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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG F. J. Roberts, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - BG F. J. Roberts

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Reference paragraph 6, AR 1-26.

2. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG F. J. Roberts. The report covers the period 21 November 1969 - 8 May 1970, during which time BG Roberts served as Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

3. BG Roberts is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges when his tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam has terminated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Cap mno, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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DEBRIEFING REPORT
BRIGADIER GENERAL F. J. ROBERTS
COMMANDING GENERAL
II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY
21 NOVEMBER 1969 - 9 MAY 1973
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The comments in this debriefing report cover the period from 20 November 1969 to 9 May 1970, during which I served as the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery. Although these observations relate, in large measure, to the operational aspects of artillery employment, they also correlate the importance of logistic readiness, continuous training, and an efficient unit administration to the conduct of operations in a combat environment. Increased tactical mobility of heavy artillery; the design, construction and employment of air mobile fire direction centers; improved survey operations; and aspects of the artillery Vietnamization program are dealt with in detail. Overviews of major tactical operations are presented from an artillery point of view, with emphasis upon artillery lessons learned.

**TACTICAL MOBILITY VERSUS THE UMBRELLA CONCEPT.** During the past six months, mobility has been the key to effective artillery employment and support of maneuver forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). During a period of decreasing, overt enemy activity, small maneuver forces were employed to conduct reconnaissance, and search and destroy operations in many widely dispersed locations. These operations sometimes developed very quickly into large scale operations, with immediate requirements for medium and heavy artillery fire support. Even more significantly, maneuver forces were increasingly employed against traditional strongholds in War Zones D and C, and in the eastern reaches of the III CTZ, in an effort to bring maximum pressure to bear on the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (NVA) prior to any further drawdown of US forces. The nature of the operations conducted clearly indicated the need for providing responsive artillery support in a fluid situation.

Prior to this time, heavy and medium fire support had been provided in two ways. First, heavy artillery was positioned in relatively permanent positions with the objective of providing an 105/175mm artillery umbrella for the bulk of forces in the III CTZ. Second, when operations were conducted outside the umbrella, light and medium artillery, in many cases employed by platoons, were used to provide the required support. This method of employment fragmented available artillery resources and failed to exploit the capability inherent in massing heavy concentrations of artillery on critical points.

As a preliminary step to the adoption of a mobile concept of artillery employment for all calibers of cannon, a detailed explanation of the techniques to be employed was presented to maneuver and artillery commanders alike. Maneuver commanders, used to area coverage, were reluctant initially to give up assets in their sectors so that they could be concentrated elsewhere. Artillery commanders, used to the relative ease of operating from relatively fixed bases, were reluctant to move. The positioning of heavy artillery at the scene of the action and the calculated employment of medium artillery by battery rather than by platoons provided significantly greater firepower at the place where it could most effectively influence the battle. The success of the concept immediately became apparent, and drew with it the praise...
and enthusiastic support of II Field Force division commanders.

**COMBAT MAINTENANCE.** The frequent displacements required to provide artillery support at critical action points placed a heavy strain on all equipment. More frequent and more serious breakdowns were experienced, especially with self-propelled artillery, but this was only partly due to increased moves. Probably the greater share of breakdowns was due to the mistaken notion that there is not sufficient time for maintenance in combat. This attitude was overcome through implementation of an extensive program of instruction, promulgation of detailed guidance, and, above all, an energizing of interest in logistic readiness all the way down the chain of command. This strong command emphasis, together with the logistic readiness program, reduced deadlines and actually increased the overall maintenance posture of II Field Force Artillery markedly, at the same time that moves were sharply increasing.

**A RETURN TO ARTILLERY FUNDAMENTALS.** The American artilleryman's reputation for being able to deliver devastating and accurate fires did not come about by happenstance. Only through meticulous attention to the fundamentals of artillery technique, as developed at The Artillery School, has this reputation been achieved. However, over a period of time, any units of II Field Force Artillery Vietnam had adopted procedures which were not in accord with sound artillery practice. Lieutenants, performing as Fire Direction Officers, did the job to the best of their ability, but techniques employed were a far cry from the high professional standards which are the hallmark of good gunnery.

The areas of fire direction; survey; firing battery; metro; radar; and reconnaissance, selection and occupation of position were found to have degenerated to very low levels of proficiency with regard to adherence to accepted practice. Battery officers and non-commissioned officers were gaining artillery experience, but much of it was unpolished and unrefined. The solution to this situation was a return to the book and an insistence by me, that only sound artillery tactics and techniques would be practiced in II Field Force Vietnam Artillery. I took personal charge of the problem of raising the standards of gunnery within this command to a high professional level.

A comprehensive program of instruction, training, inspections and command emphasis was used to obtain strict adherence to proven and accepted artillery practice. Frequent drills and on-site evaluations were used to increase proficiency and assess progress. The increased emphasis on fundamentals resulted in quantum gains in artillery effectiveness, and, everyone up and down the line began to give evidence of great pride in their newly acquired accomplishments.

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CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY OPERATIONS. During the final days of the period, the conduct of the war abruptly changed, as ARVN, Cambodian and US forces entered into joint operations against the VC and NVA support activities entrenched in Cambodian sanctuaries adjacent to the border. Combat operations became more conventional as swift armored cavalry thrusts, highly mobile sweeps and deep airmobile insertions were employed by reinforced battalion and larger size elements, to seal and destroy the previously sacrosanct headquarters and logistical support areas of the enemy. The recently instituted mobile concept of general support artillery employment permitted II Field Force Vietnam Artillery to respond immediately to the extensive requirements demanded in support of a two-pronged attack against the enemy's rear area. Force Artillery assets were rapidly deployed to forward positions along the border to provide concentrated fire power, throughout initial and subsequent phases of operation, for maneuver units operating within Cambodia.

Operation TOAN THONC 43 (TOTAL VICTORY), conducted along the northwestern border of III CTZ, in the area known as the Fish Hook, exploited the high mobility characteristics of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade, as joint airmobile insertions and armored sweeps were employed to trap and destroy major COSVN facilities. Operation ROCK CRUSHER was initiated against VC and NVA concentrations along the southwestern III CTZ border, in the region of the Parrot's Beak and the Angel's Wing. Operation ROCK CRUSHER, consisting principally of ARVN maneuver elements, was characterized by rapid mechanized sweeps and pincer actions targeted toward destruction of the enemy and his supply depots trapped between maneuver elements. As additional resources were committed and all major enemy concentrations along the western III CTZ border were brought under attack, Force Artillery units accompanied maneuver elements across the border and repositioned, to assure that massed fire capabilities of heavy artillery were continuously provided to all maneuver elements. Both initial border sanctuary operations are discussed in further detail in Section IV.
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TACTICAL SETTING

GENERAL. The period was characterized by small unit contacts, as the enemy avoided any large confrontation. Allied forces continued to maintain the offensive and carried the flight to many enemy strongholds previously considered impregnable. These thrusts were extremely effective in limiting enemy movement, disrupting his lines of communication, and perhaps most important of all, uncovering and denying him sorely needed supplies. Continued US troop withdrawal resulted in increased responsibility being placed on the Vietnamese units.

CHARACTERIZATION OF THE NATURE OF THE WAR. While main force enemy units continued to operate out of their border sanctuaries in the northern tier of III CTZ, contacts with large units were increasingly rare. The enemy's ability to avoid large confrontation and to select the time and place for harassing attacks, were his greatest assets. The enemy assumed a primarily defensive posture, designed to protect War Zones C and D, while maintaining lines of communications to the south. Efforts were concentrated on disrupting the pacification program through acts of terrorism, small unit action, and attacks by fire on key installations and small outposts.

Allied conduct of the war was centered on search and destroy operations designed to deny the enemy freedom of movement, disrupt his lines of communication, and to uncover and deny him use of base camps and supplies. This technique greatly restricted the enemy's capability to mount sustained operations in the III CTZ. US forces forayed in enemy strongholds, such as War Zones C and D, and Bu Cia Map, previously considered near impregnable and consequently avoided.

Major attention shifted to Vietnamlization, as increased emphasis was placed on preparing ARVN units to assume major responsibility for conduct of the war. For the first time in the war, the 5th ARVN Division was assigned sole responsibility for an Area of Operations (AO). The Dong Tien (ForwardTogether) Program, aimed at increasing the combat effectiveness of RVNAF, accomplished most of its goals and slowly began phasing out as redeployment increased.

ENEMY SITUATION AND DISPOSITION. Prior to the end of the year, the 17th NVA Division moved to IV CTZ. Defense of War Zone C was enhanced by the movement of a fifth regiment into that area. Phuoc Long Province, long an enemy stronghold, supported only two regiments compared to five during November. The VC/NVA divisions operating in III CTZ were reduced to the 5th NVA Infantry Division, with headquarters reported west of Bu Dinh; the 7th NVA Division, with headquarters reported northeast of Loc Ninh; and the 9th VC Division, with headquarters reported on the Cambodian border near the area known as the "Fishhook". A significant decline in the strength of NVA/VC main force units was noted during the period. In late November, the enemy was credited with 135 combat battalions, which by mid-December dwindled to 116, a decrease of 14%. During the same period, the main force personnel strength was down from 37,500 to 29,500, a decrease of approximately 26%.
Several factors influenced the deterioration in combat efficiency of these units. First, the aggressive GVN pacification program and a steady decline in VC fortunes of war made the recruiting of replacements increasingly difficult and forced the enemy to rely more heavily on replacements infiltrated from North Vietnam. Secondly, a poor rice harvest coupled with a lack of cooperation from the local populace aggravated an already significant problem in the procurement of food. For example, in the period February through March, allied operations along enemy supply routes uncovered and thus denied, some 450 tons of rice to the enemy. In a message intercepted during the period, the 74th NVA Artillery Regiment complained to its higher headquarters that the problem of procuring food had become so acute that it could not perform its mission. Thirdly, ammunition became increasingly more difficult to obtain. During February, the 3d Mobile Strike Force uncovered a series of caches in War Zone D containing some 161 tons of ammunition. Several enemy artillery units were called out of action, for various periods of time, due to lack of ammunition supplies and inability to effect resupply.

**FRIENDLY SITUATION AND DISPOSITION.** Redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division with resultant shifts and realignments dominated the friendly scene. Realignment resulted in increased AO’s for the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, as well as assignment of an independent AO to the 5th ARVN Division. The resultant dispositions are shown on the map at TAB A. Generally, the 1st Cavalry Division had the entire northern tier of III Corps Tactical Zone, while the 25th Infantry Division retained the west and southwest provinces. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade, 1st Australian Task Force, and the 15th ARVN Division shared joint responsibility for the eastern half of III CTZ. Of particular interest was the movement of US forces away from the vicinity of Saigon, as ARVN units assumed the responsibility for defense of the Saigon area. Assignment of an independent AO to the 5th ARVN Division in southern Binh Duong Province accompanied assignments of increased AO’s to the 2d ARVN ABN Brigade, in western Phuoc Long Province; the 3d ARVN ABN Brigade, in northern Tay Ninh Province, near Katum; the 9th ARVN Regiment, at Chon Thanh; astride Highway 13; and to numerous ARVN battalion size task forces throughout III CTZ.

**ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION AND DEPLOYMENTS.** The implementation of Phase III redeployment, which concluded on 15 April, reduced Force Artillery assets to 42 artillery pieces and 1215 artillerymen (see TAB B). Two light artillery battalions, one medium artillery battery, and two radar detachments were redeployed or inactivated, and the personnel strength of NHB, II FFORCEN Artillery was reduced by 19 spaces. The organizational charts at TAB C show the structure of II FFORCEN Artillery prior to and after execution of Keystone Bluejay.

Redeployment was executed in a highly satisfactory manner, through the phasing of unit standdown dates and establishment of close liaison with support units. Throughout this operation, continuous artillery support of the highest quality was provided to maneuver units. Battalion headquarters and support elements were realigned to facilitate both standdown procedures and future operations (see TAB D).
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VIETNAMIZATION

GENERAL. The Artillery Dong Tien Program was instituted in November, 1969, to complement the Joint II FFORCENY and III ARVN Corps, Operation Dong Tien. Both plans were designed to improve the combat effectiveness of RVNAF and US/FWMAF units, by close, continuous association and mutual assistance programs. Artillery Dong Tien steadily improved the capabilities and effectiveness of the combined artillery team in III CTZ. Major US/FWMAF and ARVN Artillery Headquarters were designated as associated units, by pairing ARVN and FWMAF units of like caliber in the same general geographic areas. This program called for the completion of nine interrelated mutual support projects designed to improve ARVN artillery capabilities.

Achievements in the nine mutual support projects improved unit training, standardized techniques and delivery of artillery fires, and prepared ARVN to accept a greater role in providing combat support to the maneuver forces of III CTZ. In the course of accomplishing the scheduled projects, participating units generated several subsidiary programs, such as, mobile training teams, RVNAF ODT programs in US units, and specialized schools. Two significant programs initiated by II FFORCENY Artillery, under the purview of Dong Tien, were the training of an ARVN Jungle Battery and the establishment of the CIDC Artillery School.

ASSOCIATED BATTERY - UNIT REFERENCE TRAINING. The associate battery program created close working relationships between US/FWMAF and ARVN artillerymen. Exchange visits of battery personnel were conducted to improve mutual understanding, and existing advisory programs were augmented. Problem areas were discussed and battery operations and techniques received mutual observation. Closely associated with this was the combined unit refresher training program, which vastly improved the level and amount of training conducted. Mobile training teams were created and dispatched to isolated areas to give instruction. Small classes were used to insure thorough instruction for key personnel and specialists, and on the job training was conducted whenever and wherever possible.

COMBINED FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTERS. Combined Fire Support Coordination Centers (CFSEC) were created in various provinces throughout III CTZ to provide a central agency for planning and coordinating combined fire support. These centers included ARVN and US/FWMAF artillery representatives, Air Force, and where necessary, Navy representatives. In addition to planning fire support and clearing fires, they provided a readily accessible means for the interchange of fire requests between ARVN and US/FWMAF units. The CFSEC's resulted in significant gain in ARVN mutual support and reduced primary reliance on US artillery while at the same time gaining fullest utilization of ARVN artillery capabilities.

CALIBRATION/METRO/SURVEY/REDISTRICT PROGRAMS. In order to develop ARVN artillery into a highly efficient means of combat support, it became readily apparent that combined training was needed in those areas of artillery techniques which bear directly on the accuracy and effectiveness of fire...
Four projects were undertaken to standardize procedures and improve the accuracy of artillery fires. First, a calibration plan was developed to ensure all ARVN weapons received calibration annually. Second, a registration program was established which standardized policy for conducting registration throughout III CTZ. Third, assistance was provided to ARVN in developing the capability to produce meteorological data. And fourth, a combined effort was initiated to extend survey control to all artillery units in III CTZ. During the period covered by this report:

1. Over 78% of the howitzers employed by ARVN Artillery in III CTZ were calibrated.

2. A substantial majority of ARVN artillery units in III CTZ accepted and aggressively employed US registration techniques.

3. All metro stations in III CTZ conducted dual language broadcasts four times daily.

4. Metro data was received and employed by the majority of ARVN Artillery units in III CTZ.

5. Survey was brought in to over half of the ARVN firing locations. The success of these four projects was evident in the increased accuracy and capabilities of ARVN Artillery.

CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP. The CID Artillery School at Tanjung's Sup was created to train CID artillerymen to assume the artillery support of seven special forces camps. The school was staffed and operated by the 23d Artillery Group. Three, ten week long sessions were conducted by the school, which trained a total of 136 CIDC artillerymen. Upon completion of training, each group was deployed to designated camps, and subsequently freed ARVN artillerymen for employment elsewhere.

FIRE DIRECTION OFFICER SCHOOL. The facilities of the Fire Direction School, conducted by II FFORCEN Artillery for its own officers, were made available to ARVN units. This week-long school assisted in standardizing artillery procedures in III Corps by giving specific instruction in the latest gunnery techniques employed by US artillery. A total of 56 ARVN officers were graduated from this school.

ARVN JUNGLE BATTERY. Training of ARVN artillerymen in techniques of supporting the 3d Mobile Strike Force culminated in December 1969 with the transfer of responsibility for the elite, US Jungle Battery to ARVN. The conversion was unique due to the specialized mission carried out and the combined 105/155 configuration of the Jungle Battery. This program returned six tubes to Force Artillery assets for employment in needed areas of III CTZ and added a highly effective unit to the ARVN force structure.

COMMAND LIASON AND EXCHANGE VISITS. Command emphasis was focused on the entire program through weekly exchange visits to both US and ARVN fire...
support bases by the Commanding General, II FFORGEV Artillery, the III Corps Artillery Commander and the Senior Advisor, III Corps Artillery. Briefings were given by the battalion commander of the visited unit, after which, tours were made of the battery areas to observe operations and training. Demonstrations for the III Corps Artillery Commander and the Senior Advisor, III Corps Artillery were conducted in such areas as employment of improved conventional munitions (ICM), defense of a fire support base through use of "Killer Junior" and other fields of mutual interest.
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II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY OPERATIONS

GENERAL. II Field Force Vietnam Artillery operations during this period were characterized by emphasis on sound artillery techniques, aggressive employment, and a determined "can do" attitude. Basic artillery principles were retaught, and applied with exacting precision. Heavy artillery was made responsive to the maneuver commanders, with an alacrity comparable to their direct support light artillery. Moves were made on short notice, over roads and trails not previously used, and accurate, responsive fire was delivered from fourth-order surveyed positions, in areas where survey had never previously existed. In short, Force Artillery moved to the sound of the battle.

TACTICAL MOBILITY. MOVE, SHOOT, and COMMUNICATE have been the basic tenets of Field Artillery for many years. The relative success enjoyed by field artillery battalions in support of maneuver forces during prior wars could be correlated to the efficiency with which artillery units accomplished these three salient tasks. In Vietnam, artillery mobility has been enhanced through exploitation of newly conceived air mobile and airborne fire support delivery means. Because of its physical characteristics, heavy artillery was an "ugly duckling" in this environment; hence, it was relegated to a relatively immobile status, being installed at well established fire bases—the fire capabilities of which were so arranged as to provide a thin layer of large caliber fire power through the more active areas of III CTZ.

INNOVATIVE ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT. As assets were reduced through redeployment, it quickly became apparent that the role played by general support artillery was in need of major reassessment; area artillery coverage had progressed from a necessity to an expensive luxury. In order to fully capitalize on remaining resources, general support artillery units were concentrated in those areas of most concern to the major maneuver unit commanders. The inherent mobility of heavy self-propelled artillery, previously held dormant, was fully exploited to influence the tide of battle wherever the need arose. The success of this innovative concept was vividly portrayed in operations conducted in War Zones C and D, and in the Bu Gia Map operation. In addition, artillery task force organizations were tailored to meet the needs of the maneuver commander, as evidenced in the Jerry/Bu Dop operation of November 1969.

WAR ZONE D. In mid-February, when the size and extent of the caches discovered by the 3d Mobile Strike Force in the vicinity of Rang Rang became apparent, the Commanding Generals of II FFORCENY and of III Corps took prompt steps to move elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 1st ARVN Airborne, the 199th LIB, and the 5th ARVN Cavalry into the surrounding area. These measures were taken to preclude a large enemy force returning to the main supply base and engaging the Mobile Strike Force, thus preventing evacuation or destruction of the caches.

In order to ensure that maneuver elements in the Rang Rang area had maximum firepower at their disposal, heavy artillery units, in a 175mm
gun configuration, were moved to firing positions established at Bunard, Phuoc Vinh, Libby and Hai (see map, Incl 1, TAB E). All units were tied to a common grid through the extension of 4th order control into these four position areas.

Shortly thereafter, Headquarters, DELTA Force moved to Bunard, and a close affiliation was immediately established between members of the heavy artillery units and the DELTA Force personnel at that location. As a result, the DELTA Force enjoyed artillery support for the first time during any of its operations in Vietnam. The successful employment of heavy artillery in support of the reconnaissance and highly mobile infantry elements which make up the DELTA Force is best denoted in the following extract from the DELTA Daily Summary of 7 March 1970:

"The II FFORCEV Artillery is commended for their outstanding support. The professional knowledge and capabilities of the firing batteries are without equal. The courage, devotion to duty, and esprit de corps of the officers and men is beyond comparison. The II FFORCEV Artillery personifies the highest qualities of the U.S. Army."

WAR ZONE C. At 2230 hours, 17 February, the Division Artillery Commander, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), and key members of his staff advised the Commanding General, II FFORCEV Artillery, of a serious situation developing in WAR ZONE C. Intelligence sources had revealed that battalion-size increments of the 271st VC Infantry Regiment, 272d VC Infantry Regiment, 95 C NVA Infantry Regiment and supporting artillery and sapper regiments and battalions were moving aggressively toward US and ARVN occupied facilities. The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery Commander conveyed the request of the Division Commander for additional firepower to thwart this challenge. II FFORCEV Artillery responded by moving both 8" and 175mm artillery into FSB Jake at Special Forces camp, Tong Le Chon (see map, Incl 1, TAB E), from where they reinforced the 11th Armored Cavalry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. Simultaneously, 8" howitzers were moved northward from FSB St Barbara to FSB Carolyn, thence, to FSB Beverly, at Special Forces Camp, Katum, six kilometers from the Cambodian border. On 11 March, this heavy artillery unit moved westward to the vicinity of Special Forces Camp, Thien Ngon, on 21 March the battery moved further westward to FSB Illingsworth, from whence they supported 1st Cavalry Division operations in the Dog Face. During the period ending 31 March, in excess of 2100 rounds had been fired by this unit in support of the 11th ACR, the 1st ARVN Airborne and the 1st Cavalry Division.

Other heavy artillery units moved northward in response to the 1st Cavalry Division's request of 17 February. Included an 8" platoon from Tay Ninh, which displaced, first to FSB Cindy, then to FSB Sarah, FSB Sharon, and finally into FSB Hazard. Each move kept step with the 1st Squadron, 11th ACR. Subsequently, when the 2d Battalion of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment moved westward from the Tong Le Chon area, an 8" artillery unit
moved from Dau Tieng, through Binh Duong and Binh Long Provinces in order to join the squadron, as it progressively established fire support bases at Marcha and Fort Defiance.

In substance, the movements of II FFORCEV heavy artillery in support of friendly operations in War Zone C, during the period referred to above, entailed traveling nearly 400 kilometers, often over rough roads and trails that had not been used by US or ARVN forces in years. The appreciation of the 1st Cavalry Division was conveyed by the Division Commander in a written comment, which stated inter alia "your readiness and willingness not only to provide the support requested, but also to assure that your artillery was positioned to provide maximum firepower to the area of the greatest activity has measurably enhanced the ability of the lst Cavalry Division to accomplish its mission".

BU GIA MAP. The Bu Gia Map operation began with establishment of FSB Elaine, near the II - III Corps boundary, on 15 February. Inasmuch as Route 14 was hard-topped and uncined, the movement of II FFORCEV heavy artillery into position was accomplished with dispatch, and 8" units were firing from surveyed position before division artillery resources were airlifted to the site.

As the Bu Gia Map operation progressed, heavy artillery assets crossed the Song Be River, and commenced moving north over roads and trails covered with jungle growth through long disuse. FSB Candy was occupied on 26 February; then FSB Loan; and, finally, FSB Hung Vuong. From this latter location, three kilometers south of the Bu Gia Map airfield, five 8" and 175mm pieces fired in concert with light and medium artillery weapons of the lst ARVN Airborne Division, in response to requests for support from this allied unit, as well as from the lst Cavalry Division. From these forward locations, nearly 7,000 rounds of heavy artillery were delivered in support of ground forces. The morale of personnel was high and firing was of an excellent quality, utilizing 4th order survey control which was extended to all II FFORCEV Artillery firing positions.

JERRY/BU DOP. On 7 November 1969, an artillery task force was organized from units of two II FFORCEV Artillery battalions, the 2d Bn, 13th Arty, and the 2d Bn, 12th Arty, to conduct operations at Bo Duc District - (XU 969 25J), in Phuoc Long Province. Initially, this artillery task force supported two infantry battalions, later enlarged to eight battalions at the peak of the operation. The infantry force was composed of the 3d Mobile Strike Force; the 9th ARVN Regiment; the lst Bn, 7th Cavalry of the 3d Bde, 1st Cavalry Division; and two troops from the 11th ACR. The artillery task force consisted of Battery B, 2d Bn, 13th Arty; four howitzers from Battery A, 2d Bn, 12th Arty; and Battery D, 2d Bn, 13th Arty, this last battery was a combined US/ARVN unit composed of four 105mm howitzers and two 155mm howitzers.

The mission of this force was one of protective reaction to counter the enemy siege of Bo Duc District and the Bu Dop Special Forces Camp adjacent
to the Cambodian border. From the artillery standpoint, the operation began 7 November and terminated 20 December 1969, when the task force was disbanded. During this period, the two fire support bases occupied by the task force, FSB Jerri (XU 964 231), and Bu Dop (XU 974 291), sustained almost daily attacks by direct and indirect fire. Besides firing in support of the infantry forces in the area, the artillery task force conducted vigorous defensive and countermortar fires, with expenditures often exceeding 1500 rounds per day.

OPERATION ROCK CRUSHER. II Field Force Vietnam Artillery support of Operation ROCK CRUSHER gained full momentum by 1200 hours, 26 April, with the establishment of the 23d Artillery Group forward command post at Go Dau Ha. Collocated with the III Corps forward tactical operations center, this command post permitted close coordination of Force Artillery assets in support of both III Corps and IV Corps maneuver task forces, as they initiated operations across the Cambodian border into the regions known as the Parrot's Beak and the Angel's Wing. Long a haven for the 271st VC Regiment, numerous VC and NVA battalions and logistical supply bases for enemy activities in southern III CTZ and IV Corps area, this region was attacked by three III Corps task forces (see maps, Incl 2 and 3, TAB E), and two IV Corps task forces. The artillery organization for combat is shown at inclusion 4, TAB E.

Heavy artillery support operations commenced on 25 April with the deployment of two Force Artillery units to positions adjacent to the border. Succeeding days saw the displacement of elements from six additional Force Artillery units deployed to positions from which their massed fires provided the initial preparations in support of the combined assault on 29 April. Liaison was established with all ARVN task forces, III Corps and IV Corps to insure availability of maximum fire power to all maneuver elements throughout the operation. Over 2400 rounds were fired within the first 24 hours of the attack. A report of 230 KIA during the initial preparation for Phase I was credited to three artillery units alone. On the 30th of April and the 1st of May, ten additional Force Artillery displacements were conducted to provide maximum heavy and medium artillery support to units initiating Phase II of the operation.

Initiation of Phase II consisted of III Corps elements changing direction and sweeping south in a pincer operation with IV Corps elements attacking northward from the base of the Parrot's Beak (see map, Incl 5, TAB E). Support of this combined III-IV Corps operation demanded maximum coordination of heavy artillery assets (see Incl 6, TAB E) to insure continued close artillery support to all ARVN maneuver units, particularly, as it pertained to IV Corps operations against the Bathu area. All preparatory fires for this later operation were observed by the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, to ensure that fires were delivered accurately against the designated military targets.

Phase III of ROCK CRUSHER was initiated after a 47 hour standdown of the maneuver forces (see map, Incl 5, TAB E). During this interval between operations, Force Artillery units displaced medium and heavy artillery into Cambodia into position to support ARVN forces moving northwest from Rte 1.
in the direction of Kh Chak. Additional Force Artillery was displaced in rear of another ARVN task force moving from the northeast so as to close the pincer in the objective area (see Incl 7, TAB E).

OPERATION TOAN THANG 43 (TOTAL VICTORY). The operation in the Fish Hook area, conducted simultaneously with Operation ROCK CRUSHER, was Operation TOAN THANG 43 (TOTAL VICTORY). Major objectives of this operation were targeted toward the annihilation of COSVN headquarters, the control center for all enemy activities in South Vietnam and adjacent border areas, and destruction of extensive logistical stores located throughout the area. The joint US and ARVN task force, comprised principally of elements from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), the 11th ACR, and the 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade, under the command of BG Shoemaker was designated to accomplish this mission. Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade were airlifted across the border and took up blocking positions while elements of the 11th ACR swept overland to link up with the airmobile troops.

Elements of four Force Artillery battalions (see Incl 4, TAB E) were alerted and immediately deployed to firing positions along the border so as to provide maximum firepower to the maneuver elements upon initiation of the attack. From these forward locations (see Incl 3, TAB E), three 155mm batteries provided general support and reinforced the fires of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, while five heavy artillery platoons added extended depth throughout the area of operations. Over 5,500 rounds were fired by Force Artillery units in the support of the task force during the first week of the operation. Fires of all available artillery were massed on known and suspected enemy locations, paving the way for exploitation by maneuver forces.

The Deputy Commander, II FFORCEW Artillery was dispatched to the task force headquarters at Quan Loi to insure immediate and continuous artillery support was available to all task force elements. From this location, control of the resupply and displacement of all supporting Force Artillery units was conducted. As initial objectives were achieved and task force elements began the exploitation phase, Force Artillery units were moved across the border and accompanied maneuver elements during their sweeps of the base camp areas (see map, Incl 9, TAB E).

COMBINED BORDER SUPPORT. The successful achievement of initial objectives in both Operation ROCK CRUSHER and Operation TOAN THANG 43, was followed by a rapid exploitation throughout the border sanctuary. Commitment of additional maneuver units and expansion of operations along the western border brought elements of both task forces within range of common heavy artillery units. The preponderance of Force Artillery assets (see Incl 6, TAB E) were thus made responsive to ARVN, Cambodian and US maneuver units as they continued to inflict severe damage to the enemy in his long cherished border sanctuary.

ADDITIONAL BORDER OPERATIONS. On the final two days of the period covered by this report, additional operations were initiated: TIC CHOP against forces and installations in Base Area 707 and 354, NAC MA against
Coincident with all of the foregoing operations heavy artillery units were deployed in battery configurations. A total of 15 moves were accomplished within a 48 hour period, to the end that almost all II. FFORCEN Artillery was in position to render maximum support to maneuver elements operating against enemy forces in Cambodia (see Incl 7, TAB E).

AIR MOBILE FIRE DIRECTION CENTER. In order to enhance mobility, decrease the time required in preparation for firing, and provide immediate protection to a vital installation, an air mobile fire direction center, fabricated from CONEX containers, was developed. Similar type structures had been constructed in the past; however, this FDC was designed to be a completely self-contained, fully equipped structure, compact for ease of movement (8' by 12'), yet expandable on the ground to a size (16' by 12') suitable for a battery FDC (Incl 1, TAB F). Based upon field tests, several modifications and improvements were made in the design and construction. A total of eight such structures, two of which were large enough for a battalion FDC (22' by 12') were built and deployed to field sites (Incl 2, TAB F). This concept proved highly successful, as verified by extensive field tests and comments from using units.

IMPROVED TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL FIRE DIRECTION. One of the most significant programs embarked upon in the past six months was that of improvement of gunnery procedures throughout Force Artillery. The wealth of practical but unrefined experience of the junior officers was channeled into standard gunnery procedures. Control of the conduct of fire, which had been allowed to slip into the FO's hands by default, was returned to the FDO. Training of the FDO's and FDC's became the Battalion S-3's primary responsibility. Continued emphasis reestablished the almost forgotten techniques of massing fires of multiple calibers on targets of opportunity and TOT missions. Achievement of this goal required a vigorous inspection and reteaching process. In addition to the Fire Direction Officers School conducted by II FFORCEN Artillery, two types of artillery unit inspections teams were fielded.

1. ARTILLERY OPERATIONAL READINESS EVALUATION. II FFORCEN Arty Reg 525-3, Artillery Operational Readiness Evaluation, provided for an evaluation team of qualified staff officers, headed by the Force Artillery Deputy Commander or the S3. The team inspected, on the average, one battery each week and evaluated its ability to accomplish its mission in its total environment. These unannounced inspections permitted evaluation in depth, and provided an excellent index from which to judge a unit's overall combat effectiveness.

2. ARTILLERY GUNNERY EVALUATION. II FFORCEN Arty Reg 525-2, Artillery Gunnery Evaluation, established the requirement for subordinate battalions to conduct detailed monthly inspections of gunnery and firing battery procedures within each of their firing batteries. Group headquarters was
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responsible for semi-annual inspections of each of its batteries. The results of these inspections, and corrective actions taken, were forwarded for review by this headquarters. II Field Force Artillery Headquarters, in turn, conducted Artillery Gunnery Evaluations for the batteries of battalions reporting directly to II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

SURVEY. The ability to place devastating fires on fleeting targets immediately after identification and to mass available artillery effectively without prior adjustment, depends almost entirely upon the accuracy with which units and targets are located. Prior to November 1969, little was done to exploit organic survey capabilities or to extend existing survey control. Vast areas of III CTZ had no 4th order survey control and no plans were in effect to extend control into these areas (see map, Incl 1, TAB G). Clearly a reorganization of effort was needed, followed by a determined unrelenting program to extend high quality survey control into all areas of III CTZ. Survey parties of the 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery, and each organic subordinate unit were used to achieve this goal (see maps, Incl 2 and 3, TAB G). Additionally, in conjunction with the Dong Tien program, two groups of ARVN enlisted men were trained as instructors so that survey expertise could be extended to ARVN units as well.

1. IMPROVED TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. Survey operations conducted in III CTZ prior to November 1969 suffered from the lack of well-planned objectives and coordination. Although a great deal of effort had been expended in survey, it did not lead to an improving survey posture nor to a high quality, common grid throughout III CTZ. II FFORCEN Artillery Survey OPLAN 1-70, published and implemented on 23 Jan 70, provided the objectives, priorities, and coordination required to begin a systematic survey of III CTZ. This OPLAN aggressively followed, insured the survey response necessary to support immediate tactical operations, and at the same time systematically upgraded and extended existing survey control.

2. EXTENSION OF 4TH ORDER CONTROL. Since the 199th LIB TAOR, Ngon Thrach sub-sector, and the RTAVF TAOR were not US Division responsibilities, HHE, II FFORCEN Artillery Survey Section was used to extend survey control which met or exceeded 4th order accuracy to these areas. Work began in the 199th LIB TAOR in early Jan 70 and 4th order survey was established from Bien Hoa to Xuan Loc, and from intersection QL-1 and QL-20 to the Corps boundary, as well as from Xuan Loc south on QL-2 to a link up with the Australian system. The map at Inclosure 4, TAB G depicts this 4th order survey control extension.

3. SURVEY QUALITY CONTROL. Accurate survey depends in large measure upon the training and degree of proficiency of survey personnel. The success of Survey OPLAN 1-70 was thus directly related to the availability of highly trained and well qualified surveyors, as well as strict adherence to rigid standards of survey accuracy. To insure the success of the OPLAN, a regulation was written which subjected all division and II Field Force Artillery survey sections and operations to periodic quality control inspections. These inspections, undertaken by II Field Force Artillery, succeeded in standardizing techniques, improving the state of survey training, and in upgrading the quality of maintenance afforded to the survey equipment. It is

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doubtful if the Survey OPLAN could have succeeded as well as it did without the Survey Quality Control Program as a corollary effort.

4. Surveyed Registration Point Program. The extension of 4th order survey to firing positions signaled only the half-way point along the route to increased accuracy and timeliness of fires. There remained the need for well defined, accurately located registration points. Accordingly, an extension program was undertaken by II Field Force Artillery to survey key permanent terrain features, supplemented in many areas by old car bodies. These were surveyed to the same accuracy as the firing batteries. Increased validity and accuracy of registration resulted in more accurate and deadly fire support for the maneuver unit commanders.

Radar Operations. As enemy activity decreased throughout the III CTZ, available target detection means became increasingly important to the success of operations and came under increased command scrutiny. Ground surveillance radars were employed in areas of maximum productivity and geared to respond to changes in enemy movement patterns. Countermortar radars were deployed to protect those areas subjected to frequent indirect fire attacks, and their use extended to provide an increased registration capability to all artillery and mortar units within range. The ability to displace frequently and get back in action quickly determined the effectiveness and success of radar operations. To insure this capability, a quality control program similar to that applicable to survey was established.

Quality control teams were fielded and dispatched regularly to all sites to evaluate performance and proficiency. Forty-one quality control inspections were conducted of the 27 primary radar sites within the III CTZ in a period of 5 months. The value of this program was evidenced by the success enjoyed by countermortar crews in increasing acquired targets from 17.1% in October to 30.5% in March 1970.

Meteorological Operations. An extremely valuable, but often neglected aspect of artillery gunnery technique—meteorological operations, was subjected to a most critical appraisal. Again, the Quality Control concept, which was first applied to metro operations as the result of an artillery school program, was used to insure optimum operation and validity of broadcast data. Combined quality control inspections and maintenance assistance visits were used to insure the effective and continuous operation of all II Field Force Artillery metro stations. As a part of the Dong Tien program, metro information was extended to ARVN units through the initiation of dual-language broadcasting. Equipment difficulties were overcome by the establishment of a closed-loop radio rebuild program, which returned Rawin sets to CONUS for repair and subsequent return to Vietnam.

Air Defense Automatic Weapons Employment. November of 1969 found the major assets of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery, badly fragmented and in some cases mal-employed. The elements of the battalion were OPON to major maneuver unit commanders, and assigned primary missions of providing static FSB defense and convoy security. Elements of the battalion were

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dispersed to an average of 55 to 60 different positions throughout III CTZ. This method of employment was inefficient and wasteful of assets. As redeployment gained momentum, major adjustments had to be made in order to realize maximum effectiveness from this unit. Mission concepts, employment techniques, and organization were given a thorough reassessment. The result was an entirely new concept for the employment of these critical assets. The new concept reduced control problems, permitted tailoring of units to missions, allowed for concentration of effort to best influence the ground action, and provided a system of control whereby the unit commanders could implement an effective maintenance program.

In December 1969, a three phase plan was initiated to place the AW assets in general support of major maneuver units, thus increasing the Force Artillery Commander's capability to redeploy units efficiently and in accordance with Force priorities. This plan, fully implemented in March, consolidated dusters, quad .50's, and searchlights into Task Forces, which were placed in general support of major II FFORCEN formations and positioned for rapid deployment throughout III CTZ. These task forces immediately responded to the most critical needs of maneuver unit commanders with increased assets and greater tactical capability.

STANDARDIZATION OF TACTICAL SOP'S. At the beginning of the period, tactical operations were generally governed by a proliferation of battalion, group and II Field Force Artillery SOP's. Accordingly, a program was undertaken to provide clear and accurate guidelines for subordinate units at two levels: II FFORCEN Artillery and Artillery Battalion.

The II FFORCEN Artillery Tactical SOP was extensively rewritten to provide both general policy and, in many cases, detailed guidance, in all aspects of artillery operations for the units assigned, attached, or OPCON. Published in January 1970, this basic document standardized the operations of all units in II FFORCEN Artillery. Detailed as it was in some areas, the Field Force Artillery SOP did not delve into all the areas that concern a battalion in its daily operation. A battalion level SOP was needed to supplement the Force Artillery SOP. Rather than burden each battalion with the production of an SOP, a standardized SOP, applicable to all battalions, was drafted, published and distributed to all battalions.

OPERATIONS SECURITY. The capture of an entire enemy communication intelligence team, complete with intercept equipment and documents in December 1969, provided irrefutable evidence that the enemy possessed an electronic warfare capability far more sophisticated than was believed to have existed previously, within the III Corps Tactical Zone. This discovery brought to light the need to place additional emphasis on an effective operations security program. Command messages, staff calls, and special briefings were fully exploited to insure each man of Force Artillery was fully cognizant of this crippling threat. Maximum effort was directed toward the employment of secure voice equipment for FM radio communications and secure radioteletype equipment, whenever possible.
Implementing a comprehensive program of operations security was a difficult task. The problem was dealt with by creating at each command, down to battalion level, a committee made up of principal staff officers. The committee was charged with all aspects of operations security (OPSEC), and given authority to institute required OPSEC measures. With broad overwatch responsibilities, reinforced by intense command interest, the committee was able to institute a number of individual measures, but probably more importantly, was able to increase the awareness and interest of the command as a whole in this vital area.

ARTILLERY ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REDUCTION PROGRAM. The number of accidents/incidents which occurred was quite low in view of the near half-million rounds of artillery ammunition and uncounted number of mortar rounds expended monthly in III CTZ. However, these few mishaps still produced casualties which were of concern to all commanders. The sudden surge of firing mishaps in December 1969 (See Chart, Incl 1, TAB H) was countered by increased command emphasis on the safe delivery of artillery, a more stringent requirement to fix responsibility, and a harder line on accurate and effective investigation and prevention procedures. Results of investigations were published in the Weekly Artillery Summary in order that units might benefit from the causes and lessons learned from the mishap. Command emphasis succeeded in causing commanders to review their procedures, to institute new precautions, and in some cases, to re-train entire units. The chart at Inclosure 2, TAB H shows a breakdown of accidents, incidents and incomplete investigations, by unit.
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TRAINING

GENERAL. Increased emphasis on professional qualification and a concerted return to artillery fundamentals at all levels, led the units of this command back to the tried and proved concepts of field artillery. Battalions exposed to the high turnover typical of Vietnam, were confronted with enthusiastic, but frequently inexperienced leadership, particularly at battery level. To fill this experience gap, and to ease transitions, several programs were developed. One such program, the Commander’s Checklists (Roberts’ Rules) was designed to fill the experience gap and to provide ready reference on the many aspects of battery and battalion operations. The checklists covered all significant areas of field artillery techniques, as well as administration and logistics, and proved an excellent supplement to the II FFORCEN Artillery Tactical SOP and the Standard Battalion SOP. In all, one hundred fifty checklists were produced, ranging in length from a few pages to over thirty pages. Each checklist contained a series of teaching questions, each of which had been thoroughly researched, documented and verified for accuracy. They covered all areas of artillery battery and battalion operations, from administration and maintenance, to fire direction and survey. Each question was purposely designed to raise an issue or expose an important facet of some aspect of battery operations, and then provide the answer within itself. Additionally, each question was referenced to specific army doctrine (regulation, field manual, etc.,) so that the reader could go to source material to gain additional information or clarification. The reading of a checklist on any one subject was calculated to give the reader an appreciation of the most important aspects of the subject at hand. Following the guidance in a particular checklist, for example, a junior officer could be assured that he was being attentive to the essential elements of that subject.

GUNNERY TRAINING. Gunnery training has been mentioned as the target of Artillery Gunnery and Operational Readiness Evaluations. Before the fire direction centers could be evaluated fairly, their personnel first had to be taught the desired standards of proficiency. Frequent command visits, command letters, formal schooling, and close command supervision of scheduled training were all employed to upgrade gunnery training.

1. FIRE DIRECTION OFFICER SCHOOL. The II FFORCEN Artillery Fire Direction Officer School was established in November 1969. The purpose of the school was to provide Fire Direction Officers with a review of basic gunnery procedures and specific instruction in rules of engagement and double check procedures. The goal was to provide each FDO in the command with an in-country, trained, FDO, in order to insure strict adherence to sound gunnery techniques and to eliminate accidents and incidents caused by FDO error. The school was conducted monthly at Camp William S. Price, Long Binh, RVN, and since its inception has trained 96 officers assigned to the II FFORCEN Artillery heavy battalions and the 23d Artillery Group. Indicative of the results achieved by FDO refresher training is the fact that to date, there has been only one artillery incident attributed to an FDO which was supervised by a II FFORCEN FDO School graduate.
2. DAILY FIRE DIRECTION CENTER TRAINING. The II FFORCEV Artillery Training Regulation 350-1, published in February 1970, spelled out the requirements for formal FDC training. Each shift was required to conduct one hour of formal class, one hour of team drill, and a half hour of combined drill with the howitzer crews each day. FDC weekly training schedules were closely monitored at Force Artillery headquarters for content and applicability. When a battery moved, the battalion S3 accompanied it into the new location and personally supervised the establishment and functioning of the FDC for the first few days, or longer if needed, in order to insure that gunnery standards were met.

SURVEY. Survey has received special and intense command interest. Programs were developed, aimed at battalion reconnaissance and survey officers and their survey teams. During the period, 9 Feb to 11 Feb 70, a school was conducted for battalion and group survey officers. The course concentrated on the duties of the reconnaissance and survey officer and those problems peculiar to survey in Vietnam. II FFORCEV Artillery Regulation 350-1, Training and Education, prescribed the policy and provided the guidance in the planning and conducting of training for unit survey personnel. The success of this program was apparent in the improved proficiency of survey crews and an increase in the speed and accuracy with which batteries were surveyed.

FIRING BATTERY. Another important step in improving the overall performance of II Field Force Artillery was the tightening up and refinement of firing battery practice and technique. The battery executive officer had to be made to assume responsibility for the proper training of the chief of section, gunner, assistant gunner, and other howitzer and gun crew members. Although our junior officers were eager to assume these duties, relatively few had had an opportunity to gain the necessary experience, knowledge or background in firing battery techniques. The problem was especially acute in M107 and M110 batteries. Under the supervision of the battery commander and executive officer, daily training was conducted by the gun crews in firing battery fundamentals. The progress and quality of this training was closely followed by Force Artillery, group and battalion commanders and through announced Artillery Gunnery Evaluations and Artillery Operational Readiness Evaluations. The key to success in this area was to give thorough instruction, then to impose rigid standards to be met by all firing sections. By demanding high standards and refusing to compromise those standards, officers and MOS's felt challenged to measure up. The high standards were achieved and intervening obstacles overcome.

MAINTENANCE TRAINING. The chronic shortage of experienced maintenance personnel, forecasts of continued shortages in maintenance MOS's, and reports of recurring deficiencies noted on command, staff and technical inspections demanded immediate action to preclude unsatisfactory deadline times, and to achieve the highest possible maintenance standards in all subordinate units. Emphasis was placed on establishing sound maintenance programs, and all personnel were alerted to the direct effect that maintenance had on operational capability. A concerted maintenance training program was initiated.
to insure that optimum use was made of available experience and expertise, and that this training was extended to organizational and operator level. It is almost trite to say it, but the responsive movement of II Field Force Artillery units to areas of greatest battle activity would not have been possible without eminently workable and effective programs of maintenance and maintenance training.

1. SPECIAL SCHOOLS AND CLINICS. The continued use of organic generators to provide the required electrical power for unit facilities and the harsh climatic conditions under which the equipment is operated, required the constant application of good preventive maintenance. Unit operators normally had other primary duties and had received little formal training in generator maintenance. At the request of II Field Force Artillery, a generator preventive maintenance course was conducted by personnel from G4, USARV, to train two generator inspectors from each assigned battalion and from HHD, II FFORCE Artillery. Subsequently, organizational and operator maintenance improved, equipment availability increased, and many potential maintenance problems were identified and corrected before serious damage was done.

The availability of repair parts at organizational level depended on maintaining an accurate prescribed load list (PLL). Many junior officers, NCO’s, and immediate supervisors did not have sufficient knowledge of procedures required to inspect unit PLL’s. Consequently, two day, PLL courses were conducted by qualified personnel from 195th Maintenance Battalion, for selected officers and NCO’s of assigned and OPCON units. This school had an immediate and continuing beneficial effect on the maintenance posture of II Field Force Artillery units.

2. MAINTENANCE TRAINING CONTACT TEAMS. The ability of officers and NCO’s to apply the principles of preventive maintenance is related directly to their ability to recognize PM indicators during the conduct of daily informal inspections. To improve this capability, a preventive maintenance course was conducted at each assigned and OPCON unit to insure that immediate supervisors were proficient in conducting daily inspections of their equipment. Technicians from 29th General Support Group made frequent visits to assist units in conducting detailed technical inspections.

COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING. The capability to communicate, regardless of the situation, has always been a source of great pride to the field artilleryman. The disposition of force artillery units throughout the III CTZ, called for continual emphasis on communication capabilities and training of personnel. The communications environment was characterised by operation over great distances, over nets crowded with traffic, manned by inexperienced personnel, and operating, in some cases through enemy jamming. Redeployment of artillery units within the III Corp Tactical Zone, placed renewed emphasis on the need for effective and responsive communications. Additionally, improvements were needed in the area of communication security and radio net discipline.

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1. COMMUNICATION SECURITY. All battalions subordinate and OPCON to II FFORCEV Artillery were directed to secure their command nets between the battalion net control station and each battery and split battery fire direction center (FDC). This required an extensive training program to insure that all users of secure voice equipment for FM radios received thorough training on the use and operation of the equipment. The training helped personnel gain confidence in the use of speech security equipment and the increased use of secure equipment served to deny access by the enemy to intelligence information related to artillery operations.

2. NET DISCIPLINE. Communication support provided by the area communication system was reduced as signal units were inactivated or redeployed. Many battalion to firing battery, dedicated circuits, used for command and control were lost. As a result, greater reliance had to be placed on the use of FM radio communications. It became increasingly evident from existing conditions that strict radio net discipline was required to gain maximum operating efficiency from existing radio nets. Command attention was directed toward the need for proper radiotelephone procedure. Personnel using radiotelephone communications received training and close supervision in the correct use of such procedures. Net control stations made on the spot corrections, and became more strict in insisting on proper procedures. Authentication became mandatory. This added emphasis reduced misunderstanding between radio stations, served to expedite radiotelephone procedure, and improved the overall operating efficiency of radio nets within II FFORCEV Artillery.

DRIVER TRAINING. Although vehicle accidents for II FFORCEV were well below the expected USARV accident rate, accident rates in some battalions were running higher than expected. To improve driver proficiency, a battalion driver training program was initiated on 17 February 1970. This program was expanded to battery level with the publication of the II FFORCEV Artillery Reg 350-1, Education and Training. The goal of the program was to obtain an in-country trained driver assigned to each vehicle. Over 400 drivers participated in this program, resulting in significant reductions in accident rates, improved driver maintenance, and a reduction in vehicle breakdowns.
GENERAL. The increased demands for tactical mobility placed upon II Field Force Artillery during the period, threatened for a time to break down a weak and flabby maintenance system. It became obvious that if II Field Force Artillery were going to be able to move its weapons to the most critical combat areas, the entire concept of maintenance would have to be transformed. Commanders had to be disabused of the notion, that had been permitted to exist, that you couldn't fight and at the same time maintain your equipment at a high standard. Combat service support commanders had to be urged to support mobile artillery operations on an area basis, rather than on a unit basis.

Indicative of the command emphasis and pressure that was placed on subordinate II Field Force Artillery commanders was the number of maintenance publications and instructions issued by Force Artillery headquarters. During the period, 2 regulations, 12 command letters, 2 maintenance newsletters, 14 Commander's Maintenance Checklists and 2 maintenance messages were published. In addition, frequent command and staff visits, as well as a systematic program of unannounced inspections, was used to assess and evaluate unit maintenance programs at every level. High goals on Command Maintenance Management Inspections (CMMI's) were set for commanders and they were challenged to meet the goals. A standard of 90 percent on both maintenance of materiel and maintenance operations was set for II Field Force Artillery units.

Combat service support, organized to support essentially static artillery operations, required a complete overhaul. At the suggestion of the CG, II Field Force Artillery, the 29th General Support Group conceived a totally new concept of providing combat service support to the mobile units of II Field Force Artillery. Instead of fixed support relationships between combat support and combat service support units, the 29th General Support Group substituted combat service support on an area basis. Wherever an artillery unit moved, it could depend on the combat service support unit in that area. Supplementing the area support concept was the extensive use of highly mobile contact teams. The density and makeup of contact teams was varied according to the density of type weapons in a given area through close coordination and cooperation between Force Artillery and the 29th General Support Group.

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE. The increased mobility of Force Artillery was achieved by means of a number of complementary programs. One of the most important of these was a comprehensive program of preventive maintenance. The maintenance of tactical mobility required that problems be discovered and corrected before breakdowns occurred. The key to the Force Artillery preventive maintenance program was a series of systematic and periodic command, staff and technical inspections, followed by vigorous corrective action.

Force Artillery and 23d Group CMMI teams carried out numerous inspections.
of maintenance management and maintenance operations, and conducted technical clinics to upgrade the technical proficiency of maintenance personnel. CM.MI inspections were supplemented by No-notice Administrative Readiness Evaluations (NARE), No-notice Operational Readiness Evaluations (NORE), and numerous command and staff inspections. Unannounced roadside spot check inspections produced additional indicators of the maintenance posture of Force Artillery units. Timely inspections, combined with a concentrated program of maintenance training permitted Force Artillery to achieve all mobility goals.

MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT. A major effort was required in all Force Artillery units to make the TAERS system work. The state of training of PLL and TAERS clerks at the beginning of the period was extremely poor. Special training programs produced 71 PLL and TAERS Clerk graduates who, in turn, undertook the upgrading of PLL management and parts supply. As command interest focused on this critical area, parts supply improved, while at the same time over 9,000 excess items were identified, catalogued, and turned in.

ENGINEER SUPPORT. Engineer support for II FFORCEV Artillery units was provided by both divisional and non-divisional engineer elements. To reduce the high demand on these critical assets, a stringent system of priorities, reviewed at command level, was instituted. Every effort was made to accomplish the required work at the lowest possible level, to anticipate needs, and by exploiting organizational capabilities, reduce outside assistance to an absolute minimum. In this manner, the most efficient use of engineer support was insured, and the most critical construction projects were accomplished first.

A wide variance of material available, preferences of individual commanders for size and layout, and the conditions under which construction was accomplished resulted in considerable disparity between similar units with similar requirements. This problem was further compounded by the increased number of structures required in support of the new mobile concept of the general support artillery. An analysis was conducted to standardize bunker and firing pad configuration into structures that could be prefabricated by non-divisional engineers and erected by the using unit. The demand for combat engineering support was thus not eliminated, but was substantially reduced.

FOOD SERVICE. The preparation and presentation of attractive and palatable meals carried special importance to the health, welfare, and morale of all personnel. The jungle climate posed severe problems in sanitation and food preservation. Command emphasis on cleanliness, insect control, rodent control, and adequate drainage assured that unit messes operated properly. Twice quarterly inspections of each unit's mess facilities by the Food Service Advisor assisted in providing high-quality mess operations throughout the command. On the spot corrections were made during each inspection and written reports submitted for以后 of problem areas and trends. Competition was encouraged through initiation of "Best Mess" competition award.
Following the experience gained in building and fielding airmobile FDC's, the application of the same concept appeared to have merit when applied to providing an airmobile kitchen. Accordingly, one experimental model was built for field testing. Shortly after its completion, a II Field Force Artillery unit underwent heavy enemy attack at Fire Support Base Illingsworth, destroying or damaging many of the unit installations. The airmobile kitchen was airlifted into the site the same day where it was placed into immediate operation. The self-contained installation proved so successful that more will be built as materials become available. The design of the airmobile kitchen is shown at Tab I.

SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY REPAIR AND RETURN (R & R) PROGRAM. The best trained, most highly motivated field artillerymen are only as effective as the accuracy of the weapon they fire. There are no finer cannons than those of the US Field Artillery; however, as with any precision instrument, they need continual maintenance. Detailed tests of on carriage fire control instruments could not effectively be administered in remote field locations; hence, a comprehensive program was enforced to return individual weapons to third echelon maintenance facilities on a scheduled basis. Close coordination was maintained with the 29th General Support Group to insure an appropriate supply of repair parts was available before a weapon was removed from operational status. The value of this program paid for itself time and again as deadline rates were decreased by the early detection of equipment malfunctions.

CLASS V MANAGEMENT. During the period, increased command emphasis on the control and management of ammunition resources required the revision of the previous accounting system. The old system was based on expenditures rather than draws. The available data on draws was usually 48 to 96 hours old. The system had been adequate in the past because ASR's were liberal and not unduly restrictive on units. The need to place ammunition under more stringent controls required close monitoring to avoid overdrawing monthly allocations.

Ammunition accountability presented problems for all parties concerned. The physical transfer of copies of draw documents from all ASP's in III "T" was difficult because of distances involved. The administration of ammunition accounting contained numerous errors. Posting of data enjoyed relatively low priority, making the accumulation of timely data extremely difficult. It was obvious that a completely new attitude toward ammunition accountability had to be developed at all levels in the data gathering chain.

A new system of accountability was developed by II Field Force Artillery and adopted by the II Field Force Commander. The system is presented graphically at Tab J. The system entails a comparison of current draws and expenditures, not more than 24 hours old, for each unit, by caliber. The Daily Ammunition Drawn and Allocated chart (TF K), presents the ammunition drawn compared to a proportion of the authorized
allocation, by unit, and caliber. Through daily monitoring of these two charts, and accurate evaluation of the current ammunition draw/expenditure status could be made. The result was the production of timely and accurate data upon which the commanding general could base decisions on when and where to commit his ammunition reserves.
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PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

GENERAL. In addition to the normal administrative functions of a force Headquarters, the additional role of accomplishing the responsibilities which would normally fall to an artillery group headquarters had to be accomplished. This dual responsibility, for three heavy artillery battalions developed several unique programs.

ADMINISTRATIVE READINESS EVALUATION. The objective of this program was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Headquarters and Service Batteries of the battalions within II FFORCEV Artillery. Particular emphasis was placed on assessing the support given the battalion as a whole, and in rendering assistance wherever possible. II FFORCEV Artillery Reg 20-1 served as a guide for the sixteen inspections administered during the past six months.

JUNIOR OFFICER RETENTION PROGRAM. The problems of retaining good junior officers was a continuing matter of command concern. Personnel management, placement of officers in assignments consistent with their needs, the needs of the command, and career counseling were aggressively pursued by all commanders. A comprehensive pamphlet was prepared and distributed down to battery level to provide commanders with detailed information for use in counseling junior officers. As Commanding General II Field Force Artillery, my deep interest and concern for junior officer development was manifested in my personal association with every JOC within the command, as evidenced by my speaking, at least once, at each battalion's junior officer council meeting. This personal command interest by the Commanding General, I found, prompted further command interest by group and battalion commanders.

OPERATION AMNESTY. In October 1969, USARV initiated a broad marijuana and drug suppression program. Operation Amnesty, an important aspect of this program, received maximum emphasis from this headquarters. Because of the possibility of misunderstanding by commander and soldier alike, the provisions of Operation Amnesty were clearly set forth and distributed in the form of two command letters. One letter presented a detailed explanation of the entire Amnesty Program, to be used as a guide by unit commanders. The second was addressed to the individual soldier, instructing him on how he could avail himself of the program. Copies of both letters are found TAB L.
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CIVIC ACTION - CIVIL AFFAIRS

GENERAL. Units of II Field Force Artillery conducted a varied and extensive civic action program aimed at improving relationships between US military and the Vietnamese civilian population of III CTZ. Programs that received specific emphasis were Vietnamese Scouts, Medcap, and assistance to hospitals and orphanages.

BOY SCOUT PROGRAM. Five headquarters were actively engaged in promoting scouting, and two additional units initiated scout-support programs. The troop at An Loc developed a civic action plan that is being initiated by other scout troops in the area. Scouts from An Loc traveled to Montagnard villages and hamlets on numerous occasions to assist in individual and group projects. They dug drainage ditches, taught first aid, worked on sanitation problems, and even tried their hand at teaching "home making" to the women. To bolster interest and improve the kinds of programs undertaken, II Field Force Artillery sought to provide both individual and troop equipment to newly organized troops. In early May, for example, I presented nearly 900 items of equipment to scouts in Long Khanh Province.

MEDCAPS. All battalions participated in this program, treating in excess of 1,000 patients each week. Particular emphasis was placed on developing programs that would remain in effect after US troops departed from the areas. The 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, incorporated a public health team from the Binh Long Province hospital into its visits, in order to develop in the province medical staff the habit of actively going out to the villages to help the people. Another method used was to place Vietnamese medical personnel in stationary aid stations, where they gained practical experience in hospital medical treatment, operations, and logistics, while under the supervision of US personnel. This method worked well in aid stations established by 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery, and the 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery.

SUPPORT OF SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, AND ORPHANAGES. The majority of the civic actions in this area concentrated on providing help to children and to the seriously ill. Usually, individual batteries adopted a school or orphanage and provided such support as contributions to fund raising campaigns, food building of duck ponds, procuring of livestock, digging wells, and making small and sometimes major repairs to buildings. Regardless of the material objectives attained, the most significant contribution was in showing the Vietnamese people that U.S. units cared about the problem of their school or orphanage. The assistance provided by the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, to the Province Hospital at An Loc, through construction of a conference/TV room and initiation of plans for a new kitchen area, typifies the approach of II Field Force Artillery units.

CONFIDENTIAL
VIII-38
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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Loss</th>
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<td>7th Bn, 9th Arty, redeployed.</td>
<td>18 tubes (105) 528 personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 13th Arty, redeployed.</td>
<td>18 tubes (105) 528 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery F, 16th Artillery (Sep), inactivated.</td>
<td>6 tubes (155) 125 personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHB, II PFV Artillery, drawdown.</td>
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<tr>
<td>76th FA Detachment (Radar), inactivated.</td>
<td>9 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260th FA Detachment (Radar), inactivated.</td>
<td>9 personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 36 tubes (105) 1218 personnel  |
| 6 tubes (155) 42 tubes         |

Tab B

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II FORGEV ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION CHARTS

Inclosure 1 - II FORGEV Artillery Organization as of 20 November 1969
Inclosure 2 - II FORGEV Artillery Organization as of 15 April 1970
1. II FFORCEV Artillery Units

   23d Field Artillery Group (OPCON)
   7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (Assigned)
   6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (Assigned)
   2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (Assigned)
   5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery (OPCON)

   HHD 8th TAB, 25th Artillery (Assigned)

2. Unit Organizations:

   a. II FFORCEV Artillery - 3 Battalions 8"/175mm (SP)
      (1) 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, 8"/175mm (SP)
      (2) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, 8"/175mm (SP)
      (3) 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, 8"/175mm (SP)

   b. 23d Field Artillery Group - 6 Battalions: 2-105mm (T), 2-155mm (T), 2-155mm (SP), and 1 Battery - 155mm (T)
      (1) 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery, 105mm (T)
      (2) 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, 105mm (T)
      (3) 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, 155mm (T)
      (4) 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery, 155mm (T)
      (5) Battery F, 16th Artillery, 155mm (T) (Attached 2/12 Arty)
      (6) 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, 155mm (SP)
      (7) 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, 155mm (SP)

   c. 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery
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(1) Four organic batteries of 16, M42, 40mm weapons (Dusters) each.

(2) Battery D, 71st Artillery (Attached) with 24, .50 Caliber Quad Mounted Machineguns.

(3) Battery I, 29th Artillery (Attached) with 23 inch Xenon Searchlights.
1. II FFORCEV Artillery Units.
   23d Field Artillery Group (OPCON)
   7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (Assigned)
   6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (Assigned)
   2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (Assigned)
   5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery (OPCON)
   HHB 8th TAB, 25th Artillery (Assigned)

2. Unit Organization.
   a. II FFORCEV Artillery - 3 Battalions - 3"/175mm (SP)
      (1) 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery - 3"/175mm (SP)
      (2) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery - 8"/175mm (SP)
      (3) 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery - 8"/175mm (SP)
   b. 23d Artillery Group - 4 Battalions: 2 - 155mm (T), 2 - 155mm (SP)
      (1) 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, 155mm (T)
      (2) 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery, 155mm (T)
      (3) 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, 155mm (SP)
      (4) 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, 155mm (SP)
   c. 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery
      (1) Four organic batteries of 16, M42, 40mm weapons (Dusters) each.
      (2) Battery D, 71st Artillery (Attached) with 24, .50 Caliber Quad
           Mounted Machineguns.
      (3) Battery I, 29th Artillery (Attached) with 23 Inch Xenon Searchlights.

Incl 2 to Tab C

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MAJOR OPERATIONS STATISTICS

Inclosure 1 - War Zones C and D.
Inclosure 2 - Border Sanctuary Operations.
Inclosure 3 - Operation ROCK CRUSHER - Phase I.
Inclosure 4 - II FFORCEV Artillery Initial Border Task Organisation.
Inclosure 5 - Operation ROCK CRUSHER - Phase II-III.
Inclosure 6 - II FFORCEV Artillery Task Organisation - 5 May 1970.
Inclosure 7 - II FFORCEV Artillery Task Organisation - 7 May 1970.
II FFORCEV ARTILLERY INITIAL BORDER TASK ORGANIZATION

**OPERATION ROCK CRUSHER**

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<td>REINFORCE 23D ARTY GP</td>
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<td>2T C/6/27 (175)</td>
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<td>GS II FFORCEV; PROVIDE SUPPORTING FIRES TO III CORPS ELEMENTS IN ZONE</td>
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<td>GS II FFORCEV; PROVIDE SUPPORTING FIRES TO III CORPS ELEMENTS IN ZONE</td>
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<tr>
<td>B/5/42 (155 T)</td>
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**OPERATION TOAN THANG 43**

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Incl 4 to Tab E
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<td>GS II FFORCEV</td>
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<td>C/6/27 (175)</td>
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OPERATION - UNIT

ROCK CRUSHER, PHASE III

B/7/8 (175)
C/7/8 (8"
A/1/27 (155 SP)
C/1/27 (155 SP)

TOAN THANG 43

B/2/32 (8"/175)
A/6/27 (8"/175)
B/2/12 (155 T)
A/2/35 (155 SP)

TIA CHOP

A/2/32 (8"/175)
C/2/32 (8"/175)
B/1/27 (155 SP)
B/5/42 (155 T)

HAC MA

C/6/27 (175)
A/2/32 (155 T)
C/2/12 (155 T)

GIONG TO

B/6/27 (8"/175)

MISSION

REINFORCE 23D ARTY GP
REINFORCE 23D ARTY GP
GS II FFORCEV; PROVIDE SUPPORTING FIRES TO III CORPS ELEMENTS IN ZONE
GS II FFORCEV; PROVIDE SUPPORTING FIRES TO III CORPS ELEMENTS IN ZONE
GS II FFORCEV
GS II FFORCEV
GSR 1st CAV DIV ARTY
GSR 1st CAV DIV ARTY
GS II FFORCEV
GS II FFORCEV
GSR 25th INF DIV ARTY
GSR 25th INF DIV ARTY
GS II FFORCEV
GS R 1st CAV DIV ARTY
GS R 1st CAV DIV ARTY
GS II FFORCEV
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AIR MOBILE FDC'S

Inclosure 1 - Floor Plan and Pictures, Battery FDC
Inclosure 2 - Floor Plan, Battalion FDC

Tab F

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SURVEY CONTROL LOCATIONS

Inclosure 1 - Verified Existing 1st - 4th Order Survey Control, III CTY.

Inclosure 2 - Fifth Order Control Established, III CTY.

Inclosure 3 - Fourth Order Control Established, III CTY.

Inclosure 4 - Extension of Survey Control.
verified existing
1st-4th ORDER SURVEY CONTROL — II FFORCE — III CTZ AREA OF OPERATION

CAMBODIA

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1st-3rd ORDER = ▽
4th ORDER = •
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ACCIDENTS - INCIDENTS

Inclosure 1 - Accidents/Incidents and Casualties
Inclosure 2 - Accidents/Incidents by MIL

Tab H

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CONFIDENTIAL
NUMBER ACCIDENTS & INCIDENTS
NOV 69 - APR 70

ACIDENTS
INCIDENTS
INCOMPLETE

UNIT
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

FLOOR PLAN AND PICTURE
AIR MOBILE KITCHEN
DAILY AMMO DRAWN AND EXPENDED CHART

1. PERIOD indicates the applicable calendar month.

2. ALLOCATION DAY DESIGNATOR shows the day of the allocation period.

3. EXPENDITURE BAR CHAIN indicates proportional part of the total allocation expended on the date identified by 2.

4. AMM BAR CHAIN indicates proportional part of the total allocation drawn on the date identified by 2.
# Daily Ammunition Drawn and Allocated Chart

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<th>155 Cumulative</th>
<th>8&quot; Cumulative</th>
<th>175 Cumulative</th>
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<td>TOT. ALLOC</td>
<td>DRAWN</td>
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<td>1st CAV</td>
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<td>TOT. ALLOC TO DATE</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st INF</td>
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<td>9th INF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Date** is the day of the 31 day allocation period to which posted draw and expenditure data has been compiled.
- **ASH Date** is the day of the 31 day allocation period to which posted draw and expenditure data has been compiled.
- **TOTAL ALLOCATION** blocks show the total allocation assigned to a unit within the respective caliber artillery for the current month.
- **ALLOCATED IN CAPE** is the daily allocation multiplied by the day of allocation of the 31 day period. On the 31st day of allocation the unit would reach a zero balance.
- **TOTAL** line indicates draw totals, total allocation, and allocation date for all units within II FFVA.
- **TOTAL DIFFERENTIAL** is the difference between the rounds drawn and the allocation date for all of II FFVA.
- **RESERVE** shows the amount of ammunition held in reserve at II FFVA Artillery.
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OPERATION AMNESTY

Inclosure 1 - A Guide for Unit Commanders
Inclosure 2 - An Opportunity for Self Help
SUBJECT: Operation Amnesty - A Guide for Unit Commanders

1. References:

2. General: Department of Defense message AV1HPM-PO 8251, dated 22 June 1969, announced a policy of emphasis on programs designed to prevent and eliminate drug abuse within the Armed Forces. On 9 October 1969, USAFRV implemented this policy by initiating a broad marihuana and drug suppression program. An important aspect of this program is Operation Amnesty.

3. Purpose: This letter provides guidance to unit commanders for implementing Operation Amnesty.

4. Applicability:
   a. Operation Amnesty is available to anyone. Anyone who desires to seek help for a marihuana or drug problem may, without fear of disciplinary action, disclose his problem to any person or agency he selects to aid him. Surgeons, Chaplains, Staff Judge Advocates, and Provost Marshals have been alerted to the Operation Amnesty program, and are already active in this area. The individual may be referred to a physician or psychiatrist for consultation and treatment, or, if he desires to give information, to a criminal investigator.

   b. Exceptions: Immunity from disciplinary action will not be given to three classes of persons:
      (1) Those persons currently under investigation for marihuana or drug abuse.

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AVF3-FAD
SUBJECT: Operation Amnesty - A Guide for Unit Commanders

(2) Those persons having marihuana or drugs on their person or otherwise in their possession at the time they request help.

(3) Those persons, who, having begun a program of rehabilitation under Operation Amnesty, subsequently use or possess marihuana or drugs.

1. The Buddy System: Each individual referred for counseling or treatment for a marihuana or drug problem will be encouraged to select another member of his unit to unofficially monitor his recovery and to provide all possible assistance.

2. Military Justice Implications: In order to avoid misunderstandings, each commander will insure that each member of his unit is aware of the fact that:

a. He must discard or destroy all marihuana or drugs currently in his possession before he requests help; otherwise, he is subject to disciplinary action.

b. The term "possession" refers not only to marihuana or drugs on his person, but also to marihuana or drugs located in items or places under his custody or control, such as his room, his bunk and his footlocker.

c. He should remain silent concerning his use or possession of marihuana or drugs if he falls within one of the three exceptions to the Operation Amnesty program (enumerated in paragraph 4b, above); otherwise, he will incriminate himself.

d. The immunity conferred by Operation Amnesty extends only to himself; it does not serve to protect his friends. Any statement he makes concerning the use or possession of marihuana or other drugs by his friends may serve to incriminate them.

e. He will lose the immunity granted by Operation Amnesty if he subsequently uses or possesses marihuana or other drugs.

f. The individual he selected as his "buddy" may be called as a witness against him if he is prosecuted for subsequently possessing or using marihuana or drugs.

7. Procedures for Implementing Operation Amnesty: Unit commanders will comply immediately with the following requirements:

a. Posting: A copy of the attached letter, subject: Operation Amnesty - An Opportunity for Self-Help, will be posted on the permanent...
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portion of the unit's bulletin board and above the Amnesty box, discussed below.

b. Initial Orientation:

(1) Each unit commander will ensure that Operation Amnesty is brought to the attention of each member of his unit. This may be done, at the commander's discretion, either on an individual or on a group basis. Where groups are utilized, attendance will be taken.

(2) Each unit commander will encourage discussion of the amnesty program and will insure that each of his subordinates fully understands its operation.

c. Use of Amnesty Boxes:

(1) Each unit will construct an Amnesty Box which may be used by an individual to discard marijuana or drugs. The box will be located at the entrance to each unit's orderly room, and will be so constructed as to preclude any individual from being able to retrieve any item. The box will be clearly labeled, "Amnesty Box", and will have a copy of the attached letter posted directly above it.

2) Commanders will set aside an hour in the morning, afternoon and evening of each day as a period during which an individual desiring to discard marijuana or drugs may do so without fear of being found in possession of the same while enroute to the Amnesty box. A bulletin setting forth the hours of operation will be posted above the Amnesty box and on the permanent portion of the unit bulletin board, adjacent to the attached letter. The bulletin will be clearly labeled, "Hours of Operation - Amnesty Box." Any change in the hours of operation will be announced by posting a bulletin at least 48 hours prior to the effective date of such change.

(3) No search of an individual's person or possessions will be conducted as a result of observing his discard an item in the Amnesty Box. No person will be questioned concerning what he has dropped in the Amnesty Box. No records will be made of persons utilizing the Amnesty Box or otherwise taking advantage of Operation Amnesty.

d. Destruction of Contents of Amnesty Box: Commanders will insure the destruction, by burning, of the entire contents of the Amnesty Box. Such destruction will occur at least once per week.
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b. Coordination with II FFORCENV Artillery: Commanders should address questions concerning Operation Amnesty to this headquarters, ATTN: Legal Officer.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. G. FARRISH
LTC, FA
Adjutant

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SUBJECT: Operation Amnesty - An Opportunity for Self-Help

1. What is Operation Amnesty? Operation Amnesty is a program designed to help you solve any marihuana or drug problems you feel you may have. You may request counseling or treatment for your marihuana or drug problem from any person or agency you choose, without fear of disciplinary action. Operation Amnesty immunizes you from any form of disciplinary action. You need have no fear, for example, that you will be subsequently reprimanded, given an Article 15, or prosecuted.

2. What Persons or Agencies Will Give You Assistance?

   a. Your unit commander, your chaplain, and personnel of the Provost Marshal’s Office, the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, and the Surgeon’s Office stand ready to assist you in every possible way. You will be counseled by the person you select, and, if you so desire, you will be referred to a physician or psychiatrist for professional counseling and treatment. No records will be maintained by your unit commander or by any other agency whose assistance you seek.

   b. Your unit commander will make all arrangements necessary to insure that you have the opportunity to consult with the person(s) of your choice.

   c. The Buddy System: Once your program of rehabilitation has begun, you may, if you so desire, select someone in whom you can confide who will help insure that your rehabilitation is a success. He will unofficially watch your progress and assist you in every possible way.

3. Can Everyone Take Advantage of the Immunity Granted by Operation Amnesty?

The answer to this is, “No.” You will not be granted immunity from disciplinary action, if:

   a. You have marihuana or drugs on your person or otherwise in your possession and under your control at the time you request help.
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b. You are under investigation for drug abuse at the time you request help.

c. You use or possess marihuana or other drugs after starting the program.

4. What Procedures Should You Follow?

a. First, you must destroy or get rid of any marihuana or other drugs you may have in your possession before you request help. Your unit should have an Amnesty Box outside of the Orderly Room for this purpose, with the hours of operation posted above it. During the hours posted, you are immune from disciplinary action for possession of marihuana or other drugs while enroute to the Amnesty Box. No one will keep a record of the fact that you have used the Amnesty Box. No one will ask you questions concerning what you have placed in the Amnesty Box. No search will be made of your person or of your room or possessions as a result of the fact that you have utilized the Amnesty Box. The contents of the Amnesty Box will be destroyed at the end of each week by your unit commander.

b. Second, report to your unit commander. Inform him that you want to take advantage of Operation Amnesty. You need not discuss your problem with him. Ask him to make an appointment for you to see either a physician, a chaplain, a psychiatrist, or a staff judge advocate. You may make the choice.

c. Third, consult with the person you have chosen. Be candid with him. He stands ready to assist you in every possible way.

d. Fourth, once you are on the road to a successful rehabilitation, select a friend in whom you can confide, a buddy to assist you and to check your progress unofficially.

e. Finally, encourage others to accept Operation Amnesty. By persuading others, you will help to insure the success of your own program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. C. PARRISH
LTC, FA
Adjutant

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