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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
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Section I Operations: Significant Activities (U)

1. (U) Throughout the reporting period, the 525th Military Intelligence Group continued its efforts in support of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Intelligence Improvement Program. A detailed study of the Group’s contributions to Vietnamese counterpart intelligence organizations is attached as Inclosure 1.

2. (U) The 525th MI Group engaged in direct combat support activities during the entire reporting period, a total of 89 days. During this period, the 525th MI Group produced 7,533 Intelligence Information Reports (IIR’s). Supported units responded with 1,032 artillery strikes, 313 air strikes, and 647 ground operations. Confirmed evaluations of IIR’s indicate that 1,504 VC/NVA were killed and 139 VC/NVA were captured during the period as a result of 525th MI Group information. For more detailed information, see Operational Production Report, attached as Inclosure 2.

3. (C) As of 30 April, a total of 1,185 coded sources were employed by the 525th MI Group in intelligence collection throughout Vietnam.

4. (C-NOFORN) The following synopsis of significant activities is representative of the nature and scope of the Group’s mission activities:

   a. Combat Responses:

      (1) In early February 1970, combat responses to a series of IIR’s from 5th MI Battalion (Prov) resulted in three VC killed in action, one VC captured, two AK-47 assault rifles and six AK-47 magazines, and five secret tunnels destroyed in Bao Ona Hamlet, Duc Hoa District. In
addition, 436 rounds of 82mm mortar, 144 rounds of 60mm mortar, and
17,000 rounds of AK-47 assault rifle ammunition were captured by Ben Luc
Sub-Sector forces acting on Detachment D's information.

(2) A 2d MI Battalion (Prov) report traced movements of a 300-
man WVA unit in the border area of Kontum District, Kontum Province and
Le Trung District, Pleiku Province from near Plei Op, southwest to
Plei O, then to Plei Touan and, finally, to a camp near the Gram Cram
Stream. The unit's weapons included two 122mm rocket launchers, two 82mm
mortars, an unknown number of R-10 rockets, and other assorted weapons.
While in Plei Touan, members of the unit had reportedly told the villagers
the unit would attack US and ARVN troops after 8 February 1970. Aerial
reconnaissance, artillery strikes, and ground operations against the unit
resulted in 28 enemy killed, three captured, and the seizure of various
weapons and fortifications.

(3) 1st MI Battalion (Prov) reported the location of a VC hospi-
tal in Tien Phuoc District, Quang Tin Province in an Intelligence Infor-
mation Report (IIR) dated 22 November 1969. The report was later con-
firmed by S2, 196th I/Bttn, 1st MI Battalion (Prov) and 32, Quang Tin Sector. A
-ground operation by the 1/5th ARVN Division on 19 February 1970 resulted
in five enemy killed, one captured, and 200 beds seized.

(4) During February, the enemy lost 205 killed in action as a
result of allied ground, artillery, and aerial responses to information
supplied by Detachment D, 1st MI Battalion (Prov). The responding com-
bat forces included RVN Civilian Irregular Defense Group units, ARVN
Special Forces, 2d ARVN Division, and District Regular Forces.

(5) On 19 February 1970, an IIR of 1st MI Battalion (Prov) report-
ed the location of a celebration to be held by the VC Son Tinh District
Unit. The 198th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, fired artillery
on the location, and dispatched a patrol which made contact with an
enemy force. A total of 29 VC were killed in the artillery and ground
actions.

(6) An agent from 1st MI Battalion (Prov) provided the location
of VC military hospital CK-120. In addition, a prisoner of war also
reported a hospital with the same designation in the same vicinity.
Reacting to the information, 3d Brigade, 5th ARVN Division discovered
a hospital complex on 24 February 1970 with a capacity of 800 to 1,000
patients. The troops seized 440 pounds of dry plasma and 661 pounds
of other medical supplies and equipment. Documents seized revealed
that the hospital had evacuated over 1,000 patients to North Vietnam
in both 1968 and 1969, and expected to evacuate 1,400 patients in 1970.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCI CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(7) An IIR of the 1st MI Battalion (Prov) in February 1970 gave the location and a description of the enemy's B-23 Dispensary and revealed the names of the chief physician and his principal staff. The G2, 2d ARVN Division evaluated the usefulness of the report as great and confirmed the information. The Division conducted an aerial reconnaissance and two ground operations which destroyed the hospital and its three operating rooms. The following were also captured or destroyed: 2.5 tons of rice; 100 kgs of potatoes; 800/900 kgs of corn; 100 kgs of cotton; 100 bottles of Penicillin; 165 pigs; 1,000 chickens; 1,000 rounds of mixed M-19, B-40 anti-tank ammunition, and 82mm mortar rounds; 30 cans of fish sauce; 5 houses; 100 bottles of blood plasma; and 3 bunker of small arms ammunition.

(8) In March, a coded agent of the 3d MI Battalion (Prov) reported the location of 600 NVA troops and numerous bunkers in Bo Duc District, Phuoc Long Province. The report was confirmed by the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). An operation in the area discovered more than 100 bunkers and numerous military structures. Two Aircraft strikes were placed in the area, and subsequent bomb damage assessment showed destruction of 138 bunkers, 30 military structures, and one bridge. Heavy bloodtrails marked the area. Three NVA bodies were found.

(9) In March 1970, an agent of the 3d MI Battalion (Prov) reported the location and intention of element Q-l, NVA 7th Artillery Regiment to rocket Bien Hoa Air Base. Elements of the 18th ARVN Division responded with aerial reconnaissance, air strikes, and artillery in conjunction with a ground operation. Subsequent contact with an estimated enemy battalion resulted in 61 enemy killed, 60 weapons, and several mines and mortar rounds captured. The action is credited with having prevented an attack against the Air Base.

(10) A 4th MI Battalion (Prov) IIR reported the location of an estimated 60 to 70 men of the 301st Main Force Battalion in the vicinity of the crash, of a "Phantom TW-light" which had been shot down on 23 March 1970. Phong Dien sector responded with an air strike and a follow-up ground operation resulting in 24 VC killed, five VC captured, 45 sampans destroyed, and the discovery of numerous weapons and supplies.

(11) US combat responses in March 1970 to an IIR of 1st MI Battalion (Prov) resulted in contact with a 100-man NVA sapper unit near Fire Support Base Fuller. An NVA soldier captured in the action identified the unit as 2d Company, 305th Sapper Battalion. There were 55 NVA killed in the action. Items captured included one B-40 rocket launcher, 12 AK-47 assault rifles, one M-16 rifle, 200 RPG-2 rounds, 207 rounds of 82mm mortar, 152 Chicom Claymore mines, 33 pounds of TNT, 900 kgs of rice, 700 kgs of sugar, 83 notebooks, and 700 bars of soap.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 52nd Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CJPAC-65 (c) (U)

(12) Two reports from 1st MI Battalion (Prov) generated local responses in April 1970 in which 14 of the enemy were killed. One of the reports located elements of the enemy's 7th Front, which was subsequently engaged by an airstrike.

(13) 1st MI Battalion (Prov) reported a meeting of high level personnel of Front 76 scheduled for 6 April in the Ban Co Mountain area, Thuong Bao District, Quang Nam Province. Those attending reportedly included Front 76's Commanding General and an unknown number of regimental and battalion commanders and political officers. A US Marine reconnaissance team approached to within 700 meters of the site and reported heavy enemy activity at the location. The area was subjected to artillery and air strikes for three consecutive nights. Secondary explosions were reported.

(14) Based on information from a VC province level cadre member, a coded source, 1st MI Battalion (Prov) located the base area of the 71st Transportation Company and several Provincial Food Section members. Visual reconnaissance conducted at the request of 32, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division partially confirmed the report. An air strike on 15 April 1970 destroyed two structures, damaged one bunker, and uncovered one tunnel complex.

(15) The location of an unidentified element of the Ca Kau VC City Unit in Thai Binh District, An Xuyen Province was reported in a 4th MI Battalion (Prov) IIR in April 1970. The 21st ARVN Division responded with a ground operation which resulted in 38 VC killed and 17 captured. Captured equipment included one Browning automatic rifle, three K-1 rifles, and one K-2 rifle.

(16) On 15 April 1970, 31st Regiment, 21 ARVN Division redeployed to Kien Tan District, Kien Giang Province in reaction to two IIRs from the 4th MI Battalion (Prov). One IIR gave the location of an unidentified 200-man VC unit; the other reported that 500 men of the 9th VC Division were in the District. Contact was established on 15 April and continued through 16 April, resulting in a total of 14 VC/PVA killed. On 18 April, the Regiment made another contact in the same area, killing 11 VC and capturing one.

b. Other Significant Support:

(1) 1st MI Battalion (Prov) designed a pocket-size sketching and reporting booklet titled "Grass-Roots" to enable semi-literate, partisan Vietnamese agents to compensate for their lack of verbal skills through their inherent drawing ability (Inclosure 3). The booklet is bilingual, illustrated, unclassified, and simply written. Classroom and informal
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SITUATION:  Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RMS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

Training in observation and sketching techniques were given first to all US base officers and Vietnamese team chiefs. On 25 February 1970, indigenous collection sources of Detachment D, ARVN Unit 101 received initial instruction from their team chief, based on the booklet. Within ten days, sources who had undergone the training began including sketches with their Intelligence Information Reports (IIR's). Combat responses to the IIR's of Detachment D increased from 12 in March to 117 in April. The sketches are considered to be a major factor in the increase in combat response. The remaining Unit 101 detachments had received booklets and supplementary training in sketching by early April. Approximately 50 of the 28th reports submitted in April contained sketches. The details of the written product have also improved.

The mission of the 525th MI Group was expanded on 1 March 1970, to include responsibility for a clandestine collection operation along the Republic of Vietnam border area contiguous to Cambodia. This mission involves intelligence collection activities from sites at Du Co, Tay Ninh, Chau Doc, and Ha Thien. To provide personnel resources to accomplish this mission, Headquarters, USARV has recommended to Department of the Army that the authorized strength of the 525th MI Group be increased by 40 personnel spaces.

Information received through a Detachment A, 5th Battalion source enabled 525 MI Group to report the strong possibility of the ouster of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Cambodian Chief of State three weeks before the actual event. The Agent put a Detachment A Case Officer in contact with SON NGOC THANH, present leader of the KHMER SEREI (Free Cambodians), who stated that a message received by him from LON NOL (Premier of Cambodia) on 20 February 1970, coupled with previous negotiations between LON NOL and the KHMER SEREI, indicated that LON NOL intended to overthrow the SIHANOUK Government while SIHANOUK was out of the country. This report was borne out on 18 March 1970 when LON NOL and STIRK RATAN (Vice Prime Minister) successfully overthrew SIHANOUK while he was still in Moscow.

An IIR of 1st MI Battalion (Prov) in April 1970, described present VC Main Force activities and plans in preparation for the second phase of the Spring Campaign. The report also enumerated the intentions of local guerillas, sappers, and district force units, and outlined the political instruction received by VC cadre. Hoi Chanh, prisoners, and other agent reports have already confirmed part of the information.

5th MI Battalion (Prov) obtained information during April that VC had brought approximately 10 kilograms of composition C-4 explosive, one Chinese "chemical pencil" detonator, three pull-friction detonators, and 19 electrical detonators into Saigon. The report gave the precise locations of the items, and all but the electrical detonators were neutralized and replaced in the VC caches. Neutralization was accomplished by the Ordnance Section, Combined Material Exploitation Center, MACV; the Office of the Special Assistant to the US Ambassador; and the

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Department of Defense Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team, Saigon. Two Chicom RKG-3T anti-tank grenades were also neutralized.

(6) 5th MI Battalion (Prov) reported on 25 April 1970 that US-manufactured expended brass shell casings had been illegally obtained and stored in a Saigon warehouse allegedly for shipment out of Vietnam. Based on this information, the warehouse was immediately placed under covert observation by criminal investigators of the 5th Military Police Group (CI). On 27 April, US Army criminal investigators and RVN customs agents raided the warehouse and seized brass shell casings of various calibers with an estimated total value of $400,000. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, USARV termed it "... a very successful black market suppression operation ..."

5. (U) Two eight-day Military Intelligence-Area Intelligence Orientation (MIO-AIO) seminars were conducted by this Headquarters for 73 students. These seminars are designed to familiarize newly assigned personnel with the operational environment of the 525th MI Group and with covert HUMINT collection techniques. With the exception of two Naval officers, all students were members of the 525th MI Group. Guest lecturers participated from the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, MACV, NAVFORV, HACCORDS, Phoenix, 1st MI Battalion (AR3), and the US Embassy.

6. (C) In compliance with USARV directives for reduction of the American presence in Saigon and to reduce costs by vacating leased property, the 525th MI Group initiated the following actions:

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 525th MI Group finalized planning for relocation to the MACV Amoy and Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Relocation is scheduled for completion by the end of May.

b. On 30 April, 3d MI Battalion (Prov) relocated to the Bien Hoa Air Base.

c. By 15 May, 358th Aviation Detachment will have relocated to Camp McDermott, Nha Trang.

7. (FOUO) Within the reporting period, the following personnel changes occurred in key command and staff positions within the Group:


Section II Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations
Evaluations, and Recommendations (U)

A. (U) Personnel: None

B. (U) Intelligence: None

C. (U) Operations: None

D. (U) Organization: None

E. (C) Training:

Observation: Even intelligence personnel assigned to the Republic of Vietnam for second or third tours are seldom aware of the correct way to write Asian names. This includes a basic lack of knowledge of the use of the diacritical markings used to impute desired tonal sounds to particular portions of names. Additionally, most personnel do not know how to transliterate the names of the many different non-Vietnamese groups present within the country.

Evaluation: As a result of this lack of background on the transliteration of proper names and the use of diacritical markings, many written actions are improperly routed, misfiled, or returned to the originator for clarification, causing an administrative overload and seriously impeding intelligence operations. Of particular concern is the initial Name Trace/Registration action which must be accomplished prior to utilization of any source in an intelligence operation. Name Trace/Registration actions that reach this Headquarters without the correct information must be returned to the Case Officers for correction, causing delays in registration of five to 15 days, depending on the distance and transportation links between Headquarters and the Case Officer. Time, in many instances, is a critical factor in proper coverage of tactical targets. Administrative delays of the magnitude cited can stalemate a potentially lucrative collection operation.

Recommendations:

a. That more emphasis to writing Asian names and to the correct use of diacritical markings and telecodes in transliterating the names be given at various courses of instruction, to include:

(1) The Southeast Asia Orientation course and MOS 9666 (Intelligence Research Officer) and 9668 (Area Intelligence Officer) courses.
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SUBJECT: Operational report-Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1973, RG9 03RR-65 (Re) 48

at USAFINT.

(2) The Defense Language Institute.

b. That operations officers emphasize the importance and proper completion of name trace/registration when briefing incoming personnel, and that periodic reviews be made of these actions to insure adherence to policies.

F. (U) Logistics: None

G. (C) Communications: None

I. (C) Material:

Observation: During the past three months, the 525th MI Group Technical Support Division (TD) has continued to test the operational employment of beacon transmitters in support of the Group's field elements. The beacons used and tested during this reporting period are the EBC 201-286.3, a commercial beacon procured at 525th MI Group's request by USAICV J212 from the Emergency Beacon Corporation, New Rochelle, New York; and the HRT-11, an OSA (GA3) designed beacon procured from OSA (GA3) Technical Services Branch, Saigon.

Evaluation: Technical specifications and pertinent operational data of these two beacon devices are as follows:

a. Technical Specifications:

(1) NAME: EBC 201-286.3 Beacon

(a) FREQUENCY: 286.3 MHz

(b) POWER OUTPUT: Approximately 50 milliwatts

(c) POWER CONVERSION: 36 milliamperes at 9 volts DC

(d) AUDIO CHARACTERISTICS: Two tone warble

(e) EBC GS-23 BATTERY LIFE: Life is 72 hours, but additional GS-21 or other battery packs can be used with this beacon to extend transmission time. Transmission time is governed by the number and size of batteries in the pack, which in turn is determined by the storage capacity of the object in which the beacon is to be concealed.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RG 3 CS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

(f) RANGE: Signal has been received at ranges exceeding 20 miles. The range of the device is dependent upon the altitude of the aircraft in which the receiving and direction finding equipment is installed. Altitudes of from 5,000 to 10,000 feet have been tested and found to be suitable.

(g) SIZE OF BEACON: 3 1/2 inches long by 2 inches wide by 3/4 inch deep.

(h) LENGTH OF ANTENNA: 12 1/2 inches.

(i) SIZE OF 72-HOUR CS-21 BATTERY PACK: 3 1/2 inches long by 2 inches wide by 3/4 inch deep.

(2) NAME: HR7-11 Beacon

(a) FREQUENCY: 230 to 239 MHz

(b) POWER OUTPUT: Approximately 25 milliwatts

(c) POWER CONSUMPTION: 18 milliamps at 9 volts DC

(d) AUDIO CHARACTERISTICS: Interrupted single tone

(e) BATTERY LIFE: Special 9 volt DC OSA (CAS) designed battery packs provide for 72- or 144-hour operation, depending upon the size of the object in which the device is to be concealed.

(f) RANGE: Signal has been received at ranges up to 20 miles. As with the EBC 2-1-286.8 beacon, range depends upon the altitude of the aircraft in which receiving and direction finding equipment is installed. Altitudes of from 5,000 to 10,000 feet have been found most suitable for this device also.

(g) SIZE OF BEACON: 3 1/2 inches long by 3/4 inch in diameter, cylindrical.

(h) LENGTH OF ANTENNA: 16 to 18 inches, dependent upon the frequency of the device.

(i) SIZE OF 72-HOUR OSA (CAS) BATTERY PACK: 8 inches long by 1 1/2 inch in diameter, cylindrical. For 144-hour operation, these dimensions are doubled.

b. PERTINENT OPERATIONAL DATA:

(1) EBC 201-286.8 Beacon: In order to reduce the size of the EBC 201-286.8 beacon transmitter for concealment, the transmitter was
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

removed from its original metal housing. The extendable rod antenna was removed and replaced with an equal length of piano wire. The indicator lamp was removed since it is not required for operation of the beacon transmitter. The beacon and its battery pack were concealed in a soldierwood log common to the area of proposed operational use (see photo, Inclosure 1). The concealment area was hollowed out of the log to provide space for the beacon, battery pack, antenna, and an off-on switch. After the beacon and the ancillary equipment were placed inside the log, the log was plugged and recut to reduce exposed connection edges in order to disguise it from the casual observer. A small access hole the size of piano wire was provided to allow the switch to be externally activated just prior to dispatch. The beacon was then transported to the general area of operational interest and activated before dispatch to the specific target areas by HUMINT assets. Since specific targets were not known prior to dispatch, a predetermined period of time had to elapse after dispatch before direction finding operations could begin. A safe area within the vicinity of operations was provided the agent, in the event he could not locate a suitable target within the prescribed time. When the direction finding operation had begun and the beacon location had been "fixed", combined air and ground operations were conducted. In all instances, the beacon was readily identified by the direction finding aircraft and subsequent operations resulted in positive contact with VC/NVA troops and material. All operations were conducted in very damp areas under single canopy jungle. Three limitations were found in using the EBC 201-286.8 beacon: 1) The original packaging did not allow for ready concealment, and the beacon had to be removed from the manufactured metal case; 2) the beacon's size and rectangular configuration limited concealment devices to larger items; and 3) the fact that the beacons were all equipped to operate on only one frequency negated their use in the vicinity of another similar beacon.

(2) IRT-11 Beacon: The IRT-11 beacon transmitter was utilized effectively under conditions identical to those under which the EBC 201-286.8 was operated. The lower power output of the IRT-11, however, coupled with its less discernible one-tone modulation, made this beacon the more difficult of the two devices to locate on the receiver of the aircraft used in direction finding operations. The beacon did, however, operate effectively and proved to be dependable during operations in which it was used. The configuration of this beacon is cylindrical and smaller in size than the EBC model, thereby making it concealable in smaller objects. This beacon has been concealed in bamboo poles, AK-47 assault rifles, and logs.

Recommendations:

a. That additional EBC 201-286.8 beacons be obtained from the Emergency Beacon Corporation. Based on previous test and usage factors,
it is suggested that these additional beacon devices be modified and re-packaged by the manufacturer to meet the following specifications:

1. The device should be removed from the metal housing and encased in a rectangular package 3 13/32 inches long by 1 30/32 inches wide by 1/32 inch deep. The encasing material should be of a type similar to that used on the EBC GS-21 battery pack manufactured by the Emergency Beacon Corporation.

2. The switch and test indicator lamp should be eliminated as they are not required for the method of employment involved in HUMINT operations.

3. The extendable rod antenna should be eliminated because a wire of equal length will be attached by the user prior to the beacon's use.

4. Each beacon should operate on a different frequency, i.e., 286.2, 286.4, 286.6, 287.0, 287.2, 287.4, 287.6, 287.8, 288.0 MHz, etc.

b. That the OSA beacons be obtained from OSA Technical Services Branch only as required to meet the needs of specific operations.

I (c) Other:

Observation: During the USARPAC inspection of the Group's Intelligence Contingency Fund account in January 1970, emphasis was placed on the proper computation and posting of conversion gains and losses which occur as a result of foreign currency transactions. This inspection pointed out a significant problem area in the maintenance of ICF accounts throughout the Group, particularly at the battalion level.

Evaluation: The maintenance of ICF records is made more complicated and time-consuming by the current requirements to maintain US dollar value accountability for all currencies with the resultant necessity to compute and precisely account for conversion gains and losses. This requirement has created a problem within the Group, particularly at battalion level where the ICF custodians are normally inexperienced and are normally assigned duties in addition to those of ICF custodian. It is estimated that at least 20% of the time required to account for ICF transactions is devoted to the computation and posting of conversion gains and losses. In addition, approximately 25% of all errors made in processing ICF transactions involve conversion gains and losses. The fact that a significant problem exists was amply demonstrated during a recent series of audits of battalion ICF custodians in which the auditor spent 30-40% of his time verifying and correcting conversion gain and loss computations.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, GSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

The use of a separate cash blottler for Intelligence Contingency Funds (DA Form 703) for each currency at the battalion Class A Agent and Custodian level would eliminate the requirement to maintain separate Subsidiary Currency Ledgers and the resultant requirement to compute conversion gains and losses at battalion level.

Recommendation: That the use of Subsidiary Currency Ledgers (DA Form 2502-R) for cash type currency be discontinued and that the battalion Class A Custodians be authorized to use a separate cash blottler for DA Form 703 for each type foreign currency.

[Signature]

William H. Patterson

1. Vietnamese Counterpart Intel Organization
2. Operational Production Report
3. Sketching and Reporting Booklet
4. Photo
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AVHEC-DST (19 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, NOS CHRON—65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 10 JUN 70

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 525th Military Intelligence Group.

2. (C-NF) Comments follow:

   a. (C-NF) Reference item concerning “Pocket-Sized Sketching and Reporting Booklet”, page 4, paragraph 4B(1); concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning “Training”, page 7, paragraph E; concur. This becomes more critical as US intelligence personnel take a less active part in Vietnam as the Modernization and Improvement of the ARVN progresses. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning “Material”, page 8, paragraph H; concur. This report on the operational employment of beacon transmitters is a continuation of the evaluation which was reported in the last Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by the 525th MI Group. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning “Intelligence Contingency Fund”, page 11, paragraph I; concur. The stringent requirements of AR 361-141 (Provisions for Administration, Supervision, Control and Use of Intelligence Contingency Funds) do, in fact, impose a great administrative burden on Intelligence Contingency Fund (ICF) Class A Custodians. This is particularly true at battalion level where the Custodian is invariably a young and inexperienced Lieutenant or Captain. The problem is particularly acute in

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Vietnam because of the short tour (12 months) which means that as soon as the individual becomes proficient in this function, he is due for reassignment. Although the solution recommended by the Commanding Officer, 525th MI Group, that separate cash blotters be used for each type of currency, would minimize the conversion problem of the Class A Custodian, it would not reduce the conversion problem of the Class A Agent, (e.g., at HQ, 525th MI Group). Department of the Army is obliged to maintain very strict accountability for these funds, which have been exempted from audit by the Government Accounting Office. The problem essentially stems from the stringent requirements of AR 381-141, which reflects the very nature of the funds. It is, therefore, recommended that DA (i.e., ACSI) examine the feasibility of amending AR 381-141 so as to permit a nominal droppage, when necessary, to offset the net effect of gains and losses accruing from the conversion of currencies. Such an amendment would be in consonance with paragraph 12-55, AR 37-103 (Finance and Accounting for Installation Disbursing Operations). It is envisioned that the droppage need not exceed $.05 per $1,000.00. In the event Department of the Army does not consider it feasible to authorize such a droppage, this headquarters concurs in the recommendation made by the Commanding Officer, 525th MI Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens, Jr.
Cap., AOC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy ftor:
525th MI Group
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GPOP-DT (19 May 70) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 525th Military Intelligence Group for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CHFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed except as indicated in the comment below.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 21, page 11: Nonconcur in the proposal for maintenance of separate cash blotters for each foreign currency. During the recently concluded annual audit and inspection of Intelligence Contingency Fund accounts of this command by the Inspector General, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, DA, it was determined that AR 381-141 is presently being revised and is expected to be ready for publication during the latter part of CY 1970. The revised regulation includes simplified instructions for the handling of fractional gains and losses to accountability resulting from foreign currency transactions. Publication of these instructions will obviate the requirement for establishing and maintaining duplicate procedures for each variety of foreign currency utilized by intelligence agents in Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. Ozaki
CPT, AAC
Asst AG

Cc: furn:
CC USAFRV

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(U) PURPOSE: This study has two purposes. First, it describes the scope of intelligence activities conducted by the 525th Military Intelligence Group and its two civilian counterpart intelligence agencies: the Military Security Service (MSS) and ARVN Unit 101. Secondly, it describes and analyzes 525th MI Group efforts to improve the operational effectiveness of its counterpart agencies and to assist them in attaining operational self-sufficiency.

2. (C-NOFOR) BACKGROUND:

a. ARVN Unit 101 is subordinate to J2, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Joint General Staff (JGS), and has the mission of collecting tactical military intelligence for RVNAF using covert agent operational techniques.

b. MSS is administratively responsive to the General Political Warfare Department (GFWD) but operationally responsive to requirements issued by the Chief of Staff, RVNAF JGS, the Prime Minister, and the President. It has a very broad military counterintelligence mission which includes, in addition to normal CI activities, a counter-espionage mission and investigation of dishonesty and malfeasance within the government.

c. The 525th MI Group's relationship with Unit 101 and MSS is primarily operational. Group guidance, direction, and material support have been focused on the accomplishment and improvement of collection operations and aggressive bilateral counterintelligence efforts.

d. Since 1968, 525th MI Group efforts at counterpart improvement have been keyed to J2, MACV's RVNAF Intelligence Improvement Program (IIP). In accordance with IIP guidance, the Group first established clearly defined improvement goals for Unit 101 and MSS, identified objectives, or milestones, incident to the attainment of these goals, and prescribed a timetable for the achievement of each objective and improvement goal.

3. (C) UNIT 101 IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS:

a. Conduct of Liaison: 525th MI Group liaison with ARVN Unit 101 is conducted by Command Liaison Element Romeo (CLE-R), an activity which consists of six officers, three NCO's, and three EM, supported by 13 Vietnamese interpreter/translators and three Vietnamese typists. The OIC, CLE-R, a Lieutenant Colonel, is both the personal representative of the Commanding Officer, 525th MI Group to the Unit 101 Commander and assistant Group 33 for bilateral operations. In September 1969, bilateral desk officers were moved from Group Headquarters to the CLE-R office, and are now collocated on the Unit 101 compound with their Vietnamese counterparts. Frequent liaison is maintained by the Group 33, Training Officer, and Budget and Fiscal Officer. In addition, ad hoc bilateral committees are appointed on a specific needs basis to resolve joint...
operational, fiscal, and administrative problems as they arise. Working liaison is also effected on a daily basis by 525th MI Group operational elements at Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ)-level and below in conjunction with the conduct of active bilateral operations.

b. Combined Agreements:

(1) The following joint agreements have been developed and implemented under provision of the RVNAF Intelligence Improvement Program: a MACV-JOS Collection Agreement, a 101/525 Collection Agreement, a Fiscal and Logistics SOP, a Source Administration SOP, a joint letter on project plan formats, and miscellaneous joint messages clarifying operational procedures.

(2) In April 1970, the 525th MI Group and Unit 101 jointly agreed to further refine the 101/525th Collection Agreement by developing a comprehensive, joint, bi-lingual SOP for Operations. A planning committee has been appointed, and an outline has been drafted and approved by both headquarters. Target date of 15 August has been established for completion of the final draft. The completed product is intended to improve the quality of operations, to provide additional training to key 101 personnel in fundamental principles of agent operations, and to provide Unit 101 with a guide for preparing its own internal SOP.

c. Combined Operations:

(1) Unit 101 and the 525th MI Group are presently implementing 46 approved project plans. Early plans were directed primarily toward the collection of tactical intelligence, but current plans have been increasingly oriented toward intelligence on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). As of 31 March 1970, US-funded expenditures for these projects during FY 70 was $1,900,000. Projected total expenditure for FY 70 is $24,000,000, and for FY 71, $322,950.

(2) Beginning in July 1969, the two organisations began a systematic review and revision of all project plans to improve the quality and productivity of combined operations. As a result, 15 of 61 original plans were eliminated or consolidated, and the reliability and usability of intelligence collected in the remaining operations has dramatically improved. Through periodic operational reviews, extraneous and marginal assets are continuously eliminated from the 525/101 collection system. Marginal operations are replaced by specifically targeted projects. Sources with natural placement and access to important targets are aggressively sought, assessed, and recruited. These actions have resulted in a decrease in the number of raw IIR’s produced by bilateral collection operations; however, the level of evaluations by user agencies has increased and the kill/capture totals in combat responses is at a new high.
Personnel: The authorized strength of Unit 101 is 876. The current assigned strength is 832, approximately 92% of that authorized.

Supply, Logistics, and Communications:

1. Unit 101 has only 42% of its authorized TO&E equipment. The most critical need at present is signal equipment adequate to permit the organization to maintain command and control independent of the 525th MI Group radio net. The CIC, CLEK has been working closely with Unit 101 and MACV advisors to revise the TO&E to obtain authorization for additional equipment and to obtain equipment now authorized. Limited progress has been made. This problem must be addressed by higher headquarters if improvement action is to take place. Recently, the 525th MI Group recommended to MACV that a full-time US logistics advisor be assigned to Unit 101 for a period of 90 days to help resolve supply and equipment difficulties.

2. One key improvement in Unit 101 fiscal procedures was realized on 1 November 1969 with the implementation of a Combined 525th MI Group/Unit 101 Budget and Fiscal SOP. For the first time in the history of Unit 101, ICF funding procedures for combined operations were placed on a plan-program-budget basis. The Combined SOP was derived largely from US Army ICF regulations, and the degree of control now exercised over these funds conforms closely to US standards. The critical financial problem remaining is the lack of a rational planning-programming-budgeting system at JOS/MOD level. This deficiency precludes firm estimates by Unit 101 and other ARVN organizations of GVN appropriated funds available for operational purposes. This problem was addressed by the CO, 525th MI Group in reports to MACV on acceleration of improvement in RVNAF Intelligence Capabilities in September, October, and December 1969.

Training:

1. 525th MI Group efforts to improve the training competence of Unit 101 have been directed at improvement of the in-country collection training capability. Since early 1969, the Group has assisted in three revisions of the Program of Instruction (POI) of the Field Operations Intelligence Course presented at the RVNAF Intelligence School Annex in Vung Tau, RVN. Until April 1970, the Group had a full-time resident liaison officer at the Vung Tau Annex. This liaison representative assisted the Senior Advisor, RVNAF Intelligence School, in making plans for the proposed expansion of the Vung Tau Facility to accommodate 150 students. Student capacity is now 25 per class. Three classes a year are conducted.

2. The Group has also assisted Unit 101 in attempts to obtain additional off-shore quotas for training of officers in the Military Intelligence Collection Course at USARPACINTS, Okinawa.
(3) At the request of the 525th MI Group, and with the concurrence of JSARPAC, USARPAC, and JSARPACINTS agreed to expedite reproduction of instructional materials for the Military Intelligence Collection Course to train new in-country, ARVN-conducted course. These materials are expected to arrive in SVN during May 1970. Upon receipt, they will be introduced into the POI of the Vung Tau collection course, and will also be used by 525th MI Group field elements in the conduct of unit-level counterpart training programs.

(4) In February and March 1970, two one-week Team Chief Conferences were held at Unit 101 headquarters to provide refresher training for all Unit 101 team chiefs. Instruction was provided by Unit 101 and 525th MI Group personnel. Team chiefs have the opportunity to question the commanders and principal staff officers of both organizations on operational problems and policies.

(5) The 525th MI Group and the MSS have established "nucleus" bilateral training programs to review fundamental intelligence doctrine and to solve operational problems peculiar to their individual areas of operations.

4. (C-MUFORN) MSS IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS

a. Conduct of Liaison: 525th MI Group liaison with the Military Security Service is conducted primarily by Command Liaison Element Sierra (CLE-S), an activity which consists of three officers, one enlisted man, and four local national civilians. The OIC, CLE-S, is the personal representative of the CO, 525th MI Group to the Director, Military Security Department, the headquarters element of MSS. The operations officer, CLE-3 is counterparted to the operations officer (Chief, CI Branch), MSS and also performs liaison with a number of other key staff officers as required to provide for the exchange of counterintelligence information. In addition, frequent liaison is performed by officers from the following 525th MI Group staff sections: S-3 Training Division; S-2 Technical Support Branch and Special Investigations Branch; and Management/Budget and Fiscal Branch. Close liaison between the two headquarters is also reflected in the relationship between the field elements of both organizations. Working liaison between the battalions of the 525th MI Group and the counterparted corps MSS organizations is conducted daily.

b. Combined Agreements: On 11 April 1969, the 525th MI Group and MSS entered into a combined agreement for joint operations. This agreement forms the framework within which operations are conducted and includes annexes on funding, targeting, and source administration procedures.

c. Combined Operations:

(1) The ever increasing cooperation between the 525th MI Group and the MSS is graphically illustrated by the constantly increasing number of combined operations. In June 1968, only one aggressive counterintelligence operation was jointly conducted. By June of 1969, the
number had risen to eight. As of 30 April 1970, more than 30 operational proposals for aggressive counterintelligence penetrations had been jointly analyzed. Of these, 19 were considered to have sufficient potential for penetration of high priority targets to justify further development. Eleven more proposals are now being analyzed by the two headquarters. In mid-1969, the Director, MSS announced as his goal the establishment of 50 combined counterintelligence operations with the 525th MI Group.

(2) As 525/MSS operations expanded, so did operational expenditures. Total FY 1969 expenditures for combined MSS/525 operations were $500. As of 31 March 1970, FY 1970 expenditures were $2,500, with a committed balance of $4,000 for the remainder of the fiscal year. InFY 1971, the dollar cost of combined operations is projected at $31,850.

(3) Both the 525th MI Group and MSS are constantly seeking means for fostering closer working relationships. On 16 and 17 March 1970, 525/MSS conducted a two-day seminar during which all areas of mutual concern were examined and discussed. One of the most significant results of the seminar was a commitment by MSS to further emphasize long-range VCI penetration operations with the 525th MI Group.

(4) As a result of the combined seminar, MSS and the 525th MI Group have created a four-man bilateral Operations and Training Analysis Team. This team is now in the process of visiting all Corps Tactical Zones to make a field evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of current combined CI operations and the status of CTZ-level counterpart training.

d. Personnel: The authorized personnel strength of MSS is 2,816. As of 30 April, the assigned strength was 2,504; 90% of total authorized. As a result of a 525-MSS study, a proposal has been staffed through MACV and JGS to increase MSS strength by 1,900 men during the period July 1970 to December 1971. This proposal is pending final approval by ARVN JGS. If approved, the expansion will permit MSS to staff 250 additional field offices at the sub-sector level. This action will greatly increase the ARVN capability to extend CI protection to primary tactical and civic levels which, up to now, have provided a haven for VC infiltrators.

e. Supply, Logistics, and Communications: MSS is operating at approximately 55% of its authorized TO&E level of supplies and equipment, an increase of 11% since the end of fiscal year 1969. Although shortages exist in each of the technical areas, the most critical are in Quartermaster and Signal areas. In addition to coordinating with US and RVNAP logistical activities for the purpose of assisting MSS in the procurement of authorized TO&E equipment, the 525th MI Group has given assistance within its own resource capabilities in obtaining mission-essential intelligence operations equipment. Notable was the procurement late in 1969 of a substantial amount of DAR equipment. As is the case with Unit 101, the Group has requested MACV to provide a full-time logistics adviser for a 50-day period to organize and expedite the issue of authorized TO&E items of equipment through RVNAP logistics channels.

f. Training: The 525th MI Group has long considered improvement of the quality and quantity of MSS instructional programs and instructor
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The following program has been undertaken.

1. Improvement of Existing Instruction: Training Bureau, MSD has been provided with "JAINS Project X" instructor packets on Counterintelligence; DAME, DASE, Photo (DDP); and Intelligence for Stability Operations. These materials are used regularly by Vietnamese MSD instructors at the RVNAF Military Intelligence School. 525th MI Group CPF technicians give periodic instruction to MSD counterintelligence classes. Finally, through 924th MI Group efforts, USAFRACINTS accelerated the production of lesson plans for the USAFRACINTS Security/CT Course (MSD) for distribution to MSD and the RVNAF Intelligence School. These instructional materials are expected to arrive in Vietnam in May 1970, approximately six months ahead of their previously scheduled delivery date. Their use will significantly improve the quality of in-country counterintelligence instruction.

2. New In-Country Instruction:

a. Advanced Security Course: During the period January to May 1970, the 525th MI Group assigned a full-time liaison officer to the MSD Training Bureau to assist in writing a 10-week Advanced Security Course. This course will be given two to three times a year to MSD captains and first lieutenants with prior training and field experience in MSS CI Operations. 525th MI Group assistance included participation in writing the Program of Instruction (POI), technical assistance in writing the lesson plans, and direct support to the project in the form of finished instructional materials. The course plan is on schedule with the first class to begin on 8 June 1970. This instruction is designed to qualify students to command MSS field offices and has been granted promotion point credit equivalent to the Combat Arms Company Commanders Course.

b. DAME, DASE, Photo (DDP) Course: In order to better assist MSS in developing a professional DDP capability, the 525th MI Group has made recommendations to the MACV Directorate for Intelligence Training and Advisory Affairs (IT & AA) concerning the steps required to establish a self-sustaining, in-country DDP course. The present USAFRACINTS DDP course trains only DDP officer supervisors; it does not train lower grade enlisted men, NCO's, or officers to become DAME, DASE, or Photo technicians.

3. Off-Shore Training: The 525th MI Group regularly coordinates with MACV in obtaining quotes for courses at both USAFRACINTS and USAINTS. On 19 February 1970, correspondence was forwarded through USARV to OASDI/DA requesting assistance in obtaining off-shore polygraph training for MSD technicians. An answer is expected.

4. CTZ-Level Training: Each of the five MI battalions (Prov) of the 525th MI Group have established local training programs to teach the techniques of aggressive penetration operations to key members of the counterart MSS detachments. The Operations and Training Analysis Team

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described in para (1) will provide recommendations for further improve-
ment of training.

(5) MSS Instructors: In July 1969, MSS had one full-time instructor
at the RVNAF Intelligence School. Largely through 525th MI Group efforts,
the Director, MSD has subsequently assigned six additional, full-time
instructors to the school and is expected to assign two more prior to the
start of the Advanced Security Course.

5. (C-NOFOR) SIGNIFICANT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

a. Analysis of Improvement Efforts: 525th MI Group efforts to improve
the capabilities of Unit 101 and MSS are divided into three broad categories:
operations, training and doctrine; logistics, equipment and personnel; and
funding and budgeting. Progress in each area is summarized as follows:

(1) Operations, Training and Doctrine: Significant progress has been
made through development of combined operational agreements, conduct of
joint operations, participation in joint conferences and seminars, improve-
ment and expansion of formal instruction at the RVNAF Intelligence School,
and initiation of CTZ-level training programs by 525th MI Group battalions.
"3 is being trained in the basic techniques of aggressive CI penetration
operations, and is improving its professional standards in other areas.
Unit 101 has materially improved the professional quality of its operations
and is gradually acquiring a greater awareness of the principles of compart-
mentation, security, and thorough cover planning. Both units are determined
to concentrate on more sophisticated, long-range operations targeted prin-
cipally against the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

(2) Logistics, Equipment and Personnel: The input of equipment, sup-
plies, and personnel establishes the basic framework within which any
organisation operates. The serious lack of RVNAF logistic support to its
HUMINT components is responsible for critical deficiencies in both units.
Unit 101 has 34% of its TO&E equipment; MSS has 55%. These TO&E equip-
ment shortages and a lack of adequate field support facilities and services
continue to retard mission performance. Neither unit will achieve true
competence until requisite supply, equipment, and real property priorities
are established and exercised by JGS and intermediate logistics head-
quarters. This is the most serious remaining impediment to self-sufficiency,
and is capable of resolution only at MACV/JGS level.

(3) Funding and Budgeting: The amount of money available determines
to a large measure the extent to which an intelligence unit can exploit
its existing physical and human resources. At present, JGS/RVNAF lacks a
coherent system of priorities for allocating resources to subordinate units.
Because of the availability of funding from other sources, MSS is in-
convenienced, but not crippled, by this pervasive RVNAF deficiency. The
system more severely hampers Unit 101 efforts to achieve self-reliance,
however, and forces it to rely largely on the 525th MI Group for financial
support. In late 1969, Unit 101 and the 525th MI Group entered into a
combined Budgeting and Fiscal Agreement to insure that this financial

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Special Handling Required
Nct Releasable to Foreign Nationals
support would be properly budgeted and expended by operational elements in accordance with the highest standards of RCINCINT collection operations. The new procedures have led to tighter control by Unit 101 over its operations and to more effective expenditures of funds. Because of the stringent restrictions on disbursement of IOC, however, and limitations on funds available, 525 MI Group support is not a substitute for adequate funding through open ARVN channels.

b. Development of Unit 101: Since January 1969, when CLRGR was established by the 525th MI Group, Unit 101 has shown significant improvement. Through increased emphasis on training, revision of existing project plans, and development of the Budget and Fiscal SOP, the unit has advanced significantly in professional expertise. Still further internal development will be necessary before a stable, high-level quality of overall operational activity is attained. Implementation of the proposed Unit SOP will contribute to this objective. The attainment of full self-sufficiency is contingent upon solutions for the overriding problems of logistical and fiscal support. From that point to attainment of operational autonomy might reasonably be expected to require an additional three years.

c. Development of MSS: MSS is a reasonably professional and competent organization. Its professionalism stems in large measure from the many years of experience of its senior personnel and from internal improvement efforts. Nevertheless, this Headquarters estimates that it will be a minimum of two more years before MSS can attain self-sufficiency. This achievement is directly dependent upon the rate at which JCS supplies personnel, equipment, and funds.

d. Assessment of Progress: The 525th MI Group has accomplished all the original goals it established for the improvement of MSS and Unit 101 capable of attainment through the application of Group resources. Those objectives which have not been met are dependent upon a reassessment of priorities and procedures at JCS, MOH-level and can best be attained through positive action by higher US and ARVN headquarters. The problems associated with further improvement have been addressed both in communications by the CO, 525th MI Group to J2, MACV and in informal liaison between principal Group staff officers and J2, MACV offices.

Incls:
1. 525th MI Group/Unit 101 Organisation and Counterpart Relationship Diagram.
2. 525th MI Group/MSS Organisation and Counterpart Relationship Diagram.
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525/101 ORGANIZATION AND COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS

US

J2 MACV

HQ 525

525 BN

DET

TEAM

CASE OFFICER

ARVN

J2 JGS

HQ 101

FIELD DET

TEAM

AGENT HANDLER

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525/MSS ORGANIZATION AND COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS

- J2 MACV
- HQ 525
- BN (PROV)
- DET
- TEAM
- CASE OFFICER

- GPWD
- MSD
- MSS/CTZ
- MSS/DTA *
- FIELD OFFICE
- AGENT HANDLER

* DIVISION TACTICAL AREA

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**Operational Production Status Report:**

1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970 (U)

1. (C) Total number of raw Intelligence Information Reports (IIR's) produced: 7,533.
   - a. Unilateral: 1,119
   - b. Bilateral 525/101: 2,904
   - c. Bilateral 525/M33: 510

2. (C) Tactical unit responses to IIR's:
   - a. Artillery strikes:
     - (1) Unilateral: 784
     - (2) Bilateral 525/101: 230
     - (3) Bilateral 525/M33: 18
   - b. Air reconnaissance missions:
     - (1) Unilateral: 1,306
     - (2) Bilateral 525/101: 385
     - (3) Bilateral 525/M33: 24
   - c. Air strikes:
     - (1) Unilateral: 147
     - (2) Bilateral 525/101: 153
     - (3) Bilateral 525/M33: 13
   - d. Ground Operations:
     - (1) Unilateral: 484
     - (2) Bilateral 525/101: 152
     - (3) Bilateral 525/M33: 8
   - e. Naval Missions:
     - (1) Unilateral: 34
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(2) Bilateral 525/101: 26
(3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 2

f. Command Alerts:
(1) Unilateral: 139
(2) Bilateral 525/101: 137
(3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 23

j. (C) Results of Tactical Responses:
a. VC/NVA Killed in Action:
(1) Unilateral: 880
(2) Bilateral 525/101: 568
(3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 56

b. VC/NVA Captured in Action:
(1) Unilateral: 81
(2) Bilateral 525/101: 56
(3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 2

4. (C) Total number of IIR evaluations received from supported units: 6,585.

5. (C) Validity of IIR's based upon evaluations submitted by supported units:

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<th></th>
<th>UNILATERAL</th>
<th>525/101</th>
<th>525/MSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Confirmed: 82 (2.76)</td>
<td>116 (6.00)</td>
<td>26 (8.87)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Probably True: 961 (32.36)</td>
<td>505 (26.11)</td>
<td>116 (39.59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Possibly True: 1,433 (48.25)</td>
<td>970 (50.16)</td>
<td>121 (41.30)</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Doubtful: 86 (2.90)</td>
<td>65 (3.36)</td>
<td>11 (3.75)</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Improbable: 14 (0.47)</td>
<td>9 (0.47)</td>
<td>3 (1.03)</td>
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<td>f. Cannot Judge: 398 (13.40)</td>
<td>269 (13.90)</td>
<td>16 (5.46)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>2,977 (100.14)</td>
<td>1,917 (100.00)</td>
<td>293 (100.00)</td>
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6. (c) Usability of IIR's based upon evaluations submitted by supported units:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNTILATERAL</th>
<th>52S/101</th>
<th>525/M38</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Great</td>
<td>1,933 (11.63)</td>
<td>289 (14.94)</td>
<td>75 (25.60)</td>
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<td>b. Moderate</td>
<td>1,589 (15.03)</td>
<td>1,190 (61.53)</td>
<td>154 (52.56)</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Slight</td>
<td>825 (27.87)</td>
<td>327 (16.91)</td>
<td>57 (19.45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. None</td>
<td>143 (4.83)</td>
<td>52 (2.69)</td>
<td>1 (0.34)</td>
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<td>e. Do Not Need</td>
<td>2 (0.07)</td>
<td>76 (3.93)</td>
<td>3 (1.02)</td>
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<td>2,892 (97.70)</td>
<td>1,934 (100.00)</td>
<td>290 (98.97)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Totals are less than total evaluations received due to some inevitable duplicate, unuseable, partial, and invalid evaluations.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 525th Military Intelligence Group**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.**

CO, 525th Military Intelligence Group

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**OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310**

**ABSTRACT**

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