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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Period 1 May to 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army (ASSFOR DA)
Washington, D.C. 20310

SPECIAL NOTE
Subject at right is enclosed for your information.

SECTION I
COMPLIANCE NARRATIVE

A. COMMON TRENDS:

1. (C) During the period 1 May through 31 July 1966, the 89th Military Police Group continued to provide security support throughout the Republic of Vietnam. At the termination of this quarterly period, the total strength of the Group was 503. With the addition of the 506th Military Police Company, the 92d Military Police Battalion attained operational status. The 252d Det also arrived, adding to the investigative support capabilities of the 89th Military Police Group.

2. (C) As of 31 July 1966, the following units were assigned or attached as subordinate to this headquarters:

   a. 92d Military Police Battalion (HED)
      (1) 30th Military Police Company
      (2) 188th Military Police Company

   b. 95th Military Police Detachment (HED)
      (1) 91st Military Police Detachment (Confinement Facility)
      (2) 148th Military Police Platoon
      (3) 557th Military Police Company (Escort Guard)
      (4) 560th Military Police Company
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1. (6) On 24 June 1966, the 300th Military Police Company arrived at Vung Tau, RVN, and was subsequently deployed to the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area. Organized under provisions of TQ 11-97F, and under the command of Capt Charles R. Glick, the unit was assigned to the 92d Military Police Battalion with a primary mission of port and vessel security.

2. (6) On 29 July 1966, the 198th Military Police Company disembarked at Vung Tau, RVN, and on 31 July 1966 was flown to Tan Son Nhut for overseas duty with the 92d Military Police Battalion. This Company will be utilized for port and vessel security in the Saigon Port area, to including the guarding of vital installations.

3. (U) Key personnel assignments and significant changes within the Staff, major commands were as follows:

   a. Lt Col Richard S. Johnson – to XO, 69th Military Police Group

   b. Major David J. Anderson – assumed command of the 95th Military Police Battalion and Installation Coordinator for Pursuing Field.

   c. Capt Eugene Siegel – XO of 95th Military Police Battalion

   d. Major James R. Barkur – to Adjutant 69th Military Police Group
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a. Captain Raymond H. Humphrey - to S-1, 89th Military Police Group
b. Captain Robert W. Short - to S-2, 89th Military Police Group
c. Captain Lawrence Willaiming to CO, 615th MP Company
d. Captain Ronald Shum - to Civic Action Information Officer, 89th MP Group

e. WO Billy W. Farrow - to Personnel Officer, 89th MP Group
f. Captain Thomas H. Sanford - to Physical Security Officer, 89th MP Group

6. (U) Significant Changes in Organization and/or Group Structure:

a. The 516th Military Police Platoon: The Prisoner of War Processing Platoon was inactivated and the equipment laterally transferred to other units under provisions of Lttr dtd 11 May 66 IACV. This was instituted due to the needs of IACV for MI advisors.

b. 560th Military Police Company: Under the command of Capt Darrell B. Hartson, moved from Shua Compound, TSN, to Con Tho assuming an operational mission of Military Police support in IV CTZ.

c. Operational Units: With the arrival of the 305th Military Police Battalion, the 92a Military Police Battalion became operational. The Battalion's primary mission is that of vessel and port security in the Saigon Port Area.

d. The 118th Military Police Platoon came under operational control 89, USAV Special Troops, assuming the mission of security for H3, USAV.

7. (U) Movement to New Location: Though construction in the Long Binh area continued, the 89th Military Police Battalion began formulating plans to relocate. The move itself is contemplated in late August. The first unit to relocate to Long Binh will be USAV Stockade (91st MP Det). Other 89th MP Group units programmed for Long Binh are: 89th Military Police Group Headquarters, 720th MP Bn (not in country), 557th MP Company, and the 615th MP Company.

8. PERSONNEL, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

1. (U) A modification to TGS has been requested for a Group Information Officer to insure that Group activities, interesting occurrences and individual
Achievements are afforded appreciation and publicity which is necessary and helpful to individuals doing a consistently exemplary job. Also, the information officer will endeavor to ensure that the military policemen themselves recognize the distinguished achievements, civic affairs projects, and "esprit de corps" of the various units within the Group. The "Melbarian Herald", the Group's newspaper, continues to be published monthly and is eagerly received by the men of the Group. Members of the command are urged to submit articles for publication and this has been an excellent morale factor because of these personal contributions. In addition a commend letter is distributed weekly to keep the men of this command abreast of the commander's policies.

2. (U) There were no malaria cases contracted during this reporting period. Command emphasis in the implementation of the malaria program continues.

3. (U) There were 17 traffic accidents reported during this period, a slight reduction from the previous quarter. All units of this command have presented a class in "Safe Driving in Vietnam", which is tailored to local driving conditions. Military policemen operating patrol vehicles are directed to comply with, as well as enforce, whenever necessary, the basic traffic laws and local rules of traffic. All personnel, to include new arrivals, are oriented on the importance of traffic courtesy, and the part it plays in improving our image with the Vietnamese people.

4. (U) Personnel in the command are taking advantage of the R&R program. Subject to operational requirements and current directives of higher headquarters, maximum participation in the program is encouraged. Maximum publicity also is given to the In-country R&R program. R&R allocations to this command continue to be adequate.

5. (U) The 89th Military Police Group continues to receive support from the public in the United States for their Civic Action Project at the Orphanage Nationals. Among contributions received during the reporting period was a check from Mr. Robert Carroll, Kansas City, Mo., in the amount of $1,112. Mr. Carroll visited the Orphanage in December of 1965 and has subsequently spoken in the United States on many occasions on the Orphanage and its sponsorship by the 89th Military Police Group. In addition to monetary contributions, the Group has received donations of clothing and toys from many organizations and individuals. On 8 July 1966, a permanent Board of Governors of the 89th Military Police Group Civic Action Fund was elected by personnel of the Group at large. As the program has progressed in size, it has the time necessary to provide over the general activity, hence, the Board of Governors; through this program (and others), which has received sincere appreciation of the Vietnamese people, it is felt that a bridge to understanding has been initiated.
6. (PU) An average of 31 VD cases were reported monthly during this period. Vigorous action is being taken by commanders at all levels to keep VD rates in check. In outlying units where there is not easy access to exchange facilities, units are providing prophylactic devices free of charge to their men. Preventive action measures continue.

7. (U) Military Policemen on static posts in the Saigon/Cholon area are now armed with the M-16 rifle. Weapons familiarization and indoctrination are conducted prior to assignment of an individual to duty. In addition, permanent type guard posts are now in existence and provide the Military Policeman with additional safeguards against terrorist activities.

8. (C) The Group strength as of 31 July 1966 was 303. This represents an overstrength of 632 enlisted men, and can be attributed to an over requisition by HQ USAV during the build-up because of personal shortages, and an increase in local overseas extension by personnel currently assigned. The overstrength in MOS 958 was to be reduced by cancelling the June requisition. Information furnished by higher headquarters indicated that DA will reduce our existing requisitions to compensate for the current overstrength. No difficulties pertaining to rotation were encountered during period 1 April 1966 to 31 July 1966. Non-arrival of certain key type replacements (nuclear sargent, mess stewards, supply sargent) is being felt, requiring personnel of lesser rank and experience to carry out the responsibilities of the position.

9. (U) There were eighteen Congressional Inquiries and Presidential Interest type correspondence processed during this reporting period. In all cases, extensive investigations were conducted. Corrective action, where required, has been taken. Personnel are continually counselled to utilize military channels seeking assistance.

C INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (U) Intelligence a. Information of a low intelligence value continues to be provided by the 11th Security Dog Company. Penetrations and probing of unfortunes proved useful in determining security requirements for installations, although the bulk of intelligence on incidents was reported through the Judge Marshal and Criminal Investigation channels.

b. Information regarding combat intelligence was made available in the form of weekly intelligence reports, listing combat operations and was the basis of the reports to subordinates. The Intelligence Collection Plan, published on 1 April 1966, provided a sound basis for units to gather low level intelligence. Units, consequently, based their own collections on essential items desired, by the 89th RP Group and CS USAV.

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2. (U) Counterintelligence:

a. There were 303 security actions processed by this headquarters during the reporting period; these included 129 clearance validations, 17 final security clearances granted, 92 clearance requests forwarded and no revocations or denial actions.

b. The Intelligence and Security Section, S-2, maintained a high degree of efficiency, with no security violations reported or disclosed.

D. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

1. (S) Major Operations Supported:

   a. Military Police units of the Group provided support for the following major operations during the reporting period:

      (1) Operation HOUSECUT II involved the receipt, processing and movement of the Logistic Support Package (LSP) through the aerial/surface port of Nha Trang to designated staging areas.

      (2) Operations HOUSECUT was designed to provide support, to include personnel and equipment, from available resources to Commanding General 1st Log Command, for security within the Saigon/Nha Be Port Complex. Military Police provided personnel to man water patrols and central and communications centers.

      (3) Operation YIKIYOGO: A 12 man operation involving tactical security patrols on the main supply routes connecting 1st Infantry Division vicinity Di Linh and the 25th Inf Division, vicinity of Chu Chi, with Saigon. This provided valuable expertise for future operations. This operation, however, was terminated during this period due to shortage of available personnel.

      (4) Operation ROBAR involved the receipt, processing and movement of the 4th Inf Division and associated non-divisional units through the ports of Cam Ranh Bay/Nha Trang and subsequent deployment to field locations.

      (5) The following operational plans by 39th MP Group were formulated in July for future operations to be executed during next reporting period:

         a. Operation BLUE JAY
         b. Operation STSME
         c. Operation M1000-LRX
         d. Operation -RN

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b. Support for these operations involve varying degrees and combinations of:

(1) Port Security
(2) Vessel Security
(3) Convoy Escort Security.
(4) Traffic Control and Route Security.

c. Numerous company sized units were assisted in minor administrative movements during this period.

d. In addition, the 295th HP Battalion provides escorts for the 90th Replacement Battalion for movement of rotating and arrivals from Saigon to Long Binh nightly. On a number of occasions, escorts have received small arms fire, but, to date, has suffered no casualties.


b. Vessel Security: Responsibility for Port and Vessel Security is being transferred from CO 89th HP Group to CO 1st Log Comd. Resources from the 92d HP Battalion will continue to support this mission.

c. MACV Provost Marshal Support: Continuing through the reporting period was requirement of assistance and support to the MACV Provost Marshal in Bangkok, Thailand. Currently, the Group provides eight (8) enlisted Military Police men and two commissioned officers. Personnel are programmed to Bangkok on a staggered assignment. This support will terminate during the next reporting period as the 219th Military Police Company will arrive in Thailand, August 1966.

d. Entry Point Program: At the closure of the reporting period, a 111 of 146 dogs were utilized by the 89th Military Police Group. These 77, assigned to the 212th Military Police Company (Entry Log), are utilized in-country locations, amounting a total of 146 posts. Additional posts have been surveyed and approved and will be initiated in the near future. Permanent K9 facilities at Phan Rang and Can Tho have not been completed. The kennels located at Vinh Long, Soc Trang and Long Binh have been completed.

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3. (C) Communications activities: Significant communication activities accomplished during the report period are:
   a. Established a re-curring inspection system for outlying detachments.
   b. Submission of a Group MI Communications Net for all RTN.
   c. Requisitioning of old radios to supplement present non-existent items.

B. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Supply and Maintenance Management: During this reporting period, supply and maintenance management inspections and visits were conducted in four (4) units and eight (8) locations by members of the Group's 5th staff. Assistance and guidance was extended in continuing efforts to maintain the highest calibre of supply and maintenance management. This command has experienced no difficulty in the procurement of vehicle spare parts, other than on relatively infrequent occasions during the reporting period (e.g., N-15 vehicular batteries).

2. (U) Organizational Clothing and Equipment: Comments included in this command's last CML, dated 15 May 66, remain applicable.

SECTION II
COMMAND'S OBSERVATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

A. PART I OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

1. Personnel:
   a. Item: Large number of personnel losses due to PCS
   b. Discussion: The large number of personnel rotating within a short period of time has had adverse effects on operations in Group.
   c. Observations: To transfer personnel within the command within 123 and 305 so that no more than 1/12 of personnel within a unit will rotate in any given month. This is to preclude any unit from having a heavy loss of personnel due to 123 in any one month.
2. OPERATIONS

1. Item: Convoy and Route Security

Discussion: Military Police units employed in convoy and route security missions are subject to continual enemy fire, especially during the hours of darkness. Military Police so employed use M-60 equipped 4 ton trucks and, as such, are exposed and vulnerable.

Observation: That a requirement exists for the issue of M-151 armor plating kits to Military Police units engaged in this type mission. Elements of the 50th Military Police Battalion have utilized this equipment with posit results.

2. Item: Port and Vessel Security

Discussion: Military Police employed in mission of Port and Vessel security are separated from reaction forces by a time-distance-water factor. Communication with shore forces and harbor craft are conducted with the M1/PRO-25 radio, a cumbersome radio not easily adaptable to this mission. Military Policemen are currently armed with M-4 rifles.

Observation: That a need exists for weaponry featuring rapid fire and ease of handling. That a requirement exists for a miniaturized M1 radio capable of being hand carried and transmitting considerable distances.

3. Item: Assumption of full control, to include operational control, of all non-tactical MP units in RVN.

Discussion: At the present time one of the Group's four battalions is under operational control of an area commander. The remaining battalions have either direct or general support functions.

Observation: The 89th Military Police Group should retain operational control of all of its assigned units and it should be tasked with the mission of providing general and direct support to area commanders. This should improve utilization of resources and assist in proportional distribution of resources to assure accomplishment of all assigned missions.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

1. Item: Reaction training for MP patrols providing security escorts to convoys.

Discussion: Military Police patrols providing security escorts for bus convoys carrying, relieves and replacements to and from the 90th Replacement
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Battalion have an inherent mission of serving as a reaction force in events
of attack. This requires training in reactionary measures to be taken to
protect the convoys.

Observations: That special patrol reaction training is necessary in
order for patrols to adequately carry-out their mission.

II. Submission of Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment.

Discussion: Present TOE's of all 89th MP Group units require
modification in personnel and equipment authorization in order to adequately
accomplish their assigned missions.

Observation: Units which require modification of their present
TOE's should submit properly documented requests for TOE's. This problem
should be alleviated somewhat with the pending publication of USARV Regulation
30-33.

4. LOGISTICS:

5. COMMUNICATIONS:

Item: Second echelon signal maintenance support

Discussion: Several MP companies having detachments and subdetach-
ments located throughout RVN do not have the organic capability of providing
second echelon signal maintenance support to their detachments.

Observations: The detachments must receive maintenance support
from signal units in the area where the detachments are located.

B. Part II Recommendations:

1. Personnel: That personnel be interchanged among units deploying
to RVN in order to gain continuity. In addition, units will not lose all
personnel during a given month but losses will be reflected ideally and
equally over 12 months.

2. Operations:

a. That M-51 armor-plating kits be made available to selected Mil-
itary Police units engaged in Route and Convoy Security.
b. That miniaturized HF radios (Koterola) be issued to Military Police units engaged in vessel and port security, and that Military Policemen performing these duties be armed with automatic-fire weapons.

c. That the 69th Military Police Group, and eventually the 15th Military Police Brigade, assume full operational control of all non-tactical NP units in country according to established doctrine. Proper utilization of available resources cannot be controlled at area level and should be proportionately distributed by the Senior Headquarters ensuring accomplishment of all assigned missions.

3. Training and Organization: That expeditious handling of all MTG's be emphasized at all levels of command in order to rapidly provide necessary personnel and equipment to needed units. That units providing security escorts conduct reaction force training prior to assuming this type of security escort mission.

4. Logistics: None

5. Communications: That maintenance support for Military Police Detachment operating far from their parent units be provided second echelon signal support by signal units in the area where the detachments are located.

SECTION III

NEGATIVE

ROBERT S. BOLSY
Colonel, MPO
Commanding

Best Available Copy

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VINSON, APO San Francisco 96307
21 OCT 1966

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by the 69th Military Police Group for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. (U) Concur with comments contained in the basic report except as noted below.

3. (U) Reference Section I, Paragraph 68: The assigned strength of the 69th Military Police Group is projected to be reduced to authorized strength plus 50% authorization by October 1966. This was accomplished at Headquarters, USARV by reducing the personnel requisitions for September and October 1966.

4. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, Paragraph 1: Department of the Army has approved a policy which provides for 30 day curtailments and up to 15 day extensions. The implementation of this program will prevent a heavy loss of personnel in a one month period.

5. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, Paragraph 2a: Army Concept Team in Vietnam (USARV) is receiving test quantities of .50 caliber vehicular armor kits for operational evaluation in SVN and will give priority to military police units during the conduct of the tests.

6. (O) Reference Section II, Part II, Paragraph 2b: Unit was informed of proper procedures to be followed when requesting this type equipment. Standardized R. covers may be obtained under the existing Non-Standard, Urgent Requirements for Equipment (NSUKE) program. However, this item must be justified as an operational requirement which cannot be met by standard equipment.
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7. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, Paragraph 5: Second echelon signal maintenance support can be provided to isolated military police detachments. This headquarters has directed the 85th Military Police Group to provide the military police units requiring support, the location of these units, the signal units from which support is desired, and the type of signal equipment on hand.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt., AGC
Asst Adjutant General
Headquarters, 

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 89th Military Police Group 

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 Jul 66.

CO, 89th Military Police Group 

Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 66.

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