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AGDA (M)  (9 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 702218  14 July 1970

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. MCNICHOLAS
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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  1st Military Intelligence Battalion
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)
APO San Francisco 96307

AVIH-AOPN

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion
(Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1970
RCS CSFOR 65 (R2) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. (C) Section 1, Operations-Significant Activities:

   a. The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) and its four lettered detachments are organized under TO&E 30-5D 30-6D, 30-7D and MTO&E 30-5DPOI. The present organizational structure of the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) is indicated by inclosure 1.

   b. The Battalion was engaged in providing combat support to United States, Republic of Vietnam and Free World Military Assistance Forces for the entire reporting period. Training was conducted on 35 days during the reporting period. On 14 April 1970, Detachment E was formally deactivated as a result of the reduction of personnel ordered by Headquarters United States Army, Vietnam, on 1 January 1970. On 20 April 1970, Detachment A completed its move from the quarters in Bien Hoa City to Bien Hoa Army Base. No major problems were encountered. Operations continued during the move with no degradation of the support rendered. On 15 April 1970, the 1st MIBARS Interpretation Center (IMIC) became operational at Tan Son Nhut using available authorized resources. At the present time IMIC is interpreting all USAF flown targets in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) except those requested by ARVN units. ARVN requested missions will continue to be interpreted at the integrated MIBARS detachments/ARVN Corps II Section. The center was established in order to provide a more timely second phase exploitation of aerial imagery thus allowing faster dissemination of the supplemental photo interpretation reports (SUPIR) to the tactical units. Being located in close proximity to the USAF facilities, the IMIC can obtain and exploit the imagery as soon as the Air Force Photo Processing and Interpretation Facilities (PPIF's) have completed their work, rather than wait for distribution to the MIBARS detachment located in the respective corps area. This represents a time savings of up to 24 hours in III and IV CTZ and should represent even greater time savings in I and II CTZ when the IMIC starts interpreting targets in those areas.

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The following changes in command occurred during the reporting period.

1. MAJ William R. Jackson, assumed command of Detachment D on 18 February 1970.

2. CPT Richard Ng, assumed command of Headquarters and Headquarters Company on 14 March 1970.

d. The following key personnel changes occurred during the reporting period:

1. CW2 Earl W. Robinson assumed duties as Battalion S4, on 2 March 1970.

2. CW3 Glen D. Beauchamp assumed duties as Battalion S2/3 on 30 March 1970.

e. The primary mission of providing tactical interpretation, reproduction and aerial delivery of imagery and related materials from tactical air reconnaissance operations within the Republic of Vietnam was successfully accomplished during the reporting period. Support has been rendered to the Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN), Republic of Korea Forces (ROK), 1st Australian Task Force, New Zealand and Royal Thai units as well as US Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force elements throughout the four (4) Corps Tactical Zones. Significant operational statistics and illustrative examples of the numerous types of regular and special support rendered by the Ist MI Bn (ARS) to the requesting units are presented:

1. 1st MI Bn (ARS) Detachments:

(a) Number of targets interpreted: 3,684

(b) Number of frames interpreted: 837,112

(c) Number of imagery interpretation reports: 3,490

(d) Number of new items or significant changes reported: 6,606

(e) Number of mosaics constructed: 1

(f) Feet of paper processed: 594,460

(g) Number of hand-held missions flown: 136

(h) Number of hand-held prints made: 18,906

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(i) Number of aerial sorties: 1,615
(j) Pounds of cargo hauled on aerial deliveries: 38,185
(k) Passengers transported: 397
(l) Requests for reproduction of photography filled: 1,438

(2) The Headquarters Imagery Interpretation Section in conjunction with the PPIS handled the following amount of imagery during the reporting period:

(a) Number of targets interpreted: 5,868
(b) Infrared targets interpreted: 2,155
(c) Photo targets interpreted: 3,710
(d) Number of imagery interpretation reports: 4,321
(e) Number of items reported: 1,613

(3) The 1st MIBARS Interpretation Center (IMIC) handled the following amount of imagery since the 15th of April:

(a) Number of targets interpreted: 189
(b) Number of imagery interpretation reports made: 181
(c) Number of items reported: 229
(d) Number of frames interpreted: 25,508

f. 1st MI Bn (ARS) personnel continued to provide instruction in hand-held camera and 35mm film processing techniques, to aid in the familiarization with the aerial reconnaissance system and to accomplish hand-held camera missions. Hand-held photography (35mm) was acquired, processed, and disseminated by the 1st MI Bn (ARS) in support of numerous requests throughout the four (4) Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) for operational planning, targeting, confirmation/denial of interrogation and agent reports, and other intelligence purposes.

g. During this reporting period the 1st MIBARS was officially tasked by COMUSMACV on 8 February 1970 as the US Advisor to the ARVN Photo Interpretation effort in Vietnam. Subsequent to that time, all four Corps ARVN Image Interpretations Sections have integrated and ARVN-MIBARS personnel are working side by side in accomplishing the mission in all MIBARS detachments. Liaison has been established on a physically assigned basis with the J2, JGS, as well at Fort Cay Mai, the RVNAF.
Military Intelligence School. The Fort Cay Mai program of instruction has been reviewed by MIBARS and revisions have been adopted by the school staff. MIBARS is presently working closely with USAF advisors in order to enhance VNAF and ARVN liaison and coordination.

h. During the reporting period, the detachments continued to provide its basic hand-held course to personnel located in the four corps tactical zones. A total of fifty-six (56) personnel were trained in the techniques and applications of the hand-held photography program and the operation of the Fuji Lab.

i. During the reporting period, problems of obtaining photographic supplies and the ever increasing problems in obtaining vehicular repair parts continued to be of major significance. For a time, procurement problems existed in the II Corps Tactical Zone. This was due to policy changes which caused Detachment "D" requests to be cancelled without notification to detachment personnel. This was resolved by direct coordination with Cam Ranh Bay Army Depot. Shortages of one quarter ton utility vehicles, and non-availability of replacements required retention and continued utilization of vehicles below the Equipment Serviceability Criteria Standards. Indications from USARV G4 are that this problem will become more critical in the coming quarter with no relief in view. During the last two weeks of the previous report period, technical supply operation procedures in Detachment B were revised due to problems caused by physical distance which resulted in a lack of rapid, reliable parts delivery. As a result this detachment was authorized to maintain a PLL for its two aircraft. This revision of procedures appears to have been completely successful.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations:

   a. Personnel: None
   b. Intelligence: None
   c. Operations: None
   d. Organization: None
   e. Training:
      (1) Traffic Safety.
      (a) Observation: A greater need to educate the personnel, to the traffic hazards while driving in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area.
(b) Evaluation: The high accident rate, involving US military personnel, especially in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area necessitated that a more aggressive traffic safety program be initiated and vigorously pursued.

(c) Recommendation:

(1) In view of this problem, the Battalion Commander directed that this battalion implement a vigorous training program to educate the personnel in this battalion to the traffic hazards while driving or riding in a military vehicle. In view of this, safety classes were presented during three separate days by the Battalion Safety Officer to stress to the personnel the need for involvement in this program, their responsibility while operating a motor vehicle, and how they as drivers/vehicle commanders will be involved. The personnel of this battalion received the following instructions:

(a) A one (1) hour class concentrating on the results of unsafe driving acts and their causes.
(b) A one (1) hour class stressing the human impulses that cause accidents.
(c) A one (1) hour class involving the safe driving procedures as they pertain to the Saigon area.

(2) A Battalion Safety Council was appointed to establish the following program:

(a) To follow up with periodic safety classes.
(b) Establish a driver's course for personnel of this battalion.
(c) To produce a Battalion Safe Driver's Rule Book.
(d) To establish a monthly Safe Driving Award Program.
(e) To establish a Safety Inspection once a month on the vehicles of this unit.
(f) Establishment of an Initial In-country Safe Driver's Program.

(3) Since the institution of this Program, this unit has had no accident involving US Military personnel and civilian nationals. Due to the apparent success of this program, recommend that other units in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area initiate similar programs to educate their personnel as to the driving hazards in the Saigon area.

(2) Drug Abuse.

(a) Observation: A great need to educate the personnel to the hazards and dangers of using drugs.

(b) Evaluation: The easy access to purchase Marijuana, Heroin, Barbiturates and Amphetamines increases the need for a sound program to help the Commander control the use of the drugs.
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RCS CSFOR 65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendations: In view of this problem the Battalion Commander
directed that a program of instruction be provided to the personnel of
this battalion to make them aware of the dangers of using drugs. This
program was started by using authoritative guest speakers to talk on the
dangers of using drugs and what they do to the human body. Films were
used showing what a drug addict goes through while taking the various
kinds of drugs. In connection with this program, one guest speaker
showed the personnel of the unit what the marijuana mixture here in
Vietnam consisted of. In this particular case after analyzing the
marijuana, it was reported to contain ingredients physically harmful to
anyone. To further enhance the program, a Battalion Drug Control
Officer and a Battalion Drug Advisory Board was appointed to keep the
Commander informed and the personnel of this battalion aware of the
dangers of using drugs. Recommend that other units start the same
kind of program to discourage the using of drugs.

f. Logistics:

(1) Photographic Paper.

(a) Observations: Approximately one-third of the Photographic
Paper-Projection Printing received in recent months has been damaged
by moisture and found to be in an unusable condition.

(b) Evaluation: The paper had been exposed to moisture, which
caused the posterboard containers protecting the paper to decompose and
allow light and moisture to enter the container causing the paper to
fog and spot.

(c) Recommendations: That photographic supplies of this nature
be provided covered storage at all times and, where available, tempera-
ture control storage should be provided. If the photographic supplies
are provided this special handling, much of the spoilage due to improper
handling and storage would be eliminated.

(2) ES-38B Photographic Darkroom Group.

(a) Observations: As a result of present operations it has been
found that the Photographic Darkroom Group ES-38B requires an abnormally
long time to reproduce prints from Air Force KA-82 and KA-83 negatives.

(b) Evaluation: The continuous contact printer EN-6C is normally
used for the printing of the above film. There are several problem
areas in using this printer; they are:

(1) The lack of proper calibration prevents the unit from automatically
determining changes in the exposure necessitated by changes in the negative
density. If placed in the manual mode all exposures are the same regardless
of negative density. The result is an unnecessary number of reprints to
complete the mission.
(2) The continuous contact printer is designed so that the largest roll of film it can print is 500 feet long. This requires that film in excess of this length be cut into 500 feet lengths.

(3) The processing machine, film and paper RH-48B is used to process the prints made by the continuous printer EN-6C; there are several problems here also. They are:

(a) Due to design limitations the processor will only accept printing paper in lengths up to 200 feet, therefore requiring 2½ rolls of 200 foot paper to print one copy of a 500 foot roll of negatives.

(b) The normal operating speed for processing printing paper is 7 feet per minute; at this speed it takes approximately 40 minutes to process 200 feet of printing paper with the attached leader, therefore taking approximately 2 hours, including loading time, to process 500 feet of paper. The speed cannot be raised due to the paper not drying properly.

(c) Due to the amount of iron and foreign matter in the water used in the processor, frequent changes of chemicals are required. Under normal conditions, this requires approximately 30 minutes to complete.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) Due to complete failure of the Automatic Exposure Control System, through improper calibration, it is recommended that the necessary calibration equipment, spare parts and trained repair personnel be made available at the earliest possible time to get these tactically critical printers back in proper operating condition.

(2) The inability of the continuous printer to print rolls of negatives greater than 500 foot lengths can only be corrected by the modification of the supply section of the printer. It is recommended that a test be started at Fort Monmouth on enlarging the film supply capability of the printer to accept larger than 500 foot rolls of negatives.

(3) The inability of the processor to accept printing paper larger than 200 foot lengths can be overcome by enlarging the size of the take-up section of processor and enlarging the take-up reel flanges to accept 500 foot lengths of paper and possibly 1,000 foot lengths.

(4) It is recommended that a test be started at Fort Monmouth to increase the processing speed of the processor. This can theoretically be done by raising the chemical processing temperature and drying temperature.
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(5) The water filter system in the ES-38B is designed to remove particles down to 3 milli-microns in size. It is recommended that new filters be designed that remove particles down to .5 milli-microns. This would increase the effective life of both the processing machine and the photo chemicals by at least 40%.

  g. Communications: None

  h. Materials: None

  i. Others: None

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as

ALBERT F. P. JONES
LTC, MI
Commanding
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A/HGC-DST (19 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion
(Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1970
RCS CSFOR 65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Military
Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support).

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "ARVN Photo Interpretation Effort
      in Vietnam", page 3, paragraph 1g: concur. This is an excellent example
      of co-operation between US and Vietnamese forces and should go a long way
      in improving the efforts of both nations. Item has been extracted and will
      be considered for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelli-
      gence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning "Photographic Paper", page 6,
      paragraph f(1): concur. Photographic supplies are stored under cover and,
      to the extent possible, refrigerated storage is provided.

   c. (U) Reference item concerning "ES-38B Photographic Darkroom Group",
      page 6, paragraph f(2)(c)(1) - (5): USAECOM personnel have been requested
      to submit a Field Engineering Action Request (FEAR) to the Field Engineering
      Division of Electronics Command covering all recommendations contained in
      referenced paragraph. Additionally, in order to properly calibrate equip-
      ment contained in the Automatic Exposure Control System, Electronics Command
      has been requested to manufacture the necessary cable to be used with the
      calibration equipment. Upon receipt of all equipment required for calibration
      USAECOM personnel will be sent to appropriate units for assistance in
      training and calibration. Unit has been so advised.

   d. (U) Reference item concerning "Water Filter System in the ES-38B",
      page 8, paragraph 2f(2)(c)(5). Three improved filters have arrived in country
      and have been distributed to the 101st Airborne Division, the Americal Division,
      and to the Information Office at Long Binh. A follow-on system will be pro-
      curred if these three prototype models prove effective.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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DOD NR 5200.10

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GPOP-DT (19 May 70)  2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion
        for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  25 JUN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
    Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
D. D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
**REPORT TITLE**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion

**DESCRIPTION OF REPORT**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 70 to 30 Apr 70.

**AUTHORS**

CO, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion

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