of a squadron of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 594th Engineer Battalion, two aviation companies of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 173rd Aviation Company. Plans are under way to dismantle a number of buildings in the base for re-erection at other bases for use by US troops.

(b) Several minor bases declared excess due to repositioning of US forces have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred.

1 Rach Kien (XS7426), formerly manned by elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, was transferred to elements of the 50TH ARVN Regiment, 25th ARVN Division on 24 April 1970.

2 Crocker Compound, formerly occupied by Advisory Team #91, was transferred to RVNAF on 25 April 1970. Crocker Compound will become an RVNAF Induction Center.

3 Minor base transfers in progress include Can Giouc (XT825716), and a portion of Fire Support Base Concord.

(c) An additional portion of the Lai Khe Base Camp containing approximately 289 buildings is currently scheduled for transfer to RVNAF on 30 May 1970 in an effort to reduce security requirements for US forces remaining in Lai Khe.
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(5) Engineer Support.

(a) General. Engineer support during this quarter included a wide variety of combat and operational support missions. Continuous support, both from divisional and non-divisional units was provided throughout the III CTZ. Continued fair weather allowed heavy emphasis to be placed on road building. Engineer support from both divisional and non-divisional units also included land clearing, airfield maintenance, fire support base construction, and support of tactical operations.

(b) LOC Program. The 20th Engineer Brigade, ARVN engineers and RMN/BRU, a civilian contractor, were engaged in restoring principal roads in III Corps Tactical Zone. The 20th Engineer Brigade had units working on QL 20 from Gia Kiem to the II/III Corps Boundary which is now 60 percent complete, QL 1 from the junction of QL 20 to Gia Ray, with is now 55 percent complete, QL 13 from Le Gi Khe to An Loc which is 65 percent complete, and TL 2A/LT 1A from the junction of QL 13 to Phuoc Vinh. This latter section is now 62 percent complete. All of these roads are programmed to be completed by 31 July 1970. RMN/BRU completed paving on QL 1 from Cu Chi to Saigon and is 42 percent complete on QL 15 from Bearcat to Vung Tau.

(c) Tactical Road Program. Work continued throughout the quarter on the II FF/ARVN Tactical Road Program, a project designed to open secondary roads in the six most heavily populated provinces in III Corps. A total of 559 kilometers of secondary road are scheduled for opening in Long An, Hau Giang, Tay Ninh, Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa Provinces. At the close of the quarter 416 kilometers of road were completed. This represents 74 percent of the program. This program has proven to be successful in assisting the local populace to return to land previously inaccessible and by allowing the province to establish control over the population in outlying areas.

(d) Land Clearing Program.

1. Clearing operations continued at a high rate during this period with the 62d Engineer Battalion being heavily committed. A total of approximately 35,000 acres were cleared in this quarter, with significant operations conducted, in the Vung Tau, Gia Dinh, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Nha Be, and Duc Phuong areas.

2. On-the-job training of personnel assigned to the 316th ARVN Land Clearing Company was conducted throughout the quarter with outstanding success. The newly formed unit is now expected to deploy with US advisors.
Another major change took place on 8 April 1970, when the 501st Engineer Company (Land Clearing), organic to the 62d Engineer Battalion, was deactivated. To assure continuity of operations, a provisional combined land clearing company (US and ARVN) was formed as part of Company A, 62d Engineer Battalion. This unit will continue to operate until formal turnover of equipment and deployment of the 318th ARVN Land Clearing Company.

(e) Minefield Clearing. During the quarter there was an increase in requirements for minefield clearing of US installed anti-personnel minefields for which no accurate records exist. To avoid the extreme hazards of sending soldiers into a completely unknown field various methods of clearing have been attempted to include attempting to snag trip wires with grappling hooks; burning the vegetation to both explode mines and simplify detection of unexploded mines; exploding mines using bangalore torpedos, and dosing mines out of the ground using combat engineer vehicles and bulldozers with armored cab and belly pans. None of these methods has proven entirely satisfactory, and at best they are very slow. Presently there are several units using the mine roller with tanks. Insufficient data is available at this time to make an assessment; however, it is estimated that more and more requirements for mine removal will be generated as forces withdraw from country.

(f) The 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) continued its support of HQ, II Field Force and OPCON units by producing military geographic data and disseminating it to the field. The most important documents produced were an updated minefield listing showing location of known minefields and a special terrain study. Other major projects completed during the quarter were series of overprinted maps showing updated land clearing operations, base camp maps, helicopter landing zones and trail overprints and geology maps. Members of the 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) continued aerial and ground reconnaissance of natural construction materials, roads, bridges and airfields in the III CTZ and contiguous areas. This is a recurring program to enable immediate and accurate response to queries from OPCON units concerning these features within the II Field Force area of interest.

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations. During the reporting period, II Field Force psychological operations (PSYOP) were conducted in support of tactical
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operations, pacification, redeployment of US military forces, and special campaigns. The period was highlighted by:

(a) Continued implementation of the Chieu Hoi Revitalization Campaign through distribution of a II FFORCES letter of instructions on 13 February 1970. This letter established guidelines and objectives to include an analysis of the enemy’s 1969-1970 Spring/Summer/Fall Campaigns, a discussion of the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) Resolution 9, and samples of media prepared to support the program. Additional leaflets were developed and prestocked at unit level for rapid dissemination during enemy high points.

(b) Establishment of a program to promote increased coordination among the PSYOP agencies of III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). A combined Political Warfare (POLWAR)/PSYOP Team was organised to assist in the implementation of the program throughout III CTZ. The team visited with representatives of all PSYOP agencies operating within the provinces to include the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), Sector S-5, ARVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FMMAF). The purpose of these visits has been to determine PSYOP problem areas, seek methods for improvement, and to insure closer coordination of PSYOP activities. The team was organised to include:

1. Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, II FFORCES
2. Deputy Chief of Staff, POLWAR, III Corps
3. POLWAR advisor, III Corps
4. Deputy Director, PSYOP, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), III Corps Tactical Zone.

Plans are being developed to expand the program to include assistance to selected districts in III Corps Tactical Zone.

(c) Continued emphasis on PSYOP support of the redeployment of US military forces. All units have been encouraged to develop and stock materials for use upon notification of redeployment from Vietnam. The objective of the media is to counter enemy propaganda, and convince the people of the capabilities of NVMAF to protect them.

(d) Continuation of Operation Family Tree. This campaign, based on reporting subordinate enemy unit failures and losses to specific enemy headquarters on the premise that failures are not being reported by the subordinate units, continues to be an effective means of creating friction and distrust within the VC/NVA command structure. Over 70 special leaflets
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

were developed during the reporting period and distributed by OPCON units of II FFORCEV.

(e) Inauguration of a new PSYOP reporting system, Psychological Operations Information System (PSYOPSIS), as directed by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). This system has been designed to give a more timely and accurate picture of PSYOP effectiveness by providing selected items of information to the MACV data bank. Readouts will then be distributed to field units for the purpose of evaluation of this new system.

(2) Civil Affairs.

(a) Civic action projects were undertaken during this period to include Integrated Civic Action Programs (ICAPS), Medical Civic Action Programs (MCAPPS), education, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, and others contributing to economic and social betterment. Vietnamese individuals or institutions requesting civic action support are being encouraged to place their requests into district and/or province channels. If requests are approved, but limited or no support is available through GVN channels, they are passed to the province oriented civil affairs platoon. The civil affairs platoon then solicits and coordinates support from RVNAF or US units stationed in the area. Emphasis has been placed on encouraging RVNAF to participate in civic action projects. The assistance provided by the civil affairs platoons in the coordination of projects with the appropriate GVN officials assures continuity, reduces the impact of redeploying units, and insures that projects which may be counter-productive to GVN urban and rural development programs are not undertaken.

(b) The 1st Infantry Division redeployed to CONUS during the reporting period. Prior to departure the unit insured that civic action projects not completed were turned over to a responsible unit or to the III Corps Tactical Zone Advisory Team.

(c) In observance of Tet which was celebrated during this period, a coordinated effort was made to insure that the established Vietnamese customs were appropriately observed. Information concerning courtesy calls on GVN officials and visits to hospitals throughout III Corps Tactical Zone were scheduled to enhance the relationship between the military forces and the Vietnamese populace.

(d) Community Relations Committees have been formed by installation coordinators to review potential problem areas and to suggest improvements
that may be mutually beneficial to the local community. The formation of Friendship Councils was encouraged with local Vietnamese officials as members. Problem areas which cannot be solved by unilateral action are presented for discussion.

(e) Salutation payments are being made by II PFORCEN units in accordance with local custom and letters of condolence are being written when applicable as a result of reported incidents.

(f) Upon standdown for redeployment, the 1st Infantry Division had approximately 290 Kit Carson Scouts on hand, of which 239 were recruited and transferred to other US units. The majority of those Scouts remaining in the program were hired by units whose area of operations was near the Scout's home or family.

g. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

(1) Pacification and Development.

(a) Development: According to HES/70 figures as of 31 January 1970, 3,105,200 people in III CTZ lived in A, B or C hamlets (94.3 percent). As of 31 March this figure had increased to 3,229,100 (95.6 percent). Now only a minuscule percentage (0.1 percent) of the population remains under VC control. More impressive, however, is the fact that 2,828,600 people (83.7 percent) in III CTZ enjoy A or B pacification status. The goal (83 percent AB population) of the Phase I 1970 Pacification and Development Campaign has already been surpassed.

(b) Rural Development Cadre: In this reporting period, III CTZ Son Thon Rural Development (STED) Cadre Groups were reorganized into 30-man units with an organizational structure similar to that of the RD Cadre group. The paramilitary role was eliminated. The new organization emphasizes parapolitical objectives. At the same time, there was a major shift of authorized STED Cadre strength as three provinces (Phuoc Long, Long Khanh and Binh Tay) were instructed by the Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities (KMUW) to reduce their STED Cadre strength while Binh Long Province received authorization to increase. Two provinces previously with STED Cadres (Thai Binh and Phuoc Tay) were authorized and instructed to organize two STED Cadre groups each. A STED Cadre basic training course, comparable to the RD Cadre training program, has been organized at the National Training Center, Yen Bai. The first class is scheduled to begin May 1970. This training program is expected to increase the STED Cadre effectiveness in III CTZ.
People's Self Defense Forces: During this reporting period a six-week course of training for interpreters and team leaders at the Van Kiep and Lai Thieu Training Centers was completed. Critical analysis of the training POI led to the deletion of subjects considered inappropriate to PSDF requirements. As a result, the course was reduced from six to four weeks in length. The second cycle of training began 6 April 1970 and will be completed 2 May 1970. Students who attended the first cycle were considered receptive to the training despite initial administrative problems in the areas of orientations, equipment, and arrangement of personal affairs. Preparation for the second cycle reflected considerable effort at all levels of government to eliminate the administrative problems encountered during the first cycle.

Substantial progress was made in organizing combat PSDF; however, efforts to organize support PSDF lagged considerably. A letter published by the Ministry of Interior on 31 March 1970 directed the reduction of the minimum age of those personnel eligible for membership in the PSDF from age 13 to 7. The reduction in age has significantly increased the chances of III Corps attaining its Phase I goal for organizing support PSDF.

Territorial Security.

The number of enemy contacts from 1 February to 30 April 1970 continued at about the same pace as the previous reporting period. However, this period enemy losses increased, with a corresponding decrease in friendly losses. It can be generally inferred that these favorable results are at least partially due to an increase in RF/PF effectiveness. The high point of enemy activity, which commenced 1 April 1970, initially had a deleterious effect on RF/PF loss ratios. However, several small scale enemy successes were later offset by two notable RF/PF victories in Tay Ninh Province. These actions resulted in 138 enemy killed with only 12 friendly losses.

The second phase of the RF/PF force structure increase progressed extremely well, resulting in an increase of three RF companies and 7 PF platoons. All 3 RF companies and 89 of the PF platoons are now under-going formal basic training. Additionally, the authorization and subsequent organization of two RF battalions was accomplished. These battalions are to be used as provincial mobile reaction forces. One of these battalions is now under-going basic unit training and the other will commence training on 7 May 1970. These battalions were organized from existing RF resources in Long An and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. Replacement companies for the eight companies used to organize the two battalions will be authorized for
recruitment in the first quarter FY 71. A 90-day test of this provincial mobile reaction force concept was begun on 1 April 1970 in Tay Ninh Province. The test battalion is composed of the 58th RF Battalion Headquarters from Long Binh Special Zone, and four existing independent RF companies from Tay Ninh.

(c) In an effort to employ RF units in accordance with Combined Campaign Plan, AB 145, the 86th RF Battalion from Gia Dinh is undergoing reorganization. This battalion previously had 11 companies, most of which were involved in installation and static security. On 15 April 1970, the battalion and four of its companies were sent to the 18th ARVN Division Training Center to train for duty as a mobile operating force upon its return to Gia Dinh. The remaining seven companies are planned for eventual conversion into National Police.

(d) CIDG conversion continues to progress according to schedule. One CIDG camp completed conversion with a net realization of two RF companies. Two other camps will complete conversion on 1 May 1970. This is planned to realize an additional eight RF companies. The remaining conversions will be completed by 30 June for a total increase of 21 RF companies in III CTZ.

3) Chieu Hoi.

(a) Chieu Hoi ralliers for the period were 1,340 returnees. This is a decrease of 638 ralliers (33 percent) from the preceding period when 1,978 persons rallied. The current ralliers were classified into 721 military, 377 political, and 240 other elements. There were 38 NVA soldiers among the military ralliers. The monthly breakdown of the 1,340 returnees is: February - 498; March - 476; and April - 366.

(b) Thirty-six percent of the goal (5,100 Hoi Chanh) for Phase I of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan of the III CTZ has been accomplished as of 30 April 1970 with 1,833 Hoi Chanh credited since 1 January 1970.

(c) A course for Armed Propaganda Team (APT) leaders was started and completed in Vung Tau National Training Center during the reporting period. A second similar course is currently being conducted at the same center.

(d) The 2,000,000$VN construction of two buildings at Bao Trai, Hau Nghia was completed during the period, thus resolving the previous critical housing problem for Hoi Chanh in that province.
(a) The District Chieu Hoi Reception Center in Tanh Linh, Bin Tuy Province, was hit with 3-0 rockets on 25 February 1970, causing 50 percent damage to the building. The Provincial Chieu Hoi Center in Bao Trai, Paul Nghia Province was shelled during the early morning hours of 16 April 1970, causing 10 percent damage to the Administration Building.

(4) Development.

(a) Price levels in III CTZ have moved upward markedly in the last quarter. Many types of basic consumption commodities have been scarce in the market. The most prominent of these items is rice, which continues to be in short supply, due not only to slow movement from the Delta but also to hoarding by landlords and merchants attempting to drive the prices even higher than the unrealistic figures they presently demand. Upward movement of construction costs caused by rising lumber prices and scarce building materials along with generally increased cost-of-living levels continue to hold back economic revival and stability.

(b) The Minister of Economy, based upon instructions issued by the Prime Minister, canceled a decree signed in early January restricting the use of portable engine-operated rice mills. This type of rice mill is used extensively in the Village Self Development Program and new installations were restricted by the decree due to the prevailing security situation and possible use to the enemy. The Minister of Economy also approved legislation facilitating certain investments on behalf of the private sector by granting import licenses for machinery and equipment deemed essential. Projects financed under Japanese aid were also allowed to import essential items in a further attempt to expand industrial development.

(c) The Land-to-the-Tiller bill was promulgated into law by President Thieu on 26 March 1970. The significance of this is that some 65-70,000 farmers, who have been farming an estimated 130,000 hectares of rice land in Region III will eventually become owners of that land.

(d) Recognizing the changing social-economic-political conditions in the country, the educational leaders have initiated innovative steps to effect a move away from the traditional French-influenced system to a more modern institution designed to meet changing conditions. Examples of such innovations are: revising university curricula with the view to educate not only an elite but also a larger group of potential leaders in government, business, industry, and in the professions; vitalizing the secondary curriculum in order to offer greater opportunities for technical skills training, and...
emphasizing community education in the elementary schools to focus instruction on the role of the school in community development.

(e) The construction program, budgeted under the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) for roads and bridges, is proceeding satisfactorily. Presently, 30 percent of the 1,700 program calling for 1,110 kilometers of roads and 31 bridges has been completed. A total of 57 percent of the CPDC program is being constructed by Public Works and 43 percent by ARVN Engineers. The Military Advisory Command-Director of Construction-Lines of Communication (MAC-DC-LOC) program of National and Interprovincial roads (226 kilometers) is about 30 percent complete and the II FFV Secondary Road Program (575 kilometers) is about 65 percent complete.

(f) The electric power system in Vietnam since January 1970 is almost completely operated by the Power Company of Vietnam. The power network is being expanded and upgraded. A contract was signed in February and work started in March on a new 66 megawatt (MW) steam generating plant in Thu Duc, Cia Dinh, which in two years should be helping to meet the ever-increasing demand for electric power. The Vietnam Power Company is attempting to support the smaller systems, which are too remote from the main power network, by furnishing additional generators until those areas can "tie-in" on the main system.

(g) The 1970 Village Self-Development Program (VSDP) has progressed slowly due to emphasis being placed on implementation/completion of the 1,616 VSD projects and the village/hamlet elections carried out in March and April. Considerable effort was expended in disseminating VSDP information to the population. Training of village/hamlet officials in all aspects of the 1970 VSD program also received emphasis.

(h) Elections were held during March and April in 186 (52 percent) of the 202 villages scheduled for election by 30 June 1970. Elections for hamlet chief were held during this same period in 401 (3 percent) of the 676 hamlets scheduled for elections by 30 June 1970. The fact that there has been an average of 1.5 candidates for each elective village/hamlet office attests to the fact that for the first time since local elections were reinstituted in Vietnam in 1967, the people have a reasonable choice of candidates.

h. Artillery.

(i) General. This reporting period was again characterized by numerous rapid repositionings of II FFORCIN Artillery assets to counter specific enemy
threats and to bring maximum fire power to bear on the enemy. Continuing emphasis was placed on the improvement and training of ARVN and CIDG artillery.

(2) Tactical Developments. Current deployment of II FFORCEV Artillery units are listed at Inclosure 10. Heavy artillery unit locations are listed at Inclosure 11. Heavy artillery coverage for III CTZ is portrayed graphically at Inclosure 12. All heavy artillery units were in a general support mission to II FFORCEV.

(a) Heavy artillery coverage in III CTZ has changed since the last reporting period. The repositioning of several heavy artillery elements has been accomplished to provide the best possible coverage to US and Allied operations and to counter specific enemy actions. There were 96 heavy artillery moves during the period, and of these 11 were made to support operations varying in duration from one to three days. In mid-February heavy artillery units in a 175mm gun configuration moved overland to support maneuver elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, 1st ARVN Airborne, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 5th ARVN Cavalry Squadron in the vicinity of Nang Rong. The 3d Mobile Strike Force had discovered extensive trail networks and large caches in the area. To insure that the maneuver elements had maximum fire power at their disposal 175mm platoons were positioned as follows: on 9 February 1970 one platoon, Battery C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery moved to Fire Support Base Buarn (YT25289); on 20 January 1 70 one platoons, Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery moved to Fire Support Base Libby (YT44229); on 21 February 1 70 one platoon, Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery moved to Phuoc Vinh (XT50479). After the initial positioning the platoon at Fire Support Base Libby (YT44229) moved to Fire Support Base Dan (YT50479) on 27 February 1 70 to support operations in the eastern part of the AO and they returned to Fire Support Base Libby (YT44229) on 2 March 1 70. They again moved to support operations in the eastern portion of the AO on 26 March 1 70 to Fire Support Base Dan (YT50479) and returned to Fire Support Base Libby on 20 April 1 70.

(b) On 18 January 1 70, one 8" platoon, Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, moved from Landing Zone Buttons (YU443073) to Fire Support Base Lee (XT226371) and on 15 February 1 70 the platoon moved to Fire Support Base Elyas (YU5-6178). One 175mm platoon was already positioned at Landing Zone Buttons (YU443073). These platoons were to support elements of the 1st ARVN Airborne Division and 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Bu Gia Map area in the northern part of Binh Long Province, directed at the enemy's supply lines, believed to be the main source of supply for War Zone "D". One 8" platoon Battery C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery moved from Phuoc Vinh (XT70477) to Song Be (YU443073) on 22 February 1 70 to support this
same operation. On 24 February 1970, the personnel of Battery C at Song Be and Battery B at Fire Support Base Elmer were exercised to effect a complete battery of 8"/175mm at Song Be (YU43073). As the operation progressed, Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery felled the Song Be River to Fire Support Base Candy (YU82224) on 26 February, then to Fire Support Base Loan (YU260300) on 14 March, and finally to Fire Support Hong Yuen (YU010300) on 15 March 1970. The battery returned to Song Be (YU43073) on 3 April.

The 8" platoon, Battery C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery returned to Phuoc Vinh (XT.70437) on 8 March 1970.

(c) Numerous heavy artillery moves were made in War Zone "C" because of a situation which was developing. Intelligence sources had revealed that battalion size elements of the 271st VC Infantry Regiment, 272d VC Infantry Regiment, 95C NVA Infantry Regiment and supporting artillery and mortar regiments and battalions were threatening US and ARVN occupied facilities. On 11 March 1970 one 8" platoon Battery A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, moved from Fire Support Base Carolyn (XT271783) to Fire Support Base Beverly (XT271783). On 18 March this platoon moved to Fire Support Base Ann (XT271783) and at the same time one 175mm platoon Battery A moved to Fire Support Base St. Barbara (XTS068855) from Fire Support Base Carolyn (XT271783). To support operations of the Ist Air Cav Division in the Dog's Face on 21 March the 8" platoon Battery A moved to Fire Support Base Ilingworth (XT57623) where they remained until 8 April, then moved to Fire Support Base Elmer (XTW43446).

To support the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment moving westward from the Tong Le Chan area, one 8" platoon Battery C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery moved from Dau Tieng (XT64497) to Fire Support Base Harrah (XT599821) on 22 February, and then further west with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to Fire Support Base Ft. Defiance (XT65751) on 7 March. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in conjunction with the 6th Plows moved southward. The 8" platoon Battery A moved with them to Fire Support Base Ricky (XT65751) on 22 March, and then on 2 March returned to Fire Support Base Ft. Defiance (XT65751). On 2 April through 4 April this platoon moved to Quan Loi (XT618907), to Lai Khe (XT757376) and to Dau Tieng (XT64497) where the remainder of the battery was located. Another 8" Platoon of Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery moved northward to support the Ist Air Cav Division operation in the Dog's Face. In doing so, they moved progressively from Fire Support Base Hull (XT263380) to Fire Support Base Christine (XT271784), to Fire Support Base Cindy (XT282815), to Fire Support Base Sarah (XT28451), to Fire Support Base Sharon (XT414451), to Fire Support Base Hazard (XT01840), to Fire Support Base Kramer (XT027228), to Fire Support Base Hazel (XT442818) between 1 February and 22 April 1970. In doing so, the unit was moving to provide the maximum artillery fire power to maneuver elements.
During the last few days of the quarter heavy artillery was being rapidly repositioned to provide artillery support for future operations planned by ARVN and FMFAF.

At the close of this reporting period, all but three heavy batteries were in the configuration of two 8" howitzers and two 175mm guns. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery and Battery A, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, each has four 8" howitzers, and Battery C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery has four 175mm guns.

An airmobile fire direction (FDC) was designed and tested during this period. Subsequently, a total of seven FDC's have been built and deployed to the field. The FDC was designed to decrease the time required in preparation for firing, and provide excellent protection to a vital installation. This FDC was designed to be a completely self-contained, fully equipped structure, compact for ease of movement, yet expandable on the ground to a size suitable for a battery FDC. The current models of airmobile FDC's have proven highly successful, as verified by extensive field tests and comments from using units.

During the reporting period two light battalions (2d Battalion, 13th Artillery and 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery) and one medium battery (Battery A, 16th Artillery) were deactivated. At this time II Field Force Vietnam Artillery does not have any light artillery assigned.

As a result of the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, the boundaries and responsible units of some of the Artillery and Air Strike Warning Control Centers (AASWCC) had to be adjusted. The 1st Infantry Division was responsible for Dau Tieng and Lai Khe AASWCC's. Responsibility for Dau Tieng AASWCC was transferred to the 25th Infantry Division, effective 14 March. The boundaries of Dau Tieng and Phuoc Vinh AASWCC's, which were adjacent to Lai Khe AASWCC, were adjusted to eliminate Lai Khe AASWCC, effective 14 March.

During the period, Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC) trained the ARVN personnel of Long Bien Special Zone (LBSZ) in the operations, intelligence, and fire support coordination functions normally performed by BHTAC. On 1 April 70, BHTAC was deactivated. Effective 1 April 1970, CG, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery was tasked with the responsibility of maintaining liaison with LBSZ and coordinating US assets that are in support of LBSZ.

ARVN and CIDG Artillery.
(a) The CIDG Artillery School, located at Trang Sup, graduated its second class on 3 February 1970. A total of 55 artillerymen were graduated and assigned to Special Forces Camps at Tra Cu and Loc Ninh to man Special Forces howitzers at each location. A third class of 75 students began training on 16 February, and is scheduled to graduate on 2 May 1970. CIDG artillerymen graduating from this class will man howitzers in Special Forces Camps at Duc Hue, Bu Dop and Thong Le Chon.

(b) ARVN Fire Direction Officers (FDO) were trained at the II Field Force Artillery FDC School at Camp Price. Two classes were completed during the quarter for 28 officers from ARVN artillery units throughout III CTZ.

(c) The Artillery Dong Tien (Forward Together) Plan continued to improve ARVN artillery standards and significantly increased the capabilities and effectiveness of the combined artillery team within III Corps Tactical Zone. This was done by close and continuous coordination on the mutual support projects of the plan.

(d) More than 130 associate battery visits were made between US/FWMAF and ARVN artillery units. The visits improved mutual understanding, augmented existing advisory programs, and provided for mutual discussion of problems and observation of battery operations and techniques.

(e) Combined Fire Support Coordination Centers (CFSCC's) were established at Hau Ngia, Binh Long, Long Khanh, and Binh Duong Provinces during the quarter. They provide central control facilities for coordination of fire support and exchange of tactical information.

(f) In many isolated areas in III CTZ, not served by a Combined Fire Support Coordination Center, unit to unit coordination was accomplished to provide coordination of combined fire support. This was done through liaison between ARVN artillery and US/FWMAF artillery.

(g) The Operational Readiness Evaluation project standardized evaluations thus aiding in identification of weak training programs and in ensuring that standard gunnery procedures were being followed. Checklists were adopted and published and inspection teams traveled to ARVN artillery locations to conduct joint operational readiness evaluations.

(h) The Refresher Training Program has continued to be the primary means of enhancing the entire Dong Tien Plan. Over 2,300 hours of instruction have been given to 1,034 ARVN personnel in Firing Battery, Fire Direction, Forward Observation, Metro, Survey, Artillery Mechanics, and Communications.
The most success has been shown by units utilizing mobile training teams and programs of instruction. It is interesting to note that 3 ARVN units have formed their own mobile training teams as they prefer the training be given to the ARVN chain of command.

(1) Four projects significantly assisted in standardizing procedures and improving the accuracy of artillery fires. These were standardization of tube calibration procedures, standardization of registration policy, combined use of metro data and a combined survey control plan. Division and field force artillery calibration teams calibrated 88 percent of the ARVN howitzers. Approximately 74 percent of the ARVN units are registering in accordance with the standard registration policy. Over 79 percent of the ARVN units are receiving metro data, with 61 percent of them utilizing the data. Approximately 60 percent of ARVN artillery locations were surveyed. In several cases, AN personnel have been attached to US metro and survey sections for on-the-job training.

(4) Radar.

(a) AN/MFG-4A Countermortar Radar (CMR).

1 Operation effectiveness. The continued program of evaluation and analysis of the effectiveness of AN/MFG-4A CMR's employed throughout III CTZ for the months of February, March, and April revealed the statistics discussed below. The overall effectiveness percentage was determined from the number of sightings acquired during all attacks by fire occurring within range of any of the AN/MFG-4A radars in III CTZ. This figure does not include attacks which could not be observed due to mechanical downtime and sectors other than the sector of fire being observed at the time of the attack.

2 Analysis of operational statistics. Of the 169 attacks by fire in III CTZ which occurred within range of countermortar radars, two (2) attacks occurred during mechanical downtime and 91 attacks occurred in a sector other than the sector of search at the time of the attack. Of the 76 attacks observed, 40 possible launch sites were found for a percentage of 52.6. Inclosure 1 contains these statistics for each II FFORCE OPCON unit. (NOTE: Data for the above analysis is obtained from daily artillery SITREP and the II FFORCE Journal. It is dependent on the validity of these reports.

1 Location of AN/MFG-4A radars. See inclosure 14 for locations of AN/MFG-4A radars as of 30 April. (II FFORCE Artillery assets are indicated by hash marks).
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(b) AN/TPS-25A Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR).

1. Operational effectiveness. The AN/TPS-25A radar continues to be successfully employed in an offensive role throughout III CTZ. During the period of 1 February to 30 April, 3,654 sightings were reported. Of these, 1,224 were engaged.

2. Radar locations. During the reporting period one (1) additional AN/TPS-25A radar was relocated to DMAC for additional ground surveillance coverage of that area. The locations of the remaining seven (7) AN/TPS-25A radars in II FFORCIV as of 30 April are shown at Inclosure 15 (II FFORCIV Artillery assets are indicated by hash marks).

(c) Improvement of Effectiveness.

1. Radar Quality Control Inspection Team. In continuing efforts to upgrade the operational and maintenance standards of the radar detachments in III CTZ, a radar quality control/inspection team consisting of a qualified radar warrant officer and a qualified radar maintenance technician inspected 34 radar sites during the reporting period. Reports were submitted to the parent unit for corrective action.

2. Radar operator training. During the months of February, March, and April, a total of 24 enlisted operators from divisional and II FFORCIV Artillery radar detachments received a three day course designed to present the operational and maintenance problems peculiar to the employment of radars in Vietnam.

(5) Survey.

(a) Extension of control. During the reporting period, a plan was executed which brought fourth: order survey control to the TACR of the 19th Light Infantry Brigade. Control points were emplaced at 35 locations within this area.

(b) Control point recovery. A program was started to recover previously surveyed control points throughout III CTZ. During the reporting period 217 points were successfully recovered while 153 points could not be located or were found to be destroyed.

(c) Survey quality control. A II FFORCIV Artillery Survey Quality Control Team visited all seven (7) artillery battalions in II FFORCIV Artillery in an effort to determine the capability of each battalion survey.
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section to carry out its mission. Reports for corrective action were submitted to each battalion.

(6) Logistics. During the reporting reporting period, two field artillery battalions, one separate field artillery battery, and two main detachments were inactivated as part of the Keystone Bluejay Program. The processing for redeployment involved several steps. Direct support maintenance personnel classified the equipment of Keystone Bluejay units as serviceable or unserviceable, and accepted the latter for turn-in. Maintenance teams, composed of mechanics and other maintenance personnel from II FFORCEV Artillery units not affected by Keystone Bluejay, aided the remaining units in bringing their serviceable equipment to the highest possible state of maintenance. Residual units submitted lists of shortages and were given to request, from USAV, lateral transfers of equipment made available by Keystone Bluejay. USAV designated the units which were to pick up this equipment. All turn-in and lateral transfer was accomplished on schedule.

(7) Communications. During the period 1 February 1970 to 1 April 1, operable NESTOR equipment not in use (operational spares) decreased from 26 percent of on hand assets to 17 percent. NESTOR equipment awaiting installation decreased from 29 percent of on hand assets to 24 percent. This has resulted in an overall increase in the use of NESTOR assets during the cited period from 45 percent to 59 percent. Action is continuing to increase NESTOR utilization to meet current guidelines. In addition, a training program has been initiated to increase operational efficiency in the use of NESTOR equipment.

1. Communications. Significant changes in communications in support of II FFORCEV operations during the reporting period are outlined below:

(1) Radio.

(a) On 30 December 1969, preparations were begun for signal support of Operation "WHITEHAT", the code name for the visit of Vice President Agnew. In order to provide secure voice capability between the areas that the Vice President visited and the II FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center, four FM secure stations and two FM secure retransmission stations were established. One of the two retransmission stations was located at Phu Lai. The other was positioned in a helicopter and remained airborne over Cu Chi. All equipment was dispatched to individual locations and tested on 31 December 1969, and was placed into operation throughout the daylight hours of 1 and 2 January 1970. This action, which occurred in the previous quarter, was not reported last quarter because of the security classification assigned to the operation.
Company A, 5th Special Forces Group entered the II FFORCEV Command Secure Net on 7 February 1970.

On 13 February 1970, a secure FM net was established to provide secure voice communications between the areas which were visited by Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, and General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The net passed vital traffic without any difficulty.

On 15 February 1970, an AN/GRC-26D was delivered to the Special Forces Base of Operations at Bunard to provide a RATT capability to Team B-52 in support of Project Delta.

On 24 February 1970, the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) station in the II FFORCEV RATT Net was deactivated as part of the phase out of CMAC.

The 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division came under the operational control of II FFORCEV on 2 March 1970 and, on the same date, the 2d Brigade's FM station, located at the brigade rear command post, Bearcat, entered the II FFORCEV Command Secure Net.

On 2 March 1970, the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor came under the operational control of II FFORCEV and entered the II FFORCEV Command Secure Net on 3 March 1970.

On 14 March 1970, the AN/GRC-26D in support of Project Delta was deactivated. The radio and team was flown back to base camp on 18 March 1970.

On 15 March 1970, the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC) station operating in the II FFORCEV Command Secure Net was deactivated in conjunction with the BHTAC phase-out.

On 17 March 1970, a study team from the Research Analysis Corporation visited II FFORCEV to discuss procedures used in deriving call words, assigning frequencies and compiling signal operating instructions (SOI). They presented a briefing on automated procedures that have been developed and discussed problems that are encountered in these areas.

On 19 March 1970, the 1st Infantry Division deactivated its FM station in the II FFORCEV Command Secure Net. On the same date, the division reverted to the operational control of USARV in its final preparation for redeployment to CONUS.

On 24 March 1970, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry deactivated its station in the II FFORCEV Command Secure Net because they were no longer under the operational control of II FFORCEV.
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(a) On 25 March 1970, two radio teams from the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) were deployed in the Project Delta area of operation to establish and operate single sideband (KWM-2) radio stations for Special Forces Liaison personnel.

(n) The lst Infantry Division deactivated its RATT station in the II FFORCEV AN RATT Net on 25 March 1970. There was no longer a requirement for this RATT capability because the division had deactivated its communication center.

(o) On 1 April 1970, the BHTAC was deactivated and FM communications support to the command was discontinued. On the same date, Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry deactivated its station in the II FFORCEV CG FM Command Secure Net. FM secure voice communications between II FFORCEV and Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry was no longer required due to the company standdown posture in preparation for deactivation.

(p) On 6 April 1970, a five man radio team with FM and RATT radio sets was dispatched to Go Dau Ha to support a special liaison mission for CE II FFORCEV. The team took one AN/VRC-46, one AN/VRC-47 and one AN/GRC-122, all with secure equipment.

(q) On 19 April 1970, the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) provided an FM radio and operators to enable the 1st Australian Task Force Forward Command Post to enter the II FFORCEV CG FM Command Secure Net during the period 16-24 April 1970.

(r) Personnel and equipment from the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) operating Project Delta, were returned to base camp on 20 April 1970.

(2) Communications Center/Communications Security.

(a) Command emphasis has increased the use of FM secure voice (NESTER) equipment. The II FFORCEV NESTER Implementation Plan was executed on 1 Mar 1970. This plan provided guidance and established priorities for the employment of NESTER equipment. Utilisation of NESTER equipment has increased 37 percent during this quarter. NESTER information newsletters are published periodically to keep subordinate units informed of NESTER utilization and developments.

(b) The 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, came under the operational control of II FFORCEV on 2 March 1970 and a teletype circuit was established at Bearcat. At the same time the 125th Signal Battalion extended the teletype
service from Bearcat to the 2d Brigade Forward Command Post at Fire Support Base Colorado.

(c) On 15 March 1970, the teletype circuits from II FFORCEV Communications Center (TOC) to BHTAC were deactivated because the facility was no longer used as the II FFORCEV alternate Tactical Operations Center.

(d) On 25 March 1970, the teletype circuits from II FFORCEV Communications Tactical Operations Center to 1st Infantry Division Tactical Operations Center and from II FFORCEV Main Communications Center were deactivated due to the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division.

(e) On 13 April 1970 the AUTODIN Mode 1 DSTE terminal was activated in the 53d Signal Battalion Communications Center. The two Mode V terminals were deactivated at that time and placed on a backup status for a sixty day period.

(f) Wire Communications.

(a) AUTOSEVOCOM

1 On 2 February 1970, the AUTOSEVOCOM terminal of the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe was deactivated due to redeployment of the division. The same terminal was reactivated for use by the Senior Advisor to the 5th ARVN Division.

2 On 30 March 1970, automatic secure voice terminals (AUTOSEVOCOM) were activated for II FFORCEV Artillery and II FFORCEV Assistant Chief of Staff, G3. The secure voice terminals provide these two key elements of II FFORCEV with a fast, reliable means of discussing classified information.

(b) Multi-Channel (VHF) Systems.

1 On 16 February 1970, an AN/TRC-24 system was installed by the 53d Signal Battalion from Plantation to DM An to provide communications to the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters during its phase out. At the same time, the system from Plantation to Lai Khe, the division's previous location, was deactivated.

2 On 25 February 1970, AN/TRC-24 systems were installed from Plantation to Bearcat and Cu Chi to provide command and control communications between 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and II FFORCEV, and administrative communications between 25th Infantry Division and the 2d Brigade.

3 On 10 March 1970, the AN/TRC-24 system from Hurricane to BHTAC (on call) was deactivated due to the elimination of BHTAC as II FFORCEV alternate Tactical
Operations Center. This equipment was returned to the 53d Signal Battalion and rehabilitated for future requirements.

On 25 March 1970, the AN/TRC-24 system to 1st Infantry Division at Di An was deactivated. This system was no longer required since the division reverted to the operational control of USARV on 19 March 1970.

(c) Telephone and Wire Service.

1. During the months of February and March 1970, the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) installed a new outside cable plant in the II FFORCEV Headquarters area. The new installation upgraded the quality and reliability of internal telephone circuits.

2. Between 20 March and 31 March 1970, all contingency circuits from BHTAC to II FFORCEV and OPCON units were deactivated due to the elimination of BHTAC as II FFORCEV alternate tactical operations center.

3. On 9 April 1970, two common user circuits were installed from Hurricane switchboard to Blackhorse (Rear) switchboard at Di An to support the relocation of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Rear) from Bien Hoa to Di An.

J. Information.

(1) During the reporting period, "The Hurricane" continued to feature stories on Vietnam, its culture, its people and its Armed Forces. In the February, March, and April issues, there were 39 feature articles; 21 emphasized Vietnamese subjects to include pacification. Thirteen articles featured Free World Forces and American Forces in III Corps Tactical Zone while the remaining five were on miscellaneous subjects.

(2) The Radio and TV section continued to produce the weekly program "Dateline III Corps" and the program "III Corps Roundup" which was broadcast three times per week by AFVN. There were 151 Hometown Radio Tapes, 25 feature tapes for AFVN, 5 spots for AFVN and 29 Hometown TV releases.

(3) In public information, there were 79 press releases and 145 Hometown News Releases.

(4) Relations with the civilian news media continue to be excellent. Nine of one correspondents attended the all press up-date briefings conducted during the period. During the same period, 36 correspondents interviewed the Commanding General.
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k. Inspector General. During the reporting period the Inspector General completed three inspections and conducted three investigations/inquiries.

1. Staff Judge Advocate.

   (1) During the reporting period, personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate section continued to make visits to the subordinate units in the field to provide legal assistance and guidance in the handling of military justice matters. The section continued to experience an increase in the workload of military justice matters due to the implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968; however, no additional officers were assigned.

   (2) Four general court-martial and seven special court-martial BCD trials were conducted during the reporting period.

   (3) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp, and station functions.

   (4) Claims processing remained at a high level during the quarter.

2. (C) Section II. Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel. None.

   b. Intelligence.

   (1) Security Procedures.

      (a) OBSERVATION: Recent events indicate a need for increased security measures on the part of personnel involved with the disposition of excess property.

      (b) EVALUATION: In one instance, several classified documents, including KAC codes and SOI material, were found in an unlocked container in a property disposal facility. The container had apparently been turned in by a unit in a stand-down process. In another case, one SECRET and 16 CONFIDENTIAL documents were discovered in a cabinet inside a signal van which was turned in by a unit being inactivated.

      (c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

         1. That strict adherence to sound security practices be emphasized.

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2. That containers used for storage of classified material be subjected to a thorough search prior to disposal of the item.

That procedural problems involving containers be referred to the appropriate G2/G3. Technical assistance is available from organic military intelligence units.

(2) INTSUM Reporting.

(a) Observation: Daily unit INTSUMs provide a valuable intelligence tool for subordinate as well as higher headquarters. In some instances, complete and timely reporting procedures were not being followed.

(b) Evaluation: Timely and accurate intelligence reporting is essential to successful military operations, particularly in the counterinsurgency environment. INTSUMs are laterally disseminated to all components, including senior tactical commanders, corps advisory groups, and Free World Military Assistance Force units which have interest in, or responsibility for, matters covered in this report. Subordinate units have been advised to emphasize intelligence training for all US personnel, regardless of assignment so that they may be fully aware of their responsibilities in reporting all items of intelligence interest to their immediate commanders or intelligence officers.

c. Operations.

(1) Specified Strike Zones.

(a) Observation: The definition and proper use of specified strike zones was misunderstood by both US and ARVN forces and confused with block clearance. There was a near incident when US elements entered a specified strike zone VNAF attacked targets within the specified strike zone without notifying the appropriate ground commander. CG, III CTF cancelled all specified strike zones within III CTF in February.

(b) Evaluation: US units were using specified strike zones to obtain political clearance over an extended period of time for a specified area. However, they still used these areas for maneuver. By definition, a specified strike zone is an area in which there are no friendly forces or populace, and targets may be attacked on the initiative of any friendly commander, after notifying the appropriate ground commander.

(c) Recommendation: That US commanders, desiring to expedite artillery fire, and reduce the time required to obtain clearances, obtain block clearance for the desired area, for an extended period of time.
(2) Security Measures at Military Outposts.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy is capable of swift and lethal strikes inflicting losses to personnel and equipment due to a lack of night vigilance and other attendant security precautions.

(b) EVALUATION: On 8 April 1970, an NVA Platoon (reinforced) moved undetected to the main gate of a Regional Force platoon outpost. The sentinel who commanded the critical field of view on the avenue of approach was sleeping. The guard was summarily killed and an enemy element entered the outpost. With covering fire from the main body, this element was able to penetrate to the center of the Regional Force compound tossing grenades into all the bunkers and killing Regional Force soldiers as they slept. Friendly losses were 14 killed, 2 wounded, and 1 missing. Equipment losses included 1 M-60 machine gun, 1 M-79 grenade launcher, 4 .45 caliber pistols, 18 M-16 rifles, 4 carbines and 1 PRC-25 radio. Enemy losses were unknown. The chief factor behind the enemy's success was the Regional Force unit's disregard for night vigilance and security. The sentinel who commanded the critical field of view on the avenue of approach was sleeping. There were no other guards posted. The enemy demonstrated once again his capability for a swift, well-planned and lethal attack.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis, by both US and GVN, be given to the proper methods of maintaining perimeter security. Aggressive employment of ambushes and strict adherence to proper night vigilance would have hindered enemy movement and prevented him from getting inside the perimeter without detection.

(3) Use of RD Cadre in the Security of RF Platoon Outposts.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy is capable of detecting and exploiting weaknesses of outpost and fortification defenses.

(b) EVALUATION: On the night of 9 April 1970 a VC sapper element attacked an RF platoon compound. The VC breached the outer perimeter wire and under the cover of a diversionary attack by fire on the western side of the compound infiltrated to the eastern base of the triangular shaped compound. The RF commander showed poor judgement in placing the RD cadre only along one entire side of his outpost. The VC knew that no soldiers guarded that flank, conducted a successful and damaging attack. Only the quick deployment of an RF squad to the eastern side of the perimeter prevented the compound from being overrun. Friendly losses were 5 killed (2 RF and 3 RD Cadre), 14 wounded (5 RF and 9 RD Cadre), and 1 PRC-25 radio destroyed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis, by both US and GVN, be given to the proper utilization of RD Cadre. While there is no objection to using RD Cadre
in the defensive perimeter, proper consideration should be given to the amount of their previous training and experience. When RD Cadre are employed in the defense they should be integrated with regular soldiers and not given a unit sector of responsibility.

(4) **Selection of Ambush Sites to Cover Known Avenues of Approach.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Poor selection of ambush sites and disregard of known avenues of approach frequently permits the enemy to take advantage of GVN carelessness.

(b) **EVALUATION:** On 26 February 1970 a PF platoon leader chose to ignore an order to emplace ambushes on known enemy approaches into a hamlet. Instead, the ambushes were employed within the hamlet itself, leaving the southern section of the hamlet exposed. This exposed side was the area in which all previous VC incidents had taken place. The ambushes were located in positions with poor observation and ineffective fields of fire. In addition, they were overly close to PSIF ambushes with the hamlet. One ambush was 15 meters away and another 60 meters away. The enemy initiated their attack on one ambush from the direction of the uncovered portion of the hamlet on the known avenue of approach. The other two ambushes were unable to render assistance because of poor observation fields of fire and could not engage the VC force without firing into friendly troops. The heavy volume of fire and close proximity of the ambush sites effectively prevented the PF from maneuvering against the enemy. Friendly losses were 2 killed (1 civilian child and 1 PSIF - Assistant Hamlet Chief), 9 wounded (4 RD Cadre, 3 civilians, and 2 PSIF), and two M1 carbines were captured by the VC. Enemy losses were one wounded.

(c) **RECOMMENDATIONS:** That US advisors and VN commanders place emphasis on adherence to orders by junior leaders. Frequent spot checks of actual ambush locations should be conducted within hamlets to ensure they are mutually supporting and cover the known avenues of approach.

(5) **Ambushes Placed on Sound Intelligence are Most Effective.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Knowledge of local conditions and a well-planned and executed ambush operation results in enemy losses and prevents him from carrying out his mission.

(b) **EVALUATION:** On 4 February 1970 an RF company employed five ambushes on known routes of infiltration into a village complex. The ambushes were a minimum of 200 meters from the village and were also mutually supporting. Upon the receipt of intelligence, the commander shifted one of the ambush sites 100 meters from its initial place of employment after it had been on location for...
about one hour. The intelligence received indicated that someone within the village was going to guide the enemy through the ambush areas by watching where the ambushes were employed at dusk. Several hours after the ambush site was changed, the platoon leader noticed a light signal from the village. Soon a small group of VC were spotted moving toward the village avoiding the platoons previous ambush site and moving toward their new position. When the VC entered the killing zone they were taken by surprise. The enemy who fled upon contact were caught by supporting fires from another ambush site 300 meters away. The friendly forces suffered no losses while the enemy losses were 11 killed and 2 AK-47 rifles, 1 M-16 rifle, and 3 M-2 carbines captured. The success of this action is attributed to the unit's willingness to respond to intelligence and its flexibility. Mutual supporting ambushes increase the effectiveness of the night defense and encourages troops to engage a larger force.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis be placed on shifting of ambush sites after dark in order to counteract any compromise. Ambush sites should be emplaced to give mutual support whenever possible in order to bring maximum fire power on the enemy force.

(6) Search and Clear Operations by Regional Force Units are Increasing in Effectiveness.

(a) OBSERVATION: RF companies are developing swift reaction to contacts and fresh intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION: In several actions since 1 February 1970, RF companies have inflicted casualties on the enemy, captured prisoners and equipment with minimal losses. In one action, after the command post of an RF company was attacked in the early morning hours, the platoons began a search and clear operation immediately after suppressive fires were lifted. The platoons came into contact with VC and continued to engage and pursue these forces throughout the day. Friendly losses were 2 killed and 3 wounded, while the enemy losses were 15 killed, 1 prisoner captured, with the capture of 11 AK-47's, 18 82mm mortar rounds, 8 800's, and a wheeled tripod for a .51 caliber machine gun. The success was attributed to the unit's ability to react to situations as they develop.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That emphasis on quick reaction be stressed as a factor in successful operations, and that units practice quick reaction drill in their unit training programs.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training. RVNAF On-the-Job Training.

(1) OBSERVATION: Results of the Artillery Dong Ngu Narration Training Program varied considerably among units. This refresher training is considered to be RVNAF on-the-job training.
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(2) EVALUATION: Those units showing the most success, used mobile training teams to increase the volume of instruction and used programs of instruction to provide long range implementation of the programs.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That RVNAF on-the-job training be enhanced by greater use of mobile training teams and development of programs of instruction.

f. Logistics, Disposal of Vacated Real Property Facilities.

(1) OBSERVATION: Real property facilities vacated by US forces may be best utilized on one of the civil agencies of the GVN.

(2) EVALUATION: Real property disposal directives presently given to RVNAF for vacated US facilities.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the MACV Directive 735-3 pertaining to disposal of real property be revised to allow civil agencies of GVN equal priority over RVNAF where tactical military considerations are not paramount and where GVN/US recognition of utilization of such higher priority exists.

g. Communications.

(1) Installation of the HYL-3 Secure Automatic Retransmission System.

(a) OBSERVATION: The HYL-3 secure automatic retransmission device has been used in III Corps Tactical Zone on a limited basis for several months. Initial experience has brought out several problem areas.

1. Broken or shorted wires in the interconnecting cables delayed several installations. Replacement cables are not readily available, and the potting compound used in the connectors makes field repair difficult.

2. The PLL208 adapter card must be inserted in the KY-8 to permit monitoring of the secure retransmission at the HYL-3. Since this requires removal of the case, it is a maintenance function and is not supposed to be performed by the operator. Therefore, either any KY-8 modified for use with the HYL-3 must be identified and set aside solely for that purpose, or a crypto repairman must remove or insert the adapter card whenever the KY-8 is replaced.

3. Because the connectors on interconnecting cables are neither labeled nor unique, it is easy to install the HYL-3 incorrectly and damage the equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: Most problems encountered thus far can be attributed to inadequately trained personnel. Simply following the instructions in
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Technical Manual would have avoided many of the errors. However, replacement components, particularly interconnecting cables, are needed.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That radio operator training (MOS 05B) include operation of the HYL-3 and the NESTOR secure voice equipment.

2 That the interconnecting cables be labeled to make installation easier.

(2) Use of Directional Antennas to Increase Range of Tactical FM Radios.

(a) OBSERVATION: The RC-292 antenna often used with tactical FM radios does not always provide reliable communications over the long distances sometimes required in Vietnam. This is particularly true when NESTOR equipment is used to secure FM voice transmissions. The range is usually limited by interference from other stations rather than radio line-of-sight propagation characteristics.

(b) EVALUATION: Directional antennas have proven very useful in extending the effective range of tactical FM radios. They also reduce interference with other nets. Good results have been obtained from the AN/2169/G antenna normally used with the AN/GRC-163 radio set.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That directional antennas be used more often to increase the range of tactical FM antennas and reduce mutual interference.

h. Material.

(1) Slipping Radar Subassemblies.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several radar sets incurred a problem within the azimuth subassembly due to insufficient lubrication in the bearing assembly.

(b) EVALUATION: Insufficient lubrication in the bearing assembly of the azimuth subassemblies of radar sets has caused a drifting of the azimuth dials making computer alignment difficult and resulting in inaccurate weapon locations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a hypodermic syringe with scanner oil (FSN 9150-823-8059) be used to lubricate the bearing assemblies in the azimuth subassembly.

(2) APC Crystals.

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SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: The AFC crystals on some AN/MPQ-4A radars burn out far too frequently.

(b) EVALUATION: A surge of voltage induced into the wire tied to when the antenna is moved causes the AFC crystal to malfunction.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: As a field expedient two (2) crystals can be connected between terminals 15 and 16 of TB 2002. The cathode of one crystal should be connected to terminal 16 and the anode to terminal 15. The cathode of the other crystal is connected to terminal 15 and the anode to terminal 16. Three types of crystals which have been used successfully are IN 69, IN 277, and IN 4245. Connecting the crystals to the terminal by maintenance personnel requires no soldering.

1. Other.

(1) Land Reform.

(a) OBSERVATION: The implementation of the Land-to-the-Tiller program is being delayed because implementation instructions for the program have not been issued. Consequently, such activities as training of officials and applications for land cannot be carried out.

(b) EVALUATION: The working committees in the Directorate General for Land Affairs/Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture and Fisheries Development (DGIA/MLRAFD) have been working on plans and programs for implementation of the Land-to-the-Tiller program. The massiveness of the program was not realized by the Ministry in the early stages. Also, the Ministry was unable to proceed in the pre-planning stages until assured of the passage of the bill.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: An understanding must be developed by all parties concerned of the ability of DGIA/MLRAFD to carry out this task. Haste in implementing the program without trained Land Reform (LR) cadre will cause frustration and embarrassment to the government. On establishment of implementation procedures, systematic training should be undertaken immediately.

(2) Vietnamization of Education System Operations and Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: The gradual transfer of responsibilities to local officials and employees has continued during the period. The US advisory effort has emphasized that education is a GVN program and that the government has principal responsibility for its success or failure.

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(b) EVALUATION: The transition from dependence upon US/FW assistance to self-reliance on the part of GVN officials in support of the program may take an extended period.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: There should continue to be a good balance between what should be done by GVN and what support should be offered by the US. US support of education should be restricted to secondary education activities for maximum impact of available US resources.

(i) Secondary Road Maintenance.

(a) OBSERVATION: Lack of an adequate capability by the Provincial Public Works Services to maintain the secondary roads now being upgraded by US and ARVN engineers has become more evident as the roads become usable.

(b) EVALUATION: The Provincial Public Works Services are responsible for maintaining the national, interprovincial roads, and the secondary roads now being upgraded. The principal highways being upgraded in the LOC program will somewhat lighten the maintenance effort required because of their paved surfaces and better quality subgrades, but the more numerous secondary roads add a workload which the Public Works Services are not capable of performing adequately. The Commanding General, III Corps/III Corps Tactical Zone has recommended that selected military men who are former public works employees be returned to their former jobs while still in military service.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: The capabilities of the Public Works Services should be increased by raising salaries to compete with those offered by civilian contractors and thus help retention and recruiting. Construction equipment which is to be left behind by US military units or contractors should be turned over to Public Works Services. Public Works funds should be increased to provide contracting of road maintenance work which Public Works Services are unable to perform. Recognizing that the public works will not achieve the necessary capability in the near future, US and ARVN engineer units should be tasked with a portion of road maintenance, particularly those roads which are heavily used by the military.

FOR THE COMMANDER: 

W. C. BARTER, JR.
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1. II FFORCEV Order of Battle

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR -65 (R2) (U)

- II FFORCEV Troop List
- II FFORCEV Area of Operations
- Close Air Support
- B-52 Strikes
- Aviation Statistics
- C130/C123 Sorties
- Enemy Organization in the III CTZ
- Disposition of Enemy Forces
- II FFORCEV Arty Force Structure
- Locations of Hvy Arty Units
- Hvy Arty Coverage
- AN/MPQ-4A CMP Effectiveness
- Location of AN/MPQ-4A CMP
- Location of AN/TPS-25A CSR

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AVHGC-DST (14 May 70) lst Ind


Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Counterintelligence/PHOENIX", page 5, paragraph c(3); concur. Item has been extracted for inclusion in next USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Security Procedures", page 61, paragraph b(1); concur. All commanders must stress to their subordinates the importance of conducting a thorough search of all property which is to be turned in for disposal. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV's Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "INTSUN Reporting", page 62, paragraph c(2); concur. The timely and accurate dissemination of intelligence from one unit to another can put in place the missing piece of the puzzle which could lead to a successful operation. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.
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f. (C) Reference item concerning "Ambushes Emplaced on Sound Intelligence Are Most Effective", page 64, paragraph c(5), concur. Reliable and timely intelligence combined with a thorough knowledge of terrain and a well coordinated but flexible plan can prove most effective in countering enemy movements. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of RD Cadre in the Security of RF Platoon Outposts", page 63, paragraph c(3), concur. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Disposal of Vacated Real Property Facilities", page 66, paragraph f(1), nonconcur. Civil agencies should not be given equal priority with RVNAF for transfer of excess US real property. RVNAF requirements should continue to receive first consideration, although it is recognized that civil agencies may require certain facilities. USAID has proposed establishment of an Inter-Agency Facilities Disposition Committee with MACV/USAID/MACCORDS representation. If approved by the US Embassy, the committee will determine disposition of facilities not required by RVNAF. No change to MACV Dir 735-3 is required, and no further action is required by USARV HQ.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Installation of the HYL-3 Secure Automatic Retransmission Device", page 66, paragraph g(1), concur. However, the initial observation of problems with the interconnect cables is an isolated instance that has not occurred elsewhere. Recent more extensive evaluations of the HYL-3s have produced no new or recurring problems. The interconnecting cables are color coded and are readily recognizable to trained and well supervised personnel. Replacement parts and cables are always in short supply during the initial fielding of any new item of equipment and will not be a continuous problem. Unit has been so advised.

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of Directional Antennas to Increase Range of Tactical FM Radios", page 67, paragraph g(2), concur. The effective range of an FM radio set is increased by using a directional antenna. This is caused by the energy of the radio beam width being concentrated or focused into a narrower field of radiation. Range will then be only limited by the radio line of sight as long as there are no obstructions in the radio path. No further action is recommended.
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AVHGC-DST (14 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)(U)

k. (U) Reference item concerning "Slipping Radar Subassemblies",
page 67, paragraph h(1): nonconcur. Paragraph h(1) refers to the
AN/MPQ-4A Radar Sets. USAECOM technical personnel advise that bearing
assemblies contained in the AN/MPQ-4A radar set are sealed and self-
lubricating. Most of the problems encountered by DS/GS maintenance units
with the subassemblies in these radar sets are due to dirt and dust.
Unit has been so advised.

l. (U) Reference item concerning "AFC Crystals", page 67, paragraph
h(2): concur. An Equipment Improvement Record (EIR) should be submitted
to USAECOM, Ft Monmouth, New Jersey 07705. Unit has been advised.

m. (U) Reference item concerning "Land Reform" and "Vietnamization
of Education System Operations and Support", page 66, paragraphs 1(1)
and 1(2): concur. Guidelines on both observations are contained in
GVN's Plan for Pacification and Development. These recommendations can
only be influenced or assisted by US Forces, because GVN establishes
policy on these matters. The II Field Force OML and this indorsement
are being forwarded to MACV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cc: (a) (c)
MACV
II FFORCENV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 24 JUL '70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L. E. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
## II FFORCEN ORDER OF BATTLE

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY
III CTZ - CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U)
1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970

1. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in III CTZ Flown By:
   - US/RAAF: 6764
   - VNAF: 4139

2. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of RVNAF By:
   - US/RAAF: 1087
   - VNAF: 4021

3. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of II FFORCEV Ofcon Units By:
   - US/PWNAF: 5677
   - VNAF: 118

4. (C) Distribution of FAC Controlled Sorties in Support Of:
   - RVNAF: 5108
     - 1st Inf Div: 395
     - 1st Cav Div: 2904
   - 1st 25th Inf Div: 1815
     - 199th Inf Bde: 533
     - 1st ATF: 369
     - RTAVF: 204
     - Co A 5th SPG: 67
     - 3/17 Cav: 6
     - HQ II FFORCEV: 2

5. (C) Radar Controlled (Combat Sky Spot) Sorties in Support:
   - RVNAF: 9
     - 1st Cav Div: 251
     - 25th Inf Div: 8
     - 199th Inf Bde: 4
     - 1st ATF: 19

6. (C) Results (As Reported by USAF FAC's to III DASC):
   - KBA (Body Count): 635
   - KBA (Estimated): 272
   - Structures (Destroyed): 751
   - Structures (Damaged): 115
   - Bunkers (Destroyed): 7906
   - Bunkers (Damaged): 2555
   - Sampans (Destroyed): 7
   - Sampans (Damaged): 2

Close air support was fully adequate for the period 1 February - 30 April 1970.
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<th>BUU 40K</th>
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<th>LONG 60K</th>
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## Quarterly Summary

### Aviation Statistics

#### Rotary Wing

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#### Fixed Wing

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#### Personnel

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### Rotary Wing Totals

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### Fixed Wing Totals

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## STATISTICAL SUMMARY
### USAF C130/C123 SORTIES
#### 1 FEB - 30 APR 70

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TOTAL: 
- 7
- 15
- 260
- 2,342
- 3,164

TOTAL TONS: 26,200
TOTAL PASSENGERS: 25,362

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II FFORCEV ORDER OF BATTLE
(Disposition of Enemy Forces)

[Map showing military regions and forces']

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1. The following units are assigned to II Field Force Vietnam Artillery:
   b. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion (Target Acquisition), 25th Artillery.
   c. 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery.
   d. 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.
   e. 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.

2. The following units are assigned to II Field Force Vietnam Artillery and/or placed or placed as indicated:
   a. 234th FA Detachment (Radar) CPOC 25th Inf Div
   b. 258th FA Detachment (Radar) CPOC 15th Inf Div

3. The following units are assigned to III, 8th TAC, 25th arty and/or as indicated:
   a. 9th FA Detachment (Radar) CPOC II FEV
   b. 246th FA Detachment (Radar) CPOC 25th Inf Div
   c. 248th FA Detachment (Radar) CPOC II FEV
   d. 257th FA Detachment (Radar) CPOC ATV
   e. 259th FA Detachment (Radar) CPOC 1st Cav Div

4. Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery has operational control of one automatic weapons battalion, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery. The battalion has two additional batteries attached as indicated below:
   Battery D (MG), 71st Artillery
   Battery I (GIMT), 29th Artillery

5. Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery has operational control of the 2d Artillery Group and its four assigned battalions as listed below:
   a. 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery.
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b. 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery.

c. 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery.

d. 3d Battalion, 42d Artillery.
# LOCATIONS OF II FFORCEV HEAVY ARTILLERY UNITS AT 022400H APRIL 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>COORDINATES</th>
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<tr>
<td>HHB, II FFORCEV Arty</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
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<td>Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (2 tubes - 8&quot;)</td>
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<td>Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (2 tubes - 175)</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

II Field Force Vietnam

15 May 1970

N/A

N/A

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