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BY

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 135th Military Intelligence Group (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters 135th Military Intelligence Group for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, ACC
Acting The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)

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Security Officer
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Commanding Officer
135th Military Intelligence Group
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

TO: Commanding Officer
525th Military Intelligence Group
APO US Forces 96507

(U) The following report is submitted in accordance with USAW Regulation 870-2, dated 19 July 1966:

SECTION I
SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

(C) On 31 January 1966, the final draft of 155th Military Intelligence Group MOE 50-500D (C) was forwarded to the 525th MI Group for review and approval. The assimilation of Company B, 519th Military Intelligence Bn (Frd A) and the 155th MI Group required that the current TOEs of each unit be combined into one MOE which would reflect the redistribution of personnel and equipment assets in the new organisation. Action on formulating this MOE for the 155th MI Group was initiated on 10 August 1966 following the receipt of pertinent directives from higher headquarters.

(U) Prior to 10 January 1967, the 155th MI Group staff was organised into two staff divisions: an Operations Division and a Support Division. On 10 January 1967, the Group staff was reorganised into S1, S2, S3 and S4 Sections. This resulted in improved control of administration.

SECTION II
Part 1
OBSERVATIONS - LESSONS LEARNED

Personnel

Item: (U) Management of Operational Personnel
AVGJ-CCC 8 February 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Discussion: (C) As of September 1966, the Operations Division of this unit was staffed with 57 individuals, a number inadequate to cope with the workload of the headquarters. As a result, little time was available for the preparation and dissemination of comprehensive operational guidance to the field elements. Stop-gap methods were used in order to meet heavy operational requirements. Although personnel worked long hours, often suspense dates were not met. Prior to September 1966, no detailed records of production were kept by any section or desk.

Observation: (C) After accumulating sufficient statistical data, a study of the workload of the various elements of the Operations Division was made. This resulted in personnel shifts and assignments designed to insure that all operational functions were accomplished. Prior to the arrival of the 155th MI Group, no statistical records were kept on which realistic personnel assignments could be based. The following indicators are used for determining manpower needs in the Operations Division: production figures, manhours, and operational functions performed.

Operations

Item: (U) Communications in Operational Activities

Discussion: (C) Communications between Group Headquarters and its field elements are slow and, occasionally, unreliable. Processing time for Personnel Security Investigations is approximately 30 days, much of which is for transportation of operational correspondence. The average time required to deliver a Lead Sheet to Region I in La Wang is eight to ten days, with a corresponding number of days required for a response.

Observation: (C) Use of air in cases where operational correspondence must follow does not appreciably lower suspense time, although it gives the action office advance notice of requirements. The best solution would be to dispatch operational correspondence by air whenever possible; however, aircrews are reluctant to sign for and take custody of classified material, and difficulty is often encountered in getting the correspondence from the air terminal to the final destination.

Item: (C) Data Regarding Missing/Captured Personnel

Discussion: (C) This organization has the mission of collecting, collating, and plotting information concerning US and POW/POWAP Prisoners of War (POW's). This information is forwarded to higher headquarters for use in recovery operations.
8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

Reports received have been, in many instances, incomplete, inaccurate, or untimely. Timeliness is especially important since a PW can be moved in the time lapse between his sighting by a source and the launching of a recovery operation. Offers of monetary reward by the US Embassy to persons supplying data leading to the release of US PW's resulted in many false reports from bogus intelligence swindlers. A PW photo album is maintained by the unit for the purpose of making positive identification in sightings of PW's. Great difficulty has been encountered in obtaining photos of missing/captured personnel of all services.

Observation: (C) This Headquarters has published directives outlining general requirements which are to be fulfilled in reporting. Until recently, most information received concerning captured personnel has been fragmentary. It has usually consisted of dated observations made by the source. Emphasis is required in source debriefings in order to secure all possible information which might lead to the recovery of captured personnel.

SECTION II

Part 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) That an air courier service, for use solely by intelligence organizations, be established throughout the RVN for transport of high priority intelligence information. Such air couriers could also carry priority administrative correspondence and items of equipment.

2. (U) That a photograph of personnel of all services assigned to duty in the Republic of Vietnam be included in their respective 201 files.

Paul Goodman
Colonel, AFS
Commanding
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AVGJ-HC (14 Feb 67)  1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR)

HEADQUARTERS, 525TH MI GROUP APO 96307  16 March 1967

TO: Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters 135th
Military Intelligence Group and forward one copy of the Report.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

   a. Section I

      (1) The commanding officer did not state the number of
days the unit was engaged in training, troop movement, and/or oper-
ations, per USARV Regulation 870-2, paragraph 5a(1)(b).

      (2) The date of submission of the MTOE for this unit is

      (3) The title of the MTOE is shown as MTOE 30-500D (C),
indicating that the title is classified. The basic TOE is not class-
ified, and this MTOE should read MTOE 30-500D (U).

      (4) The concept of organization as mentioned will greatly
assist in administrative control and operational direction.

   b. Section II

      (1) The discussion and observation input for Management
of Operations Personnel (U), is appropriate for in-house correspon-
dence, but it is recommended that such comments not be submitted to
a higher headquarters. These comments appear to be a combination of
accusing a prior commander of failure to organize, and then taking cre-
dit for organizing.

      (2) Requirements from higher Headquarters substantially
increased this quarter and it is anticipated that the S3 Staff, 135th
MIG, may have to undergo further reorganization to fulfill the expanded
mission reflected in ACSI, J2, MACV, LOI, dated 2 Mar 67. Comments
regarding communications and detainees are shown below.

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AVGJ-HC (14 Feb 67) 1st Ind 16 March 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR)

(3) The discussion and observation input for Communications in Operational Activities (U) and Data Regarding Missing/Captured Personnel is not substantial enough to justify the recommendation of air courier service solely for intelligence organizations. When this document is received at USARV, and DA, CSFOR, the comment on the need for aircraft will be staffed through the Aviation Officer. Without more substantive discussion, Aviation would nonconcur.
USARV Regulation 870-2, paragraph 5a(1)(d)2, requires that effects of personnel and logistic support should be reported in sufficient detail to permit evaluation. Recommend this problem area be expanded upon or deleted based on the anticipated arrival of the 560th Aviation Detachment. Assignment of the programmed Aviation Detachment in July may alleviate this problem of communication.

(4) Part 2, 2: Should be amended to read: All DOD personnel assigned to an overseas area subject to hostilities will be photographed as part of POR requirements; photographs will be filed in Permanent and Field 201/Personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

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1 Incl 1
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AW-6C-14H (8 Feb 67)
2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (JOC: FSPAL-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, APO San Francisco 96307
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOH-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 135th
Military Intelligence Group as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item on communications in operational
activities, Page 2; Paragraph 1, Page 3; and Paragraph 2b(3), 1st
Indorsement: USAIV currently maintains a courier system which could
be utilized by the 135th Military Intelligence Group. Couriers utilize
Air Force aircraft for daily flights to most headquarters areas in
Vietnam, including Da Nang. These couriers transport classified material
to include SECRET/CRYPTO.

b. (FOUO) Reference item on data regarding missing or captured
personnel, Pages 2 and 3; Paragraph 2, Page 3; and Paragraph 2b(4), 1st
Indorsement:

(1) Paragraph 25c, AR 606-5, concerning issuance of ID cards,
states: "Two photographs will be prepared. One will be affixed to DD
Form 2a (green) and the other will be attached to the original copy of DA
Form 428 and filed in the individual's DA Form 201." DA Form 428 is the
application form for the ID card.

(2) Prior to April 1967, the DA Form 201 for missing enlisted
personnel was forwarded direct from the unit to USA Personnel
Services Support Center, Post Benjamin Harrison, and for officers to
The Adjutant General, ATTN: AGFP, DA. USAIV Message 21761, 6 Apr. 67,
was dispatched to all Army commands, requiring the DA Form 201 (Personnel
Records) to be forwarded to G2, USAIV. This new procedure is necessary
under the LEAP-PAC Program.

(3) The CO, 135th MI Group has been advised of the above
and of action being taken to obtain missing photographs. Additionally,
personnel management teams, when visiting subordinate commands, will
include as an item of special interest the requirement that each DA Form
AVHGC-DH 2d Ind 3 MAR 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (CSG CSS-65)

201 contain a photograph as required by paragraph 25c, An 606-5. When photographs are missing, the command concerned will be requested to take corrective action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JERRY V. KORN
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
GPOP-OT (8 Feb 67) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 25 MAY 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. R. KOBALY
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 135th Military Intelligence Group**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 66 to 31 Jan 67.

CO, 135th Military Intelligence Group

**Report Date**
8 February 1967

**Contract or Grant No.**
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**Project No.**
670104

**Other Report No(s)**
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**Supplementary Notes**
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**Sponsoring Military Activity**
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**Abstract**

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