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<td>Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>30 Apr 1982, per document marking, DoDD 5200.10; AGO DA ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970, HQS-CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. General:

(1) The battalion's mission during the period was general support of United States, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and Free World Military Armed Forces in the Task Force South area of operations. The battalion was attached to I Field Force Provisional Artillery Group for the entire reporting period.

(2) This headquarters maintains liaison elements with Binh Thuan and Binh Thim Provinces, 2nd Squadron 1st Cavalry and the 44th ARVN Infantry Regiment at Song Hao and the 1st Battalion (Mech), 50th Infantry at Phan Thiet. TAC CP's are maintained in Phan Rang and Phan Thiet for command and control of three assigned batteries; Battery A, 4th Battalion 60th Artillery (2-M42, 2-M55), 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (2-23" S/L, 1-30" S/L). The TAC CP at Phan Thiet also provides fire support coordination for southern Binh Thuan Province to include ARVN Artillery.

b. Operations:

(1) The mission of Task Force South remains unchanged. Its forces are comprised of the 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry; 1st Battalion (Mech), 50th Infantry and Company C, 75th Infantry (Ranger) in coordination with the 23rd ARVN Division (Light) which is comprised of the 44th and 53rd ARVN Infantry Regiments. During the reporting period this battalion supported combat operations which involved 11 tactical artillery pieces, 4 of which were by air. There are 63 Regional Force companies and 137 Popular Force Platoons within our area of operations. On 1 February this battalion lost control of Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22nd Artillery to its parent unit and Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery (Sr) departed on 19 February 1970 for further deactivation by its parent unit. At the close of the reporting period, firing elements...

For OT UT

 Inclosure

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S U B J E C T: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

Controlled by this unit were located as follows:

- 1/5/27 AN 786067
- B/5/27 (-) (5-How) AN 817162
- C/5/27 (-) (1-How) AN 849242
- C/5/27 (-) (4-How) BN 522483
- C/5/27 (FLT) (2-How) BN 268458

(2) Total missions fired by type:

- Confirmed: 172
- Acquired: 2,270
- Counterbattery: 98
- Preparation: 55
- Interdiction: 143
- Special Purpose: 609
- Others: 19

Total Missions Fired: 3,366
Total Rounds Fired: 24,200

Results:

- KIA (BC): 15
- Bunkers Damaged: 2
- Bunkers Destroyed: 4
- Secondary Explosions: 2
- Captured: 1 (AK47)

Aircraft Utilization:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>UH1</th>
<th>CH58</th>
<th>CH47</th>
<th>CH54</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>959</td>
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C. Mission Related Activities:

(1) This unit is converting over to the M102 howitzer. To date...
AV A-493-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

Batteries A and B have completed the turn over and Battery C is in the transition.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commanders observations, evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel: None

   b. Intelligence:

      (1) Observation: There exists a critical shortage of officer forward observers in proportion to supported maneuver forces.

      Evaluation: This can be offset for the most part by substitution with well trained and highly motivated enlisted personnel. However, in many cases these personnel cannot give the advice on artillery employment that a better trained officer can and consequently advice of the enlisted observer is frequently not requested by the company commander.

      Recommendation: Recognizing the fact that the officer forward observer situation will more than likely not improve, the battery commander can enhance his enlisted forward observers knowledge and effectiveness by frequent field visits from himself and his officers to help bridge any existing gaps. Once an observer wins the confidence of his company commander the artillery's effectiveness increases and its use in a direct support role is furthered.

      (2) Observation: In most cases artillery units now largely provide for their own security.

      Evaluation: With the many types of mechanical detection and observation devices available to maneuver units the overall fire base defense can be increased greatly by the use of these devices if they can be obtained more readily and employed at battalion level. With the absence of separate maneuver forces providing security the artillery fire base presents a most lucrative target for a ground attack. It is imperative that an enemy be detected as early as possible to prevent penetration of its perimeter.

      Recommendation: That all artillery battalions be authorized direct access to mechanical detection devices. This program would be monitored directly by the S2 in conjunction with the fire base commanders.

   c. Operations:

      (1) Observation: Much time is lost between locating enemy positions by sophisticated detection equipment and its subsequent transmittal to artillery units capable of engaging these targets.
SUSPECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

Evaluation: Due to the control of detection equipment on a high level, often times the total reaction time before engagement is too long and/or insufficient information is provided to determine what type munitions to employ. The normal communication channels do not appear to be adequate to handle this type classified and perishable information with the onset of these devices.

Recommendation: That a system of immediate readout down to battalion level be provided so as to fully exploit this potential.

d. Organization: None
e. Training: None
f. Logistics: None
g. Communications: None
h. Material: None
i. Other:

(1) Observation: A unit's TOE calls for sufficient generators to power only that equipment authorized by the TOE.

Evaluation: Several factors, particular to the climate and disposition of fire bases in South Vietnam, indicate a need for an additional power source for necessities as follows: perimeter lights, refrigeration units for field messes, emergency power reserve and troop welfare items such as fans. A commander can not afford to overtax and ruin his authorized generators and TOE modifications do not lend themselves to provide this type power.

Recommendation: That each battalion be authorized a large generator per base: a minimum of 45 kilowatts.

JAMES N. BEIL
LTC, Fl
Commanding

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DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and concur. The following comment is made reference paragraph 2c.

Recommend further study be conducted to determine the feasibility of dedicating readout devices to battalion level on a selected basis to reduce reaction time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WALTER J. MEHL
Lieutenant Colonel, ADA
Adjutant

DA, CSFOR (2)
CO, 5th BN, 27th Arty
AVFA-32-HIST (30 April 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS, CoFOR-65 (A2)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO ... F. 96350 24 May 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVAO-ARTY,
APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-
Lessons learned and forwarding endorsements and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CF:
1 - CO, I FFORCERY ARTY (LESS ORLL) DPT, ASC
1 - CO, 5TH BN, 27TH ARTY (LESS ORLL) AAS: A8

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Access to Mechanical Detection Devices", page 3, paragraph 2b(2); concur. It is assumed the recommendation for mechanical detection devices refers to Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO) equipment and systems. There are no restrictions on the employment of these detection devices down to artillery battalion level. However, due to high cost and limited availability it is necessary that the allocation of these devices be controlled at the division/separate brigade level. Such controls guarantee distribution on an as needed basis and provide for an effective integrated target acquisition system. Unit has been so advised.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Sufficient Generators", page 4, paragraph 2i(1); concur. Units do not have sufficient equipment for the operation of major base camps, however this equipment should be part of the base camp TDA and not authorized on the unit's TOE. It should be noted that base camp TDAs submitted to USARPAC/DA are being approved minus FEMA equipment. This headquarters is aware of the problems connected with base camp TDAs and is presently working on a standard type base camp TDA which will provide necessary equipment and personnel to perform the essential base camp functions. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy fmr: I FORCE
5th Bn, 27th Army

[Signature]

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GPOP-DT (30 Apr 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Battalion 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L-H. GZAKX
CPT. AG
Asst AG

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, CO, 5th Battalion 27th Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

CG, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery

REPORT DATE
30 April 1970

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