**UNCLASSIFIED**

**AD NUMBER**

| AD510166 |

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

| TO: | unclassified |
| FROM: | confidential |

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

| TO: |
| Approved for public release, distribution unlimited |

| FROM: |
| Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310. |

**AUTHORITY**

GDS per DoD 5200.1-r; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 11 Jun 1980

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN RESPONSE REFER TO

AGDA (M) (10 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 70B025 16 July 1970


This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Titles 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Albert E. Hunter, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, ADC
Acting The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Combat Surveillance School

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Electronic Warfare School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
Chief of Military History
The Provost Marshal General
OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Director, Defense Research & Engineering
Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commanders in Chief
Pacific
US Army, Pacific
US Strike Command
Commanding Generals
III Corps, ATTN: Director, Project MASSTER
US Army Computer Systems Command
Chief of Staff, USAF
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commandants
Armed Forces Staff College
Defense Intelligence School
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
The National War College
Defense Documentation Center
USAF Project RAND
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - BG Albert S. Hunter

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG Albert E. Hunter. The report covers the period 8 June 1969 - 1 June 1970, during which time BG Hunter served as Commanding General, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon.

2. BG Hunter is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

INCL

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debriefing Report by: Albert E. Hunter, Brigadier General, USA

Duty Assignment: Commanding General, USASUPCOM, OR

Inclusive dates: 6 June 1969 to 1 June 1970

Date of Report: 1 June 1970

1. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPOT AREAS: Since 1 June 1969, seven locations have been closed and consolidated with the main area at Long 50. The Vehicle Park and Class I Yard remain in Qui Mon. The operation involved relocation, issue, or retrograde of 202,000 tons of supplies and 558 vehicles. Location 10 (Phu Tai) was closed in October and the Cha Rang Engineer Construction Yard was closed in January 1970. Only about 8,000 tons of slow moving items such as pipe, sheet steel, and timber remain at Cha Rang. The consolidation has resulted in increased security and more efficient operation. Stockage on hand at Qui Mon Depot has been selectively decreased from 226,000 to approximately 100,000 tons.

INCREASED CYCLE PRODUCTION: Daily automatic data processing cycle production increased from 16 to 20 to 28 cycles per month in the December through February period, thereby setting a high among Ist Logistical Command depots. The requirement that ADP run a minimum of 24 cycles per month has distributed work loads more evenly for the Storage Division. Excessively large releases of material release orders (MRO's) from a single cycle are less frequent, thus facilitating faster processing of all MRO's. Increased cycle production also facilitates receipt processing by ensuring that receipt documents can be loaded into a cycle within 24 hours from the date of receipt of the material. This accomplishment was recognized in a letter of commendation to the Depot from the Commanding General, Ist Logistical Command.

MATERIAL RELEASE ORDER (MRO) PROCESSING: A thorough study of MRO processing methods resulted in the elimination of all unnecessary steps from processing procedures. Increased emphasis has been placed on bin replenishment to preclude indiscriminate transfer of MRO's to other locations. Increased cycle production has distributed workloads more evenly for storage as a whole. A new MRO processing procedure was implemented in March 1970, placing increased emphasis on processing old MRO's. In order to expedite the processing of Item I and II MRO's, those MRO's are now being marked with blue and red diagonal stripes respectively. This practice has greatly improved the performance of the Vietnamese labor force by providing a simple method of recognizing high priority documents. The backlog of MRO's was reduced from 30,000 on 1 June 1969 to a present average of 5,000 at one time at the Depot.

FOR OFF UT
708025
Inclosure 1

CONFIDENTIAL
A phased locator survey system was initiated in February and has resulted in substantial improvement in the Depot's locator accuracy. Location accuracy is considered the key to maximum demand satisfaction and a minimum warehouse denial rate. Cards were created for all known locations in any given storage area and matched to actual locations. Those locations that do not match or have no stock are killed and existing locations which have generated no cards are picked up on locator add cards. The survey is proceeding ahead of schedule, and reliability checks are being made by quality assurance. Resurveys are being conducted as necessary to achieve the 1st Logistical Command goal of 95% accuracy. Thus far, 4300 additional locations have been added to the Master locator file.

SIT Report: The first step toward the eventual implementation of financial inventory accounting in Vietnam was initiated in October 1969 with the submission of the Monthly Report on Changes in Appropriation Financed Secondary Item Inventories Report (SIT). The objective of this report is to accurately reflect all increases and decreases to the dollar value of the Depot inventory. The opening balance for the Depot was $8.8 billion. The balance has been reduced to $108.9 million as reflected in the April 1970 report.

Processing Area for Fringe Retrograde: A processing operation was established at the Depot to receive and package material to be retrograded as a result of Project Fringe. The Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV) develops and sends to the Depot a listing of fringe items that are to be retrograded from Vietnam. The material is then pulled and delivered to the processing area. The processing area is located within a covered shed equipped with work tables, two rows of roller conveyors, packaging material and pre-built boxes that are specifically designed for use in Sea-Land vans. The fringe material is then processed through the line, repackaged as necessary, placed in the pre-built boxes, documented and the boxes stenciled. At the end of the line, the boxes are stored or immediately loaded on a pre-positioned Sea-Land van. The vans are then treated in accordance with United States Public Health Service/United States Department of Agriculture standards, blocked and braced, and then moved to the port to await shipment.

Class VII Stockage Level: In January 1970 the level of uncommitted Class VII assets within the Depot decreased from 845 items to 261 items. This reduction represents major progress in the command project to reduce Class VII stockage levels. The stockage level remained constant from January (5420 S/T) through March (5602 S/T). In April, shipments increased by approximately 50 percent over previous months, thereby reducing tonnage on hand to 3764 S/T. Class VII asset reporting and operation of the Class VII activity was transferred to Com. Rhah Bay Support Command on 1 May 1970.

Relocation: Fed Ball operations at the Depot were relocated in January 1970 from the Qui Phan Army Airfield to their present covered storage facilities.
hardstand location within the Depot. Previously fragmented operations were consolidated into one area, thus greatly improving efficiency, supervision and response to the customer. In March, 100% of all requisitions and referrals were processed within twenty-four hours from the time of receipt in the Depot. This represents an improvement of approximately 50%.

By April, total processing time had been reduced to 15 hours. Status (filled or denied) is furnished IOC within 15 hours of receipt on 90% of all referrals.

RECOUPLING PROJECT: A recoupling project was undertaken to rebox the material in Area 44 of the Depot that had deteriorated due to age and weather. A large percentage of items, such as Kraft paper, paper cups, paper napkins, fiberboard boxes, and toilet paper had partially deteriorated which resulted in customer dissatisfaction. The $123,000 contract was awarded to the Vinnell Corporation. The processing takes place under a covered shed in Area 44. The boxes are pulled from the pads and taken to this shed, where they are inspected by quality assurance personnel who separate the damaged material from the undamaged. The undamaged material is then moved by four lines of roller conveyors through the processing line where they are repackaged/boxed, stenciled, and then moved to new locations within location 44. Simultaneously, Area 44 is being improved by upgrading and establishing new storage locations. Upon completion of the project, location 44 will have been completely rewarehouse. As of 30 April the project was 60% completed. It is anticipated that the entire operation will be completed by late June 1970.

COLD STORAGE WAREHOUSE: A cold storage warehouse was constructed at the Class I point in Qui Nhon by troops of the 84th Engineer Battalion, with refrigeration equipment being installed by RMK. The first half of the facility was turned over to PA&E in June 1969 and the remainder in September. The completed warehouse consists of two 80 by 220 foot buildings providing 180,546 cubic feet of storage. RMK laid 10,000 square yards of asphalt pavement around the facility in November. Completion of this facility permitted release of the SS Hibarus, a refrigerator ship which had been leased for two years to provide cold storage. This action has resulted in considerable dollar savings and greater efficiency of operations.

MOBILITY OF CONEX FACILITY: The inadequacy of the CONEX repair facility site at 5th Maintenance Battalion dictated the movement of the facility to the Depot because of availability of space and security requirements. Also, this places the facility at the location where most of the repaired CONEX will be used. The move commenced on 1 March and was completed on 11 March 1970. It has been fully operational since with 180 CONEX repaired at a cost of $10,478.51 in March and 220 CONEX repaired at a cost of $12,359.05 in April.

VIETNAMIZATION AT DEPOT: A great deal of effort is going into the training of Vietnamese civilians working at the Depot. Both old and new employees are being given intensive instruction in such areas as warehouse operations.

CONFIDENTIAL
forklift operation, driving, office machinery repair, typing, math, English language, ADP operations, postal operations, and administrative skills. The training, when applicable, is conducted in two phases: first a period of classroom type instruction, then OJT at the Depot in the particular skill. The Central Training Institute in Saigon provides Vietnamese instructors for the program. Thus far, 260 persons have completed the program successfully.

2. (C) POL Operations.

STORAGE FACILITIES: The Support Command operates six major POL storage facilities within Northern II CTZ. Tank Farm #1 is located in Qui Nhon. This tank farm was completed in June 1965, the first to be constructed. It consisted of six 10,000 barrel tanks and two 3,000 barrel tanks (total, 66,000 barrels) until mid-1969, when two of the larger tanks had to be taken out of service due to leakage. Tank Farm #2, placed in operation in November 1967, now has a storage capacity for 100,000 barrels JP-4, 10,000 barrels AVGAS, 20,000 barrels MNOAS, and 60,000 barrels DF-2; this totals 190,000 barrels. It serves as the central tanker loading facility for the Qui Nhon area, with eight fill stands handling 5,000 gallon tankers at a rate of 7 1/2 per hour. The Packare Petroleum Depot had been a tank farm with a 46,000 barrel capacity until it was destroyed by enemy action in March 1969. Since then, only package products have been handled at that location. It is the command's only wholesale package POL point. The An Khe tank farm, head terminal of the An Khe pipeline, has a capacity of 33,000 barrels. This is divided into 20,000 barrels JP-4, 3,000 barrels AVGAS, and 10,000 barrels DF-2. The Picheru tank farm continues with its original volume of 56,000 barrels bulk storage. Finally, the Phu Hiep tank farm was placed in service in December 1969 with a capacity of 13,000 barrels. Retail supply points are operated at Cheo Doa, LZ English-Uplift, Qui Nhon AAP, Dak To, Kontum, Song Cau, Duc Pho, 5OK Valley, and in support of task force operations as required.

PIPELINES: There were four major pipelines operated by the command in addition to those used to transfer fuels from the harbor to the local tank farms. Of the four, two are currently in operation. The Qui Nhon-An Khe pipeline was multiproduct six inch victaulic line extending 53 miles from Tank Farm #1 to the An Khe tank farm. Fuel was pushed through by five pump stations, each operating four pumps. Station #2 had a bulk storage capacity of 9,000 barrels. The An Khe - Picheru pipeline extended from the An Khe tank farm to the Picheru tank farm, a distance of 62 miles. Another five pump stations were used on this line. Fuel was pumped from Tank Farm #2 18 miles to Phu Cat through a single-product (JP-4) six inch victaulic line without intermediate pump stations. This line is being replaced with a buried welded line. The last line to be placed in operation was between Vung Hoa Biv and Phu Hoa, a distance of 18 miles.

The harbor lines consist of two eight inch lines extending from the POL jetty to Tank farms #1 and #2 respectively. Through these, ships can be
CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

Discharged at a rate of 3,000 bph. There is also a six inch local line extending two miles from Tank Farm #1 to Tank Farm #2.

Receipt of Bulk POL: Bulk product is delivered to the ports of Qui Nhon and Vung Po Bay by ocean-going T-2 class tankers (130,000 barrel capacity). These vessels are scheduled in by lst Logistical Command to arrive at approximately seven day intervals. Irregular and untimely arrival of these tankers has at times caused the stockage throughout the command to fall below a safe level. In Qui Nhon, fuel is pumped from a jetty located in the inner harbor to shore tankage through a booster pump station capable of discharging a T-2 tanker in 48 hours. At Vung Po Bay, a mooring system with submarine lines is employed. There is no shore tankage at Vung Po Bay; fuel is discharged directly to Tay Ho Air Force Base tankage located approximately eighteen miles inland. Vessel discharge time there is approximately 72 hours. Tankers arriving at both ports are manifested for four products: JP-4, AVGAS, MOGAS, and diesel fuel. Product is sampled and tested at the Qui Nhon petroleum laboratory prior to discharge.

Distribution and Consumption: During the period 1 June 1969 through 1 May 1970, approximately 237,000,000 gallons of bulk petroleum products were distributed throughout the command. Of this total, 156,000,000 gallons was shipped by 5,000-gallon tank trucks, 79,000,000 gallons by pipeline and 2,000,000 gallons by rail car. Average consumption over the same period was approximately 700,000 gallons per day. Jet fuel (JP-4) constituted forty-five percent of the average daily issue.

Closing of the AF KBP - Phu Cat and Qui Nhon - Phu Cat Pipelines: During the period May - July 1968, the pilferage of fuel from the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon pipelines to Phu Cat and An Phu became a major problem. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Petroleum and the 24th Quartermaster Battalion requested assistance from the Civil - Military Operations Office in coordinating a campaign to inform the local population of the dangers involved in pilfering highly volatile fuel from the pipelines. In cooperation with the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAC) and the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), a campaign on the dangers of fuel pilferage was conducted using teams of Vietnamese with loudspeakers for face-to-face contact, an airplane with a tape recorded message which flew over the pipeline areas, and hand distribution of 300,000 leaflets. Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials rendered little support to the effort to control and punish pilferers, and without their backing, the effort failed. An exposed pipeline offered local nationals too much temptation to pilfer fuel for personal use such as cooking and vehicle operation and for sale on the black market.

Throughout the period August - October 1968, numerous coordination meetings were held between US and Vietnamese officials and considerable correspondence was dispatched to US, GVN, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces officials dealing with the problems of POL pilferage from pipelines operated by this command. The Commanding Generals of

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

I Field Force Vietnam, the Capital 401 Infantry Division, the MOY, White Horse Division, and the 4th Infantry Division, the Province Chiefs of Phu Yen and Binh Dinh Provinces, and district chiefs in Quy Nhon, An Khe, and Binh Khe were all requested to assist in lowering the pilferage problem to an acceptable level. Directives from CO, IFFV and CO, ARVN II Corps directed that tactical organizations shoulder the responsibilities of pipeline security. As of 31 October 1969, the results of these directives were negligible. The most aggressive efforts to stop and/or discourage pilferage at that time were by elements of this command.

The Qui Nhon - Phu Cat and An Khe - Pleiku pipelines were closed on 3 November and 8 January respectively due to excessive losses. MAUSUPCOM.

 Qui received 20 additional 5,000 gallon tankers from Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay to provide the additional line - haul to Phu Cat and Pleiku. The closure of these pipelines has produced a savings of $1.1 million. The Pleiku line was picked up and is being disposed of through retrograde and PDC channels.

CLOSING OF THE QUI NHON - AN KHE PIPELINE: Attempts to reduce pilferage on the Qui Nhon - An Khe line continued during the period November 1969 - March 1970. Daily helicopter surveillance was initiated and the number of repair crews further increased, but losses continued to be unacceptable. The line was finally closed on 31 March. It is currently being picked up, with unserviceable sections going directly to PDC and serviceable sections being staged for retrograde shipment.

REDUCTION OF LOSS RATE ON THE VUNG RO - TUY HOA PIPELINE: During December 1969 the Special Assistant for Combat Security assisted the ACofS, POL in implementing improved security measures for the POL pumping operation conducted between Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro Bay. To achieve this, three defensive zones were set up. The Phu Hiep MP Detachment monitored the northern section; the ARVH and RF/PF have dismantled patrols and ambushes during the hours of darkness, while during daylight they have established fixed positions at valve locations. The 545th Transportation Company makes intermittent patrols in the central zone. FCKA units also have roving patrols along QL-1 during daylight and close QL-1 at night. As a result of this operation, the loss rate was significantly reduced. The average monthly loss for the period June 1969 thru December 1969 was 21.7%. The average monthly loss for the period January 1970 thru April 1970 was 4.6%.

The increased cooperation between the Province officials, FCK Army, ARVN and pipeline operating personnel, coupled with improved pumping techniques (i.e., pumping only during daylight hours and closing selected valves at the end of the pumping period), were the primary reasons for this favorable downward trend in pipeline losses.

PHU CAT WELDED PIPELINE: As a part of a major effort to reduce pipeline losses within the Support Command, a civilian engineering company (RMKBRJ) was awarded a contract to construct 18 miles of buried six inch
welded steel pipeline from Qui Nhon to Phu C't. The new line will replace the above-ground coupled line which was closed on 3 November 1969. The project also includes the construction of an eight inch line and a six inch line extending from Tank Farm #1 to Tank Farm #2. Construction began on 29 December and by 26 April the line was completed from the intersection of QL-1 and QL-19 to Phu C't AFB. This portion of the line was tied into the existing coupled surface line and pumping operations were begun on 30 April. The project is scheduled for completion in mid-July.

RELOCATION OF THE CAMP HOLLOWAY (PLEIKU) POL POINT: The relocation of the POL Supply Point from Camp Holloway to the Logistics Center at Pleiku began on 20 February 1970. The purpose of the move was to consolidate logistical activities and reduce levels of both Class III bulk and packaged petroleum products. The project also generated 10,000 gallon collapsible bags; these will be cleaned and redistributed within the command as required. Relocation was completed on 23 April 1970.

VIETNAMESEUALIZATION OF TFX PLEIKU TANK FARM: In March 1970, the 2d Area Logistical Command (ARVN) agreed to a USASUPCON, QN proposal that they take over operation of the Pleiku Tank Farm and assume the mission of bulk fuel storage in support of ARVN and US forces in the Pleiku area. By terms of the agreement, the 2d ALC will be responsible for all aspects of receipt, storage, and issue on an around-the-clock basis. Bulk re-supply will continue to be by US convoy as long as US units are being supported in the area. The 2d ALC will adhere to US Army standards of operation and quality control. Monitoring will be by US Army personnel, and the US will provide petroleum laboratory service. Any change in storage tank product service while US units are being supported must be approved by CC, USASUPCON, QN.

On 13 April, a program was initiated by the 45th General Support Group to train a nucleus of 2d ALC personnel in petroleum operating procedures. Their attainment of operating proficiency and capability to provide security will determine the date on which the tank farm will be turned over to the ARVN.

PACKAGE POL STOCKAGE: During this fiscal year, the 240th Quartermaster Battalion Package POL Depot has retrograded 619 tons of product to Okinawa and 47 tons to FPO.

Plans have been developed for throughput of packaged petroleum products. Product will go direct to customer locations allowing for a phasdown of the Qui Nhon Package Petroleum Depot from the current stockage level of approximately 3,000 short tons to 1,000 short tons.

TONG SHIN CONTRACT FOR FY 70: The Qui Nhon petroleum terminal complex is operated by a Korean civilian contractor, Tong Shin, Ltd. The contractor operates the POL jetty, two tank farms, and the package petroleum depot,
and also performs all pipeline maintenance within the Qui Nhon complex. Cost of the contract for the first six months of FY '70 was approximately $600,000.

Bid proposals have been received for the FY '71 contract. The scope of this contract will be broadened to include maintenance on the new buried welded pipeline from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat AFB.

3. Port Operations

FACILITIES AT QUI NHON: The Port of Qui Nhon is the primary point of entry for all materials coming into the command. Its permanent facilities include a DeLong Pier providing four deep draft vessel berths, benches capable of handling four LST's and five LCU's, a POL jetty for offloading T-2 tankers, an ammunition wharf, and five anchorages for general cargo deep draft vessels in the inner harbor. The available marine assets consist of contractor operated 100 ton and 60 ton barge dredge cranes, a 100 foot tugboat, two cargo barges and a fuel barge, three LCU's, a Q-boat, and a J-boat. The port has the capability, when working at a maximum potential, of moving 180,000 S/T of cargo per month, including both discharge and backloading.

FACILITIES AT VUNG RO BAY: Another point of access to sea shipping is provided by the port of Vung Ro Bay. Its facilities include a DeLong Pier capable of berthing two deep draft vessels, a POL anchorage, and two ramps, one wood and one steel, each able to handle one LST or LCU. Available harbor craft are a medium tug on loan from Saigon Support Command and a LCM. With these facilities, the port has a capability for discharging 750 S/T and backloading 500 S/T in a 24 hour period. The offloading of ammunition is limited by the amount which may be located on the pier and in the staging area. The rate of port clearance is the rate determining factor.

CONTRACTOR OPERATIONS: Han Jin Transportation Co., Ltd. handles 80 to 85% of all cargo discharged at the Port of Qui Nhon and also performs the mission of port clearance under government contract. The average cost of these services is $2.0 million a month. Contractor owned equipment includes twelve 10 ton cranes, 26 barges, four small tugs, and a 300 ton drydock. Their trucking fleet consists of 402 assorted bulk cargo vehicles, among them 52 tractors and trailers and eleven reefer. Any of these not required for port clearance are offered to the Movement Control Center for use on line haul.
TONNAGE MOVED: During the period July 1969 to April 1970, the combined inbound and outbound tonnages handled at Qui Nhon and at a Vung Ro Bay were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>QUI NHON SHORT TONS</th>
<th>VUNG RO BAY SHORT TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>118,174</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>111,298</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>91,276</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>110,903</td>
<td>10,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>98,335</td>
<td>19,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>93,648</td>
<td>13,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>117,330</td>
<td>8,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>89,151</td>
<td>8,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>91,559</td>
<td>6,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>111,806</td>
<td>11,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNLOADING OF AMMUNITION AT DELONG PIER: During the monsoon period of November and December 1969, 5th Transportation Command was tasked to discharge critical ammunition from ships at the DeLong Pier instead of the normal discharge area in the outer harbor. This action was necessary due to the unusually turbulent condition of the seas and a vital need for the ammunition. This was an unprecedented operation for the Qui Nhon Port and inherently dangerous because of the close proximity of the explosive laden vessels to enemy weapons fire and sapper action while at the DeLong Pier. For security reasons, vessels had to be moved out of the harbor every evening and back to the pier at dawn, precluding continuous operations and limiting actual cargo handling time to less than 12 hours per day. In spite of these limitations, the operations resulted in discharge of over 30,000 tons of vital ammunition from six different vessels in fifteen days of operation. This is an average of over 2,000 tons per day, a remarkable figure for even a well established ammunition operation.

AMMUNITION WHARF OPERATIONAL: In December 1969 the new ammunition wharf became operational. This facility has six barge pints, 60,000 square feet of staging area, and a rated capacity of 2,000 short tons of ammunition per
24-hour period. This action resulted in more efficient operation and replaced the previously used 'can dock' for unloading ammunition, which was in bad repair.

LARC OPERATIONS: LARC IX's (Lighter Amphibious Peso Supply Craft) were used to transport ammunition and outsized cargo from Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa. During the period July 1969 through April 1970, 10,282 S/T were moved via this route. However, they presented a rather formidable maintenance problem since they required 1 1/2 hours of maintenance for each hour of running time. Due to this and also due to their low speed (about 4 mph), use of LARC's has been phased out. Qui Nhon is now providing a heavy lift capability on an as needed basis.

PORT OF DA NANG: On 26 February 1970, a survey team representing the 5th Transportation Command visited Da Nang Support Command and observed the Navy operation of the Da Nang Port. Comparisons were made of US Army and US Navy port operation practices, adaptability of the existing operation to Army organization, and requirements for vessels, materials handling equipment, administrative vehicles, and other equipment. A formal report is being prepared to be forwarded to CO, Da Nang Support Command; CO, USASOFCOM, QM; and CO, 1st Logistical Command. A full-time planning staff has been formed within 5th Transportation Command to effect the orderly transition of the Port of Qui Nhon to a US Army Transportation Terminal Unit (USATTU) contractual operation, while preparing 5th Transportation Command units for movement to Da Nang. A permanent liaison officer and NCO were sent to Da Nang in March.

HAI PHONG CONTRACT FOR FY 71: Due to changes in the military running level at the Port of Qui Nhon, it has been proposed that Haiphong could assume a greater role in the overall port operation. There will be an increase from two to seven separate commodity rates if refrigerated cargo, CONEX containers, Roll On/Roll Off trailers, and heavy vehicles will be added to the present service. Three levels of effort are being considered for incorporation in the contract, any of which could be implemented after a working period. The levels are: a. The present total tonnage per month; b. Twice the present tonnage per month; and c. One-half the present tonnage per month. The contract proposal includes operation of all marine equipment, i.e., cranes, tugs, barges, lighters, and harbor pilot service. It also is proposed that the trucking operation be expanded to include cargo transport to Tuy Hoa and Phu Hiep.

OUTPROCESSING FACILITIES: NK-ERJ started construction of outprocessing facilities at Chn. Phan and the Port of Qui Nhon in late January 1970. The facility at Chn. Phan will include four vehicle rinse racks, two flat pads, two wheel/track combination type lubrication racks, water supply, and connecting hardstand. One half of this facility was turned over on 24 March; final completion is slated for 15 May.
The final staging area at the port will include two vehicle rinse racks, two flat pads, a water storage tank, a settling basin for water recovery, and 30,000 square yards of hardstand. Rinse facilities are scheduled for completion by 25 May 1970, followed by the hardstand at the end of June.

VIETNAMIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES: Efforts in the area of Vietnamization of transportation activities were centralized and solidified in September 1969 with the establishment of a Joint Committee consisting of representatives of 5th Transportation Command, ACoS, Transportation (USASUPCOM, QT), ARVN Terminal Command, and 2d Area Logistical Command (ARVN). The committee was to accomplish the following:

a. Cross briefings on mission functions, capabilities and personnel status of units.

b. In depth analysis of personnel and equipment requirements to operate the port.

c. Establishment of project committees to coordinate ARVN individual training and increase employment of ARVN units for specific tasks.

d. Development of plans for ARVN discharge of ARVN sponsored cargo.

e. Preparation of an agreement for joint utilization and subsequent turn-over of the Arno Can Dock.

f. Collocation of the 203d Marine Boat Group (ARVN) and the 1098th Transportation Company (Marine Boat) Marine Maintenance facility. Additional plans are being made for turn-over of the facility when no longer required by the 1098th Transportation Company.

Progress has been slow, but is steadily improving. Initial efforts were to train ARVN personnel and have them observe Han Jin operations. ARVN has now participated in discharge operations of seven deep draft vessels, amounting to 2824 S/T of Class I, II, III, and V cargo worked. As a result of an agreement reached at a Joint Committee meeting, the ARVN are now discharging coastal vessels at the Barge Quay. So far, four vessels have been discharged and cleared. ARVN now uses their assets to clear all ARVN sponsored cargo from the port.

Concurrently, under Project Buddy, ARVN personnel have received on-the-job training in supervisory and technical skills of terminal service and marine craft operations. Thirty-three have completed training and eleven more are currently being trained in seventeen stills.

VIETNAMIZATION OF THE PORT: With the end view of eventual ARVN operation of port facilities, 33 ARVN personnel have been given on-the-job training as cargo stowage supervisors, harbor masters, deck crewmen, coxswains,
engineers, riggers, hatch foremen, winch operators, salvage and maintenance officers, boat mechanics, electricians, fuel and electrical system repairmen, and electrical FL operators. Another eleven are currently being trained as tug boat masters, harbor craft operators, marine engineers, and deck crewmen.

Turn-over of the can docks had been part of the plan for eventual Viet-namization of the port. This action was given impetus by the partial destruction of the docks by a storm on 30 November 1969. Repair was found to be uneconomical, so completion of the ammunition wharf then under construction was expedited, resulting in its becoming operation in December, about four months ahead of schedule. The can docks were repaired by M/E using assets provided by the 5th Transportation Command. They were officially turned over to ARVN on 2 May 1970. At the present time, they are being used primarily as a mooring for LCIs’. Only small amounts of cargo are being moved.

4. (C) Ammunition

RECEIPT AND DISTRIBUTION: Class V stocks destined for USASUPCCU, Can, are shipped to the Port of Qui Nhon either directly from CONUS in ocean going vessels or from within Vietnam in shallow-depth vessels. These stocks are then distributed within the command in accordance with stockage objectives prescribed by 1st Log Ord. This distribution is based primarily on usage experience in the various areas. However, overall estimated capacity of the ASPs must be a consideration. The overall stockage objective is 11,200 short tons, distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Stockage Objective</th>
<th>Estimated Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASP #1 (Qui Nhon)</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP #341 (Pleiku)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP #340 (An Khe)</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ English</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Capacity is the maximum amount authorized to be stored in the Pleiku ARVN Depot.

Average monthly issues have ranged from 10,000 to 15,000 S/T, depending upon the intensity of tactical operations within Northern II Corps Tactical Zone. In the month of April 1970, for example, ASP #1 issued 5,500 S/T; ASP #341 issued 5,700 S/T; ASP #340 issued 2,500 S/T; and LZ English issued 1,400 S/T. This amounts to a total of 15,100 S/T. The high issues at
ASP #1 and ASP #341 were due to RNG operations in the Tuy Hoa area supported out of Qui Nhon and U.S. operations in Pleiku province.

Controls were placed upon the use of Harassing and Interdiction fires in February, resulting in a decrease in issue of artillery ammunition.

CONSOLIDATION OF US AND ARVN ASP's IN PLEIKU: Plans have been formulated to consolidate the 156th Ordnance Battalion Ammunition Supply Point, ASP #341, Pleiku, into the ARVN depot at Pleiku. The consolidation will be in three phases as follows:

a. Phase I - Extensive joint training program conducted by US with emphasis on supply procedures and ammunition operations.

b. Phase II - Phase-down of US stocks at ASP #341 with concurrent build-up of US stocks at the ARVN depot to 3,000 short tons. The receipt and issue of US stocks will be handled by US personnel until the joint training program and physical plant improvements have been completed.

c. Phase III - ARVN provides Class V direct support to US units in the Pleiku area from consolidated stock. The US will replenish all stock issued to US units. Two accounts will be maintained for reporting debit-credit actions. A US liaison team will remain to coordinate all US actions. Prior to the consolidation of stocks, the ARVN ASP must be upgraded. An engineer estimate of the work to be accomplished was completed. In general, the work consists of the construction of nine pads and berms, the upgrading of six presently existing pads and berms, and the upgrading of the internal and access road network. The expected completion date for consolidation is 1 June 1970.

PROJECT TOSCA: TOSCA (Test of Sea-Land Containerized Ammunition) was conducted in February 1970. Twenty-two vans arrived at Qui Nhon Port on 18 January 1970 and twenty-two arrived on 20 January. The vans were throughput to all storage locations, i.e., the Ammunition Base Depot and the ASPs at Pleiku, An Kho, and LZ English. Under this method, two ships were unloaded in one-half day as opposed to a normal operation of at least two days. The test proved conclusively that containerized shipments of ammunition provide obvious economies in handling and transportation. The ability to effectively throughput ammunition from COMUS will permit the phasing down of the Qui Nhon ABD to an ASP and supply of II Corps Tactical Zone (North) by containerized shipments. This would be implemented in three phases:

a. Initial phasedown of ABD and implementation of RO/PO.

b. Combining RO/PO with an implementation of Sea-Land.
c. Full use of Sea-Land.

To date, 164 twelve-ton trailers have been received.

**PHASEDOWN OF THE AMMUNITION BASE DEPOT:** A new stockage objective which will reduce the SO from 24,000 to 8,000 tons was approved by 1st Logistical Command. Reduction of stock and construction of the new perimeter were completed on 15 April 1970. The storage area was reduced 60% by removal of 54 pads.

**IMPROVED SECURITY OF AMMUNITION BASE DEPOT:** During the period from January 1969 to May 1969, enemy sapper attacks on the Qui Phan Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) resulted in the loss of 11,547 short tons of ammunition valued in excess of $13,000,000. During the period June 1969 to date, enemy sapper attacks on the Qui Phan ABD resulted in the loss of only 30 short tons valued at $56,000. This reduction is primarily the result of increased security measures and the immediate reaction of 184th Ordnance Battalion personnel in combating ammunition fires. Since June 1969, new perimeter fencing has been constructed entirely around the ABD and 22 new positions have been added to the perimeter defenses. Prefabricated bunkers were installed by the Provisional Guard Company which greatly reduced the time required to construct adequate defensive positions. Extensive training of guard personnel in sapper tactics increased the awareness of the guards and stopped approximately twenty attempted penetrations. An extensive harassment and interdiction program discouraged enemy activity in the immediate vicinity and anti-personnel radar was installed in early January 1970. These measures greatly increased the security posture of the ABD.

5. Transportation

**LINE HAUL:** Line haul within the Qui Phan Support Command is the responsibility of the 8th Transportation Group. Their assets are, by type: 36 - 2 1/2 ton trucks, 183 - 5 ton trucks, 354 - 5 ton tractors, 14 - 10 ton tractors, 455 - 12 ton tankers, 120 POL tankers, 15 - 2 1/2 ton tractors, 50 reefer, 5 dray wagon, 20 low boys, 4 - 40 foot low boys, and 61 gun trucks. In addition, vehicles of the Han Jin Co. not needed for port clearance were made available for line haul. These trucks are convoyed to all points in Northern II CTZ, to include An Khe, Pleiku, Ben Het, Dak To, Kontum, Phu Tho, Van No, Tay Hoc, Chu Lai, Cheo Reo, LZ English, and LZ Uplift. Since December 1969, line haul in the Phu Hiep area has been the responsibility of the 593d General Support Group. Performance over the last year in ton miles moved by the 8th Trans Gp, Han Jin Co, and the 593d GS Gp are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Ton Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JULY 69</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>3,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>6,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECEMBER</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
Due to increased driver availability/utilization and increased vehicular utilization, ton mileage figures soared in March to 5,700,000 ton miles. This was only 136,000 ton miles fewer than the all-time 8th Transportation Group high reached in March of 1969. This is especially noteworthy because this was accomplished with three companies less than were available in 1969.

**CONVOY SECURITY PROCEDURES:** Resupply of the forward Logistical Supply Areas (LSA’s) within the Support Command area of responsibility, is accomplished by line haul assets provided within the command’s 8th Transportation Group (‘T”). To accomplish this line haul mission over the 500 miles of road network within Northern II CTZ, the group provides over 450 task vehicles daily.

Security for these convoys is provided through a variance of tactical and logistical means: The LOC’s are swept by tactical forces, either US, ROK, or ARVN dependent on their area of responsibility for tactical security, and these same forces provide strong points along the LOC at bridges and likely ambush locations. These forces are under the operational control of the Highway Coordinator, who is provided by the tactical force in that area. The Highway Coordinator likewise has access to gunship and tactical air forces if required to suppress an ambush or other incident against a convoy. The Highway Coordinator controls the LOC and a release for convoy must be approved by the coordinator. In addition he, in coordination with ALCON, establishes road operating and closing times.

The 8th Group supplements this convoy security posture through the utilization of hardened Maintenance/Gun Truck vehicles. These are usually 5 ton cargo trucks, hardened with sheet steel and armed with automatic weapons. They are dispersed among the convoy serial, usually 1 for every 10 task vehicles to provide maintenance assistance as required to the convoy and provide immediate fire power in the event of an ambush until the kill zone has been cleared of task vehicles.

Last year the command experienced 153 incidents initiated against support command convoy operations in Northern II CTZ resulting in 15 command personnel being killed in action with an additional 99 being wounded in action. So far this year, we have experienced 32 incidents resulting in 2 killed and 22 wounded.

This concept has proven very satisfactory within the command and has been thoroughly documented and reviewed by the US Army Transportation School.

**POL LINE HAUL:** Due to enemy interdiction of the pipeline on QL-19 between Qui Nhon and Plice, the pipeline was closed. POL tanker assets were
consolidated in the 8th Transportation Group when this pipeline was closed. Military line haul then became the primary means of POL transportation to An Khe and Pleiku, replacing the pipeline distribution system. The 8th Group tankers compiled a commendable record by placing 20,415,000 gallons of fuel into Pleiku over a 92 day period between November 1969 and January 1970. Fuel management levels were maintained at a higher level than had been previously maintained by using the pipeline.

NEW CONVOY ROUTE TO CHU LAI: On 17 March 1970, 8th Transportation Group initiated a regular line haul from Qui Nhon to Chu Lai in support of the American Division in the I Corps Tactical Zone. This move has resulted in a quicker response to American Division supply needs and is a more reliable mode of transportation than the sea transport which had previously been used.

DRIVER AVAILABILITY: During the period December 1969 and January 1970, 8th Transportation Group had many tractors and trucks which were not being utilized effectively due to a shortage of drivers. During the most critical period, driver availability was down to 35% of the required number. Through increased co-ordination, an intensive on-the-job training program for men with other MOS's, and by encouragement of in-country transfers, driver availability was improved to 100%. This program resulted in the maximum utilization of 8th Transportation Group rolling stock.

CARGO EXPRESS SERVICE: On 19 March 1970, the 8th Transportation Group began a cargo express van service. Commanders of units throughout Northern II Corps can expect to receive prompt fill of high priority requisitions. This service will provide rapid handling and delivery of sensitive, high priority cargoes to units in the field. Utilizing retrograde vans which 8th Transportation Group personnel refurbished, this shuttle-type service operates between Qui Nhon Depot, Pleiku, and An Khe using units. This system, which moves the cargo by road from the depot directly to the requesting unit, reduces delivery time from 5 1/2 days to 1 1/2 days. It eliminates much time-consuming handling by 'riddle men' who previously handled such items as many as seven times.

6. (C) Maintenance

ARTILLERY R&R PROGRAM: During fiscal year 1970, the Artillery Repair and Return (R&R) Program has continued successfully. In this program, each heavy self-propelled artillery piece (M10/M107 eight inch self-propelled howitzer and 175mm Sam, self-propelled) undergoes a complete seven day maintenance stand-down with the assigned firing crew, at the owning battery's direct support unit. M10s and M107s are scheduled for R&R every 90 days, at which time maintenance and firing crews perform scheduled maintenance and necessary repairs. DSU maintenance supervisors also train the firing crew on daily operator and crew maintenance. This program has resulted in better overall maintenance for each of these important pieces of equipment, a higher level of crew training, and fewer unscheduled trips to support maintenance, all of which have improved mission availability.
ROADSIDE SPOT CHECKS: Since December 1969 vehicular maintenance within UHASUPCOM, OS has improved significantly. Performance on 1st Logistical Command Roadside Spot Checks has improved from a score of 54% passing in December 1969 to 81% passing in April 1970, indicating that our programs for organizational and operator maintenance have been successful.

PHASE III STANDARDIZATION: Phase III Standardization has resulted in the reorganization of several maintenance units of this command. Overall changes were the inactivation of one heavy equipment maintenance (HEM) company (GS) and one light equipment maintenance (LEM) company (GS), and the activation of one light maintenance company (LE) and one LEM company (divisional DS). In addition, a thirteen man automotive maintenance detachment and a ten man heavy materials storage detachment were activated. The latter has since been inactivated.

The principal increases in capability as a result of this reorganization have been at the direct support level in the repair of small arms, fire control instruments, and engine refrigeration, engine construction, power generation, automotive, field radio and office machine equipment. Additions were also made in the supply sections to increase the capability to operate and maintain the FCP 500 system.

At the general support level, the TOE change for the LEM company resulted in a large decrease in chemical equipment repair capability. The effect at the general support level was not felt so much in TOE changes but rather in the loss of two GS units, a LEM company and a HEM company. The loss of the LEM company will result in a marked decrease in communications-electronics repair capability once personnel levels are brought into line with the new TOE by normal attrition.

KEYSTONE: Phases I and II of the redeployment of US forces, codenamed Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal did not affect the structure of Qui Mon Support Command except for space reductions. Phase III, Keystone Bluejay involved movement of the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, and the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. The command was tasked with receiving, processing, and disposing of all the equipment generated by these units.

To this end, processing locations were established at Pleiku and Ch'a Rang. The facility at Pleiku was primarily a reception and holding area at the 62d Maintenance Battalion. Two buildings were made available for processing and dipping of small arms and for packing and crating smaller items. The more extensive facilities in the 86th Maintenance Battalion area at Ch'a Rang included grease racks, wash racks, and water blasters. Personnel from the 604h Processing Platoon were supplied by 1st Logistical Command to supplement 27 men obtained from within Qui Mon Support Command resources in operation of the Pleiku area. The Ch'a Rang facility was run by personnel from the 86th Maintenance Battalion and an augmentation from the 604th Processing Platoon.
Extensive planning was done prior to initiation of the project. Maj Barry, the project officer, observed Keystone operations at Phu Tai and spent 30 days working with 1st Logistical Command in preparation for the project. Numerous meetings were held to coordinate movement of the units involved, insuring a smooth flow of material.

The first material was received on 1 February 1969. Receipts were closed out on 15 April. Between these dates, material received amounted to 247 wheeled vehicles, 130 tracked vehicles, 18 towed howitzers, 131 trailers, 107 generators, 9 air compressors, 29 other pieces of engineer equipment, 2,223 items of combat equipment, 3,677 small arms, 2,485 items of FM-4. The Pleiku area was closed 10 April.

TRAINING OF ARVN: As part of the Project Buddy Vietnamization program, a large number of ARVN personnel are being trained in maintenance activities. This training has occurred both in US units with the ARVN personnel undergoing OJT alongside US soldiers and in ARVN units visited by Instruct and Advise (I&A) teams. Of the 825 men instructed to date in 42 maintenance MOS's, 635 were trained by these teams. The I&A teams are currently handling the full load of 150 ARVN personnel now receiving maintenance instruction.

7. (C) Forward LSA Operations

BINH TAY OPERATIONS: In support of the Allied thrusts into Cambodia in May, the command was tasked with development of forward Logistic Support Areas (LSA's) for forward of any established logistical complexes. Responding to this requirement with less than 48 hours notice, an LSA was established at Plei Djerem to provide all required classes of supply in support of the insertion of the 4th Infantry Division into Cambodia. In addition, a supplementary refuelling point was established at Duc Co. The establishment and stockage of these significant forward activities exemplifies the responsiveness of the command to the demands of tactical commitments.

BINH MOC OPERATIONS: Similar operations had been previously been established at Ben Het during the 1965 siege there and at Dak To and Kontum during the siege of Dak Saeng in March and April 1970. However, neither of these was established in as short a time nor grew to the magnitude of the support rendered the Cambodian operation.

8. (C) Retrograde and Disposal

RELOCATION OF CC&S ACTIVITY: The Collection, Classification, and Salvage activity moved operations from Phu Tai Valley to Che Rang Valley and was placed under the operational control of the 86th Maintenance Battalion. The move was initiated early in January and completed on 10 February 1970. This relocation has given the command the capability to handle and process
a greater quantity of materiel. The unit constructed a wash rack which will handle four vehicles at one time. This facility is used by both CCMS and Keystone Bluejay operations until the RKX-ERU wash rack for Bluejay is completed. A new loading dock was fabricated for the expeditions loading of Sea-Land vans. This dock will accommodate up to 17 vans at one time.

The month of February saw a record breaking shipment for this CCMS activity with a total of 7,330 tons shipped. The backlog remaining at the close of February was 185 tons.

PROPERTY DISPOSAL: The command organized a provisional property disposal company with an authorized strength of nine officers, one warrant officer, and one hundred and forty-five enlisted men. This was necessary because of the large amount of material being generated by redeploying units. As of the end of February, CCMS/QN had 6,969 short tons of usable property on hand and 9,371 short tons of scrap within the property disposal yard. All scrap has been sold to Horton Private Limited, a contractor which has a long term contract with the US Government.

9. (U) Communications

AUTODIN INSTALLATION: Due to the installation of the Automatic Digital Information Network station in the Qui Nhon area, the CCMS/QN headquarters communications center was no longer required and was closed. This action released 13 personnel to other duties and resulted in a savings of $500,000.

10. (C) Security

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR COMBAT SECURITY: Centralized responsibility for combat security of Support Command units has been placed in the office of the Special Assistant for Combat Security and Deputy Installation Defense Coordinator (SACS/DIDC). This was done to obtain maximum control and emphasize command interest. SACS advises the Commanding General on all matters relating to combat security within the Qui Nhon Defense Installation area and those areas occupied by Support Command units outside QNDI. He establishes standards and operational doctrine for the defense of installations, facilities, convoys, and pipelines. To meet these responsibilities, SACS/DIDC is organized into four branches: Operations, Intelligence, Duffel-bag, and Tactical Operations Center.

QUI NHOI DEFENSE INSTALLATION ORGANIZATION: The QNDI area covers some 135 square kilometers containing over 12,000 US Military/Civilian personnel. The numerous small compounds in this area have been organized into twelve compound complexes for security purposes only. The senior commander within each compound complex is designated the complex commander for security matters. The senior officer at each compound is responsive to the complex commander on matters of security. Four reaction forces
have been designated, organized, and equipped so as to be able to deploy throughout the area to meet emergency conditions. In addition, each compound complex is required to maintain a reaction force for its own security.

OPERATIONS BRANCH: The Operations Branch publishes security operations plans and orders, conducts security inspections, maintains records and reports, and presents security briefings. OPORD 3-70 was published in March 1970 and, barring any major reorganization within the command, will be valid until March 1971. This comprehensive plan combines all aspects of security operations such as artillery support, illumination support, PBR support, composition and control of reaction forces, communication requirements, medical evacuation, intelligence, etc. Officer personnel from the Operations Branch conduct detailed day and night security inspections of all Support Command installations. During the period April 1969 - May 1970, over 200 inspections were conducted. In addition, current directives require unit commanders to conduct monthly field grade inspections of their compounds.

SENTRY DOGS: The use of sentry dog teams has given added depth to the defenses at three critical installations which are vulnerable to sapper attacks: the Ammunition Supply Point #1, which has ten posts; Tank Farm #2, with three posts; and Lane Army Heliport, with four posts. Two dog teams are provided for each post. They are used mainly to cover avenues of approach to the installations, complementing visual surveillance, night observation devices, radar, and sensing devices. Their effectiveness was demonstrated on the night of 1 April 1970 when a dog alerted his handler to the presence of an infiltrator in the perimeter wire. The handler immediately fired on the infiltrator alerting the guards, who detected and engaged two more sappers in the wire. All three were killed, terminating a penetration which might have been undetected.

A project to construct kennels for 70 dogs at Camp Harper has been approved by MACV. Sentry dog teams will be added to the security forces at ASP #1, and the USA. Depot - Quil Phon.

SEARCH LIGHT SYSTEM: A 30-inch Xenon searchlight was installed on Ba Hoa Mountain in June 1969 and another on Nui Hon Che Mountain became operational in January 1970. Three 23-inch searchlights are also located on the mountains around Quil Phon. These lights, with ranges up to several miles, are employed to illuminate areas of suspected enemy activity, and have proven to be especially valuable when used in conjunction with radar and gunships. They provide more effective illumination than artillery fired flares and also preclude the possibility of fires started by flare debris.

A light coordination center, similar to an artillery fire direction center, has been established to assure optimum utilization of the light system. Missions are requested, planned, and coordinated through the center on both pre-planned and immediate bases. The center insures that missions will not interfere with tactical troops and provides for adjustment and shifting of illumination.
On 29 January 1970, radar detected 50 to 60 VC moving toward Tank Farm #2. Gunships were called and the Light Coordination Center was alerted. When the gunships were in position, a searchlight placed its beam on the position obtained from radar. Two seconds later the gunships were expending into the lit area. This exercise in close coordination resulted in 22 VC killed.

RADAR: A second radar was obtained from I Field Force Vietnam (IFFV) for use during the TET '70 period. One set was positioned near the ABD to detect movement in the Phu Tai Valley and on the eastern perimeter of the ABD. The other maintained surveillance of the mud flats north of Tank Farm #2 and the port. There have since been no successful penetrations of these installations. Radar #1 (ABD) has made 131 sightings; Radar #2 (Tank Farm) has made 78. On 10 April 1970, IFFV repositioned one radar set outside the Qui Nhơn area.

ARTILLERY: A coordinated fire plan developed in January 1970 provides rapid response to enemy movements. Ninety-one concentrations were initially planned, of which 31 were registered. Eighteen more have been registered since as the result of enemy sightings and harassing and interdiction fires.

TACTICAL FORCES: In December 1969, D Co, 58th Infantry gave the command a patrol and ambush capability. Its activities in the vicinity of the tank farms have greatly improved the security of these prime targets. In addition, its 4.2 inch mortar platoon provides an extra measure of response to enemy contacts. On 25 April 1970, Co D, 58th Infantry and Co C, 58th Infantry were assigned to the 1st Logistical Command and further assigned to Qui Nhơn Support Command.

Close coordination by SACS with Tuy Phuoc District, Binh Dinh Province, and ROKA liaison personnel has resulted in the setting of 40 to 50 TF/PF and ROKA ambush patrols nightly within QNDI. The 8th POKA Company operates the perimeter of ASP #1 (ABD) and patrols north. The 9th POKA Company operates south of the ASP along Highway CL-1 to prevent large infiltrations.

PERIMETER IMPROVEMENTS: QNDI compounds are now using lime in their perimeter defenses. This has been found to serve a three-fold purpose: it retards the growth of vegetation; it provides a reflecting surface which increases the effectiveness of illumination; and it serves as an irritant to the skin and eyes of infiltrators.

SECURITY SEMINARS: Monthly security seminars were initiated in January 1970 as a means of correcting deficiencies noted in security measures. Topics are based on newly published regulations and new equipment which may improve the command's defensive posture. Open discussions often provide solutions to problems and dissemination of techniques of defense. Instruction in fabrication of fougasse devices and a live fire demonstration were given in April; four compound complexes have now incorporated fougasse into their defenses.
CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING: Practice alerts are held to maintain a high state of readiness in Support Command units. One feature of these alerts is the movement of the reaction forces to areas of probable employment. The units are aware of these areas and can test their plans for receipt of the forces. Newly assigned personnel are given marksmanship refresher training which allows them to become more familiar with their weapons. Beginning in April 1970, selected individuals will be eligible to attend the 4th Infantry Division Sniper School. Graduates are outfitted with National Match M-14 rifles and 20 power scopes. Guards have also been trained in detecting and engaging an enemy at ranges up to 200 meters during hours of darkness.

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH: This branch collects local intelligence from ARVN, Province, POK, US Army, and US Navy agencies in Binh Dinh Province. Significant items are also provided by reports from IFFV, 1st Logistical Command, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 173d Airborne Brigade.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: The Intelligence Branch prepares weekly intelligence summary. This summary is distributed to all compound complex commanders and all staff sections. It has proven to be a valuable tool for commanders in evaluating enemy operations during the period and determining his capabilities and vulnerabilities.

DUFFELBAG BRANCH: The Duffelbag Branch consists of one school trained officer and an E2 who supervise the entire Support Command Duffelbag Program. This was initiated 1 January 1970 and has rapidly developed to equal in size and scope that of the 4th Infantry Division. At present, 212 sensors of various types are operational. These include balanced pressure systems, unattended seismic devices, seismic intrusion devices, magnetic intrusion devices, infrared intrusion devices, patrol seismic intrusion devices, aerial delivered seismic intrusion devices, and acoustical intrusion devices. These are strategically located around critical logistical installations. Detailed map studies and aerial reconnaissance are made to locate and identify established trail networks which could serve as avenues of approach. Radio frequency sensors are then emplaced at distances from the installation greater than the range of B-40 and B-41 rockets, with balanced pressure devices closer in as a backup system. When an activation is received, the area is immediately brought under intense fire. To date, there have been 407 activations resulting in twelve VC killed, two wounded and captured, and four secondary explosions. Heavy blood trails have been found on numerous occasions.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER: The TOC is collocated with the Binh Dinh Sector TOC and US Advisory personnel from MACV Team 42 in Qui Phan. It is operational 24 hours a day serving as the nerve center for the twelve compound complexes within QNDI and possesses a dual net capability.

The TOC is staffed by an OIC, E3, and two clerk typists (one at night), and houses liaison personnel from the Capitol POK Infantry Division, the
CONFIDENTIAL

22d ARVN Infantry Division, Tuy Phouc District, and numerous support agencies. Present also is a USAF Air Liaison Officer and US Army Aviation Liaison Officer. These personnel effectively implement rapid coordination of any combat or combat support request. Located also in QMTOC is the fire support coordination center and search light coordination center. Some of the capabilities that the QMTOC provides are H&I fires, illumination, gunships, tactical air support, Spooky, and Shadow. In addition it originates all alerts and deploys task forces.

An alternate TOC is maintained within the Operations Branch. It functions from 0700 to 1900 hours daily and during all periods of emergency or increased readiness.

11. (C) Personnel

PERSONNEL TURBULENCE: Transfers of units from the command has imposed a considerable amount of personnel turbulence. All units in the command are not normally manned at the same level, because of varying requirements and priorities of requirements. However, when transferred from the command, it has been a standard requirement that they be at command average strength. This has meant that personnel had to be levied from other units, thus hampering mission accomplishment to a degree. Management would be simplified if orders for unit moves would direct that the unit be moved at its strength as of the day of the order, or if replacement personnel were specifically assigned to the command to bring the unit up to required strength, thus avoiding the levy procedure.

Unfortunately, this has not always worked in both directions. As an example, two platoons of the 525th Quartermaster Company (Pipeline Operating) were received at less than 50% strength, and with even fewer of the authorized skills. Later, one of the platoons was transferred to another command at this command's average strength. Other losses which have imposed problems of this nature include a supply and service company, two transportation companies, a transportation platoon, and an Engineer maintenance company.

A similar area which has been of concern is the retention in position of key commanders and staff personnel. This has been a constant challenge which has not always been met satisfactorily, although the machinery has never bogged down. At times, a considerable amount of attention was required to keep it going; attention that could have been devoted to other areas had there been more stability. Six months is just not long enough for even the best of battalion and group commanders to establish and complete really meaningful programs. Likewise, efficient staff operations are complicated by the selection of outstanding key staff officers for command halfway through their tours. These problems caused by foreseeable moves are aggravated by the necessity for more frequent shifts of key "top" personnel in order to keep up with critical vacancies as they develop. The deputy commander's position, for instance, was occupied by four different
Confidential

Colonels during the last year. Just when the deputy is really getting to know the local situation and can get on top of things so his weight is really felt, the load shifts back to the commander. The same situation holds for key staff positions. People have had to be shifted around to fill vacancies in the field; new staff officers then have to be trained. The cycle continues when slots are not filled from the replacement stream as they open up.

The situation has been somewhat the same at lower levels. While officers from draw-down tactical units are welcomed, their assignment to the Support Command with only a short time remaining in country is not the best solution to personnel problems. In a few cases, they have no particular affinity for their new home; in others, their skills are almost wasted. Most of them are barely broken in before they leave. Motivation and development of a sense of importance in these people is a real challenge for commanders. These men help maintain command strength, but also add to the amount of shifting which must be done to achieve maximum utilization of personnel with the most retainability.

It has been impossible in the last year to effectively plan the utilization of personnel since there was no advance information on replacements, with the exception of field grade officers. It could not even be assumed that there would be replacements for known losses. Much of the turnover in terms of sheer numbers occurred in July and August 1969, in association with Phase I of the troop reduction in RVN. As a result, a rotational "hurp" has been established which can be expected to manifest itself again this summer.

Shortages. Assigned enlisted strength during the year has fluctuated from a low of 93% of authorization to a high of 97%; officer strength varied from 88 to 90%. The most persistent shortage has been that of majors, with less than 50% of those authorized being on hand during several months.

Obtaining certain skills, both in officers and enlisted men, has been a continuous problem. There is a perennial shortage of petroleum specialists, pay and disbursing specialists, and movement specialists, to name a few. In some cases, these are actual shortfalls of authorization; in others, shortfalls of what is required but not recognized by authorization documents. These requirements are imposed by the nature of the command's operations. It has, for example, been necessary to operate specially tailored logistics support activities. In one instance, two LSA's were organized using the TOE of a supply and services company. When two LSA's approaching company size or larger are built essentially out of the TOE of a single company, some jobs cannot be filled from that one document. A company has only one first sergeant, one supply sergeant, one motor sergeant. With all supervisory positions, there are difficulties in getting enough skilled people to accomplish the mission.
CONFIDENTIAL

The same holds true for headquarters personnel. In one case, a provisional staff equivalent to a battalion headquarters had to be organized. In addition to the requirements of the LSA's themselves, field grade officers are needed as logistics coordinators. Again, these slots are not provided by any TEC or TDA. Units suffered because these officers came out of their authorizations.

Besides the LSA's, there are several other activities which mean much to the command's accomplishment of its mission for which spaces have to be filled from within the command's resources. e.g., the Fuel Drum Repair Facility, the Collection, Classification, and Salvage Company, the Property Disposal Activity and the Keystone staffs.

In non-mission areas -- mess associations, transient billeting facilities, central welfare fund activities, craft shops, libraries, recreation activities, the post, camp, and station activities which add so greatly to morale -- it is really difficult to find the number of trained personnel required. And the number of good, highly skilled men it takes to provide these activities is awesome. These costs in manpower have to be paid from somewhere.

REENLISTMENT: Percentage of reenlistments has increased over that for last year and VA reenlistment goals have been substantially exceeded. The VA goal for first term losses is 33.3%; this command achieved 42.7%. Against a goal of 5.7% for AUS losses, 12.4% reenlisted. Of personnel in a career category, 29.3% were retained.

This excellent showing is due to command emphasis at all levels on selective retention of qualified individuals. Reenlistment was stressed at all command conferences. Helping spread the word were TV spots and a series of talks given by /Cos, Pers to officers and senior "Cos in the major subordinate commands.

SAFETY IMPROVEMENT. December - January saw six accidents per million miles as compared to November's 18 accidents per million miles traveled. This can be attributed to an intensive command-wide program which was initiated in December. At that time there was a military police crackdown on speeding and an additional 250 speed limit signs were posted. Several illustrated safety lectures were conducted to orient troops on the importance of safety. Added incentive was provided by allocating each major subordinate command a 3-day P&R to Vung Tau per month. To become eligible for the P&R drawing a driver must have an accident free month of more than 250 miles. Additionally, a drawing is held from among the unit's winners and a $25 bond is awarded monthly. All means are utilized to publicize all aspects of the safety program.
12. (C) Cost Reduction

COST REDUCTION PROGRAM: The USASUPCOM, 07 share of the 1st Logistical Command cost reduction goal for FY 70 is $22,000,000. Twenty-four cost reductions with a total value of $21,981,300 have been submitted to 1st Logistical Command. Of these, actions totaling $5,532,000 have been validated and $7,905,000 rejected; the remainder are pending decision. Half of the ten submissions that were invalidated, comprising the bulk of the dollar volume ($7,165,000), were actions associated with turn-in of excesses. The decision that no turn-in of excesses will be validated was announced by USARPAC Army Audit Agency on 1 April 1970. Units were informed not to submit any further actions that achieved cost reduction through turn-in of non-essential TO&E equipment, turn-in of secondary items, or turn-in of any other items.

The major actions submitted were:

a. $4,432,000 realized as a result of a program designed to restrict the usage of sandbags to necessary applications, substituting sand-filled 55 gallon drums or other improvisations wherever possible. This action has been validated.

b. $1,100,000 worth of POL saved through reduction of losses following burial of the Vung Ro Bay - Tuy Hoa Pipeline. This action has also been validated.

c. $6,340,000 realized through expansion of the care and preservation project conducted by the Vinnell Corporation at USAD, OK. This action is pending.

d. $1,276,000 saved by the 240th Quartermaster Battalion in closing the Qui Phan - An Khe and Qui Phan - Phu Cat pipelines, and transferring POL issues to POL forces from Binh Ho to US facilities. This action is also pending.

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING: Technical supply functions have been consolidated at the 5th and 86TH Maintenance Battalions, making possible the release of two NCR-500 systems. One of these was transferred to the 19th Supply and Services Company, permitting them to convert from manual to automatic stock control.

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION: Major subordinate commanders have been appointed as the contracting officer's representative for those contracts which support their mission. This change was made so that the commanders would be more aware of the contracts and the contractors' performances.

TURN-IN OF NON-ESSENTIAL TO&E EQUIPMENT: The command has initiated a program requiring all commanders to review operations and authorizations to
identify equipment in excess to mission requirements. The goal of the pro-
gram is two-fold: to reduce unnecessary on-hand equipment together with a
reduction of man hours expended for maintenance, and to emphasize to all
commanders that, in the interest of good management, equipment not essen-
tial to the accomplishment of mission relate tasks should be deleted from
current on-hand authorizations. During the month of February 1970 autho-
rization was received to turn in non-essential TOE equipment with a total
value of $283,016.

SAP TRAILER REPAIR: The Central Trailer Maintenance Facility of the 8th
Transportation Group has devised a new method of repair for landing legs
on the M274A1 12 ton stake and platform trailer. By using 4 1/2 inch
salvaged pipe, new legs have been constructed which do not require guide
grooves. This materially strengthens the lower legs while the addition of
a dead axle also gives more strength and rigidity. To date a $10,000
savings has been realized with a $40,000 annual savings possible.

TRAINING: Replacement Training for new incoming personnel to Qui Nhon
Support Command is given by each major subordinate command within seven
days of their assignment. Replacement training consists of sapper tac-
tics, unit perimeter/internal defense, perimeter security, VC tactics and
techniques, Vietnam and relationship with Vietnamese, convoy procedures,
physical security and sentry duty, POW/detainee handling, claymore mines,
safe handling of grenades and explosives, safe driving techniques, NVA/VC
mines and booby traps, weapons safety and safe weapons handling, familia-
ization and battle sights zero with assigned weapon as required, and pro-
tective mask and gas chamber exercise as required. Other courses conducted
within the Support Command are the engine diagnostic course (86th Maint
Bn), the helicopter sling loading course (593d GS Gp, 45th GS Gp, 184th
Ord Bn, USAD, and 340th GS Bn), and driver training (8th Trans Gp). Per-
sonnel are also sent TDY to courses conducted outside the Support Command.
These are the forward observer school, the PCR 500 course, the 36VN course,
the PLL course, the packing and preservation course, and the UNIVAC 1005
course. In the period from June 1969 through April 1970 3,186 US person-
nel have received formalized classroom training and 3,147 have been
trained by OJT.

13. (C) General Command Activities

PROJECT BUDDY: To date, 976 ARVN personnel have been trained in 42 MOS's
under Project Buddy. Another 401 are currently participating in the pro-
gram. Of these, 150 are in on-the-job training held by the Instruct and
Advise (I&A) team at the 824th Logistics Battalion (ARVN) in Qui Nhon.
This team was formed in December 1969 for the purpose of carrying Project
Buddy into ARVN installations. Its five members are specialists in mecha-
nical maintenance, supply, armament maintenance, metal working, and fuel
and electrical systems. They have already conducted training programs at
the 220th Ordnance Support Center, the 821st Ordnance Company, and the
22d Logistics Battalion. The success of the I&A Team prompted the formation
CONFIDENTIAL

of a second term, which took to the field on 4 May. It is now engaged in training 246 men at the 22d Logistic Battalion.

In addition to those being taught by the I&I teams, ADW personnel are receiving training in port station operations, PCL laboratory techniques, and port operations. The 8th Transportation Group held a two day seminar on convoy practices and procedures. For 25 company grade officers from the 22d Transportation Group, ending with a practical exercise based on situations common along CI-19. Other training has covered the complete range of the Support Command's area of competence.

AIRFIELD PAVING: In August 1969, the paving of the runway, taxiways, and parking aprons at Cu Chi Army Airfield was completed by RMK-BRJ, resulting in improved operations for the airfield.

THE LOGMAN: Plans for the command newspaper were drafted in August 1969 and approved by USAV in September. A grant from the Central Post Fund enabled the first of the monthly issues to appear in October. The Logman is essentially a feature publication highlighting the accomplishments of the corps and units of the command. It promotes the command information program and provides a medium of exchange for command policy and programs.

The January opening of MACV's IBM cold type composing system in Saigon allowed the Information Office to prepare copy in final form in-country before printing Pacific Stars and Stripes in Tokyo. The resulting savings will be sufficient to publish four additional issues on the original grant. Fortunately, the Information Office had the expertise necessary to paste copy here. Previously, the paper had been composed entirely in Tokyo.

The Logman is now well established as the seventeenth paper started in Vietnam. It is published by the smallest Information Office in RVN to produce a corporate command publication. Reaction from subordinate unit commanders has been quite favorable, resulting in increased interest in the overall information program. Also, the additional material being produced has led to an increase in the command's releases in other media.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

During the past year, the QNSC continued to provide for the logistics support of approximately 90,000 Free World Forces. At the same time, the initial phase of a major retrograde program was begun. Significant reductions were made in excess stocks at the QN Depot and at DEU's. The TO&E equipment of one infantry brigade and an artillery battalion was received, processed and disposed of in operation Keystone Bluejry. Other units were encouraged to turn in non-essential equipment. Throughout the retrograde program, strong command emphasis has been placed on the objective "FETRO RIGHT" to maintain high standards in the care and handling of retrograde items.

Concurrent with the increased retrograde program, QNSC began a major effort to consolidate logistics support facilities in order to decrease security requirements and make maximum use of a decreasing base of logistics manpower resources. Consolidation of QN depot areas, reduction of Vung Ro Bay facilities, elimination of the QN-Pleiku pipeline and pump stations, and reduction of the QN Ammunition Base Depot to an ASF are some of the major actions accomplished. Plans have been developed for additional restructuring and consolidation which will be accomplished consistent with the phased withdrawal of US forces.

A final but not noteworthy accomplishment has been the success achieved by QNSC in the ARVIZATION Program. The 1377 members of the ARVN 2d Area Logistics Command who have been trained in logistics skills represent about 23% of the 6,000 personnel assigned to the 2d ALC. Other ARVIZATION highlights include the planned relocation of US Ammunition stocks into the ARVN ASP-Pleiku early in June 1970 and the ARVN operations of the Pleiku Tank Farm. QNSC is giving high priority to the ARVIZATION Program in order to prepare the ARVN 2d ALC for the eventual takeover and operation of US logistical facilities.

Turning now to problem areas, personnel turbulence and shortages continue to lead the list of critical problems within the command. The policy of rotation of key commanders coupled with the shortage of experienced field grade officers unnecessarily complicates the conduct of our support mission. There is little or no flexibility to staff Logistic Support Activities or to provide installation type support within a recognized requisition basis. These critical functions are operated from existing resources which reduces the efficiency of basic mission functions. Finally, with the exception of key command positions, there is little information available at this level to plan incoming officer assignments. Information on replacements by grade, branch, MOS and expected arrival dates is negligible. Prior planning and dissemination of information to this level would alleviate some of these problems and result in better utilization of limited resources.
Another area of concern has been the impact of security requirements on logistics mission resources. Throughout the command, approximately 25% to 30% of the available manpower has been applied to the security mission. This has degraded the logistics mission capability and at times has resulted in less responsive logistics support. The answer to this problem is to provide security guard companies for key logistics installations such as PCL tank farms, ASP's, ports, and depots.
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report:** BG Albert E. Hunter

**Report Title:**

Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 8 June 1969 to 1 June 1970.

**Report Date:** 1 June 1970

**Contract or Grant No.:** N/A

**Originator's Report Number(s):** 708025

**Other Report No(s):** N/A

**Distribution Statement:** N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity:** OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract:**
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.