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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (22 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 702182 31 July 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Advisory Group, Korea, Period Ending 30 April 1970

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY ADVISORY GROUP, KOREA
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96302

EAAKCFD
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Advisory Group, Korea, for period ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR (R2) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
Eighth United States Army
APO 96301

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310


a. (U) Command

Mission. The general mission of the United States Army Advisory Group, Korea (KMAG), is to advise and assist the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) on combat operations, organization, tactical and technical training, intelligence, administration, and logistical matters in support of Eighth U. S. Army (EUSA) operations. Additionally, KMAG, within capabilities, verifies proper utilization of military assistance furnished by the United States Government to ROKA in the form of supplies, materiel, and equipment. KMAG programs essential material to be furnished ROKA by the United States through the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and advises on the development of the annual ROKA budgets and requirements for United States Government furnished budgetary support.

b. (U) Personnel.

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(2) Proposed Change in KMAG MTDA. A proposed KMAG MTDA P8W08TAA05 was prepared and forwarded to Eighth U. S. Army for processing on 3 April 1970. The proposed MTDA reflects end strength FY 70 and FY 71 space ceiling established by CINCPAC. A comparison of the current MTDA P8W08TAA04 and the proposed MTDA follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>ENL</th>
<th>DAG</th>
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<td>-3</td>
<td>-93</td>
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<td>-56</td>
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(3) KMAG Headquarters Staff Reorganization.

(a) Effective 15 February 1970, the Office of the Senior Advisor, Headquarters, KMAG, DCSPER/AG and the Office of the ACofS G1/AG were combined and redesignated as ACofS, G1. Under the old organization the Office of the Senior Advisor DCSPER/AG area was responsible for all advisory functions in the G1/AG area while the Office of the ACofS G1/AG was responsible for all internal KMAG operations in the G1/AG area. Under the new organization the Office of the ACofS G1 is responsible for both the advisory and internal operations functions.

(b) Effective 24 April 1970, the Office of Surgeon was placed under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Headquarters, KMAG.

c. (C-MOFORM) INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) Operations.

(a) With the improvement of the weather, the sightings along the DMZ increased. The training of the small North Korean (NK) units which commenced in January has continued and has apparently progressed to company and battalion level. The sighting of extensive training activities occurred in the same time frame last year. This year the sighting of artillery and tanks have been more numerous.

(b) The NK's have again commenced improvement of old and/or construction of new positions along the DMZ. The valley from Kumwha to Kumsong has been the scene of much activity as new caves and apparently new defensive positions were constructed. This valley was also the scene of many sighting of artillery and tanks.

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An incident occurred on 14 March 1970, when a patrol from the 28th ROKA Division returning from a friendly guard post towards the north tape encountered two hostile individuals. In the ensuing fire fight the two individuals were killed and later a third individual was seen escaping to the north across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). From the dress and the equipment they carried, it was estimated that this was a two man agent team and an escort. It is thought that the agents were attempting a deep penetration for espionage and possibly sabotage purposes.

At 2921571 April 1970, six personnel from the 3rd Division, V ROK Corps spotted an unknown number of Unidentified Individuals (UI) in the vicinity CT 679387. Friendly small arms, claymores and various caliber mortar rounds were fired and enemy small arms fire was reported. A ROKA Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was committed. Pieces of flesh and teeth were later found in the area. By 3004171 April 1970, all friendly troops had left the area. No U.S. forces were involved.

IOKA Anti-Communist Exhibit - 1970. On 6 April 1970, opening ceremonies were held for this year's Anti-Communist Exhibit. This activity sponsored annually by the ROK Army security Command (ASC) and Duksoo Palace grounds in Seoul. The two month exhibit which normally attracts around 1,300,000 persons displays photos, pamphlets and models showing life in North Korea and atrocities committed by North Koreans in the ROK. The primary purpose of the exhibit is to publicize to the youth of the ROK the communist militancy and atrocities. During 1969, the exhibit ran for about four months. The items were displayed in 67 different locations and an attendance of 1,651,162 was reported. Similar exhibits have been held in Korea since 1955. This anti-communist program is receiving increased emphasis in 1970. Additional funds were included in the Won Budget to permit the ASC to establish 25 permanent display centers throughout the country.

North Korean Infiltration Attempts. On 9 March 1970, a motor boat was found on the east coast beach at coordinates KR342158. Homeland Defense Reserve Forces (HDRF) in the area were mobilized under the 50th Rear Area Security (RAS) Division in coordination with the Korean National Police (KNP). One Counter-Infiltration (CI) battalion from the 36th RAS Division was placed under the operational control of the 50th RAS Division. Air mobile operations were employed during the operation using ROK Army helicopters. The operation area included an area from Ulchin on the east coast, west to Yongju, southward through Andong to a point inland approximately on a line with Pohang and then east to the coast at Pohang. Some units of the ROK Marine Corps were placed under the operational control of Second Republic of Korea Army (SROKA).
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on 13 March 1970, and were given an area of operation in the Pohang sector. The search operations were terminated by SROKA units on 27 March 1970, and 1st ROK Marine Division (-) continued search operations in the Pohang sector. On 30 March 1970, the 5th ROK Marine Div. engaged two North Korean infiltrators in a fire fight at coordinates EQ346946 resulting in two North Korean infiltrators KIA and one ROK Marine KIA. The two North Koreans are believed to have utilised the motor boat found on 9 March 1970, to infiltrate the coast line.

(4) ROKA Won Budget Review. A review of the intelligence portion, ROKA Won Budget was completed on 3 March 1970. There was a 10% increase in the intelligence budget for CY 70 over the adjusted CY 69 figure. The approved budget is adequate for current and programmed projects. As could be expected, the ROKA officers contacted in reference to the review were very guarded with regards to explaining in detail most aspects of the budget. The greatest variance between the CY 69 and CY 70 budgets for intelligence activities was in the area of Intelligence Agency training. A considerable amount of these funds was designated for wage and vessel maintenance. Those two combined were required to effect major repairs on the Army Security Command's special purpose boats. The second major item budgeted was the establishment of 25 display centers located throughout the country. The centers, operated by counterintelligence personnel, will exhibit captured equipment and documentation which exemplifies the threat of communist infiltration.

(5) ROKA Intelligence Military Assistance Training Program (MATP). On 7 March 1970, 10 ROKA Officer Students and three interpreters returned from attending the Specific Needs - Security and Counterintelligence Course (8 weeks) at the USARPAC Intelligence School, Okinawa. Five ROKA officers were processed and departed on 16 April 1970 for the Intelligence Staff Officers Course II at the same school. The departure of these five students for this 10 week course completes in full, ROKA's Intelligence training under MATP FY 70. A total of 23 ROKA officers participated in MATP at the USARPAC Intelligence School during FY 70.

(6) Aerial Photo Interpretation (API) Course. An API course was conducted for ROK Army Officers from 13 to 24 April 1970 by personnel from the Imagery Interpretation Branch (11B) of G2, USA. The objective of the training course was to familiarize students with an API kit; to enable the students to accurately make measurements on oblique and vertical aerial photography, to make mosaics and to read data markings. Two officers from the ROK Administration School, five officers from the Military Intelligence Group and one officer from the ROK Navy completed the course. All of these students were returned to their respective units and will serve as API instructors. Upon completion of the
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In the course of the week, the students were given an orientation visit to the Imagery Interpretation Branch, G2 EUSA.

d. (G) PLANS, OPERATIONS, AVIATION, TRAINING, ORGANIZATION, RESERVE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS (ACoS, G3).

(1) East Coast Operations. In the last ORLL (Nov 69 - Jan 70) it was stated that three coast defense battalions had been formed and three more were planned. The last three battalions have now been formed, trained and are on duty in the southern portion of the East Coast Defense Force sector (the coastal area from the rear boundary of the 12th ROK Division to the boundary of FROKA fronting the Sea of Japan). One battalion of the 9th Regiment has been released from coast defense duties and returned to its parent unit, the 11th Division. The balance of the 9th Regiment will be released by July 1970.

(2) U. S. Army Aviation Operations in Support of Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Training. The 3rd Platoon, 239th U. S. Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) under the operational control of FROKA Detachment, IMAQ, participated in and supported actual and training missions for FROKA QRF. A summary of operations is listed below:

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Actual QRF Operations</th>
<th>Training QRF Missions</th>
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<td>50</td>
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(3) Unit Rotations. Throughout the reporting period FROKA GOPL battalions were rotated with reserve units. The rotations have included movement of reserve division battalions to the GOPL with attachment to GOP divisions and detachment of GOP division battalions to reserve divisions.

(4) CPX/FTX "Nyul Gung". During the period 6 -15 April 1970, CPX/FTX "Nyul Gung" was conducted by FROKA. The 11th ROK Division (-) was the Blue (friendly) force and the 32nd Regiment (+) of the 2nd ROK Division was the Red (enemy) force. The exercise closely followed existing operational plans:

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(a) The objectives of the exercise were as follows:

1. To improve flexibility and ability of commanders and staffs to operate under combat conditions.
2. To develop means of air and ground movement under conditions of nuclear and CBR warfare.
3. To develop combined and joint combat capability.
4. To endow small unit commanders with the capability for independent employment.
5. To improve the capability of administration and employment of signal communications.
6. To review the reporting system of HDRF and private citizens.

(b) During the exercise the KMAG III Corps Advisory Team concentrated on planning, coordinating and monitoring support by U. S. units. This was the first major exercise in which the newly organized Corps Advisory Team (CAT) participated. The experience gained during the exercise will be used as a basis for establishing procedures for future operations.

(c) In general, the exercise was conducted in a professional manner. An effective program of safety and traffic control resulted in no reportable accidents. Major deficiencies included communications failures (both U. S. and ROKA), lack of adequate transportation and deficiencies in command control and planning capabilities of participating U. S. Army Units.

(3) Defense from Biological Attack. During the period of this report, the Government of the Republic of Korea announced that the North Korean Government had attempted to purchase Cholera, Anthrax and other disease producing organisms from Japanese firms. This disclosure was associated with the Republic of Korea Cholera epidemic of 1969 and accusations were made that North Korea had initiated Biological Warfare against the ROK. In February and March 1970, the ROK Army reviewed Biological defense plans and initiated defensive countermeasures throughout the Republic. In anticipation of North Korean use of south-flowing streams, southerly summer air-currents, and animal...
vectors in the DMZ, FROKA issued instructions to subordinate units for an increased readiness posture against biological attack. These instructions included prohibiting the use of untreated water for drinking, bathing or washing purposes, hunting wild animals or fowl in the DMZ or fishing in south-flowing streams. Other positive steps included periodic sampling of streams, fish, fowl, animals, and insects, a program for eradication of rodents (rats), and erection of numerous signs and billboards emphasizing support of the various steps and procedures being taken. The net result of the entire program will be improved sanitary conditions and environment for ROK soldiers.

(6) Vegetation Control. In letter, FACM-0 370, subject: the Vegetation Control Program, CY 70, dated 4 April 1970, to CSUSA the Commanding General, FROKA, recommended continuation of previous year's application programs of herbicides along the DMZ Security System Fence and requested action be taken to secure materials for such a program in 1970. EUSA is currently surveying Vietnam for available herbicides.

LOGISTICS.

(1) Excess Utilization Programs.

(a) Military Assistance Program Excess Utilization Program (MAPEX). KMAC continues its efforts in the MAPEX program with teams in Vietnam and Okinawa. KMAC MAPEX effort also includes screening lists from U. S. Army, Japan (USARJ) and U. S. Army Property Disposal Agency, Korea (USAPA-K). There was a decrease in Engineer and in Ordnance items received. The estimated value of MAPEX receipts (acquisition cost) is placed at approximately 1.5 million dollars for the quarter. To date, items valued at $18.3 million (acquisition cost) have been approved for MAPEX release, and $10.42 million (acquisition cost) have been received in Korea, with a utility value of $2.61 million.

(b) Secondary Item Excess (SIMEX). SIMEX covers new or like new secondary items and repair parts or consumable excesses in world wide DOD stocks. KROA has received approval for submission of specific SIMEX requisitions in 44 general categories of material. Currently, SIMEX acquisitions in process, receipts and pending requisitions have a potential value of $37.28 million to ROK Army. Receipts total $22.8 million.

(c) Major Item Excess (MIMEX). MIMEX covers major end items in excess status in world wide DOD stocks. This ROK has MIMEX allocations with an acquisition value of $15.32 million to the ROK Army. To date
receipts total $2.06 million (acquisition cost) with a utility value of $.515 million.

(2) M9A1 Protective Mask. On 5 March 1970, a letter was dispatched to U. S. Army Material Command requesting information on the availability of production machinery which will permit ROKA to produce M9A1 protective mask. Establishment of a production capability in Korea could serve to increase ROKA's CBR posture, reduce MAP costs, and further assist ROKA in developing self-sufficiency.

(3) Tank Track Shoe Rebuild.

(a) The ROKA M47/48 tank track shoe repair plant is currently prepared to conduct pre-operational checks on installed equipment and pilot runs thereafter. On 14 April 1970, U. S. Army Tank Automotive Command (USATACOM) advised that the initial 90 day requirement of rubber stock had been procured through Red River Army Depot (READ).

(b) Technical assistance personnel from Japan (experts on the vulcanising presses purchased from Nihon Co., Ltd. Japan) and CONUS (READ) are scheduled to provide the necessary training in equipment and reclamation operations.

(c) ROKA track repair pilot runs and production startup operations cannot be determined at the present time pending receipt of a firm delivery date for rubber stock. A request for air freight of the small quantity required for pilot runs has been made.

(4) Unserviceable Barrier Material for ROKA. A procedure was initiated, in conjunction with FUSA G4, by which unserviceable (Code H) material contained in prepositioned barrier project stocks will be identified annually and offered to ROKA for in-place acceptance under the MAPEX program. A MAPEX release was obtained for the Code H material identified in the 1968 annual inventory and these items were released to ROKA by FUSA. This procedure allows annual purging of the pre-positioned barrier stock, which is located at 122 sites throughout the PROKA area, so that replenishment can be accomplished with serviceable material.

(5) Korean Economic Assistance (KEA) Open Wire Telephone Lines. KEA open wire telephone lines were originally installed or rebuilt by U. S. Army troops during the Korean War, using Korean Economic Assistance Funds, to upgrade communication facilities in Korea. It was agreed that
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these facilities would be used by US Forces as long as necessary, then would be turned over to the Ministry of Communication (MOC) to become part of the civil communication network. Such lines were built in various parts of Korea and most of them have been transferred to the MOC. Several lines in the FROKA area, however, are still retained by EUSA. They are used by FROKA and are considered to be part of the FROKA communication system. They are maintained by FROKA Signal construction troops using materials funded or provided by Eighth U. S. Army. Generally, these KEA open wire lines provide FROKA circuits between Seoul and Chunchon, between Chunchon and various ROK corps headquarters, from Chunchon to Wonju, and from Wonju to Suwon. They have gradually evolved from exclusive use by EUSA units to the present shared use by ROKA, the KNP and the MOC. Inasmuch as these lines are no longer used by U. S. Forces, EUSA is seeking ways to transfer these lines to the MOC as soon as practicable. As a matter of additional interest, a significant part of these lines will soon be inundated as the result of the construction of a dam on the Soyang River. These lines will be relocated at the expense of the dam contractor.

(6) Maintenance of Equipment for Counter-Infiltration Counter-Guerrilla Concept Requirements Plan (CIGCOREP). EUSA agreement to provide maintenance support for selected items of ROKA CIGCOREP equipment has been extended to end on 31 August. The support includes break wire for the AN/GSS-9 anti-intrusion device, the AN/PPS-4 Radar and Xenon Searchlights. Supply support of EA-1100 batteries was also included on a reimbursable basis. ROKA has drafted a comprehensive maintenance support plan for CIGCOREP equipment which covers all aspects from unit through depot rebuild or evacuation to CONUS for repair and return. As of 30 April, ROKA will accept responsibility for full support of the AN/FRC-93 and AN/GRC-106 radio sets.

(7) The Republic of Korea Army Maintenance Float. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific has authorized a change to the Military Assistance Manual (MAM) that will allow MAP countries in the Pacific co program, as an investment cost, Maintenance Float items of equipment. The Supply and Maintenance Division, AG/SC, G4, Hq EUSA, in conjunction with EUSAG Technical Services, and utilizing the latest reference manuals available, prepared an appropriate list of maintenance float items required by ROKA. This list was forwarded to the Director of Supply, DCSLOG, ROKA in April 1969, with a request that it be updated yearly by ROKA. Advisory efforts are now underway to assist ROKA in the first annual update of this maintenance float listing.
(8) Reevaluation of Continuing Resolution Authority/Emergency Funds. Stockage at the ROKA Signal Base Depot (SBD) continued to deteriorate as the direct result of a shortage of funds against which to requisition. Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) was exhausted in virtually all Record Control Numbers (RCN) in October 1969, and the only significant additional CRA received through late April was a small amount in each of RCN SD98 Communication Repair Parts (Comparts) and RCN YS73 (Dry Batteries). RCNs SD98 (Comparts) TS94 (Generator Parts), YR78 (Photo), SK05 (Meteorological), and AZ11 (Repair and Return of Counter-infiltetration, Counter-guerrilla Concept Requirements Plan equipment) were in such grave condition that a second request for emergency funding was submitted. SBD stockage of meteorological supplies is totally depleted. As of 30 April 1970, a large segment of the remaining funds had become available. Meanwhile, the dollar value of requisitions held/not submitted because of lack of funds had increased to more than $2.14 million. A large part of this total was for critical repair parts for EE-8 Telephones; AM/FRC-6, -9, and -10 Radio Sets; and SB-72 and SB-86 Switchboards. Of the entire Signal inventory, these six items require more than 22% of the total annual support requirement and consume 31% of the actual Signal program. Although requisitions were immediately submitted upon receipt of these late funds, the situation did not improve because of the long Order-Ship Time (OST) involved before supplies are received. The zero balance rates in repair parts for these six items is increasing; an unacceptable backlog has accrued in depot maintenance and rebuild as a direct result of lack of repair parts and is clearly demonstrated by the production charts in the 3d Quarter FY 70 ROKA review and analysis, wherein is portrayed the fact that the backlog is three times the level at this point in time one year ago. Additional funds were requested to eliminate these conditions on three separate occasions. It was to no avail inasmuch as the next-to-last MAP Order funded areas other than those requested by lst DIM comptroller. The preponderance of the remaining funds were received in the last MAP order.

(9) R. R. Use of ROKA Microwave System. Representatives from ACofS, Communications-Electronics (C-E), Eqs EUSA and USAG STRATCOM-PAC (Hawaii) visited Eqs EUSA to discuss various aspects of an EUSA project to modify the ROKA Microwave System, by adding U. S. purchased multiplex equipment, to provide 60 channels for use by U. S. Forces, Korea. EUSA proposes to use the ROKA Microwave System between Seoul-Taegu and Taegu-Pulmoan and to provide a new feeder system between Pulmoan to Changan in the EUSA Backbone Communication System. Engineering plans are now being formulated.
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(10) Camp Long Dial Exchange. Mr. Perrin and Mr. Harris, ACoS, C-E, EUSA visited Camp Long during the week of 2 February 1970, to inspect the exchange building and survey the outside cable distribution system. A twenty-five pair cable is needed to service R-401, KMAG airfield. Installation of this cable on the presently existing KEA pole line was coordinated with FROKA Signal. Original estimate for delivery of the equipment on (25 February 1970), slipped due to negotiations for contract modification to include the revamp of the outside plant cable system, dismantling the dial exchange for the American Embassy, delivery of the dial exchange to Camp Long and provisions for six technicians for operation and maintenance of the dial exchange. The contract was signed on 6 April 1970, and work began in late April. Expected date for completion is 30 June 1970. The 304th Signal Bn was tasked to supervise the telephone exchange installation and to provide the dial telephones, drop wire, protectors, etc., under Fixed Plan Installation Directive 32-70, ACoS, C-E, EUSA, dtd 4 April 1970.

(11) Radio Wire Integration (RWI) Capability for Camp Long. As a result of correspondence from CG, EUSA a requirement for a Radio Wire Integration capability at Camp Long developed. Discussions were conducted with the Deputy Commander, STRATCOM Signal Bde, Korea for the purpose of determining the feasibility of establishing an RWI capability at the Camp Long Microwave site. Equipment availability is the only limitation. Action has been taken to request that the equipment needed be included in the FROKA Detachment's Joint Table of Allowances. The radio set and power supply needed have been located. The RWI equipment (AH/GSA-7, Control Set, Radio) is still not available. The converter (12V DC to 25 V DC) required for installation of the radio equipment in the CG, FROKA Det, was received on 19 March 1970. A letter was dispatched on 18 March 1970 to the CG, EUSA outlining the requirements for an RWI capability to be provided as expeditiously as possible. Personnel discussion with COL Smith, ACoS, C-E, EUSA early in April 1970 indicates full support in providing this capability to Camp Long.

(12) Installation of a Fixed Stations Communications Center Camp Long. The ACoS, C-E, EUSA is preparing a project to move the 304th Communications Center into the new telephone exchange building. Site preparation will include all the necessary wiring for Communications Security (Red-Black) and termination of a Digital Subscriber Terminal equipment in conjunction with the installation of a Regional Automatic Digital Switching Center at Taegu. The Digital Subscriber Terminal equipment will allow entry into the Worldwide Automatic Digital network (AUTODIN).
Field Office, Okinawa visited Camp Long on 9 - 10 March 1970, to conduct a site survey for the AUTODIN installation. This is a long range project and further developments will be reported.

(13) Weather Forecast Service for Camp Long/R-401 Airfield. On 13 January 1970, a request was submitted to Hqs KMAG for the establishment of a teletype weather forecast service from the 18th Air Force Weather Squadron to R-401 airfield. Coordination between, FROKA Detachment Signal Section, Hqs KMAG, Signal Section, CO 304th Signal Bn and ACoS, C-E, EUSA resulted in agreement to provide a weather forecast terminal at R-401 airfield. Coordination was effected on 12 February 1970, with FROKA Signal to provide the required metallic circuit between Camp Long and R-401. The Circuit Service Order to establish the circuit was issued by the ACoS, C-E, EUSA during the week of 15 February 1970. An equipment problem at the Yongsan terminal delayed completion of the project. On 24 February 1970, the project was completed.

(14) Revision of SOI's and SLOI's for FROKA Detachment and Corps Advisory Teams. The recent reorganization of the FROKA Detachment and the Corps Advisory Teams required that the EUSA Hqs KMAG SOI's and SLOI's be revised and corrected to conform to the new communications requirements. All the SOI's and SLOI's have been reviewed and modifications, deletions and/or changes resulting from the reorganization have been submitted. The request to modify EUSA SOI item 37-1, secure RATT and unsecure voice nets which provide 304th Signal Bn communications support to FROKA Det and the five Corps Advisory Teams was approved on 9 February 1970.

(15) Development of Exhaust System Heater.

(a) A heating system for drivers compartment of vehicles has been developed by FROKA Transportation personnel. The system includes a manifold type heater and consists of a fabricated tin box which is bolted over the engine exhaust manifold system. Air is forced through holes in the front of the heater box by the engine fan, is heated by the exhaust manifold, and exits through the outlet of the heater which is in the drivers compartment of the vehicle.

(b) FROKA estimates the material cost to be 123 won per unit. There was some concern over the possibility of Carbon Monoxide being introduced into the driver's compartment but tests conducted to date support the contention that there are enough air vents to preclude any serious carbon monoxide collection. The heater raises the temperature in the drivers compartment approximately 20 degrees in zero degree weather.
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(c) FROKA plans to install this heater on all vehicles assigned to Transportation Units by November 1970.

(16) Medical Air Evacuation. During the past quarter, there have been no requests through this office for aeromedical evacuation for FROKA. This is significant since prior to this quarter, most requests for this service have gone through this office to EUSA facilities. The formation of the 21st Airmobile Company, ROKA, composed of twelve UH-1H helicopters has been the most significant factor. However, in wartime, these air resources would be used for combat support. Therefore, the formation of one or more air ambulance companies in FROKA should be considered.

(17) MAP Cargo. During the quarter 1 February through 30 April 1970, a total of 95 ships entered the ports of Pusan and Inchon with Military Assistance Program (MAP) Cargo for the Republic of Korea. 76,895.1 M/T of MAP cargo was discharged during the quarter. This, combined with prior cargo discharged during calendar year 1970, amounts to 103,527.5 M/T which is an increase of nine percent over that received during the same period of calendar year 1968. MAP Cargo arriving for the Republic of Korea Army via parcel post and air freight for the quarter totaled 7045 packages and 2935 boxes respectively. The combined total for calendar year 1970 to date was 8428 packages via parcel post and 3063 boxes via air freight. This is a 60 percent increase for parcel post and 114 percent increase for air freight compared to the same period of calendar year 1969.

f. (C) AIR DEFENSE.

(1) Improvement of ROKA Nike Hercules. The Republic of Korea was provided four Nike Hercules batteries in 1965. These units were of the basic configuration when received. The modification kit to update one battery to an Improved Nike Hercules unit was purchased by MAP. An Alternate Battery Acquisition Radar (ABAR) was purchased in lieu of the High Power Radar that is normally installed with an Improved Nike Hercules system. Modification of the Basic Nike Hercules system and installation of the ABAR at "B" battery, 222nd BN, 1st ADA ROK Bde began during the 2nd Quarter FY 70. The installation of the ABAR was completed and transferred to ROKA in Feb 70. The final inspection and return to ROKA control of the modified Nike Hercules system was completed in April 1970.
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(2) Operational Readiness of ROKA Surface Air Missile (SAM) Units. The operational readiness of ROKA Surface Air Missile (SAM) is based on the capability of the unit's personnel and equipment to perform their assigned air defense mission. Based on this criteria, SAM units are then classified as Combat Ready (CR), Limited Combat Ready (LCR), or Not Combat Ready (NCR). This is the same criteria used for U.S. Units. The total number of hours the units were available for the Air Defense mission during this reporting period was compiled. The percent of these hours the units were CR, LCR or NCR was computed. The ROKA Nike Hercules units were Combat Ready 49%, Limited Combat Ready 36.3% and Not Combat Ready 14.7% of the time. ROKA Hawk units were Combat Ready 24.3%, Limited Combat Ready 65.5% and Not Combat Ready 10.2% of the time.

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

   a. Personnel. None
   b. Operations. None
   c. Training. None
   d. Intelligence. None
   e. (U) Logistics.

   (1) CRA Funding.

      (a) Observation. The Signal FY 70 Operating Cost Program submission requesting CRA funding approximately 25% of the total program value, or enough to sustain operations through the end of the first quarter FY 1970.

      (b) Evaluation. Since the Military Assistance Act was not passed until February 1970, making requests for emergency CRA is not an acceptable solution to this problem as this action will not guarantee that the required funds will be provided.

      (c) Recommendation. CRA funding for key ROK operational support line items should always be requested at a minimum of 50% of the program value to preclude emergency supply situations which threaten ROKA combat readiness.

   (2) Application of Corrosion Preventive Coating to Undercarriage, Floor, and Back of Dashboard of the Truck. Utility 4 Ton. 4x4 MLS1A1.

      (a) Observation. The floor, especially on the driver's side, corroded through before the vehicle is 3 years old. Behind the dashboard scales of
rusted have been found. Back fenders although undercoated (thin undercoating), have rusted through especially where the metal is joined together by welding.

(b) Evaluation. A thin undercoating under the fenders of the M151A1 Truck is not sufficient to preserve the life expectancy of the body and chassis of this vehicle. The undercarriage of this vehicle as well as the undercarriage of the ½-ton Trailer is not undercoated at all. Excessive welding repairs are needed prematurely. If the entire carriage were undercoated, considerable maintenance could be avoided.

(c) Recommendation. Recommend that the entire undercarriage of the M151A1 be undercoated like a POV is undercoated. Special attention should be given to the area under the fenders and floor. Inside the passenger compartment, the floor also should be coated with an appropriate substance to retard rusting.

(3) Lack of Requisition Numbers on Cargo Manifests (DD Form 1385-1) for Lumber, Plywood, and Steel Bars.

(a) Observation. Cargo manifests (DD Form 1385-1) for lumber, plywood, and steel bar do not reflect requisition numbers of the Engineer Base Depot (EBD). Material Inspection Reports (DD Form 250) and Award of Contracts, which are forwarded to EBD from the manufacturer, contain EBD requisition numbers. In order for EBD personnel to credit the correct requisition number, it is necessary to match the DD Form 1385-1 against the DD Form 250 and/or Award of Contract. The problem is that approximately 30% of the DD Form 250's and Award of Contracts do not arrive at EBD until after receipt of supplies and cargo manifests. This results in unnecessary delay in crediting the correct requisition numbers as well as properly accounting for supplies.

(b) Evaluation. Manufacturers have knowledge of the requisition numbers as they are indicated on the DD Form 250 and Award of Contracts. The manufacturers should be able to provide these requisition numbers to the Port facility which prepares the cargo manifest. Annotation of EBD requisition numbers on the cargo manifest would enable EBD personnel to complete processing of paper work immediately upon receipt of supplies and cargo manifests.

(c) Recommendations. That International Logistics Command (ILC) request manufacturers of lumber, plywood, and steel bars to forward EBD requisition numbers to Port facilities for annotation on cargo manifests.
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(4) **Phase Out of USARJ MAP/AID Mission.**

(a) Observation. The phase out of USARJ MAP/AID Mission is less than 70 days away.

(b) Evaluation. Instructions to Korea (probably the 2nd largest customer of Depot Command, Japan (DCJ) are woefully inadequate. In March 1970, ILC conducted a seminar in Japan on the changeover. Representatives from Korea who do millions of dollars worth of business annually with DCJ and ILC were not invited to this seminar.

(c) Recommendation. ILC should immediately send a representative to the LIC Det, KNAG to eliminate potential problem areas.

(5) **Status of Funds in Record Control Numbers (RCN) Under Control of ILC in CONUS.**

(a) Observation. The status of funds in RCN's controlled by ILC, the status of requisitions in the operating program RCN's, the receipt of requisition submitted and all other pertinent data, necessary to control the requisitioning and funding are not supplied to KNAG on a regular basis unless Audit Trail of the RCN is requested.

(b) Evaluation. A report or print out, could be furnished regularly, i.e., weekly or semi-monthly, so that the important information contained in such a report could be used to update balances at regular intervals.

(c) Recommendation. That ILC provide the necessary reports as now provided by USARJ on RCN's controlled by that command.

(6) **Sealand Containers.**

(a) Observation.

1. During the first week of March 1970, a Sealand container loaded with MAP cargo for the ROKA Medical Base Depot was discharged from the SS Pittsburg. This container, one of a shipment of containers consigned to the U. S. Army under a new contract with the Sealand Company, was filled with MAP cargo by mistake. The containers were discharged at the ROKA Pier #3 and drayed to the Han Jin container yard. The container filled with MAP cargo was later drayed by Han Jin to the ROKA Medical Base Depot where it was emptied in two hours and returned to the Han Jin yard.
the same day. Due to the mistake in filling the container with MAP cargo, Sealand covered the drayage and discharge costs at no expense to the ROK government.

2. During the first week of April, 1970, five more of the large 40-foot containers were discharged from the SS Pioneer Moon, Far East Lines, at Pier #3. The size of these containers far exceeded the capacity of any equipment available to the 3rd Terminal Port Command (TPC) for drayage, and, unlike the Sealand operation, no convenient contract was available. Consequently, 3rd TPC was required to "break-bulk" the containers at Pier #3 for temporary storage and ultimate drayage to the depot. Due to the double handling required, any benefits from the containerization concept was lost.

(b) Evaluation.

1. From ROKA's point of view, the Sealand container operation was a huge success in the respect that ROKA needed only to accept the containers at the depot and not become involved in the drayage operation.

2. With an eye to the immediate future, however, it must be kept in mind that ROKA is not equipped at the present time for large scale container operations in respect to both port operations and drayage. In the case of the larger, 40-foot container, 3rd TPC has no equipment available for the handling of a container of this size. Furthermore, it is doubtful that a 40-foot container could successfully negotiate the narrow access roads to the various depots or are all the depots equipped with loading docks of sufficient dimensions for accommodation of containers.

3. Finally, MAP regulations require that the ROK government be responsible for bearing the costs of port handling, discharge and transportation cost of MAP cargo. This raises the question of financial liability for container cargos inasmuch as ROKA does not, at present, have a contract with container companies or local freight haulers for the receipt and movement of containerized cargo.

4. ROKA is presently studying the possibility of using the containerization concept. However, if this is a coming trend it must be reconciled against ROKA's logistical organization under the technical service concept.
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(c) Recommendation.

1. That CONUS supply sources not contract for any containerization of MAP cargo consigned to ROKA since at the present time movement of MAP cargo to Korea in containers is not feasible due to the unavailability of equipment, facilities and contracts for the handling of containers.

2. If ROKA is forced to receive containerized MAP cargo in the future, sufficient notice and time must be given ROKA for the purpose of negotiating contracts and obtaining the equipment necessary for efficient handling of containers.

(7) Reclamation of M47 Tank Engine Crankshafts.

(a) Observation. TB 9-2800-208-50 prescribes reclamation procedures for reference crankshafts. According to the TB, crankshafts that do not clean up at .020 undersize must be scrapped. Crankshafts that clean up within .020 undersize may be reclaimed by chromium electroplating. ROKA does not have this capability.

(b) Evaluation. Since new crankshafts cost approximately $800 each, a welding process in Japan was explored and through USARJ a contract was let to reclaim one crankshaft on a trial basis. The reclamation cost is approximately $200 resulting in a $600 savings. One crankshaft was reclaimed, shipped back to Korea, tested in an engine for 150 hours and proved satisfactory. The crankshaft is now in process of being shipped back to USARJ for further evaluation.

(c) Recommendation. That ILC consider reclamation of all types of crankshafts if welding procedure proves satisfactory.

FOR THE CHIEF:

[Signature]

MICHAEL S. WILLIAMSON
Captain, AG
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Advisory Group, Korea, for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR R2 (U)

Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, APO 96301

8 JUN 70

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report. The following comments supplement the report.

2. Reference item concerning CRA (Continuing Resolution Authority) Funding, page 14, para 2e(1). This recommendation should be referred to unified command channels which supervise the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and approve CRA funding.

3. Reference item concerning Application of Corrosion Preventive Coating to Undercarriage, Floor, and Back of Dashboard of the Truck, Utility, ½ Ton, M151, page 14, para 2e(2). Concur.

4. Reference items in paras 2e(3), (4), (5) and (7). These lessons learned recommend actions outside of the purview of this headquarters. These items should be referred to US Army Japan and International Logistics Center for appropriate comment.

5. Reference item concerning Sealand Containers, page 16, para 2e(6). Concur. The shipment of MAP cargo via containers is not a general practice. A continuing effort is being made on the part of shipping terminals to preclude mistaken container shipments of MAP cargo.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Copies furnished:
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HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2e(4) - Phase Out of USARJ MAP/AID Mission.

(1) Information received by this headquarters subsequent to the receipt of this report indicates that the problem addressed in paragraph 2e(4)(b) has been resolved and no action is required at this time.

(2) Reference paragraph 2e(4)(c) - It is understood that a permanent AMCIL representative will be assigned to Korea shortly and will be able to answer any KMAC questions. If assignment of this individual is delayed, DCSLOG USARPAC could provide a representative in the interim period.

b. Reference paragraph 2e(7) - The recommendation to reclaim all types of crankshafts by a welding process considered satisfactory based on one M47 Tank Engine Crankshaft field tested for 150 hours is not concurred in. Crankshafts for other than M47 Tank engines should be individually evaluated as the requirement occurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
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Cy furn:
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, United States Army Advisory Group, Korea

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