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SECURITY
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (24 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 702186 31 July 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 101st Airborne Division (Airborne)
APO 96383

AVDG-GC

17 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1 - CD, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
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Inclosure

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3. Department of the Army Survey Information
   None

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   a. (1) Operations.

(1) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN continued during the reporting period until conclusion on 31 March 1970. The division continued to support combined US/GVN operations and training to upgrade the effectiveness of GVN forces; to detect, capture or destroy members of the local Viet Cong infrastructure and their sympathizers; to disrupt routes of supply between mountain base areas and the rice producing lowlands and population centers; and to support the Thua Thien Province accelerated pacification and development program. The division continued to restrict enemy infiltration and movement in the populated lowlands by conducting extensive patrol and night ambush operations in coordination with RF and PF units; radar raids to detect targets for engagement by artillery; river patrols around key bridges and populated areas; and augmentation of GVN bridge security forces during periods of high threat. The period was marked by the establishment of enemy forward logistic bases and forward staging areas in the central canopy region, suitable for supporting operations in the lowlands. The end of the period was characterized by an increase in the number of enemy ground attacks on Allied fire support bases and an increase in enemy attacks by fire.

(2) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was developed, planned, and executed in close cooperation and coordination with Vietnamese civilian and military agencies at all levels. All the resources of the entire division were committed to the accomplishment of two basic, interrelated tasks:

(a) To provide, in coordination with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN), a protective shield on the periphery of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province.

(b) To support, to the maximum extent possible, the attainment of the goals of the 1970 Province Pacification and Development Plan.

(3) All operations conducted by the division during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were planned to maximize security of the population and to support accelerated attainment of the eight objectives of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. These eight objectives are:

(a) Territorial security: Security is the prerequisite to insuring that social, economic, and political development in Thua Thien Province progresses and yields the desired results. The efforts of US, ARVN, Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), People's Self Defense Forces (PSPF), and the National Police/National Police Field Forces (NMPF) must be coordinated and combined in order to insure effective security for all the people.
(b) Protection of the People Against Terrorism: The neutralization of the VCI through combined efforts at increasing the effectiveness of the Phuong Hoang (Phoenix) organization at every level, to include the effective administration of intelligence material by District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIIOC) and Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOC).

(c) People's Self Defense: Better organize, train, and equip PESD to increase their capabilities of protecting the villages and hamlets and to discharge their responsibility of helping to identify the VCI.

(d) Local Administration: Development of a local administration with the capability of self-management in administrative, economic, and financial affairs; complete election of all village, hamlet, municipal and provincial councils.

(e) Greater National Unity: Continue implementation of the Ho Chi Minh program with greater emphasis on rallying high and middle ranking enemy cadre to the government ranks.

(f) Brighter Life for War Victims: Increase efforts at improving life for war victims, assisting resettlers in returning to secure areas and encourage their participation in local economic development.

(g) People's Information: Establishment of an effective information system based on close coordination between government agencies and between the various people's organizations, with emphasis on information aimed at educating the people and motivating them to participate in local development in every field.

(h) Prosperity for All: Continue to build on the achievements of preceding years, advancing steadily from previous economic and political successes to economic independence.

The two basic tasks, territorial security and pacification and development support, were organized in the following manner:

(a) Territorial security was developed through combined operations with ARVN and territorial forces, and through an extensive training program that provided specialized instruction for ARVN units, but concentrated on training EP, PP, and PESD units to accomplish their assigned tasks with the equipment and personnel authorized.

(b) The pacification and development goals of Thua Thien Province during RANDOLPH GEN were to provide adequate security for the entire population, eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure, initiate and complete
needed public projects, improve existing economic programs, and implement economic reforms where required. These objectives were advanced through extensive psychological operations and civic action.

(5) The focal point for coordination of all efforts in Thua Thien Province was the informal Area Coordination Committee composed of the CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl); CG, 1st Inf Div (ARVN); the Province Chief; and US senior advisors. This committee coordinated broad policies for the employment of military forces to accomplish the established objectives and determine priorities for pacification and civic action. Detailed coordination to implement these policies was effected through continuous liaison at division level with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and with province/sector officials. Brigades provided liaison teams with dedicated communications to counterpart regiments and each district in the area of operation.

(6) The conduct of Operation RANDOLPH during the reporting period was influenced by these factors:

(a) The northeast monsoons, which reduced the ability of the division to move into and sustain operations against the enemy base areas deep in the jungle canopy.

(b) The mission to provide maximum security for populated lowlands while the training of territorial forces progressed.

(c) The requirement to prevent and defeat, if initiated, any enemy offensive action during the Tet period.

As the period progressed, the impact of each of these factors on the conduct of operations diminished. Increased security measures in February prevented any significant enemy interference during the Tet holiday season. By mid February, the weather permitted airmobile division elements to begin moving deeper into the piedmont and canopy areas. Training of territorial forces progressed satisfactorily and RF and FF units became more capable of performing their intended missions, while the training provided PAVN elements increased their confidence in their ability to defend their hamlets and villages. Weather conditions improved significantly in March and it became possible to employ to a greater extent the airmobility of the division to conduct offensive operations against the enemy base areas established during the monsoon period.

In addition to these factors, the effect of US troop redeployment continued and further reductions were announced. Planning began for future operations when the division A0 may extend beyond Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. One of the foremost considerations in this planning was to
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RDS CSPA-65 (A2) (U)

minimize the interruption to both pacification and development support and
the coordinated efforts of the divisions and GVN forces and agencies in
the provinces. As planning progressed, courses of action were developed
and analyzed, and the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation
RANDOLPH GLEN were evaluated. It became clear that the basic concepts
of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN remained valid and that, with the necessary
adjustments in brigade missions and locations, the foundation for pro-
gress in the lowlands developed during the operation could be built
upon, while providing the combat power necessary to counter the threat
of enemy build-up in the western reaches of Thua Thien and Quang Tri Pro-
vinces. In early March, planning was completed and the decision was made
to terminate Operation RANDOLPH GLEN on 31 March 1970.

(7) In mid-March, CPORD 2-70 (TEXAS STAR) was published for imple-
mation on 1 April. This operation was planned to exploit the suc-
cess of RANDOLPH GLEN, incorporate the lessons learned during that
operation, to continue the cooperation developed among all Allied elements
in the province, and to provide for the movement of a portion of the 1st
from Thua Thien Province if it becomes necessary.

Under Operation TEXAS STAR, the 2d Brigade assumed responsibility
for pacification and development support throughout the province, while
the 1st and 3d Brigades were tasked to conduct offensive operations against
enemy units in the western portions of the province. Concurrent with the
repositioning of division units, the areas of operation of regiments of
the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) were adjusted to maintain the brigade-
regimental relationships developed and refined during the preceding months.

(8) The chronological sequence of combat operations for the period
1 February - 30 April 1970 is as follows:

(a) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (7 December 1969 - 31 March 1970) was
concluded during the reporting period.

1 The primary missions of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were:

a To conduct offensive operations to locate and destroy NVA/VC main
force units and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands
of Thua Thien Province.

b To conduct operations to defeat VC/L/VC in the populated lowlands.

c To conduct limited objective operations west of the piedmont in
reaction to hard intelligence.

d To conduct periodic interdiction of the A Shau Valley and place
fires on acquired targets on a continuous basis.

e To conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in the AO.

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To provide one airborne infantry battalion as corps reserve.

To support GVN pacification and development plans and programs.

To provide civic action assistance.

To assist GVN forces to assume full responsibility for combat, pacification, and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province.

The success of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was accomplished through the full commitment and integration of resources, energies and efforts of the 101st Abn Div (Amb1), 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province. Significant progress was made in training and preparing territorial forces to assume a greater responsibility for the defense and development of their homeland. Additional land was put under cultivation, schools were built, roads constructed, and resettlement progressed ahead of schedule. Accomplishment of the division's missions has laid the foundation for an effective Vietnamese security system that will continue after the departure of the division, or major portions of the division from Thua Thien Province. Detailed significant activities during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN have been submitted in Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV-32 (R2) (7).

Cumulative enemy losses inflicted by Allied forces during RANDOLPH GLEN were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>PV</th>
<th>Indiv Wms</th>
<th>Crew Served Wms</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>ARVN</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/YP</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>

Total division casualties during the operation were 123 KIA, 163 WIA (evacuated), 84 WIA (minor), and 4 MIA. The 4 MIA were aboard an aircraft lost in flight, which is still unlocated.

(b) Operation TEXAS STAR (1 April 1970 - continuing)

1 Task Organization:

1st Brigade  2d Brigade  3d Brigade
1-327 Inf    2-327 Inf    1-506 Inf
1-501 Inf    3-187 Inf    2-506 Inf

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### 1st Brigade
- 2-502 Inf
- 2-320 Arty (105mm How) (DS)
- 1 A (-)/326 Engr (DS)
- 1st FSE, DISCOM (DS)
- Tn, 101 MI Co (-)
- 1-265 RRC (DS)
- 42d Inf Ptt (Sat Dog)
- TACP USAF
- Spt Tn 501 Sig (DS)
- 2 Tms, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)

### 2d Brigade
- 2-502 Inf
- 1-321 Arty (105mm How) (DS)
- 0(-)/326 Engr (DS)
- 2d FSE, DISCOM (DS)
- Tn, 101 MI Co (-)
- 2-265 RRC (DS)
- 47th Inf Ptt (Sat Dog)
- TACP USAF
- Spt Tn 501 Sig (DS)
- 2 Tms, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)

### 3d Brigade
- 2-501 Inf
- 2-319 Arty (105mm How) (DS)
- B(-)/326 Engr (DS)
- 3d FSE, DISCOM (DS)
- Tn, 101 MI Co (-)
- 3-265 RRC (DS)
- 58th Inf Ptt (Sat Dog)
- TACP USAF
- Spt Tn 501 Sig (DS)
- 2 Tms, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)

### 2-17 Cav
- Co L (Ranger) 75th Inf

### DISCOM
- 426 S&G Bn
- 326 Med Bn
- 5th Trans Bn

### 101 Avn Co
- 163 Avn Co
- 101 Avn Bn
- 158 Avn Bn
- 159 Avn Bn
- 479 Avn Co (-)
- 101 Abn Div Arty
- 2-11 Arty
- 4-77 Aerial Rkt Arty
- 1/377 Arty (Avn)

### 101 Avn Co
- 326 Engr Bn (-)
- 265 RRC (-)
- 10th Cml Ptt
- 20th Cml Det
- 101 MI Co (-)
- 557 Cmbt Tracker Ptt
- 4th PSYOP Det (-) (DS)
- 7th Ptt, 29th CA Co (DS)
2 Operation TEXAS STAR is a division operation developed in close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province and sector officials to meet the challenge of the forward disposition of enemy forces in the division area of operation; insure the smooth transfer of pacification and development tasks from the entire division to only a single portion of the division, thereby providing a posture that will facilitate expansion of the division AO with no major interruptions to pacification and development support. Operation TEXAS STAR is designed to continue and expand the concepts, and to exploit the success and experience gained by the division during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. Complete integration of effort of all agencies within the division area of operation is continuing to provide for the accomplishment of the inseparable tasks of territorial security, populace and resources control, and environmental improvement. The primary missions of the operation are:

a To conduct extensive airmobile combined operations in the area east of the A Shau Valley and west of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province to locate and destroy enemy units, base camps and cache sites and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands to provide maximum security for the population.

b To conduct operations in coordination with GVN forces to defeat VC/LN in the populated lowlands.

c To conduct combined, limited objective, airmobile operations in reaction to hard intelligence within the AO.

d To place fires on acquired targets in the A Shau Valley on a continuous basis.

e To conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in the AO.

f To reinforce, on occasion, the Hai Loc CIDG Camp.

g To provide one air mobile infantry battalion as corps reserve.

h To support GVN pacification and development plans and programs.

i To provide civic action assistance.

j To assist GVN forces in the defense of Hue.

k To assist GVN forces in providing security for the Vietnamese Railway System (VNSS) within the AO.
To assist GVN forces to assume full responsibility for combat, pacification and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province.

To prepare for operations in an expanded AO, on order.

To accomplish these missions the division continued to support the 1970 accelerated pacification and development program in Thua Thien Province by employing three battalions and nine mobile training teams in the early stages of TET-AI STAR. The success of the mobile training team program indicated in RANDOLPH GREN was expanded to provide 18 teams in the lowlands and piedmont area under control of the 2d Brigade. Operations in close coordination with GVN officials were conducted to isolate the lowlands from infiltration by NVA and main force units, restrict enemy movement in the populated areas, search out the Viet Cong infrastructure and eliminate their influence on the populace, and to increase the people's confidence in the local government. Two dedicated battalions continued to conduct combined operations and training in Phu Loc and Phong Dien Districts and one battalion conducted combined operations with RF units in the piedmont south of the to eliminate enemy infiltration into the area. The 2d Brigade conducted extensive combined operations from squad through company size to increase the participation of territorial forces in the defense of their homes. The mobile training teams continued to train territorial forces to increase their combat effectiveness and PSDF to improve their ability to defend their hamlets and villages. The brigade also maintained liaison with district headquarters to improve the capability to react to incidents of enemy terrorism and food gathering among the people.

The 1st and 3d Brigades, in conjunction with the 54th and 1st Regiments (ARVN), deployed against NVA in the canopied area between the lowlands of Thua Thien Province and the A Shau Valley. Combined airborne operations were conducted with elements of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) to locate and destroy enemy forces, base camps and cache sites.

Cavalry, Air Force and artillery aircraft continued to conduct extensive aerial reconnaissance throughout the area of operations and the division continued to expand the employment of unattended sensor and other surveillance devices to locate enemy targets and employ artillery and air fire power against them.

(9) Other Significant Activities.

(a) Road construction. Road building and upgrading projects were continued during the period. Although engineer efforts were primarily in support of tactical operations, road and bridge building significantly strengthened the local economy and substantially aided resettlement, particularly in Phong Dien and Quang Dien Districts.

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(b) Boundary acquisition. On 19 February the division acquired an addition to the eastern portion of the area of operation from the 1st Marine Division. The area included fire support bases Tomahawk and Los Banos and completed the embodiment of all Thua Thien Province into the division AO.

(c) F Troop. On 12 March, Troop F (Provisional), 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Caw was inactivated and redesignated as Co A, 101st Avn Bn (Ambl). The troop had been organized from assets of the division on 16 December 1969 to supplement division reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

(d) Personnel influx. A number of personnel from the redeploying 1st US Infantry Division joined the ranks of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) as a result of redeployment of that unit from the Republic of Vietnam.

(e) 2d Brigade movement. 2d Brigade, three infantry battalions and supporting elements moved from Camp Sally to Phu Bai Combat Base on 13 March following the movement of XXIV Corps headquarters to Da Nang. At 1700 hours on 30 March, Camp Sally was officially released from control of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and transferred to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) in a ceremony at Camp Sally.

(10) Enemy losses during the reporting period:

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<th>KIA</th>
<th>KBA</th>
<th>KBH</th>
<th>PW</th>
<th>WIC</th>
<th>CSSC</th>
<th>Grain - Tons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.4675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.6905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demolitions</th>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>88.25 lbs</td>
<td>11.25 lbs</td>
<td>20,952 rds</td>
<td>1182 rds</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>79.45 lbs</td>
<td>21.25 lbs</td>
<td>11,836 rds</td>
<td>1912 rds</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>610.00 lbs</td>
<td>15.25 lbs</td>
<td>23,358 rds</td>
<td>88,076 rds</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
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(11) Friendly losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contacts</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>1</td>
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(12) G3 Air activities:

(a) During the reporting period, close air support sorties were flown in the division area of operation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned sorties</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate sorties</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat sky spots</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flareships</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunships (Spooky, Shadow and Stinger)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Tactical air strikes expended 5682 tons of bombs and 200 tons of napalm, resulting in 46 NVA/VC KIA and the following damage:

1. 844 bunkers destroyed
2. 14 bunkers damaged
3. 23 hnts destroyed
4. 4 military structures destroyed
5. 25 12.7mm gun positions destroyed
6. 259 secondary explosions
7. 256 secondary fires
8. 20 boxes of ammunition destroyed
9. 14 ammunition fires
10. 68 trucks destroyed
11. 1 bulldozer destroyed
12. 2 half tracks damaged
13. Routes 916, 9222 and T7 interdicted in 365 locations
14. Numerous trails interdicted
15. 10 tunnel entrances destroyed

(c) During the reporting period, 67 B52 strikes were conducted against targets in the AO.
b. (c) Training.

(1) In order to maximize forces available during the Tet period, battalion refresher training was suspended from 21 January to 16 February. Again on 9 April, training was suspended due to the increased enemy contact throughout the AO. Training remained suspended through the end of the reporting period. The program continued to emphasize marksmanship, small unit tactics, airmobile operations, mines and booby traps, and ambush operations.

(2) To assist in upgrading the effectiveness of the territorial forces, additional Mobile training teams (MTT) were organized, trained at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS), and employed in the division area of operation. At the end of the reporting period, 18 MTTs were deployed.

(3) During the reporting period, a total of 27 selected personnel attended one of the three cycles of the MACV Recondo School. Twenty-four personnel from the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) also attended the school. Each ARVN soldier was assigned a US buddy who was also attending the school to encourage participation by the ARVN and assist in the transition from ARVN to US instruction.

(4) Three cycles of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Sniper School were conducted during the period. Fourteen personnel from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and 45 personnel from the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) graduated from the school. All graduates were equipped with the XM21 sniper rifle. A sniper contact team, consisting of the sniper school OIC and several instructors visited units in the field to discuss and assist commanders in planning for sniper employment.

(5) The Pathfinder Platoon conducted training in pathfinder operations for soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). Two classes, totalling 35 personnel, were graduated. To aid instruction, the Pathfinder Handbook was translated into Vietnamese. Training stressed pathfinder principles, techniques in planning and conducting airmobile operations, and ground control of rotary wing aircraft.

(6) The 101st Airborne Division Airmobile Operations School conducted two classes at Camp Eagle during the reporting period. A total of 67 personnel from the division, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), and MACV Advisory Team 18 attended the courses. Instruction was presented to battalion and higher commanders, S3 and S5 Air officers, and other selected staff officers. During the month of April Airmobile Operations School instructors presented classes to 33 cadre personnel of the Vietnamese Dong Da National Training Center.
AVDC-00
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air mobile) Period Ending 30 April 1976, ERS GSF02-65 (R) (U)

o. (2) Chemical.

(1) General. During February, March and April, the Division Chemical Section with operational control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CSRC) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (DS) (Separate) continued to provide chemical combat support to the division.

(2) Operations.

(a) During the reporting period, the Division Chemical Section performed the following missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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<tr>
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<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Flame Operations</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>3,462 55 gal drums</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulk CS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42 55 gal drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 42 ( \frac{2}{3} ) 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 4 BLU-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical CS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>125 BL58 Cannisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 1,120 M7A3 grenades</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 8 CBU-30/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Defoliation (Herbicide)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>780 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Defoliation (Diesel)</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Fougnasse Issued</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>600 bbl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspected/Installed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>246/186 bbl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasch Flare Installed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N5 CS Launcher Inspected/Installed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>69/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop Destruction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>210 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cave Seeding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>160 lbs CS2</td>
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The Airborne Personnel Detector continued to be used as a primary intelligence gathering device to supplement or confirm intelligence concerning enemy activity and to assist in locating enemy base areas and cache sites. The brigades conducted AFD missions in their respective AOs, while the 2A Squadron (Arm), 17th Cavalry conducted missions in the reconnaissance zone and special missions requested by the brigades. The division chemical section provided technical assistance in planning the missions. An officer was also provided to serve as OIC for the conduct of the missions and for interpretation of results for immediate exploitation of the targets. Several significant trends in enemy activity were indicated by the AFD readings which assisted in determining enemy locations. Methods of exploitation by divisional units included employment of AHA, gunships, artillery, air strikes, CS, and bulk flame drops.

(a) Aerial flame operations using both the CH47 and UH1H helicopters were conducted on booby trapped areas planned for resettlement; to clear fields of fire around fire support bases; on landing zones for clearing booby traps and to assist in expansion; and on suspected enemy positions and cache sites.

1 Two major flame projects were conducted in Huong Thuy and Phu Tho Districts to assist in clearing booby traps in areas planned for resettlement and to clear mines and booby traps from trails and dikes adjacent to inhabited areas. The operations were supported by ground elements from the infantry brigades and by Marine CAF Teams and Popular Force platoons. These personnel were responsible for marking the targets and sweeping the areas following the drops to detect booby traps exposed by the flames.

2 Flame was used extensively on landing zones to clear booby traps prior to troop insertions. The value of the aerial delivered flame munitions was demonstrated by the number of booby traps detonated, neutralized, or exposed by the flames. On one occasion a landing zone, booby trapped with Chicos claymore mines facing upward for possible detonation by rotor wash of helicopters, was cleared by the flames. Ten secondary explosions were observed immediately following the drop.
Several new fire support bases were constructed and several previously constructed bases were reoccupied during the reporting period. This required extensive clearing operations around the perimeters to facilitate observation and provide fields of fire. Bulk flame drops were conducted to assist in these clearing operations.

A major flame project was conducted for the 2d ROK Marine Brigade in booby trapped areas 20 kilometers south of Da Nang. The project was conducted to assist in clearing the booby trapped areas planned for Vietnamese resettlement and to provide instruction and technical assistance in training the ROK forces in the development of their own aerial flame program. The 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) provided a CH47 helicopter and personnel for the conduct of the flame operation. A briefing was conducted at the ROK brigade headquarters to describe the concept of employment and the operational techniques. A total of 520 drums of fuel were dropped during the initial three days of the operation. Assistance was provided by the ROK forces in marking the target areas and in rigging the nets for the drops. An area of approximately one half square kilometer was cleared during the initial portion of the operation, with a total of eight secondary explosions reported and several other booby traps neutralized.

The use of bulk and tactical CS increased significantly during the reporting period. The munitions were employed using both organic helicopters and USAF and USMC high-performance aircraft. Bulk CS targets included enemy base areas and major road networks leading into the northern half of the A Shau Valley. The tactical CS missions were conducted on suspected enemy locations in conjunction with artillery and air strikes and in support of troop insertions and ground operations.

Fifty-five gallon drums of CS-2 equipped with the XM245 impact fuze and burster assembly were dropped from CH47 helicopters on nine separate target areas for terrain restriction and for interdiction of roads. MK77 500 pound bombs, each containing 80 pounds of CS-1, and BUW-52 bombs, each containing 260 pounds of CS-2, were employed from USMC and USAF high-performance aircraft to interdict the heavy vehicular traffic bringing enemy troops and supplies into the forward base areas. The interdiction caused the enemy to divert equipment and personnel to clear the areas or construct new routes, thus exposing their position to artillery and air strikes employed against them.

E158 CS canisters were employed on suspected enemy positions in support of ground elements conducting sweep operations, in support of artillery and air strikes, and for combined US/ARVN operations conducted in the vicinity of FSB Henderson. The E158 canisters were employed from UH-1D helicopters with each aircraft carrying 10-15 canisters; 1763 grenades were also delivered from fabricated rocket tube assemblies constructed from four 2.75 inch rockets. Each tube assembly is filled with 20 CS grenades; approximately 400 grenades can be delivered by each aircraft.
In supporting the troop insertions, the munitions were employed on enemy mortar and automatic weapons positions directed at the landing zones to be used for insertion. The E158 cannisters were also employed to screen the flanks of a unit conducting sweep operations. One tactical CS mission was conducted using eight CSU-50/A bombs dropped from F-100 aircraft, in support of an aerial rocket artillery raid in the northern portion of the A Shau Valley.

(e) Helicopter defoliation missions using both diesel and oil mixture, and herbicides, were conducted with the modified Agaveno sprayer. The diesel spray operations were conducted around fire support bases in the piedmont area where herbicides could not be used due to proximity of friendly crops. Herbicide missions were also conducted on major infiltration routes leading into remote fire support bases and on areas where several large cache sites had been located.

(f) Extensive ground defoliation operations were conducted around fire support bases and along routes where the dense foliage hampered visual observation. The diesel was sprayed using a fabricated spray system consisting of a hose and pump assembly attached to the fuel container. A major project was conducted to clear the foliage along approximately seven kilometers of the Hue-Do Nang railroad track which had been the target of enemy mining. A method was developed employing large containers carried on railroad flat cars to spray diesel along each side of the track. The area of spray extended out approximately 50 feet to each side of the tracks. The sprayed area was then burned.

(g) A cave seeding operation was conducted on a cave and tunnel complex discovered during a sweep and clear operation. The complex, which consisted of several rooms and tunnels, reinforced with concrete, was thoroughly seeded with powdered CS-2 by placing eight pound bags of CS-2 on detonating cord located throughout the cave.

(h) Two crop destruction missions were conducted using Agent Blue to destroy the increasing number of garden plots scattered throughout the division AO. Two techniques were used in destroying the plots. The Agaveno sprayer was used in areas where numerous garden plots were concentrated and where the enemy ground fire threat was negligible. In areas of higher threat five gallon plastic collapsible containers (Lug-a-jugs) filled with Agent Blue were dropped from HUH helicopters on the garden plots. The average coverage of the liquid using this technique is approximately 20 x 80 feet with additional coverage gained by vaporization and wind drift.

(i) New Methods.

1 Modified Agaveno Sprayer. The Agaveno sprayer used for spraying herbicides and diesel for defoliation was modified by removing the windmill.
pump assembly and replacing it with the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier bilge pump. The pump operates from the aircraft electrical system, making the spray concentration independent of aircraft speed. This modification enables missions to be flown at slower speeds, providing a heavier concentration of spray in the area desired. At a speed of 80 knots, the modified Agavenco sprayer will dispense 110 gallons of defoliant over a distance of seven kilometers. The width of spray is approximately 60 feet, providing a concentration of three gallons per acre.

2 Use of plastic containers to dispense defoliants. A system was developed using five gallon collapsible containers (Lug-a-jugs) filled with Agent Orange or Blue to engage the numerous garden plots scattered throughout the division AO. Delivery techniques are discussed in paragraph c. (2) (h), above. A problem was encountered in filling the containers and in retaining the cap in place to prevent spill. A more durable container with a cap providing a better seal will assist in overcoming the problem.

1 "Jeepo" containers for cave seeding operations. The "Jeepo" containers are filled with 8 pounds of powdered CS-2 and were used in cave seeding operations. A fusing system was developed using a non-electrical blasting cap, a six inch length of detonating cord, and a metal shield made from a tin can. This system has proven successful, however, much time is required to assemble it. A VIAP request was submitted requesting development of a non-pyrotechnic CS grenade similar in size to the M1A3 grenade with a 8-10 second fuse to assist in cave seeding operations.

d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Situation.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period enemy units were located as follows:

1 In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH), local force companies were located in their normal area of operations: C113 vicinity YD4033, C114 vicinity YD4019, C115 vicinity YD6217 and C116 vicinity YD7904. The Phu Yang Special Action Unit (PYSU) was unlocated. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion (FLAB) and the 4th NVA Regiment were operating in the Phu Loc Mountains with most activity centered in the Phu Loc (D) Headquarters and the Truoi River Bridge areas. The 5th NVA Regiment was deployed in its traditional area of operations southwest of Hue, with the 804th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC8195, the 810th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD7815, the 932 Rocket Artillery Battalion operating vicinity YD7299, and the unlocated Chi Thua I and Chi Thua II Sapper Battalions possibly operating vicinity YC6282. The 29th NVA Regiment was located east of the central A
Shau Valley along the Bao Le River Valley, vicinity PS Mooren (YD4812). The 83d NVA Regiment was believed operating from eastern Base Area 611 and possibly in the A Shau Valley. Elements of the 6th NVA Regiment were deployed in the proximity of the Phong Dien (D) lowlands with elements of the K12 Sapper, 800th and 806th Infantry Battalions operating with the Cl15 and Cl14 Local Force Companies. The maneuver battalions of the 7th Front had returned to the area west of former Base Area 101, after being refitted and reinforced.

2. In the B-5 (DMZ) Front at the beginning of the reporting period there were eight enemy units operating in the DMZ area. The 52d NVA Regiment, 320th Division was located in northwestern Quang Tri (F). The 21st Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment was in the western portion of the central DMZ, vicinity XD8363. The 2d Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment was operating vicinity YD0568. The 31st NVA Regiment was deployed throughout the eastern DMZ area and making incursions in the Quang Tri (F) lowlands. The 270th NVA Regiment was located in the northeastern DMZ vicinity YD1986. The 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment was deployed throughout the DMZ in general support of the B-5 Front. The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment was located vicinity XD2289.

(b) Enemy activity during the month of February failed to match anticipated IET high points. Prisoners of war and captured documents indicated that Allied operations had severely restricted enemy activities in the lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and NVA forces located in the forward edge of the jungle canopy were forced to obtain their rice from North Vietnam. There were sporadic surges of activity by the 27th and 246th NVA Regiments along the DMZ and by the 5th NVA Regiment operating south of Hua. These surges were evidenced by an increase in the attacks by fire on Allied installations and forward fire support bases. NVA forces continued a high level of logistical activity in their rear support areas. Photo and visual reconnaissance repeatedly detected signs of vehicular activity in the Vietnamese Salient and the northern A Shau Valley. The enemy increased anti-aircraft fire throughout the division area of operations, with the most numerous incidents encountered along his critical lines of communication.

(c) Enemy initiated contacts showed no significant change in Northern I Corps during March. DMZ activity was characterized by attacks by fire in the area south of the central DMZ. There was an increase in ground activity in the B-5 Front area of operations with 80 contacts in March, as compared to 64 in February. In addition to the overall increase in ground activity there was also a significant rise in the number of platoon and company sized contacts. Intelligence indicated that elements of the 304th NVA Division had moved into western Quang Tri (F). A major logistical buildup continued in the Thua Thien mountain region where NVA
forces were concentrated. Photo and visual reconnaissance missions continued to detect signs of NVA vehicular activity in the Vietnamese Salient and throughout the A Shau Valley. The enemy continued to repair roads interdicted by Allied air strikes with bulldozers and engineer equipment. During March there was an increase in the use of larger caliber weapons employed against Allied aircraft with the heaviest volume of fire still being encountered along the enemy's critical lines of communication.

(d) Enemy initiated contacts increased significantly during the first two weeks of April. DMZ activity was characterized by attacks by fire primarily in the Khe Sau Fuller and Camp Carroll areas. The enemy used 120mm mortars in the DMZ for the first time in two years. The presence of the 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division in the upper Da Krong Valley increased the enemy threat in central Quang Tri (P). The extensive logistical buildup continued in the Thua Thien (P) mountain region. The enemy improved and expanded logistical facilities eastward towards the lowlands, establishing cache sites, improving lines of communication and constructing bunker and tunnel complexes. Enemy offensive operations in the central Thua Thien (P) canopy and piedmont regions were characterized by attacks by fire and limited ground and sapper attacks. Aerial and ground reconnaissance and surveillance operations continued to indicate heavy vehicular activity in the Vietnamese Salient and the A Shau Valley.

(e) At the end of the reporting period enemy units were located as follows:

1. In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MTH3), local force companies were located in their normal area of operations: C113 vicinity Phong Dien (D), C114 vicinity Quang Dien (D), C115 vicinity YD6604 and C116 vicinity YD2160. The Phu Vang Special Action Unit remained unlocated. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion and the 4th NVA Regiment continued to operate in the Phu Loc Mountain. The K40 Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment was located vicinity YC2193 and the K45 Battalion, 4th Regiment was located near YC1986. The 5th NVA Regiment remained in its traditional area of operations with the headquarters located vicinity YC5020, the 804th Infantry Battalion vicinity YG6195, the 810th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD5715, the 439th Battalion vicinity YD6297, the K32 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD7999, the Chi Thua I Sapper Battalion vicinity YC6282, and the Chi Thua II Sapper Battalion vicinity YC7290. The 6th NVA Regiment was deployed in the canopy east of the Phong Dien (D) piedmont area with the regimental headquarters vicinity YD316, the 800th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD922, the 802d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD924, the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2010, the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC4622, the K35 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD5620, and the K12 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3423. The 29th and 803d NVA Regiments of the 324B Division were operating east of the
Shau Valley just south and southeast of the 6th NVA Regiment. The 29th NVA Regiment Headquarters was located vicinity YD405, with the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD510, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD470, and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD490. The 803d NVA Regiment Headquarters was located vicinity YD3415, with the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3616, the 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4112, and the 3d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3311. The headquarters of the 24B Division remained in Base Area 611 with NHTH Headquarters. The 675th NVA Artillery Regiment was still carried in Base Area 611. The 7th Front remained located vicinity of former Base Area 101. The 812th NVA Regiment, which had been engaged in logistical activity supporting the 7th Front, was now located well into Thu Thien (P) with its headquarters vicinity YD2525, the 4th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4228, the 5th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0023, and the 6th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2025.

2 At the end of the reporting period, in the B-5 (DIZ) Front, there were ten units operating in the DIZ area as far south as the Ba Long River Valley. The 52d NVA Regiment, 320th Division was still carried in the northeastern corner of Quang Tri (P). The 246th NVA Regiment was operating in the western portion of the central DIZ with the headquarters vicinity XD9171; the 1st Battalion vicinity XD9455; the 2d Battalion vicinity XD8353; and the 3d Battalion vicinity XD9461. The headquarters of the 27th NVA Regiment was located vicinity YD666, with 1st Battalion vicinity YD0563; the 2d Battalion vicinity YD0570; and the 3d Battalion vicinity YD0459. The 75th Anti-aircraft Battalion was recently deployed to the DIZ and is employed vicinity XD9561. The 36th NVA Regiment was not active during the reporting period and is carried as unlocated in North Vietnam. The 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment and the 164th Rocket Artillery Regiment appeared to alternate fire support responsibility in the central DIZ area. Headquarters, 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment was located vicinity XD2189. The newly arrived 66th NVA Regiment was located vicinity YD0242. Forward elements of the 304th Division were operating south of the Khe Sanh Plateau vicinity XD8438. Elements of the 27th Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment were operating in the Quang Tri (P) lowlands with the battalion and regimental headquarters in North Vietnam vicinity YD1185. The 270th NVA Regiment remained located north of the eastern DIZ vicinity YL'986.

2 Viet Cong Infrastructure Activities.

(a) The month of February 1970 reflected a decline in VC/VCI incidents over the previous month. The majority of incidents during the month involved the collection of rice. These collections included confiscation or were conducted under the guise of taxation. The increase in propaganda activity was indicative of the emphasis by the enemy on discrediting the Allied pacification program and the preparation of the lowlands for
possible future offensive activity. There were two VC/VCI related incidents in February that have not been recorded for some time in the lowlands. The first involved a VC local force company (probably the C113) that entered UU Thuong (H) in Phong Dien (D). The company organized a propaganda meeting and upon their departure destroyed 85% of the fence around the hamlet. The other incident occurred on 12 February when three 122mm rockets impacted in the City. This was classified as an incident of terrorism since all casualties were civilian. The attack probably was a political propaganda lesson implying that GVN forces cannot protect the populace and that, when US forces are withdrawn, the city of Hue will once again fall under Communist control. During the month of February a total of thirty-nine VCI were eliminated by GVN and allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, twenty-three were considered significant under current MACV standards. Inactivity during the Tet holidays may account for the decrease in VC/VCI incidents during February.

(b) During March the total number of VC/VCI related incidents showed no significant change from February; however, a large increase in sabotage activity was noted. Sabotage was directed primarily against the Hue-De Nang railroad in Phu Loc (D) and hamlet security forces in Phong Dien (D). A recent raider from Phong Dien (D) stated that due to heavy losses, the C113 Local Force Company has been reorganized into a group of special action units. The company has a strength of approximately forty-six personnel, organized into four special action units deployed throughout Phong Dien (D). This reorganization is consistent with the strategy outlined by COSTN Resolution 14, which states that maximum emphasis should be placed on guerrilla warfare. During the month of March a total of seventy-seven VCI cadre were eliminated by GVN and allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, twenty-two were considered significant under current MACV standards.

(c) During April the total number of VC/VCI related incidents rose sharply. Rice collection activity declined, however, there was an increase in the number of terrorist and sabotage incidents. On 24 April, 12 armed VC entered Doc Buu (H), Huong Lo (V), Huong Tra (D) and kidnapped the entire village district council (six VN Civ) and five members of the PSDF. This incident is indicative of VCI attempts to frighten and terrorize the local populace, with the desired effort of dissuading the people from participating in the GVN government. During the month of April a total of forty-four VCI cadre were eliminated by GVN and allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, twenty-one were considered significant under current MACV standards.

(d) The following table compares the VC/VCI incidents for February (left), March (center), and April (right), by district:
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AVDG-GC
SUBJKT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RG0 CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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<td>1/0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19/15/9</td>
<td>6/1/11</td>
<td>2/9/10</td>
<td>0/1/1</td>
<td>0/1/4</td>
<td>1/0/4</td>
<td>2/2/8</td>
<td>30/29/47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) During the reporting period coordination has been effected with
the Commanding Officer, 245th Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) and the
108th Artillery Group to reduce the time required to deliver fire support
in the division reconnaissance zone in response to inflight SIAR and RMI
HUAC reports. The system presently being used has the following features:

1 245th SAC aircraft performing missions in support of the division
   enter the G2 Air net when committed to the division area of operations.

2 The FSC of 108th Artillery Group at Dong Ha Combat Base monitors
   the division G2 Air net.

3 245th SAC aircraft render inflight reports of moving targets or
   RMI HUAC emissions to the G2 Air. These reports are monitored by the
   108th Artillery Group.

4 108th Artillery Group passes the fire mission to the firing battery.

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5. G2 Air passes the fire mission request to the division FSB in the DTOC. The FSB obtains artillery clearance and passes it to the 108th Artillery Group.

6. The 108th Artillery Group passes artillery clearance to the firing battery and the target is engaged.

(b) The 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company has provided one additional sortie per day for a total of twelve sorties to the division daily. This sortie has been allocated to the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section of the 101st II Company. This additional sortie enables the II Section to perform visual reconnaissance and hand-held photographic missions into high risk areas, releasing divisional aircraft to support other areas. This added capability has greatly enhanced the ability of the division to perform reconnaissance of major infiltration routes and to obtain timely photographic coverage of transitory targets. Moreover, the aircraft which perform these missions have acted as strike coordinators when gun ships, ARA, and tactical air support have been employed against such targets as anti-aircraft installations and truck parks.

(4) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations.

(a) The G2 Ground Surveillance Section established secure voice radio communications with sensor readout aircraft beginning in February 1970. This secure net is used to pass significant sensor information and has improved target analysis and response to the information.

(b) The sensor monitor site at Camp Sally was closed on 15 February 1970. Strings which had been previously monitored from that site were passed to the control of the monitor site at Camp Evans. A new monitor site was established on a barge in the Dam Lap An Bay between FSB Los Banos (AT831999) and Lang Co Bridge (AT866956) on 15 February 1970. This floating monitor site was organized with six sensor personnel equipped with three portables, a NOD, a FFT-5 radar with operators, and a security force with two 50 caliber machineguns. The site monitored 10 strings consisting of 33 minisides and 15 adsids located along the Hue-DaNang Railroad and approaches to the railroad track. This operation was established in an effort to deter the enemy from interdicting the track which has been a consistent target in the past. The raft sank during a heavy storm on 2 April 1970 and all equipment aboard sank in the bay. When the equipment was recovered on 3 April it was found that all three portables were still operational and the monitor site was reestablished at Lang Co Bridge. The track in the target area was not interdicted during the period that the sensors were in operation.

(c) A plan was developed during the reporting period to saturate
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Pre-selected target areas with acoustic sensors in such a manner as to better define enemy locations, monitor traffic into and out of an area and to determine routes of ingress once the target was engaged. Six strings consisting of 26 acoustic bouys and 6 spikebouys were air delivered on 1 April 1970 in a target area vicinity FSB Airborne (YD355072). Six strings consisting of 26 acoustic bouys and 2 spikebouys were air delivered on 14 April in another target area vicinity FSB Bradley (YD278122). To date, heavy vehicular traffic has been detected in both target areas. Artillery response to these detections resulted in numerous secondary explosions.

(d) During the reporting period, the number of operational RF sensor strings in the division area of operations increased from 47 to a new high of 76. FSB sets on hand in the division increased from 90 to 105 and operational USD/W-1 increased from 29 to 42.

(5) Counterintelligence Section.

(a) The CI Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) from enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion. IG and CI inspections of unit personnel, document and physical security programs were conducted to detect and eliminate security violations and vulnerable areas subject to enemy exploitation.

(b) Personnel security investigations and complaint investigations were conducted to insure the validity of security clearances within the division. Clearances for 828 replacements were validated, 359 SECRET clearances were granted, local files checks for 2296 personnel were conducted, and the intelligence records check of 354 individuals were forwarded to higher headquarters by the Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) Section.

(c) In order to reduce the threat of VC agents gaining access to 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) base camps, the CI Section maintains current biographical data on all local nationals and third-country nationals working on Allied installations. All local national permanent hire personnel on Camp Eagle now have a security clearance or an interim clearance awaiting final determination. Close liaison is maintained with the Industrial Relations Division, Phu Bai, to insure that local nationals go through the CI Section before obtaining acceptance for employment.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section. The G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section continued to monitor and record the enemy situation throughout Northern I Corps with increased emphasis being placed on disseminating collected intelligence. The Order of Battle Handbook was published in
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RO 350065 (R2) (3)

February 1970 highlighting many months of research and analysis on enemy forces opposing Allied units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The Order of Battle Handbook was updated periodically to remain current with the changing situation.

(7) Interrogation Section.

(a) During the reporting period, the Interrogation Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company processed seven prisoners of war (2 VC and 5 NVA) and two Ho Chi Minh (1 VC and 1 NVA) from the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). A number of prisoners of war and Ho Chi Minh captured by AMN were also interrogated.

(b) During the reporting period, 120 batches of captured enemy documents were exploited by the Interrogation Section.

(8) Weather. The Air Force Combat Weather Team, 5th Weather Squadron, continued to provide meteorological support for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The weather team provides climatological information, weather forecasts, weather warnings, special forecasts for individual flights by army aviators, current weather reports for field commanders, weather summaries used in the evaluation of past operations, and daily weather advice and interpretation for the commanding general and his staff to assist in decisions concerning planned weather sensitive operations.

(a) February 1970.

1. The weather during February was typical of the last full month of the northeast monsoon. Rainfall occurred on more days than the average. However, the total rainfall for the month was below the mean. Precipitation was measured on 12 days during February, with another 2 days experiencing a trace of rainfall. The total rainfall for the month was just under 1½ inches. The ceilings and visibilities were typical for February. Ceilings and/or visibilities below 1500 feet and 3 miles occurred on 18 days. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities less than ½ mile were reported on 8 days. Fog formed almost every day during February. The average high temperature was 76°F and the average low 64°F.

2. The impact of the monsoon rainfall during February reduced the air mobile capability of the division. Aerial reconnaissance in the division reconnaissance zone was occasionally restricted by weather. Air Force tactical air support had to be cancelled on six days in February.

(b) March 1970.

1. During March the total rainfall was far below the average. However, precipitation fell on more days than the mean. The total rainfall measured
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, ROC GSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

was 1.6 inches and occurred on 11 days with a trace of rain recorded on another 5 days. There was one thunderstorm reported, however, no rainfall was observed. Cloudiness and visibility restrictions occurred on more days than normal. Ceilings below 1500 feet and/or visibilities less than 3 miles were observed on 24 days this month. Ceilings below 500 feet and/or visibilities less than 1/2 mile were observed on 4 days. Fog formed on 14 days. Temperatures were very close to the March mean. The average high temperature was 79°F and the average low temperature was 65°F.

2 The effects of the weather during March greatly hampered airborne operations. Air Force tactical air support was cancelled on 18 days. In general there were only 9 days when planned operations were not restricted and they occurred during the first half of the month. The most significant weather problem was the postponement of combined US/AWV operations near FSB Ripcord from 17 through 25 March.

(c) April 1970.

1 During April the total rainfall was approximately equal to the mean value of 2.1 inches. However, due to the changeover from a steady rain pattern to a showery one, some areas received more than twice the mean. The total rainfall was 2.29 inches and it occurred on 13 days which is twice the normal frequency. Thunderstorms were reported on three days along the coastal plains, however, thunderstorm activity occurred on 22 days over the mountainous areas. Cloudiness and visibility restrictions occurred on more days than normal. Ceilings below 1500 feet and/or visibilities less than 3 miles were observed on 13 days. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities less than 1/2 mile were reported on 6 days. Fog formed on 15 days. The average high temperature was 87°F and the average low temperature was 72°F, which are the expected mean values.

2 The weather during April reflected the last of the monsoon season restrictions on airborne operations. Beginning with the first four days of the month, Air Force tactical air support and visual reconnaissance flights were cancelled. The only other period of restrictive weather occurred between 12 and 16 April. Visual reconnaissance flights were cancelled on 8 days in April.

(d) Precipitation Data (Inches).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAX</th>
<th>AVG</th>
<th>MIN</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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a. (U) Personnel.

(1) Chaplain. During the reporting period the division moved from fifth to first place among Army divisions in Vietnam in religious services held and attendance at these services. The two factors having the most significant impact on this achievement were the realignment of Catholic chaplain resources to employ a modified area concept coverage, and availability of transportation for chaplains to take services to the men. A special Easter Sunday service at Camp Eagle was attended by over 8,400 soldiers from the division and other units throughout northern I Corps Tactical Zone.

(2) Personnel management. A program was initiated to reduce rotational humps in units so that no battalion size unit would lose more than ten percent of its strength during any one month. The program has been completed through the month of August.

(3) Medical.

(a) During the reporting period, two significant epidemiological investigations were performed. On 1 March 1970, two eleven week old puppies, mascots of Troop B, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, were diagnosed as having rabies. Subsequent investigation revealed that 108 individuals had sufficient contact to warrant treatment with the 14 day series of duck embryo vaccine. No rabies cases were reported and logs under three months old were banned from division installations.

(b) The second epidemiological investigation involved an outbreak of hepatitis in Company B, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry in mid-February. Investigation revealed that the probable source of infection was a surface stream which the men of the unit used for drinking water without utilizing the iodine purification procedure. Continued emphasis in field sanitation and hygiene practices is expected to preclude recurrence of this type incident.

(4) Military Police.

(a) In March, a soldier with a degree in chemistry was assigned to the military police company. This individual was then trained in marijuana analysis at the USAWC Crime Laboratory, Long Binh. Arrangements were made for utilization of the 9th Medical Laboratory facilities, 85th Evacuation Hospital, Phu Bai to process marijuana evidence, greatly facilitating the completion of marijuana investigations. Processing time was reduced from approximately five weeks to one week.

(b) With the move of the 2d Brigade from Camp Sally to Phu Bai Combat Base, the 2d Platoon of the 101st Military Police Company was relieved of
its direct support role of the brigade and placed in general support of Phu Bai Combat Base on 22 March. Joint police operations were established with the 504th MP Battalion which resulted in improved military police coverage for the base.

(5) Finance. On 15 April, a retroactive pay raise was ordered accruing four months pay for servicemen. This requirement resulted in a supplemental payroll for April. The division finance office processed and prepared the supplemental payroll prior to the end of the month.

(6) Changes in command and staff. During the reporting period the following changes in command and staff assignments occurred:

ACofS, G2  LCO L.W. Bindrup  succeeded Maj Zierdt on 10 Apr
ACofS, G4  LCO D.R. Pinney  succeeded LTC Pickett on 1 Mar
ACofS, G5  Maj E.B. Porter  succeeded LTC Dasing on 6 Mar
IG  LCO J.E. Hartling  succeeded LTC Trappeyer on 1 Apr
1/327 Inf  LCO D.A. Toder  succeeded LTC Brophy on 1 Mar
2/327 Inf  LCO R.J. Pickett  succeeded LTC Fischer on 1 Mar
2/507 Inf  LCO O.W. Livingston  succeeded LTC Brashears on 18 Apr
1/506 Inf  LCO H.G. Holt  succeeded LTC Pinney on 2 Mar
2/506 Inf  LCO A.C. Lucas  succeeded LTC Crowell on 4 Mar
2/319 Arty  LCO W.H. Walker  succeeded LTC Hammond on 25 Apr
1/321 Arty  LCO A.A. Ely  succeeded LTC Basanes on 7 Feb
2/17 Cav  LCO B.F. Molinelli  succeeded LTC Bindrup on 24 Mar

f. (c) Logistics.

(1) General. Logistical support for Operation RANDOLPH GLEN and Operation TEXAS STAR was provided through the Division Support Command (DISCOM) Forward Service Support Element (FSSE) using the area support concept. DISCOM elements forward to the FSSE provided direct support for the three brigades in all classes of supply, medical service, and maintenance of COMZL, ammunition, and administrative equipment. At Camp Eagle, direct support maintenance and repair parts supply, to include ordnance and aircraft armament, was provided for division aircraft. DISCOM continued to operate two forward aircraft refueling points at FSB Roy and FSB Birmingham, and a forward aircraft refueling point at Quang Tri.
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SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Air-mobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCUS CPKG-65 (62) (U)

(a) The 2d Brigade with maneuver units and attached support units
relocated from Camp Sally to Phu Bai Combat Base during the first half of
March. The relocation was phased to provide continuous administrative,
logistical and communications support to the brigade. The 2d FBSC re-
located in two phases, completing the move on 15 March. DISCON Mov-
ements Control Center (MCC) coordinated ground transportation with the
39th Transportation Battalion to provide vehicle support for the duration
of the move.

(b) The JFR Airdrop Test Program, initiated in the last reporting
period, was continued into this period. Improved techniques in rigging
and search and recovery have been developed. Procedures for requesting,
processing and coordinating requests are being refined and criteria for
the selection of drop zones also improved.

(c) Super contact teams continued to provide personnel and equipment
maintenance services to units returning from operations for stand-down.
The number of company size units supported were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMPLETE TEAM</th>
<th>PARTIAL TEAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bds:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-527</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-527</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bds:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-501</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-502</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-501</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bds:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-506</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-506</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-187</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Supply.

(a) The trend in total tonnage of class I supplies moved upward during
the period as demand for ice, which is the most prominent single item in
considering class I tonnage, increased due to the onset of warm weather.
Class I tonnage during the period was 2596 in February; 3160 in March; and
3328 in April.

(b) The current six hundred item authorized stockage list for class II
items permits intensive management of a small number of items but does not
permit a high demand accommodation rate. The demand satisfaction average declined in March and April because of a reduction in supply response by supporting depots in the form of extended order ship time. Increased emphasis placed on expeditious shipment of critical, high demand items is expected to relieve this situation. The average authorized stockage list zero balance for the month of March increased because of the failure of supporting depots to meet required delivery dates. The following are percentages for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accommodation</th>
<th>Satisfaction</th>
<th>Zero Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) An upward trend in total tonnage for class III was experienced during the period and is directly related to increased flying hours in support of operations. Class III tonnage during the period was 8710 in February; 9201 in March; and 9193 in April.

(d) Class IV tonnage during the period was 214 in February, 273 in March; and 220 in April.

(e) Class V tonnage in February reflected increased fires in support of the pre-Tet preparation period, and an April high reflected issues in support of increased offensive operations. Class V tonnage during the period was 4650 in February; 4347 in March; and 5675 in April.

(3) Maintenance.

(a) Automotive operational readiness (OR) showed steady improvement throughout the period as the OR increased from 94.1 at the beginning of the period to 95.5 at the end of the period. The favorable trend was achieved through continued command emphasis, improvement in prescribed load list performance, roadside spot check inspections, and technical assistance visits.

(b) Armament operational readiness increased throughout the period and recorded a record high of 99.83 at the end of the period.

(c) Electronics operational readiness increased from 95.9 to 97.2 during the period primarily as a result of more rapid repair in support maintenance and COMUS facilities. High priority handling of ground surveillance radars from the operator to the maintenance unit resulted in an increased OR for FPS4 and PP85 radars.
(d) Aircraft availability remained relatively stable during the period at 82 to 83%. This high availability rate was maintained in spite of an increasing combat damage rate from 3% in January to 6.4% for April. This accomplishment was made possible by superior supply systems, maximum effort by all aircraft maintenance units, and command emphasis at all levels.

g. (U) Civil Affairs.

(1) Pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province continued at an accelerated rate during this reporting period. Territorial security, achieved through combined US and GVN tactical operations and local security measures, provided a safe environment in which long range, high impact projects were generated in all ten rural districts of Thua Thien Province, and the three urban districts of Hue City. All pacification and development efforts during this period were directed toward the achievement of the national objectives outlined in the Thua Thien Province Pacification and Development Plan, 1970. As a part of the overall effort, the division continued to improve its civic action program. The number of projects in progress at the beginning of this reporting period was 126. At the end of this period, there were 136 in progress. Eighty nine projects from the Province Civic Action Priority List were completed. This priority list, developed in the hamlets, villages and districts, and consolidated and approved at province level serves as the guideline for selection of new projects.

(2) Under the national objective of "Brighter Life for War Victims," the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan listed the goals of resettling 11,848 war victims and identifying war victims who have not previously been identified. The term "War Victim" classifies two types of individuals; refugees and war victims requiring resettlement. Refugees are those individuals who have not received the full measure of relief benefits as authorized by the Ministry of Social Welfare. War victims requiring resettlement are those individuals who have received temporary relief payments, resettlement payments, homecoming allowance, and enjoy the development projects at temporary camps. Individuals in this category are no longer carried as refugees even though they require resettlement at some future date. Using these definitions, no new refugees were generated in Thua Thien Province during this reporting period and the refugee population was reduced from 13,374 to 9,068. These refugees are located in the following hamlets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Hamlet</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>No Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nam Hoa</td>
<td>Cu Chanh</td>
<td>YD756169</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Thuy</td>
<td>Phu Nam</td>
<td>YD855160</td>
<td>2,981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the reduction in refugee population, 7,331 persons of 1,447 families were resettled during this reporting period. Advanced planning at province and district level for the continuing resettlement in Phong Dien, Hoang Dien and Quang Dien districts, and planned future resettlement in other districts indicated that the year end goal will be exceeded. Province headquarters approved 27 civic action projects for five resettlement hamlets in northeast Phong Dien, two resettlement hamlets along the coast of Hoang Dien, and eight resettlement hamlets along the Street Without Joy in Quang Dien district. These projects include six wells, three markets, three health stations, and 15 schoolrooms. An estimated 14,000 persons in the 15 hamlets will benefit from the projects. Coordination for the projects was performed by the Province Pacification and Development Office. Thu Thien Province will furnish cement, roofing, paint, and transportation. Territorial force units (BP, PP and PMSD) will furnish labor, while the division will furnish lumber, reinforcing steel bars, and nails. These projects will be initiated during the next reporting period.

(3) Significant progress was made in the MEDCAP program during the period of this report. A total of 491 MEDCAPs were held; 27,188 medical and dental patients were examined; 896 immunizations were administered; 13 Vietnamese were evacuated to hospitals for medical care; and 426 persons received health and sanitation training during the period of this report. Although medical treatment increased during this report period, the real significance of the program is that more of the actual treatment was administered by the Vietnamese, thus freeing US medical personnel to become involved with the training of Vietnamese medical personnel and health workers.

(4) Improvements and repairs to roads and bridges throughout the province during the period of this report materially assisted the resettlement process and the resumption of trade and commerce. While the roads and bridges were built for tactical purposes, the effort enriched the pacification effort immeasurably. Of particular significance was the completion of 21 kilometers of road in the southern area of Phu Thu district and 12 kilometers of road in northern Phong Dien and Quang Dien districts. The Phu Thu road permitted formerly waterbound inhabitants to
use the completed road as a farm to market route, further strengthening the economy. The resettlement of the northern areas of Phong Dien and Quang Dien is directly attributed to the roadwork in those areas.

(5) The territorial security provided by US and SVN forces during this period enabled local administrations to strengthen and expand the influence of the government of Vietnam throughout Thua Thien Province. All 85 villages in Thua Thien Province have elected officials, with none in exile. Of the 400 hamlets recognized by the central government in Saigon, only 12 have appointed rather than elected officials, with none in exile. Thirty-three villages held elections in April with 82% of the registered voters casting their ballot. Security for the elections was provided by local Vietnamese and national police forces. Eight of the 12 hamlets with appointed officials are included in the scheduled elections for May 1970.

(6) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

(a) Ba Lang school construction (TD907205), Phu Thu.
(b) Vinh Thai Village office repair (TD947163), Phu Thu.
(c) Tan Bao school repair (TD920186), Phu Thu.
(d) Vinh Trinh school construction (TD945195), Phu Thu.
(e) Uu Dien school repair (TD465434), Phong Dien.
(f) Trach Pho school repair (TD486425), Phong Dien.
(g) Uu Thuang school repair (TD505365), Phong Dien.
(h) My Xa school construction (TD722312), Quang Dien.
(i) Quang Dien bridge repair (TD597398), Quang Dien.
(j) Vinh Loc police station construction (3) (TD032122), Vinh Loc.
(k) Huong Dien well construction (23) (TD653426), Huong Dien.
(l) Thanh Thuy Chanh health station repair (TD824217), Huong Thuy.
(m) Boy Scout camporee site (TD753193), Huong Thuy.
(n) Loc Thuy school construction (TD146998), Phu Loc.
(o) Loc Tu dispensary repair (TD205010), Phu Loc.
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Due to a school repair (YD726240), Huong Tra.

Tri Le school repair (YD735277), Huong Tra.

Thanh Duong school construction (YD941246), Phu Vang.

Phuong Dien school construction (YD942248), Phu Vang.

Di an Loc school construction (YD949243), Phu Vang.

Phu Mau school construction (YD765273), Phu Vang.

Phu Tan school construction (YD814308), Phu Vang.

Phu Vang police station construction (11) (YD732270), Phu Vang.

Vinh Ve bridge repair (YD806247), Phu Vang.

Huе Boy Scout Center (YD759228), Huе I.

Other projects completed during the reporting period included 23 schools, 39 wells, 6 dispensaries, 1 market, 2 village headquarters, 14 police stations, 2 bridges, and 2 Boy Scout projects.

Current projects include 15 schools, 4 administrative buildings, 13 dispensaries, 6 markets, 6 police stations, 78 wells, and 14 other projects. One of the current projects in the "other" category is the upgrading of the capabilities of the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistics Center (SM & DSLC) to enable the center to provide better maintenance and logistical support to RF, FF, PSDF, and ED cadre in Thua Thien Province. Detailed plans were developed by the division support commander, assisted by the division engineer, for the relocation of the SM & DSLC to a more suitable location. The plans also involved the upgrading of operational activities, with assistance being provided by appropriate elements of DISCOM.

Commodities issued during the reporting period:

- Food: 39,200 lbs
- Clothing: 1,480 lbs
- Soap: 1,530 lbs
- Ammo Boxes: 14,357 boxes
- Paint: 34 gallons
School Kits & 1,200 kits 
School Desks and Benches & 109 desks and benches 
Trade Kits & 26 kits 
Cement & 4,253 bags 
Reinforcing Steel Bar & 11,023 linear feet 
Tin & 1,251 sheets 
Scrapwood & 11,000 lbs 
Sand and Rock & 270 cubic meters 
Construction Lumber & 25,799 board feet 
Electrical Wire & 2,500 linear feet 
Water Pipe, random size & 2,020 linear feet 

The majority of these commodities were salvaged items. Sources for the materials included the sanitary fill for scrap lumber, firebase for ammunition boxes, and construction units for salvaged building materials and hydrated cement. The CA/PSTYAR fund was also used to purchase needed items on the local economy. While the majority of the commodities were delivered by vehicle, helicopters were used for deliveries to areas inaccessible by other means.

h. (U) Psychological Operations.

(1) Statistics. Type and quantity of propaganda media employed:

(a) Leaflets disseminated: 150,809,000
(b) Loudspeaker broadcasts: 1,555 hours
(c) Movies shown: 258.5 hours
(d) Quick reaction leaflets: 455,000
(e) PSTOP mobile teams: 10 missions
(f) PSTOP Campaign, Tet 1970.
(a) The 1970 Tet Campaign was conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in coordination and cooperation with other PSYOP agencies and activities in this area. The overall campaign was coordinated by a combined PSYOP advisory council composed of the following representatives: the assistant province advisor, PSTOP; the Chieu hoi/armed propaganda team advisor; the G5, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and his US advisor; the PSTOP officer, XXIV Corps; and the PSTOP officer, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Areas of interest included:

1 Coverage of targets in the jungle canopy and mountainous areas southeast of Qui. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) agreed to cover these areas.

2 PSYOP coverage of the piedmont area, which the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) agreed to accomplish.

3 Target audiences located within the populated areas along the coastal lowlands. Elements of the regional forces, popular forces, people's self defense forces, and revolutionary development cadre groups were employed by Thua Thien Sector to cover these areas. Additionally, the assistant province advisor, PSTOP, was tasked to disseminate to hamlet level all Tet material supplied by JUSPAO.

(b) The division PSYOP intelligence analyst, in coordination with the order of battle section, G2, initiated a detailed target area study. A total of 54 known and suspected enemy locations were ultimately designated as PSYOP target areas for the 1970 Tet Campaign. Each brigade was tasked to cover targets in its AO, and the division PSYOP section covered targets located in the division reconnaissance zone. Brigade targets were grouped on the division target list in a manner that insured brigade coverage of from three to five targets daily. The 9th Special Operations Squadron (9th SOS) continued its general support of the division during the 1970 Tet Campaign. Targets not covered by the brigades on any given day were assigned to the 9th SOS for coverage.

(c) The 1970 Tet Campaign began on 15 January, using standard leaflets on hand. On 20 January, the division began delivering special Tet leaflets procured through the 7th PSYOP Battalion. The Tet Campaign was terminated on 10 February 1970.

(3) The division PSYOP section worked in close coordination with the assistant province advisor, PSTOP, and the Chieu Hoi Center in Hue on a campaign designated as "Operation Homecoming." This campaign was directed at 1,100 families who had VC affiliations in Thua Thien Province and was designed to encourage VC/VCI members to rally under the provisions of the chieu hoi program. During the period 2-5 February, the Chieu Hoi Center distributed gifts to these families. Pictures and statements were obtained from the families and were developed into leaflets which were air-dropped.
and hand-disseminated. The statements contained personal appeals to the VC/VCI to return home for Tet by rallying to the GVN. The Vietnamese Information Service concentrated on an active face-to-face campaign and the national police and Phoenix Committee maintained close surveillance of the designated target areas. Special wanted posters and leaflets were developed and distributed. In spite of the deliberate planning and concentrated effort expended on "Operation Homecoming" the actual outcome, measured in terms of the number of ralliers, were far below the anticipated result.

(4) The Voluntary Informant Program (VIP) was supported by all PSYOP agencies in the province. Aerial loudspeaker support, leaflet drops, distribution of ground posters, ground loudspeaker missions, and word of mouth dissemination of the VIP were combined into an extensive campaign to publicize the program. A special effort was made to inform children of the program since it was found that information relating to the program and its associated rewards was spread rapidly by young people. A large number of weapons and munitions were turned in to friendly forces by children.

(5) On three occasions during the period, the quick reaction aerial broadcast in response to specific situations proved to be productive. Following three aerial broadcasts made by recent ralliers, three additional VC rallied to the GVN. These personal appeals combined with the low morale of VC units ultimately resulted in their decision to return to the GVN.

1. (C) Medical.

(1) The tactical deployment of companies within the 326th Medical Battalion (Airborne) places Company A in direct support of the 1st Brigade, Company B in support of the 2d Brigade and Company C supporting the 3d Brigade. Headquarters and Support Company continued to provide area medical support for division rear units located at Camp Eagle. One major movement occurred during the reporting period when the 2d Brigade moved from Camp Sally to Phu Bai Combat Base accompanied by Company B, 326th Med Bn (Amb). Company B now occupies Combat Base Area 5, Echo Station, Phu Bai Combat Base.

(2) Medical Statistical Recapitulations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>A CO</th>
<th>B CO</th>
<th>C CO</th>
<th>SPT CO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total patients seen at clearing station</td>
<td>2,969</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>1,795</td>
<td>3,175</td>
<td>9,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dental patients</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total admissions</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total transferred</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, ECS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Recapitulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A CO</th>
<th>B CO</th>
<th>C CO</th>
<th>SPT CO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IEMHA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Diseases:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUS</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin Diseases</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/P</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Problems</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat Injuries</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Evac Missions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Continued emphasis was given to reduction of surplus equipment and supplies. A new water tower was built for Support Company and water towers were installed at Company C. Battalion Headquarters alleviated a water shortage problem by replacing small water tanks with a 40,000 gallon water tower. Water storage was increased by two thirds.

(4) During the reporting period the division medical supply office (DMSO) maintained an average 93% fill. This required considerable extra effort on the part of DMSO personnel due to Company C movement to Phu Bai. For approximately three weeks all 2d Brigade units reported directly to DMSO for medical supplies resulting in approximately 200 additional requests being processed by DMSO per week. Continued emphasis was placed on preventive maintenance programs and PLL. Training of PLL clerks received command emphasis.

(5) Company MEDCAP programs continued with the medical companies supporting brigade civil affairs programs. Each physician conducted one MEDCAP each week.

(6) The air ambulance platoon continued its mission to provide aeromedical evacuation support to the 101st Abn Div (Airmobile), 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) and ARVN units in their respective areas of operation. Two UH-1H air ambulances are now stationed at Camp Evans to provide quicker response to the northern regions of the area.

J. (C) Signal.

(1) The 501st Signal Battalion (Airmobile) continued its mission to provide communications/electronics support for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). An SSB EMT station was placed in support of the 3-506th Infantry.
operating in II Corps Tactical Zone for communications between that unit and the division. Secure RATT capability was also provided when needed. Other AN SSB RATT teams continued to provide stations at the three brigades: DENGUOM and DINARY. A capability to provide stations for contingencies was maintained at all times. The battalion responded to increased requests for four channel carrier communications by installing AN/GCI123 systems at Camp Evans, Camp Sally, Phu Loc, and at 13 forward fire bases. In support of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN), a four channel shot using AN/MEC68 continued from Hie to the 3d ARVN Regimental headquarters at firebase Geronimo (TD69204). This station was reterminated at firebase Z-Bone (TD659203) when fire base Geronimo closed. One additional AN/GRC163 system was installed between Dong Ba and FOB Henderson (YD81411) for ARVN/NAVY support. Despite serious maintenance problems with the multiplexer AH/TGC70 of the AN/GRC163, the battalion maintained an overall VHF reliability of 97% during the period. The battalion continued its policy of direct exchange of equipment that could not be immediately repaired. Units were further assisted by contact teams sent to field locations for on-site repair.

(a) Forty-seven public address requests were fulfilled including support of a joint Catholic-Protestant and separate Catholic and Protestant services for approximately 8400 troops at Camp Eagle on Easter Sunday.

(b) The four division MARS stations completed 13,108 phone patches during February, March and April. A single station USAHV record was set by the division MARS station with 2,801 patches during the month of March.

(2) The 63d Signal Battalion continued its area support by providing cable, 12 channel VHF and microwave communications to the brigades, major subordinate, and higher unit headquarters. In February, the 596th Signal Company completed the AN/20028 dial exchange and deactivated the old AN/MEG9 manual Eagle switchboard.

k. (U) Engineer.

(1) During the reporting period the 326th Engineer Battalion (Amb) continued to provide direct engineer support to maneuver units as firebases were reopened, new firebases constructed, road upgrading continued, and extensive mine sweep and clearing operations were conducted. Project LINESAVER continued with a total of 84 landing zones constructed or improved. The battalion also continued to provide boats and operators in support of riverine operations.

(2) Headquarters and Headquarters Company continued to provide general support to the division during the reporting period. In addition to
providing equipment support to the line companies, HHC was tasked with several independent projects. Eagle International Heliport was rehabilitated and upgrading was completed. The ammunition resupply helipad at Phu Bai was upgraded by improving the drainage and rebuilding the helipad access road. Projects at Camp Eagle completed or in progress at the end of the period included dust palliative operations, road and motor pool rehabilitation, and opening and closing of sumps. Potable water production was provided throughout the area of operation with major purification points located at FSB Bastogne, Camp Eagle and Thua Lnu Bridge.

(3) The line engineer companies of the battalion provided direct support to the infantry brigades and furnished general support to the division as required. Major projects were firebase construction and rehabilitation.

(a) A minefield surrounding FSB Los Banos was cleared, and wire obstacles were emplaced and bunkers rebuilt to improve the defense of the firebase. Additional tactical wire was emplaced at FSB Arsenal and FSB Bastogne. Fire support bases Veghel, Pisto, Rifle, Fist, and Kathryn were reopened by A Company with major improvements in fields of fire, artillery firing pads and tactical wire emplacement. FSB Shock and FSB Falcon were constructed and opened by placing an engineer platoon in each location with infantry security. Tactical operation centers, fire direction centers, and bunkers were constructed at firebases as required. Engineer technical assistance teams were provided to assist infantry battalions in preparing one ship landing zones throughout the AO. Daily mine sweeps were conducted and demolition teams were provided as required.

(b) During the pre-Tet period, an aluminum footbridge was installed at the Truoi River Bridge site to improve surveillance and security for the highway and railroad bridges at the site. A pneumatic raft was constructed on DLM LAP AN to provide a floating sensor readout station and ground surveillance radar site for elements providing security for the Hue-Da Nang Railroad.

(c) Special combat support missions during the reporting period included providing teams to assist in the destruction or extraction of downed aircraft and to interdict enemy LOC in the A Shau Valley. Project LEBEATER support was continued by providing landing zone construction teams to expand one ship LZs to two ship LZs throughout the division area of operation.

(d) FSB Jack, Hooney, Ryfcord, and Rakkaan were reopened by B Company. Support rendered on these firebases consisted to TOC and bunker construction, clearing fields of fire, emplacing wire obstacles, improving and leveling
artillery positions, demolition and mine sweeping tasks, and opening and closing swamps. In addition, FSB Granite and FSB Gladiator were opened as new firebases.

(e) Company C reopened FSB Spear and Normandy and conducted firebase improvement projects at FSB Birmingham. At FSB T-Bone one squad provided technical assistance to ARVN units in bunker construction. A major project completed during the period was the reopening of the Street Without Joy which provided not only a tactical road in Phong Dien District but was instrumental in opening the area for resettlement.

1. (O) Army Aviation.

(1) General.

(a) Throughout the reporting period the 101st Aviation Group (Combat) (Airmobile) provided aviation support to the division and non-divisional units. In addition to providing airlift and armed aerial escort support, the group provided augmentation of the aeromedical capability of the medical battalion, air traffic control and pathfinder support, and limited battlefield surveillance and target acquisition.

(b) Aviation requirements were met on a daily basis to provide necessary support for combat operations, logistical resupply, and pacification and development efforts. One aviation company was placed in direct support of each brigade with the remaining aviation assets of the group in general support of the division. Daily logistical resupply and combat assault requirements for the brigades were normally met with ten aircraft from the DS aviation company. Additional aircraft from GS assets were provided when required.

(2) The following is statistical data for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TONS FLOWS</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
<th>ACFT RECOVERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101st Avn Bn</td>
<td>14,903</td>
<td>54,909</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158th Avn Bn</td>
<td>16,224</td>
<td>64,274</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159th Avn Bn</td>
<td>8,245</td>
<td>71,325</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163d Avn Co</td>
<td>4,795</td>
<td>8,567</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Total</td>
<td>44,167</td>
<td>199,075</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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ARDC-GG

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) The number of aircraft receiving ground fire increased by 17 from the last reporting period. Thirty-nine incidents of ground fire were reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URIE</th>
<th>AR1G</th>
<th>OR6A</th>
<th>OR47</th>
<th>OR54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Throughout the period the 101st and 158th Aviation Battalions alternated providing direct support companies to the brigades. The 159th Avn Bn (ASH) provided general support to the division to conduct air movement of artillery, troops and supplies. Diversified logistical support was provided to non-divisional units throughout ICTZ. The 161st Aviation Company (GS) provided general support to the division, performing such missions as visual reconnaissance, photography, courier, psychological operations support, airborne personnel detector, and command and control. The company provided the primary means of air transportation for the division staff.

(5) Maximum use was made of available school training quotas to increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the group. During the period, a total of 81 personnel attended 17 different schools and classes presented on technical subjects.

(6) The employment of flares munitions from group aircraft increased significantly during the reporting period. Increased accuracy and quick response to requests provided ground unit commanders with a valuable additional means to aid the accomplishment of their missions. The low altitude and slow air speed necessary to accomplish these missions did, however, increase aircraft vulnerability to enemy ground fire, partially accounting for the increase in ground fire incidents.

(7) Air traffic activities for the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Eagle Tower</th>
<th>Eagle GCA</th>
<th>Liftmaster</th>
<th>Sally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>47,396</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>11,883</td>
<td>15,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>48,220</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>10,037</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>39,821</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>8,688</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) The preparation of area studies was continued during the period to provide information to aircraft pilots and crews concerning the location of landing zones, and the location and caliber of enemy ground fire received by aircraft.

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AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airborne) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RG5 CSFOR-65 (a2) (U)

m. (U) Air Cavalry Operations. Maximum use was made of the assets
of the 2d Sdo (Amb), 17th Cav to provide aerial reconnaissance and
security throughout the division area of operation; to engage in combat
as an economy of force unit; and to provide reaction forces and downed
aircraft security forces for the division. To accomplish these missions
extensive visual reconnaissance was conducted for the infantry brigades
and in the division reconnaissance zone. Other missions included bomb
damage assessment, target acquisition for artillery raids, insertion,
extration and security of long range reconnaissance patrols, airborne
personnel detector missions (sniffer), screening of friendly units, and
convoy escort.

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Troop. The command aviation section
of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop supplied support aircraft and
administrative liaison to the four lettered troops of the squadron. During
the month of March, aviation support was provided to Company L (Ranger),
75th Infantry for insertion, extraction and security of ground reconna-
issance patrols. As a result of heavy combat damage to squadron aircraft
during the month of April, headquarters was called upon to provide addi-
tional aircraft support to the lettered troops. These missions resulted
in the seven aircraft of the command aviation section flying over 450
hours during the month.

(2) Troop A. All operational assets of Troop A were stationed at
Quang Tri. The aerial rifle platoon remained on standby at Quang Tri
throughout the period to provide immediate response to enemy ground action,
ranger patrol contacts, and downed aircraft security missions. During
the latter stages of Operation RANDELPH GLEN, Troop A provided support to
the 3d Brigade through the employment of hunter-killer teams. The teams,
composed of one AHC Cobra and one OH6A light observation helicopter,
worked in close support of company size ground elements, providing sur-
veillance to the front of the maneuver unit and security to the flanks
and rear. The teams also provided immediate response to intelligence,
and side looking airborne radar and sensor activations. The increased
enemy activity during the period and the increased reconnaissance and
security effort by the squadron resulted in extensive combat damage to
aircraft. Maintenance personnel provided maximum effort to keep the troop's
aircraft flying.

(3) Troop B. From 1-14 February the troop provided support to the 1st
Brigade. Throughout the period the aerial rifle platoon remained on standby
at Camp Angeles. Troop B provided support to the III MAF Reconnaissance
Company, Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry, and conducted airborne personnel
detector missions. The troop also conducted tactical CS drops in the divi-
sion reconnaissance zone. This employment was particularly successful in
high elephant grass and single canopy jungle areas. The E158 cannister as-
sembly provided excellent area coverage and forced the enemy into the oper

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AVOD-3C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFGR-65 (R2) (U)

(4) Troop C. The troop supported the 2d Brigade during the month of March and the 3d Brigade in April. Support was provided through employment of scout teams (two OH-6A) and hunter-killer teams. The extensive employment of scout teams reduced the flight time of the more maintenance critical AH-1G Cobra and also provided an excellent training vehicle for less experienced scout pilots. The aero-rifle platoon was employed to conduct detailed ground reconnaissance and performed bomb damage assessment following B-52 strikes. When not engaged in operations, the platoon was placed in a standby posture at Phu Bai Combat Base.

(5) Troop D. During the reporting period Troop D participated in 34 combat assaults, 12 106mm recoilless rifle raids, two cordon and search operations, two convoy security missions, and provided a ready reaction force at Camp Eagle. Night ambushes were also conducted by the troop on the Camp Eagle perimeter.

(6) Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry. Long range reconnaissance patrols were conducted by the ranger company in four major areas: the Co Tam (ID9431) and the Khe Sanh (ID8659) areas during February and March; and the Ba Long River Valley (ID0941) and Muong Khe Valley (XU7190) in April. Throughout the period Company L maintained an average of five teams deployed in the division AO daily.

(7) Troop F (Provisional) was released from control of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav on 12 March and redesignated Company A; 101st Avn Bn (AH), 101st Avn Gp (Comb) (Ambl). During the reporting period, until deactivated, Troop F provided increased reconnaissance and surveillance capability to the division by performing visual reconnaissance, airborne personnel detector, downed aircraft recovery, and ranger support missions.

n. (U) Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile) provided close and continuous fire support to maneuver units throughout the reporting period. Light howitzer battalions continued to provide direct support to the infantry brigades with the 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty (105) in direct support of the 3d Brigade; the 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty (105) in direct support of the 1st Brigade; and the 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty (105) in direct support of the 2d Brigade.

Battery D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty (105) remained attached to the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Infantry.

Providing general support to the division were the 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty (155), the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty, and Btry (Avn), 377th Arty.

Artillery with the division, in general support of XXIV Corps, was the 1st Bn (155) (SF), 39th Arty; the 1st Bn (8'175) (SF), 94th Arty; Btry D (Mi2), 1st Bn, 44th Arty; and a section of Btry C (Mi5), 65th Arty.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPGH-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Artillery fires were employed throughout the division area of operation to interdict enemy lines of communication and infiltration routes. This was accomplished through artillery raids and fires in reaction to sensor activations, radar detections, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. Extensive artillery fires were employed nightly in the "rocket belt" area on the periphery of the populated lowlands to interdict enemy movement and activity directed against population centers and key installations in the lowlands.

(3) Throughout the reporting period US and ARVN artillery units continued to jointly employ fires in support of combined operations. The division artillery aerial surveillance program continued to locate targets and adjust fire on them and to provide observation for artillery registrations.

(4) During the period a total of 73 artillery displacements of battery and battery (-) size elements were made to maintain close and continuous fire support to maneuver units.

(5) On 28 April the symbolic three millionth round was fired in support of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in the Republic of Vietnam.

(6) Information.

(1) Public Information.

(a) During the reporting period the division information office forwarded 4,733 hometown news releases to the Army Hometown News Center. A total of 271 news/feature stories and 102 photographs were released to the public and military media.

(b) Coverage was also provided for 39 distinguished visitors to the division, including Senator Peter H. Dominick, Congressman John Mahan, Jr., John J. Rhodes, and J. Irving Whaley, the Honorable Thaddeus Beal, Generals Creighton Abrams, Lewis W. Walt, and Ralph E. Haines and the Reverend Dr. Richard Halverson.

(c) Support was provided to 63 correspondents during the reporting period.

(2) Command Information.

(a) During the reporting period seven issues of the division newspaper, The Screaming Eagle, and the winter issue of the division magazine, Rendezvous With Destiny, were published.

(b) The layout and copy for the 1969 Pictorial Review was approved and sent to Tokyo for printing.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, BCS CSFUE-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Division information office implemented MACV requirement for presentation of monthly command information topics at unit level.

(d) Division Circular 360-1 was published concerning the distribution of Pacific Stars and Stripes from Da Nang to the division area utilizing organic aviation assets. The new system brings Stars and Stripes to the division area early enough to enable distribution to major units on the day of publication.
2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Sensors in a stay behind role.

(a) Observation: Sensors can be effectively employed in a stay behind role when friendly troops evacuate previously occupied LZs, night defensive positions (NDF) and fire support bases.

(b) Evaluation: Reports indicate that the enemy will forage through vacated overnight positions. Prior to the extraction of friendly units from an LZ, NDF or fire base, a combination minioid sensor with external magid detector can be implanted at the LZ or on the approaches. The minioid is placed in the "D" mode in order to guard against false or random detections. By coordinating with supporting artillery units, preplanned fires may be rapidly fired in response to sensor activations. Fires should be planned on and around the sensor device as the magid will detect only personnel within ten feet of its location.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders employ sensor equipment at previously occupied positions in a stay behind role.

(2) Translation of captured enemy documents.

(a) Observation: Due to the lack of adequately trained translators, quality control of captured document analysis is difficult.

(b) Evaluation: In early March 1970, G2, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) was included in the chain of evacuation of enemy documents captured by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The following results were noted:

1. Document analysis in the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) provided an additional check against error and omission in the local document exploitation effort.

2. Information obtained from captured documents was processed by the order of battle section by both divisions. The results of this duplicate processing were not always identical since each section has different sources for their data base information.

3. A wider range of order of battle comment was obtained and both sections were able to benefit from the exploitation and the analysis of
(c) Recommendation: That captured documents be processed by the order of battle sections of US and ARVN division/agencies concurrently so that wider interpretation can be provided.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) Employment of artillery reconnaissance by fire.

(a) Observation: The effectiveness of artillery employed in a reconnaissance by fire role has been a lesson relearned by units of this division.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy's extensive use of trail watchers, who normally escape detection until they initiate contact, has resulted in a number of casualties, particularly among pointmen. Artillery fired along routes of movement makes it difficult for trail watchers to remain in concealed positions. Additionally, the rounds fired can be used as references to assist in more rapid adjustment of fires if contact is made.

(c) Recommendation: That all units consider employing artillery in a reconnaissance by fire role.

(2) AN/MP-4A counter-mortar radar.

(a) Observation: The initial rounds of incoming rocket or mortar fire are not often detected by the AN/MP-4A radar because of the narrow search beam generated by the set.

(b) Evaluation: When the radar set is oriented in the proper direction, it will accurately determine the firing position of incoming rocket and mortar rounds. With a dedicated communication system between the radar section, ground unit command posts, and artillery fire direction centers, the radar set can be quickly reoriented in the direction of the suspected enemy position when the attack begins. The location of the enemy firing position can then be determined and accurate counter-fire delivered. It is essential that the communication system function smoothly and that all maneuver and artillery units within the range of the radar be aware of the radio frequencies and call signs of the radar team so that target information can be rapidly disseminated.

(c) Recommendation: That the capabilities of the counter-mortar radar be exploited by planning communications between the radar site and supported units in order to provide rapid and accurate exchange of information.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDL-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Employment of reaction forces.

(a) Observation: In the early morning hours of 6 April, Fire Support Base Arsenal was attacked by a well armed NVA sapper unit. The attack was repulsed with six NVA killed and two captured. Friendly casualties were four WIA.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy succeeded in breaching the perimeter of the firebase at one point but the employment of the firebase reaction force, within minutes of the initiation of the attack, halted the penetration and ejected the enemy from the position. This immediate reaction was a result of the positive identification of the reaction force, careful selection of key personnel, detailed planning, and numerous rehearsals under conditions simulating an actual attack.

(c) Recommendation: Defensive plans for all positions be frequently rehearsed under conditions simulating an attack, to include the movement of internal and external reaction/reinforcing forces.

(4) Difficulty in assembling the D5A tractor.

(a) Observation: There have been several instances of excessive delay in reassembling D5A tractors that had been disassembled for air movement to a firebase.

(b) Evaluation: When disassembled into two loads, the D5A tractor may be airlifted to firebases by a C130. Reassembly on the firebase requires an area of 20 by 75 feet of hard, level ground. Soft muddy ground and insufficient area result in difficulty in movement and assembly. During periods of wet weather or muddy soil conditions, several sheets of steel matting will facilitate assembly.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders of units accepting D5A tractors onto firebases recognize the requirements to facilitate assembly and make appropriate plans.

(5) Improved techniques of clearing mined and booby trapped areas.

(a) Observation: During recent operations two new techniques were employed in clearing mined and booby trapped areas.

(b) Evaluation: Booby trapped areas were encountered where grappling hooks were ineffective in clearing the area because of buried, close-to-the-surface bamboo detonators. Modifying the standard grappling hook by flattening it and sharpening the prongs, caused the enemies to dig in and trigger the devices. Additionally, areas subjected to mine drops were effectively neutralized by the fire. Trip wires and booby devices were destroyed by the fire and in many cases the enemy were detonated.
(c) **Recommendation:** That flattening and sharpening the prongs of grappling hooks should be considered when clearing mined and booby trapped areas. The use of flame drops should be considered early in the clearing operation.

(6) **Adjustment of 105mm CS munitions.**

(a) **Observation:** Adjustment procedures for cartridge, tactical CS, XM629 in firing table 105-AS-2, supplement 1, requires that a 200 meter bracket be established with shell high explosive, and then the adjustment continued with CS.

(b) **Evaluation:** Experience in this division has been that the requirement above results in unnecessary expenditure of CS rounds and, when fired on targets in close proximity to friendly forces, introduces the possibility of CS drifting into friendly positions.

(c) **Recommendation:** That the following procedures be established for adjustment of CS missions: Use shell high explosive in adjustment to within 100 meters of the target; use shell smoke (HC) in subsequent adjustment insuring that the smoke drifts over the target; fire one verifying high explosive round; correct final data for shell CS; and fire for effect, saturating the target area with the agent.

(7) **Employment of blocking fires.**

(a) **Observation:** The procedure of selecting several grids for employment of blocking fires is time consuming.

(b) **Evaluation:** The following procedure has been developed when employing artillery fire in a blocking role: the forward observer selects one grid behind the enemy force. The fire direction officer places a target grid over the selected coordinates and orients it perpendicular the direction of contact or enemy movement. He then selects six grids 100 meters apart, perpendicular to the direction of enemy movement. Firing data is computed using the M-18 gun direction computer (FADAC). The battery FDC then computes the corrections for each 100 meter increment by the “trig mode” and sends special corrections to each firing piece. This method has reduced reaction time as much as seventy-five percent.

(c) **Recommendation:** That the procedure discussed above be disseminated to all units.
(8) Use of yellow smoke at night.

(a) Observation: Yellow smoke is more easily identified when fired under illumination than white smoke.

(b) Evaluation: Maneuver units engaged in night airmobile operations have reported that yellow smoke is more easily identified under illumination than white smoke. This is particularly true when using smoke to mark LZs or as reference points for navigation at night.

(c) Recommendation: That artillery units use yellow smoke when smoke is being used for marking rounds under illumination.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (U) Training.

(1) Use of demonstrators in territorial force training.

(a) Observation: According to Vietnamese custom, older men are revered and the younger man are accustomed to seeking their advice. The reverse is not true.

(b) Evaluation: In a training situation where a young man is used as a demonstrator or is selected for a leadership position during practical exercises, the older Vietnamese are reluctant to ask questions of them. In some cases this has resulted in portions of the training not being completely understood.

(c) Recommendation: That local customs be researched and applied in territorial force training, such as using older Vietnamese as demonstrators or for leading practical work.

(2) Competition in territorial force training.

(a) Observation: The Vietnamese enjoy competition and the attention that comes with success in a competitive situation. They become more alert and attentive because of their desire to win and gain recognition.

(b) Evaluation: Territorial force training presents numerous opportunities for competition among the Vietnamese, e.g., the cleanest weapon or the fastest assembly or disassembly of weapons. Small rewards for success are helpful but not always necessary, as long as the success is recognised and commended.
(c) Recommendation: As much competition as possible should be integrated into territorial force training programs.

f. (U) Logistics, None.

g. (C) Communication:

(1) Communications contact teams.

(a) Observation: The rapid turnover of communications personnel and increased distances between units has caused a decreased reliability in communications.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel arriving in the division through replacement channels do not have the experience or training to keep communications equipment operating at peak efficiency. A technically qualified team from the division signal battalion has visited units to provide assistance and training in the employment and maintenance of communications equipment. The result has been an increased operational capability.

(c) Recommendation: That division signal facilities and personnel be employed to assist subordinate units to maintain a high degree of proficiency in communications operations.

(2) Maximum VHF equipment in the field.

(a) Observation: Employing a maximum amount of four channel VHF equipment in the field has increased communication capabilities within the division.

(b) Evaluation: The systems are normally employed to provide VHF communications from brigade to battalion command posts located at forward fire support bases. Maintaining as much VHF communications equipment as possible in field operations provides the supported unit with the capability to pass large amounts of voice traffic and insures that operators become experienced in installation and operation of the equipment. Communications personnel and equipment move with infantry battalions between firebases and gain invaluable experience in rapid deactivation and installation under combat conditions.

(c) Recommendation: That signal units employ as much signal equipment in the field as possible in order to fully exploit the capability of communications equipment.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) FM VHF communications.

(a) Observation: VHF communications using the AN/GRC-163 is not limited to line of sight.

(b) Evaluation: Many systems not having line of sight between two terminals have been established without a relay. This represents a savings in the personnel and equipment which would be required to establish a relay site. The log periodic antenna, a component part of the AN/GRC-163, is the primary contributing factor for this capability.

(c) Recommendation: That signal personnel continue to attempt communications which do not profile, maintain site records of the results for future operations and inform higher headquarters of the capabilities of this equipment.

h. (U) Materiel. None.

1. (U) Other.

(1) Psychological operations.

(a) Observation: When the Viet Cong make an incursion into the populated areas, their influence has a detrimental psychological impact on the people.

(b) Evaluation: A broadcast message designed to counter this impact is much more effective when it is made by a local official. Such a broadcast also helps to improve the communication between Vietnamese leaders and their people.

(c) Recommendation: Whenever psychological operations efforts are required to counter VC influence, local officials should be encouraged to make the primary effort.

(2) Distribution of leaflets.

(a) Observation: Airdrop of leaflets is not always the most effective method of distributing information to the people in the populated lowlands. Air drops will often miss the target or result in uneven distribution. Experience in this area has been that people lose interest when an excessive number of leaflets are dropped.

(b) Evaluation: Hand distribution of leaflets results in personal contact and demonstrates a personal interest in the people's welfare. The method insures even distribution into the hands of the people.
Recommendation: That distribution of leaflets be made by hand and that air drops take place only when hand distribution is not practical.

3. Civic action priority list.

(a) Observation: Civic action projects should be initiated only from an approved project list which has been carefully developed beginning at the village/banlat level, processed through the district chief, and forwarded to the US sub-zone coordinator as a request for military civic action.

(b) Evaluation: After seven months of use by this division, the civic action priority list has proven to be an excellent tool for the management of civic action projects. In contrast to the characteristic "shotgun method" for selecting civic action projects, the priority list serves to prevent duplication of effort and provides a basis for the careful allocation of resources. It facilitates proper distribution of needed materials and reduces the flow of construction materials onto the black market. The list permits a great volume of work to be accomplished and the prestige of hamlet/village, district, and province officials is increased by insisting that the desires and needs of the people are considered and that the efforts are directed through GVN channels.

(c) Recommendation: That organizations involved in military civic action coordinate their efforts through established GVN political and administrative channels, establish a civic action priority list, and support only those projects that are approved and entered on the list.

4. Civic action accountability and follow-up.

(a) Observation: Civic action teams should require accountability of materials and conduct follow-up visits to insure reasonable progress is being made on supported projects.

(b) Evaluation: Because most US civic action materials and commodities are salvaged, unaccountable items, a portion of the material provided in support of a civic action project is sometimes diverted by local nationals and not used on the intended project. Considering the conditions that exist in a country at war, especially in the orient, the wholesale distribution of unaccountable materials invites misuse and diversion of civic action commodities unless some form of control is imposed upon the recipient. In this division, a bilingual, locally printed receipt form is used to account for all material furnished in support of a project. Further, only a portion of the total material required is furnished at one time. The village/banlat chief acknowledges by signature his receipt of the materials and the S5 retains the receipt. The S5 monitors the manner in which materials are being used, project progress, and requirements for additional material through frequent follow-up visits.
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AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS GSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: That civic action teams use a receipt system and conduct frequent follow-up visits to projects to insure proper utilization and accountability of materials.
AVII-OCT (17 May 1970) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Report - Lessons Learned
101st Arm Div (ARML)

DA, Eq, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Commanding General, USAW, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The ORLL for 101st Arm Div (ARML) has been reviewed by this headquarters in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (U) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning sensors in a stay behind role, page 46, paragraph 2, b, (1); concur. However, based on the given circumstances the "c" mode may prove most effective and should not be completely ruled out.

b. Reference item concerning translation of captured enemy documents, page 46, paragraph 2, b, (2); concur. However, safeguards must be included in the system to insure documents are still forwarded to higher headquarters in the required time frame for translation and dissemination to the entire intelligence community.

c. Reference item concerning employment of blocking fires, page 49, paragraph 2, c, (7); concur. This method of computing firing data for blocking fires is satisfactory when the terrain and likely enemy escape routes make a standard distribution of fires appropriate. Separate target locations should be selected when irregular distribution of fires would be more effective.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

PAUL V. IRAXLER
CPT
ASSI AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Sensors in a Stay Behind Role", page 46, paragraph 2b(1): concur. Sensors, though they will not keep the enemy out of the area, can be economically used to monitor the area and provide information of enemy activity. In addition to being used as a basis for immediate reaction in the way of preplanned fires, these sensors can be monitored to obtain information on the volume and direction of enemy movement in and around the area, and to provide the basis for planning countering actions at the most propitious time. Item will be considered for inclusion in next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   b. Reference item concerning "Translation of Captured Enemy Documents", page 46, paragraph 2b(2): concur. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   c. Reference item concerning "Difficulty in Assembling the D5A Tractor", page 48, paragraph c(4): concur. Appropriate liaison and coordination with Fire Support Bases Commanders on the requirements for assembling D5A tractors should help alleviate the problem. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   d. Reference item concerning "Adjustment of 105mm CS munitions", page 49, paragraph 2e(6): concur. The current 105-AS-2 Supplement for the XM629 CS cartridge requires a 200 meter bracket be achieved with HE, then further adjustment continued with CS. The firing of shell smoke to verify the drift pattern appears sound. Because the CS and HE cartridges are not a ballistic match it is essential to troop safety that appropriate corrections are applied when changing from HE to CS. Adjustment procedure should be submitted to the US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma for evaluation. Action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "Maximum VHF Equipment in the Field", page 51, paragraph 2g(2)(c): concur. Commanders should be briefed on the problems that may evolve when division signal VHF Radio relay assets are utilized to provide brigade to battalion communications, and equipment controlled by an external source must be relied upon to provide division to brigade level communications. Unit has been so advised.

f. Reference item concerning "Distribution of leaflets", page 52, paragraph i(2): concur. Face-to-face communication has always been considered the most appealing to the target audience and one that is very effective in this type of conflict. Other media can effectively support face-to-face communications, such as hand distribution of leaflets. Policies and guidance are contained in DA Field Manual 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. Unit has been so advised.

g. Reference item concerning "Civic Action Priority List", page 53, paragraph i(3): concur. This recommendation is in keeping with guidance contained in USARV Regulation 515-1 on coordination of civic action projects with GVN. A civic action project list is presently maintained at each province senior advisor's office. Utilization of this list insures the required coordination has been made with all GVN agencies and advisors. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy Furn:
XXIV Corps
101st Abn Div (AM)
GPOF DT (17 May 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RG 3207 (R2) (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

2. Recommend that the adjustment of 105mm CS munitions, paragraph 2c(6),
page 49, be brought to the attention of CONARC and the US Army Artillery
School for evaluation.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGG
Asst AG
1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambi)

HHC, 1st Bde
1st Bn (Ambi), 327th Inf
2d Bn (Ambi), 327th Inf
2d Bn (Ambi), 502d Inf
42d Inf Pt (Sct Dog)

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambi)

HHC, 2d Bde
1st Bn (Ambi), 501st Inf
2d Bn (Ambi), 501st Inf
1st Bn (Ambi), 502d Inf
47th Inf Pt (Sct Dog)
25th Pub Info Det (Fld Svc)

3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambi)

HHC, 3d Bde
3d Bn (Ambi), 187th Inf
1st Bn (Ambi), 506th Inf
2d Bn (Ambi), 506th Inf
58th Inf Pt (Sct Dog)
34th Pub Info Det (Fld Svc)

101st Abn Div Arty (Ambi)

HHC, 101st Abn Div Arty (Ambi)
2d Bn (Ambi), 319th Arty
2d Bn (Ambi), 320th Arty
1st Bn (Ambi), 321st Arty
2d Bn (Ambi), 11th Arty
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambi)
268th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
331st Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
388th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
Btry A (Arty), 377th Arty (Ambi)
650th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)

101st Aviation Group (Cbt) (Ambi)

HHC, 101st Avn Grp (Cbt) (Ambi)
101st Avn Bn (Aeft Hel) (Ambi)
499th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
510th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
516th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
527th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
158th Avn Bn (Aeft Hel) (Ambi)
159th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
168th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
273d Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
1694th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
159th Avn Bn (Aeft Opt Hel) (Ambi)
478th Avn Co (Hv Hel)
625th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
327th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
649th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
382d Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
163d Avn Co (GS) (Ambi)
530th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
359th Avn Det (Div)

Division Support Command

HHC and Band
5th Trans Bn (Aeft Maint and Sup) (Ambi)
326th Med Bn (Ambi)
426th S& S Bn (Ambi)
801st Maint Bn (Ambi)
101st Admin Co (Ambi)

Division Troops

HHC, 101st Abn Div (Ambi)
2d Sqdn (Ambi), 17th Cav
Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf
332d Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
333d Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
507th Trans Det (Aeft Maint)
326th Engr Bn (Ambi)
501st Sig Bn (Ambi)
101st MP Co (Ambi)
557th Inf Pt (Cbt Tracker)
265th Edo Rech Co
10th Cal Pt (DS)
20th Cal Det (CBR Cen)
22d Mil Hist Det
101st MI Co (Ambi)
Operating Location 6
5th Weather Det (USA)
20th TASS (USA)

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13 May 1970

CC, 101st Airborne Division

Conduct of United States forces and elements of I Corps involved in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70.

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