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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC.UE

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 30 April 1970

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SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the
period 1 February through 30 April 1970. During the quarter the 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment continued Operation Kentucky Cougar under the operational
control of the 1st Cavalry Division (A). Regimental activities were directed
toward securing the countryside by means of ground reconnaissance and
sweeps in Binh Long, Binh Duong, and Tay Ninh Provinces.

On 15 February, Operation Fresh Start commenced in War Zone C. The objective
of the operation was to interdict the enemy north-south line of communication.
This area is known as the Saigon-Michelin Corridor and is characterized by a
series of supply trails paralleling the Huestag Trail. Direct support from
the 501st and 984th Land Clearing Companies was provided the 1st and 2nd
Squadrons. Large cuts in the jungle were made by Rome Plows secured by arm-ored cavalry. At first, Route 246 and the Huestag Trail were opened to
200 meter widths; the increased maneuver areas and the resultant FSB's began
to sever the enemy's resupply routes.

Faced with increased pressure in War Zone C, the enemy apparently tried to
cause the deployment of either the 1st or 2nd Squadron from War Zone C to
attacking the 3rd Squadron in the vicinity of Loc Minh. The attack did not
achieve its objective and Operation Fresh Start continued to strengthen the
enemy's lines of communication.

In late March, a series of tactical cuts in the vicinity of enemy base camps
were made in the areas immediately north of Route 246. On 31 March, these
tactics paid off as a NVA replacement school was found a short distance from
the Cambodian border. Sweeps of areas cut by the Rome Plows were becoming
extremely effective. An emphasis upon the use of automatic ambushes began to
seriously hamper the enemy's ability to move along his common footpaths. On
4 April, the Rome Plow cuts were completed.

On 9 April, the enemy again reeled under constant pressure and tried des-

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In order to eliminate Fort Defiance, the center of operations for the 2nd Squadron, the enemy attempt was unsuccessful, and again on 15 April, he launched a heavy, but unsuccessful, indirect fire attack on the 1st Squadron at PSB Kramor in the Dog's Face area of War Zone C. Thus the quarter ended with the enemy supply lines through the war zone severely restricted. Base areas and rear services of the enemy were forced to move into the Cambodian sanctuaries in the north.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY:

a. General: During the quarter the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operated primarily in eastern War Zone C. However, operations were also conducted along LOC's in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces.

During the months of February through April, elements of the 5th VC Division (AO: northern and central Phuoc Long Province and Binh Tuy Province), 7th NVN Division (AO: northern and western Binh Long Province and the Fishhook area of War Zone C), 9th VC Division (AO: northeast section of the Dog's Neck to the southern tip of the Angel's Wing), and 50th Rear Service Group comprised the main force enemy units operating in the 11th ACOR. Other identifications included the 69th Artillery Command (K35 Bn, 94th Arty Regt and 2nd Bn, 208th Arty Regt), SR-1 (1, 2 & 3 Bns, 101st Regt), SR-5 (K2 & K Ens pl-us C16 Co, Dong Hai Regt), 70th RSG (K50 Hospital), 52nd RSG (C-109 Bn or Co, D5 Medical Service Section), COSVN (Propaganda Training Section, Civil Health Section, Military Intelligence Directorate, and Military Post Office), 2115 Infiltration Group (1st Co, 6th Bn), and 2154 Infiltration Group.

The current NVA/VC offensive is Campaign X, placing emphasis on psychological victories. Attempts to discredit RVN Government control and increase political pressure for US withdrawal will be made. NVA/VC military activity will increase during the campaign but not on the effort, like the 1968 Tet Offensive, is not expected. NVA/VC Party Committees at district level and below will concentrate on creating unrest in RVN Government controlled areas by emphasizing social distinctions, increasing hostile feeling toward the US and RVN leadership, and intensifying mob violence.

Special emphasis will be placed on recruiting of RVN dependents in the VC political struggle. Popular feeling in favor of a "peace government" will also be instigated and disruption of the RVN pacification program will be attempted. In Directive 14/CT-7-70 dated 10 March, the NVA/VC expressed their view that disruption of the RVN accelerated pacification program would lead to the disruption of the de-Americanization of the war and victor for the NVA/VC. Attempts to increase US casualties will be made to heighten political and social pressure on the RVN Government.

INCL 2
De-escalation and de-Americanization of the war reduces political pressure on the US Government for a negotiated settlement and provides additional time to strengthen RVN Armed Forces. The NVA/VC policy makers realize strong RVN Armed Forces could result in their defeat and eventual reunification of Vietnam under RVN control. They also realize that public opinion in the United States could induce the US Government to accept a coalition government including Communists. COSVN Directive 04/CTNT gives the impression that Campaign X was designed to create political repercussions in the US Congressional Election in November, 1970. NVA/VC policy makers want total withdrawal of US forces expeditiously rather than over a prolonged period to prevent the US from increasing RVN capabilities.

Campaign X will utilize Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla elements to destroy the RVN administrative infrastructure and RVN Armed Forces, particularly Regional and Self Defense Forces, in an attempt to wrest control of the population in selected areas and deny the RVN Government manpower resources. Main Force units at regional level are to intensify their attacks on sensitive areas which will tie down RVN forces and enable Local Force (VC) units, at province and district level, to support village guerrillas in seizing control of their assigned hamlets. The three pronged attack (military, political and social proselytizing) will be increased in RVN cities to compel a major portion of the RVN forces to defend their cities and enhance conditions for the disruption of the RVN accelerated pacification program in rural areas. Sub-sectors, controlling locations of the RVN accelerated pacification program, will be attacked by snipers. Attempts will be made to kill RVN administrative personnel at the ward and quarter levels in the towns and cities to neutralize RVN control and promote revolutionary movement. Terrorist activity will increase during Campaign X.

NVA/VC forces operating in villages under RVN control are to preserve the legal RVN controlled status of the local population. They are not to conduct large attacks because such activity will compel RVN/FWLIF to sweep the villages and root out the NVA/VC. Any trouble which might disturb the local farm production and NVA/VC operations is to be avoided. NVA/VC forces will attempt to replace loyal RVN administrative personnel with VC or VC sympathizers through legal procedures and then continue to preserve the legal status of the RVN administrative organization under VC control.

Campaign X started around 28 March, and is expected to last until the end of May. It consists of three phases: 28 March - 9 April, 20-25 April, and 6-31 May. Highlights of the campaign will be International Labor Day (1 May), Dien Bien Phu Victory Day (7 May), and Ho Chi Minh's birthday (19 May).
The 11th ACR intelligence effort remained targeted against local forces and guerrilla activities as the enemy's main forces continued to avoid contact in concurrence with the present economy of force tactics. The problems of identifying and neutralizing an individual or group responsible for mining LOC's, and the problem of neutralizing local forces and guerrilla units responsible for harassing attacks by fire, intimidation andWei-si-lizing of the local populace, remain unsolved in conjunction with the Vietnamese program. The Regiment's intelligence effort operated on two levels simultaneously during the quarter: local force and guerrilla units received emphasis, while main force units received primary attention.

b. Order of Battle: In the first half of the quarter enemy activity was light throughout III CTZ, as the enemy avoided contact except for isolated attacks. However, enemy activity increased during the last half of the quarter when Campaign X got underway. NVA/VC forces continued the economy of force tactics that they adopted after the death of Ho Chi Minh. Attacks by fire, sapper probes and heavy mining of the lines of communication continued.

From 1 February to 15 March, elements of the 7th NVA Division, 9th VC Division and the 50th Rear Service Group conducted limited reconnaissance and resupply missions, while taking advantage of natural cover and concealment to harass friendly units and NDP's. Ground to air firing increased significantly during the latter half of the quarter. During February, enemy forces increased their resupply and reconnaissance missions from the Fishhook down along the Saigon-Tchelinh Corridor. Elements of the 165th Regiment, 50th Rear Service Group and the 96th Artillery Regiment were contacted and identified on several occasions during this period.

From 3-19 March, enemy activity was focused in the Do Tu-Phuoc Trail area of War Zone C, where 1st Squadron encountered elements of the 95C VC Regiment in three major engagements. From 19 March until the end of the reporting period, enemy forces received replacements, refitted, retrained, redeployed and initiated Campaign X.

c. Intelligence Sources:

(1) General: The number and type of intelligence sources utilized by the 11th ACR during the quarter were approximately the same as last quarter. There was an increase in PW's which significantly improved intelligence collection efforts. The Regiment's overall intelligence producing ability was excellent.

(2) Visual Reconnaissance: Visual reconnaissance missions, flown on a daily basis by Air Cavalry Troop, provided the bulk of the information used for the planning of B-52 strikes, TAC Air, armored ground recon-
naissance operations, and ARP/LRP insertions. The Air Cavalry Troop has also been instrumental in locating enemy units in jungle areas as well as providing secondary evidence of enemy movement, fortifications and general location. The visual reconnaissance missions of the ACT have been used to confirm or disclaim the information obtained from SLAR, Sniffer, Red Haze, and usually reliable agent reports.

(3) Captured Documents: During the reporting period the primary value of captured enemy documents was to establish unit identification, and secondly, to provide the 11th ACR intelligence personnel with "nice to know" information concerning the past activities of various enemy units. Captured documents also gave insight into the political aspects of NVA/VC military activities. Documents usually provide information from which general trends can be deduced rather than immediately exploitable information.

(4) Prisoners of War and Hoi Chanh: PW's and Hoi Chanh's provide the Regiment with the best, and usually the most readily exploitable, information. During the quarter the 11th ACR captured twelve enemy and received one Hoi Chanh. As a group, they possessed little knowledge.

(5) Agent Reports: Team 3ACX, under the guidance of the 3rd Bn, 525 MI Group, ceased providing agent reports to the 11th ACR as the information contained in their reports was not from the Regiment's area of operations. During the reporting period significant information was obtained from the 5th Special Forces Group, Team B-33, the Binh Long Phoenix Coordinator An Loc Sector 2, and the District Intelligence Organization Coordinating Center.

(6) Integrated Civic Action Projects: On 1 April, ICAP's ceased in the 11th ACR AO. This was due to MACV Directive stating that ARVN participation was required, and local province and district officials were unable to provide adequate support. ICAP's provided useful information on VC personnel entering villages for food and other supplies as well as advance warning on light ground probes and mortar attacks on RF/PF outposts.

(7) FAC's: Daily missions flown by the Air Force Forward Air Controllers are an occasional source of intelligence and have proved helpful in the accurate mapping of enemy lines of communication.

(8) Technical Detectors: SLAR, Sniffer, Red Haze, ground radar and ground sensors are, as a general rule, only useful as intelligence indicators. The usual reaction to a detector activation is the firing of artillery and/or a visual reconnaissance. Technical detectors, especially ground sensors, have a limited value in the plotting of enemy movements at night or in heavily jungled or inaccessible areas and their limitations must always be kept in mind.
d. Enemy Personnel and 'Lateral' Logos:

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(NOTE: 1/11th ACR, while OPCON to the 1st Bde of the 1st Cavalry Division (A) had 58 enemy KIA not included in the above totals. 3/11th ACR, while OPCON to the 3rd Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (A), had 78 enemy KIA not included in the above totals. A/1/11th ACR, while OPCON to the 1st Bde of the 1st Cavalry Division (A), combined with a 1st ACD infantry company, A/2/8, had 88 enemy KIA not included in the above totals.)

3. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation of Operations: A new phase of Operation Kentucky Cougar began when a decision was made to move the 11th ACR into War Zone C to secure Rome Plow operations and to interdict the main enemy supply lines from the war zone to the Saigon-ichelin Corridor. The decision took the form of Operation Fresh Start.

(1) Rome Plow Operations in War Zone C: The 501st and the 984th Engineer Land Clearing Companies became DS to the 11th ACR for the operation. The 1st Squadron was moved from the Loc Ninh area to east-central War Zone C near FSB's Sara and Cindy. The 3rd Squadron replaced the 2nd Squadron in the Loc Ninh area after moving from the Tonle Cham road. It escorted numerous convoys from Tan Loi through An Loc to Loc Ninh and almost continually swept QL 13 and roads leading to FSB Thunder II. The 2nd Squadron forwarded Team G/2/11 with the 984th Engineer Land Clearing Company and G Troop, and the Rome Plows began to clear both sides of Route 246 which runs west to east across War Zone C. The Team usually cleared over 100 acres a day.

During February, twenty-one contacts were made resulting in 101 NVA/VC KIA and 2 FW's. Eight of these KI's were due to 2/11 ACR automatic ambushes. Sixty to seventy bunkers were found by E Troop, 2/11 ACR, which identified the 59th Artillery Command, COSVN; the 50th Rear Service Group; the 272nd Regiment; the 95C Regiment; and the 165th Regiment.

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons expanded their Rome Plow operations in March because they found extensive bunker complexes adjacent to Route 246 and the illustrious Trail. Now, cuts were made from the main routes into trails and base camp areas. In conjunction with this tactic, numerous automatic ambushes were laid along obvious routes that the enemy was using. These ambushes were extremely
effective. The average ambush was detonated by small groups of infiltrators or couriers, usually between 1800-2200 and 0600-1000 hours. In March alone, 59 NVA were killed by the automatic ambushes of 2/11 ACR.

(2) Loc Ninh: The 3rd Squadron was OPCON to the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (A11) from 19 February to 14 March. Their mission included ground reconnaissance in the vicinity of Loc Ninh. Additionally, they swept QL 13 and 14A. FSB Marge was used frequently during this period.

On 9 March, L/3/11 had an automatic ambush detonated and on the following the 1st Platoon was sent to sweep the ambush site. About one kilometer into the rubber to the southeast, the platoon made contact with a large enemy force. For the next six hours L Troop swept the enemy from his positions. With the assistance of TAC Air and light fire teams, the Blackhorse Troopers silenced the wave upon wave of RPG's. The 3rd Battalion, 209th Regiment lost 88 KIA and 6 PWs. L Troop lost 4 men killed and 16 wounded. The enemy attempt to gain a victory near Loc Ninh failed. In addition, the losses he was suffering in War Zone C would continue to cause his units along the Saigon-Michelin Corridor to starve logistically.

(3) The "Dog's Face": In late March, 1st Squadron shifted its operations from central to western War Zone C and became OPCON to the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (A11). The north control of the war zone was becoming increasingly treacherous for the enemy. Expecting to be able to cut deeper into his base areas, 1/11 ACR moved west. Aerial reconnaissance showed that there were several dwellings and trails north of B Troop's NDP of 30 March. Also, the 919th Engineers finished a culvert bridge across the Suoi De Ha River which would permit B Troop to make a ground reconnaissance of the area. The next day 2 platoons from B Troop moved into the area. Following a small trail north, the Troop came upon an assembly point for the NVA. On closer examination hoochies and fighting positions were discovered. An RPG was fired at a Sheridan, but it missed, and a fight ensued which resulted in 27 NVA KIA and 16 captured. Support was received from B/11 and Pink Teams. A number of classrooms and training aids were found, and interrogation revealed that this was a replacement school for NVA entering the 272nd Regiment. The entire complex was within 160 meters of the Cambodian border.

(4) Defense of FSB Fort Defiance: The 2nd Squadron moved into FSB Fort Defiance (XT502832) on 8 March, with the mission of continuing the FSB Fort Defiance cuts in eastern War Zone C. Throughout March, the Squadron interdicted enemy supply lines through the area. Captured documents told the difficulties of the 50th Rear Service Group in supplying Sub-Regions 1 and 5. During March, the enemy gradually increased his harassment and economy of force measures. Intelligence reports during the period noted the upswing of
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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

May 1970

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enemy activity in the area of Fort Defiance, as the enemy moved more men and units into the area. Automatic ambushes of 2/11 ACR were taking more and more enemy. Freshly laid mines were found along Route 246 and the Air Cavalry Troop saw 30-40 individuals along the Mustang Trail on 1 April. On the night of 7 April, G Troop engaged 25 NVA who did not return fire. Later on a sweep through the area, they found 3 NVA KIA and 30 NVA uniforms and packs. In addition, documents were found which identified the 50th Rear Service Group and the 101st Regiment.

On 9 April, Fort Defiance was occupied by H Company, HHT, and Howitzer battery of 2/11 ACR. At 0002 hours, an intense mortar and rocket barrage hit the fire support base. Almost 90 mortar rounds impacted in or near the embattled position. B-40 rocket and .51 caliber rounds were utilized in the attack. A few more incoming rounds were received the following morning and, when the surrounding area was swept, documents identifying the 165th NVA Regiment were found. The fact that the tanks of H Company and the 155's of the Howitzer battery kept up their fire throughout the night, enabled Fort Defiance to remain a major obstacle to the enemy.

(5) Defense of FSB Kramer: On 1 April, FSB Illingsworth (elements of the 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div), northeast of 1/11 ACR, received an attack by fire followed by a ground probe. On 12 April, 1/11 ACR conducted a tactical road march from FSB Hazard to a new AO, establishing FSB Kramer. On 15 April, Kramer was occupied by D Company, HHT, the 1/11 Howitzer Battery, and two 40mm dusters from II Field Force, Vietnam. The FSB was equipped with radar and "killer junior" for the artillery. At 0135 hours, movement was detected by radar and the area was reconed by fire. In addition, 2 Cobra's from the 1st Brigade were on station. By 0231 hours, mortar and rocket fire was received. Fire was immediately returned by tanks and dusters. Later, 75mm recoiless rifle and RPG rounds began to impact. Throughout the night Night Hawk and Shadow supported. By morning, when a sweep was made, 20 NVA bodies were found. The enemy consisted of elements of two battalions from the 95C NVA Regiment. The last large contact of the quarter had left the 11th ACR in a position to severely hamper the efforts of the enemy in War Zone C. The 1st and 2nd Squadron continued to utilize sweeps and automatic ambushes to advantage. Seventy-four NVA were killed by their automatic ambushes during April.

b. Dong Tien (Go Forward Together) Program: Although the 11th ACR worked most of the time in War Zone C, 3/11 ACR worked very closely with AR/PF and ARVN units in Binh Duong Province. These operations consisted of search and senach, reconnaissance, road security and ICAP operations. Represented below are combined operations from 1 February through 30 April 1970:

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COMBINED OPERATIONS

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<tr>
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The following number of ICAF's were conducted in cooperation with provincial medical personnel:

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<td></td>
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c. Training: The Replacement Training School at Blackhorse Rear serves an important function in preparing replacements for their assignments with the 11th ACR. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows: February - 523, March - 611, and April - 277.

4. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Chemical:

(1) General: The 33rd Chemical Detachment continued to provide direct chemical support and technical advise to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Personnel Detector Missions: Eighty-five "Sniffer" missions were flown during the reporting period. On 20 February, the operational procedures for "Sniffer" missions were changed to include a LOH to VR all "Sniffer" readings and two Cobras to cover the helicopters and to fire on any enemy detected.

On 12 April, the "Sniffer" helicopter was shot down resulting in severe burns to the Detachment CO and one E1. Equipment losses were one Concealed Personnel Detector ("Sniffer"), 2 .50 cal rifles, 2 flight helmets and 3 flak jackets.

In cooperation with the S-5, the Detachment has continued to drop leaflets during the "Sniffer" missions. This saves the S-5 from flying repetitious missions and aids in disguising our primary mission.

(3) CS Results: During the reporting period there were no
Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 30 April 1970

persistence of CS drops in the Regimental AO; however, there were twelve drops
of M15822 CS Cannister Clusters. Ten of these drops were made during contact,
while the remaining two were placed on Saigon intelligence targets.

(4) Problem Area: The Chemical Detachment is unable to obtain
OMEX flight suits and gloves. Due to the large possibility of fire in the
event of the "Sniffer" helicopter being shot down, the detachment should be
authorized to requisition and draw OMEX suits and gloves.

b. Signal: The Regimental Radio Relocation Station was relocated from
Cao Ray Mountain to Nui Ba Den Mountain in Tam Minh Province. The move was
necessary due to the Regiment's area of operation in Tam Minh and Minh Long
Provinces. Nui Ba Den offered the best choice because of its ideal geo-
ographical location and commanding altitude over the entire area. The
success of the transfer was affirmed by the immediate sharp increase in the
volume of traffic processed through the site.

The relocation of Blackhorse Post from Bien Hoa to Di An necessitated the
rerouting of trunk lines to Blackhorse Forward and Hurricane Switch. Black-
horse Post was provided with two class "A" circuits to Di An main switch,
thus providing direct dialing capabilities to the switchboard's subscribers.
Progress was made in the secure voice program with shipments of WIC-12/XY-36
Interface Cables and XYK-28 Code Changers. This equipment permitted securing
of all three Squadron Command Nets, thus securing voice communication down
to troop level.

c. Artillery:

(1) General: During the quarter Blackhorse artillery supported
the Regiment's varied activities from fire support bases in Tam Minh, Minh
Long and Binh Duong Provinces.

(2) 1st Squadron: The Squadron began the quarter under the
operational control of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (A). Firing
from FSB Christine (XT317849), the 1st Howitzer Battery, supported by two
tubes of 8" Howitzers from B Battery of the 2/32 Artillery, supported the
Squadron's Rome Plow operation in the area north of Tam Minh. On 10 February,
1st Squadron moved to FSB Cindy (XT320910) to continue Rome Plow operations
in Nui Trang. This period the 1st Howitzer Battery's fires were employed mainly
in suppressing and interdicting enemy activity in the AO.
On 27 March, 1st Squadron was placed under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (A/4), and moved to FSB Howard (XT079839). The Squadron's mission was to conduct ground reconnaissance operations in the Dog's Head area of western War Zone C. 1st Howitzer Battery supported the Squadron with reconnaissance by fire and fire support in contact missions. On 29 March, and again on 1 April, the Howitzer Battery fired over 300 rounds of high explosives in support of ground contacts. On 11 April, 1st Squadron moved to FSB Kramer (XM20728) to conduct ground operations in a new AO. On 22 April, 1st Squadron was returned to the operational control of the Regiment. The Howitzer Battery and one platoon from B Battery, 2/32 Artillery, were located with the Squadron Headquarters at FSB Hazel (X454818).

On 30 April, the 1st Squadron moved to FSB Burkett in preparation for Operation Thien II. The 1st Howitzer Battery was located at FSB South I (XT515-906) to reinforce the fires of the 2nd Howitzer Battery.

The following artillery units provided general support and were located at FSB Burkett: one platoon of 8" from B Btry, 2/32 Arty; one platoon 8" from A Btry, 6/27 Arty; and C Btry, 2/12 Arty (155mm Howitzer). The fires of these units were controlled by the Regimental FSE through the 1st Squadron Liaison Officer.

(3) 2nd Squadron: The 2nd Squadron spent most of the quarter conducting Plov operations in the northwestern area of Tuy Hinh Province. From 1-19 February, the Squadron conducted ground reconnaissance operations from FSB Wade (XT528814), in the vicinity of Loc Hinh. Second Howitzer Battery supported these operations by reconnaissance by fire and fire in support of contact. On 19 February, the Squadron moved to FSB Tarsha (XT599821) to conduct Plov operations in western War Zone C. On 2/ February, two Howitzers from C Battery, 2/32 Artillery, were sent to FSB Tarsha to provide additional fire support for the Squadron. On 3/ March, the Squadron CP and 2nd Howitzer Battery moved to FSB Fort Defiance (XT506833) to provide better coverage of the Plov operations. During the entire period (Tarsha and Defiance) the 2nd Howitzer Battery fired numerous TOT's on the suspected forward base camp of the 101st U.S. Regiment and were credited with making them move their CP nightly.

On 22 March, the CP and 2nd Howitzer Battery moved to FSB Kingy (XT495751) to support Plov operations in the northeastern portion of their AO. On 29 March, four of the battery's Howitzers returned to Fort Defiance in support of ground operations in northeastern War Zone C. At the same time the battery's remaining platoon moved to FSB Cathy (XT935570) to support the continuing Plov operations.

On 9 April, FSB Fort Defiance received 130 rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm
mortar fire and 107mm and 122mm rocket fire. In firing the C7VCR Plan, the Howitzers at Fort Defiance were assisted by the platoon at Elvira, and the 175mm guns of A Battery, 6/27 Artillery, at FSB's St. Barbara and Andy. On 10 April, the platoon at Elvira rejoined the battery at Fort Defiance. On 13 April, an E Troop contact resulted in 31 NVA killed, 8 being credited to 2nd Howitzer Battery. On 14 April, Fort Defiance again took incoming and again the battery fired the CM/CR Plan. On 15 April, the Squadron CP and the battery moved to FSB Burkett. During this period 2nd Howitzer Battery fired the Regiment's greatest number of contact fire missions. On 30 April, the 2nd Squadron moved to FSB South I in preparation for Operation Dong Thion II.

(4) 3rd Squadron: The Squadron continued to operate out of FSB Jake until 20 February, when it was put under the operational control of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AIF), and moved to FSB Wade. Third Howitzer Battery supported both the 3rd Squadron and elements of the 3rd Brigade. On 21 March, the 3rd Squadron was placed in support of the 5th ARVN Regiment at Le Khe. At this time, 3rd Howitzer Battery moved into FSB Thunder I (XT88456) in Binh Duong Province. Two days later, the 3rd Squadron was placed under the operational control of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AIF), and the 3rd Howitzer Battery was located at FSB Rob (YT260915) with the Squadron CP. On 28 April, the 3rd Squadron was returned to the operational control of the Regiment and started movement to FSB South II in preparation for Operation Dong Thion II. A Battery, 2/35 Artillery (155mm), joined the 3rd Squadron on 29 April and both batteries closed FSB South II the following day.

(5) During this quarter two steps were taken to improve the Howitzer batteries abilities to support the ground forces. First, all three batteries adopted the use of the FADAC Fire Direction Computers in their FDC's. This will measurably improve the speed and accuracy in computing fire missions. Second, an "R&R" program of intense support maintenance for the Howitzer has begun to alleviate the maintenance overload the batteries have been carrying.

(6) In the reporting period Headquarters, 11th ACR, assumed the fire support coordination and clearance of fire functions previously provided by the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery. The changeover was completed on 12 February, when the fully trained and equipped, the Regimental Fire Support Element moved into the Tactical Operations Center.

(7) Artillery Fire Statistics:
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AVIC-1E

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (M)

ROUNDS FIRED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF MISSION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MISSIONS</th>
<th>HIGH EXPLOSIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>12,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>11,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Battery</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preperations</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>6,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Support</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>45,612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) General: During the reporting period elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) participated in Operations Kentucky, Cougar, and Fresh Start, while providing direct combat engineer support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The primary area of operation was War Zone C in the Tay Ninh area. During the quarter the separate platoons of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) were normally OPCON to the individual squadrons of the 11th ACR. Engineers accomplished demolition work, ford and AVLB site construction, reconnaissance, NDP construction, tunnel exploration, mine detection and removal, culvert construction and combat as an armor element.

(2) Operations: During the reporting period the 919th Engineers were employed in many diversified missions which took them into every corner of War Zone C. In supporting a unit as mobile as the 11th ACR, the individual platoons usually found themselves working as separate units. To do justice to each platoon and its accomplishments, the events of the last three months will be reported by platoon.
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AVIC-WE 21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(a) First Platoon: During the first two days of the reporting period, the 1st Platoon was located at Quan Loi Base Camp for a maintenance stand down. While at that location, they were engaged in a daily mine sweep north along QL 13 from An Loc to the vicinity of the Quu Cam Lo Bridge (X718974). During this period the engineers found and removed five enemy mines.

On 3 February, the 1st Platoon left Quan Loi for FSB Jan and became OPCON to the 3rd Squadron. At Jan the Platoon was assigned a daily mine sweep from that location to the vicinity of XT66/834 and undertook the continuing maintenance and improvement of FSB Jan. On 19 February, the 3rd Squadron and 1st Platoon moved north to the Loc Minh area and established a NDP at FSB Wade, where the engineers worked on fire support bases improvements. The Platoon conducted daily mine sweeps in the area, placed culverts and constructed a helipad at XU731008.

On 14 March, the 1st Platoon moved with 3/11 ACR to FSB Thunder I, in the vicinity of Lai Khe. There the engineers were assigned a daily sweep on QL 13 from Thunder I to Thunder II. On 16 April, the Platoon moved with the 1st Squadron to FSB Krainer (X141732). While working in that area on 19 April, ACAV E-13 detonated an estimated T4/66 AT mine. The vehicle was a combat loss. On 21 April, the Platoon moved east with the Squadron to FSB Hazel. While at Hazel, the engineers were engaged primarily in improving that position as well as sweeping Highway 246 from Hazel to the vicinity of XT378859. At the end of the reporting period, the 1st Platoon was engaged in mine sweeps along Highway 246.

(b) Second Platoon: At the beginning of the quarter, the 2nd Platoon was OPCON to the 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, near Loc Minh and conducted daily mine sweep operations south along QL 13 from Loc Minh to the vicinity of XT723995. On 2 February, the Platoon moved with the Squadron and established a NDP at FSB Carolyn. Over the next five days the engineers were engaged in culvert construction in the area.

On 10 February, the 2nd Platoon moved to FSB Cindy and conducted nine sweeps and culvert construction in that area. On 16 February, ACAV E-23 detonated an unknown sized enemy mine. The vehicle was a combat loss and two persons were injured. On 20 February, a second ACAV detonated an estimated T4/66 AT mine. The vehicle was also a combat loss and one person was wounded.

On 24 February, the Platoon was relocated to FSB Hazel and operated on engineer missions from that location. On 28 February, the 2nd Platoon arrived at Quan Loi Base Camp for a maintenance stand down. While at Quan Loi, the Platoon was engaged in an intermittent mine sweep along Highway 246 from the
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AVIC-VE

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

21 May 1970

juncture of QL 13 and 246 to the vicinity of FSB Jake, and a daily mine sweep along 245 in conjunction with the Scout Platoon, HHT/11 ACR. From 13 March to 4 April, two ACAV's and two CEV's were combat lost, and three persons were injured due to the detonation of enemy mines. Numerous other mines were discovered and either evacuated or blown in place. On 23 April, the 2nd Platoon departed Quan Loi for Lei Khe and became OPCON to the 3rd Squadron. They moved to FSB Buniard (XT248882) and remained at that location until 28 April, when the Squadron moved south and west to FSB Jake. There the Platoon was engaged in upgrading Highway 2/6.

(c) Third Platoon: On 1 February, the 3rd Platoon was OPCON to 3/11 ACR and was engaged in the construction of FSB Jan. This project was completed on 2 February, on which date the Platoon entered Quan Loi Base Camp for a maintenance stand down. During this time they were assigned the mission of sweeping QL 13 from An Loc to the vicinity of Cau Cam Le Bridge.

On 28 February, the Platoon departed Quan Loi and became OPCON to the 1st Squadron. They established a NDP at FSB Sarah, then moved to FSB Vick. The Platoon was immediately assigned engineer missions. Over the next several days, the engineers constructed two timber trestle bridges (XTA08675 and XT396633).

After establishing a new NDP (FSB Sharon) at XTO09691, the Platoon spent three days maintaining their equipment before beginning a daily mine sweep operation from FSB Sharon to XT415865. On 26 March, the engineers constructed a log pad at FSB Sharon and moved with the 1st Squadron into the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), area of operations. A NDP was established at FSB Hazard. For a period of approximately three weeks, the 3rd Platoon swept a section of road from XT13663 to FSB Washington (XT49568), after which they returned to XT13663 and swept to XT089785— in all the sweep was 17 miles long.

On 8 April, while engaged in mine sweep operations, five individuals from the Platoon triggered an automatic ambush at XTO48887. Two persons were killed and three others severely wounded. It was arranged at that time to bring the 3rd Platoon into Quan Loi and replace them with the 1st Platoon. The switch was made and the 3rd Platoon arrived at Quan Loi on 18 April.

While at Quan Loi, the 3rd Platoon was engaged in various projects related to Base Defense, which included replacement of concertin-wire along the perimeter and mine sweeps along Highway 2/6 to FSB Jake. On 29 April, the Platoon departed Quan Loi enroute to Jake and participated in the upgrading of Route 2/6.
STJO:*:*:CT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970

(d) Fourth Platoon: At the beginning of the reporting period, the 4th Platoon was OPCON to the 2nd Squadron at FSB Wade. The Platoon was engaged in daily mine sweep missions along QL 13 from Loc 56K to the vicinity of the Cuu Cam Le Bridge. While at Wade, the engineers loaded bunkers and concertina wire, and generally improved the posture of the fire support base. Also, the Platoon constructed six holipads at Wade and improvised equipment over the pads.

On 16 February, the 4th Platoon moved to the vicinity of XM14198 and destroyed a NVA bunker complex. After completing this demolition work, the engineers moved with the 2nd Squadron to a new NDP (FSB Vershka) at XT599820. On 6 March, the 4th Platoon moved to XT06634 and began construction of FSB Fort Defiance. In addition to constructing the two fire support bases, the Platoon was assigned daily mine sweep missions along Route 246.

On 21 March, the 4th Platoon moved to XT49752 and began construction of FSB Nicky. Work continued until 29 March, when the Platoon returned to Fort Defiance.

Work continued at Fort Defiance throughout the first half of April, as the engineers improved the position and performed their daily mine sweep missions. On 16 April, the 4th Platoon began construction of FSB Burkett at XT448821. Work continued at FSB Burkett through 21 April. For the remainder of the reporting period, the Platoon was engaged in improving their NDP defenses and later, on 29 April, joined other elements of the 11th ACR and established a NDP at XT512904.

(e) OPCON Status of Engineer Platoons: The engineer platoons were OPCON to the squadrons for the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platoon</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Platoon</td>
<td>3 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Platoon</td>
<td>1-27 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Platoon</td>
<td>28 Feb - 17 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Platoon</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) New Equipment: The 919th Engineer Company (Armored) received three Rome Plows only 12 days prior to the close of the quarter. For this reason no truly valid evaluation can be made of the Rome Plows. An evaluation of this equipment will be included in the next ORLT.
(4) Base Camp Development: During the quarter the 919th Engineers were engaged in several projects designed to improve the defenses of the Quan Loi Base Camp. Much of this work was concentrated in the Orange Sector of Base Defense, and consisted primarily of utilizing the engineer equipment organic to the unit for the preparation and improvement of bunkers and emplacements. Front loaders, 5-ton dump trucks, Roto Plows and dozers were most extensively used in these projects. In addition to considerations to defense, the 919th was responsible for administration of the S-4 yard, from which were issued a multitude of materials. Also, the engineers were assigned the project of repairing a schoolhouse located in the Vietnamese section of Quan Loi. The damaged roof was replaced and the entire structure repaired.

b. Army Aviation:

(1) War Zone C operations posed no particular problem. In fact, the smaller area of operation and absence of friendly population enhanced the air cavalry response. The local enemy was relatively "trail bound", which simplified the Scout search methods.

(2) The ARP was employed with good success in emplacing and checking sensor equipment in War Zone C. A total of 15 detectors, both seismic and magnetic, were emplaced requiring 8-10 hours.

(3) "Sniffer" missions were accompanied by a Scout LOH to reduce reaction time to readings. On several occasions this technique resulted in a number of confirmed enemy kills. Also, enemy activity was detected by the LOH and followed by ARP insertion to further exploit the "Sniffer" reading.

(4) Night Hawk was utilized during the quarter, orienting on open and Rome Plow cuts in War Zone C. Results in terms of confirmed kills were minimal; however, it was felt the aircraft's presence was a deterrent to enemy movement.

(5) A locally fabricated mount attaching the XM191, 4 tube, 66mm Launcher to the OH-6A LOH was tested by the Scout Platoon. This device was employed in a local test and was found to be excellent as an offensive anti-personnel weapon, as well as for marking targets. The device has been observed by representatives of ACTIV and USARV.

5. (c) Combat Service Support:

a. Logistics:
(1) General: During the reporting the logistical posture of the Regiment changed from the previous quarter. The tactical situation fluctuated during February, March and April with one squadron OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division in War Zone C, one squadron OPCON to the 5th ARVN Infantry Division at Lai Khe, and one squadron under Regimental control in War Zone C. The flow of logistical support continued to originate in the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area with Class III and Class V being flown to forward airstrips at Tonle Cham (FSB Jake) for the 2nd Squadron and to Thien Ngon for the 1st Squadron, while 3rd Squadron was resupplied almost entirely by overland convoy to Lai Khe on the MSR. The 1st Squadron rear area at Tay Ninh supported Class I and Class II operations for its forces with hook-out operations, while 2nd Squadron provided similar support from Quan Loi to its elements. The 3rd Squadron, because of its favorable location on the MSR and also because of the proximity of its fighting elements to the Squadron Rear, required a negligible amount of blade time.

(2) Problem Area: Up until the third week of April, the Regiment was allocated 24 hours of blade time per day to fly its resupply. It was cut to 21 hours on 22 April and further reduced to 18 hours on 27 April. Two squadrons, the first and second, were receiving all of the blade time (except twenty minutes which was allocated to the 3rd Squadron). The two squadrons were in central War Zone C, which is 35 minutes from Tay Ninh, 25 minutes from Quan Loi, and approximately 10 minutes from FSB Jake. Each squadron requires between fourteen and sixteen sorties per day, and more during heavy contact. Simple mathematics indicates that eighteen hours were insufficient to support two squadrons in War Zone C with hook-out pods at Tay Ninh, Quan Loi and FSB Jake. An average day requires at least 27 hours of blade time.

The blade time required was reduced by going to overland convoy from Jake to the forward operating bases at FSB Burkett (2/11) and FSB Hael (1/11). The obvious disadvantage was the requirement to provide security to the land convoy with fighting elements of the squadrons and the time and effort consumed sweeping the routes for mines.

(3) Supply and Maintenance:

(a) Class I: The troops in the field continued to receive two hot meals a day, ice, water, soda and beer in sufficient quantities. Some problems were experienced with the 2nd Squadron's water purification rig; however, it remained operational. One water purification rig was combat lost by the 1st Squadron when it was hit by shrapnel from an exploding round.

(b) Classes II & VII: There were no problems in Class II, Class VII (miscellaneous items) replacement was responsive with the average replacement time of four days for combat losses. Replacement of 5-ton cargo
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970

RCS CSFOR-65 (R)

trucks, M54A2 Cargo Carriers, M548 Flame Thrower Service Units, and medium recovery vehicles continued to lag due to non-availability of these items in sufficient quantities at the US Army Depot in Long Binh.

(c) Class IV: Seventy-two inch culvert needed to provide overhead protection for ammunition at fire support bases was very difficult to acquire. Forty-eight inch culvert and M8A1 steel matting was in lieu of the larger item.

(d) Classes III & V: No real problems were encountered.

(e) Maintenance: Deadline rates for combat vehicles were significantly up this quarter. This is mainly a result of increased combat operation in War Zone C. Deadline rates for the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLE</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR/AAV Sheridan</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M38A1 M13A1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Tank M48A3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm S.P. Howitzer</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Medical:

(1) General: The overall health of the Regiment has remained unchanged since the last reporting period. The most significant change noted for the quarter was the large decrease in the number of malaria cases. The number of cases dropped from an average of 45 per month for the preceding period to an average of 9 per month during the current reporting period. Although there were several factors involved in this decrease, including change of AO8s and the arrival of the dry season, the fact that this decrease occurred after the Regimental Commander placed strong command emphasis on malaria prophylaxis cannot be discounted.

(2) Injuries: Non-battle injuries increased during this quarter due primarily to extensive land clearing operations conducted by the Regiment. Total incidence of accidental injury was 1177 cases of which only 109 required admission to a treatment facility. While most of these injuries were in the form of minor scratches and abrasions, some were of a serious enough nature to warrant evacuation out of the Republic of Vietnam.

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Due to the increased enemy activities during the past three months, injuries resulting from hostile action increased sharply from 314 during the previous quarter to 450 during this reporting period.

(3) Significant diseases diagnosed during this quarter are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>CURRENT PERIOD</th>
<th>LAST PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Hepatitis</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>27.61</td>
<td>130.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>23.82</td>
<td>9.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal</td>
<td>209.67</td>
<td>150.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>21.68</td>
<td>17.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Noneffectiveness*</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NOTE: All rates expressed as admissions per 1000 troops per year.)

*Includes man days lost for all admissions to 11th ACR treatment facilities. Expressed as sick days per 1000 troops per day.

(4) EDCAP: The majority of EDCAP activities in the Regiment were performed by the 37th Medical Company in conjunction with the Regimental S-5. A total of 3,189 civilians were treated; no treatments were performed for injuries sustained due to hostile action. Due to the lack of medical support from ARVN units, EDCAP activities were abandoned during April.

(5) There was a complete reorganization of the Regimental Surgeon's Section. Of significant importance was the addition of a flight surgeon to the section. The flight surgeon has set up an aviation aid section in the Air Cavalry Troop area at Quan Loi and this arrangement has greatly improved the patient care of the Regimental aviators.

c. Religious: During the reporting period the Regimental Chaplain Section has maintained a vigorous program of religious services, individual counseling, personal contact, visitation of the sick and wounded and group orientations. Also, during the quarter the Chaplain Section moved from Bien Hoa to Di An and the Regimental Chaplain assumed the added duties of Di An Post Chaplain with the responsibility of coordinating the chapel programs of all resident units, as well as supplying coverage for US units at Lai Khe.

The spiritual state of the troops and the morale as it relates to religious activity, are very good and can effectively be measured in the high degree of
participation in the religious program. The only noticeable decline in the spiritual and emotional states of the men occurs as a result of a high casualty rate, a loss of parent unit identity (e.g. OPCON by troop/company), or during sustained inactivity.

d. Postal:

(1) General: On 19 March, the 7th Army Postal Unit moved from Bien Hoa Army Base to Di An Army Base in order to take over the area postal operations from the 1st Infantry Division Postal Section. In Bien Hoa, the unit served approximately 6,800 troops; now at Di An the postal unit serves over 15,000 troops, an increase of 120%. The assigned strength of the 7th APU increased from 18 to 39 men, an increase of 117%.

(2) During the reporting period 26,766 money orders were sold for a total value of $1,991,057.12. 749 money orders were cashed for a total value of $47,823.10. Stamp sales for the quarter totaled $31,725.75.

(3) Mail volume handled for the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Dispatched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouches (letter mail)</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks (parcel post)</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Pieces</td>
<td>6,152</td>
<td>3,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured</td>
<td>2,431</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

c. Strength: The following are strength figures by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASGD</th>
<th>TDY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>4469</td>
<td>1355</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>4469</td>
<td>4498</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>4469</td>
<td>4491</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mo</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th>NBD</th>
<th>NBW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. MOS Shortages: In the table below the monthly figure represents the number of personnel assigned to the Regiment with the MOS indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05B</td>
<td>6/</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05C</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12A</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31B</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31G</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45GT</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67A</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Replacements: The overall caliber of replacements shows them to be technically qualified and competent personnel. The general analysis is that they are receiving sufficient training in their MOS's to successfully accomplish their assigned duties.

e. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Statistical Summary of US Awards:

22
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star, Service</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal, Service</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star, Valor</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal, Valor</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal, Valor</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Statistical Summary of Foreign Awards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Order of Vietnam, 5th Class</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Service Medal, 1st Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action Honor Medal, 1st Class</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action Honor Medal, 2nd Class</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Bronze Star</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Silver Star</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st Class</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor Medal, 2nd Class</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: During the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr, the Regimental PSYOP Program continued to be effective, with 34 million leaflets being dropped and 72 hours of aerial broadcast time being flown in both Binh Long Province and War Zone C.

b. Chieu Hoi, Volunteer Informant, and Pacification Programs: The Chieu Hoi Program received the greatest amount of aerial loudspeaker time, with leaflet and loudspeaker missions being flown during and after every contact. Special attempts to produce ralliers have been used, such as emplacing banners and posters along major infiltration routes in conjunction with special appeals—such as the homesick appeal—such as "Who takes care of your family now?"

Because the TAOI lacks friendly populace, there has been no emphasis placed on the Volunteer Informant Program, except during ground missions conducted in conjunction with the ICAP activities in Binh Long Province. This program is still proving valuable, with more civilians feeling that the GVN is strong enough to defeat the NVA and VC guerrillas in the province.

The Pacification Program has also suffered since the 11th ACR moved out of Binh Long Province, with the entire responsibility for this form of PSYOP being left to the VIS and YACCORDS personnel. However, to help spread the word, the Regiment is providing the province with a helicopter and aerial loudspeaker on a twice weekly basis.

9. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION: Civic action activities were slowed somewhat during the quarter. The greatest emphasis was placed on the Integrated Civic Action Program (ICAP), with 3,189 patients treated in the last three months. The program has been temporarily discontinued due to provincial lack of interest and the inability of district medical personnel to receive supplies through their channels. The program was conducted only in the An Loc area by the Regimental S-5 Section and the 37th Medical Company. All other civic action was confined to road repair and bridge and culvert construction.

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations:

(1) OBSERVATION: When an armored unit moves into a new area, the enemy can be expected to heavily mine routes within three or four days.
EVALUATION: The enemy has the ability to readily emplace anti-tank mines in areas where they were previously unnecessary. It is quite simple for the enemy to react to the presence of armor and to ascertain which routes will be traveled by armor.

RECOMMENDATION: Although an armor unit may not initially find mines in a new area of operations, mine sweeping should be continued if at all possible.

(2) OBSERVATION: While making tactical cuts in the jungle with Rome Plows, a contact was made when an occupied bunker complex was discovered. The plow operators dismounted their plows and crawled underneath them.

EVALUATION: When the operators left their controls, they hindered the progress of the fight because their stopped plows proved to be a barrier to the responding armor unit.

RECOMMENDATION: Rome Plow operators should be instructed to stay with their plows and maneuver them as directed— even toward the enemy if necessary. Consideration should be given to providing radio communication between the plows and the security force of armor. An integrated combat team such as this could prove to be devastating to the enemy in jungle terrain.

(3) OBSERVATION: Although automatic ambushes are extremely effective in curtailing enemy movement, they pose a significant danger to friendly troops because they can be booby trapped.

EVALUATION: The enemy has been known to discover automatic ambushes, and he has booby trapped them for friendly troops when they return to disarm them.

RECOMMENDATION: Only the man who set the automatic ambush should attempt to disarm it. This man should retain enough familiarity with his ambush to safely approach it and to recognize any alterations.

(4) OBSERVATION: When an automatic ambush detonates at night, the unit will usually sweep the area the next morning.

EVALUATION: An enemy force has been known to utilize this fact to engage friendly units when they sweep an ambush site. Indirect fire can be placed in the vicinity of the automatic ambush after it has been detonated. The sweep force should approach the ambush site prepared for contact.
RECOMMENDATION: Sweep of ambush sites after detonation should be done cautiously.

c. Training: None.
d. Intelligence: None.
e. Logistical: None.
f. Army Aviation:

OBSERVATION: There is a need for a change in existing directives requiring international orange for conspicuous markings on LOH aircraft engaged in air cavalry scout missions.

EVALUATION: During air cavalry operations in RVN, the Aero-Scouts fly erratic patterns over heavy jungle in all types of weather. Their success, in terms of mission and their very lives, depends on the continuous observation and coverage provided by their Cobra escorts. The international orange allowed by current directives is not adequately conspicuous when viewed from altitude against the jungle canopy or floor—especially when shadows from broken or scattered cloud cover prevail.

RECOMMENDATION: Change existing directives which concern conspicuous markings to allow air cavalry troops in RVN to select color schemes which they deem appropriate for LOH scout aircraft.

g. Signal:

(1) OBSERVATION: When the antenna kits provided with the Radio Terminal Set, AN/GRC-163, were erected, it was discovered that the mast sections were too feeble and bent rather easily, making erection by inexperienced personnel very difficult.

EVALUATION: Successful erection of such a system requires previous experience, a rarity in a non-signal unit.

RECOMMENDATION: The problem may be solved in at least two ways: 1. Provide more intensive antenna-erecting training in related signal MOS’s, especially in the O5C20 course and in the NCO Academy program. 2. Provide sturdier mast sections capable of withstanding the strain of erection.

(2) OBSERVATION: Expanded voice secure systems have greatly increased repair requirements at Regimental level. Present authorization is
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970

one 31S30 at Regimental Level. It has been observed that about one-half of all voice secure equipment turned in for repair from squadrons are operational.

EVALUATION: Squadron radio repairmen improperly diagnose crypto-radio system failures due to the lack of knowledge of crypto systems.

RECOMMENDATION: That one 31S20 be authorized at squadron level to properly diagnose crypto-radio system failures and to insure proper care of crypto systems at squadron level.

h. Medical: None.

i. Base Camp Development: None.

j. PSYOP/Civic Action:

OBSERVATION: Numerous incidents have occurred in which Vietnamese language PSYOP materials have been policed up by Allied units and turned in for intelligence information.

EVALUATION: These incidents were due to a lack of understanding of the Vietnamese language. This causes a gap in the PSYOP's effort and creates delays in initiating special programs.

RECOMMENDATION: Subordinate commanders and staffs should thoroughly brief their personnel, particularly aviators, when these materials are to be utilized, and insure that they emphasize the necessity of not removing the materials from their locations.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-ME

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Dominic R. Bongiorni

1LT, ACC

Assistant Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

1 OGH
2 CINC USARPAC
3 CG, USARV
1 CH, USARV
2 CG, IFFV
5 CG, 1st CAV DIV (Aid)
1 USAIS
1 USAARMS
1 USAARMC
1 Army War College
1 USACGSC
1 CO, 11th ACR
1 XO, 11th ACR
1 CO, 1/11th ACR
1 CO, 2/11th ACR
1 CO, 3/11th ACR
8 28th HHD, 11th ACR

4 Incl

as

Anx B w/d HQ DA

28
TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO San Francisco 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and submits the following comments:

a. Reference item concerning "Nomex flight suits and gloves", section I, page 10, paragraph 4a (4); Concur that personnel flying "Sniffer" missions should be authorized to requisition and draw Nomex suits and gloves. Personnel involved usually fly an average of 50 hours per month. The low altitude and the low speed required by the nature of their mission involves a high degree of risk for which the men receive no additional compensation, nor are they authorized to draw protective clothing.

b. Reference item concerning "Allocation of blade time", section I, page 18, paragraph 5a (2); This headquarters is not in a position to comment on the reduction in allotted flying hours since logistical support aircraft do not come from this Division. However, concur with the position of the 11th ACR that the requirement to resupply by overland convoy, which necessitates providing convoy security, reduces the combat effectiveness of those element when so employed.

c. Reference item concerning "Army Aviation", section II, page 26, paragraph 1f; Concur with the need for more conspicuous markings for LOH scout aircraft. 1/9 Cav, 1st Cav Div (AM) has also indicated that some other color/markings which are more easily seen than international orange be authorized for LOH scout aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KENNETH R. SWAIM
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CF: DA ACSFOR

29
A&VFBC-M (21 May 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ, II FORGEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO-FT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and concurs except as indicated in paragraph 2, below.

2. (C) The following comments are provided:

a. Reference item concerning "Conspicuity Markings for Army Aircraft", page 26, paragraph 1f: nonconcur. The policy and procedures for painting and marking of army aircraft in RVN are prescribed by USARV Regulation 95-27, 29 November 1968, as amended, subject: Conspicuity Markings for Army Aircraft. Units with a mission that may require deviation from the prescribed procedures should forward a request through command channels to the USARV Aviation Officer. The request should include a statement of circumstances and specific recommendations.

b. Reference item concerning "Erection of the Antenna for the Radio Terminal Set, AN/GRC-163", page 26, paragraph 1g(1). Mast sections for the AN/GRC-163 antenna are adequate if proper procedures are used to erect the antenna. Reporting unit should request through S3 channels that USARV tasked 1st Signal Brigade to provide operator training at USASEASS; erecting AN/GRC-163 antennas should not be taught in 05020 MOS training.

c. Reference item concerning "Radio Repairman at Squadron Level", page 26, paragraph 1g(2): concur. The reporting unit is preparing a request for change in the MTOE. The change will include a request for the addition of one repairman, MOS 31330, at squadron level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. Bartel
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CG:
CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)
CO, 11th Armd Cav Regt
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (21 May 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 30 April 1970

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters,
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and concurs with comments of indorsing
headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Nomex Clothing", page 10, paragraph
4a(4), and paragraph a, 1st Indorsement: concur. Unit has been advised
to submit a request to USARV for permission to issue Nomex flight clothing
to "Sniffer" (XM3 Personnel Detector) team personnel. No action by DA
or USARPAC is recommended.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Blade Time", page 28, paragraph
5a(2), and paragraph b, 1st Indorsement. The blade time restrictions
cited in the ORLL were applicable to CH-47 aircraft. These restrictions
were imposed by CG, II Field Force in order to prepare for the support
of operations in Cambodia. The unit is now being allocated 30 hours of
CH-47 support daily. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Rome Plows", page 25, paragraph
b(2): concur. There should be radio communications between Rome Plows
and the security force. USAECV(P) Rome Plow units have such radio
communications. The mission of Rome Plows is to remove jungle growth.
The action to be taken by Rome Plows encountering an occupied enemy
bunker complex is dependent upon the situation; e.g., type fires directed
against the plows, proximity and reaction time of the security force,
visibility and mobility permitted by the jungle growth, and other
variables. Where the security force is armor and is in the immediate
vicinity, it may be practicable and desirable for the Rome Plows to cut
toward the bunker complex while the armor force is also attacking the
bunker complex. It is also possible that other situations might dictate
that Rome Plows halt rather than continuing to cut toward the bunker
complex. The course of action will require a command decision for each
occupied enemy bunker complex encountered by the Rome Plows. Unit has
been so advised.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Automatic Ambushes", page 25, para-
graph 1b(3): concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for
inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No
action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

CONFIDENTIAL
e. (C) Reference item concerning "Automatic Ambushes", page 25, paragraph 1b(4); concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Conspicuous Marking of LOHs", page 26, paragraph 1f; and paragraph c, 1st Indorsement; and paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement; concur with 2d Indorsement. Unit has been advised to submit to USARV correspondence containing recommendations for deviation from present directives. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

g. (U) Reference item "Antenna Kites", page 26, paragraph g(1); concur. The AB-864 Antenna Mast is programmed to replace the AB-301 Antenna Mast which is the standard mast for the AN/GRC-163 radio configuration. Unit has been so advised.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "PSYOP/Civic Action", page 27, paragraph 1j; concur with the recommendation, however, individuals should still continue to turn in any propaganda they find, if they are not certain which nation, i.e. SVN, US, NVN, disseminated the propaganda. The coordination and application of this recommendation can be implemented by the local commanders. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furni
II Field Force Vietnam
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Ch W Stevens Jr
Comd USARV
Assistant Adjutant General

32
GPOP-DT (21 May 70) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
D.D. Cline
2LT, AGQ
Asst AG

33
# Annex Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Organizational Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Roster of Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>OCPON Status of Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Army Aviation Statistical Summary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armored)
*140th Maintenance Battalion
*506th Supply and Service Company
1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion
5th Field Team, Company B, 6th PSYOP Battalion
7th Army Postal Unit
17th Public Information Detachment
28th Military History Detachment
33rd Chemical Detachment
124th Composite Support Maintenance Detachment
202nd Military Intelligence Detachment
398th Transportation Detachment
409th Radio Research Unit
541st Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Company
Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
E Troop
F Troop
G Troop
H Company
Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
I Troop
K Troop
L Troop
M Company
Howitzer Battery

*Attached Support Unit
Annex C

TASK ORGANIZATION:

1. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (ACR) during the entire reporting period.

2. Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

   a. During the reporting period the following major units were OPCON to the 11th ACR for the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/11 ACR</td>
<td>18 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11 ACR</td>
<td>1-19 Feb, 28-30 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/5 Inf</td>
<td>2-19 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/5 Inf</td>
<td>10-18 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/5 Inf</td>
<td>7-19 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2/5 Inf</td>
<td>7-19 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/2/5 Inf</td>
<td>8-19 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1/5 Cav</td>
<td>1-8 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>18 Feb - 18 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>18-24 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>18 Feb - 18 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>18 Feb - 6 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>18 Feb - 18 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/8 Cav</td>
<td>1-3 Feb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. During the reporting period the following units were GS to the 11th ACR for the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/6/27 Arty</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/32 Arty</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/32 Arty</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/32 Arty</td>
<td>24 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. During the reporting period the following units were DS to the 11th ACR for the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B/2/12 Arty</td>
<td>18 Feb - 31 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/19 Arty</td>
<td>18 Feb - 31 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501 LCC</td>
<td>18 Feb - 6 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>984 Engr Co</td>
<td>15 Feb - 4 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

3. HQ, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:
   a. The following units were OPCON to 1/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>18 Feb - 25 Mar</td>
<td>1st Bde, 1st Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501 LCC</td>
<td>18 Feb - 6 Apr</td>
<td>1st Bde, 1st Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/3/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 Feb - 9 Apr</td>
<td>1st Bde, 1st Cav Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. The following organic units of 1/11 ACR were not under its operational control during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/1/11</td>
<td>18-26 Feb, 6-27 Mar</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/11</td>
<td>18-21 Feb, 21-30 Apr</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/1/11</td>
<td>1 Feb - 1 Mar</td>
<td>199 LIB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. The 1/11 ACR was not OPCON to the 11th ACR from 1-18 Feb, when it was OPCON to the 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (A).

4. HQ, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:
   a. The following units were OPCON to 2/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B/1/5 Cav</td>
<td>1-8 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/5 Inf</td>
<td>16-19 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>19-26 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>28 Feb - 18 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>25 Mar - 6 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. The following organic units of 2/11 ACR were not under its operational control during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E/2/11</td>
<td>9-15 Mar</td>
<td>2/7 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/2/11</td>
<td>5-8 Feb</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/2/11</td>
<td>1-5 &amp; 13-15 Feb</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div(A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. The 2/11 ACR was OPCON to the 11th ACR during the entire reporting period.

5. HQ, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:
   a. The following units were OPCON to 3/11 ACR for the periods indicated:
b. The following organic units of 3/11 ACR were not under its operational control during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B/2/5 Inf</td>
<td>10-18 Feb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/7 Cav</td>
<td>18-19 Feb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/8 Cav</td>
<td>1-8 Feb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>984 Engr Co</td>
<td>15-19 Feb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 3/11 ACR was not OPCON to the 11th ACR during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb - 15 Mar</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Mar - 23 Apr</td>
<td>5th ARVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Apr - 28 Apr</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div (A')</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Sorties Flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>OH-6AA</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>3386</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3959</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Lift (Combat)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Lift (Logistical)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (Combat)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (Logistical)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>1485</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>1594</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Helicopter</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Number Passengers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>3081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6AA</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>4671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Tons Cargo: UH-1H carried 16 tons during the reporting period.

4. Total hours and sorties flown by aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>2302</td>
<td>6922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6AA</td>
<td>1479</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>3418</td>
<td>8288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>1418</td>
<td>142?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Results of Fire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA (BC)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Ammunition Expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>392,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>11,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>14,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 caliber</td>
<td>2,910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Aircraft Availability (% Operational Ready):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Aircraft Non-operational Ready (% Hours Downtime due to Supply):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Aircraft Non-operational Ready (% Hours Downtime due to Maintenance):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations,**

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

**21 May 1970**

**N/A**

**N/A**

**N/A**

**702199**

**OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310**

**41**