**UNCLASSIFIED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD510200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>unclassified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>confidential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AUTHORITY**

GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A altr, 29 Apr 1980
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (8 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 702149
14 July 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Armor School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Commanding General, US Army Weapons Command
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Defense Documentation Center
USAF Project RAND
Commanding Officers
US Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
6th Battalion, 27th Artillery
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 6TH BATTALION, 27TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96289

AVN-EL-JC

19 May 1970


1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

(a) Command Group

(1) The 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery remained assigned to II Field Force Vietnam Artillery. The organic batteries of the battalion where not detached during this period.

(2) At the end of the reporting period the assigned personnel strength of the battalion was under authorized strength. Shortages existed in the following MOS's.

| MOS  | POSITION        | AUTHORIZED | SSID/SM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13E20</td>
<td>ASST Gunner</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E20</td>
<td>FDC Computer</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>Roon Sgt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E20</td>
<td>FDC Mech</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63D40</td>
<td>Motor Sgt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71T20</td>
<td>Battery Clerk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71T20</td>
<td>Maint Data Sp</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FDC LE NS CCL SHORT GE

MTOE 6-437G authorizes each firing battery six (13E20) FDC personnel. In the event that a battery is split and two FDC's are required to operate on a 24 hour basis, there is not a sufficient number of trained personnel to carry out the mission of the FDC in an efficient and safe manner. Since the batteries are structured to operate in a four gun configuration it is not considered feasible to further modify the MTOE; therefore, utilizing sources within the battalion to meet the additional requirement, survey qualified personnel (MOS 82C20) have been found to have the highest aptitude area scores applicable to FDC operations. One of the battalion survey teams was split in order to give each battery FDC an additional three personnel for on-the-job training. With the exception of one man the survey personnel were successfully utilized to accomplish the FDC's mission.

(b) The morale of the battalion remained high with the R&R program the biggest morale factor. The following is a breakdown of the R&R al-

FOR GT UT
702149
Inclosure

CONFIDENTIAL
CONyFIDENTIAL

AVON-00-00


Locations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>20 14</td>
<td>15 12</td>
<td>11 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>8 4</td>
<td>7 6</td>
<td>6 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>6 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madi</td>
<td>16 15</td>
<td>8 6</td>
<td>12 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birod</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamin</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) There were no significant morale problems. There were two Special Courts-Martial during this period. Article 15 punishment was administered as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) There were 13 W.T. due to hostile action during the reporting period. This is an increase of 11 W.T. over the last reporting period.

(6) Awards and decorations presented to members of this command are as follows:

- Three Bronze Star Medals (Valor)
- Five Bronze Star Medals (Achievement)
- Sixteen Bronze Star Medals (Service)
- Sixty Commendation Medals (Achievement)
- Ninety-one Army Commendation Medals (Service)
- One Air Medal.

(7) Religious services were provided by chaplains from the 1st C.S. Division (M1C) and the 23d Artillery Group for all units.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

19 May 1970


L. Operations

At present, the batteries of the battalion are located as shown in enclosure 1.

At the beginning of the period, the mission of each firing battery was:

Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, GS, II FFORCEN
Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, GS, II FFORCEN
Battery C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, GS, II FFORCEN

(2) During this period the battalion participated in several operations and displaced units as indicated:

(a) Battery A:

1. On 20 February 1970, 175mm platoon, departed L2 Jake at 1330 hours. Convoy closed Quan Loi at 1540 hours without incident.

2. On 20 February 1970, 175mm platoon, departed Quan Loi at 1445 hours. Convoy closed Thmeo Vinh at 1615 hours without incident.

3. On 7 March 1970, 175mm platoon, departed Thmeo Vinh at 1300 hours. Convoy closed Quan Loi at 1315 hours without incident.

4. On 2 April 1970, 8th platoon, departed Quan Loi at 0930 hours. Convoy closed Fort Defiance at 1530 hours without incident.

5. On 15 April 1970, 8th platoon, departed Fort Defiance at 1300 hours. Convoy closed FSB Paul (L.E. Durkett) at 1425 hours without incident.

6. On 26 April 1970, 175mm platoon, departed Quan Loi at 0800 hours. Convoy closed FSB Ann at 1350 hours without incident.

7. On 27 April 1970, 175mm platoon, departed FSB Ann at 1605 hours. Convoy closed Quan Loi at 1907 hours without incident.

(b) Battery B:

1. On 26 February 1970, 175mm platoon, departed Phuoc Binh at 0800 hours. Convoy closed FSB Candy at 1630 hours without incident.

2. On 14 February 1970, 8th platoon, departed FSB Lee at 0800 hours. Convoy closed LZ Elaine 1620 hours without incident.

INCL

CONFIDENTIAL

On 23 February 1970, personnel from 8" platoon at FSB Elaine were exchanged with the personnel of the 8" platoon, Battery C, at Song Be. Unit designations were changed, thus moving Battery B 8" platoon to Song Be.

On 26 February 1970, 8" platoon, departed Song Be at 0800 hours. Convoy closed FSB Candy at 1630 hours without incident.

On 14 March 1970, Battery B departed FSB Candy at 1300 hours. Convoy closed FSB Loan at 1900 hours without incident.

On 15 March 1970, Battery B departed FSB Loan at 0800 hours. Convoy closed FSB Huong 1445 hours without incident.

On 3 April 1970, Battery B departed FSB Loan at 0800 hours. Convoy closed Song Be at 1921 hours without incident.

On 4, 5 and 6 April 1970, 175mm platoon, departed Song Be and conducted artillery raids from YU 188117, firing into the area the battery had departed on 3 April 1970. Element returned nightly to base camp at Song Be.

On 16 April 1970, 8" platoon, departed Song Be at 1300 hours. Convoy closed Fort Compton 1533 hours without incident.

On 18 April 1970, 175mm platoon, departed Song Be and conducted an artillery raid from YU 188117, firing in the vicinity of FSB Huong. Convoy returned to Song Be closing at 1630 hours without incident.

Battery C:

On 8 February 1970, 1 Tube, 175mm, departed Phuoc Vinh with security element at 1213 hours. Convoy closed LZ Dunard at 1550 hours without incident.

On 9 February 1970, 8" platoon, departed FSB Jako at 0800 hours. Convoy closed In Kho at 1730 hours without incident.

On 10 February 1970, 175mm platoon (-) departed Phuoc Vinh at 0930 hours. Arrived LZ Dunard at 1105 hours without incident.

On 22 February 1970, 8" platoon, departed Phuoc Vinh 0830 hours. Convoy closed Song Be 1950 hours without incident.

On 23 February 1970, as stated in paragraph 5(2)(b)(3) above, personnel from the 8" platoon exchanged with the 8" platoon of Battery C.

2 On 8 March 1970, 8" platoon, departed FSB Elaine at 1050 hours. Convoy stopped enroute to LZ Bunard and picked up the 175mm platoon. Battery (intact) closed Phuoc Vinh at 1930 hours without incident.

8 On 20 March 1970, 8" platoon, Battery C departed Phuoc Vinh at 1300 hours. Convoy developed maintenance problems and closed FSB Lobo at 1800 hours.

9 On 21 March 1970, 8" platoon, departed FSB Lobo at 0836 hours. Convoy closed FSB Thunder II at 1307 hours.

10 On 7 April 1970, 8" platoon, converted from 8" to 175mm, making the Battery a complete 175mm Battery. The platoon remained at FSB Thunder II.

11 On 28 April, 175mm platoon, departed FSB Thunder II at 1105 hours. Convoy closed Quan Loi at 1500 hours without incident.

12 On 29 April 1970, 175mm platoon, departed Quan Loi at 0812 hours. Convoy closed FSB Jake at 1435 hours without incident.

(d) During the period 7-13 February 1970, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery moved from Quan Loi to its present location at Phu Loi, RVN.

(e) Service Battery moved from Long Binh to its present location at Phu Loi on 14 March 1970.

(3) The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition expended as indicated during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MISSIONS FIRED</th>
<th>175mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 6/27 Arty</td>
<td>2742</td>
<td>3708</td>
<td>3595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B, 6/27 Arty</td>
<td>5253</td>
<td>5356</td>
<td>7849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 6/27 Arty</td>
<td>2167</td>
<td>4546</td>
<td>1714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>10,162</td>
<td>13,610</td>
<td>13,158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Training

1 A vigorous and continuous cross training program of personnel was necessitated by extended period operations at platoon level and a
shortage in certain critical MOSs. The most significant skills developed in this program were Fire Direction and Gun Section Chiefs.

(2) In-country schools were utilized to upgrade assigned personnel through attendance at Officer Fire Direction, Generator, and Driver courses conducted on a battalion level. Advanced training gained through these classes has enhanced unit operations.

(3) Assigned survey personnel have significantly improved MOS skills during this period due to a continuing emphasis toward extending survey control throughout the Corps zone and by extended operations at platoon level.

(4) New arrivals in the unit have continued to receive in-country replacement training within seven days after arrival. This training has provided a firm basis for rapid adaptability of the individual to a combat environment.

(5) Inductive training subjects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>REQUIRED HOURS</th>
<th>HOURS COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Character Guidance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Information</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fme Prevention</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Firing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Training</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hino &amp; Bocoo Tmp Warf</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapper Training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility Training</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Intelligence

(1) During the reporting period, observers of this battalion flew 155 VR missions consisting of 457 hours which resulted in 35 significant digatings and 11 fire missions.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFD-4-IC


(2) Target surveillance credited this battalion with 11 confirmed enemy killed by artillery (E.K.) and 2 possible K.I. Attacks against hard target complexes resulted in the battalion destroying 50 bunkers, 13 hooches, 2 bridges, and 2 automatic weapons positions; 9 bunkers damaged, 1 hooch damaged, 1 tunnel entrance uncovered, and 3 fighting positions damaged. The battalion was also credited with 3 secondary explosions.

(3) Survey operations during the reporting period established a total of 11 orienting stations and their orienting lines, 11 battery and platoon centers, 0 flash bases and 1 radar position.

E. Logistical and Maintenance. The battalion engaged in normal supply, maintenance, and ammunition support and service activities during the reporting period. Daily air resupply of all classes of supply was made to Battery D, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery throughout the period. Daily air resupply was also made to most platoons operating over from the battery command post during split battery operations; Fort Defiance, FSB John, FSB Andy, FSB Candy, FSB Filmo, FSB Hun, FSB Canton, and FSB Durward. During the period February through April, the battalion successfully completed US.MV CMH's of all batteries with ratings of satisfactory.

F. Organization. None

G. Other.

(1) Medical. The health of the command continues to be good. Emphasis was placed on sanitation and the prevention of malaria through classes conducted by the Battalion Surgeon. Classes were also presented on venereal diseases. The medical non-effective rate was minimal.

(2) Civic Action. This battalion does not have the personnel or equipment in the present configuration to handle all aspects of a full MEDCAP/ICAP program; therefore, the battalion pursues joint action with other units. At present, the battalion medical section at Tho Loi coordinates with the 23d Artillery Group in conducting MEDCAPS at Gia Dinh. Approximately 100 Vietnamese are treated weekly. Battery C medics at Phuoc Vinh treat Vietnamese of Phuoc Vinh village on a weekly basis. This is conducted on a battery level with no assistance from other units at that location. Medical personnel of Battery D at Son Do conduct MEDCAPS twice weekly in villages in that vicinity. Approximately 100 Vietnamese are treated weekly and it is felt that these programs are most successful.

(3) Communications. During the reporting period the Battalion Headquarters moved from Quan Loi to Phu Loi. This move extended the range of the battalion FM communications to the point that it was necessary to establish a permanent relay on Nui Ba Ra. Communications improved; however, to increase both range and transmission capabilities, it was necessary to install a retransmission capability at the relay site. This has greatly
CONFIDENTIAL

19 May 1970

AVFD-RN-JC


aided in improving MI communications and has doubled the range of our MI capabilities.

2. (C) In the interest of Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

   A. Personnel:None

   B. Operations:

   (1) Verification of artillery lay.

   (a) OBSERVATION: In a 6400 mil environment where artillery pieces are reloaded and an aiming point re-established for each azimuth, extreme care must be taken as there is no real check of the lay by the gun other than by azimuth markers.

   (b) EVALUATION: It is the responsibility of the Battery Executive to lay the battery for direction. In many areas this is done mechanically and without conscious consideration of the final results. An objective examination of the 0-3600 mil line of the Aiming Circle and a quick check of the line of sight with a compass will provide an accurate and responsible check of the work with the Aiming Circle.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That all battery officers be reminded of their responsibilities in laying and referring and that they be encouraged to make a habit of an objective check of the lay at frequent intervals.

   (2) Checks on AVLB.

   (a) OBSERVATION: This battalion narrowly missed a serious accident due to a missing pivot pin on an AVLB.

   (b) EVALUATION: The AVLB has two (2) critical pivot points when emplaced (see diagram), these pivot pins should be checked each time the bridge is emplaced as they have a tendency to vibrate loose.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That all convoy commanders and responsible personnel concerned with use of AVLB be briefed on this hazard and that an officer personally check the pins prior to loading the bridge.

   (3) Fan Belts for M107/M110 Track

   (a) OBSERVATION: Many of the problems presently existing with the fan
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFB-FA-BC


19 May 1970

belts on the M107/M110 can be alleviated by proper installation and maintenance.

(b) EVALUATION. Proper installation of fan belts calls for pre-stressing by running the engine at 12,000 RPM (approximate) for five minutes and then readjusting the tension. In addition, belts will last much longer if drivers are cautioned against excessive racing of the engine to reduce strain on the fan belts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That concerned personnel review proper installation procedures and that all drivers and Section chiefs be advised of the adverse effects of sudden acceleration.

(4) Underground Field Fortifications.

(a) OBSERVATION. When occupying fire support bases, it is necessary to construct both personnel bunkers and storage bunkers. Terrain permitting, the underground bunker provides the best security for both personnel and ammunition.

(b) EVALUATION. Because of the additional heavy equipment required for protective bunkers, i.e., heavy timbers, culverts, PSP, engineer stakes, etc., extra transportation must be available. A minimum of two five-ton trucks is required for this transportation. With the number of vehicles presently assigned by MTOE, it is impossible to secure sufficient vehicles to transport the battery equipment plus the additional material required for bunkers and storage revetments.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That each firing battery be authorized two five-ton trucks to transport the additional materials required when occupying a fire support base.

(5) Towing capabilities are minimal when heavy artillery batteries are operating at platoon level.

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been noted during platoon level operations that towing capabilities are inadequate.

(b) EVALUATION. Due to the shortage of M578's, heavy artillery units must depend on the primary weapon as a towing means. Tow cables have proven inadequate when towing distances exceeding 1 kilometer. At present, no tow bars are authorized for the firing batteries.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. One tow bar for each heavy artillery platoon be authorized.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFB-FA-BC

19 May 1970


(6) Improvement of FM Radio Communications

(a) OBSERVATION. Due to the increased communications range, normal FM communications were not satisfactory within this battalion.

(b) EVALUATION. It was necessary to improve the battalion FM communications to maintain control of our firing elements. To aid in this improvement, a relay was placed on Nui Ba Ra, Song Be. This proved helpful, but still did not provide the maximum in communications for control of all elements. Radio set AN/VRC 49 was installed at the relay site giving this battalion retransmission capabilities. This has proved a great aid in communications and has doubled our broadcast range.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that each heavy artillery battalion be issued one radio set AN/VRC 49 to aid and improve long range communications.

Training. None

D. Intelligence. None

E. Logistics and Maintenance. None

F. Organization. None

O. Other. None

IN Ho.

LTC, F.

Commanding

Incl as

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific
3 - Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam
2 - Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

CONFIDENTIAL
AVFB-FAC (19 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27 Artillery
for Period Ending 30 April 70. RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFLO-H2, APO 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the quarterly report of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery and concurs in operations and lessons learned as reported.

para 2 B(4) Additional vehicles may be obtained through LTCG action or temporary loan. During the latter portion of the reporting period 5-ton trucks were readily available on a temporary loan basis and the battalion requested and received 3 5-ton trucks.

FG: THE COMMANDER

[Signature]

R.G. Palkish
LTC, FA
Adjutant
AMFL (19 MW70) 2d Inf

Za: Operational Report of Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, HA, II FORCENY, APO San Francisco 96266 4 JUN 1970

TO: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC(DS:), APO 96375
    Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GCP(LF), APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters,
6th Battalion, 27th Artillery and concurs with the comments of the indorsing
headquarters.

2. (U) Additional comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Towing Capabilities for Heavy Artillery
      When Operating at Platoon Level", page 8, paragraph 2b(5). The self propelled
      artillery weapon should be used as a recovery vehicle only in an emergency.
      Unit is being advised to submit a request for HCS change for consideration.

   b. Reference item concerning "Improvement of FM Radio Communications",
      page 10, paragraph 2b(6). Unit is being advised to submit a request for
      HCS change for consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. BARTEL
CP, AG
Ass AG

CF:
CO, II FORCENY Arty
CO, 6th Bn, 27th Arty
AVHCC-DST (19 May 70) 3d Ind


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]


CF:
HQ, 6th Bn, 27th ARTY
HQ, IIFFV
GPOP-DT (19 May 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. UHRE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL


Battery Locations:

At present, the batteries of the battalion are located as shown below:

- 8" Howitzer Platoon, Battery A, 6th Bn 27th Arty, XT541845 (FSB Burkett)
- 175mm Gun Platoon, Battery A, 6th Bn 27th Arty, XT697926 (FSB Eagle 1)
- 8" Howitzer Platoon, Battery B, 6th Bn 27th Arty, YU053152 (FSB Compton)
- 175mm Gun Platoon, Battery B, 6th Bn 27th Arty, YU140070 (Song Be)
- 175mm Gun Platoon, Battery C, 6th Bn 27th Arty, XT628812 (FSB Jake)
- 175mm Gun Platoon, Battery C, 6th Bn 27th Arty, XT971496 (Phuoc Vinh)
- HHD, 6th Bn 27th Arty, XT850140 (Phu Loi)
- Service Battery 6th Bn 27th Arty, XT850140 (Phu Loi)

Incl 1
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 70 to 30 Apr 70.

Co, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery

**Abstract**

N/A