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**LIMITATION CHANGES**

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<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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**AUTHORITY**

GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (20 Jun 67) OR OT 670017

27 June 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (U.S. 8)

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act, Title 19, U.S.C., Section 503 and 42 U.S.C. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)

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Commanding Officer
7th Battalion, 9th Artillery
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH BATTALION, 9TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96370

AVGAW-C

11 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67 (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
54th Artillery Group
ATTN: AVGAW-C
APO 96257

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FAC
APO 96227

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307

Commander-In-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-4H
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.1G

Incl 1
SECTION I

(C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities

a. Administration/Personnel.

(1) Administration: During the reporting period, there have been no awards or decorations presented in this unit. One individual has been recommended for award of the Purple Heart but the award has not yet been approved.

(2) Personnel: This battalion arrived in country on 30 October 1966 with an assigned strength of 35 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 433 enlisted personnel. The total constituted 87% of our authorized strength. At present we have 35 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 493 enlisted personnel. We now have 99.1% of our authorized strength. There are no critical shortages of personnel and the unit is capable of performing all assigned missions.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Battalion air observer flew 124 missions during the reporting period. Type missions flown were:

(a) Convoy cover.

(b) Reconnaissance.

(c) Aerial observed fire missions.

(2) No combat or reconnaissance patrols were conducted.

c. Training.

(1) Batteries have been given live training in rigging and air lifting equipment utilizing CH-47 Chinook helicopters.

(2) All personnel have test fired, battle zeroed, and familiarized with their individual and crew served weapons.

(3) Batteries conduct cannoneer drill daily to increase speed and improve accuracy of artillery fires. Fire direction personnel conduct team drills during lulls in activities to increase proficiency in fire direction procedures.
(4) An active cross-training program has been followed. A number of survey personnel have been trained in fire direction procedures and are now capable of augmenting existing fire direction centers to assist in maintaining continuous 24 hour operation.

d. Operations.

(1) The battalion arrived in country on 30 October 1966 at Vung Tau. The unit was flown to Phu Loi, where it was staged and sponsored by the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, 23rd Artillery Group.

(2) "C" Battery fired the first in-country round of the battalion on 9 November 1966 at Phu Loi base camp, 23rd Artillery Group, in the vicinity of coordinates XT 858155. The battery remained in Phu Loi until 14 November 1966, when it moved to Xuan Loc in the vicinity of coordinates YT 467089 to provide fire support for base camp defense. It remained at Xuan Loc until 13 January 1967, then moved to Bear Cat, the permanent base camp for the entire battalion in the vicinity of coordinates YS 167995.

(3) Headquarters Battery and "B" Battery moved to the Bear Cat base camp on 10 November 1966. "B" Battery fired its first round at Bear Cat on 11 November 1966. Service Battery arrived on 13 November 1966. The battalion was completely operational on 14 November 1966.

(4) "A" Battery remained at Phu Loi until 24 November 1966. While there the battery fired in support of elements of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry when they were attacked by an enemy force, estimated at 300-400 VC. This action resulted in 43 VC dead by body count. On 24 November the battery moved to Bear Cat.

(5) Operation DAN TAM 81. On 7 December 1966, "B" Battery was attached to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to give artillery support to the rice harvest operation in the Binh Tuy Province. On 7 December, the battery moved to Xuan Loc, and on 8 December, the unit linked up with the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for move to firing positions at Vo Dat in the vicinity of coordinates YT 721326. However, due to road conditions, the battery had to occupy positions at Gia Ray in the vicinity of coordinates YT 625112. They remained there until 25 December when they moved to Vo Dat. On 26 December, they displaced to Vo Xu in the vicinity of coordinates YT 813380. The battery was relieved from attachment to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment on 29 December, and was given the mission of General Support to the 43rd ARVN Regiment, 18th ARVN Division.

(6) On 12 January 1967, "B" Battery moved and occupied firing positions of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery at Xuan Loc. They remained there until 21 January when they returned to Bear Cat.
(7) Operation FAIRFAX. On 4 January 1967, "A" Battery was attached to the 1st Infantry Division to participate in Operation FAIRFAX. The battery departed Bear Cat and occupied positions at the Vietnamese Army's Infantry School near Thu Duc. It remained there in direct support of the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry. During this operation, the fires of the battery accounted for 6 Viet Cong dead by body count. On 13 January the battery moved to Phu Loi to occupy firing positions of the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery to fire in support of base camp defense.

(8) "A" Battery remained at Phu Loi until 19 January 1967 when it was relieved from attachment to the 1st Infantry Division and moved to Tan Son Nhut Airbase in the vicinity of coordinates Xs 802969 to replace "C" Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery. Its mission there was to provide artillery fires in support of the defense of Tan Son Nhut. It remained there through the end of the reporting period.

(9) Operation COLBY: On 21 January, "C" Battery was attached to the 9th Infantry Division. It occupied positions near the town of Binh Son in the vicinity of coordinates XS 208934. Its mission was to provide Direct Support to various infantry battalions operating near the Binh Son rubber plantation. It remained there through the end of the reporting period.

e. Logistics.

(1) Logistical activities for the period of this report consisted of normal resupply of the battalion. Approximately 37,200 miles were traveled by Service Battery elements in support missions and 774 tons of ammunition were transported by the ammunition train.

(2) The WABTOC materials for the battalion arrived at the Saigon port on 23 November 1966. During the period 25 November through 28 November, twenty-four 5-ton truck loads and forty-six 2½-ton truck loads of materials were moved from the Saigon docks to our base camp. All materials hauled were by the battalion's organic equipment.

(3) During the period 29 December 1966 through 12 January 1967, "B" Battery was at Vo Xu in support of the 43rd ARVN Regiment during operation DAN TAH 81. Because of insecure roads, resupply had to be accomplished by air. Class I and III supplies were moved by CV-2B Caribou aircraft. Class V and water were carried by CH-47, Chinook helicopter.

f. Civic Action. Most of the civic action projects of the battalion were accomplished by batteries while on operations.

(1) "B" Battery, while on operation DAN TAH 81, repaired two water pumps for the villagers at Gia Ray.
(2) On the same operation, some 347 Vietnamese children
and civilians were treated by the battery aid man at the village of Vo Xu.

(3) The battalion surgeon is participating in IED CAP in
conjunction with the program established by the 9th Infantry Division.

g. Number of missions and ammunition expended during the re-
porting period:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF MISSIONS</th>
<th>105mm AMMO EXPENDED</th>
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h. The following is the number of days batteries were away
from base camp during the reporting period.

(1) "A" Battery - 50 days
(2) "B" Battery - 53 days
(3) "C" Battery - 83 days

i. The batteries scheduled four hours per week for conducting
training. While on operations, section training was conducted during lulls
in activity.

Part I. Observations:

A. Personnel: While this battalion arrived in country with only
87% strength, the unit was capable of performing its mission and most filler
personnel have since arrived. There are no major shortages.

B. Operations:

Target Plot Inspections

ITEM: Target plot inspection by the fire direction officer.

DISCUSSION: Personnel requesting fire did not always inspect
the target in sufficient detail to insure that friendly personnel and vil-
lages were not in the area. This occurred quite frequently on H & I targets.

OBSERVATION: The fire direction officer must carefully in-
spect each target plot, both on the 1:50,000 map and the 1:25,000 pictomap
supplement to insure that the rounds will not impact inside prescribed
distances from friendly villages. Any plot that the fire direction officer
feels is questionable should be referred to the requesting agency for veri-
ification.

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**Firing Charts**

**ITEM:** 6400 mil firing charts.

**DISCUSSION:** At the time the battalion was activated, the Ft. Sill Fire Coordination and Control letter No. 1, had not been distributed. The unit adopted the template system recommended in several lessons learned publications. The system, when used properly proved rapid and accurate. After arrival in country, the recommended Ft. Sill system was tested and found to be satisfactory. Both systems, however, have disadvantages imposed by inadequate equipment. 3200 or 6400 mil RDP's would eliminate the numerous deflection and azimuth indexes and simplify the gunnery problems.

**OBSERVATION:** 6400 mil firing equipment should be developed and issued to artillery units in Vietnam as soon as possible. Additionally, a single 6400 mil firing procedure should be developed and incorporated in FM 6-40.

**6400 mil Firing Capability**

**ITEM:** Wind cards, 105 H-6.

**DISCUSSION:** Prior to deploying for Vietnam, this unit requested and received 105 H-6 Wind Cards. Upon arrival in-country, the Wind Cards were incorporated into the 6400 mil firing system. Since conduct of registrations are limited by observer availability and other restricting factors, registrations for a given charge are generally conducted on only one azimuth. Application of Wind Card data for targets within range transfer limits, but outside deflection transfer limits, sometimes resulted in large corrections (5 mils deflection and up to 100 meters in range). Application of corrections of this magnitude are vital in the conduct of close-in fire.

**OBSERVATION:** Wind card procedures should be incorporated in FM 6-40 and recommended for all caliber of artillery operating in an environment requiring a 6400 mil firing capability.

**Fire Direction Centers**

**ITEM:** Function of fire direction centers in base camps.

**DISCUSSION:** This battalion has experienced that 105mm batteries are seldom in base camps for long periods of time. Normally the battalion has had only one organic battery in base camp at any one time. There has been no need for the operation of both battalion and battery fire direction centers while in base camp.
OBSERVATION: The battalion FDC is best equipped to control the fires of batteries in base camp. Battery FDC personnel provide shifts for the battalion FDC. This procedure gives the battalion fire direction officer the opportunity to monitor and assist all fire direction personnel in the unit and insures uniformity of FDC procedures within the battalion.

Firing Battery Configuration

ITEM: Firing battery howitzer configuration suitable for firing.

DISCUSSION: Since arrival in-country, this unit has occupied a number of established artillery positions, each having a different layout for distribution of pieces. In many cases, positions were such that special corrections were required to mass the fires of the battery, regardless of the azimuth of fire. It has been the experience of this unit that the star formation gives the most effective distribution. The fire of none of the pieces has been restricted except for piece mask, with the firing battery employed in the manner. In this configuration the sheaf is always similar and fire can be accurately and effectively delivered regardless of the direction of fire.

OBSERVATION: The star configuration for six-gun batteries is recommended for use when the battery is employed as a single fire unit.

Ammunition Exposure

ITEM: Howitzer ammunition exposure to high humidity.

DISCUSSION: Unpacked ammunition powder increments have been noted to absorb moisture especially during the night and early morning hours. Extreme care must be taken with howitzer ammunition to insure that powder increments are not allowed to absorb moisture.

OBSERVATION: The battery executive officer must insure that excessive ammunition is not unpacked. Ammunition that has been unpacked should be stored with the fiber container ends placed over both ends of the canister to protect the primer and powder increments.

Air Movement Procedures

ITEM: Air movement equipment and training.

DISCUSSION: Prior to deployment to Vietnam, the unit received a brief instructional presentation on CH-47 Chinook air movement procedures. The unit was unable to obtain air movement rigging equipment in CONUS and received information that it was readily available in-country. Since ar-
rival the battalion has been able to obtain only enough rigging to air-
lift one firing battery. CH-47 helicopters can be obtained for training
exercises, however, aircraft availability time is limited.

OBSERVATION: 105mm howitzer units deploying to Vietnam should
make application for required rigging equipment prior to departing CONUS.
Extensive training in air movement and development of unit air movement
SOF's should be accomplished prior to deployment.

C. Training and Organization:

Cross Training

ITEM: Training of survey personnel in FDC procedures.

DISCUSSION: Due to the continuous 24 hour operation of fire
direction centers, additional personnel above those authorized must be
cross-trained in fire direction procedures.

OBSERVATION: Because of the relatively few requirements for
detailed survey, survey personnel should be cross trained in FDC. This
training permits their use on shifts in FDC and also permits them to be
available for survey when the requirement for survey exists.

SHELLREP Teams

ITEM: Training of shellrep teams.

DISCUSSION: Many times countermortar radar is not available
to provide a rapid and accurate means of locating enemy mortar positions.
In order to provide accurate and rapid countermortar fire, shellrep teams
must be organized and trained in shellrep procedures as outlined in FM 6-121.

OBSERVATION: All unit personnel should be taught the basic
principles of shellrep procedures. A minimum of two teams per battery
should be organized and given detailed training to insure a high state of
readiness.

D. Intelligence:

Air Observation

ITEM: Mission time for air observers

DISCUSSION: Based upon operational experience of air obser-
vers in this unit, it has been observed that the ability of an air observer
to perform all his observer functions decreases after being in the air in
excess of two consecutive hours and engaged solely in visual reconnaissance.
OBSERVATION: When possible, air observers should be rotated or given a rest on the ground after two hours of flying time.

E. Logistics:

Use of CONEX Containers

ITEM: Shortage of secure dry storage space.

DISCUSSION: This battalion deployed for Vietnam with the majority of its equipment packed in vehicles and trailers utilizing very few CONEX containers. Since arrival in-country this battalion has experienced difficulty in having available a sufficient amount of dry secure storage area. CONEX containers provide an excellent storage facility.

OBSERVATION: Units deploying for Vietnam should be allowed to obtain and pack a sufficient number of CONEX containers to facilitate future operations.

Packing of Personal Equipment

ITEM: Arrival of Red Disk T.T after arrival of main body.

DISCUSSION: Because of transportation problems, a unit usually receives its Red Disk T.T from three to five days after the arrival of the main body of troops. Because of the large amount of personal equipment that each individual must have for deployment, not all of it can be carried in the duffel bag. Each individual must pack a separate box and ship it as Red Disk T.T. Because of limitations placed on Yellow Disk T.T this unit packed its armored vests and mosquito bars in Red Disk T.T, thus making them unavailable immediately upon arrival. This equipment was packed as instructed at CONUS station and the unit was informed that it would accompany personnel to final destination.

OBSERVATION: Units should insure that items needed for personal protection be hand carried by the individual or in his duffle bag. Sufficient allowances should be provided in Yellow Disk T.T for this equipment.

F. Communications.

RC-292 Antenna

ITEM: Reduced range capability of the RC-292 Antenna.

DISCUSSION: The range capability of the RC-292 antenna is greatly reduced due to the terrain and climate in Vietnam. This unit has used additional mast sections (AB-35/TRC-7) with the antenna to raise the elevation of the antenna base (MF-68).
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OBSERVATION: The use of additional mast sections greatly increases the range capability of the RC-292.

Antenna Group GR-4

ITEM: Use of Antenna Group GR-4 with the AN/GRC 46 radios.

DISCUSSION: This unit has experienced that the Antenna Group GR-4 is the most satisfactory antenna for the operation of the AN/GRC 46 AM radio. The long wire and doublet type antennas have proven to be unsatisfactory due to the orientation requirements when batteries are widely separated.

OBSERVATION: The Antenna Group GR-4 is the most satisfactory antenna with the AN/GRC 46 AM radio.

Spare Radio

ITEM: Need for spare AN/VRC 46 FH radio in the firing battery.

DISCUSSION: The firing elements of this battalion are normally located independently and at some distance from the battalion headquarters. Since the firing battery is not authorized any radio repair element, each battery needs one spare AN/VRC 46 FH radio to insure continuity of operation when a radio becomes inoperative and must be evacuated for repair.

OBSERVATION: One spare AN/VRC 46 FH radio is needed in each firing battery.

AN/GRC-46 AM Radio

ITEM: Modification to the AN/GRC-46 AM radio.

DISCUSSION: To operate the AN/GRC-46 AM radio in this theatre, it must be modified to accept the communication security equipment, TSEC/KW-7. The radios belonging to this battalion were not modified prior to shipment due to non-availability of the modification kit. As a result the sets were inoperative in excess of three months after arrival in-country awaiting application of required modifications.

OBSERVATION: All modifications should be applied to AN/GRC-46 AM radios prior to unit deployment.

Telephone Set T-312/PT

ITEM: Need for additional field telephones T-312/PT.
DISCUSSION: Commercial type telephones are normally not available to combat units in base camp. Telephones are required by operational necessity to be installed in working and living areas of key unit personnel. This situation places a great demand on telephones authorized by TOE.

OBSERVATION: Additional field telephones Ta-312/PT should be requisitioned prior to deployment.

Part II. Recommendations:
A. Fire direction officers should inspect each target plot to insure that rounds will not impact within prescribed safety distances.
B. Standard equipment and procedures should be developed for 6400 mil firing techniques.
C. All artillery requiring 6400 mil capability should utilize wind cards.
D. Battery and battalion fire direction centers should be consolidated while in base camp.
E. The star configuration should be utilized when the battery is employed as a single fire unit.
F. Excessive ammunition should not be unpacked. All unpacked ammunition must be carefully protected to guard against absorption of moisture by powder increment.
G. 105mm howitzer battalions should be trained in airlift procedures and should have on hand all necessary rigging equipment prior to deployment.
H. Survey personnel should be cross trained in fire direction procedures.
I. Training in shellrep procedures should be conducted and a minimum of two teams per battery should be organized.
J. Air observers should not be required to fly visual reconnaissance missions for extended periods of time.
K. Sufficient CONEX containers should be authorized unit deploying for Vietnam to facilitate future operations.
L. Additional allowances should be permitted in Yellow Disk TAT to insure that personnel have on hand all equipment needed for his personal protection.

M. Additional mast sections should be utilized with the RC-292 antenna.

N. The antenna group GRA-4 should be utilized with the AN/GRC 46 AN radio.

O. An additional AN/VRC 46 radio should be authorized each firing battery.

P. The AN/GRC 46 radio should have all modifications applied prior to units deployment.

Q. Units deploying for Vietnam should be authorized to requisition additional TA-312/PT field telephones.

WALLACE E. NICKEL

LTC Artillery

Commanding
AVGA-C (11 Feb 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operation Report on Lesson Learned (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 54TH ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96376

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFB-FAC, APO 96266
Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO-PKH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 7th Bn, 9th Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph B, Target Plot Inspections. In addition to target plot inspections a complete system of dual checks has been instituted on the guns and in the fire direction center. There have been no injuries to friendly personnel by this unit.

3. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph B, Air Movement Procedures. Correspondence from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command indicates that air mobility equipment will be available in March 1967.

4. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph B, Firing Charts. This headquarters concurs with the need for a 3200 or 6400 mil RDP. The situation and mission in Vietnam require that artillery units maintain a 6400 mil capability. Using standard FDC equipment requires numerous deflection and azimuth indexes. A 3200 or 6400 mil RDP would alleviate this problem. This headquarters is writing to the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School at Fort Sill to determine the availability of the 3200 mil arc range-deflection protractor depicted on page 80 of the January 1967 issue of "Artillery Trends".

5. (C) Reference Section II, Part II. Concur with all recommendations of the 7th Bn, 9th Artillery.

CHARLES M. MIZE
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
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AVFB-PAC (11 Feb 67) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67 (U)

DA, HQ, II FORCENW Arty, APO 96266 3 APR 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307
Commander In Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly operational report submitted by the 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B of basic document and paragraph 4 of 1st Indorsement; concur. The 23d Artillery Group recently conducted field tests of the 3200 mil RDP referred to in 1st Indorsement. The RDP proved to be inaccurate due to its 1:50,000 scale and to the oversized vertex which permitted the instrument to slip. Recommend that the RDP be redesigned for test use at a scale of 1:25,000 with the vertex sized to fit the standard plotting pin.

3. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph N of basic document; concur. Both the AN/GRA-4 and AN/GRA-50 antenna groups have proven effective in RVN when used with the AN/GRC-46 radio.

4. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph Q of basic document; concur. Field artillery units must maintain communications systems both in base camps and in operational areas. Present supply procedures do not assure the availability of the necessary additional telephones within a reasonable period after arriving in RVN. Recommend that units be permitted to requisition additional TA-312/PT telephones at a rate of 20% above TOE authorizations before departing CONUS.

5. (U) Concur with all other recommendations in basic document.

W. D. CRITTENDEN, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
AVFBC-H (11 Feb 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery
DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 4 APR 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96907

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-ME, APO 96528

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery for the quarter ending 31 January 1967 is considered adequate and is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the 1st and 2nd indorsement. Concur with the comments, recommendations and actions taken as stated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES A. ULVEMES
Capt. AGC
Asst. AG

Repced: UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From Classified Inclosures

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A.ViWC-DST (11 Feb 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (HCS C504-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
   Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 7th
   Battalion, 9th Artillery, as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item on 6400 mil firing charts, page 6; para-
      graph B, page 11; paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement; and paragraph 2, 2d
      Indorsement: Concur. The nature of operations in Vietnam demands
      that artillery units have a continuous capability for 6400 mil fire.
      The development of 6400 mil firing equipment and a single 6400 mil
      firing procedure for incorporation in FM 6-40 deserves high
      priority.

   b. Reference item on spare radios, page 10, and paragraph 0, page
      12: The supply of the new series of radios in SVN remains cri-
      tical. An increase in TOE authorization to overcome maintenance pro-
      blems, however, is not appropriate. Close coordination with the di-
      rect support maintenance unit must be maintained.

   c. Reference item on the need for additional field tele-
      phones TA-312/PT, pages 10 and 11; paragraph 4, page 12; and para-
      graph 4, 2d Indorsement: Units should not as a rule be authorized to
      draw base camp communications equipment prior to deployment. The 1st
      Signal Brigade is responsible for installing base camp communications
      as rapidly as work priorities and available assets permit.

   d. Concur with all other recommendations of the unit, and
      comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. L. KENNEDY
CPT, AG
Asst Adjutant General

16

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FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
GPOP-OT (11 Feb 67)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 Jan 67 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) - Hq 7th Bn, 9th Arty

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  13 JUN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in basic report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph E, Part I, Section II. Present policy permits units in Vietnam to retain CONEX containers for storage, Authorization in CONUS, however, should be based on availability of the item.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. R. KOBAZY
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 30 Oct 66 to 31 Jan 67.

CO, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery.

11 February 1967

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310