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GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA QD (18 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701211 29 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, I Corps (Gp), ATTN: EACICT-T
APO San Francisco 96358
Commanding General, Eighth US Army, ATTN: EAGO-MH,
APO San Francisco 96301
Commanding General, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO
San Francisco 96558

TO: ACSFOR, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (S) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Increased Cavalry Troop Capabilities: General Order 524, dated
      24 January 1969, reorganized the 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry under TOE
      17-105G. This reorganization increased personnel and equipment author-
      izations and enabled the Cav Sqdn to organize "D" Troop which was previ-
      ously at a zero strength level for personnel and equipment. The Air
      Cav Troop now has operational control of one UH-1B and three OH-23G
      helicopters and is assigned two officers, three warrant officers, and 36
      EM. An additional UH-1B and UH-1D are operated and maintained by the
      2d Avn Bn pending an increase in the 4-7 Cav Sqdn maintenance capability.
      This reorganization essentially extends the capability of the squadron to
      perform its normal reconnaissance and security missions. While the troop
      configuration lacks an aero-weapons section, with projected assets the troop
      will possess adequate command and control resources, an aero-scout cap-
      ability, and a limited lift capability for employment of an aero-rifle element
      or quick reaction force. The troop has now initiated quick reaction force and
      aerial gunnery training.
b. During the period 19-21 November 1969, the 2d Infantry Division conducted a communications exercise designed to evaluate the adequacy of the Division Tactical Communications System under normal operating conditions. Additionally, the exercise served as a vehicle to acquaint commanders and staffs with the capabilities and limitations of the tactical communications system available to them. All division radio nets and tactical radio relay and wire systems were utilized. The reliability of the tactical system as a whole was extremely high. Exceptions were the high frequency, AM radio communications and off-line encryption systems which were experiencing a high deadline rate. The exercise provided excellent training for communications personnel and pointed out that operator proficiency and equipment maintenance need additional emphasis.

c. The POL restrictions implemented in November 1969, four months after the beginning of the fiscal year, were reflected in the operations and training of the Division. Tactical operations were reduced in scope and only the minimum amount of training was conducted. A projection of POL requirements indicated that even these essential activities would be reduced unless relief was granted. Consequently an additional POL allocation was requested and approved. 12.5% increase in MOGAS allocation and a 6.45% increase in Diesel was allocated and should provide sufficient POL for the conduct of essential operations and training for the remainder of the fiscal year.

d. The 2d Infantry Division has received six AN/PPS-5 radars. This radar should eventually replace the AN/TPS-33 and the AN/PPS-4 radars in all 2d Infantry Division units. The Army Electronics Command (ECOM) conducted a one week operations and maintenance course for this equipment in December 1969. Two AN/PPS-5 radars are currently employed south of the IMJIN River in conjunction with operation KICKAPOO (Anti-agent surveillance of IMJIN River) and two are employed in locations forward of the IMJIN River to monitor North Korean activity. Initial reports from radar operators have been favorable and indicate that readout from the two visual scopes reduces operator fatigue and permits exact determination of direction and azimuth.

e. During December 1969, a study was conducted to determine the extent of the North Korean infiltration threat in the 97th ROK Regimental Combat Team (RCT) area of responsibility (AOR). In addition this study assessed
additional measures which might be employed to counter the threat. Conclusions were that the North Korean agent infiltration threat in this sector is significant and the 97th RCT counter-infiltration posture should be improved to meet the future threat. To counter this increased infiltration threat, construction of a seven kilometer chain link fence was approved and is now being constructed by the 97th RCT along their front on the Han River vic BS 966817 to BS 963858. Materials were provided mainly by Eighth US Army. Future construction efforts will be directed towards construction of an IMJIN River barrier, vic cord CS 002913 to CS 012902 and erection of 3-4 man observation towers in high priority infiltration areas. The proposed IMJIN River barrier will consist of an illuminated physical barrier system suspended from floating buoys. Lights will be mounted on every third buoy to illuminate the river and a complex of anti-swimmer fishhooks will be suspended at random lengths between the buoys to prevent enemy agents from using the river as a means of infiltration/exfiltration. Observation of this barrier will be augmented by searchlights positioned on the high ground on each shore.

f. To increase the effectiveness of the barrier fence the following projects are in progress:

(1) ARPA fence: An instrumented fence designed by Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) has been installed in conjunction with the Chain Link barrier fence for evaluation along a three kilometer section of the 2-38th/1-23d Infantry sector along the DMZ. The ARPA fence is a six-strand barbed wire fence which sounds an alarm when any of the wires are cut, when a pressure exceeding ten (10) pounds is exerted on the wires, or when the fence is short-circuited. Based on availability of funds and the results of this evaluation, additional ARPA fence may be installed within the 2d Infantry Division.

(2) Barrier Lighting: The 2d Infantry Division is attempting to augment surveillance of the barrier fence through the use of lights and at the present time approximately five kilometers of fence have been lighted using local resources. ARPA has expressed interest in construction of a lighting system along the fence and plans to construct a two kilometer test section by 1 October 1970. After evaluation of the initial test section is completed it is anticipated that an additional 22 kilometers of barrier lighting will be constructed.

g. Revision of the 2-9th Inf Bn (M) mission: The 2-9th Inf Bn (M) has been permanently employed north of the IMJIN River with one company on the
barrier since December 1968. To reduce the operational commitment of the 2-9th Inf (M) and to afford the unit additional time to conduct training, the unit was relieved of its mission to maintain one company size force on the barrier, effective 15 December 1969. The 2-9th Inf (M) is now under the operational control of the 1st Bde which has also assumed the mission of providing security for LIBBY Bridge vic CT 096013 (performed by the 2-9th Inf (M)) and the responsibility for an extended TAOR (500 meters north of LIBBY Bridge vic CT 095017 extending southwest along Route 1z to vic CS 069984).

h. Rehabilitation of Guard Posts (GP): Rehabilitation of the eleven Guard Posts in the 2d Infantry Division sector of the DMZ, as outlined in the last report, continued until mid-January when weather halted the construction season. At this time rehabilitation of two of the eleven Guard Posts (GP) has been completed. Rehabilitation of the remaining Guard Posts is approximately 25% completed. In addition a chain link fence similar to the barrier fence has been constructed around GP Lucy to provide additional security and protection. Chain Link fences will be constructed around six of the remaining ten GPs, which are considered to be exposed and vulnerable.

i. Direct Aviation Support: During this reporting period one additional OH-23G and four additional UH-1 aircraft were received by the 2d Infantry Division bringing the Aviation Battalion total to 16 OH-23 and 16 UH-1 aircraft. 2d Aviation Battalion has now initiated direct aviation support and OH-23 aircraft are now provided on call to the Commanders of each infantry brigade, Div Arty, DISCOM, and the Engineer Battalion.

j. Mineclearing: The Dong Nam Kae Bal Song Sa (Korean contractor) continued its minefield clearing operations and scrap collecting within the 2d Infantry Division area north of the IMJIN River. This was accomplished under the supervision of the Division Engineers. Approximately 7,100 anti-personnel and anti-tank mines were cleared during this reporting period prior to the termination of mine clearing operations in mid-January due to the frozen ground conditions.

k. Observation Post Construction: During this reporting period the 2d Engineer Battalion constructed eight ground observation posts and two air observation posts along the IMJIN River in the Division area.
1. The organization and mission of the Counter Agent Company (CAC), consisting of approximately 200 KATUSA personnel are being revised to give this unit a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) type capability. It is envisioned that under wartime conditions this unit would be employed as twelve LRRPs, initially by the use of the stay-behind patrols and exfiltrating by means of escape and evasion. A training program for 100 of the CAC personnel was completed on 30 January at the Division's Advanced Combat Training Academy (ACTA). These personnel will provide the nucleus for the LRRP platoons and company headquarters. One Conventional Counter Agent platoon as well as a covert platoon will be retained in the unit's organization.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

   a. Personnel: None.

   b. Intelligence: None.

   c. Operations:

   (1) Observation: Four anti-intrusion systems have been evaluated to determine the effectiveness of each system in countering infiltration/exfiltration attempts along the barrier fence. Systems evaluated were: Line Sensors, Surveillance-Target Acquisition-Night Observation (STANO), ARPA Fence, and Barrier Lighting.

   (2) Evaluation:

   (a) The Line Sensor System utilized Balanced Pressure Systems, Unattended Seismic Detectors, Infrared Intrusion Detectors, Multipurpose Concealed Intrusion Detectors, and associated equipment for relay and display of intrusion alarms. Evaluation of the system determined that:

   1 Effective surveillance of the system required more personnel than were originally required to man the barrier fence.

   2 Maintenance requirements were excessive.

   3 Infiltrators attempting to penetrate the system must be delayed for effective verification of sensor alarms.
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EAOIDGO-O
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

4 Present equipment is not ideally suited to weather conditions encountered in Korea.

(b) A test of the STANO system evaluated unattended ground sensors, radars, night vision equipment, and their effectiveness in supporting a battalion in mid-intensity conflict night operations. It was found that selected items of STANO equipment enhanced the effectiveness of the battalion; however for this effectiveness to be maintained, augmentation above present TOE authorizations for STANO equipment and improvements in the logistics system are necessary. In addition, some items of STANO equipment require improvement from the standpoint of human factors, engineering, and performance. Night observation devices and searchlights are satisfactory as presently designed, and are currently being used to augment the 2d Infantry Division's anti-infiltration mission along the DMZ.

(c) An evaluation of barrier fence operations was conducted by the 1-23d Infantry Battalion along its sector in October 1969. The evaluation was conducted by having selected teams of experienced personnel attempt to penetrate the barrier fence. Attempts were made against the following systems:

1. Unlighted Non-ARPA Fence.
2. Lighted Non-ARPA Fence.
3. Unlighted ARPA Fence.
4. Lighted ARPA Fence.

(d) Results of the evaluation indicated that the most effective barrier system consisted of a lighted ARPA fence. It is significant that no successful penetrations were made against any sector of lighted barrier fence and the lighted barrier fence alone proved more effective than the unlighted ARPA/Barrier Fence.

(e) Comparison of the various anti-intrusion systems tested indicates that the most effective deterrent to barrier penetration attempts is a lighted barrier fence.
SITREP

Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

3 Recommendation: That high priority be given to installation of a
barricade lighting system across the 2d Infantry Division sector.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics: Commercial Cargo and Dump Truck Services:

(1) Observation: Effective 1 January 1970, commercial cargo and dump
truck contractual services in the Division area were terminated.

(2) Evaluation: Termination of commercial hauling has necessitated
the use of organic vehicles to perform these services. The heavy usage
of tactical vehicles for this service increases the end-cost, contributes
to higher vehicle deadline rate, and decreases the degree of vehicle
material readiness in the Division.

(3) Recommendation: That when possible commercial cargo and dump
truck contractor service rather than organic tactical vehicles be used to
perform bulk cargo hauling.

g. Communications: None.

h. Materiel: None.

i. Other: None.

THE COMMANDER:

John R. Franklin

2 incl

1. Div Organization

2. Changes of Command and
   Staff Assignments

   incl 2 w/ HQ, DA

CF: CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
   CG EUSA, ATTN: EAGO-MH

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

TO: Commanding General, Eighth US Army, ATTN: EAGO-MH, APO 96301

(U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report. The following comments supplement the report:

a. (C) Reference items concerning Operations, pages 5 - 7.

   (1) Paragraph 2c(2)(a): Concur in conclusions concerning Line Sensor System as regards excessive personnel and maintenance requirements, verification delay and general unsuitability to the local area.

   (2) Paragraph 2c(2)(b): Concur in conclusions concerning STANO System evaluation.

   (3) Paragraph 2c(3): Concur in recommendation that high priority be given to installation of a barrier lighting system in the 2nd Division sector. At this stage of development of the barrier fence, this lighting is the single most important improvement yet to be made in increasing the effectiveness of the barrier as a counterinfiltration measure.

b. (U) Reference item concerning Commercial Cargo and Dump Truck Services, page 7, paragraph f. Concur. It is the understanding of this headquarters, that the contract was cancelled due to fund limitations imposed by higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FRED J. LESICA
ILT AGC
Asst AG
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AR C-1 (Ab Feb 70) 2d Ind

Subject: Operational report of 2d Infantry Division for period ending
31 January 1970, ACS OR 000-65 (AL) (1)

To: Commander, Eighth United States Army, AG 90/189

From: Chief, United States Army, Pacific, AFD 4000, AK 1656

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs.

The following comments supplement the report.

2. Reference item concerning 10th Corps, para 6, p. 8, para 9

a. Reference comments concerning line sensor system. Corps

Utility Equipment Research and Development Command (NERC) has been

notified of favorable final evaluation results of line sensor system.

To Army request for withdrawal of subject equipment. It is
to be noted that technical assistance would be provided by electronics

and testing personnel, if required. 2d Inf. Div. has been
directly to remove subject equipment and return line sensor system

as soon as weather and ground conditions permit.

b. Reference comments concerning TEA'O Evaluation. Corps

A final evaluation report containing conclusions and recommendations

will be submitted to basic document by Eighth Army. Command

and endorsed copy of TEA'O final evaluation report will be

forwarded through command channels to 18 Army Combat Development Center.

2. Reference comments concerning evaluation of barrier fence lighting.

The Corps has found the "K" barrier fence lighting concept and

author requests the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) provide

additional kilometers of "K" barrier fence lighting by October 1970. In a related

action, Eighth Army favorably reviewed the 2d Infantry Division Evaluation

of the current three kilometer section of ARPA fence installed in the

Seoul sector. The ARPA Representative, Korea, has been directed to

request that ARPA fund the installation of eight additional kilometers

of ARPA fence. A total of 30 kilometers of ARPA fence have been offered
to Eighth Army by ARPA. If approved, action will be initiated to determine

suitable locations for additional ARPA fence installations.

3. Reference item concerning 10th Corps and 3d Inf. Div. (ED),
p. 11, para 27; and 1st Inf. Div., p. 9, para b. Concur. 2d Ind.

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vehicles for general administrative purposes is not desirable. A section of contractual trucking services was a combined result of funding constraints and desire to make maximum utilization of administrative vehicles in Transportation Motor Pools (TMP). However, sufficient TMP assets were not available to satisfy all demands. A review of overall contractual trucking service support requirements for FY 71, in light of FY 70 experience to date, is now in progress. A continuing review will be made of TMP vehicle utilization in relation to contractual requirements to reduce overall use of tactical vehicles for general administrative purposes whenever possible.

OOf THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Copies furnished:
CT, I Corps (Sp), APO 96358 (and only)
CT, 2d Inf Div, APO 96224 (and only)
GPOP-DT (23 Feb 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CHARLES E. ZIMMER
Lt Col, AGC
Asst AG
# ORGANIZATION OF THE 2D INFANTRY DIVISION

**1ST BRIGADE**

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*1-31 Infantry from 7th Infantry Division under operational control of the 4th Brigade.

**Brigade Headquarters from 7th Infantry Division under operational control of 2d Infantry Division.

***97th ROK RCT from 32d ROK Division under operational control of 2d Infantry Division.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 2d Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.
CG, 2d Infantry Division

23 February 1970

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310