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IN REPLY REFER TO

ACDA (M) (26 Aug 70) FOR OT UT 702276 2 September 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96371

AVBB-MH

14 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (02) (U)

Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, ATTN: AVDC-MH, APO 96225
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DST, APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

REFERENCE: MAP, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L77/14 Sheets 6230 I, II, III, IV; 6330 III, IV; 6229 I, IV; 6329 I, IV.

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities
   a. (C) Introduction:

   (1) During the reporting period, 1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operations in Long An Province and the political boundary areas of the four adjacent provinces; Bau Nhia, Gia Dinh, Dien Tuong, and Kien Tuong. The brigade headquarters remained at Tan An.

   (2) The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was involved in multiple combat operations daily during the reporting period. There was one twenty-four (24) hour cease fire during this reporting period; 051800 Feb 70 to 061800 Feb 70. Only base defense operations were conducted during this period.

   (3) During this reporting period, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division participated in Operation Toan Thang (Phase IV). The objective of Operation Toan Thang IV (Complete Victory) is to seek out the enemy with combined US-GVN operations to prevent his employment of men and equipment.

   (4) During the reporting period, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division turned over two Base Camps to GVN control as a start in the eventual withdrawal of all US Forces from Long An Province. OPEOD 3-70 (GEORGE) provided for the displacement of US Forces from Can Giuoc and Can Duc Districts along with the turnover of Can Giuoc Base Camp (K983217) on 15 March 1970. OPEOD 5-70 provided for the...

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14 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

turnover of Rach Kien Base Camp (XS7644698) on 24 April 1970, and the displacement of US Forces from the eastern portions of Rach Kien District, generally east of the 69 North-South grid line.

b. (C) Organization:

(1) During the reporting period the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued to have minor revisions of TOE's to assigned units as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>USARPAC GO AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65th Inf Det (CBT Tracker)</td>
<td>GO 22 3 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th MI Det</td>
<td>GO 22 3 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Co 75th Ranger</td>
<td>GO 43 17 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Inf FA Det (Radar)</td>
<td>GO 43 9 Mar 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
<td>GO 77 12 Mar 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The only change to authorized strength was USARPAC GO 128, 8 Apr 70.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>ENL</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-47th Inf (Mech)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Under USARPAC GO 73, 9 March 70, the United States Army Air Cushion Vehicle Platoon was activated and organised as: 39th Cavalry Platoon (ACV). Authorized strength is one OFF, one WO, 33 ENL, 35 AGGR, effective date: 1 May 70.

(5) Task Organization - Inclosure 1

(6) Brigade TAOI and Primary Unit Locations - Inclosure 2

(7) Assigned Units and Locations - Inclosure 3

(8) Supporting Unit Locations and Relationships - Inclosure 4

c. (U) Personnel and Administration:

(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength. During the reporting period the Brigade's overall strength was about 2% higher than last period. Officer strength gradually increased over the period and is currently at 120% of authorized. This can be attributed, not only to new replacements but also to in-country transfers from the 1st Infantry Division. The Brigade experienced a significant increase in the flow of replacements and losses being processed through the replacement detachment. This was due to three principle factors:

2
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SU1JIMT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, ECS CSTOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Infusion Program: Described under Personnel and Manpower Management.

(b) USARV Strength Reduction: During the period the 1st Infantry Division was redeployed from Vietnam. Individuals from the 1st Division with over 60 days remaining on their tour were reassigned to other units in Vietnam including the 3d Brigade.

(c) Accelerated DEROS: As a part of the USARV strength reduction program individuals with under 60 days remaining on their tour were given curtailments up to 32 days. Casualty figures were slightly lower than last period. Inclosure 5 depicts Brigade Strength, Replacements, and Rotates, and Inclosure 6 depicts Casualties for the reporting period.

(2) Personnel and Manpower Management.

(a) Infusion Program: During February and March a personnel infusion program was undertaken to reduce the impact of heavier than normal DEROS losses from the Brigade during the months of April and May.

(b) Enlistment statistics - Inclosure 7

(c) Key Personnel - Inclosure 8

(3) Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(a) Special Services Activities.

1. The following shows were provided during the reporting period:

The William Lundigan USO Handshake Tour
The Harrison and Tyler USO Show
The Earl Michel USO Show
The Hari Rhodes USO Handshake Tour
The New Society Command Military Touring Show
The Edie and Scottie USO Show
The McNeile’s Navy USO Handshake Tour
The Frankie Darre and Roosevelt Livingood USO Handshake Tour
The Gary Marshall and Susan Oliver USO Handshake Tour

EORL
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (RZ) (U)

2. Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Allocations and Utilization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OUT OF COUNTRY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocations</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilised</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>117%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IN-COUNTRY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocations</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilised</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Special Service Movies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number Shown</strong></td>
<td>986</td>
<td>36,823</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>36,823</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>33,961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>25,247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>96,031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Postal Activities

1. During the reporting period APO 96371 received an inspection by the USARV Staff Postal Officer and was awarded a Satisfactory rating on a satisfactory or unsatisfactory scale.

2. The following statistics indicate the volume of business conducted by APO 96371 during the reporting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money Order Sales</td>
<td>$211,262.61</td>
<td>$230,729.21</td>
<td>$256,682.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamp Sales</td>
<td>$8,680.00</td>
<td>$7,389.00</td>
<td>$6,717.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail Received</td>
<td>137,080 lbs</td>
<td>134,106 lbs</td>
<td>112,959 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail Dispatched</td>
<td>61,575 lbs</td>
<td>62,174 lbs</td>
<td>91,395 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3. Postal activities generally decreased since last period because last period included the Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years holidays.

(c) Awards and Decorations. Awards and decorations completed during this reporting period are shown as Inclosure 9.

(d) Chaplain Activities.

1. Two new chaplains joined the Brigade during the period, one Catholic and one Southern Baptist. Three chaplains rotated during the period.

2. Two new chapels were completed, one at Tan Luc and one at Tan An Airfield.

3. Both the Navy and the 25th Division assisted in insuring complete religious coverage for all troops during the moves made by three out of four infantry battalions during the reporting period.

4. An exchange program has been initiated with local Vietnamese religious leaders. Local religious leaders have spoken at Brigade church services and a Vietnamese choir sang at Easter services at the Tan An Airfield Chapel.

(e) Surgeon Activities. Two studies are being conducted with 3d Brigade medical personnel. A fungal and pyodermal disease study is being conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) Team. Participants in the study are 2-60, 5-60 and 6-31. The study is testing the effectiveness of griseofulvin used as a prophylactic measure against infections of the skin. The gastro-intestinal disease study is also being conducted by the WRAIR Team at 3d Field Hospital. It is hoped that this study will help us to learn more about the causes of gastro-intestinal disease which is so prevalent in RVN. The Medical Drug Abuse Team, consisting of a doctor and a psychiatrist, have been holding frequent classes which are aimed at the medical implications of drug abuse. Classes are given every other day at GD DEVIL Academy, and trips are made to the outlying battalions on a bi-weekly basis. Statistics on significant medical cases during the period are shown at Inclosure 10.

(f) Finance Activities. The Brigade Finance Section continued to provide complete financial services despite the loss of over 50% of the authorized finance clerks due to DODS. During the reporting period a policy was established whereby an experienced clerk was sent to each battalion base camp every payday to handle all pay complaints.

(4) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(a) Provost Marshal.

1. In an effort to decrease traffic accidents, combined police patrols on Highway Q1A have been increased. Two joint Military Police-ARVN Military Police
highway patrols have been added. In addition, there are joint MF-National Police combined highway patrols.

2. In February, three Military Policemen were provided to the 5-60 Infantry at each Kien, thus permitting all four fire support bases to have Military Police support. In April, three Military Policemen were withdrawn from the 2-47 Infantry due to the battalion's move to a distant firebase.

3. During the quarter, 3d Brigade Military Policemen successfully escorted large convoys of the 6-31 Infantry and 2-47 Infantry to new fire support bases.

4. In April Major William L.D. Lyght replaced Major Terrell R. Williams as the Brigade Provost Marshal.

5. On 24 April, 3d Brigade Military Policemen participated in a ceremony in which the each Kien Fire Support Base was turned over to RVN Armed Forces.

6. Statistics on offenses committed during the period are listed at Inclosure 11. Traffic accidents are listed at Inclosure 12.

(b) Staff Judge Advocate.

1. During the reporting period the following number and types of courts-martial were processed and tried:

- 1 Summary Court-Martial
- 40 Special Court-Martial
- 3 General Court-Martial
- 2 Special Courts-Martial authorized to impose Bad Conduct Discharge

2. During the period the SJA reviewed 380 Nonjudicial Punishments under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ, against personnel as follows:

- 76 Enlisted Personnel, E-5 and above
- 304 Enlisted Personnel, E-4 and below

3. During the period the SJA also handled such military legal matters as wills, powers of attorney, citizenship, taxes, civil suits, counseling of persons accused or suspected of criminal acts, and reviewed recommendations for administrative eliminations, line of duty investigations and other miscellaneous investigations.
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14 May 1970

d. (C) Intelligence

(1) Discussion:

(a) General: Enemy activity against US forces in Long An Province during this reporting period continued to remain at a fairly moderate level. The Summer Campaign, which is now moving into Phase Two, is the only high point to be recorded during this reporting period. Phase Two was to start between 25 April 70 and early May. Tactics that were to be employed in this offensive phase were attacks by fire, Sapper attacks and large scale ground attacks. The 3d phase of the offensive is scheduled for early June 70. Generally, enemy activity is usually scattered, with small ARVN and OP, OP's as the enemy's main target for attacks. The enemy continued to place a strong emphasis on Sapper tactics as one of their key weapons against isolated OP, OP compounds. Because of low strengths and a failure of the Rear Service to supply equipment in adequate amounts and quantities, Main Force Units and the 1st WVA Bn have been assigned a mission of avoiding contact and countering the SVN Pacification program in Long An Province. Local Force Companies have been used to guide Main Force Units and replacements and act as security elements for meetings of Village and District cadres.

(b) February: Activity during the month of February was limited to scattered contacts. On 23 Feb 70, an increase of enemy movement occurred throughout the province. US operations on the night of 20 Feb resulted in 23 enemy KIA. There was a sharp decrease in enemy movement detected the following night.

1. On 10 Feb 70, vic X5578755, 627 EF Co took documents from four enemy KIA. The documents identified the Co, 308th EF Battalion.


3. During the week of 22 to 28 Feb 70, the 320 MF Battalion was contacted repeatedly, resulting in a loss of 30 men to the Battalion.

(c) March: Enemy activity remained at a moderate level for the month of March. On the night of 7 March 70, the enemy lost 18 men. This was the most active day throughout the province.

1. On 7 March 70, vic X595694, 761 EF Co and the 627 EF Co killed 13 enemy soldiers and apprehended two NW's. All were members of the C35 Co, 1st WVA Bn.

2. During the month of March the 211 Sapper Battalion and the 25 WVA Battalion, 1st Ind VVA Bn suffered a combined loss of 57 men. The 211 Sapper Battalion lost 17 men, while the 25 Battalion suffered 40 WVA KIA.
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(d) April: Enemy activity during the month of April was somewhat of an increase. The reason for this was possibly due to the initial start of Phase I of the Summer Campaign. During this month, the enemy only suffered a loss of 115 men. This is the lowest number of enemy KIA during the reporting period. Also during this month there were six attacks by fire on US installations.

During the month, the K5 NVA Battalion was once again contacted numerous times resulting in a loss of at least 26 NVA to the unit. The largest contact came 1 April 1970, when the 60 RF Co engaged an estimated squad of enemy resulting in six enemy KIA and one PW.

(2) Enemy Order Of Battle.

(e) Recapitulation: During the period, VC/NVA combat effectiveness continued on a low scale. The enemy's rear service is continuing to operate under severe handicaps because of low strengths in many units. The 1st Ind NVA Regt remains the dominant unit in the AO but has been suffering ever increasing casualties, PW's and HoI Chanhs. All Main Force elements in Long An Province are trying to avoid contact and are hiding in an effort to build up lost strength. Local Force units are at very low strengths; in fact, one of these units, the C2 Ton Tru LFC was completely dropped from OB listings because of lack of contact and identification for a period of approximately one year.

1. The 1st Ind NVA Regt has been extremely active in Long An Province in the past three months and has sustained many casualties. Of special interest is the K5 Battalion which has had approximately a 40% loss in strength due to Allied activity and desertion.

2. The 6th MF Battalion was last identified from documents captured in a contact on 12 March 1970 vic XS683830. This unit was also contacted on 5 March 1970 vic XS683814 and one PW from 3d squad, 3d platoon, 6th MF Battalion was captured. It was stated that the Battalion has a strength of 174 men. The 306 MF Battalion became fairly active during the period 1 Feb - 30 April 1970. Contact was made with this unit on 10 Feb resulting in four enemy KIA. On 12 Feb documents were captured at vic XS604793 identifying the 308th. On 16 April 1970, vic XS666782, two enemy KIA were identified as members of the 308th MF Battalion. The 211 MF Battalion has been very active in the last three months. There have been numerous captured documents, HoI Chanhs, and PW's attesting to the unit's operations in Long An Province. On 15 March 1970, vic XS717649, the Political Officer of the 211 MF Battalion was captured. The 211 remained dispersed in an effort to conserve strength. The 265 Battalion has continued to operate at an extremely low strength level. According to documents captured 14 March 1970, there is an indication that the 265 Battalion possibly has been reduced to a company size unit. Last contact was made on 18 March 1970 when National Police apprehended one detainee who was a deputy hamlet chief and a member of the 265 MF Battalion. The 520 MF Battalion had been all but wiped out at the end of the last reporting period. The strength of this unit was 50 VC/NVA at the end of the last reporting period as compared to 175 at the beginning. At present the strength of the 520 MF Battalion is eight VC/NVA. The 520th was last contacted on
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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

24 April 1970 vic X5740637 when an element from the 281st RF Co killed one enemy from the 520th.

3. Identification of local force companies come mostly from documents and ralliers. Low strengths, low morale, lack of supplies and illness are the reports from these sources. The local force units are hiding from friendly forces and aiding RF Battalions where ever possible. Of the seven local force companies held to be operating in Long An, the largest has a strength of 24 men; the remaining average nine men per LFC.

(b) Current Holdings (See Inclosure 13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>COORD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind NVA Regt</td>
<td>685 NVA</td>
<td>25 Apr</td>
<td>N Rach Kien</td>
<td>XS6673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind NVA Regt</td>
<td>210 NVA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K6 NVA Bn</td>
<td>125 NVA</td>
<td>30 Apr</td>
<td>N Ten Tru</td>
<td>XS5970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K5 NVA Bn</td>
<td>80 NVA</td>
<td>16 Apr</td>
<td>N Binh Phuoc</td>
<td>XS6060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K6 NVA Bn</td>
<td>130 NVA</td>
<td>25 Apr</td>
<td>Binh Phuoc</td>
<td>Tan Tru, Rach Kien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K7 NVA Bn</td>
<td>150 NVA</td>
<td>20 Apr</td>
<td>PW</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

MAIN FORCE UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>COORD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dong Phu MF Bn</td>
<td>50 NVA</td>
<td>16 Mar</td>
<td>W Can Giouc</td>
<td>XS8073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Long An MF Bn</td>
<td>100 VC/NVA</td>
<td>20 Apr</td>
<td>E Can Giouc</td>
<td>XS8572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Long An MF Bn</td>
<td>70 VC/NVA</td>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>N Can Giouc</td>
<td>XS9775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Arty MF Bn</td>
<td>32 VC/NVA</td>
<td>19 Apr</td>
<td>Dispersed SR-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th MF Bn</td>
<td>139 VC/NVA</td>
<td>12 Mar</td>
<td>W Rach Kien</td>
<td>XS6590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211 Sapper MF Bn</td>
<td>100 VC/NVA</td>
<td>29 Apr</td>
<td>Dispersed SR-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>765th MF Bn</td>
<td>28 VC/NVA</td>
<td>18 Mar</td>
<td>E Can Giouc</td>
<td>XS8664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308th MF Bn</td>
<td>110 VC/NVA</td>
<td>16 Apr</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>XS6080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520th MF Bn</td>
<td>8 VC/NVA</td>
<td>24 Apr</td>
<td>W Can Giouc</td>
<td>XS7362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

LOCAL FORCE COMPANIES

Long An City Force 18 VC/NVA 15 Feb PH W Binh Phuoc X35461
C1 Ben Thu LFC 19 VC/NVA 21 Mar Con S Ben Luc X35877
C2 Ben Thu LFC 24 VC 3 Apr Doc S Thu Thua X35074
C1 Can Duoc LFC 2 VC 20 Mar Doc Can Duoc X37662
C2 Can Duoc LFC 10 VC 7 Apr Doc Rach Kien X37270
C1 Can Giouc LFC 3 VC 18 Feb HC Rach Kien X37671
C313 Chau Thanh LFC 16 VC 4 Apr HC W Binh Phuoc X56058
C314 Tan Tru LFC 5 VC/NVA 9 Apr PH S Tan Tru X56364

(3) Discussion of Enemy Techniques and Tactics

(a) During the reporting period, enemy initiated activity remained at a low level, with March as the lowest month.

(b) Due to the increased GVN and Allied operations and the success of the Pacification Program, the enemy is gradually losing the security of his lines of communication and his once numerous hiding places. In accordance with COSVN Resolution #9, an all-out military effort has been discontinued, and the enemy has fragmented the 1st NVA Regiment and his NLF Battalions by operating in dispersed five to seven man squads. The purpose of this is to conserve both manpower and equipment, and to allow these elements to establish control of the population in their assigned areas by concentrating at the lowest level. Recent captured documents point toward increased emphasis on guerilla operations using small scale sapper tactics to overrun isolated GVN outposts and lightly defended hamlets.

(4) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses:

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<th>FEBRUARY</th>
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<th>APRIL</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970

RCS

FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL

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<td>.033 ton</td>
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(5) Intelligence Sources and Assets

(6) Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of Counterintelligence:

1. The Counterintelligence Section (CIS), in keeping with its basic mission, employed eight (8) coded sources, five casual informants and six tiger scouts. During the reporting period, CIS manpower was increased by the assignment of four additional special agents. This increase in personnel made possible a new program of assigning special agent personnel directly to the three maneuver battalions of the Brigade. These special agents have established field offices with the respective battalions which now operate in conjunction with the central field office located at 493d MI Detachment Headquarters. Each field office controls its own informant net. The presence of these offices with each battalion has greatly reduced the time period between acquisition of information by CIS and dissemination of information to reaction elements. Working closely with the battalion S2, the CIS personnel are able to provide information on a very timely basis. To further the dissemination of information, all reports produced by battalion field offices are sent by secure electronic means to the S2, 3d Brigade. This procedure allows the Brigade Commander to be fully informed of intelligence data on a timely basis, so that the fullest co-ordination of response can be obtained. Because of the location of the field offices with the battalion S2's, local agents help in solving problems of base camp security and the monitoring of the activities of indigenous personnel in the base camp areas.

2. During this reporting period, CIS has maintained close co-operation with the 85, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Providing the 85 with a Special Agent and Interpreter personnel on its ICAP missions has resulted in an increase in intelligence production in this area. The CIS has employed five new tiger scouts.
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Aih-141
14 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

during the reporting period and has enjoyed increasing success with this program. The tiger scout, working exclusively under CIS direction, leads combat units against intelligence targets. CIS has had continued success in the utilization of coded sources and Special Agent personnel to assist the commander in the C&C helicopter in pinpointing intelligence targets during strikes. This technique precludes compromise of either the source or the Special Agent, and neither are in the area of conflict. Cooperation with Field Station 34 of the 525th MI Group in Long An Province has provided valuable verifications of CIS reports and, on occasion, supplemented information. Liaison with Province Security Committee advisors to the Special Police, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Chieu Hoi programs has provided CIS with other extremely valuable information. CIS is also now receiving intelligence information from the Ministry of State Security which has given it valuable leads, especially in regard to attempts by Communist intelligence units to penetrate US bases of the 3d Brigade. CIS has utilized Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam facilities in Saigon to develop a broader data base for CI operations and information pertinent to the 3d Brigade TAOD. CIS continues to work closely with the 14th ARVN MTD in a mutual exchange of information and has just recently begun to work with representatives of the Australian FWMAF operating in an area adjoining 3d Brigade TAOD in an exchange of information germane to the mutual operations.

(b) The Prisoner Interrogation Section:

During the reporting period, the IPW Section processed a total of 116 detainees. Of this total, 24 were classified Innocent Civilians, 17 were classified Civil Defendant, five CD/VCI, 52 were classified PW's and 20 were classified Hot Chams. In addition, the section processed 123 batches of captured weapons, clothing and equipment.

(6) Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of Aerial Reconnaissance:

(a) The Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission, accomplished the following during the reporting period (1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970): 52 aerial photographic missions were received and plotted. From these missions a total of 22 Photo Interpretation Reports were prepared and disseminated. In response to specific requests, the II Section prepared 24 photo mosaics, 10 special targeting overlays, and two trail overlays. A total of 63 Red Haze sorties were received, evaluated, and their results disseminated.

(b) 17 photographic missions have been cut and packaged with field plots for dissemination to 3d Brigade units.

(7) Effects of Weather and Terrain on Friendly and Enemy Operations:

(a) The reporting period covers the majority of the dry season. During this period the water table fell to its lowest point and consequently the entire rice crop was harvested.
(b) During the dry season infantry units, both mechanized and ground, were afforded hard ground on which to conduct operations. Additionally, air mobile operations were never affected by adverse weather conditions. The dry terrain also permitted longer operations without being plagued by immersion foot and other fungus infections.

(c) The enemy was also provided with this increase in ground foot movement, however, the removal of the rice crop decreased the concealment available to the enemy for his night movement. While on the other hand, the lower water table gave him access to many areas which previously had been too swampy to fortify.

(b) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Possible Courses of Action:

(a) The enemy has the capability to:

1. Conduct attacks on Province and District seats, other major cities, and military installations.

2. Conduct brief attacks by fire, hide his equipment, and withdraw from the area prior to employment of counter-mortar techniques.

3. Conduct attacks by fire and harassment on towns, villages, hamlets, outposts, and other installations.

4. Conduct sniper and terrorist attacks on key bridges, roads, RD projects and population areas.

5. Defend base areas and positions with local security forces and reinforce within a four kilometer area.

6. Disperse major units into platoon and squad size elements.

7. Withdraw and disperse easily.

8. Wage political and psychological warfare on the populace and hold control of any area where there is no friendly security at night.

(b) The enemy is vulnerable to:

1. Loss of support of the population.

2. Friendly superior artillery and air power.

3. Interdiction of the LOCs and loss of cached supplies.

4. Disclosure or capture of attack plan.
5. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.
6. A breakdown in his infrastructure by aggressive allied actions.
7. A lack of combat effective troops and a low morale due to heavy casualties, and desertions.

(9) New Techniques:

(a) Continuing intelligence reports, Hoi Chanh information, and PW readouts indicate that enemy movement during the hours of darkness along lines of communications was being conducted by widely dispersed groups. Because of the Brigade's intensified night ambushes and aggressive air assault techniques, Tet 1970 and Campaign "X" failed to materialize.

(b) Using a five man "skimmer" craft on the waterways enhanced interdiction and movement of men and material in Long An Province, RVN. The success of these "waterborne" operations are attributed to the combined intelligence efforts of Army, Navy, and GVN forces participating in combined operations. Increased use of small scale aerial photography in locating intelligence targets assisted the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry on 19 April 1970 in locating the 1st Company, SR-3 Commo Liaison resulting in 15 enemy KIA and disrupting a major infiltration route into eastern Long An Province from the Ba Thu area. Each battalion S-2 of the 3d Brigade has been staffed with a representative from IPW, MI, OB and an interpreter to facilitate processing of immediate tactical information, interrogation, establishment of local agent nets and exchanging information with their respective district counterparts.

(10) Techniques of Radar Employment:

(a) During the reporting period the Brigade Ground Surveillance Radar detected 3880 sightings resulting in 545 artillery fire missions. The Brigade reacted to the targets of 10 ground surveillance radars, including the eight organic PPS-5's, one Navy PPS-5, the PPS-25 attached to the 2/4th Artillery, and the PPS-25 operating in the Pineapple Area. Due to recent detachments in the Brigade our organic PPS-5 strengths has decreased from eight to six.

(b) Our radar effort has been concentrated in areas which the enemy uses for infiltration and resupply. An area of major concern is the Plain of Reeds, and we have had numerous radar sites in that area. The loss of the attached TPS-25 on 25 April 1970 has greatly decreased our coverage in the Plain of Reeds, and required concentration of organic radars to compensate for its loss.

(c) The quick reaction to radar targets by artillery is by far the most desirable method of engagement, and even though surveillance of the target area can not be conducted prior to daylight, the effectiveness of this technique has successfully denied the enemy his major routes of communication and supply. In addition, the targets acquired allow us to accurately determine the new routes which the enemy is being forced to use.
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AVBB-MH 14 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCSCSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

e. (C) Operations

(1) 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Phase IV of operation Toan Thang. The Brigade accounted for 653 enemy killed, 32 prisoners of war and 13 Moi Chanhs while participating in this operation. From 1 February 1970 to 28 February 1970 the Brigade conducted offensive operations in Long An Province with four maneuver battalions: 2-47 Inf (Mach), 2-60 Inf, 5-60 Inf, and 6-31 Inf. On 28 February, 6-31 Inf was placed OPCON of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and stayed under their control until 18 April. On 18 April, 2-47 Inf (Mach) was moved north and placed under tactical direction of Nhon Tu Ch District Chief, (YS0185). From 27 April to 30 April, 2-47 Inf was placed under OPCON of the 1st Cav Division for operations in Cambodia.

(2) Enemy activity in Long An Province continued at a reduced level in February and dropped off to an even lower level in March and April. Except for the period 1 March to 16 March, when the enemy conducted nine attacks on GVN outposts, there were few enemy initiated incidents. The communists continued to avoid decisive engagements with Brigade forces throughout the reporting period.

(3) The 3d Brigade has continued to keep pressure on the enemy through the use of daily daylight Jitterbug Airmobile Operations and night Checkerboard Ambush Operations. These techniques have reduced the enemy's ability to move during daylight and made him susceptible at night. The number of enemy eliminated decreased significantly in April as has the number of total contacts. The Brigade had 129 contacts in February; 125 in March; and 81 in April.

(4) Combined operations continue to be the primary technique for upgrading GVN forces. These operations have rapidly increased effectiveness of GVN units. In April, for the first time, GVN forces accounted for more enemy killed than Brigade forces. Training continues in the technical aspects of radar employment, and other operations; techniques which have been employed successfully by US units.

(5) Combat Operations:

(a) A series of Communist Violations of both the FWHAF Tet truce and their own truce accounted for 12 of the 18 Communists eliminated by Brigade forces on 3 February. At 1640 hours a Brigade Ranger Team, while moving to night locations in the vicinity of ZZ700640 was engaged by 3-4 enemy with small arms. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in three Communists KIA. Later that evening, after establishing a night position, the team was again engaged, this time by an unknown size force. Fire was returned with organic weapons, and a light fire team and Night Hawk supported. The Ranger team killed one Communist. At 2140, via ZZ6574727, a platoon from 5-60 Inf received small arms fire from an estimated squad of enemy. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in four Communists KIA and three AK-47's captured. At the same time at vic ZZ605738, a platoon from 2-60 Inf received small arms fire from an unknows size enemy force.
Fire was returned resulting in one Communist KIA. At 2.40 hours via XIO6H, 5-60InfRatPatrolwasengagedwithsmallarmssfirebyanunknownsizeenemyforce. Fire was returned in three Communists KIA.

(b) On 281100 Feb 70, Co D, 2-60InfconductingAirmobileoperations
threekmsNNWofTanTru(XS648660),madecontactwithanunknownsizeenemy
element. 2d platoon, 2-60Inf and the rest of D Company were inserted into
areas adjacent to the contact to provide blocking forces. At 1300 hours, 1st
platoon engaged and killed two additional Communists at 1310. 1st platoon also
sustained one US KIA by gunshot. 2d platoon, C Company, at 1350 hours, found
four CCK’s, four BAR’s, one French LMG, one M-1, one SNIP, one AK-47, and one RPG
launcher in the contact area during their sweep. At the same time B/3-17 Cav LOH
took two Communists and was hit by enemy SA fire wounding the pilot and observer.
The pilot flew the LOH back to Tan An and the pilot and the observer were evacuated.
2d platoon, Co D, found one Communist and one AK-47 at 1635 hours and
2d platoon, Co D, found one Communist at 1700. The platoons were left in the
contact area during the night, but there were no further contacts. At 290800
a re-sweep of the contact area revealed an additional AK-47, three AK magazines,
miscellaneous gear and one kilo of documents.

(c) On 141000 March 70, vic X870663, B/3-17CavLOHconductingavFR
for their Airmobile Platoon (ARP), engaged and killed three Communists evading to
a bunker. The ARP inserted into the area and at 1040 hours engaged and killed
two Communists hiding in a bunker and captured a small amount of documents.
5-60Inf, on Airmobile operations, was diverted to the area and inserted two pla-
toons of D Company and two platoons of B Company. The ARP’s were extracted at
1100 hours and a hunter-killer team remained over the contact area to cover for
the 5-60Inf units. At 1335 hours, 3d platoon, Co D, engaged two Communists
evading, killing one who attempted to hide in a bunker. Artillery and tac air
were called into the area and at 1435 hours, 5-60Inf elements resumed their
sweep. At 1500 hours, Co B found one Communist killed by artillery and also
destroyed eight bunkers. At 1610 hours, they engaged and killed one Communist evading in a stream and
captured one AK-47 and web gear. B/3-17 engaged and killed one Communist attempt-
ing to evade in a stream at 1625 hours, and 115th AHC gunships killed one Com-
munist. At 1820 hours, Co B elements found two additional Communists killed
by B/3-17 Cav, and at 1900 hours the elements were extracted from the contact
area. At 1945 hours, 1st platoon, Co D, working on Vietnamese Navy PFN’s on
the VN Co Doug, engaged two Communists attempting to evade from the contact
area, killing one. The unit was later identified as the 211 WF Sapper Battalion.

(d) At 270123 March 70, 3d platoon, Co D, 5-60Infinitiated contact in the
Plain of Reeds (X5506800) with organic weapons and gunships. This unit was
conducting a seven-day operation with the Recon Platoon in the Plain within
AO East Duc as requested by the Province Chief. The unit had a scout dog team.
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5/23GCT

Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade 9th Infantry

Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS WRD-8 (RJ-2) (C)

A combat tracker team was employed as part of the operation. Upon sweeping in the contact area, elements found 11 Communists KIA (KIA), and two Communists KIA. Additionally, they captured three SKS rifles, two AK-47s, a rocket launcher, one Chicom 30 caliber machine gun, one bag of rice, two Chicom grenades, seven RGD rounds, and one large bag of documents. At first light, the unit swept the contact area and found one additional AK-47. Company D also found three caches at grids X551793, X551792, and X550785, containing the following equipment and supplies: 29 82mm mortar rounds, 6,300 AK-47 rounds, one shovel, two land mines, one large can of TNT, 30 Chicom grenades, and one can of explosives. At 0600 hours, they found at X550795, six more RGD rounds and one land mine. They destroyed sampans, 11 cans of small arms ammunition, four 82mm mortar rounds, one NVA gas mask, 30 pounds of rice, 30 nonelectric blasting caps, one pair of wire cutters, and miscellaneous clothing and medical supplies. On continuation of the sweep and search of the area at 0945 hours, an additional time Chicom grenade was captured, one 37mm recoilless rifle, and one case of AK-47 ammunition was discovered, as was a fresh spider hole with one land mine and 300 pounds of 7.62mm ammunition. At 1025 hours, one AK-47 and two and one half rounds of ammunition were found. The scout dog team attached to the unit was responsible for locating one of the three caches. At 1300 hours, a tunnel and cache detector was sent to the unit along with two operators. This was the first employment of the device in a known cache area; however, no additional caches were discovered.

(e) On 191173 April 70, ARP A/3-17 Cav with a Hot Chanh were inserted into an intelligence target grid X557079. Upon insertion, the ARP found fresh footprints in the area and began following the footprints to the southeast. At 1235 hours, A/3-17 LRRP received automatic ground fire and went down. At 1305 hours, 11th Inf Command and Control was on-station to assist the Cav. At 0050 hours, 11th Inf began three mobile insertions and at 1325 hours, 2d platoon, Co D, was inserted into the area 3d platoon, Co C, followed at 1330 hours. At 1330 hours, 2d platoon, Co D sustained two US WIA from a grenade boobytrap and shortly afterward found sleeping positions and two destroyed sampans. At 1400 hours, 2d platoon, Co D was in contact with an unknown size enemy force and sustained one US WIA. A/3-17 Cav and 11th Gunships were in support. At 1300 hours, they killed one Communist. At 1515 hours another Communist was killed by 2d platoon, Co D. The ground units pulled back and an air strike and artillery were called into the area. At 1615 hours, the ground elements, with the addition of two platoons of A Company swept the contact area. At 1630 hours, 3d platoon, Co A found one Communist KIA. Contact broke out again at 1700 hours and 2d platoon, Co A sustained two US WIA and killed two Communists attempting to evade from the area. Gunships attacked and 2d platoon, A Company, moved back into the area to sweep. At 1800 hours, they found six Communists KIA and captured one AK-47. All elements continued their sweep; 2d platoon, Co A, killed three Communists and found 50 pounds of rice, 20 Chicom grenades, miscellaneous clothing and a small amount of documents. At 1900 hours, they sustained one US WIA. At 1940 hours, they engaged and killed one Communist and captured two AK-47s. By 1940 hours, all elements had been extracted. An additional air strike and artillery were called into the area. The area was reswept by 6-31 Inf at 0005 hours the next day and A Company elements found two clavemores.
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Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970

ICS CSFOR-65 (3.2) (U)

(6) Combat Support Activities

(a) Artillery Support:

1. Artillery support for the 3d Brigade during this reporting period continued to be provided by the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery, the organic direct support artillery battalion. Battery A, Battery B, and Battery C, 5th Battalion, 42d Field Artillery with missions of general support priority of fires to the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery continued to provide medium artillery support in the 3d Brigade TAOR. A summary of the total missions and rounds fired are provided as Inclosure 15.

2. Significant operational activities of the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery is attached as Inclosure 17.

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support:

1. During the reporting period Troop B/3-17 Air Cavalry was in dedicated support of the Brigade, providing an average of ten helicopters per day. This support consisted of four AH-1G Cobra Gunships, three OH-6A LOH's, and three UH-1H lift ships. Missions included support for 3d Brigade units in contact, aerial displacement of supplies, screening and blocking operations, aerial and ground reconnaissance, Ranger insertions and extractions, and Ranger Paraknet support. While in support of the 3d Brigade during this reporting period B/3-17 Cav flew 4,943 hours and accounted for 86 Communists eliminated.

2. The 3d Brigade also received gunships from the US Navy located at Phu Loc and Nha Be. The US Navy supported elements of the 3d Brigade on a mission basis with a Light Fire Team (LFT).

(c) Tactical Air Support: A chart reflecting ordnance expended and results obtained by Tac Air in support of 3d Brigade units is attached as Inclosure 16.

(d) Strategic Air Support: There were no B-52 strikes conducted in support of 3d Brigade during the reporting period.

(e) During the reporting period organic Army Aviation supported the Brigade with 6,799 sorties and 2,493 missions; airlifted 142 tons of cargo and 5,671 passengers.

1. (C) Training:

1. Training emphasis continued to increase throughout the reporting period. Maximum attention was devoted to improvement of individual military occupational specialties through attendance at available schools and on-the-job training, combined operations with SVN Forces, and the Dong Tien (Progress Together) Program.

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AVBB-MH  16 May 1970
SUBJECT:  Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry
Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Training allocations to various schools were utilized as indicated
below:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL/COURSE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ALLOCATION</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
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<td>Jungle Environment Survival Tag</td>
<td>Clark AFB/Cubi</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NHA Trang, RVN</td>
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<td>Long Binh, RVN</td>
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<td>Generator Supervisors Course</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
Generator Operators Course  
Cu Chi, RVN  
26  
4 days

Helicopter Load Preparation  
Cu Chi, RVN  
6  
1 day

Mess Management Course  
Cu Chi, RVN  
8  
1 day

Small Arms Inspection Course  
Cu Chi, RVN  
18  
1 day

Tunnel Destruction Course  
Cu Chi, RVN  
3  
1 day

Tunnel Rat Course  
Cu Chi, RVN  
1  
1 day

(3) During the reporting period, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division "Go Devil Academy" conducted training of five (5) days duration for the following number of replacements:

Officers - 137  
NCO's - 585  
EM - 1947  
Tiger Scouts - 45

Total 2714 (Weekly Average: 209)

(4) Daily, throughout the Brigade, some 20-25 hours of mandatory and refresher training have been conducted. Special emphasis has been placed in the areas of weapons servicing and familiarization marksmanship, ambush and airmobile techniques, mines and booby traps, and communications security. Emphasis on these subjects reflects their special importance and significance within the Brigade TAOL.

(5) Other special training conducted during the quarter included an intensive two-hour class in communications security (COMMSEC) conducted for all battalions, separate companies and detachments between 31 January 1970 and 8 February 1970. On 15 February 1970, 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery concluded in the MQ-4A Counter-Mortar Radar. From 14-16 March 1970, all 4.2 mortar platoons within the Brigade received the quarterly training evaluation test from 2-4 Artillery cadre. Between 20 March and 10 April 1970, the Brigade furnished two non-commissioned officers to the 25th Inf Division to assist in forming a mobile training team in ambush techniques for the instruction of 18th ARVN Division, Kuan Loc, RVN. From 16 March - 14 April 1970, 2d Battalion (Mech), 47th Infantry Division conducted five cycles of two day training for Mobile Assistance Team personnel, RF/FP leaders and GVN interpreters from Dinh Tuong Province, IV Corps Tactical
ZONE in ambush techniques and operations. A total of 27 personnel were trained during that program. Additionally, the Dong Tian (Progress Together) Program began during the last reporting period, continues with the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery working in conjunction with the 253d Artillery Battalion, and the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry continuing to combine operations with the 50th ARVN Regiment, to include the use of a co-located tactical operations center at Tan Tru, Long An Province.

(c) Logistics:

(1) General:

(a) The logistical mission of providing planning, guidance and support for all organic and attached units of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was accomplished by the Brigade during the reporting period. The major tactical units supported were four land-based battalions.

(b) During the reporting period there were several unit moves that directly affected the logistical support of the units involved.

1. On 12 March the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, moved from Can Giuoc District to Ben Luc District.

2. On 15 March the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, forward, was attached to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division for all logistical support except Class VII; major and items.

3. On 18 April 1970 the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mech), moved from Binh Phuoc to Phuoc Trach District and received logistical support from 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and has since been placed under the OPCON of the 1st Cav Division.

4. On 18 April 1970 the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry forward elements reverted to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for logistical support.

5. On 16 April 1970 the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry moved from Rạch Kien to Binh Phuoc.

(2) Supply:

(a) 3d Brigade units draw supplies from 99th CS Support Battalion located at Tan An Airfield on a supply point distribution basis. Unit distribution of all classes of supplies was provided to FSR Gettysburg.

(b) A well was set up at Tan An Airfield to supply the units there with potable water.

(3) Maintenance:

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(a) There were no CIW's given during the reporting period because of operational requirements.

(b) Roadside spot checks and informal inspections were conducted by Company D, 99th CS Support Battalion. The spot checks, together with continuous command emphasis on equipment maintenance, have resulted in a low deadline rate in most areas. However, the deadline rate for five ton trucks and wreckers is a problem at present due to their low density in the Brigade.

(c) During the reporting period, Company B, 99th CS Support Battalion sent 15 mechanics TDY to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division to assist Company C, 725th Maintenance Battalion in supporting the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry which is now under Operational Control, and attached for logistical support to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Because of a high personnel turnover this loss could adversely affect the maintenance posture of the Brigade.

(4) Transportation: Organic transportation was adequate to meet limited tactical and most administrative requirements. However, in the latter part of the period non-organic transportation was relied on to assist in moving the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mech) to Bearcat and the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry to Binh Phuoc. Ten trucks from the 6th Transportation Battalion were used for five days to support these moves. CH-47 sorties, averaging two per day, were used to support FSB Gettysburg; these sorties were obtained from 25th Infantry Division assets.

b. (U) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs:

(i) Psychological Operations:

(a) The 3d Brigade PSYOPS effort continued in support of the Long An Province Pacification and Development Program. The objectives of PSYOPS during the period have been:

1. Quick reaction broadcasts and leaflet drops to exploit enemy personnel and equipment losses and perishable intelligence information.

2. To convince the civilian population that the pacification and development program is an expression of the response of the GVN to the needs of the people.

3. To create dissention between VC and NVA by exploiting personality differences.

4. Utilisation of the Family Tree program to create dissention between higher and lower levels of command.

(b) The Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) have been used effectively in conjunction with WDBCAP and WILCAP operations. These teams consist of NVA Ho Chi Chanhs who have become Kit Carson Scouts and they personally visit the families of known VC while the WDBCAP is in the village. The team encourages the family to cooperate in
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persuading the VC to rally by using themes that GVN is winning and that only
by rallying can be avoid being killed. Because the APT is made of NVA Hoi
Chanh, they can personally verify that Communist propaganda is not true. This

type of face-to-face PSYOP has proven very successful.

(c) The PSYOP campaign against the 1st NVA Regiment has been very successful
during the reporting period through the use of five special tapes and three special
leaflets prepared by NVA ralliers and addressed to specific units of the
1st NVA Regiment. The taped broadcasts by NVA ralliers were found to be the
most effective PSYOP appeal. Potential ralliers recognize the northern accent
and feel confident that they could believe the message. Widespread dissatisfaction
is apparent in the 1st NVA Regiment due to lack of medicine and equipment,
isolation from population, the necessity to constantly hide and fear of PVNAF’s
firepower. All these fears have been exploited in operations against the 1st NVA
Regiment.

(d) The PSYOP section has intensified the Hoi Chanh interview program to
obtain new themes for exploitation. Reasons for rallying, methods to persuade
comrades to rally, and exploitable conditions are the primary themes of this
interrogation.

(e) Major themes during the reporting period were: Chieu Hoi, Family Tree,
GVN Image, VIP, Tet, surrender/scare, hardship, health and sanitation, post con-
trol and pacification.

(f) Summary of PSYOP Activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOUDSPEAKER</th>
<th>LEAFLETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TYPE MISSION</td>
<td>NUMB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Civil Affairs:

(a) Promotion of safety program in weapons and vehicles.

(b) Summary of MILCAP programs for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILCAP</th>
<th>ICAP</th>
<th>MEDCAP</th>
<th>DECAP</th>
<th>PATIENTS TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45,171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(c) Civic actions also included construction projects to improve living conditions within Long An Province. These were targeted for short duration-high impact results. The following is a list of projects completed:

1. Dwellings 12
2. Roads 5
3. Bridges 1 built
4. Schools 10 repaired
5. Others 5 projects

(d) Materials distributed for construction:

1. Cement 37 bags
2. Tin 51 sheets
3. Lumber 3846 board feet
4. Rock 7000 tons
5. Sandbags 5000 bags
6. Blackboards 10

(e) During the conduct of MILCAPS the teams distribute various health items and commodities:

1. Health and school kits 614 kits, 2565 lbs
2. Foodstuffs 975 lbs
3. Clothing 125 lbs
4. Cooking Oil 55 gallons
5. Toys & lamps 400
6. Notepads 180
7. Chalk 350 pieces
8. GVN flags 250
9. Mattresses 210
10. Soap 400 bars
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11. Paint

50 gallons

(f) Military Civic Action and PSTOP programs have been conducted in coordination with and in support of the Long An Province and District program. The 85, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division has established effective liaison with the Sector 05. Successful programs have been initiated and explicated by well planned PSTOPS to explain to the people the purpose of a civic action project. The coordinated operations have taken the form of Integrated Civic Action Projects (ICAPS). These projects have the short range, high impact approach.

(g) 144 English Pronunciation classes were conducted with a total of 3600 students.

(h) Units of the 3d Brigade continued to arrange for medical treatment and corrective surgery for needy children at Cho Ray Hospital and amputees at the National Rehabilitation Center. The following treatments were performed during the reporting period:

1. Tuberculosis 1
2. Burns 4
3. Infection 1
4. Club foot 6
5. Body ulcers 1
6. Unknown disease 2

(i) Kit Carson Scout Program:

(a) The purpose of the ECS program is to employ Chieu Hoi returnees within six months of their day of release from the Chieu Hoi Center. They assist US Forces in patrolling and locating the enemy and his infrastructure. They are particularly adept at location of enemy booby traps, thereby substantially reducing US casualties.

(b) These scouts are known to display just as much courage and determination as their US counterparts; the following excerpt is from the annals of 3-60 Inf:

Kit Carson Scout Le Van Cong was on a Bushmaster mission with 1st Platoon, Company B, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry. They were preparing to initiate the ambush when their position came under heavy fire from three sides. Although wounded in the initial contact, Cong maneuvered to help wounded comrades and while doing this he located the enemy position and directed fire on the position. He helped bring the first dustoff ship in, refused evacuation until all others

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 NCS CSFOR-63 (R2) (U)

had been taken out. Because of his actions, Cong has been recommended for a Bronze Star Medal with "V" device.

(c) During the reporting period NCS allocations were increased from the previous 180 to 209.

(d) Summary of Kit Carson Scout Program for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESENT</th>
<th>HIRED</th>
<th>TERMINATED</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>194</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. (c) Engineer Support:

(1) During the reporting period the Long An Province 206-kilometer Secondary Road Program received the major portion of engineer effort. Elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade, the ARVN 30th Engineer Group, US Navy Seabees, and the Brigade's organic 571st Engineer Company combined to raise the program's percentage completion from 13% to 53%. While slow delivery of contractor-furnished laterite for the surface cap has delayed some projects, rapid progress has been made on base course preparation. Two of the twenty-two roads comprising the program are complete, and eight more need only the laterite cap. These eight are now usable during the dry season, and have contributed to pacification of the districts in which they are located. Tan Tru District reports the roads provide direct land access to areas which in the past could be reached by military forces only after long foot marches or by air. In Ben Luc District, former residents who moved to Saigon years ago are now building homes along the newly opened roads.

(2) The enemy has acknowledged the success of the roads by increasing booby trapping and mining incidents designed to disrupt the program. To date, no casualties or equipment damage have resulted. Many mines and booby traps have been pointed out by local villagers so that the roads would not be destroyed.

(3) The organic 571st Engineer Company has directed its resources to projects requiring earthfill, as the rapidly approaching monsoon season will inundate borrow pits. Projects that can be completed during the rainy season have been delayed to allow maximum effort on those requiring earthfill. Combat support furnished by the engineers averaged one squad per day. Combat support is provided on a mission basis, as the line battalions have a limited mine sweep and demolition capability. This capability enables the engineer company to employ their organic mine sweep equipment in support of the unit's secondary road projects.

(4) 20th Engineer Brigade units have completed all base construction in support of the Brigade. They have begun work on protective berm and minimum essential requirements for Tan An Airfield.

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J. (C) Signal Support:

(1) During the reporting period, the Brigade Signal Office continued its normal operations to include advising the Brigade Commander on all signal matters, coordinating and tasking the commitment of the 56th Signal Company assets, coordinating the signal operations of the organic battalions, and preparing and managing the 3d Brigade Signal Operating Instructions (SOI).

(2) Communication systems (VHF) have changed within the Brigade as organic battalions have relocated their base camps. VHF systems to Can Giuoc and Rach Kim have been deactivated while the four channel VHF to B Company 99th GS Support Battalion at Ben Luc was upgraded to a 12 channel system and terminated at the same VHF site before connecting to the VHF site at 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry Base Camp.

(3) A new communications complex and a new outside wire plant were installed and became operational on 27 March 1970, (See 56th Signal Co ORL, para 1 a. 1-7). Also established was a new photo facility on 19 March 1970, thereby relieving excessive wear of the special services photo equipment. (See 56th Signal Co ORL, para 1 a. 8).

(4) Communications Security (COMSEC) continues to receive emphasis in the Brigade. A COMSEC support team from the 101st Radio Research Company monitored and presented COMSEC classes during the period 24 Feb - 25 Mar 1970. The Brigade was rated satisfactory by the COMSEC team. On 31 March 1970 a NESTOR Utilisation Plan was placed in effect in the Brigade. The plan is designed to increase use of NESTOR (Secure Voice) equipment, thereby increasing FM radio COMSEC. In an effort to reduce the number of SOI compromises, an increased emphasis on the physical security of SOI's has been instituted.

k. (C) Chemical Operations:

(1) During the reporting period, the 39th Chemical Detachment continued personnel detection operations, application of riot-control agent (RCA), defoliation missions, and flame operations in support of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

(2) Personnel Detectors-NHO Airborne Personnel Detector (APD):

(a) During the reporting period 32 missions were flown for a total flying time of 4035 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the KE-1H. Results of these missions were reported to 3-2, 3d Brigade.

(b) The unserviceability of our power source, which is necessary for trouble shooting the sniffer equipment is a continual problem. The power source is at present located with the 147 LEM facility at Long Binh in an attempt to regain this organisational maintenance capability.
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(3) Riot Control Agent Operations:

(a) During the reporting period there was one mission flown utilizing bulk CS. On 23 Mar 70, 60 drums of bulk CS-2 were dropped from coordinates XS374760 to XS363750. This represents 4800 lbs of CS-2 utilized in the area of the Plain of Reeds.

(b) There were 18 M158's Tactical Clusters expended during the reporting period. On 12 Feb 14 M158 Tactical Clusters were expended in vicinity coordinates X8702560 in a night gas ambush. Other M158's were expended on point type targets developed.

(c) Still in the developmental stages is a bunker bomb made with CS-2. This bomb is designed to be carried by the infantryman and consists of approximately 1/4 lbs persistent CS-2. Although still in the developmental stage this CS device promises to be very effective here in the Delta.

(4) Defoliation:

(a) During the reporting period two helicopters spray missions were accomplished expending 560 gallons of orange-diesel mix, covering 79 hectares in the area of vicinity coordinates X87157 - X86688.

(b) On 17 April 1970, one ground spray operation was conducted at Tan An Airfield with an expenditure of 110 gallons of White defoliant.

(c) During the reporting period three boat and eleven ground-spray operations were conducted using diesel fuel as a substitute for herbicide. A total of 7310 gallons were dispersed.

(5) Flame Field Expedients: On 17 March 1970, seven flame baths were employed in the vicinity X87158 to burn green nipa and brush.

1. (C) Radio Research Intelligence Support:

(1) During the reporting period Detachment 1, EME, 303d Radio Research Battalion provided intelligence support to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

(2) This support was rendered in the form of early warning and Derelict Reliable Intelligence Reports (URIK). The detachment also provides secure communications between the Brigade S-2 and 25O, 25th Infantry Division.

(3) In the month of February there were eleven (11) URIK's passed to the S-2 of the Brigade. In March the detachment provided three URIK's, and in April there were six URIK's given as well as two early warning reports indicating impending enemy action.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

m. (C) Air Force Weather Support:

(1) During the entire reporting period the Combat Weather Team #2, OLA, Detachment 32, 5th Weather Squadron Air Force Weather supported the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The detachment consists of two assigned personnel and standard weather forecasting equipment. Its mission is to support the Army Aviation and Air Force FAC's with pertinent weather data. It also relays weather data to the 25th Infantry Division for dissemination to all air traffic flying or planning to fly over Long An Province.

(2) Rain was experienced six days in Long An Province during this reporting period as recorded at Tan An Airfield Weather Station. The total rain accumulated was .70 of an inch with the heaviest rain fall accounted as .48 of an inch in one day. The temperatures ranged between 98°F and 76°F with an average high temperature of 95°F and an average low of 78°F. Relative humidity ranged from 98% down to 45% and averaged about 55% during mid-day. Winds were generally out of the east or southeast at eight to twelve knots with occasional gusts to 25 knots.

(3) The effect of weather on operations during this period was negligible. Only when ceiling, sky conditions, dropped to 1500 feet or below and/or the visibility range dropped to less than three miles were operations affected. Under these conditions the Air Force FAC's could not direct air strikes.

(4) During the next reporting period an increase in rain fall is expected along with thunder storms beginning during the month of May. June should be the real start of the rainy season. Visibility during the next reporting period will drop to 1-3 miles at times with rain and fog, but should hold mostly at seven miles.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSGR-65 (R2) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. (C) Personnel:

      (1) Utilization of postal facilities in unit moves.

      OBSERVATION: A unit move results in an increase in the utilization of postal facilities.

      EVALUATION: When 2d Battalion (Mech), 47th Infantry made a physical move from one permanent base location to another, lack of sufficient space at the new location and a shortage of available transportation caused assigned personnel to ship non-essential personal items to GURUS using postal facilities.

      RECOMMENDATION: That postal officers, when aware of a proposed unit move, should estimate the size of the move and plan to handle an increased volume of parcel post traffic during the period immediately prior to the move. Planning should include purchase of an increased amount of stamps and an increase in the number of postal facilities.

   b. (U) Intelligence: None

   c. (C) Operations:

      (1) Marking positions during daylight.

      OBSERVATION: In the past, smoke grenades have been used to mark friendly positions for aerial observers FAC's, gunships and for the command and control ship.

      EVALUATION: This system has inherent drawbacks because of the many times the airborne observer must check and recheck friendly positions before utilizing artillery, airstrikes, or rockets. It takes anywhere from 20 - 30 seconds for the smoke to billow and for it to be confirmed. This consumes valuable time and causes a delay before effective fire can be placed on enemy positions. Smoke grenades can also be seen by the enemy who is thereby aided in evading friendly forces and/or in fixing friendly dispositions.

      RECOMMENDATION: The VS-17 (marker) panel, when displayed on the ground or carried, can be recognized in a very short period of time. Once identified, the airborne observer will be able to maintain visual contact without calling for smoke. Use of marking panels also deprives the enemy of an easy means of locating our units.
(2) Cache sites located at 100 meter intervals.

Observation: Cache sites in the Plain of Reeds are located at approximately 100 meter intervals from stream junctions.

Evaluation: The morning after an engagement, a company element initiated a second sweep of the battle area. They subsequently discovered two (2) additional weapons and three (3) caches. The Lessons Learned emphasized the importance of a thorough daylight sweep and an insight to enemy cache techniques. It was noted that the cache sites were located at 100 meter intervals from a stream junction. By using these criteria it may be possible to detect future caches in the Plain of Reeds.

Recommendation: That units operating in the Plain of Reeds portion of the Delta should seek out suspected cache sites by searching at 10 meter intervals from stream junctions.

c. (c) Operations

(3) Modified use of Airmobile Pile-On and expanded initial insertion area.

Observation: The VC/NVA build bunkers in patches of nipa along stream lines. These areas, which are very thickly covered and difficult to move through, provide excellent areas for the VC/NVA to hide. Pile-On airmobile operations were not completely successful in trapping enemy units in these areas.

Evaluation: In order to increase their security and defend against U.S. airmobile operations, the enemy has spread his bunkers further apart and fragmented his units.

Recommendation: That units of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division modify the airmobile pile-on and expand the initial insertion area. Instead of attempting to immediately seal the initial point of contact during an airmobile Jitterbug operation, Platoons should insert up to 1 kilometer away from the initial point along major avenues of escape. Air cavalry teams should be used to cover the entire area and keep the enemy from moving. The Platoons then start a series of sweeping operations moving toward the initial contact area. This tactic also allows artillery to be employed while units are being inserted. The movement of the sweeping units forces any trapped enemy toward the original contact and denies small elements the opportunity to slip away from advancing US troops. Prior to darkness, all units should complete an encirclement of the area and artillery should be used throughout the night.
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SUBJ: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCR OSPOR-65 (R2) (U)


(d) Organization: None

(e) Training: None

(f) Logistics:

(1) Relocation of battalions.

OBSERVATION: Experience showed that the several procedures used in relocating battalions of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division promoted more expeditious unit moves.

EVALUATION: Turn-in of found-on-post equipment and excesses should be at a central receiving area with only the minimum documentation required. This will expedite the move by insuring rapid clearance of base areas. Post, camp, and station items of a displacing unit should be transferred to the unit taking over the vacated facility. The unit replacing the displacing unit should turn in all excesses from the location they are leaving. This will prevent double handling of items.

RECOMMENDATION: Definite dates must be established and coordinated for the transfer of all logistic and administrative support of the displacing unit to the headquarters gaining operational control. This will insure smooth and continuous support during the transitional period.

(2) Turnover of a Fire Support Base to GVN forces.

OBSERVATION: The turnover of a battalion-size FSB to the South Vietnamese Government requires exact inventories of buildings, strict combined control, and a designated Vietnamese agency to accept responsibility for the installation.

EVALUATION: A battalion prepares for the turnover of a FSB by making exact inventories of all real property on the installation. This inventory must include building dimensions, type of construction, and building use. Buildings intended for removal should be designated separately in the inventory. Buildings constructed by the Vietnamese prior to US occupation must be listed separately. As the battalion departs the FSB, a strict combined control must be established to prevent looting and uncontrolled removal of real property. Joint American and Vietnamese Security Guards must be established at each exit of the FSB. All vehicles departing the installation must be inspected by the Security Guards. All vehicles without the permission of the S-4 or Executive Officer to remove materials. Control of the FSB in transferred to the designated Vietnamese Agency during a ceremony. Upon completion of this ceremony the last American elements should depart the installation.
RECOMMENDATION: That detailed inventories of real property and plans for the controlled turnover of existing FSBs be prepared for possible turnover to the Government of Vietnam Forces.

(3) Rears and Refuel Points.

OBSERVATION: Many valuable helicopter blade hours are lost when operating a long distance from the permanent rearm/refuel points. The turn around for rearming and refueling may consume 25% of allotted blade hours, a non-profitable use.

EVALUATION: Time and blade hours can be conserved by establishing a forward rearm/refuel point during certain airmobile operations. A portable fuel pump, a 50 GPM pump with filter-separator, a 5,000 gallon tank trailer of JP-4 and a five-ton cargo truck of rockets and minigun ammunition can be utilized in any location accessible by road for a one day operation. With this arrangement, a four-position refuel point is established and the helicopters do not have to return to the main base camps to rearm and refuel.

RECOMMENDATION: That temporary, efficiently operated rearm/refuel points, using a 50 GPM pump with filter-separator, be utilized for airmobile operations in remote areas.

g. (U) Communications: None

h. (U) Materials:

(1) MBA1 Matting.

OBSERVATION: MBA1 Matting is an excellent surface material for all types of bridges.

EVALUATION: In some cases the matting must be cut to meet requirements of roadway width. Therefore, extensive use of acetylene and a cutting torch is necessary. Advantages of MBA1 are: (1) it can be pre-cut in a rear area, hauled to the job site and placed with a minimum amount of time and effort; (2) it provides a longer lasting and stronger wearing surface than timber. It also serves two functions on Eiffel bridges: as a decking and a wearing surface.

RECOMMENDATION: That MBA1 be used extensively on all types of Eiffel bridges and other types of bridges when regular bridge decking is not available.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

25 Incl

1. Task Organization

2. Brigade TAOI & Unit Locations

3. Assigned Units and Locations

4. Supporting Unit Locations and Relationships

5. Brigade Strength Chart

6. Casualties Chart

7. First Term Enlistment Chart

8. Roster of Key Personnel

9. Awards Chart

10. Medical Treatment Chart

11. Sheet of Offenses

12. Traffic Accident Chart

13. Enemy Unit Locations

14. Combat Statistics

15. Artillery Summary Chart

16. Tac Air Chart

17. 3d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery ORL

18. 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry ORL

19. 2d Battalion, 66th Infantry ORL

20. 5th Battalion, 66th Infantry ORL

21. 99th GS Support Battalion ORL

22. 56th Signal Company ORL

23. 571st Engineer Company ORL

24. 403d Military Police Platoon ORL

25. Air Cushion Vehicle Unit ORL

Incls 4 thru 9 & 11 & 17 thru 25 wd HQ DA

W. F. WILLIAMS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
VDCMH (14 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Operational Report for the period ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, APO 96225 24 May 1970

THRU: Commanding General, II FFORCEV, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO San Francisco 96266

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHG(DST), APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This Headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

T. J. HANIF
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
CONIFIDENTIAL

AVFCB-BU (14 May 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS GSFCR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, HQ, II FORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(OST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96338

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

2. (U) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Maintenance Support", page 22, paragraph 1g(3)(c). The purpose of the augmentation of mechanics to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, was to assist in the preparation of the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mech) for future operations. Hopefully, the battalion can be maintained in a posture which will not necessitate future augmentation of maintenance personnel.

   b. Reference item concerning "Utilisation of Postal Facilities in Unit Moves", page 30, paragraph 2a(l); concur. To properly implement this recommendation would require advance notice of approximately 60 days. Special authorisation is required to augment stamp stocks and additional unit postal facilities.

   c. Reference item concerning "Marking Positions During Daylight", page 30, paragraph 2c(l). In areas where airborne visibility permits, the W-17 (marker) panel will assist the airborne observer in maintaining visual contact, however the panels are of little or no value in jungle or canopied areas.

   d. Reference item concerning "MSA1 Matting", page 33, paragraph 2h(l).

      (1) MSA1 matting has been successfully used as an expedient surfacing material for many types of light bridges, particularly the French design Eiffel Bridge.

      (2) An additional advantage of MSA1 matting is its resistance to fire which is an additional deterrent to interdiction.
AVFEC-RE (14 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry
Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, ROH CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

(3) M3A1 matting should be considered as an expedient decking for
bridges when regular bridge decking is not available.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


CF:
CO, 25th Inf Div
CO, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
AVHGF-DST (14 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, ROB CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference items concerning "Intelligence", page 11-14, paragraph d. These items have been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

   b. Reference items concerning "Radio and Research and Air Force Weather Support". These items were included at this Headquarters request and have been extracted and forwarded to respective commanders.

   c. Reference item concerning "KCS Programs", page 25, paragraph 3a. The comment concerning the purpose of the KCS Program is in error. The purpose of the KCS Program is to provide US units assistance in scouting and patrolling and other combat operations. USARV Reg 525-9 should be consulted for a complete explanation of the program. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Cy furr:
II FORCEN
3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
GPOP-DT (14 May 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 JUL 70.
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310
This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
LT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFLICT

TASK ORGANIZATION

6-31 Inf
MP Elm/HHC/3/9 Inf Div
D/2-6 FA (DS)
Sct Dog Elm/45th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
Searchlight Sec/1/2-29 ADA (Reinf)

2-60 Inf
MP Elm/HHC/3/9 Inf Div
C/2-4 FA (DS)
Sct Dog Elm/45th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
Pay Ops Tm/Pay Ops Det/B/6 Pay Ops Bn (OPCON)

5-60 Inf
MP Elm/HHC/3/9 Inf Div
A/2-4 FA (DS)
Sct Dog Elm/45th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)

99th CSSR
Elm/ADA Sec (60mm) 5-2 FA (Reinf)
ADA Sec (Quad 50) 5-2 FA (Reinf) (01 Feb - 27 Apr)

Base Control
HHC 3/9 Inf Div
453d MP Plt
Pay Ops Det/B/6 Pay Ops Bn (OPCON)
2-4 Arty
264th FA (Arty) (01 Feb - 24 Apr)
276th FA (Arty)
C/5-42 FA (Reinf)

F/75th Rangers
571st Engr Co
56th Sig Co
45th Inf Plat (-) (Sct Dog)
39th Cav Plat (ASV)
TACP/22 TASS (DS)
65th Inf Det (CHE Tracker)
tingh Chem Det
493d MI Det
19th BN Det
19th PI Det

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*Confidential*
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## CONFIDENTIAL

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*These statistics reflect the friendly casualties and enemy eliminated for those subordinate elements while under Brigade control. (For example, 6-31 and 2-47 were not under Brigade OICCON for the entire period and thus their combat statistics are not shown here for the periods when they were OICCON to other Headquarters.*)
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**HOI Changes**

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70

CO, 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division

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1970

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52

**NO. OF REFS**

52

**PROJECT NO.**

N/A

**OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)**

702276

**SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**ABSTRACT**

N/A