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| AUTHORITY |
| GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980 |

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION.

1. Forwarded as inclusion is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6c of AR 1-1 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) General. This report covers the period 1 August 1966 through 31 October 1966 and is submitted in compliance with Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam Regulation 1-3 dated 29 September 1966. Activities of subordinate units are included in this report.

   a. Type and number of aircraft authorized:

      (1) UH-1B (A) 26
      (2) UH-1D 60
      (3) U6A 1
      (4) CH-47 16

   b. The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is based at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. Subordinate elements consist of the following units located as indicated.

      (1) Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment - Pleiku, RVN.

      (2) 119th Assault Helicopter Company - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with UH-1D aircraft.

      (3) 155th Assault Helicopter Company - Ban Me Thuot, RVN. Equipped with UH-1D aircraft.

      (4) 170th Assault Helicopter Company - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with UH-1D aircraft.

      (5) 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with CH-47 aircraft. This unit arrived Camp Holloway 10 August 1966 and became operational on 7 September 1966.

      (6) 219th Aviation Company - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with CH-47 aircraft. This company was reassigned to the 223rd Aviation Battalion on 4 September 1966.

2. (C) Intelligence. The Battalion S-2 Section has continued to publish the daily INTSUM and increased the source of information. Listening has been increased to include MCV Pleiku Sector, the Special Forces S-2 Detachment and the 4th Infantry Division. The 155th Assault Helicopter Company at Ban Me Thuot now has liaison with 23rd
3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

a. The past quarter was characterized by day to day missions to Operation Paul Revore with occasional requirements for support of Republic of Korea Forces, Special Forces, and Republic of Vietnam Forces. (After Action Report for Paul Revore attached as Inclusion #1) Operational statistics for the reported period appear below.

(1) Total number of aircraft hours flown during reported period: 20,666 hours.

(2) Total number of aircraft sorties flown during reported period: 63,276 sorties.

(a) Tactical and logistical sorties in support of Republic of Vietnam (ARVNAP) and US Forces: 61,546.

(b) Training and maintenance sorties: 1,728.

b. Training subjects stressed:

(1) Aviator Training.

(a) Aviator Standardization

(b) Sling Loads

(c) Disperser Training

(d) Flight Safety

(e) Formation Flying

(f) Density Altitude

(g) Night Flying

(h) Practice D.A.'s

(i) Use of "go-no go" chart.

(2) Ground Training.

(a) Medical Training

(b) Function of Claymore Mines

(c) Weapons Familiarization

(d) Code of Conduct

(e) Escape & Evasion

(f) CBR Training

(g) Defense Plans & Alerts

(h) Character Guidance

c. PSYWAR. Although this battalion has no PSYWAR responsibilities as such, it is felt that on one occasion this unit was instrumental in effecting the surrender of approximately 28 enemy soldiers through the use of a loudspeaker from a UH-1D type helicopter.
4. (C) Logistics.

a. Installation coordination activities were removed from the S-4 area of responsibility at the beginning of this period. A Post Headquarters was organized and staffed, enabling the S-4 Office to devote its entire attention to assisting the helicopter units of this battalion in logistical activities.

b. Class I. A major problem exists in the transportation of Class I from the Cam Rhan Bay - Nha Trang Support Area to the 15th Assault Helicopter Company in Binh Hoa Province. Abundant rations are available for issue but the lack of scheduled transportation has caused this unit to be without Class I rations for weeks at a time. On numerous occasions UH-1 flights from the Nha Trang area were filled with whatever food could be obtained. Several C-2 flights were also used as an interim measure. The requirement rests with the Air Force via Army ATO channels. This problem still exists at the termination of this quarter and action is being initiated in order to eliminate this problem.

c. Class II, III, IV, and V support continues to be provided by the Pleiku Support Area. This quarter has seen a tremendous increase in support received from the logistical support elements in the Pleiku Sub-Area. This fact is due to the arrival of many additional logistical units in the area. Maintenance support, spare parts, and highly qualified personnel have added to a greatly improved maintenance picture. Direct exchange facilities, additional repair facilities, increased transportation capabilities have resulted in better logistical support. Class III and V requirements were met and supported to the sizeable increase in flying hours flown by this battalion. Throughout the Operation Paul Revere Field, many semi-permanent POL and ammunition re-arming points were established. The main location being the Camp Holloway area with additional points at Cai Lai and the Oasis. Mobile points were established at Duc Co, Vinh Ho, and also Da Nang as operations directed on a day to day basis. Class III support at Camp Holloway is provided through the use of a 4 point mini-port and 2 M49C tankers. Transient Avgas with TCP is available for C-2 aircraft. Close coordination with the 5/4, 3/25 Infantry to the Pleiku Support Area provided additional 350 GPM pumps, separators and bladders required to provide Class III support in field operations. A steadily improving picture of Class II & IV was noted this quarter. Four out vehicles, 15 tons, ambulances, and 24 tons were received by the several units within this battalion. The authorized amounts of the new family of radios, i.e., AN/VC-25, AN/VC-46, AN/VC-47, AN/VC-53's, were received and installed. A continuing shortage of 9 M49CA 24 ton POL tankers exists.

5. (U) Civil Affairs.

a. During the quarter the 524 Combat Aviation Battalion participated in the following projects and activities:

(1) The battalion was represented on the II Corps Community Relations Council.

(2) The battalion undertook as a major project, assistance to the Pleiku Montagnard Boarding School.

(3) During the week of 11-17 September 1966, the battalion was invited to participate in the mounting of Highland-Lowland relationships. The battalion provided technical advice and assistance to a group of 60 Vietnamese village students from Pleiku who came to Pleiku to provide a work force for, and a cultural exchange with, the students of the Montagnard Boarding School.
(4) Provided the financial support necessary for the formation of a Montaignard Boy Scout Troop within the Pleiku Boy Scout Council.

(5) The 155th Assault Helicopter Company at Ban Me Thuot continued to provide medical assistance to the patients of the Ban Me Thuot hospital charity ward.

(6) The 155th Assault Helicopter Company collected volunteer labor for the construction of a new charity ward at the Ban Me Thuot hospital.

6. (c) Personal

a. Personnel Actions:

(1) Non-receipt of Assignment Instructions: Assignment Instructions are continuing to arrive late, however, assignment instructions are received by individuals to MOS.

(2) Port Calls: The new system of issuing port calls prior to individuals departing from the battalion has improved the morale of all individuals concerned. The new system is operating very smoothly. However, plans are in process to have all individuals depart Vietnam out of New York, N.Y. This will eliminate the messy travel time and inconvenience to the individual concerned.

(3) Loss of 219th Avm Co: The 219th Aviation Company (FW) was transferred to the control of the 223rd Aviation Battalion effective 12 September 1966. Personnel records and allied papers were delivered to Commanding Officer, 223rd Aviation Battalion on or about 14 September 1966.

7. (b) Religious Activities:

a. During the quarter a total of 174 religious services were conducted for all elements of the battalion with a total attendance of 3,676.

b. A weekly recreation service was added to the Protestant religious worship held Wednesday evening of the 1st Sunday Communion in order to make the service more accessible and to answer the continued problems of those personnel who have to perform duties on any given Sunday.

c. The Protestant congregation initiated participation with the Catholics and other area military congregations in a joint Protestant Catholic Fellowship and 협력 in the Pleiku Missionary Compound.

d. Religious services for the 155th Assault Helicopter Company at Ban Me Thuot are conducted on a weekly basis by the Protestant Missionaries in the Catholic complex at Ban Me Thuot.

e. Miscellaneous activities accounted for the following religious/charity action projects:

(1) The personnel of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company in Ban Me Thuot continued to assist the Catholic orphanage there.

(2) Personnel of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company continued to assist the Protestant Missionary Congregation in Ban Me Thuot.

(3) Volunteer personnel at the Pleiku Protestant congregation assisted the Pleiku missionaries in the construction of a new warehouse on their compound to store welfare supplies.
The Protestant congregation on Camp Holloway contributed nine weekly offerings to assist in the construction of the Jorai Missionary Church.

The Catholic Chaplain at Camp Holloway initiated a program to raise the funds necessary to the construction of a new wing on the St. Paul of Chartres Catholic Day School.

Awards and Decorations:
Total awards processed during period of report, by type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>1,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAIV Certificate of Achievement</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL - 1,459

PIO Activities during Period of Report:

a. General news stories: 29
b. General news with photos: 4
c. Hometown news releases: 116
d. Hometown news with photos: 12

TOTAL - 161

Special Services:

a. One USO performance was presented to Camp Holloway Personnel.

(1) USO showcase - Roy Rogers and Dale Evans performed 23 October 1966 along with their band the "Travellons".

(2) Continued expansion of the library with more books, audio equipment and library furniture.

(3) A & I equipment issued to all subordinate units.

SECTION II - COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

Personnel

a. Item: Shortage of Personnel

Discussion: TO&E 1-258F does not authorize an Executive Officer, adequate supply and administrative personnel, or gunners for the CH-47 aircraft.

Observation: Changes to the above TO&E are being recommended at this time and if approved, should eliminate this problem area. An immediate augmentation for gunners should be approved for use in the CH-47 aircraft.

b. Item: 71i20 Replacements

Discussion: 71120 (Flight Operations Specialists) replacements have been found to have little or no experience. Though these men are school trained, they are greatly lacking in experience and proficiency in handling flight records and other operations duties.
Observation: The heavy flying commitments placed on units in a Theater of Operations increases operations' workloads to the point where poorly trained and inexperienced operations personnel impose an excessive burden on the unit. Their eventual training will be accomplished and they will gain experience, but only at the expense of increased workloads on other personnel of the unit.

2. (C) Operations

a. Item: Supported Unit Training

Discussion: This unit conducted training for all artillery batteries of the 4th Infantry Division soon after their arrival in-country. The training was conducted during a 5 day period and included the proper tying and lashing of internal cargo, rigging and hook-up of external loads, and orientation of personnel on safety and emergency procedures during troop moves. The training employed demonstrations and practical exercises involving the actual movement of personnel and equipment by CH-47 aircraft.

Observation: Training of this nature could be conducted in CONUS; thereby saving valuable time on the aircraft that should be utilized in support of the combat mission.

b. Item: Medical Evacuation and Medical Attention during the Conduct of a Heliborne Assault

Discussion: When conducting company size operations within the Ban Me Thuot area the attached medical evacuation helicopter flies as trail aircraft of the formation. Depending on the terrain, tactical air support and artillery trajectories, the medical evacuation helicopter breaks away from the formation and orbits at altitude about three miles from the landing zone. If the distance from the pick up zone to the landing zone is short enough, the helicopter remains in this orbit area; if on the other hand, the distance is of such magnitude as to preclude effective rescue of a downed aircraft or vehicles as well as providing adequate medical evacuation coverage for the air landed troops, the orbit point is changed. It is normal procedure to place this orbit point 1/3 of the distance between the air landed troops and their pick up point.

Observation: The use of an organic or attached medical evacuation ship during the conduct of a combat assault increases reaction time for medical evacuation thereby decreasing the probable loss ratio of wounded or injured troops while not detracting from the airmobile mission.

c. Item: Use of White Smoke to Mark Enemy Targets

Discussion: The current pyrotechnics identification as listed in the SOI is unsatisfactory. To identify enemy targets it prescribes white smoke. This color of smoke is seen throughout the area of operation and is such a common sight it draws no special notice from anyone. Every Montagnard charcoal pit, of which there are many in the Central Highlands, produces a white smoke. Every friendly LZ is identified by the refuse and sump pit, being burned, producing white smoke. In other words, the most common smoke in Vietnam is white.

Observation: White smoke for the identifying of enemy targets is unsatisfactory. The most effective and easily identified color is red. For the reasons stated above an immediate change to the pyrotechnic portion of the SOI is warranted.
d. Item: Improved Crew Chief and Gunner Communications Capability.

Discussion: The current configuration of the gunner and crew chiefs drop cords found in the UH-1 helicopter is unsatisfactory. Anytime one of these crewmembers is required to move from his seat to assist in loading, unloading, refueling, or steps out to remove an obstacle from the aircraft commander and his crew, communications in the present crew chief and gunner communications configuration is lost unless the floor button is actuated. This creates a lost undesirable and unsafe communications gap between the aircraft commander and his crew. In the present crew chief and gunner communications configuration the lack of a floor button to activate their microphone. The gunner and crew chief must have the capability for transmitting to the aircraft commander via radio the M-60 machine gun, in the case of the hand held M-60 machine gun, this is impossible and with the XM-23 machine gun is difficult.

Observation: The gunner and crew chief can be provided with a continuous communication capability by actuating their drop cords, the installation of a floor button will link those two crew members with a much needed communication capability.

e. Item: Positive Fire Control of Ground Unit.

Discussion: The current UH-1H helicopter has a massive fire support capability in its door gunners. This fire power when properly controlled and directed can be a definite asset to the ground unit being supported, as well as protecting the helicopter. However, a few instances of poor fire discipline while supporting a ground unit will cause them to lose faith in the firepower. To provide this a positive means of fire control must be established and followed by the aviation unit.

Observation: One method of enforcing fire discipline is to place the responsibility for fire control on the aircraft commander. He, being experienced in the terms and techniques used by the unit, is the logical one to direct the fire of his gunner. He will designate all targets to his gunner and give the range, fire and stop fire. When providing close fire support to the ground unit, the aircraft commander of the gunships must rigidly control the fire of the door gunners. He can do this only after he has taken personal observation of the friendly position and insured himself that it can be identified. The gunship aircraft commander controlled fire and stop fire in the same manner as a slick aircraft commander. The, however, by door gunners must be positively prohibited.

3. (U) Maintenance


Discussion: Due to the dusty environmental operating conditions, the aircraft of this battalion are exposed to in day to day operations, a common engine problem is loss of power and occasionally compressor stall due to dirty engine compressor rotors. Once an engine accumulates sufficient dirt and contamination to evidence a serious loss of power, it is too late to take preventive cleaning measures, and the engine compressor must be disassembled in order to clean the compressor rotor and restore engine to a servicable condition. Therefore, this battalion initiated a policy of preventive cleaning at each intermediate inspection by using dry cleaning solvent and water. In addition, at each periodic inspection a walnut shell cleaning procedure was directed. Although it is still too early to definitely determine the success of this policy, it is expected to maintain engine performance at maximum efficiency and reduce maintenance down time.
Observation: Preventive cleaning of engine compressor rotors by procedures outlined in Lycoming Field Service Note and TM 55-1520-210-20 will help to reduce engine loss of power and high exhaust gas temperatures.

Part II, Recommendations

1. (c) Personnel

   a. That an immediate augmentation be authorized to assign or attach personnel to be utilized as gunners aboard CH-47 aircraft. The augmentation should be on the basis of one per aircraft.

   b. That Flight Operations Specialists (7P20) be given more extensive training in maintenance of aviator's flight records. This could be accomplished by extending the school or assignment to operational units prior to sending them overseas.

2. (c) Operation

   a. Problem: Failure of XM-23 to fire to the front.

      Background: It has been found that the left side XM-23 in its issued configuration will not fire when pointed to the front. This creates an unacceptable dead space area for the left gunner. One means to partly overcome this shortcoming is to add chute links to the feed tray.

      Recommendation: That a factory modification to the XM-23 be made which will enable the weapon to fire in the full forward position.

   b. Problem: Unit Call Signs

      Background: There is no way to hide the fact that an assault helicopter company is operating in the area. The required minimum radio transmission quickly reveals that. All compounds in Vietnam are easily observed by agents, therefore the units operating from these compounds are known to the enemy. Aviation units in Vietnam are proud units. Their morale is high and their pride in the unit is outstanding. They have used the same Call Signs for years and are known throughout Vietnam as the Alligators, Stagecoaches, etc., until recently when an aviator from one of those companies made a radio call you could hear the pride and espirit in his voice. However, this is no longer the case due to recent changes in call signs.

      Recommendation: That the practice of changing Aviation Company call signs be discontinued and their traditional call signs be returned to the unit.

1 Incl:
   After Action Report
   LTC, Inf
   Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO 96318

AVGD-SC

11 November 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Paul Revere 1 August – 31 October 1966

TO: Commanding Officer
17th Combat Aviation Group
ATTN: AVGD-SC
APO 96240

1. The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion has been participating in Operation Paul Revere for the entire period of this report.

2. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

   Period 1-4 August 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere II with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, and 170th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 9 airlanded assaults, 3 extractions, numerous resupply and command & control missions.

   The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MED EVAC</th>
<th>COMBAT LUESSES</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
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   Week ending 18 August 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere II with aircraft from the 119th, 155th and 170th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 6 airlanded assaults, 3 extractions, numerous resupply and command and control missions.

   One helicopter from the 119th crashed as a result of suspected enemy ground fire; The aircraft was totally destroyed. There were no injuries to the crew or passengers.

   The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
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   Week ending 19 August 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere II with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 12 airlanded assaults and 6 extractions. Numerous resupply and command and control missions were accomplished.

   The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MED EVAC</th>
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Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

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The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation III with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Co's. The units conducted 8 airlifted assaults, 2 extractions, numerous supply and command and control missions.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MIKES</th>
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The 52d, 59th, and 119th Battalion lands on 1-8 September 66. The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation III with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Co's. The units conducted 6 airlifted assaults, 2 extractions, numerous supply and command and control missions.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

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<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MIKES</th>
<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
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<tr>
<td>1170</td>
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The 52d, 59th, and 119th Battalion lands on 1-8 September 66. The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation III with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Co's. The units conducted 6 airlifted assaults, 2 extractions, numerous supply and command and control missions.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MIKES</th>
<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
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The 52d, 59th, and 119th Battalion lands on 1-8 September 66. The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation III with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Co's. The units conducted 6 airlifted assaults, 2 extractions, numerous supply and command and control missions.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MIKES</th>
<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1170</td>
<td>5937</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Week ending 29 September 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere III with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 10 airdropped assaults, 2 extractions, numerous resupply and command and control missions.

At 0700 Hours on 26 September 66 the 1/35 Infantry Battalion was airlifted from Ya 865366 to Ya 806440. A total of 337 troops and 50 tons of equipment were moved. On 28 September 66 two Infantry Battalions were moved. The 2/35 Infantry Battalion was airlifted to Zi 184103 from Ya 835147 and the 2/8 Infantry Battalion was moved to Ya 866135 from Ya 806345. On 29 September 66, due to reports of increased enemy activity, a night combat assault was performed airdropping 30 troops at Zi 196287 from Za 205342. No contact was made and there were no incidents.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SORTIES</th>
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<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
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<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
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Period 29-30 September 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere III with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 10 airdropped assaults and numerous resupply and command and control missions.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

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</table>

Period 1-6 October 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th, and 179th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 6 airdropped assaults, 3 extractions, numerous resupply and command and control missions.

On 1 October 66 at 2000 hours a night combat assault was performed by the 119th Aviation Company, lifting 24 troops of the 2/35 Infantry Battalion from Zi 204346 to Za 205315. As the aircraft were returning to base camp (Zi 204342), they received heavy automatic weapons fire from the Cateeka Plantation. The gunships immediately took the target under fire and the weapons were silenced.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>ND LNSG</th>
<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
<th>HOURS FLOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>293</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period 6-12 October 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th, and 179th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 4 airdropped assaults, 3 extractions, numerous resupply and command and control missions.

On 9 October 66 the 155th Aviation Company lifted 445 troops of the 1/14 Infantry Battalion from Ya 674275 and Ya 745215 to Ya 950408 and Ya 962442. The 179th Aviation Company lifted the supporting artillery, B/2/9 from Ya 773228 to Ya 950408.
CONFIDENTIAL

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MED EVAC</th>
<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6008</td>
<td>1229</td>
<td>5527</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period 13-19 October 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 11 airdropped assaults, 2 extractions, numerous resupply and command and control missions.

On 14 October the 119th Aviation Company lifted the 2/8 Infantry Battalion from YA 825197 and YA 816104 to YA 916251. A total of 357 troops and 66 tons of equipment were moved on this lift.

On 16 October the 170th Aviation Company lifted the 2/35 Infantry Battalion from ZA 160575 to ZA 862458. A total of 401 troops and 14 tons of cargo were lifted on this lift.

On 18 October the 170th Aviation Company lifted the 1/35 Infantry Battalion from ZA 136540 and ZA 159476 to ZA 815462 and Plei Djerang. A total of 419 troops and 20 tons of cargo was lifted to make this move.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MED EVAC</th>
<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5620</td>
<td>1207</td>
<td>6786</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period 20-27 October 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 9 airdropped assaults, 2 extractions, numerous resupply and command and control missions.

On 21 October the 155th Aviation Company supported Operation Hoa Lu 80. The 155th lifted 111 CIDG troops from Plei Mrong to YA 958702. A UH-1B(A) prep was fired on the LZ prior to the assault.

On 22 October two Battalions of the 4th Division were in contact with an enemy force. The 170th Aviation Company provided emergency resupply to these units late into the night and early morning.

On 25 October the 155th Aviation Company supported Operation Thang Long 252. A total of 680 troops were lifted from Ban Me Thuet & Boun En Yang to BP 175875 and BP 120663.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MED EVAC</th>
<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>508</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>5992</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period 27-31 October 66: The 52d Aviation Battalion supported Operation Paul Revere with aircraft from the 119th, 155th, 170th and 179th Aviation Companies. The units conducted 6 airdropped assaults, 2 extractions, numerous resupply and command and control missions.

On 27 October the 119th Aviation Company lifted 11 CIDG's from ZA 99842 to Plei Djerang and 115 CIDG's from Plei Djerang to YA 838652.

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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On 28 October 66 two Battalions from the 4th Division were in contact with the enemy and numerous night emergency resupply missions were accomplished.

On 29 October 66 the enemy contact intensified and heavy resupply requirements were performed by the Battalions aircraft. One UH-1D of the 117th Aviation Company was shot down while performing resupply. There were no injuries to the crew however the A/C was totally destroyed.

On 30 October 1966 one UH-1D of the 155th Aviation Company was shot down in the vicinity of Y. 835605. Both the aircraft and the crew of 4 were lost.

The combined efforts of the 52d Aviation Battalions aircraft produced the following results for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>TONS OF CARGO</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>MED EVAC</th>
<th>COMBAT LOSSES</th>
<th>HOURS FLOMIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9865</td>
<td>788.2</td>
<td>3709</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>995.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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S-3
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AVMD-SC (13 Nov 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSPOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 17TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96240 3 December 1966

TO: Commanding General, I FORCSEV, APO 96240

1. (U) Basic communication is forwarded for information and necessary action.

2. (U) This headquarters concurs with Part II Recommendations as modified herein.
   b. Reference paragraph 1b. Concur.
   d. Reference paragraph 2b. Changing call signs of aviation units creates not only a problem from a morale and esprit standpoint but often results in the wrong call signs being reported by aviators in emergency situations. This could be avoided by maintaining traditional call signs.

3. (U) Lessons Learned and Commanders Recommendations will be disseminated to the Combat Aviation Battalions assigned to this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THIS IS A TRUE COPY

D.W. HATFIELD
CIT, ATG
Adjutant

RE: Operations Officer

Regrade UNCLASSIFIED when separated from CLASSIFIED material

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14
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A/FA-GC-1NC (11 Nov 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, 31 October 1966

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96350 29 Nov 1966

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO US Forces 96307

CC: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

The Operational Report of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is inadequate. Concur in comments contained herein.

WILLIAM H. JAMES
Colonel, G-3
Adjutant General

11 Incl
TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVNAV, APO 96307

1. The 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion's operational report for the period ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded for information and action.

2. This headquarters concurs with the recommendations with the additional comments.

a. Reference section II part 1 paragraph la and part II paragraph 1a: An HBA-1-250 is presently being staffed. DA has authorized door gunners for each CH-47 and each UH-1 Company. Augmentations have been authorized for all in-country and deploying assault and assault support helicopter companies with the exception of the 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company. Recommend USAVE provide the 17 gunners required for the 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company (16 CH-47 and one UH-1).

b. Reference section II part 2 paragraph 1b: This headquarters has no knowledge of the reason for poorly qualified operations specialists arriving in-country and performing inadequately. Recommend this problem be evaluated and resolved by Headquarters, USCOMARC.

c. Reference section II part 1 paragraph 2a: Supported unit training. A briefing team from this headquarters conducted a series of briefings on airborne operations in ONU6 for the units deploying to RVN. These briefings included CH-47 instruction but did not conduct practical exercises.

d. Reference section II part 1 paragraph 2c: Use of white smoke to mark enemy targets. Recommend USAVE take action to change the color of smoke used for marking enemy targets.

e. Reference section II part 1 paragraph 2d: Crew Chief and Gunner Communications. This requirement has been recognized. A test was conducted to evaluate several types of radio switches, and the results forwarded to DA for action. The brigade signal office will study the recommendation for lengthening drop cords.
AVRA-C (13 Nov 66)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(CS OSFOA -65)

K. Reference section II part 2 paragraph 2b: Unit Call Signs. The effect on morale and tactical efficiency of using traditional call signs has been recognized by this headquarters. The decision as to what call signs will be used has been delegated to the commanders of aviation groups and separate battalions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Copies Furnished
17th Cbt Avn Gp

W. RIVIERS
Captain, ADC
Asst Adjutant General
AVHGC-PH (11 Nov 66) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-66)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96202 1 - JAN 1967

to: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CSFOR-P
APO 96558

1.(a) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion as indorsed.

2.(c) Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph 1a, Part I, Section II, Page 5; Paragraph 1a Part II, Section II; and Paragraph 2a, 3d Indorsement:

   (1) The 1st Aviation Brigade has prepared MTOF 1-258 for medium helicopter companies. MTOF was received at this headquarters on 18 December 1966 and is presently being staffed. MTOF contains personnel additions to enhance the supply and administrative capability of the unit.

   (2) Door gunner augmentations of 16 men each are contained in Program IV as approved requirements for all medium helicopter companies except the 179th Aviation Company. The 179th Aviation Company has requested that it authorize the door gunner augmentation. In view of the stringent troop ceiling imposed upon USARV, personnel spaces cannot be approved by this headquarters unless the 1st Aviation Brigade can provide trade-off of approved spaces.

b. (b) Reference Paragraph 2a, Part II, Section II, Page 8:

   The 14th General Support Group has been advised of this deficiency and has requested that the 52d Aviation Battalion submit an Equipment Improvement Report (EIR). This is the first report received by the 14th General Support Group from using units concerning this problem.

c. (c) Reference Paragraph 2c, Part I, Section II, Page 8; and Paragrah 2c, 3d Indorsement: Nonconcur. The smoke code is based on the recommendations of 28 major US tactical and advisory units.
AVHGC-DH (11 Nov 66)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

All commands agreed that since only white smoke rockets were available, white smoke would be used to mark targets.

d. (C) Reference Paragraph 2b, Part 2, Section II, Page 8; Paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 2f, 3d Indorsement: Non-concur. USARV units are assigned call signs in ACP 110 Supp 31 which precludes assignment of "traditional" call signs. The advantage of having secure call signs already prepared in tabulated form is considered to be of such value as to outweigh this objection. Also, the use of these call signs makes rapid identification of a unit through call sign assignments records possible. This provides for more immediate response to radio frequency interference problems. Accordingly, USARV SOI item Nr 50-4 was published which requires all subordinate commands to derive their voice call signs from the ACP sources.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
SECRET

GP04-01 (11 Nov 66)  5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 52d Cbt Avn Bn

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  10 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT. AGOC
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc

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DECLASSIFIED TO
INCL/6
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 1966.

CO, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion

11 November 1966

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310