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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (14 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 702258 22 July 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Company H (RANGER), 75th Infantry, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, ADC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

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Co H (RANGER), 75th Infantry
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Co H (RANGER), 75th Inf (ABN), Period Ending 30 April 1970, HQS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

   a. During the reporting period, Company H (RANGER) continued to provide long range reconnaissance and surveillance for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Ranger patrols continued to be deployed according to current enemy activity with emphasis being placed on the recovery of documents and positive identification of enemy routes of movement. During this reporting period, Company H (RANGER) employed 95 patrols, of which 47 made sightings of enemy personnel, resulting in 20 engagements and 6 VC/NVA KIA.

   b. The Dong Tien operations with the ARVN Airborne Division, began in December 1969, ended on 22 April 1970. Under the program, selected members of the ARVN Airborne Recon Company were trained by H Company (RANGER) in methods and techniques of US LRP's. The program proved to be very successful.

   c. During the reporting period three changes in key personnel were experienced. Captain William S. Carrier III replaced Captain Richard K. Griffiths as Commanding Officer, 1LT John H. Armstrong replaced Captain Arthur A. Rice as Executive Officer, 2LT John R. Rowland became a Platoon Leader.

   d. On 07 February Ranger Team 43 was operating in the 2nd Brigade.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

a. The area showed heavy recent use. The team set up in an ambush position at 1055165 at 1745 hours. By 1940 hours a total of twenty armed individuals wearing green uniforms had moved past the ambush position. At 1944 hours approximately 30 individuals with bicycles stopped on the trail in front of the team's location. The patrol detonated the ambush and engaged with small arms fire and hand grenades, receiving small arms fire from the fleeing enemy. At 2005 hours when requested AAM and night hawk aircraft arrived on station, the team adjusted the supporting fire on suspected enemy locations, and observed one secondary explosion. A check of the contact area revealed five NVA KIA, six bicycles, twelve 220 pound bags of rice, one SKS, and a significant amount of enemy equipment captured. At 2055 hours the team was extracted by C 1/9, after which an air strike was placed on the contact area.

b. On 170925 February, while in an overnight halt, a patrol in the 2nd Brigade sector, vicinity of 1022024, Ranger Team 45 observed thirty individuals move past its location. Twenty of the individuals were armed with AK-47's and ten were carrying large rucksacks. At 1035 hours 2nd Brigade Scouts arrived on station and engaged the individuals approximately two KI from the team's location. 2nd Brigade Scouts continued to engage the enemy as a total of eight-three individuals had passed by the team's location. 2nd Brigade Scouts, AAM, and night hawk continuously monitoring the surrounding area and responding to ground-to-air fire accounted for forty-five enemy KIA. The Ranger Team did not engage the area.

c. Ranger patrol 52 was performing reconnaissance and surveillance of its assigned area in the 3rd Brigade area. The patrol established an overnight halt at 091630 March at 1166264. At 1000 hours the Assistant
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AVDALL-2F

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

Patrol Leader went into convulsions and the team leader immediately requested a Medevac. At 1625 hours the Medevac aircraft arrived on station. At the pilots' request the team marked its position with smoke, thereby compromising its location. After the TL was extracted by jungle penetrator, a lift ship from C 1/9 arrived on station to extract the remaining team members. A sit down IZ was not available and the aircraft commander informed the team that they would have to be extracted by jungle penetrator. At 1930 hours as the last two members of the team were raised to the aircraft one member of the team lost his grip and fell approximately 125 feet to his death.

g. On 111630 March Ranger Patrol 71 established an overnight halt to monitor a trail and several bunkers, in the vicinity of YT 037966, in the 3rd Brigade AO. At 1830 hours the patrol observed one individual staggering down the trail in front of their location. The patrol engaged the individual with small arms fire resulting in one enemy KIA. A search of the contact area revealed in addition to the one enemy KIA, one SKS, one AK-47, and a significant amount of enemy equipment.

h. Ranger Team 72 was monitoring a trail in the 2nd Brigade AO vicinity YU 493473 on 301350 March. At that time the team observed six individuals move past their location and engaged them with claymore mines and small arms fire, receiving heavy small arms fire in return. The team leader adjusted AGL onto the contact area. A check of the contact area produced three NVA KIA, three AK-47s, two rucksacks, and a sizeable amount of personnel equipment. As the extraction ship arrived on station the LOC of
On 01 April, Alpha Patrol 55 at grid UX 950122, while monitoring a northwest-southeast trail observed 12 individuals moving to the northwest. The individuals were wearing green uniforms, and NVA chest web-gear, and carried AK-47s. Six individuals were carrying small packs. All the individuals had fresh haircuts and new uniforms. At 1555 hours, while monitoring the same trail, the team observed one individual moving to the southeast carrying an AK-47 and wearing chest web-gear and a green uniform. The team engaged the suspected enemy location with artillery. On 02 April, at 0700 hours, the patrol observed four individuals moving to the southeast on the trail with one individual carrying an M-16, US type web-gear, and fragmentation grenades. The remaining were carrying AK-47s, chest web-gear, and moderate size packs. At 1640 hours, the patrol leader, medic, and rear scout, while moving out to reconnoiter claymore mines, received one fragmentation grenade which came from bushes on the opposite side of the trail. The grenade did not detonate. The patrol leader immediately picked up the grenade and threw it back toward the point from which it came. Shortly thereafter, the grenade exploded. The patrol engaged the area with small arms fire and received small arms fire in return. The patrol continued to suppress the contact area.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970 with small arms fire until 1645 hours, when B 1/9 Air Cav and 2/20 ARA arrived on station. The 2/20 ARA suppressed the contact area until 1703 hours, at which time B 1/9 Air Cav requested that the patrol move to the PZ without checking the contact area due to a low POL supply on the helicopter. The patrol then moved east and was extracted by B 1/9 Air Cav at 1715 hours.

j. On 25 April Ranger Patrol 79 at YU 361351, while monitoring a north-south trail, heard two signal shots, at 1550 hours, 200 meters to the east. At 1600 hours, the patrol heard movement 50 meters to the south and west. At 1605 hours, a light fire team arrived on station and engaged one individual 500 meters northeast of the team's location. The light fire team then spotted and engaged two individuals 100 meters southeast of the patrol. At 1615 hours, the patrol began moving northwest when the rear scout spotted and engaged one individual 30 meters to the southwest. The enemy evaded to the southwest leaving a heavy blood trail. The light fire team spotted and engaged the same individual in a fighting position 40 meters to the southwest. At 1645 hours, the light fire team spotted and engaged one more individual 50 meters to the northwest who was lying prone on the trail. At 1700 hours, the patrol moved northeast 200 meters to YU 363353, where they were extracted by a 27th Assault Helicopter Battalion Command and Control ship.

2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations
   a. Personnel: None
   b. Intelligence: None
   c. Operations: Tactics of the enemy
      (1) OBSERVATION: When a Ranger team observes a large enemy force, the team leader will call for artillery and/or ARA/Tink Team coverage. After the enemy has been engaged by supporting fires,
it often dispatches a searching force to seek out the source of fire adjustment, in this case, the Ranger team.

(2) EVALUATION: The enemy has a basic understanding of the tactics and habits of the Ranger-type units. He realizes that if suddenly he becomes the target of adjusted artillery or ARA fires while he is under jungle canopy, secure from aerial observation, someone must be adjusting those fires. The counter-measure which he often employs, is to backtrack along the traveled route to seek out his hidden enemy. This recon party either physically searches the area adjacent to the traveled route or reconnoiters by fire.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Ranger teams must be particularly alert when covertly adjusting supporting fires on an observed enemy force. Should an enemy recon element begin to search for the team position, the Ranger team must take care not to prematurely compromise its location by firing at a distant enemy which itself is simply reconning by fire.

c. Organization: None

d. Training: None

e. Logistics: None

f. Communications:

(1) OBSERVATION: Lack of satisfactory communications with teams in the field is a major problem for this command.

(2) EVALUATION: The planning range for an AN/ARC-37 or AN/ARC-77 radio is 10-12 KM. Our Ranger teams consistently operate at ranges far in excess of these figures from either of the mountain routes. Although desirable, voice communication is not essential.
S U P E R I O R  A N A L Y S I S  A N D  O P E R A T I O N A L  R E P O R T  3 0  A P R I L  1 9 7 6

H Company (RANGER) uses a sound code of squelch breaks to communicate when distances are too great to ensure the voice communications are not effective. However, often times, ranges become so great that even squelch breaks are not effective. When this happens, some of the missions so far have been successful. In practice, airborne relays at a nearby fire base is possible on occasion; however, due to a shortage of aircraft and Ranger personnel, it is seldom practical.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: This command should be supplied with a portable radio set with a planning range of 20-25 KM. This additional planning range will greatly enhance the capability of Company H (RANGER) to perform its assigned mission.

h. Materiel: None

i. Others: Safety measures for the extraction by jungle penetrator.

(1) OBSERVATION: A member of this command fell to his death while being extracted from a field location by jungle penetrator.

A safe, fool-proof method of securing the rider to the jungle penetrator rig was deemed necessary.

(2) EVALUATION: The bulk of a full rucksack prevents a Ranger from using the safety strap organic to a jungle penetrator. In addition, the weight of the equipment worn (rucksack and lead bearing equipment) tends to pull the man backward off the seat of the jungle penetrator.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Men riding the jungle penetrator will not carry or wear equipment; it will, instead, be lashed to a "Y"
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

Bolt welded to the penetrator chart. The Ranger rider will tie his sling rope snuggly around his chest securing it with a square knot and half-hitches. His snaplink will then be attached to the loose rope end and be secured to the penetrator cable.
In this manner, the rider will be safely tied to the penetrator, in case he inadvertently falls. This safety measure is presently SOI for extraction of Ranger teams by jungle penetrator.

WILLIAM S. CARR LEG III
Captain, Infantry
Commanding
AVDAGT-DT (15 May 70) 1st Inf

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Co H (RANGER), 75th Inf (ABN), Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA: Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), APO San Francisco 96490

19 May 1970
TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO San Francisco 96266

This headquarters has reviewed and concur with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Co H (RANGER), 75th Infantry (ABN).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KENNETH R. SWAIM
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVYBC-RE (i5 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Company H (Ranger), 75th Infantry (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS: CSFO2-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 1 JUN 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC (DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Company H (Ranger), 75th Infantry (Airborne).

2. (C) Reference item concerning "Lack of Satisfactory Communications", page 6, paragraph 2g. Ten radio sets, AN/PRC 74B, with AM voice capability of approximately 50 miles and CW capability of approximately 300 miles, have been authorized by MTOE 7-157 GP02, dated 5 March 1970. Reporting unit has been notified of the authorization for the radio sets and will submit a requisition. Pending receipt of these radios through normal supply channels, the unit has made arrangements to procure, on a temporary loan, six radio sets, AN/PRC 74B, for field testing. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. B**TEL, JR.
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CFs:
CG, 1st Cav Div (AN)
CO, Co H (Rgr), 75th Inf

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Co H (RANGER), 75th Inf (Abn), Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CPFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GOF-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, Co H (RANGER), 75th Inf (Abn) and concurs with the comments of issuing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "Jungle Penetrator," page 7, para 21; concur. To expedite the proposed modification, the unit is submitting an EIR. II Field Force is monitoring this action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clif W. Simons Jr.
CFO
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
Co H (RANGER), 75th Inf (Abn)
HQ, IIFFV, APO 96266
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Co H (Ranger), 75th Infantry (Abn) for period ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, Company H (RANGER), 75th Infantry

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 70 to 30 Apr 70.

CO, Company H (RANGER), 75th Infantry

PROJECT NO. N/A

Sponsor's Military Activity

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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