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AUTHORITY

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AGDA (M) (22 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701287 29 June 1970

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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13th Aviation Battalion
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
APO San Francisco 96296

AVBAMN-GC 11 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

CINCUSARPAO, ATTN: OPORD-DT, APO San Francisco 96558
Commanding General, USAV, ATTN: AVHEC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBCO-O, APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding Officer, 166th Aviation Group (Combat), ATTN: AVBCO-C, APO San Francisco 96215

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (U) Unit Mission: The 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was placed in direct support of the 21st ARVN Division on 1 January 1970. This operation called TASK FORCE GUARDIAN is a new concept in IV Corps Tactical Zone.

b. (U) Organization: Under TASK FORCE GUARDIAN the 162nd Aviation Company and the 191st Aviation Company were placed under operational control of the 307th Aviation Battalion at Can Tho. Alpha Troop of the 3/17th Air Cavalry, 12th Aviation Group was placed under operational control of TASK FORCE GUARDIAN on 5 January 1970. At the close of the reporting period the organization of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was as follows (Incl 1):

1. HHC, 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat), APO San Francisco 96296
2. 121st Aviation Company (Util Hel), APO San Francisco 96296
3. 162nd Aviation Company (Util Hel), APO San Francisco 96215
4. 191st Aviation Company (Util Hel), APO San Francisco 96215
5. 221st Aviation Company (Util /P), APO San Francisco 96296
6. 336th Aviation Company (Util Hel), APO San Francisco 96296

For OT UT
1

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S. XV. I. Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, REU 11150-65 (22) (U)

c. (C) Changes in Command and Staff are as follows:

(1) Maj. JOSEPH S. LUCAS, S-3, was assigned as the S-3 on 10 January 1970. Maj VICTOR S. COYNER, S-6, was reassigned within the Battalion.

(2) Maj. VICTOR S. CONNEL, S-6, was assigned as the Commanding Officer, 153rd Aviation Company (Util Hel) on 28 January 1970. Maj FREDERICK D. DULP, S-6, was reassigned to HNSUS.

(3) CPT BRADFORD K. BROWN, INF, was assigned as Commanding Officer, HQ, 193rd Aviation Battalion (Combat), on 26 November 1969. CPT JOHN W. HUMPHREY, INF, was reassigned to 166th Aviation Group (Combat) S-4.

(4) Maj. JIMMY J. McMAHON, S-4, was assigned as the Commanding Officer, 221st Aviation Company (Util Av), on 15 January 1970. Maj ROBERT H. THOMPS, S-4, INF, was reassigned to HNSUS.

(5) Maj. THOMAS H. KILPATRICK, S-4, was assigned as Commanding Officer, 336th Aviation Company (Util Hel), on 21 January 1970. Maj J. LEE W. HOPKINS, INF, was reassigned to the 1st Aviation Brigade.

(6) Maj. CHARLES S. KETTLE, S-4, was assigned as Commanding Officer, 111th Aviation Company (Util Hel), on 10 November 1969. Maj CHARLES W. MACKENZIE, S-6, was reassigned to HNSUS.

d. (C) Unit Strengths: See Encl 2.

(6) Aircraft Status: See Encl 3.

f. (C) Operational Results: See Encl 4.

1. (C) Operations

(1) The 13th Aviation Battalion, during the first two months of the reporting period, continued to provide aviation assets for pre-planned air-mobile assaults, troop insertions and extractions, tactical and administrative support, command liaison, medical evacuation and detailed visual reconnaissance in direct support of the Vietnamese IV Corps in the Republic of Vietnam. During the final month of the reporting period, the 13th Aviation Battalion was placed in direct support of the 21st AVN Division.
Tactical and administrative assets for the 21st Division were provided by the 121st Aviation Company, 336th Aviation Company, 221st Aviation Company, and A Troop, 3/17th Air Cavalry. Tactical support consisted of mini-packages (a flight of five (5) UH-1D/H aircraft for troop transport, a light fire team of two (2) UH-1B/C or AH-1G aircraft and a Command and Control aircraft). Tactical missions are being conducted by the Vietnamese Air Force from the 217th Squadron located at Binh Thuy. This support consists of a flight of VNAF troop transports, while the 13th Aviation Battalion supplies the Command and Control aircraft and a heavy fire team (three armed helicopters) for the mission.

(2) Airmobile Operations: The Battalion supported two hundred seventy-five (275) airmobile operations during the reporting period. Some of the significant operations are listed below:

(a) Combat Operation of 10 November 1969: The 151st Aviation Company (Asst Co) supported the 9th ARVN Division in a combined operation utilizing both ARVN and US air assets. The operation was staged out of Vl Thanh, which is located approximately 125 miles southwest of Saigon, with a center of mass at VR 1967. The Task Organization consisted of six UH-1H VNAF helicopters, a light fire team (2 UH-1G armed helicopters), and one Command and Control aircraft. The operation was started at 0940 hours (L) and the mission was to insert a Battalion size blocking force at the northeastern edge of the Viet Cong Forest at 1025 (L). One of the armed helicopters received bullet damage from sniper fire, but the aircraft remained flyable. In the early afternoon the armed helicopters encountered light contact and received numerous hits and one crew member was wounded in action (WIA) and medevaced to the nearest medical facility. One armed helicopter was rendered unflyable and had to be returned to its base of operations by CH-47 Chinook. The troops on the ground had to be reinforced. Darkness brought the operation to a close with the armed helicopters claiming seventeen (17) enemy killed by air (KEA) and only light friendly casualties. All assets were released at 1900 hours (L).

(b) Combat Operation of 18 November 1969: The 151st Aviation Company (Asst Co) staged an operation out of Cai Lao which is located one hundred ninety-five (195) miles south of Saigon. Contact was made with an estimated VC company with an attached headquarters platoon. Upon completion of the last scheduled insertion, the Command and Control aircraft began a normal reconnaissance of the area, approximately two (2) kilometers from the friendly positions a company sized VC unit was identified moving to a new location. The 151st Aviation Company's heavy fire team (three UH-1H helicopters) was vectored to the enemy location. The results were eighteen
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(18) enemy killed by air (KBA), thirteen (13) structures and fourteen (14) sampans destroyed. The friendly ground forces immediately swept through the area and claimed two (2) VC killed in action, three (3) packages of documents and a Communist flag. Later interpretation showed that the Executive Officer, a medical officer, and an advisor were killed. Captured documents showed the location of weapons and arms caches and the location of two (2) 60 millimeter mortar positions.

(c) Combat Operation of 1 December 1969: The 336th Aviation Company (Airt Hal) supported the 21st AIVN Division in an airmobile operation staring out of Bac Lieu which is located 175 miles south of Saigon. The task organization consisted of five (5) UH-1D helicopter transport ships, a light fire team (two (2) UH-1C armed helicopters) and a Command and Control aircraft. Two hundred (200) troops were airlifted into position and were engaged by the enemy in medium contact. Due to enemy fire the aircraft were unable to extract the friendly troops. A second task organization was requested for a night extraction. The 121st Aviation Company (Airt Hal) supplied the task organization consisting of five (5) UH-1D transport helicopters, two (2) UH-1B armed helicopters and one helicopter to illuminate the area of operations (AO) with aerial flares. An additional flare helicopter was supplied by the 336th Aviation Company. The combined task force extracted four (4) lifts and the armed helicopters inflicted numerous enemy casualties while sustaining no friendly casualties. A total of twenty-two (22) aircraft were utilized in the operation and the claim was thirty (30) enemy soldiers killed by air (KBA). All assets were released at 2230 hours (L).

h. (U) Training: The 13th Aviation Battalion continued to send personnel to various schools and courses.

(1) Army Aviation Refresher Training Courses: 25, Vun; Tau.

(2) Jungle Environment Survival Training School: 3, Phillipines.

(3) 1st Aviation Brigade Instructor Pilot Course: 3, Long Binh.

(4) Prescribed Load List Course: 6, Can Tho.

i. (U) Morale and Discipline: The number of approval recommendations for awards received during this reporting period are shown by the types and totals awarded: Silver Star: 11, Distinguished Flying-Cross: 5111, Soldiers Medal: 15, Bronze Star "V": 3, Bronze Star: 91, Air Medal "V": 52, air medals: 304, ARCOM "V": 51, ARCOM: 427, Purple Heart: 35, Vietnamese Cross of Galantry: 20.
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(1) During the reporting period the number of approved disciplinary actions taken under UCHJ were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summarys</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 15's</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The number of personnel that took R&R or leave to various countries are denoted below:

- Australia: 54
- Hawaii: 77
- Bangkok: 34
- Hong Kong: 22
- Manila: 5
- Singapore: 8
- Taipei: 15
- Tokyo: 6

3. (U) Safety:

(1) During this reporting period the Battalion has experienced two (2) reportable accidents, approximately one accident per 39,053 flying hours, bringing the total flying hours for FY 70 to 76,406.

(2) During this reporting period three (3) assault helicopter companies have had a zero (0) accident rate. The 191st Aviation Company (SSL Hel) has logged a total of two hundred (200) days without an accident.

(3) Accident statistics and flying hours for 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
<th>FORCED PRECAUTIONARY</th>
<th>FLIGHT HOURS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7,537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPA-65 (R2) (U)

UNIT ACCIDENTS INCIDENTS FORCED PRECAUTIONARY LANDING HOURS RATE
191 0 1 8 7,537 0
221 0 1 6 7,006 14.3
110 0 4 18 8,326 0

TOTAL 3 5 8 50 38,053 7.7

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commandor’s Observations, Evaluation, and Command Action:
   a. (U) Personnel

   Personnel Shortages.

   (1) Observation: During the past quarter the aviator status has remained consistently below authorized strength. This shortage of personnel, although not critical, has caused some difficulties and inconveniences on the part of both aviators and enlisted crews.

   (2) Evaluation: This crew shortage has made it extremely difficult to maintain a crew rotation which allows timely and efficient accomplishment of extra duties, which in turn directly affects the unit ability to function satisfactorily in an administrative environment. The enlisted crew shortage is evidenced by the fact that an overwhelming majority of late departures or instances where aircraft were not adequately prepared for a given mission can be attributed directly to a lack of personnel to accomplish the assigned tasks.

   (3) Recommendations: Continued emphasis be placed on requisitioning of new personnel.

   (4) Command Action: Personnel requirements are continuously monitored, and higher headquarters are kept informed of areas of criticality. Additionally commanders at all levels are made aware of the importance of close supervision of all personnel to insure maximum output under the circumstances of minimum personnel.

b. (U) Intelligence: None.

c. (U) Operations:

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(1) Vampire Missions:

(a) Observation: Vampire Missions (aviation assets of an aviation company scheduled for an operation the following day are placed on 30 minute standby that night for possible use. The flight consists of one (1) Command and Control ship, two (2) to three (3) gunships and five (5) troop transports and, if called out on a night mission, the following days mission is cancelled) are usually called out during the early morning hours and the aircraft invariably remain at stagefields until daylight.

(b) Evaluation: Aviation assets remain at stagefields up to six hours, this results in non-productive time and, in many cases due to the location of the stagefields, subjects the flight to exposure to enemy attack, particularly indirect fire attacks.

(c) Recommendation: That ground forces be prepared for immediate deployment upon arrival of the Vampire package thereby eliminating unnecessary exposure of aviation assets to possible mortar and ground attack at unsecure stagefields. If insertions are planned for after daybreak, air assets should remain at Soc Trang allowing only time necessary for flight to the pickup zone prior to first light.

(d) Command Action: The decision to call out the Vampire flight (as defined in (a) above) is made only when absolutely deemed necessary. This headquarters, on a continuing basis, attempts to impress on supported units the importance of immediate response. Release of the Vampire prior to dawn is, at present, due to certain other circumstances, not in accord with IV Corps tactical policy.

(2) Phantom Flares:

(a) Observation: This quarter the 162d Aviation Company was assigned the Phantom III night flare mission. This mission package was composed of one (1) UH-1H slick with flare racks supplied by the 162d Aviation Company, and one (1) light fire team, of two (2) AH-1G Cobras, furnished by the 235th Attack Helicopter Company. The mission was conducted in the Tram Forest, free fire zone, center of mass VS 7045 between the hours of 2100 and 0500 daily. Targets to be hit were acquired by OV-1 Mohawk and other type observation aircraft. Various targets were also picked out by fire team and province advisors. Once three (3) targets had been received, the package was vectored to the area by radar and strikes put in with illumination provided by the flares dropped by the slick.
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(b) Evaluation: The missions were extremely successful as it cut the enemy infiltration through the Tram Forest area, during the hours of darkness, to a minimum. A large number of enemy, killed by air, (KBA's), and supplies were also destroyed as a direct result of the Phantom III package.

(c) Recommendation: That the Phantom III mission be continued due to the excellent results.

(d) Command Action: Command action at this level has been to emphasize the obvious success of the mission in so far as the Battalion's contribution is concerned. This mission is under the operational control of the 307th Aviation Battalion. The 13th Battalion contributes the one (1) UH-1H.

(3) Combat Assault Operations.

(a) Observation: Many Airmobile Assault Operations have been unable to make contact with the enemy, while air assets in the process of making troop insertions or in reconnaissance of landing zones have had positive enemy contact, either by fire received or by visual sightings.

(b) Evaluation: Ground commanders have not remained versatile enough to take advantage of the tactical situation and divert their troops to areas of enemy contact. Landing zones which are picked prior to the actual operation are in most cases not as productive in terms of enemy contact as those discovered by the air assets during the reconnaissance. Many ground commanders are adverse to changing a previously picked landing zone, even when the concentrations are spotted in another area.

(c) Recommendation: That the Air Mission Commander insure that the Air Mobile Task Force Commander is aware of all fire received or contact made with the enemy by aviation assets. They should advise the ground mission commander of his air mission capabilities in dealing with the enemy locations discovered and the feasibility of moving his landing zone to this area.

(d) Command Action: All Air Mission Commanders have been instructed as to the importance of acting as an advisor to the Air Mobile Task Force Commander. Air Mission Commanders have further been directed to emphasize the availability of the aviation elements to assist in tactical maneuver on the battle field, and to maintain contact with the enemy whenever possible. Additionally, command action has been directed at educating supported unit commanders of the desirability of flexibility and mobility in actions against the enemy.
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(4) Armed Helicopter Escort.

(a) Observation: The troop transport helicopter sometimes receives fire on extractions. When this occurs the Task Force Commander frequently continues to make extractions from the same pick up zone even when the tactical situation does not require him to do so.

(b) Evaluation: Extractions are disengagements; except in emergencies they should not be made under fire. The object of a five (5) troop transport, one (1) Command and Control, two (2) gunship operation is to engage and destroy the enemy. Often a ground force will make no contact until extractions are under way, but will continue to extract none the less. Such action is tactically illogical. Contact with the enemy, the point of the entire operation, is established but not used to advantage. The enemy is located but not pursued. The friendly elements are exposed to an increasing risk as each lift is extracted with no conceivable tactical advantage.

(c) Recommendations: That the slicks make an automatic go around if they receive fire on final for extraction, unless they are already too deeply committed. If they go around, the Task Force Commander should assault the enemy positions. If the slicks were so deeply committed that they could not make an automatic go around, but had to extract one lift, that lift should be reinserted immediately in a tactically advantageous position. If the Task Force Commander determines that he cannot engage the enemy, his forces are needed for security elsewhere, it is growing dark, etc., he should not continue to make extractions from the same pick up zone. The slicks should be sent to a holding area and the Task Force Commander should take steps to avoid coming under fire during subsequent extractions. He may use artillery, gunships or air strikes upon the enemy positions, or he may move his remaining lifts several tree or canal lines away to a new pick up zone. He should never make extractions under fire unless he is in immediate danger of losing his elements to the enemy or unless a compelling emergency exists elsewhere.

(d) Command Action: Rather than adopt certain rules to follow under given situations involving enemy contact, the importance of flexibility and intelligent estimation of opposing forces and combative techniques against these forces is stressed. Specific command action is to stress analysis of each situation and react accordingly. Such courses of action as noted in (c) above (Recommendations) are attractive proposals under given circumstances but they are not stressed as hard and fast rules.
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(5) Armed Helicopter Escort.

(a) Observations: Frequently the Command and Control ship and the Fire Team Leader have difficulty in getting the friendly forces on the ground to mark their positions. This occurs most commonly on emergency medical evacuations, in preparation for a gunship strike, and on emergency resupply missions.

(b) Evaluation: The most common reason behind situations of this sort are lack of smoke, lack of coordination between the American and the Vietnamese on the ground and lack of preparation. Even when the ground forces have smoke, compass, and coordination, if they have not begun to determine where the limits of their forces are before the uns arrive on station, they have caused a delay, a delay which, in the case of a medical evacuation, may be critical.

(c) Recommendation: That the ground element leader ensure that a compass and sufficient smoke grenades are available, that he keep himself apprised at all times of the location of his elements through continual coordination with his counterpart. That he be prepared in advance to mark his position when he has requested airships.

(d) Command Tactics: Supported units are aware of this problem and are making every effort to solve it. That the problem is generally widespread is indicated by research and development efforts aimed at making the individual ground soldier better able to identify himself to air support elements.

(6) Armed Helicopter Escort.

(a) Observations: Sometimes on an afternoon operation the ground forces will wait until an hour before dusk before commencing extractions. This happens even in cases in which they have made no contact and have not even moved more than several hundred meters from the landing zone. It happens, in short, even when there is no cogent tactical reason to justify it.

(b) Evaluation: It often appears as though the ground forces are simply required to stay a certain period of time on the ground, as though they do not consider the air assets a flexible tactical instrument. The tactical error in making unnecessarily late extractions is, of course, that the enemy is far bolder and far more likely to fire upon extractions when he knows that he will soon be under cover of darkness. In such a case the entire operation is jeopardized to no purpose.
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(c) Recommendation: That the Task Force Commander make an estimate of the time which will be required to make extractions based upon the time consumed to make the insertion. That, unless tactical considerations dictate otherwise, he commences extractions early enough to complete them at least one hour before dusk. In this way he is less likely to come under attack when he is seeking to disengage if he has had no contact, and will be better able to react if he does come under attack despite his precautions.

(d) Command Action: Air Mission Commanders have been briefed on the importance of acting as a knowledgeable advisor, offering what information is pertinent, as required, rather than waiting for the Air Mobile Task Force Commander to solicit such advice. Air Mobile Task Force Commanders should always be advised of both present situations and those likely to occur in the near future. It is felt that this will more effectively insure that the extraction is completed at the most advantageous time in light of the existing tactical situation.

d. (U) Organization: None.

e. (U) Training: None.

f. (U) Logistics:

(1) Map Requisitions:

(a) Observation: Increased difficulty is being experienced in obtaining 1:250,000 scale maps of the area of operations and the IV Corps Tactical Zone.

(b) Evaluation: After continued requisitioning through channels it has been learned that this map is in a due out status. There are no 1:250,000 scale maps in stock at the 547th Map Depot, which is our primary source of Republic of Vietnam maps of the IV Corps Tactical Zone.

(c) Recommendation: That this deficiency be brought to the attention of the headquarters responsible for procurement of these maps.

(d) Command Action: 1:250,000 scale maps are on valid requisition and such follow up as required on subject requisitions is performed.

(2) Parts Requisitions:

(a) Observation: Parts requisitioned for maintenance of aircraft are being mislabeled.
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(c) Recommendation: That supporting maintenance units supplying requisitioned items be made aware of this mislabeling tendency and that a check of contents of requisitioned items be made, whenever possible, by personnel of this unit when picking up these items.

(d) Command Action: Supporting maintenance units have been notified of mislabeling.

(3) Constant Speed Propellers (0-1).

(a) Observation: 0-1D constant speed propellers are being returned from re-build in many instances in an unserviceable condition.

(b) Evaluation: Often after installation of a rebuilt constant speed propeller, the oil seals are found to be defective, resulting in the aircraft remaining in an Equipment Deadline for Parts status until another propeller can be procured. This is purely a lack of good quality control at the rebuild installation.

(c) Recommendation: That closer supervision in quality control be exercised at propeller rebuilding installation.

(d) Command Action: Equipment Improvement Recommendations (EIR) are submitted promptly when a defective propeller is noted.

(4) Aircraft Engines (0-1)

(a) Observation: The average waiting period for engines for Equipment Deadline for Parts is thirty (30) to forty five (45) days.

(b) Evaluation: Aircraft that are badly needed in support of combat operations remain EDP for engine change for long periods even after continuous requisitioning.

(c) Recommendations: That steps be taken to reevaluate requisitioning and supply channels to expedite normal resupply for EDP engines.

(d) Command Action: Continued EDP requisitioning.

(5) Engine Oil (Type II).

(a) Observation: There is a priority need in this unit for oil in one (1) quart cans through normal POL channels.
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(b) Evaluation: There is a priority need in this unit for oil (type II) in one (1) quart cans for aircraft flying out of stagefields. Presently oil is supplied in fifty five (55) gallon drums. After a drum has been opened it is difficult to prevent the oil from becoming contaminated. Often times many gallons of oil have to be disposed of because of suspected contamination. This in itself is wasteful, but more important, the use of contaminated oil in aircraft can result in excessive wear to engines causing unscheduled engine changes.

(c) Recommendations: That Type II engine oil in one (1) quart cans be made available through POL supply channels for distribution to lower echelons.

(d) Command Action: This headquarters continues to requisition Type II oil in one (1) quart cans. Furthermore subject requisitions receive timely follow up.

g. (U) Communications. None.
h. (U) Materiel. None.
i. (U) Other.

(1) (U) Aircraft Maintenance.

(a) Observation: Most armored seats utilized in the UH-1 series helicopters are equipped with a quick release which, when activated, will enable the seat back to recline. If these seats are not periodically lubricated they will become frozen in place.

(b) Evaluation: This unit has set forth a policy that requires these seats to be tilted back and lubricated during every preventive maintenance inspection and periodic maintenance inspection. This is done so that if the occasion ever arises that a pilot is wounded at the controls of an aircraft, he can be taken away from the controls by reclining the seat and first aid administered.

(c) Recommendation: That a policy requiring the lubrication of all tilt back armored seats during each PMI and periodic inspection be incorporated into all aviation units utilizing this model seat.

(d) Command Action: The importance of the quick release seat and the necessity of insuring that it functions properly, as well as the means to insure that it functions properly have been disseminated to all units.
(2) *Aviation Safety.*

(a) Observation: Though every aviator has been issued protective clothing and survival equipment, many aviators do not utilize this equipment even though it is issued or available.

(b) Evaluation: The requirement to wear protective clothing has saved many aviators lives. Survival radios and/or strobe light markers when needed have aided in the speedy and efficient location and evacuation of downed aircraft crews.

(c) Recommendation: That all crew members be required to wear Nomex flight suits, gloves, leather boots, and a properly fitted helmet. In addition, the aircraft commander should be required to sign out an operable survival radio.

(d) Command Action: All aviators are required to wear Nomex flight suits, gloves, leather boots, properly fitted helmets, and chest protector or flak vest. Each aircraft is required to have one survival radio and a survival kit and strobe lights are issued if available. Through weekly safety meetings and command interest this is a prime concern of all aviation personnel. Some of the items noted above such as Nomex flight suits, leather gloves and leather boots remain in short supply and stay on valid 0-2 requisition.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, 164th Aviation Group (Combat), APO 96215 5 April 1970

TO: Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSFOR

Commanding General, Ist Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC-O

1. (U) The attached 13th CAB ORLL for the period ending 31 January 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. The following comments are made on the report:

   a. (U) Para 2 a, (3) page 6: Concur with the comments on personnel shortages. Shortages of helicopter repairman, and technical inspectors (both fixed wing and rotary wing), if prolonged, will adversely effect the unit's maintenance effort. The officer and warrant officer programmed requisition authority (PRA) of 92% normally cannot be met. Units correspondingly are pinched numerically to man aircraft at the current level of tactical activity and qualitatively in terms of qualified aircraft commanders.

   b. (U) Para 2 c, (1) (c) Page 7: Non-concur with comments as this problem can be solved internally at battalion task force level with closer liaison and coordination with the supported unit.

   c. (U) Para 2 c (2) Page 8: Concur

   d. (U) Para 2 c (3) (c) Page 8: Concur with comments. Close coordination between the air mission commander and the airmobile task force commander cannot be over-emphasized.

   e. (U) Para 2 c (4) (c) Page 9: Non-concur. Each situation must be evaluated separately as to the tactical situation and urgency of the mission at that specific time. Maximum coordination between air mission commander and the airmobile task force commander is required during the decision-making process.

   f. (U) Para 2 c (5) Page 10: Concur. Aviation units can assist by requiring smoke less often and through more comprehensive and thorough briefings between fire teams.

   g. (U) Para 2 c (6) (c) Page 11: The decision as to when an extraction should commence must be made by the airmobile commander after an evaluation of the current situation has been made. Continued emphasis should be placed on air mission commanders providing the ground commander with current information concerning the air assets available for the specific operation.

   h. (U) Para 2 f (1) (c) Page 11: Concur. Outstanding requisitions have been filled and an adequate supply of 1:250,000 scale maps are now on hand.

15
AVBACE (14 Apr 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 13th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

i. (U) Para 2 f (2) (c) Page 12: Concur. Other units of the 164th
CAC have experienced minor difficulties in this area.

j. (U) Para 2 f (3) (c) Page 12: Concur. Continual emphasis is being
placed on the EIR program.

k. (U) Para 2 f (4) (c) Page 12: Concur. Recommend O-1 engines be
authorized for stockage at unit level.

l. (U) Para 2 f (5) (c) Page 12: Concur. Type II oil, in one quart
 cans, has been received through supply channels, since submission of the
13th Avn Bn ORLL report. It is currently available in sufficient quantities
to meet requirements.

m. (U) Para 2 i (1) (c) Page 13: Concur. DA Form 2028 has been ini-
tiated to incorporate the inspection for UH-1 series PMI and IMP.

n. (U) Para 2 i (2) (c) Page 14: Concur. The wear of nomex flight
suits, gloves, leather boots, and properly fitted helmet is required and
equipment is available through supply channels. Continued command empha-
sis is required to keep crew members in proper uniforms.
AVGAGC-0  (14 Feb 70) 2d Ind
SUBJ:  Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 13th Aviation Battalion
       (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CPUC-65 (c2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384  10 APR 1970

THRU:  Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN:  AVAGC-EXT,
        APO 96375
        Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN:  GPOP-DT,
        APO 96558

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
      Army, Washington, D.C.  20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the
   contents and indorsement.

2. The following comments are considered pertinent:
   a. 1st Indorsement, date following office symbol should read
      (14 Feb 70).
   b. Paragraph 2a(3), page 6, discusses aviator shortages. Department
      of the Army has established a goal for aviator fill at 92% of authorized
      strength. The 164th Aviation Group (Combat) is currently filled to 96%
      of PRA. This headquarters is monitoring the assignment of aviators within
      the Brigade to assure equitable distribution. The 164th Group is auth-
      orized 731 67N20 MOS (UH-1 Helicopter Repairman) and has 731 assigned.
   c. Paragraph 2f(3), page 12, discusses long down time awaiting replace-
      ment 0-1 engines. This problem was peculiar only to this Battalion. No
      other units are having any difficulty obtaining 0-1 engines. This head-
      quarters is currently inspecting the supply system for the 13th Battalion
      to determine why this unit is experiencing difficulty in requisitioning
      0-1 engines.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR W. LITTLE

17
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for the period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-LTE, APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Parts Requisition", page 11, paragraph 2f(2), and paragraph 21, 1st Indorsement: Concur. A DSSA services the 164th Aviation Group. This DSSA has been informed of the difficulties. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

   b. Reference item concerning "Constant Speed Propellers for O-1 Aircraft", page 12, paragraph 2f(3), and paragraph 2k, 1st Indorsement: Concur. AMMC is presently performing a technical inspection of all constant speed propellers in stock to determine the serviceability of the propeller oil seals. This continuing program should preclude the issuance of defective propellers.

   c. Reference item concerning "O-1 Aircraft Engines", page 12, paragraph 2f(4); paragraph 2k, 1st Indorsement; and paragraph 2c, 2d Indorsement: concur with all comments except that comment in the 1st Indorsement which recommends O-1 aircraft engines be stocked at unit level. O-1 aircraft engines are intensively managed items (AIMI), and as such may not be stocked at unit level. The waiting period cited in the observation is excessive. The on-hand balance of O-1 engines at AMMC for the past six months has been sufficient to meet demands. The 34th General Support Group will investigate this matter, to include an examination of the requisitioning procedures of the supporting DSSA unit. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

   d. Reference item concerning "Aircraft Maintenance", page 13, paragraph 2l(1), and paragraph 2m, 1st Indorsement: concur. A comment will be published in the May issue of the 34th General Support Group newsletter reminding commanders of the need to check and lubricate these items at each PMP.
AVHCC-DST (14 Feb 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for the period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

e. Reference item concerning "Aviation Safety", page 14, paragraph 21(2), and paragraph 2n, 1st Indorsement; concur. The equipment is available, and the requirement for aircraft crewmembers to wear the equipment is specified by regulation. Continual command emphasis and supervision is required. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy fürm:
1st Avn Bde
13th Avn Bn
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
Sgt, AGC
Army AG
CONFIDENTIAL

11 February 1970


[Diagram]

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11 February 1970

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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The table above summarizes the operational results for the 13th Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 January 1970. The data includes the number of troops, airmen, losses, downed, survivors, straggled, troops returned, airmen returned, and the total for each unit.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 13th Aviation Battalion**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 13th Aviation Battalion

**14 February 1970**