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<td>Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAM-P (M) (13 Dec 67) FOR 01-RD-670592

19 December 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th
Battalion, 8th Artillery

This document contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and
794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents
in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by
USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in
accordance with paragraph 8c and 9, AR 1-19. Evaluations and cor-
rective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of re-
cipient of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure
appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current
operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH BATTALION 8TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96370

12 August 1967


TO: Commanding Officer
54th Artillery Group
APO 96376

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FAC
APO 96266

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHOC-DH
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GFOR-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSFOR, DA
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. Administration and Personnel.
a. On 10 November 1966, the 7th Battalion 8th Artillery received
alert notification for shipment to RVN. Planning for a 4th quarters FY
67 deployment commenced immediately with submission of a personnel requisition
for 21 Officers, 3 Warrant Officers, and 343 EM. The battalion at this
time had a strength of approximately 400 Officers and EM of whom about 50% were deployable. Upon return from Christmas leaves, the non-deployable
personnel were transferred out with the exception of 17 key NCO's who were
 retained in a TUT status to be released as qualified replacements arrived.
 On 27 February 1967 the battalion commenced ICTP with essentially all of its
personnel in grades E-1 through E-5 and approximately 50% of the authorized
E-5 through E-6. On our P&D, 3 June 1967, the battalion was only 1 Officer
and 4 EM short of its authorized assigned strength, with 1 Warrant Officer
and 7 EM to be administratively delayed to rejoin the unit in RVN at a later
date.

b. On 20 May 1967, the general cargo and vehicles were shipped
from Beaumont, Texas, accompanied by 1 Warrant Officer and 3 EM, and arrived

c. On 8 June 1967, the main body consisting of 17 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer, and 502 EM departed by air for Oakland, California, departed
Oakland on 9 June 1967 aboard the USNS Walker, and arrived in RVN on 28 June
1967.

d. The advance party of 8 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer, and 16 EM
departed Tinker ABD by C141 on 19 June 1967 and arrived in RVN on 21 June
1967.

e. Upon arrival in RVN the 7th Battalion 8th Artillery, assigned to
the 54th Artillery Group, was moved into a staging area at Camp Martin Cox by its
sponsoring unit, the 7th Battalion 9th Artillery.

f. Although perhaps plagued with initial NCO shortages and other
problems not unique to this battalion, the unit was able to complete its
reorganization, deployment, and staging in RVN without encountering serious
difficulty. This was for the main part due to the excellent support rendered by the 1st FA Brigade, III Corps Artillery, and Host Support personnel
at Fort Sill and by the outstanding sponsorship of the 7th BN 9th Arty in RVN.

g. Personnel strength of the command on 31 July 1967 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOT AUTH</th>
<th>AS.IGN:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF WO EM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Battery</td>
<td>15 1 136</td>
<td>12 1 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>3 0 110</td>
<td>4 0 108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGACO-CO

12 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOE AUTH</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF WO EM</td>
<td>OFF WO EM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Battery B | 3 0 110 | 4 0 108 |
| Battery C | 3 0 110 | 4 0 109 |
| Service Battery | 3 3 68 | 2 3 72 |
| Totals | 27 4 534 | 26 4 531 |

h. Critical Shortages: One (1) Officer, Authorized Rank: Captain, MOS: 1193.

i. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM (Gains)</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM (Losses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Casualties: None

k. Five Army Commendation Medals for merit were presented during the quarter.

l. Infusion: In the month of July 1967, 93 EM of this unit with DEROS of November 1967 or later were infused with personnel of the 1st Bn, 83d Arty having DEROS in the months of September and October 1967.

m. No R&R quotas were received by this unit in the report period.

n. The Battalion Mail Clerk picks up from and delivers mail for the entire battalion to APO 96370. Subsequent deliveries are made to all outlying batteries.

o. Judicial and non-judicial actions by unit for the quarter include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLE 15</th>
<th>SUMMARY COURT</th>
<th>SPECIAL COURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Battery</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Battery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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AVUy, U-CO 12 ilut 1)67
SU.)JiLTs Olx-rational lic ort for %.ucrterly
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Paport~ Controoi ;'";Rm
p. Portable accidents for the quarter inuded three vehicle and two personnel accidents.
q. The corele of the command is outstanding due primarily to the men's occupation with the problems of unpacking, becoming operational, and setting up base camps.
r. Religious services, both Protestant a Catholic, are made available to each battery on a regular weekly basis.
s. Throughout the battalion, personal hygiene, prophylactic, and prevention of malaria have been stressed by the Battery Commanders, and Battalion Surgeon. There have been no unforeseen problems in this area to date.

2. Intelligence.
   a. On 20 July 1967, this battalion assumed the responsibility for the Visual Reconnaissance Fan centered on RVN VIC, Battery A location.

3. Training.
   a. On 10 November 1966, this battalion received alert notification for shipment to RVN.
   b. Training was started as directed using both 8" and 175mm equipment. After completion of 4 weeks of composite training the unit was notified to prepare the 175mm guns for turn-in, to complete the training as a standard 8" SP battalion, and to deploy in this configuration. The first 4 weeks of training were further complicated by serious gasoli e restrictions imposed during one week due to budgetary limitations, and by constant difficulties experienced in securing range clearances which would allow the firing of both weapons systems. During this period, the unit was kept in a constant state of flux, not knowing from week to week what type of ammunition to draw or whether to submit range requests optimizing 175mm or 8" firing. Despite the problems encountered, the 175's were turned in expeditiously and Battery ATT's were conducted with twelve (12) 8" weapons during the 5th week of training. The final 3 weeks of training were devoted to training directed towards the standard 8" Army ATT. No serious problems were encountered during this phase of training, and the battalion ORT was successfully completed on 21 - 22 April 1967.

   a. Normal operations, consistent with the battalion mission, were conducted during the reporting period.
   b. The first round fired in RVN was fired by Battery C on 7 July 1967, the Battalion Organization Day.
   c. On 7 July 1967, Battery A became operational at their designated firing position at RVN VIC.
12 August 1967

Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

d. On 9 July 1967, battery B was detached and proceeded to vicinity of CIV B for fire support of Operation "PAINTED TOW", a joint operation conducted by the 9th Inf Div, 11th ACR, Australian, and SVN Forces. This mission terminated on 16 July 1967.

e. On 16 July 1967, one battery was deployed to a position in the vicinity of BiCh Ho with the mission of General Support Reinforcing the 1st Inf Div Art'y with priority of fires to DMZ NA Sector. On 28 July 1967 an additional battery plus an operational control element from battalion headquarters moved to the same location and assumed the same mission.

f. On 31 July 1967, battery C deployed its 8" platoon from the position at AN LOC to a firing position within the 9th Inf Div base Camp at Long Tan.

g. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>8&quot; Ammunition</th>
<th>175mm Ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>1219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>2344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>1363</td>
<td>1065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>1004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Logistics.

a. This battalion was alerted for deployment on 10 November 1966. Upon receiving the 4th US Army Logistical Letter which contained logistical instructions for deployments to U. P., an intensified program was initiated to implement this reference and all other logistical references so as to ensure that this battalion would attain the optimum equipment status prior to deployment. Shortly after being alerted, all outstanding requisitions were cancelled and resubmitted on 02 priority. Though some of our major items, such as meteorological equipment didn't arrive until shortly before the E.D., no significant problems were encountered. All sets of the post were made available to us for the conduct of the ICTF. Close coordination was maintained with G4 and the various support agencies from the time of alert to the E.D. Except for a few items which were deferred for in-country issue, the remainder of our TKIs were laterally transferred to this battalion approximately 10 days prior to the E.D. The cooperation of higher headquarters as well as the many support agencies was outstanding.
b. A battalion movement officer was appointed. This officer was responsible for attending the POM briefings, and for establishing liaison with Post Transportation, Field Maintenance, and Post Engineers which was necessary in order to prepare an SOP for the orderly inspection and preparation of equipment and personnel for shipment to the deployment area. This SOP included the following:

1. A list of all TOE and critical expendables by amount and the recommended manner of shipment such as general cargo, red TAT, and yellow TAT (advance and main body).

2. POM inspection procedures which established guide procedures, layout of equipment and listed sequence of events.

3. Packing and crating procedures. Details including the ordering of inserts, pallets, and various packing boxes and papers. Procedures for borrowing scales, forklifts, and banding machines with wire were included. Package numbers were assigned and instructions for the proper stenciling of containers and preparation of packing lists were included.

c. A maintenance project officer was appointed to coordinate the POM inspection. Items needing repair were immediately repaired and unserviceable items were replaced from post assets.

d. Escorts for the general cargo and WABTOC package were placed on TDY and accompanied the equipment to destination. The escorts were members of this battalion. The escorts to accompany the WABTOC ship also checked the red TAT at the west coast where it arrived approximately a week prior to the WABTOC vessel's departure.

6. Aviation.

- a. This battalion has no organic aircraft. Both rotary and fixed wing support are provided by the 54th Artillery Group on a mission basis.

7. Civic Action.

- a. No civic action projects have been initiated as yet with the exception of MEDCAP in conjunction with the 7th Bn 9th Arty.

8. Psychological Warfare.

- a. A small number of leaflets have been dropped by AO's in conjunction with scheduled VR's.
   
a. VHF communications were scheduled for installation between XUAN LOC and BEARCAT, BEARCAT and BEN LUC, and BEARCAT and DONG TAM on 1 July 1967. As of end of the reporting period, the BEARCAT VHF Channel is the only one installed. This channel was installed on 27 July 1967.

SECTION II
Part I, Observations

1. Personnel and Administration. None

2. Intelligence.
   a. Item: Map Issue.
      (1) Discussion: Maps, 1:50,000 and 1:250,000 were ordered on a priority requisition upon arrival of the advance party in RVN. The 1:50,000 maps were received but issue has not been effected on the 1:250,000 map sheets.
      (2) Observations: Map sheets 1:250,000 are needed for AO, for Operations Situation, VR, and Air Corridor Maps.

3. Training and Organization.
   a. Item: Training and Organization.
      (1) Discussion: On 10 November 1966, this unit received alert notification for shipment to RVN. Prior to commencing the ICTP on 25 February, information was received that the unit would deploy with each battery in a composite (2-175mm, 2-8" how) posture. After 4 weeks of training, the unit was notified to turn in the 175mm guns and complete the training as a standard 8" SP battalion and to deploy in this configuration. The unit deployed to RVN as directed and upon its arrival, was notified to reassume a composite configuration.
      (2) Observation: Heavy Artillery units scheduled to be configured as composite units upon arrival in RVN should be afforded the opportunity to schedule and complete the full spectrum of pre-deployment training as a composite unit.

4. Operations: None

5. Logistics.
   a. Item: Vehicles becoming amber as a result of the Intensified Combat Training Program.
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AVGACO-CO

12 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

(1) Discussion: Many of the vehicles and weapons were scheduled to become amber prior to or shortly after shipment due to age or mileage.

(2) Observation: Vehicles and weapons in this category were identified and exchanged for green equipment prior to ERD.

b. Item: Request for special letters of authority on equipment required in deployment area.

(1) Discussion: The battalion staff spent many hours preparing these letters, most of which were disapproved.

(2) Observations: Correspondence and information received from units in Vietnam recommended bringing many items for which no authorization existed. An approved list of items, if available, would have prevented the expenditure of useless efforts attempting to obtain equipment above TOE authorization.

6. Aviation.

a. Item: Shortage of Command and Control Aircraft.

(1) Discussion: A minimum of one aircraft each day for one-half of the day is required for this unit to effectively exercise command and control over assigned batteries.

(2) Observation: This unit has had assigned batteries deployed simultaneously in four different locations spread over a distance in excess of 50 miles. Due to the time and danger involved in attempting to reach them by road, it is mandatory that all liaison be affected using aerial transportation. At this time, due to apparent shortages of allocated aircraft within the group, effective and timely command and control cannot always be extended to the outlying batteries of the battalion.

SECTION II

Part II, Recommendations

1. Personnel and administration. None

2. Intelligence.

a. The basic load of map sheets should be issued to units prior to deployment to RVN, so as to enable key personnel to become familiar with the maps and key terrain features of their programmed areas of operation.
3. Training and Organization.

   a. Heavy Artillery units scheduled to be employed as a composite unit upon arrival in RVN should be notified of this fact at the time they receive alert notification. This would allow the unit to schedule the full spectrum of training and deploy as a composite unit, thus being more proficient and combat ready upon arrival in RVN.

4. Operations: None.

5. Logistics.

   a. Reference: Section II, Part I, Paragraph 5b. Recommend that a study be made to determine what items of equipment are common to and required by all units deploying to Vietnam, and that blanket authority be granted to eligible units to request such equipment prior to deployment.

6. Aviation.

   a. Reference: Section II, Part I, paragraph 6a. Recommend that organic aircraft be assigned to each battalion of the 54th Artillery Group in order to permit effective execution of command and control of batteries forced to operate independently over large areas.

s/ William S. Price

t/ WILLIAM S. PRICE

LTC, Artillery
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

SFCR (1 Aug 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1967,
          Reports Control Symbol CSFR(45) (UIC) U/A:TO:

HEAD QUARTERS, 54TH ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96376 17 August 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, CTX: VHGC-FAC
       APC 96266
       Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, CTX: VHGC-LAN,
       APO 96375
       Commanding-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, CTX: OLCH-CAT,
       APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
    Army, ATTN: AC5FOX, OA, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Operation Report from the 7th Bn, 8th Artillery is con-
   sidered adequate.

2. (C) Reference Section II Part I paragraph 2a, Eny Issue. The
   1:250,000 map sheets are not considered adequate for artillery use by
   the 54th Artillery Group.

3. (C) Reference Section II Part I paragraph 3a, Training and Organi-
   zation. The 54th Artillery Group strongly concurs. Units deploying to
   LAN should be allowed to train in the configuration in which they will
   be deployed.

4. (C) Reference Section II Part I paragraph 3a, Shortage of Aircraft.
   The 54th Artillery Group strongly concurs with the need for additional air-
   craft.

5. (U) Reference Section II Part II. The 54th Artillery Group con-
   curs with all recommendations of the 7th Bn, 8th Artillery.

JOHN J. KELLIUS
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AIVFB-FAC (12 Aug 67)  2nd Ed
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

DA, Hq, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266   28 Aug 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO: AVSC-DH, APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, APO: GPO-CT, APO 96950

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 7th Battalion, 4th Artillery (VJAEC) adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. (U) Concur with paragraphs 2a, 3a, 5a, and 6a, Section II, Part II.

[Signature]
R. B. Murphy
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
S U R J E C T : Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, 1 July 1967 (NCC 355FOR-66) (U)

D1, Hq II FFORC-V, APO San Francisco 96366 7 SEP 1967

TO: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DR, APO 96275

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters concurs with the comments and recommendations in the basic report and 1st and 2d indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. E. W AmuesWest
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl ne
AVHGC-DST (12 Aug 67) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending: 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 25 Oct 67

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOV-OT, APO 9658

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (HQAT) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning lack of aircraft, paragraph 6a, page 8; paragraph 6, page 9 and paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement. Comment: Requirement is valid and recognized by this headquarters. During the DA Standardization Team conference 1st week in September 1967, Aviation Sections were included as part of the Artillery Battalions MTOE. These MTOE were hand carried to DA for processing. If approved a considerable time lag is expected in fill of aviation sections due to lack of resources.

b. Reference item concerning basic load of maps, section II, part II, paragraph 2a, page 8: Nonconcur. CG CONARC unclassified message 59212, DTG 121840Z June 1967, changed the map issue procedure. All units deploying to HVN may draw planning and training maps in CONUS. All units irrespective of size will procure map basic loads upon arrival in-country. Map requisitions for basic load of maps for incoming units should be made by the sponsoring unit in accordance with USARV Regulation 220-10 and USARV Regulation 117-5.

c. Reference item concerning map issue, section II, part I, paragraph 2a, page 7. The allegation made concerning issue of 1:250,000 scale maps was investigated in detail by this headquarters on 15 September 1967. The USARV Long Binh map depot has no record of having received a map request from the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery during the months of June or July 1967. Neither the S2, II FFORCEV Artillery nor the S2, 54th Artillery Group were aware of any difficulty encountered by the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, concerning issue of 1:250,000 scale maps. The proper method of consolidating subordinate unit map requirements at group level before submission to USARV map depots was discussed and explained to all elements concerned. Consensus is that the comment made by the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery concerns a problem of internal procedure of the 54th Artillery Group which had not been consolidating map requests for subordinate units. The 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery does now in fact have the 1:250,000 scale maps which it requires and no further difficulty should be encountered.
d. Reference item concerning 1:250,000 map sheets, paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement: Concur. Medium scale 1:250,000 maps are not intended for operational use by artillery units. Stock levels of large scale 1:50,000 maps are sufficient in USARV map depots and these maps are intended for operational use by artillery units to meet tactical, technical, and administrative requirements.

3. Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. L. KENNEDY
Cpt, AGC
Ass't Adjutant General
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GPOP-DT (12 Aug 67) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 from HQ, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (UIC: WALTOAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
HEAVRIN SWIDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May - 31 July 1967

CO, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery

12 August 1967

N/A

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310