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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (H) (7 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 702025 10 July 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION, 27TH ARTILLERY
APO 96253

AVI-8-T

1 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970, EOS CSFOR-65 (R2)

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1. (C) Operational Significant Activities.

a. Personnel.

(1) The 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery remains assigned to the 23d Artillery Group.

(2) Routine S1 activities were conducted during the period 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970.

(3) The average battalion strength during February, March and April was 94.1 percent. At the close of this reporting period, the battalion strength was as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>NUMBER SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARRANT OFFICERS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENLISTED MEN</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) At the close of the period, the following critical personnel shortages existed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTH BY MOS</th>
<th>NUMBER SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SP5</td>
<td>13E20</td>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>13E20</td>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>Liaison Sergeant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Sergeant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP5</td>
<td>35D20</td>
<td>Meteorological Equipment Repairman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>Chief of Section</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>76L40</td>
<td>Supply Sergeant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP6</td>
<td>94E20</td>
<td>First Cook</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NUM</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTH BY WO#</th>
<th>NUMBER SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>61410</td>
<td>Truck Vehicle Mechanics Helper</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF4</td>
<td>63220</td>
<td>Track Vehicle Mechanic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF4</td>
<td>64320</td>
<td>Heavy Truck Driver</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP3</td>
<td>71320</td>
<td>Battery Clerk</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Nine (9) casualties were inflicted as a result of hostile activities. No personnel were killed in action during this period.

(6) The following awards were presented during the reporting period:

(a) Legion of Merit
(b) Silver Star
(c) Bronze Star - Valor
(d) Bronze Star - Service
(e) Bronze Star - Achievement
(f) ACOM - Service
(g) ACOM - Achievement
(h) ACOM - Valor
(i) Air Medal
(j) Purple Heart

(7) The following recommendations for awards were forwarded and are pending:

(a) Bronze Star - Valor
(b) Bronze Star - Service
(c) Bronze Star - Achievement
(d) ACOM - Valor
(e) ACOM - Service

Incl: 2

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1 May 1970


(f) AROOM - Achievement

(g) Purple Heart

(8) There were no significant disciplinary or morale problems encountered during this reporting period that affected the operational capability of the battalion.

(9) One hundred and twenty-five (125) officers and enlisted men participated in the RAR program during this period.

(10) There were no vehicle or aircraft accidents significantly affecting operations during the period.

(11) In addition to Protestant and Catholic religious services available to all battalion personnel, Episcopal, Jewish, Church of Christ, Latter Day Saints and Seventh Day Adventist religious services are offered at Cu Chi Base Camp. The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division provides chaplain support for the three firing batteries, which are currently located near Tay Ninh Base Camp. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division provides chaplain support for the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Service Battery which are on Cu Chi Base Camp.

b. Intelligence. Essential elements of information (EEI) for the battalion were obtained from the supported infantry elements, the 1st and 25th Military Intelligence Detachments, the US Advisors to the SVN districts, Special Forces units and from INTSUMS and PERINTREPS received from higher headquarters. Additional valuable target information was gained for USAF Forward Air Control, VR aircraft, SLAR aircraft, Red Haze, People Sniffer, and Duffle Bag activations. An aircraft was available for visual reconnaissance (VR) during this period.

c. Operations.

(1) The battalion continued normal operations consistent with the assigned mission or general support reinforcing 25th Division Artillery, supporting fires provided 5th ARVN Division. Listed below is the disposition of the battalion elements on the first day of the reporting period:

(a) Headquarters Battery - Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT495472)
(b) Battery A - PSB Hull (XT263384)
(c) Battery B - PSB Washington (XT465668)
(d) Battery C - Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT495472)

Incl.: 3
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SUBJECT: Opromotional Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970, OCS 33804-65 (R2)

(a) Service Battery - Cu Chi Base Camp (XT66512)

(b) Elements of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery participated in the following operations during the reporting period:

(a) Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery continued the mission of operation of the Dau Tieng Artillery Control Center and the Base Camp Defense Fire Support Coordination Center until 7 February 1970. On this date, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery moved to Cu Chi Base Camp (XT66512) on a permanent basis.

(b) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery began the period with the mission of general support reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery. Battery A was involved in two (2) moves during this period. On 1 April, two (2) tubes moved to Minh Phuc (XT56550). For ten days those tubes, along with M2 "Dusters", operated under the control of the 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, forming a mobile task force and engaging selected targets by direct fire from the M109's and the M2 Dusters. The two tubes returned to FSB Hull (XT665384) on 10 April. On 28 April, Battery A moved from FSB Hull (XT665384) to FSB Laurel (XT20345). Their mission became GS, II FFORVN, supporting fires provided to III Corps elements. On 30 April, Battery A moved from FSB Laurel (XT20345) to FSB Lou (XT94292). The mission remained unchanged.

(c) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery began the period with the mission of general support reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery. Battery B made four (4) moves during this period. On 1 February, Battery B moved to vicinity of XT120580 for a one day operation. On 13 February, Battery B moved from FSB Washington (XT146588) for a three day operation to vicinity of XT113999. On 3 April, Battery B moved to FSB Illingworth (XT037991). Their mission became GS, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. On 4 April, Battery B moved to FSB Wood (XT047995), with the mission remaining GS, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. On 29 April, Battery B moved from FSB Wood (XT047995) back to FSB Washington (XT146588). Their mission became GS, II FFORVN.

(d) Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery began the period with the mission of general support reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery. Battery C made eight (8) moves during this period. On 13 February, Battery C moved from Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT295472) to Lai Khe Base Camp (XT635383), going on to FSB Thunder II (XT635352) on 14 February. Their mission became GS, 1st Infantry Division Artillery. Battery C returned to Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT295472) on 21 February. Their mission became GS, 25th Division Artillery. On 2 March, Battery C moved to FSB Junction City (XT635258). Their mission became GS, 1st Division Artillery. On 7 March, Battery C moved to FSB Darang (XT786622). On 12 March, Battery C moved back to FSB Junction City (XT635258). On 16 March, Battery C returned to Dau Tieng Base Camp.
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The mission became GSR, 25th Division Artillery. On 3 April, Battery C moved from Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT495472) to FSB Washington (XT465666). On 20 April, and again on 21 April, Battery C displaced to XT12503, returning to FSB Washington (XT465666) each evening. On 28 April, Battery C moved from FSB Washington (XT465666) to FSB Murray (XT091443) and their mission became G6, II FFORCEV, supporting fires provided III Corps elements in zone. On 30 April, Battery C moved from FSB Murray (XT091443) to FSB Murray II (XT098408). The mission remained unchanged.

(3) The missions fired and the amount of ammunition expended by the battalion during this period is listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MISSIONS</th>
<th>TOTAL ROUNDS EXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>12,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>15,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>10,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4695</td>
<td>38,313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The battalion was credited with the following surveillance during the reporting period. Listed below is a breakdown by battery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>NUMBERS DESTROYED</th>
<th>FIGHTING POSITIONS DESTROYED</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) At the beginning of the reporting period the battalion had one liaison party supporting ARVN units. At the end of the period there were none.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training.

(1) The following periods of mandatory training were conducted by units of the battalion throughout the reporting period (89) days:

(a) Command Information 55
(b) Care and Handling of Weapons and Ammunition 45
(c) Mobility Training 31

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1 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 37th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970, B5 63F05-65 (N)

(a) Weapons Familiarization 28
(b) Convoy Procedures 5
(c) Mines and Booby Traps 7
(d) AIM 3
(e) Physical Security 26
(f) Duds and Explosives 4
(g) Safety Non-Artillery Weapons 6
(h) First Aid 26
(i) Summary 60
(j) Character Guidance 8
(k) Driver's Training 8
(l) Security Orientation 8
(m) CBR Refresher 12
(n) Air Mobility 7
(o) M-72 LAW 5
(p) Geneva Convention 6
(q) Military Justice 6
(r) Civil Affairs 2

(2) In-Country Replacement Training for newly assigned personnel of this battalion is being conducted by the 25th Infantry Division replacement training school in Cu Chi. During the period 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970, thirty (30) personnel attended the course.

f. Logistics.

(1) A general slow-down in Class II and Class V supply channels has been noted. It has been taking longer for our requisitions to be filled through 624th SAM Company. However, no problems have been encountered in

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Class III, and Class I has remained stable. No significant problems have arisen in Class II, however, there has been a periodic scarcity of green bag powder in country. Increased expenditures of ammunition have occasioned an augmentation of the battalion ammunition section's vehicles with no corresponding increase in personnel.

(2) During this period the overall maintenance support of the battalion has improved, increased use of contact teams and rapid deployment of parts and personnel have reduced howitzer down time. Red Balls continue to be slower and more uncertain than they were designed to be.

(3) Commencing 15 January 1970, requisitions have not been authorized through depot except for essential items required for emergency. Requisitions with priority designations 01 through 08 only can be submitted as exception documents through command channels signed by the equivalent of a colonel (06) or higher citing complete justification. The purpose was to straighten out the system by allowing requisitions to be processed in order of receipt, thereby preventing the disorder within the system caused by hand carried requisitions. So far this action does not seem to have had the desired effect of reducing the time lag between requisition and receipt. In fact, this lag has, generally, increased. This is due to an increasing scarcity of certain items, caused mainly by deliberate draw-down. Efficient use of command channels must be made for items which are essential but scarce.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.


(1) OBSERVATION: While taking a seven (7) day leave or R&R a man may be absent from his unit for as long as 14 days.

(2) EVALUATION: The average soldier returning from leave or R&R is not familiar with the established transportation procedures for returning him to his parent unit. And the soldier is normally not familiar with the telephone circuits he must use when calling from Camp Alpha to his home base. To handle this problem divisional units have liaison personnel at Camp Alpha to insure that returning soldiers are quickly sent back to their respective units, resulting in less time lost for the man and for the unit.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION: That non-divisional units place liaison personnel at Camp Alpha (and other sites where personnel return from R&R or leave) to insure speedy return of personnel to units, thereby minimizing wasted time by the soldier returning from leave or R&R.

b. Intelligence. None.
c. Operations.

(1) Use of Aiming Posts

(a) OBSERVATION: An artillery incident occurred in one battery within this battalion because sound artillery practices in enplacing aiming posts were not followed.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of one set of aiming stakes as the primary aiming point with a second set of aiming stakes as the secondary aiming point, is a procedure which can result in confusion for the gunner, especially at night. Also, the practice of enplacing both sets of aiming stakes for the same howitzer close together increases the chance for error.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That M109 howitzer batteries enplace primary aiming points at 2600 miles and alternate aiming points at 5900 miles.

(2) That if aiming posts cannot be enplaced as prescribed above due to crowded conditions, etc., primary and alternate aiming points must be separated by at least 1600 miles.

(3) That all howitzers use collimators as primary aiming points.

(4) That lights on primary and alternate aiming posts be color coded to distinguish them.

(2) Performance of "Checks" in FDC Fire Missions

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a tendency for "check" personnel in the Fire Direction Center to automatically announce "check" without actually having checked the data.

(b) EVALUATION: In the noisy activity of a busy FDC it is possible for commands and numbers to be produced and passed to the guns too fast for certain individuals to actually perform an accurate check on all the data. The Fire Direction Officer may be lulled into a false sense of security as his personnel sound off with "check" at the announcement of each bit of data.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFCF-65 (2)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: During FDC training (crew drills, dry fire mission, etc.) the training should be halted abruptly several times and the FDC should check his "check" personnel to see if they are, in fact, performing accurate checks on all data.

(3) Battery Commander's Reconnaissance Party

(a) OBSERVATION: During several displacements made by batteries of this battalion the mine sweep team started later than planned and moved more slowly than anticipated while clearing the convoy route.

(b) EVALUATION: The delayed starts made planning difficult, especially when the initial concept called for the entire battery to displace and to meet an early "laid and ready to fire" time in the new position. The slow pace of the mine sweep team, at times further drawn out by rest halts, resulted in the howitzers becoming overheated during the road march. Also, the longer road march time reduced the time the battery was in a firing position ready to provide immediate fire support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That, whenever possible, a battery commander's reconnaissance party depart the base with the mine sweep team, with the howitzers remaining in their firing positions.

(2) That the battery commander call the remainder of the battery forward only after he has determined that the sweep operation has progressed to a point such that the howitzers should not catch the reconnaissance party until both are in the new position. The portion of the road already swept must be kept under surveillance to prevent the enemy from re-mining after the sweep team has passed but prior to the arrival of the rest of the battery.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training. None.

f. Logistics. None.

g. Communication. None.

h. Materiel.

(1) Construction of Steps into Perimeter Bunkers

(a) OBSERVATION: Steps into perimeter bunkers are often constructed with sand bags.
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(b) EVALUATION: The placement of 105mm ammunition boxes for stop loading to the top of perimeter bunkers eliminates the constant replacement of sand bags. It also removes the possibility of slipping on wet sand bags and causing personnel injury.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ammunition boxes be used instead of sand bags in the construction of stops leading to the top of perimeter bunkers.

(2) USE OF PACKING MATERIAL IN PD FUZE CANS

(a) OBSERVATION: Point detonating fuze cans contain useful items, such as "hair curlers" and styrofoam padding.

(b) EVALUATION: The "hair curlers" mounted near a radio set make convenient hangers for radio headsets. The styrofoam makes convenient holders for easily lost, but difficult to obtain items (i.e., map pins, pens, and pencils).

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units which have these packing materials available use them to reduce the damage of radio headsets and to prevent the loss of difficult to obtain items.

CLIFFORD F. TERRY
LTC, RC
Commanding

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6 - Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS-CSFO-65 (R2) (1)

DA, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96 669 16 May 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding Officer, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFG-FAC,
APO 96 666

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period ending
30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery.

/ / Un e Baker
Colonel, FA
Commanding
AVFB-PAC (16 Mar 70) 2d Ind

SUBJ: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1970. DA 0-FM 50 (a2) (3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266 2 JUN 1970

To: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFB-PAC, APO 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the quarterly report of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery and concurs in operations and lessons learned as reported.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R.G. HAMISH
LTC, FA
Adjutant

DA, HQ, II FFORGEV, APO San Francisco 96266 3 JUN 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVSEC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report – Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, and concurs except as indicated in paragraph 2, below.

2. (U) Reference item concerning "Loss of Duty Time for R&R and Leave Personnel", page 7, paragraph 2a(3) nonconcurs. Supplying liaison personnel to Camp Alpha (and other sites where personnel return from R&R or leave) would be uneconomical utilization of personnel. Personnel going on R&R should be briefed on transportation and telephone procedures prior to departure from parent unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CP:
CO, II FFORGEV Arty
CO, 1st Bn, 27th Arty

W. C. PARTEL, 1
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens, Jr.
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
HQ, 1st Bn, 27 ARTY
HQ, II FFV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96555 1 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. CLINE
ELT, AG
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 70 to 30 Apr 70.

CO, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

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