AD NUMBER

**AD510833**

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

**TO:** unclassified  

**FROM:** confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

**TO:**  
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**FROM:**  
Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER LOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
AGDA (M) (17 Aug 70) FOR OT UT 702059 28 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Commanding General, US Army Flight Training Center
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Defense Documentation Center
USAF Project RAND
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. (U) Mission. There were no mission changes.

   b. (U) Organization.

      (1) Under the provisions of General Order 011, Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat), dated 5 April 1970, the INFANT (INSURE 100) New Equipment Training Team was attached to the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), APO 96289. (See Inclosure 1.)

      (2) An organizational chart depicting the composition of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) may be found at Inclosure 2.

   c. (U) Command and Staff.

      (1) Significant changes in the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) command and staff structure during this reporting period are:

         Command

         (a) On 2 April 1970, LTC Harry McK. Roper Jr., CE, assumed command of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), from LTC Robert W. Flint, CE.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIACA-AC
SUBJECT: O RIL for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

13 May 1970

Staff

(b) On 13 April 1970, CPT Harvey R. Allen, III, replaced CPT James E. Poulton, IN, as Battalion S1.

(c) On 9 February 1970, CPT Thomas H. Dowling, III, replaced CPT Edward W. Parker, FA, as Battalion S2.

Unit Commanders

(d) On 21 February 1970, MAJ Glenn A. Brown, SC, assumed command of the 128th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) from MAJ Thomas A. Khutson, IN.

(2) The current command and staff structure is reflected at Inclosure 3.

d. (U) Unit strengths (as of 30 April 1970).

(1) Military.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH PFD</td>
<td>AUTH PFD</td>
<td>AUTH PFD</td>
<td>AUTH PFD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>21  23  6  12</td>
<td>107  99  134  134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432d Rod Det</td>
<td>1   1   0   0</td>
<td>7   7   8   8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Asslt Hel)</td>
<td>19  16  51  52</td>
<td>218  200  268  268</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Asslt Hel)</td>
<td>19  16  51  50</td>
<td>218  209  288  275</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>759th Rod Det</td>
<td>1   1   0   0</td>
<td>7   7   8   8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Asslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>15  9   26  19</td>
<td>227  176  268  204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Asslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>15  11  26  19</td>
<td>227  186  268  216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 11th Avn De (Cbt)</td>
<td>91  77  160  152</td>
<td>1011  884  1262  1113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCL 2

CONFIDENTIAL
13 May 1970

SUBJECT: URRS for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Civilian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>3D MAT'L</th>
<th>TECH</th>
<th>REF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432d Med Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>759th Med Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 11th Avn Bn (Comb)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. (U) Aircraft Status. See Inclosure 4.
f. (U) Operational Results. See Inclosure 5.

g. (U) Employment. The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was engaged in daily support of tactical operations during the quarter. Continuous training of new personnel was accomplished concurrently with the conduct of normal combat operations.

h. (U) Personnel, Morale, Discipline and Information.

(1) Personnel Records. An average of 1,150 records were maintained during the period. Processing totals were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Processed</th>
<th>Out Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Man</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCL 3

CONFIDENTIAL
(2) Awards and Decorations. The following awards and decorations were processed this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Bronze Star &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Air Medal &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Army Commendation Medal &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1323</td>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>1327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410</td>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. (C) Intelligence and Security.

(1) Throughout this period, weekly intelligence briefings were presented to the Battalion Commander and staff. In addition, periodic intelligence briefings were presented to subordinate units. Intelligence information was gathered from II Field Force, 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile), 25th Infantry Division, 1st Aviation Brigade, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) and the 23d Artillery Group. Those sources provided intelligence coverage for the entire 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) area of operations.

(2) The 12th Aviation Group (Combat) provided current intelligence information to all group aviators, for operation and mission planning. Enemy information resulting from Infrared, "sniffer" and other intelligence reports, was updated at 24 hour intervals. The information received by the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and passed by daily courier to the companies, was posted on the units' situation maps for easy pilot reference. Data was kept posted for 72 hours and removed.
CONFIDENTIAL

AV3ACA-AC
13 May 1970
SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Security. Security measures for the defense of the Battalion aviation assets were altered during this period by the disbanding of the Security Platoon on 22 March 1970. Subsequent to that date, each unit provided a pro rata share of the Battalion's nightly guard commitment at Phu Loi. During this period the Battalion was given the responsibility of maintaining two additional towers and one bunker. Some significant improvements for the defenses of the Battalion aviation assets were made. These include:

(a) Repositioning claymore mines and trip flares nightly.
(b) Strengthening of bunkers through mortar stabilization of deteriorating sandbags.
(c) Maintaining a responsive command and control group on the bunker line itself with Sergeant of the Guard in charge.

j. (C) Plans, Operations and Training.

(1) Plans. During this reporting period the Battalion Physical Security Plan was revised and updated. The "Scatter" plan for the 173d Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter), was also revised. The revision of the "Scatter" plan for the 173d Aviation Company was due to the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from Lai Khe, Base Camp. All other 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) OPLUSS remain in effect.

(2) Operations.

(a) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) supported the following major tactical units: II Field Force, III ARVN Corps, 5th ARVN Division, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st Australian TASK Force, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF), Long Binh Special Zone (LBSZ), Capital Military District (CMD), Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (MACV/CRS), 5th Special Forces Group, 33rd Signal Group, 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 62d Engineer Battalion.

(b) Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) Phase IV initiated on 1 November 1969, continued throughout this period. In support of the operation the 11th Aviation Battalion transported 118,628 passengers and 44,039 tons of cargo while flying 55,041 sorties in 16,118 flying hours (See Inclosure 5). Mission results for this period are found at Inclosure 5. Ammunition expenditures by type and amount are found at Inclosure 6.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBAC-AC 13 May 1970

SUBJECT: ORLL For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Throughout this period airmobile combat assaults (CA), tactical extractions and direct combat support (DCS) missions were conducted daily by the Battalion. During this period the 128th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) (minus) provided dedicated support to a special operation conducted by the 5th Special Forces Group in the northeastern portion of the III Corps Tactical Zone. The After Action Report-Lessons Learned is attached at Inclosure 7.

(d) The 128th and 173d Aviation Companies (Assault Helicopter) of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) provided primary support to the 5th ARVN Division throughout this period. The 213th and 205th Aviation Companies (Assault Support Helicopter) continued to provide general and direct combat support to all major units in III Corps Tactical Zone.

(o) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was assigned 39 helibucket fire fighting missions (CH-47 "Chinooks" equipped with two 350 gallon water buckets). Seven of these missions, or eighteen percent, were canceled prior to the aircraft arriving on station. The remaining 32 missions were completed successfully. A total of 213 sorties were flown and resulted in 149,100 gallons of water being dispensed on various types of fires during this period.

(f) The 11th Aviation Battalion was assigned 91 aircraft recovery missions. Three of these missions involved the recovery of CH-47's by the 213th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) utilizing the "C" model CH-47. The remaining 88 recoveries involved the recovery of UH-1 aircraft. Two UH-1 were jettisoned due to rigging failure, (See discussion in paragraph 2. c. (2)).

(g) Training.

(a) During this period 222 personnel (100 percent of those eligible) completed Vietnam in-country training as required by USARV Regulation 350-1. Due to the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, replacement training assistance for the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was provided by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, beginning 6 February 1970. During this changeover period the level of in-country training support from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment did not meet unit requirements. To compensate for this, 117 of the eligible personnel received in-country training at company level which was conducted in accordance with USARV Regulation 350-1.

(b) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) continued to assist the ARVN in proper utilization of airmobile assets. Four classes on Airmobile Operations were administered to the 5th ARVN Division during this quarter.
(c) No allocations for the Jungle Environment Survival Training School were received by the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat). The Battalion currently has two school-trained escape and evasion officers.

(d) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Pathfinder Detachment, consisting of 12 personnel, continued its program of parachute training jumps to maintain combat proficiency. A total of 25 jumps were conducted during the quarter.

(e) The program of hooded flight training was continued throughout the reporting period, with emphasis placed on continued improvement of individual instrument proficiency. In addition to instrument training under the hood, normally conducted during flights to and from operational areas, aviators were required to perform a minimum of two instrument approaches (ADF and/or GCA) monthly.

(f) Conversational Vietnamese classes for 11th Aviation Battalion aviators and crewmembers commenced on 14 April 1970. The course, consisting of a twenty hour block of instruction, was broken down into two hour periods of instruction scheduled twice weekly for completion during a five week cycle. The present class has ten officers and ten enlisted personnel enrolled. Vietnamese classes are scheduled to continue for an indefinite period.

(g) Allocations for the Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) courses continued to decrease. Sixteen allocations were received from 12th Aviation Group (Combat) during the quarter in contrast to twenty-two during the previous quarter. The decrease in allocations is projected to continue. A total of forty-two requests were submitted to 12th Aviation Group (Combat). Allocations were received for the following courses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>NO OF ALLOCATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Supply Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Maintenance Supervisor Course</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Airframe Repairman Course</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-63 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-53-L-11 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-53-L-13 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 SAS and Speed Trim Maintenance Course</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACA-AC
13 May 1970
SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

k. (C) Logistics.

(1) There is a shortage of repair parts at all echelons for the 4,000 pound Forklift, Truck, Ranger 40 Model. There are no repair parts stocked in the Direct Support Unit for this type of equipment. Excessive order/shipping time (six to nine months), is the contributing factor to the high deadline rate of 20 percent for this equipment.

(2) Units are experiencing difficulty in obtaining A and C level calibration of tools in the Automotive Number 1 and Number 2 Common Tool Sets. The Direct Support Unit refuses to calibrate these tools except for units maintaining tracked vehicles.

(3) The Battalion continues to have a shortage of 82 M16A1 Rifles as reflected in the ORLL for the period ending 31 January 1970.

l. (C) Signal. Continued emphasis was placed on the voice secure program. With the exception of four aircraft which lack ZYE retrofit, (non-available until July), 100 percent installation of KY-28's has been attained. Secure Radio Teletype communication was established with 12th Aviation Group (Combat). The necessity for communications economy and security continues to be stressed throughout the Battalion.

m. (C) Maintenance.

(1) For all units of the Battalion, the average density was 15 UH-1B/C, each operating an average of 60.5 flying hours per month, 44.6 UH-1D/H aircraft, attaining an average of 91.3 hours each and 31 CH-47A/C aircraft averaging 75.8 hours per month (See Inclosure 8). Seventeen UH-1 aircraft were turned-in, 19 replacements were received. The assault support helicopter companies turned-in five CH-47 helicopters and received four replacements.

(2) Based on ITOE authorization at the close of the reporting period, the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was short one UH-1B/C and two UH-1D/H aircraft. The 213th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) operated with only 13 CH-47 aircraft due to turn-ins required to permit full "C" conversions on the 12th Periodic Inspection (PPI). The 205th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) has 16 CH-47A's assigned.

(3) A shortage of qualified school trained Technical Inspectors, MOS 67W30, 67U30, and 67W30, for UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft continued to present a problem. With a combined total of 17 authorized and only eight assigned within the Battalion, the work of the Technical Inspector was placed increasingly upon the on-the-job training personnel and maintenance...
supervisors. With the expected rotational losses and forecast input of Technical Inspectors the problem will become more critical during the next reporting period without continued emphasis on the on-the-job training program.

n. (U) **Aviation Safety.**

(1) Two major accidents, four incidents, one forced landing, and fourteen precautionary landings resulted in a cumulative accident rate of 8.9 per 100,000 flying hours. Both major accidents were the result of material failure. One accident was caused by engine failure and the other by drive shaft failure. Three incidents were caused by pilot error, the fourth by material (engine) failure. Material failure was the major cause factor in all forced and precautionary landings.

(2) Of particular note in the safety program is the fact that the Battalion went through the entire dry monsoon without an accident in which dust was a factor. This accomplishment can be contributed to three factors:

(a) The excellent safety programs within units.

(b) The professionalism displayed by our aviators.

(c) The excellent assistance rendered by supported units with regard to dust suppression.

o. (U) **Medical.**

(1) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) dispensaries provided primary medical support for 2,571 U.S. personnel and secondary (laboratory and X-ray) support for five other dispensaries supporting an additional 3,000 personnel. There were 2,942 out-patient visits to Battalion medical facilities, including 700 Vietnamese civilians. Time limitations precluded an active off-post MEDCAP program.

(2) No cases of malaria or other serious tropical diseases occurred. One case of infectious hepatitis and three of bacillary dysentery occurred among Battalion personnel. Eight deaths occurred in the Battalion: one as a result of hostile action, four in an aircraft accident, two in a maintenance accident, and one from natural causes. A total of seven injuries occurred as a result of hostile fire.

(3) Three aircraft accidents were investigated and 203 flight physicals were performed.
An Optometry Clinic was established in the Battalion Dispensary, operating two days per week on an appointment basis, and staffed by Optometrists from the 24th Evacuation Hospital at Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam.

Religious and Personal Services.

(1) A Group-wide Tri-Faith Religious Retreat was held 3 - 20 March at 12th Aviation Group (Combat). It was the first Group-wide religious retreat in Vietnam. The retreat was so successful that a recommendation was made and approved to continue similar retreats every six months. The next retreat is scheduled for September 1970.

(2) A Sunrise Service was held Easter Sunday, 29 March at 0700 in the 11th Aviation Battalion Chapel area. The Phu Quong Protestant Church Choir assisted in the service. Utilization of Vietnamese personnel in religious services can and did create greater interest and response in the units.

(3) Inclusion 9 reflects a summary of religious activities during this period.

Civic Actions.

(1) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Civic Action Program was directed toward Community Relations and Social Welfare projects during this quarter.

(a) The 128th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) continued to support the Lai Thieu Deaf Mute School with food staples and clothing.

(b) The 205th and 213th Aviation Companies (Assault Support Helicopter) continued to support the St. Joseph's Leprosarium near Ben San with diesel fuel and food staples. Self-support at the facility has progressed to the point that the market for the tiles produced there has been surpassed by their ability to manufacture them.

(c) The 173d Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) has relinquished control of the Lai Kho Elementary School to the 5th ARVN Division and assumed the support of the Ben Cat Orphanage near Lai Khe. As immediate action, in relation to the change over, chicken brooders were constructed and fifty chicks were purchased with funds from the Battalion Donor Deposit Fund and presented to the Orphanage. This project was intended to make the orphanage more self-sufficient.
CONFIDENTIAL

AV34A-AC

13 May 1970
SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Progress toward Vietnamese Civic Action awareness was shown as the 5th ARVN Division assumed responsibility of the Lai Khe Elementary School. The Donor Deposit Fund has achieved the desired results of consolidating and controlling the funds available for Civic Action. A new and very active Civic Action Platoon leader in Binh Duong Province has already made liaison visits to the Battalion and the various unit projects. While no important intelligence data has been gathered as a result of civic action, the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) is continuing effort in this direction.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (C) Intelligence.

(1) (C) Battalion Security Platoon.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 22 March 1970, the Battalion Security Platoon at Phu Loi was disbanded and the personnel of the platoon were assigned to units of the Battalion. Battalion guard requirements are now filled from the unit guard rosters. This caused the efficiency of the perimeter guards to decline somewhat initially, as this duty was relatively unfamiliar to many men.

(b) EVALUATION: The majority of those individuals detailed for guard are not as proficient in the performance of assigned guard duties as were the individuals in the security platoon. Most of the men work six to eight hours at their assigned duties prior to reporting for guard. This contributes to an overall decline in the efficiency and effectiveness of the security force. Unit strengths have increased but there has been very little increase in unit effectiveness since at least the same number of men gained are detailed for guard duty daily. Furthermore, the time off required for each individual before and after guard duty impairs his job continuity. Another problem is the additional drain on unit manpower in performing bunkline maintenance. Presently bunkline maintenance is performed by a work detail supplied by the units of this command.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That requested modification of TOE/MTCE submitted 6 June 1969 be reconsidered. Requested modification of personnel allowances is attached at Inclosure 60.

(d) COMMAND ACTIONS:

1. A request for modification of TOE/MTCE has been forwarded through channels.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBACA-AC

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-45 (R2) (B)

2. Comprehensive briefings and inspections are conducted prior to posting guards on the bunker line.

3. The officer of the guard conducts regular inspections of the bunker line (once every three hours).

4. The sergeant of the guard is positioned at the command point control bunker situated on the bunker line. Throughout the night he conducts frequent unscheduled inspections to insure that alert posture is maintained.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) SPH-4 Flight Helmet.

(a) OBSERVATION: The design and use of the visor on the SPH-4 flight helmet is restrictive.

(b) EVALUATION: The tinted visor on the SPH-4 flight helmet is difficult to operate and vision is restricted by both night and scoro haze conditions. The visor became very difficult to operate in a short period of time due to binding between the visor and its protection shield, aggravated by accumulation of dust and dirt in the tracks. The helmet comes with both clear and a tinted visor. However, only one visor can be installed at a time. Since a majority of battallion mission time is flown during the daylight hours, most pilots installed the tinted visor. The same visor cannot be used during night flights and during severe haze conditions, therefore necessary protection for face and eyes is lost. Recommendation that the clear visor be used and sunglasses be worn during the daylight hours has two major disadvantages. The first is that when wearing sunglasses, the earphone in the helmet is pulled away from the ears and the protection from the extremely high aircraft noise level is lost. The second problem is that wearing of sunglasses under the flight helmet is uncomfortable and in some cases caused aviators to develop severe headaches after prolonged use.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the helmet be redesigned to include both a clear and a tinted visor.

2. That all pilots be instructed to perform preventive maintenance on their helmets to insure that the tracks are clean and that the visors move freely.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACA-AC 13 May 1970
SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

A temporary means of freeing the visor and maintaining free movement can be achieved by applying soap to the guide tracks positioned in the visor shield.

(d) COMMAND ACTIONS:

1. EIR's on the SPH-4 helmet were submitted.

2. All aviators in the Battalion have been instructed to inspect their helmets daily to insure that the visor works freely.

(2) (C) Aircraft Recovery Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Failure of forward blade tiodes down strap during recovery operations.

(b) EVALUATION: This unit jettisoned two UH-1 aircraft during recovery operations due to failure of forward rotor blade tiodes down strap. The failure resulted in oscillations of the aircraft; immediate action to reduce air speed was not effective; oscillations increased in severity so rapidly that the UH-1's had to be jettisoned within 15 seconds after the rigging failed. It is evident that adequate supervision and inspection of the rigging on the downed aircraft was not accomplished prior to the recovery. Later evaluation and inspection of rigging equipment used by the recovery unit disclosed that cargo tiodes down straps used to secure the forward blade were becoming frayed and breaking due to contact with the lower hinge on the pilots and co-pilots doors.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That portion of the tiodes down strap making contact with the aircraft fuselage be reinforced.

2. That recovery air speed for UH-1 aircraft be limited to 60 knots to preclude excessive strain on rigging equipment.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Recommendations listed above have been adopted by the Battalion. Tiodes down straps were reinforced by inserting a piece of fire hose around that portion of the tiodes down strap which makes contact with the aircraft fuselage.

d. (U) Organization. None.
e. (U) Training. None.
f. (C) Logistics.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACA-AC

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

13 May 1970

(1) (C) Logistical Support to the INFANT (FIGURE 100) New Equipment Training Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: The team was attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for logistical support on 5 April 1970. The NETT was levied to commence training of aviators in the UH-1N helicopter as of 4 May 1970. The team had no internal assets other than the special system and qualified personnel to accomplish the training task.

(b) EVALUATION: Immediate requirements existed for general support equipment and maintenance support equipment. The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was, and still is, at a disadvantage to support the requirements of the team other than aircraft maintenance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That greater emphasis be placed on the logistical requirements of new concept teams by supporting activities, (i.e., USAICC, Depot) through establishment of sound priorities. Units satellited with such teams should be notified more than 24 hours in advance of the team's arrival so that proper preparations can be made.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: USAICC and Depot have been advised of the requirements of this unit through official correspondence, liaison visits, and unit requests.

(g) (U) Communications. None.

(h) (C) Material.

(i) (C) Effect on Operational Ready Rates Caused by the Turn-in of UH-1D Aircraft for Out-of-Country Transfer.

(a) OBSERVATION: The numerous problems encountered in preparing UH-1D aircraft for turn-in for out-of-country transfer necessitated grounding three aircraft for thirty days and caused the Battalion operational ready rate to drop by 6.9 percent.

(b) EVALUATIONS:

1. The criteria for turn-in was not established when this unit was notified to turn-in the UH-1D aircraft.

2. The Direct Support Unit would not accept the aircraft until they performed a 100 percent technical inspection, and all discrepancies were cleared from the AD Form 2000.
3. Initial technical inspections and follow-up inspections were not performed by the same individual. During follow-up inspections, after discrepancies had been cleared from the original DA Form 2404, new DA Form 2404’s were prepared and the original form was not used.

4. Numerous sheet metal repairs were required to meet turn-in criteria, however the aircraft were flyable.

5. Excessive man hours were spent on aircraft for turn-in that could have been devoted to maintenance on the unit’s other aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Prior to alerting a unit to turn-in aircraft, an exact criteria for turn-in be established with all direct support units in 34th General Support Group.

2. That the direct support technical inspectors perform initial inspections and a final inspection using the same DA Form 2404.

3. That all sheet metal discrepancies found on aircraft be worked off at the direct support units after the aircraft has been turned-in.

4. That operational units be allowed to turn-in aircraft if the man hours to prepare an aircraft for turn-in exceed 750 hours. This would enable the unit to use its manpower more effectively.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Numerous liaison visits were conducted with the Direct Support Unit to discuss expediting the turn-in of UH-1D aircraft.

(2) (c) Problem Analysis Involving the OH-67C Model Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: The OH-67C model availability has been adversely affected and has caused the EDP rate to be in excess of norms due to the failure of the following components: control panel (PSN 1680-179-1374; part number 114 ES 249-9); bleed band actuator mounting bolts (PSN 5306-050-6644) on T-55-L-11 engines; engines changes (PSN 2840-063-0201) due to excessive oil consumption; lack of modification kits for the fuel manifold seals required by NSN 55-2890-294-30/1.

(b) EVALUATIONS:

1. Failure of three resistors on Card A, ceased five control panel units (PSN 1680-179-1374) to short-circuit; on five different occasions aircraft were unable to meet their mission reporting times due to Card A failures.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACA-AC

SUBJECT: CRL for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CRFGR-43 (R2) (U)

1 The bleed band actuator mounting bolts (FSN 5306-062-6644) are shearing due to the vibrations peculiar to the "C" model. These bolts require two to four man hours to replace, depending on the engine in which the bolts fail.

2 Engines, T-55-L-11 (FSN 2840-063-0501), which are programmed to last 300 hours between overhauls, are removed prior to reaching the 300 hour level due to excessive oil consumption. Two engines have necessitated change at extremely low hour levels, one at 26 hours, and another at 34.

3 The lack of modification kits for the fuel manifold seals, required by IAW 55-2840-234-30/1, has caused unnecessary down time. The unit has the capability to perform this modification.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That the Card A be modified to eliminate the short circuiting of this panel.

2 That better quality control be established to prevent premature engine removal for excessive oil, and defective bleed band actuator mounting bolts.

3 That sufficient modification kits be made available to modify the all engines in-country IAW MWO 55-2840-234-30/1.

(d) COMMAND ACTIONS:

1 EIR's (H68865, H68866, M39325, M39326 and M39329) have been submitted on all control panel failures and follow-up actions have been taken direct upon request, to AVSCOM.

2 EIR's (M39318 and H68864) have been submitted, and VERTOL technical representatives made aware of the failure of the bolt (FSN 5306-062-6644) used on the bleed band actuators.

3 EIR's (M39327 and M39328) have been submitted and Lycoming technical representatives have been advised of all problems encountered concerning the T-55-L-11 engines.

4 The CH-47 project officer has been contacted thru 12th Aviation Group (Combat) and the kits are on Red Ball to CONUS.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBAC LA 13 May 1970

SUBJECT: ORR for Period Ending 30 April 1970, ROS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (U) Others: None.

10 Incal
11. General Order Number 611
   HQ 12th Aviation Group
   (Combat)
2. Organisational Chart
3. Command and Staff Structure
4. Aircraft Status
5. Operational/Mission Results
6. Ammunition Expended
7. After Action Report-Lessons Learned
   (Project Delta)
8. Aircraft Maintenance Statistical Summary
9. Chapel Statistics
10. Modification Table of Organisation and
    Equipment - Section II - Personnel Allowances

DISTRIBUTION:
5 copies to CO, 12th Aviation Group (Combat)
2 copies to CO, 1st Aviation Brigade
3 copies to CO, USAV
2 copies to CO, CINCSARPAC
1 copy to CO, 145th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 210th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 226th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 31 Sqdn, 17th Air Cav

Incls 1, 3 & 9 w/d HQ DA

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBACA-SC (13 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS-CSG-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 26 May 1970

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

In compliance with USARV Reg 525-15, the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 30 April 1970, is forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MICHEAL M. BOLIN
Captain, EN
Acting Adjutant
DA, HQ, II EYO:CEV, APO San Francisco 96266  8 JUN 1970

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

2. (U) Reference item concerning "Logistical Support to the LEAPS 100 New Equipment Training Teams", page 14, paragraph 2f(1), and "Effect on Operational Readiness Rates Caused by the Turn-in of UH-1D Aircraft for Out-of-Country Transfer", page 14, paragraph 2h(1): concur. Command action taken by the reporting unit with respect to these items is considered appropriate. The USARV Aviation Officer is being notified of these problems through technical channels in an effort to preclude future occurrences.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. BARTLETT, Jr.
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CP:
CO, 12th Avn. Co (Cbt)
CO, 11th Avn. En (Cbt)
AV2113C-0 (13 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJ: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFCR-65 (12) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 11th AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 13 JUN 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATT: AVILOG-D8T, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATT: GPCR-31, APO 96540

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Operational Report-Lessons Learned, for the period 1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970 and concurs with the basic report and the contents contained in the 2d indorsement with the following exceptions.

a. Paragraph 1k(1), page 3: Parts for the model 40 forklift are in short supply. Maximum use of Red Ball Requisitions will be used. Action by USAV is recommended.

b. Paragraph 1k(2), page 3: All Brigade units were notified that a calibration team was scheduled to arrive in the Long Binh area in early June. Brigade units will utilize this team to the maximum extent possible.

c. Paragraph 1k(3), page 6: The 12th Aviation Group (Combat) is authorized 4,083 126s, and in May reported 4,995 on hand. The 12th Aviation Group (Combat) is to effect equitable distribution of available 126 rifles.

d. Paragraph 2c(2)(b), page 13: The unit discusses the failure of the forward main rotor tie down strap during recovery operations. Supervision may have been a factor; however, the method of securing the forward blade by passing the strap through the cockpit causes the strap to chafe on the door posts. This is the major cause of the tie down strap failure. The Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility (FAMF) is manufacturing a forward main rotor blade tie down, which connects to the torsion rings in the forward portion of the skid tubes. Twenty-four of these assemblies have been issued to recovery units throughout Vietnam, and 32 more will be available in the near future.

e. Paragraph 2f(1), page 14: Logistical requirements cannot be resolved unless the requirements are known in advance. Closer coordination should have been effected between the 12th Aviation Group (Combat) and the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat). Procedures to obtain required support on a timely basis have been discussed by the Brigade G-4 and the Group S-4.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

WARREN A. PETERSON
CPT, AUG
ASST AG
1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 11th Aviation Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "SPH-4 Flight Helmet", page 12, paragraph 2c(1). In response to a request by the Safety Division, USARV Aviation, for an evaluation of the Navy-developed SPH-4 double visor kit, USABAAR, on 6 May 1970, stated that the double visor kit is undesirable. Its incorporation would increase the total helmet weight by one-half pound and would move the helmet center of mass forward significantly. An alternative to the redesign of the helmet, yet one which allows the aviator to wear eyeglasses/sunglasses while wearing the SPH-4, is the recently developed, liquid filled ear pad assembly. USARV is initiating action to obtain and distribute these pads. Unit has been so advised.

   b. Reference item concerning "Aircraft Recovery Operations", page 13, paragraph 2c(2), and paragraph d, 3d Indorsements concur with the 3d Indorsement. The new forward main rotor blade tiedown device being manufactured by the FAMF will eliminate this problem. Information concerning this new device is being published in the 34th General Support Group newsletter. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   c. Reference item concerning "Turn-in of UH-1D Aircraft for Out-of-Country Transfer", page 14, paragraph 2h(1); Gencur. However, units are expected to maintain their aircraft on a continual basis and not to allow the excessive accumulation of deferred maintenance. Aircraft will not be accepted by direct support/general support maintenance units if it is apparent that the owning unit has neglected to perform proper organizational maintenance. A message to this effect was sent to all aviation units on 29 May 1970. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   d. Reference item concerning "CH-47C Aircraft Problems", page 15, paragraph 2h(2); concur with the recommendation. A new, more reliable card has been developed for the control panel. It is currently a critical item because of the high failure rate of the existing card. A new bleed band actuator mounting
AVHCS-DST (13 May 70) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

The bolt has been developed and is available; however, existing bolts can be machined to the dimensions of the new bolt. As concerns fuel manifold seals, all CH-47D aircraft have been modified in accordance with NWO 55-2840-234-30/1. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Chief W. Stevens Jr.

CFO

ASSISTANT DEPUTY GENERAL

Fuel

1st AVN Bde

11th AVN BN
GPOP-DT (13 May 70) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, C. D. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

E.E. OZAKI
CFT, AGC
Anst AG
### Aircraft Status

**11th Aviation Battalion (Combat)**

**Aircraft Status**

**As of 30 April 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>OH-53A</th>
<th>UH-1</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTH</strong></td>
<td><strong>ON HAND</strong></td>
<td><strong>AUTH</strong></td>
<td><strong>ON HAND</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th Avn Co (Aat Hal)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aat Hal)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aat Spt Hal)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aat Spt Hal)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN EQ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn En (Cot)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
OPERATIONAL/MISSION RESULTS
FOR THE PERIOD 1 FEBRUARY 1970 THROUGH 30 APRIL 1970

a. Operational Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES FLOWN</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>CARGO TONS LIFTED</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>18,498</td>
<td>42,511</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>12,617</td>
<td>29,886</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>9,586</td>
<td>22,589</td>
<td>22,655</td>
<td>2,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>12,213</td>
<td>23,162</td>
<td>21,371</td>
<td>3,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN HQ</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
<td>55,041</td>
<td>118,628</td>
<td>44,030</td>
<td>16,118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Mission Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT CBT DAM</th>
<th>CBT LOSS</th>
<th>ENEMY KIA</th>
<th>STRUCTURES DAM DEST</th>
<th>SHAPANS DAM DEST</th>
<th>RECOVERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN HQ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure 9
11TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)  
AMMUNITION EXPENDED  
FOR THE PERIOD 1 FEBRUARY 1970 THROUGH 30 APRIL 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>7.62mm</th>
<th>40mm</th>
<th>2.75 FPAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>310,630</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>421,880</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN HQ</td>
<td>11,340</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
<td>751,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-Attachment 6-

27
1. (C) Identity of Operation: The 128th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) (minus) was engaged in dedicated support of "Delta Forces", 5th Special Forces Group, from 11 February 1970 to 10 March 1970. The "Delta Forces" were engaged in special reconnaissance activities. The operation was conducted in the northeastern portion of III Corps Tactical Zone (See map sheet at Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 7) utilizing Banar, located at coordinates YT 2987, as the Forward Operations Base (FOB).

2. (C) Task Organization: The 128th Aviation Company (minus) consisted of the 2d airlift platoon, the 3d armed platoon and personnel from company operations, communications, maintenance, and avionics sections. The 2d airlift platoon supplied six UH-1H lift aircraft daily and 26 flight crewmembers. The 3d armed platoon supplied four UH-1B gunships and 16 flight crewmembers. Thirteen other personnel from various sections of the unit supported the operation. A total of fifty-five personnel were deployed to FOB Banar.

3. (C) Concept of Operation and Execution: The Delta Forces received the mission to conduct reconnaissance operations in AO Tree Top (See map sheet attached at Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 7) to determine location of enemy supply routes in the area. This was accomplished by inserting six man recon teams at various locations throughout the AO to find and fix enemy positions. ARVN Rangers were utilized as a reaction force to support reconnaissance teams who inadvertently did engage the enemy.

4. (C) Results: The 128th Aviation Company (minus) flew a total of 2,306 sorties in 1,288.2 hours, transported 2,001 troops and conducted 13 medevac missions. The UH-1B gunships fired 103,700 rounds of .62mm ammunition, 2,394 10 pound 2.75 rockets and accounted for three VC KIA's, four sampans and countless bunker hootches.

5. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: The lift aircraft were equipped with 30 foot troop ladders and McQuire extraction rigs. One aircraft was equipped with a hoist and jungle penetrator for special recoveries. All landing zones were reconnoitered by air prior to insertions. Due to terrain configuration and dense foliage, many insertions and extractions were made from a six to ten foot hover. Extractions were normally made at either first or last light utilizing two recovery ships, one command and control aircraft and a light fire team (two UH-1B gunships). On several occasions two light fire teams were required to support the extractions when teams were in contact with the enemy.
6. (C) Problem Analysis: Problems encountered during this operation were as follows:

a. The lack of sufficient personnel in the area directly adjacent to and around the helicopter revetments at Ranard presented a major dust problem. All aircraft maintained at the FOB experienced a marked power loss due to excessive dust intake into the engines. Possibility of going inadvertent IMC in the dust clouds caused by rotorswash was a major safety hazard.

b. Major problems were experienced in the area of aircraft availability. The supported unit required six flyable UH-1H's and four UH-1B's on a confirmed and dedicated basis. In addition, that portion of the company remaining at base camp was committed for six aircraft daily in support of operations in the 3rd Corps Tactical Zone. This heavy geographically separated commitment over a prolonged period of time reduced the ability of the unit to adhere to sound maintenance management procedures. Within a very short period of time aircraft availability declined to less than established norms.

c. POL facilities were not established until the operation had been in progress for two and one half weeks. POL was the responsibility of the supported unit, however, due to their inability to provide adequate POL equipment, this responsibility was assumed by the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

7. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. That it is imperative that forward bases of operations be prepared to support aviation units prior to their deployment.

b. When an aviation unit is requested to provide dedicated support on an extended basis in a remote and distant area, the controlling agency should make provisions for maintenance down time and to/from time for replacement of down aircraft.

c. Maximum training should be conducted in the area of night operations, use of troops ladders, and McQuire rigs prior to commencement of operation. Classes on survival, escape and evasion are imperative.
### 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
#### Aircraft Maintenance Statistical Summary
**For the Period 1 February 1970 Through 30 April 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hrs Flown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B/C</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>2724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>1771</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>5557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2404</td>
<td>1807</td>
<td>6221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>3920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47C</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>3459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Available (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B/C</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47C</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Norm (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B/C</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47C</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Nobs (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B/C</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47C</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>QR</td>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SECG1256G6081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>SECURITY PLATOON HQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>PLATOON LEADER</td>
<td>LT</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>PLATOON SERGEANT</td>
<td>E7</td>
<td>11B40</td>
<td>IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>LT TRUCK DRIVER</td>
<td>E4</td>
<td>64A10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>AMMO SPECIALIST</td>
<td>E5</td>
<td>55B30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SECURITY SQUADS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>SQUAD LEADER</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>11B40</td>
<td>IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>SECURITY GUARD</td>
<td>B4</td>
<td>11B20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>SECURITY GUARD</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>11B20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Include page 10*
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations,

CO, 11th Aviation Battalion

May 1970

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310