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DOD 5200.1-3 & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11805
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (3 Mar 67) FOR OT 664421

19 OT 411 - L 1K ORN 9 3

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 716th Military Police Battalion

To: Quarter Master Sgt

1. Forwarded as enclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 716th Military Police Battalion dated 8 November 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

a/s

FILE COPY

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AVBGE-GC

8 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFCR-65)

THRU: Commanding Officer
89th Military Police Group
APO 96307

Commanding Officer
18th Military Police Brigade
APO 96307

Deputy Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army (ASCFOR, DA)
Washington D.C. 20310

In accordance with the provisions of AR 525-24 and USARV Reg 870-2 this unit's operational report on lessons learned is transmitted herewith.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

T C Jones
CPT, NPC
Adjutant

1 Incl
a/s

Copies furnished
L-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH
3-DCG, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH
L-CO, 18th MP Bde
L-CO, 89th MP Group

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Section I. Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

a. During the reporting period, assigned and attached units of the battalion included Headquarters Detachment, Companies A, B, and C of the 716th Military Police Battalion, 615th Military Police Company, 527th Military Police Company (see enclosure 1) and the 90th Military Police Detachment. The 527th Military Police Company was assigned to the Battalion effective 8 September 1966, per General Order 41, 89th Military Police Group, dtd 20 September 1966. Headquarters of all units were located in the Saigon/Cholon area. The battalion and attached units are under the command of the 89th Military Police Group, located at Pershing Field, Saigon, while operational control is under the -
Commanding General, US Army Headquarters Area Command. One platoon of the 615th Military Police Company completed special duty with Headquarters II Field Force. Vietnam at Bien Hoa and was transferred to special duty with the 92nd Military Police Battalion, Pershing Field, Saigon. All units except Headquarters Detachment of the battalion and the 90th Military Police Detachment perform security and law enforcement duties. Headquarters Detachment and the 90th Military Police Detachment performed administrative duties for the Battalion and Provost Marshal, US Army Headquarters Area Command, respectively. On 4 August 1966, command of the battalion was passed from Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Luce to Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Johnson.

b. The 716th Military Police Battalion and attached units were committed operationally throughout the reporting period. The primary mission continues to be security and law enforcement in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhat area. Specific security missions, involving approximately 70% of the military police resources of the battalion, include BOQ’s, HQ’s, the US Embassy, critical US facilities, installations and the Saigon Port. The port security mission is handled by 46 men from the 615th Military Police Company in support of FM, 4th Terminal Command. The law enforcement mission involved normal military police functions, to include criminal investigations.

(1) There were no major terrorist activities to disrupt normal police operations during this period.

(2) Special missions received from Commanding Officer, 89th Military Police Group are as follows:

(a) Operation Wren (U)
(b) Operation Bluejay (U)
(c) Operation Meadowlark (U)
(d) Operation Robin (U)
(e) Operation March (U)
(3) There were no special missions received from Commanding General, US Army Headquarters Area Command, which affected normal police or security operations during this period.

(4) (C) As of 31 October 1966, all members of the 716th Military Police Battalion except the 527th Military Police Company have completed the transition training from the M-14 rifle to the XM-16E1 rifle. Additional XM-16E1 rifles are on requisition to replace the M-14 rifles of the 527th Military Police Company. The XM-16E1 rifle provides the individual with a weapon that is ideal for this unit's present mission.

(5) (C) Approximately 70% of the battalion personnel continued to be employed in securing critical US installations, activities and billets. Construction of reinforced concrete booths (Kiosks), consisting of an 8 inch thick, concrete semi-circle, with a supported metal roof, has been completed at a majority of the static posts. Additional "Kiosks" will be constructed as needed. The protection afforded by these "Kiosks" has been a positive factor in the high morale of those personnel assigned to static security. As of 29 October 1966, 102 booths were emplaced, with construction and future planning calling for an increase to 200.

(6) (C) Experience continues to prove the worth of machine gun patrol operational during the critical hours between 2300-0700 hours daily. This "gun jeep" is a ½ ton, 4X4, M-151 vehicle, with the windshield removed and replaced by a single layer of sandbags. Each vehicle is manned by two military policemen, the rider armed with an M-60 machine gun, and the driver, an M-16 rifle. These vehicles, mounting an AN/VRC-10 radio, are assigned to nine specific patrol areas within metropolitan Saigon/city. The vehicles are fitted with an armor-plating kit which provides additional protection to the sides and rear. They are, however, highly vulnerable to small arms fire directed from above. With their mobility, erratic patrol patterns and firepower capability, the "gun jeeps" constitute, individually and collectively, a major deterrent to terrorist activities.

(7) During this reporting period, the battalion engaged in 13 days of weapons training and familiarization firing. Weapons fired during this period included the .45 caliber pistol (continuing), M3A1 submachine gun, M-14 rifle, XM-16E1 rifle (continuing) and the M-60 machine gun (continuing).

(8) Other subjects stressed:

(a) Character Guidance.
(b) Command Information.
(c) SAEDA.
(d) Search and Seizure.
(e) Basic Vietnamese.
(f) Code of Conduct.

(g) Military Courtesy and Discipline.

(h) Maintenance, Supply and Equipment and Supply Economy.

(i) Refresher Driver Training, to include familiarization with Vietnamese regulations, road signs, defensive driving, 1st echelon maintenance.

(j) Intelligence.

(k) MP/Cahn Sat (National Police) relations.

(l) Apprehension and Restraint.

(m) Others, as prescribed by Commanding Officer, 99th Military Police Group and Commanding Officer, 716th Military Police Battalion, totaling not less than eight (8) hours per week, not including the weapons training.

(9) (c) The battalion continues to operate its communications net utilizing AN/VRC-10 and the commercial Motorola radio in lieu of the V/C-46. Within the next three to eight weeks the AN/VRC-10 will be replaced by the AN/VRC-46.

c. Personnel: The following report concerning SI activities during the reporting period is submitted:

(1) There were no cases of malaria by members of the battalion or attached units.

(2) Personnel of the battalion and attached units were involved in 27 minor traffic accidents, only one of which a member of the battalion was at fault. Considering the tremendous volume of traffic in the Saigon area and the fact that members of the battalion drive over 200,000 miles per month, the accident rate is exceptionally low.

(3) One hundred and twenty-five members of the battalion were granted TDY for the purpose of rest and recuperation out of country. All personnel who applied were granted TDY for R&R.

(4) The battalion participated in various civic action projects, the major one being the collecting of funds to build a home for blind orphans in the Saigon area. Blue prints for the home have been drawn, a contractor engaged, and land has been obtained.

(5) The venereal disease rate during this period was 1.8 percent of the battalion and attached units.

(6) The battalion maintained an approximate 10 percent overstrength during this period; however, without this overstrength the battalion would have been unable to meet its commitments.
There were two congressional inquiries, both of which have been satisfactorily resolved.

During this period discipline of the battalion and attached units was considered to be good, as the article 15 and court martial rate was less than 1 percent.

One third of the officer strength and approximately 10 percent of the enlisted strength rotated to CONUS during this period. Significant in personnel losses was a complete change of the battalion staff.

One third of the officer strength and approximately 10 percent of the personnel strength rotated to CONUS during this period. Significant in personnel losses was a complete change of the battalion staff.

A significant shortage of clerical personnel was experienced by the battalion, necessitating the placing of school trained military policemen in these positions and re-training them as clerks.

The battalion during this period was awarded 1 Bronze Star medal with "V" device, 8 Bronze Star medals for meritorious service, 2 Army Commendation medals with "V" device, 5 Army Commendation medals for meritorious service, 1 Air medal, and 21 Purple Heart medals. Two men were killed in action, two were seriously wounded, and seventeen wounded.

d. (C) During the preceding three month period the 716th Military Police Battalion revamped its internal maintenance operation. All mechanics were placed under the direct control and supervision of the battalion Motor Officer in order to consolidate maintenance activities. Vehicles are operational on a 24 hour basis, and, therefore, a continuous maintenance capability must be available.

e. (C) The Vietnamese National Election, held on 11 September 1966, was accompanied by a period of increased terrorist activity within the Saigon-Cholon area. This activity was anticipated and expected to begin on or about 1 September 1966. As a result, it became necessary to increase security, with the numerous static posts manned by members of this battalion. One hundred radio sets, AN/PRC-10, were obtained and stationed at the static posts, BOCs, PEOs, and the vital US installations.

Section 2, Observations (Lessons Learned):

a. Personnel:

ITEM: Serviceman's Group Life Insurance

DISCUSSION: Some personnel coming to this unit directly from USATC's in CONUS have not had the benefits of the SOLI adequately explained to them with the result that they have not elected to have the policies effected. When the program is explained at this headquarters it is necessary that those personnel not having policies in effect have a physical examination and file a request for coverage.

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OBSERVATION: It would be unusual for personnel who have had SGLI explained to them adequately to refuse coverage. If adequate indoctrination as to the SGLI benefits were given at basic training units the additional burden of having a complete physical at already overtaxed medical facilities in RVN could be eliminated. In addition, personnel would not arrive in RVN without life insurance coverage.

b. Operations:

ITEM: Armor Plating.

DISCUSSION: Currently this unit has fourteen armor plating kits for truck, utility, 7 ton, M-151. There are twelve kits installed. Experience with these vehicles so protected, has proven many of the initial objections.

OBSERVATION:

(1) Advantages: The use of armor plating on machine gun patrols have decreased the crews vulnerability to small arms fire. This is especially true of small arms fire directed at the sides of the vehicle. A psychological advantage is gained by the crew's increased confidence in the vehicle.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) The additional weight has caused increased breakdowns involving prop shafts, u-joints, wheel bearings and bearing housing units. The armor plating has a tendency to crack easily.

(b) Additional preventive maintenance is required to properly maintain armor plated vehicles and thus utilizes increased maintenance personnel.

(c) The vehicle presents increased vulnerability to grenades being tossed into the vehicle. The driver's vision and the vehicles maneuverability is decreased by the added weight and shape of the armor plating. Once modified, the vehicle loses the advantage of being used regularly for other purposes. One 1400 pound experimental armor plating kit was assembled on a 7 ton truck for ACTIV. This kit proved too heavy and had the disadvantage of seriously limiting the driver's visibility. Additional kits were released to the 720th MP BN, for highway patrols.

ITEM: Commando, V-100 (Cadillac-Cage Corporation)

DISCUSSION: The armored command car, V-100, has been inspected and test driven. Vehicle seems to have many desirable qualities for Military Police work. Additional studies are being conducted by the 18th Military Police Brigade.

OBSERVATION: While the Commando V-100, is certainly the vehicle for convoy escort, its use in the metropolitan area to which this unit is assigned would be restricted. Consequently the information gathered by this unit was passed to the 18th Military Police Brigade for additional study in other environment in Vietnam.
ITEM: AN/VRC-46 and AN/VRC-47 radios.

DISCUSSION: The addition of the AN/VRC-46, and AN/VRC-47 radios, which were brought to VN by the 527th MP Co., has increased the communications capability of the Battalion.

The use of AN/PRC-10 radios in Military Police Security Posts has been of significant value. Since their inclusion in the Battalion Communications Network they have greatly increased the security posture of American Installations.

OBSERVATION: The shortage of a significant number of AN/VRC-46 and AN/VRC-47 radios in the Battalion is a great detriment to the communications ability of the Battalion. The AN/VRC-10 (10 AN/VRC-46) does not meet the communication requirements of the Military Police Operation in the city of Saigon. The range limitations of the radio set AN/VRC-10, though similar to the AN/VRC-46, are much greater. Buildings and high tension lines, as are found in any city, have a tendency to ground the signal transmitted from the maximum output of 16 watts on the AN/VRC-10. The AN/VRC-46, with its increased output of 25 watts will penetrate into areas inaccessible to the AN/VRC-10.

Due to the age of the AN/VRC-10, the radio sets are often in repair at 3rd echelon or higher level. This, plus the complexity of the repair work required to mend faults found in the AN/VRC-10, reduce the availability of the radio sets to the Battalion. This requires that radio sets be switched from vehicle-to-vehicle, greatly increasing the number of hours of operation, and reducing the amount of time that the radio set is available for 1st and 2nd echelon Preventive Maintenance.

It would be a decided advantage to the Battalion, increasing the communications ability through increased range, greater selection of frequencies, and ease of maintenance, if the Radio Sets, AN/VRC-46 and AN/VRC-47, authorized by TOE 19-37F, were delivered and installed.

ITEM: Use of AN/PRC-10 radios on static posts.

DISCUSSION: The use of AN/PRC-10 radios on Military Police Security Posts has greatly improved the security posture of American Installations. The radios were positioned on the static posts just prior to the critical period immediately preceding the Vietnamese National Elections, 11 September 1966.

OBSERVATIONS: There was upon implementation of the AN/PRC-10 net, difficulty in maintaining constant communications with the Net Control Station (NCS). Several of the radio sets were too far away from the NCS to adequately transmit an uninterrupted signal. By remoting several antennas, communication was established with all Security Posts.

The Battalion Communications Section obtained an AN/PRC-25 for test purposes in the Saigon area. The radio was carried to each Security post, placed at the site, and wired into the NCS. Due to no time or place did the
AN/FPC-25 fail to establish contact with the NCS, without the aid of remoted antennas. It is felt that the replacement of the AN/FPC-10 with the AN/FPC-25 would be of a definite asset to the Communications Capability of the Battalion, and it would not over the extended frequency ranges of the AN/VRC-46.

c. Training and Organization: None.
d. Intelligence: None.
e. Logistics:

ITEM: Consolidation of Battalion Maintenance Capability.

DISCUSSION: It became obvious during the past quarter that a 24 hour maintenance service would be necessary to support the constant use of patrol vehicles used for military police duties. Consolidation offered the best solution to this problem. Presently, the entire Battalion Motor Pool Operation, including maintenance, PLL, and records, is consolidated.

OBSERVATION: The consolidation has greatly increased the efficiency of the motor pool operation. Parts are more readily available and fewer vehicles are deadlined. In addition, it is now possible to accomplish scheduled maintenance services on a far more regular basis.

f. Other: None.

Section 2, Part II, Recommendations:

a. Personnel: That the spaces for motor maintenance personnel previously deleted, be restored to this battalion's Table of Organization and Equipment. This headquarters has requested this action in an MTCE recently submitted.

b. Operations: None.

c. Training and Organization: That all military police units have their squad leaders upgraded from E5 to E6 and that an assistant squad leader, grade E5, be provided. This would provide much needed sequence of promotion in military police units and allow retention of good Non-Commissioned Officers currently being lost.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Other: None.

Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: None

RICHARD S. JOHNSON
LTC, HHC
Commanding

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SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned (RCS-CeFPO-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 89TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96307 17 November 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army
(ASCFOR, DA), Washington, D. C. 20310

(i) The following are comments by this headquarters of the Operational Report of the 716th Military Police Battalion:

1. (ii) Section II, Part I. Personnel: Servicemen's Group Life Insurance: This headquarters concurs with this recommendation.

2. (FOMO) Section II, Part I. Operations:

   a. (FOMO) Armor Plating: Army Concept Team in Vietnam is continually evaluating and recommending modifications to armor plating kits, with continual queries going out to using units for suggestions on/ or recommendations for equipment improvement. The 716th Military Police Battalion is currently in receipt of detailed "evaluation" and "after action" questionnaires regarding these kits, with a suspense date to USARV of 15 December 1966.

   b. (FOMO) AN/MRC 46 and AN/MRC 47 radios: These radios are currently arriving in country in bulk quantities and being issued on a priority of combat support, then combat service support units. Latest information indicates these radios will not be issued to Military Police units in the III and IV CTZ for another three (3) months.

   c. (FOMO) Use of AN/MRC 10 radio on static posts: The 716th Military Police Battalion has submitted a modified Table of Organization and Equipment which includes the number of AN/MRC 10 radios necessary to accomplish their static post security mission.

3. (i) Section II, Part II. Personnel: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation that the spaces for motor maintenance personnel be restored to this battalion's Table of Organization and Equipment.

4. (ii) Section II, Part II. Training and Organization: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation to upgrade the Military Police unit squad leader from 9A to 1A and that an
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A H I C (13 Nov 66)  1st Ind  1st November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned (22 Oct-23 Nov 66)

Assistant squad leader grade R-2 be provided. The battalion has
submitted a revised Table of Organization and Equipment with the
upgrades included.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Incr

as

major, 1st

Adjutant

10

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AVBGE-GG (8 November 1966)  2nd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, 17TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96307, 28 December 1966

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, of the 716th Military Police Battalion is forwarded herewith.

2. (FOUO) This headquarters has reviewed the report and the first indorsement, considers them adequate, concurs with the observations and recommendations and adds the following comments:

   a. (U) Reference Section 2, paragraph a, Item: Serviceman's Group Life Insurance, page 4 and paragraph 1, 1st Ind. Concur. Recommend that personnel arriving in RVN directly from USATC's in CONUS be thoroughly oriented on the benefits of the SGLI prior to assignment to this theater of operations.

   b. (FOUO) Reference Section 2 paragraph b, Item: AN/VRC-46 and AN/VRC-47 Radios, page 6 and paragraph 2b, 1st Ind. Authorized AN/VRC 46 and AN/VRC 47 radios have been delivered and installed.

   c. (U) Reference Section 2, paragraph b, Item: Use of AN/VRC-10 radios on static posts, page 6 and paragraph 2c, 1st Ind; Section 2, Part II, paragraph a, page 7 and paragraph 3, 1st Ind; Section 2, Part II, paragraph c, page 7 and paragraph 4, 1st Ind. Referenced MTOO has been returned to the submitting unit for correction of format errors and additional justification.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CLAUDIA S. OWEN
CPT, MPO
Adjutant

1 Incl no

DOWNGRADED TO FOUO
WHEN SEPARATED FROM BASIC LETTER

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AVHOC-DH (8 Nov 66) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 3 JAN 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 716th Military Police Battalion as indorsed.

2. Concur with the basic report as modified by the previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
Br. Lt., AG
Ass. Adjutant General

1 Incl
no
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GPOP-OT(8 Nov 66) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (MCOS CHFOR-65), HQ 716th MP Bn

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 24 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. L. McLell..
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
INCLOSURE(S)__________

13
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 716th Military Police Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, Aug to 31 Oct 66.

CO, 716th Military Police Battalion

8 November 1966

N/A

N/A

N/A

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