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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (H) (19 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701278 26 June 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DA NANG
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVCA DNG-GO-MI 3 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-0
APO 96384

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVIGC-DST
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GROP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
ATTN: FOR OT UT
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

a. The US Army Support Command, Da Nang (USASUPCOM, DNC) continued to provide logistical support to all US Army units operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). Necessary and property disposal services were provided to all US Forces in the ICTZ and in support of Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMF) as directed. The logistical operations involved deployment of the Command's units in direct support of the Americal Division in Southern I Corps; 1st Airborne Division (Airborne) operating in the vicinity of Phu Bai; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) operating in the vicinity of Quang Tri; 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry Regiment operating in the vicinity of Camp Evans. In addition, all non-divisional Army units operating within ICTZ were supported. Class I was provided to the Marines in the Phu Bai area and the Naval Detachment at Sa Huynh. Inclosure 1 contains the organizational chart.

b. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS.

   (1) KEYSTONE CARDINAL: In addition to the loss of units reported on the last ORLL report the following are losses to this command during the reporting period as a result of KEYSTONE CARDINAL:

   (2) DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
   (3) DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
   (4) DOD Directive 5200.25

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DATE                  UNIT                        LOSS
3 Nov 69              274th Supply Platoon          47 Spaces (Inactivation)
20 Nov 69              HQ, USASUPCOM, DNG            23 Spaces (Drawdown)

(2) FORCE DEVELOPMENT.

(a) The following MTOE and NTDA were approved by USARPAC for implementation during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MTOE/NTDA</th>
<th>GENERAL ORDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>205th Transportation Company</td>
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<td>516th Personnel Service Company</td>
<td>12-67G</td>
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<tr>
<td>40th Army Postal Unit</td>
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<td>42nd Army Postal Unit</td>
<td>12-605G (Type 2)</td>
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<td>43rd Army Postal Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, USASUPCOM, DNG</td>
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<td>782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following units were inactivated by USARPAC General Orders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GENERAL ORDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>475th Army Postal Unit</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192nd Finance Section</td>
<td>822</td>
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<tr>
<td>384th QM Detachment</td>
<td>786</td>
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<tr>
<td>71st QM Platoon</td>
<td>822</td>
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</table>

(3) TRAINING: PROJECT BUDDY - The USASUPCOM, DNG Instruct and Advise (I&A) teams began working with ARVN on 6 January 1970. The first unit visited was the 812th Ordnance Company in Da Nang. The I&A Team will stay at the 812th Ordnance Company for six weeks and then move on to other ARVN units. The team works directly with the ARVN providing assistance and first hand working knowledge.

(4) SECURITY OPERATIONS: The Security Division, S&O, continued its normal functions during the past three months. Increased emphasis was placed on insureing that all units were prepared for an increase in enemy activity which was expected to occur during the late December through early February time frame. The 524th Military Intelligence Detachment continued to provide counter-intelligence support for the command and its subordinate units. Enemy activity throughout I Corps was generally light throughout the reporting period. Enemy units apparently spent most of their time collecting supplies for their expected Winter-Spring Campaign. The GVN/Allied security and pacification progress continued to create increasing concern among the enemy as he was increasingly denied contact with the people. Enemy attempts to interdict Logistical Operations Centers were generally light and, when attempted, were unsuccessful.
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INSPECTIONS: The 524th Military Intelligence Detachment continued to provide counter-intelligence support to the command. During the period 1 November - 31 January, 17 security inspections were made by the detachment. Of these, nine were after duty hour inspections; five were announced duty hour inspections, and three were unannounced duty hour inspections. Deficiencies noted were procedural in nature and include the following:

(a) Classified documents did not bear downgrading instructions.

(b) File folders containing classified material were not marked top and bottom, front and back, with the highest classification of the material stored therein.

(c) Security posters were not posted.

(d) Emergency evacuation and destruction plans were not posted in areas where classified information is stored.

(e) Security Control Officer not appointed on orders.

Inspected units took appropriate action to correct all deficiencies and were urged to insure that they did not recur in the future.

INTELLIGENCE:

(a) An intelligence map of I Corps was established in order to provide a graphic record of the current dispositions and major activities of the enemy. It is used to analyze intelligence information and to brief personnel on the current situation. The Security Division continues to maintain close liaison with the Hq., III MAF; Hq., I Corps; US Air Force OSI; 5th Special Forces; Hq., XXIV Corps and other support commands in the 1st Logistical Command in order to insure timely collection and dissemination of intelligence information.

(b) During November, enemy activity increased steadily during the first three weeks; however, there was a sharp decline during the last week. The decline was probably the result of the adverse weather which prevailed during the week. Enemy initiated contacts were notable in that they all were conducted by VC while major NVA units avoided contact.

(c) A sharp increase in enemy activity was expected to occur in late November; but, it failed to materialize. This was probably due to aggressive operations conducted by the allies in the lowlands and the acute difficulties generated by the inability of the VC infrastructure to procure material and political support from the people.

(d) The GVN/Allied security and pacification continued to be successful in denying the enemy access to the people. As a result, the enemy increased proselyting and political activities, in order to counter these effects.
(c) Enemy activity increased slightly at the beginning of December; however, it declined sharply just prior to Christmas. The enemy's heavy rice losses probably caused him to scale down his efforts and adjust his future plans. Enemy activity increased slightly during the Christmas ceasefire, but the overall level was still considered low. The low level activity which consisted of scattered ground attacks and attacks by fire, continued for the remainder of the month. There was also increased activity in gathering rice and supplies for an upcoming offensive. Notable again was the fact that for the second straight month, NVA units continued their tactic of avoiding contact.

(e) At the beginning of the month, information indicated that enemy activity was expected to increase during the period 19-25 December. Nevertheless, information available later in the month placed less emphasis on the late December dates and more on the Tet holiday period.

(g) The fact that no large scale increase in activity occurred in late December may indicate that allied operations have created greater problems for the enemy than he anticipated.

(h) "Vietnamization" and pacification programs continue to be a source of increased concern for the enemy. Consequently, he directed his efforts toward soliciting popular participation in a general uprising and attempting to disrupt the pacification program.

(4) Enemy activity during January remained at a low level with the exception of a brief upsurge during the week 4-10 January. An attack on 2 January in Quang Nam Province was the first time in more than two months that a major NVA unit was involved in an incident. The majority of the activity by the enemy was centered around preparations for his Winter-Spring Campaign, that was expected to begin in late January or early February. Additionally, the enemy intensified his propaganda, used proselyting tactics, and attempted to procure necessary supplies.

(j) Later intelligence reports indicated that the enemy would intensify his attacks sometime prior to Tet and then again after the Tet holidays. The enemy was expected to increase his attacks on hamlets and refugee centers in order to cover the population centers, and attacks against military installations were expected to increase as the army tried to divert NVA and Allied forces attention from the pacification program.

(7) ENEMY ACTIVITIES:

(a) 2 -8 NOVEMBER 1969: Most indicators showed an increase of enemy activity during the past week. Incoming fire rose for the third straight week to a total of 428 rounds, an increase of 60 rounds from the previous week's total. This is the highest number of incoming rounds recorded since the week of 14-20 September. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased as well to 223, up 54 from the last reporting period. Enemy KIA also registered an increase, rising to 498, an
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

increase of three over last week's total. Hoï Chanhs declined for the second week, dropping to 107, down 18 from last week. The increase in enemy activity was also reflected by the total number of POW's and detainees for the week. FMASF accounted for 25, while the ARVN acquired 60 for a total of 85, the highest number recorded since the week of 1 - 7 June when the total was 92.

(b) 9 - 16 NOVEMBER 1969: Indicators of enemy activity showed a general increase last week. Enemy initiated ground incidents totaled 239, an increase of 16 from the previous reporting period. KIA's rose sharply to 1236, an increase of 736 over the 498 reported last week. This is the highest number of KIA reported since the week ending 26 August when 1305 were reported. The number of POW's and detainees also increased, with ARVN accounting for 127 and FMASF for 21 for a total of 148. Enemy incoming rounds declined during the reporting period by 196 to a total of 432. This is the second lowest total of incoming rounds reported since the week of 9 August when a total of 349 rounds were registered. The exception is the week of 25 October when there were 333 incoming rounds. The number of Hoï Chanhs rose to 124, up 17 from last week's total.

(c) 16 - 22 NOVEMBER 1969: Most indicators of enemy activity registered an increase last week. Enemy initiated ground incidents totaled 239, an increase of 16 from the previous reporting period. KIA's rose sharply to 1236, an increase of 736 over the 498 reported last week. This is the highest number of KIA reported since the week of 16 August when 1303 were reported. The number of POW's and detainees also increased, with ARVN accounting for 127 and FMASF for 21 for a total of 148. Enemy incoming rounds declined during the reporting period by 196 to a total of 432. This is the second lowest total of incoming rounds reported since the week of 9 August when a total of 349 rounds were registered. The exception is the week of 25 October when there were 333 incoming rounds. The number of Hoï Chanhs rose to 124, up 17 from last week's total.

(d) 23 - 29 NOVEMBER 1969: There were significant reductions in most indicators of enemy activity during the past week. Incoming totaled 135 rounds, a sharp decline from the 537 recorded last week; a new low total. The previous low was 176 rounds during the week ending 6 January 1969. The number of enemy initiated ground incidents followed the trend by dropping to 171, a decrease of 64 and the lowest number recorded since the week of 26 October 1968 when there were 140 recorded. The low level of activity continued to be reflected in the number of KIA, 349, less than one-half of last week's total of 1171. Prisoner of war (POW) statistics experienced the greatest decline, dropping from 255 to 41 (24 by the FMASF and 17 by the ARVN). The number of Hoï Chanhs continued to rise, however, with a new high of 295 established.

(e) 30 NOVEMBER - 6 DECEMBER 1969: Most indicators of enemy activity registered an increase during the past week. Total incoming was 450 rounds, an increase of 315 from last week. Enemy initiated ground incidents also increased, rising to 172, an increase of 31 incidents. The number of KIA also registered a slight
increase totaling 577 for the week. The number of PWs increased by 75 for a weekly total of 116. Ho Chi Minh declined for the first time in several weeks, down 50 for a total of 245. No significant change was reported in V/C/NI counterintelligence related activities. Terrorist activity remained at a low level, consisting primarily of selective targeting designed to weaken/disrupt the pacification and security programs. Reports continue to reflect V/C/NI efforts in the collection of information on selected individuals for the purpose of creating lists, such as persons to be assassinated, proselytized, sent to thought reform camps, etc. Implementation of the intended purpose of each list would probably be conducted simultaneously with intensified or large scale enemy military activity. Priority was to be given, but not limited to, village level personalities. It should not be discounted, that this effort may be at least one of the main objectives of any future enemy military activity.

(f) 7 - 13 December 1969: There was no consistent trend established by indicators of enemy activity during the past week. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased by 60 for a total of 232, while enemy KIA also increased, up 139 for a new total of 716, the highest total in three weeks. Other indicators registered declines, with total incoming at 284, down 168 from last week. The number of PWs dropped to 71, a decrease of 45, and Ho Chi Minh were at the lowest level since the week ending 18 November, with 165, a drop of 64. V/C/NI counterintelligence related activities of the past week continue to reflect no significant change in policy or tactics. Terrorist activity remained at essentially the same level as the previous week and continued to be directed primarily at disruption of village and hamlet level pacification and security assets.

(g) 14 - 20 December 1969: Indicators of enemy activity declined sharply last week, reflecting the generally quiet conditions which prevailed over 1969. There were 124 enemy initiated incidents, the lowest two-week total recorded by CVF since January 1967. Enemy KIA were down to 494, a decrease of 222 from last week. There was a total of 14 PW taken (seven KIA and five VC), seven less than last week. Ho Chi Minh also decreased from 191 to 113, a drop of 60. V/C/NI counterintelligence related activities followed the pattern of the past several weeks. Reported enemy terrorist activity dropped to an extremely low level from the moderately low levels of the previous week. Emphasis on food collection and collecting of political, financial, material and physical support from the people continues to occupy most of the V/C/NI cadres time. Reports continue to indicate every efforts to solicit popular participation for a general uprising in conjunction with a planned large scale, all-out offensive. Other reports continue to reflect efforts toward long-range goals and preparation for a prolonged struggle. While the latter of these two indicators are more consistent with enemy capabilities, too many captured documents, reports, PW and source reports reflect every intentions of a large scale offensive, for it not to have some degree of validity. In the event such an effort failed, the enemy would then most likely pursue the alternate course of a protracted struggle in conjunction with a so-called people's guerrilla war.

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increase of three over last week’s total. Hoi Chanhs declined for the second week, dropping to 107, down 18 from last week. The increase in enemy activity was also reflected by the total number of PW’s and detainees for the week. FWMAF accounted for 25, while the ARVN acquired 60 for a total of 85, the highest number recorded since the week of 1 - 7 June when the total was 92.

(b) 9 - 16 NOVEMBER 1969: Indicators of enemy activity showed a general increase last week. Enemy initiated ground incidents totaled 239, an increase of 16 from the previous reporting period. KIA’s rose sharply to 1234, an increase of 73 from 949 reported last week. This is the highest number of KIA reported since the week of 16 August when 1305 were reported. The number of PW’s and detainees also increased, with ARVN accounting for 127 and FWMAF for 21 for a total of 148. Enemy incoming rounds declined during the reporting period by 186 to a total of 432. This is the second lowest total of incoming rounds reported since the week of 9 August when a total of 349 rounds were registered. The exception is the week of 25 October when there were 333 incoming rounds. The number of Hoi Chanhs rose from 25 to 17 from last week’s total.

(c) 16 - 22 NOVEMBER 1969: Most indicators of enemy activity registered an increase last week. Incoming rounds for IC22 totaled 517, an increase of 105 rounds from last week. There was a decrease in KIA, however, with the total dropping by 63 to 1171. This is still the second highest number of KIA registered since the week ending 23 August 1969. Enemy initiated ground incidents showed a corresponding decline with a decrease of 34, down to 205 for the week. There was a sharp increase in the numbers of PW’s, up by 107 for a total of 255; ARVN forces accounted for 136 while FWMAF took 19. The total is the highest number of PW recorded since the week of 21 December 1968, when 312 were captured. A corresponding rise in the number of Hoi Chanhs was noticed as well, an increase of 163 for a new total of 287, the highest on record.

(d) 23 - 29 NOVEMBER 1969: There were significant reductions in most indicators of enemy activity during the past week. Incoming totaled 195 rounds, a sharp decline from the 537 reported last week; a new low total. The previous low was 196 rounds during the week ending 4 January 1969. The number of enemy initiated ground incidents followed the trend by dropping to 12, a decrease of 44 and the lowest number recorded since the week of 26 October 1968 when there were 190 recorded. The low level of activity continued to be reflected in the number of KIA, 349, less than one-half of last week’s total of 1171. Prisoner of war (PW) statistics experienced the greatest decline, dropping from 255 to 42 (24 by the FWMAF and 17 by the ARVN). The number of Hoi Chanhs continued to rise, however, with a new high of 293 established.

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increase totaling 577 for the week. The number of PW increased by 73 for a weekly total of 116. Ho Chi Minh declined for the first time in several weeks, down 50 for a total of 244. No significant change was reported in VC/VCI Counterintelligence related activities. Terrorist activity remained at a low level, consisting primarily of selective targeting designed to weaken/disrupt the pacification and security programs. Reports continue to reflect VC/VCI efforts in the collection of information on selected individuals for the purpose of creating various lists, such as persons to be assassinated, proselyted, sent to thought reform camps, etc. Implementation of the intended purpose of each list would probably be conducted simultaneously with intensified or large scale enemy military activity. Priority was to be given, but not limited to, village level personalities. It should not be discounted, that this effort may be at least one of the main objectives of any future enemy military activity.

(f) 7 - 13 DECEMBER 1969: There was no consistent trend established by indicators of enemy activity during the past week. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased by 60 for a total of 232, while enemy KIA also increased, up 139 for a new total of 716, the highest total in three weeks. Other indicators registered declines, with total incoming at 284, down 156 from last week. The number of PW dropped to 71, a decrease of 45, and Ho Chi Minh were at the lowest level since the week ending 18 November, with 15, a drop of 64. VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities of the past week continue to reflect no significant change in policy or tactics. Terrorist activity remained at essentially the same level as the previous week and continued to be exerted primarily at disruption of village and hamlet level pacification and security assets.

(g) 14 - 20 DECEMBER 1969: Indicators of enemy activity declined sharply last week, reflecting the generally quiet conditions which prevailed over IOZI. There were 124 enemy initiated incidents, the lowest one-week total recorded by TOZI since January of 1967. Enemy KIA were down to 494, a decrease of 222 from last week. There was a total of 62 PW taken (seven KIA and 55 VC), nine less than last week. Ho Chi Minh also decreased from 181 to 113, a drop of 68. VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities followed the pattern of the past several weeks. Reported enemy terrorist activity dropped to an extremely low level from the moderately low levels of the previous weeks. Emphasis on food collection and soliciting of political, financial, material and physical support from the people continues to occupy most of the VC/VCI cadre's time. Reports continue to indicate enemy efforts to solicit popular participation for a general uprising in conjunction with a planned large scale, all out offensive. Other reports continue to reflect efforts toward long-range goals and preparation for a prolonged struggle. While the latter of these two indicators is more consistent with enemy capabilities, too many captured documents, rallies, PW and source reports reflect enemy intentions of a large scale offensive, for it not to have some degree of validity. In the event such an effort failed, the enemy would then most likely pursue the alternate course of a protracted struggle in conjunction with a so-called people's guerrilla war.
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(h) 21 - 27 DECEMBER 1969: Despite the cease fires observed by both friendly and enemy forces during the Christmas period, there was an increase in the number of enemy initiated incidents. One hundred and fifty-six were reported, an increase of 32 over last week. Enemy casualties increased as well, with 699 KIA, an increase of 205. There was also an increase in the number of KV captured; there were 97 (11 NVA and 86 VC), an increase of 35. Other indicators of enemy activity declined during the period. Incoming rounds totaled 117, a decrease of 53. Hoi Chanhs also declined again, with only 67 being reported, a decrease of 46. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities continued the same policy and tactics of the past several weeks. No change in the scope or intensity of activities, including terrorism, was discernible.

(1) 28 DECEMBER - 3 JANUARY 1970: Several indicators of enemy activity declined during the past week, reflecting the relatively low level of action recorded early in the reporting period. Enemy casualties totaled 637. Only 20 KV were captured, a decrease of 77 from last week (eight were taken by ARVN forces and 12 by US). The number of Hoi Chanhs increased, however, with 132 rallying. This is an increase of 55 over the previous week. The gradual rise in enemy activity later in the week aided in raising the total number of incoming rounds to 259, an increase of 162. There were 183 enemy initiated contacts recorded, up 27 from last week. These totals do not include the series of actions which occurred early on 4 January. VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities reflect an intensification of propaganda proselytizing tactics in preparation for what the enemy calls the "people's general offensive and uprising phase" of the Winter-Spring Offensive. Simultaneously, long range plans for a protracted struggle continue. Reported terrorist activity remained at a low level and consisted primarily of civilian deaths and injuries resulting from indiscriminate enemy placement of mines and booby traps.

(1) 4 - 10 JANUARY 1970: Indications of enemy activity showed a sharp increase over the past week's activity. There were 205 enemy initiated incidents, an increase of 22 from last week's 183. Enemy KIA rose sharply to 940 from last week's 637. Incoming showed the greatest increase, 1140 rounds, an increase of 581 from last week's 559, while US casualties rose from 38 to 119. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities of the past week reflect emphasis on employing techniques to gain the allegiance and loyalties of the South Vietnamese. In this regard, high priority is being placed on the expansion of women's, youth's, and farmer's-front associations through concerted recruiting and proselytizing programs. Simultaneously, large scale efforts appear to be underway to obtain legal documentation and status for enemy cadre by such means as false rallying and attempted bribing or coercing of civil servants. Such efforts are designed to infiltrate selected areas into GVN controlled areas and agencies in order to perpetrate the political struggle from within. For the three days of the current week (11 through 13 Jan) there have been 122 incoming rounds resulting in 27 friendly KIA and 375 WIA.

(k) 11 - 17 JANUARY 1970: After the brief upsurge of action reported last week, all indications of enemy initiated activity declined during the reporting period. The number of KIA was down to 415, a decrease of 168. Enemy initiated activity dropped off 75 from last week for a total of 201 incidents. There were
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AVOA 200-33-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 January 1970, ETS 0105X-63 (Cl)

299 rounds of incoming enemy ordnance reported, a decrease of 390. The number of FM also declined. Twenty-one were taken, 42 less than last week. Ho Chi Chans totaled 112, a decrease of 52. VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities of the past week continued to reflect emphasis on gaining popular support and participation for an enemy planned country-wide political and military offensive, through coerced propaganda and proselytizing efforts. Civilian deaths and injuries resulting from terrorist related activities declined sharply from the previous week, returning to a relatively low level. Assassinations and abductions continued at an extremely low level.

(1) 18 - 24 JANUARY 1970: Enemy activity continued to decrease last week, following the trend of the previous reporting period, and enemy initiated incidents declined slightly, down eight for a total of 193. Incoming enemy ordnance dropped sharply from 299 to 166, a decrease of 133 rounds. The number of KIA declined as well, down 222 for a weekly total of 599. There was a slight increase in the number of FM taken, with 38 reported (five NVA and 33 VC), up 17 from last week. The number of Ho Chi Chans also rose, with 23 more rallying than last week, for a total of 112. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the reporting period reflected no discernible change in tactics from the previous week. The main enemy objectives continue to be direct at the SVN pacification program and the US Vietnamization of the war strategy.

(a) 25 - 31 JANUARY 1970: Most indicators of enemy activity increased in I Corps last week, signaling the start of what is probably the first, or pre-TET, phase of the expected enemy offensive. Enemy initiated ground incidents rose slightly to 202, an increase of nine from the previous week. There was a sharp rise in the amount of incoming enemy ordnance, with 426 rounds recorded, an increase of 256. The number of KIA was also substantially increased with 879 reported, an increase of 288. A corresponding rise in the number of FM was also recorded, 64 were captured (23 NVA and 33 VC), 25 more than last week. The total number of Ho Chi Chans declined, 111 rallied, a decrease of 26 from the previous reporting period. Reported VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities of the past week reflected the continuation of enemy efforts on obtaining the support and political allegiance of large segments of the populace through propaganda and military proselytizing activities in conjunction with the resumed upcoming military offensive during TET 1970. No reports of enemy espionage or espionage related incidents were received during this week. Enemy sabotage and/or sabotage related incidents increased from one in the previous week to two, and consisted of the destruction of a US Navy FSB docked at the Headquarters, 2nd Combined Action Group, Ho Chi Minh City, Quang Nam Province on 24 January; and wiring of the Be Ran Bridge, located on Highways 1-1/2 vicinity (5T 10251), approximately eight kilometers southeast of Dien Ban City on 1 February. Approximately 13 feet of the bridge was destroyed by three unknown type explosions (believed to be C-4) resulting in the bridge being closed to traffic. Enemy political and propaganda related activities continued at the same level and reflected essentially no change from policy and tactics of the previous week. The South Vietnamese Government continues to be the main target of the enemy’s propaganda activities in an attempt to discredit

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the GVN and gain the support of the people through which the enemy hopes to accomplish his two main objectives - to counter the GVN pacification Program and to disrupt the US "Vietnamization" war strategy. Enemy terrorism showed a moderate increase during this week. Civilian casualties, killed and wounded, increased from a total of 41 to 70. Included in the total were four assassinations, all of which were hamlet/village officials. Of possible significance is the fact that three of these assassinations have occurred during the period 26-30 January. This may indicate that the enemy has started his intensification of terrorism which generally precedes any TET offensive. In conjunction with an increase in terrorist activity, an increase in civilian abduction will most probably take place.

c. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, PETROLEUM.

(1) PETROLEUM FACILITIES: During the months of November, December, and January petroleum activities were concerned chiefly with maintenance of facilities and equipment. The pipeline from Tan My to Quang Tri was active. The take-off line at Camp Evans supplied all JP4 for the FOL supply point at Camp Evans. The burial of the pipeline between Tan My and Hue was postponed due to extremely wet weather. This project is expected to resume in February. The US Army assumed operation of the barges/transfer point at Cua Viet previously operated by the USMC; and, this required an additional barge, US Army, model M-316 to be transferred from the Saigon area to Cua Viet to provide additional receiving capability from the NSA coastal tankers. The fuel storage site at Dong Ha closed but, a small retail supply point was established and operated by the US Army for support of the 108th Artillery Group. Coastal shipments of bulk fuels were hampered by heavy seas. Sealines at Cua Viet, Tan My, Chu Lai, and Sa Ranh were frequently damaged and had to await calm weather before repairs could be completed.

(2) MULTI-FUEL OPERATION: Preparations to allow multi-fuel operation of the pipeline were accomplished. Initially, the product in a storage tank at Quang Tri had to be changed; however, upon refilling this tank numerous leaks developed. The tank was emptied and epoxy sealant was applied to interior seams to effect its repair. All preparations were completed during January 1970; but, multi-fuel operations are being delayed due to an expected increase in enemy activities during "TET"- early February 1970.

(3) BULK PETROLEUM: Total bulk petroleum issued for this period was 21,890,000 gallons. Of this amount, 3,460,000 gallons were pumped through the pipeline. The remaining 18,430,000 gallons were line-hauled by 5,500 gallon tanker trucks. The total tonnage of package products issued was 1,652 short tons. Fuel losses occurring during pipeline operations were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GALLONS</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
<th>PIPELINE OPERATIONS</th>
<th>MECHANICAL FAILURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>92,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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A large portion of the mechanical failure losses was caused by unlocated leaks on buried portions of the pipeline. A leak detector, model 200-L, manufactured by Metrotich has been provided to aid in locating buried leaks. This device arrived on 1 February and has not yet been used.

c. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, AMMUNITION:

(1) CLASS V ACTIVITY: During this reporting period, total on hand stocks averaged 28,323 S/Tons against a stockage objective of 31,700 S/Tons. Stockage level at the close of this reporting period was 33,278 S/Tons. Total receipts during this period were 78,673 S/Tons while issues of 76,413 S/Tons were experienced. The relatively low average balance on hand as compared with the stockage objective (SO) was due to a consistent downward trend in stockage, from a level in excess to SO on 1 November, to a low of 21,985 S/Tons on 22 December, approximately 1400 S/Tons below the management level. This trend reversed itself and continued to improve throughout the remainder of December and January. This downward trend was due to the dedication of significant quantities of available lighterage to the remaining retrograde requirements of Keystone Cardinal in early November and the disruption of deep draft discharge and coastal operations due to the monsoon season. Since Da Nang lacks a protected harbor, deep draft vessels carrying Class V cargo cannot be worked effectively in bad weather. On 15 December there were seven deep draft vessels awaiting discharge of Class V cargo. Because of the backlog of Class V vessels at Da Nang, three deep draft vessels with Army Class V aboard were diverted to other ports with the cargo to be subsequently shipped to ICM by LST from Qui Nhon and Can Ranh Bay. As the monsoons subsided in late December and January, much improvement was made in the stockage picture within ICM. Deep draft operations were stopped or significantly hampered 12 days in November, 15 days in December and only four days in January.

(2) CLASS V FACILITIES: Class V supply facilities, (Table 1 shows the breakdown of Class V supply facilities in ICM). There are a total of three ammunition companies organized under TCF 9-17 assigned to the 328th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) as reported in the previous RRL. The overall storage capacity in ICM increased from 33,600 S/Tons to 39,450 S/Tons due to the assimilation of the USMC portion of ASP 101 at Quang Tri. These facilities were transferred to Army control on 13 November upon the redeployment of the last of the USMC elements under Keystone Cardinal. The Army Class V capacity of ASP 101 at Quang Tri increased from 5200 S/Tons to 11,000 S/Tons. In conjunction with the turnover of the remainder of the ASP, approximately 1,650 S/Tons of Class V stocks were turned over to Army control from assets with repayment in kind to the USMC scheduled in Da Nang. This eliminated the need for the USMC to retrograde these assets from Quang Tri to Da Nang at the same time the Army was moving similar items north to Quang Tri.
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CLASS V STORAGE FACILITIES IN ICTZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TYPE STORAGE</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASP 101 Quang Tri</td>
<td>Modular</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>571st Ord Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP 102 Camp Evans</td>
<td>Modular</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>571st Ord Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP 103 Phu Bai</td>
<td>Pad</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>571st Ord Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP 105 Chu Lai</td>
<td>Pad</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>571st Ord Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP 106 Duc Pho</td>
<td>Modular</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>661st Ord Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP 107 Da Nang</td>
<td>Modular &amp; Hillside</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>40th Ord Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPS TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 1)

3. CLASS V OPERATIONS:

(a) There were three major revisions in the stockage objective (SO) during this reporting period. Stockage objectives are revised monthly to assure that all changes in weapons density and usage rates are reflected in actual SO as expeditiously as possible.

1. November Stockage Objective - 30,198 S/Tons

(b) Retrograde of Class V ammunition and components resulted in a total of 704 S/Tons being retrograded against a total objective of 350 for this reporting period. This is broken down by month as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SEX.</th>
<th>ORI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>167 S/Tons</td>
<td>100 S/Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>389 S/Tons</td>
<td>100 S/Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>142 S/Tons</td>
<td>150 S/Tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The retrograde objective was increased from 100 S/Tons to 150 S/Tons for Class V during the month of January.

(c) Total suspended ammunition on hand at the end of the period was 580 S/Tons or 7.15 percent of the total stocks on hand.

4. DAILY CLASS V ISSUES: Average Daily Issues of Intensively Managed Items (IMI) for this reporting period by ASP is as follows:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM</th>
<th>DNG</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>QT</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>DP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A071</td>
<td>34833</td>
<td>16923</td>
<td>45212</td>
<td>22673</td>
<td>68867</td>
<td>29834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A165</td>
<td>7731</td>
<td>6824</td>
<td>27956</td>
<td>13220</td>
<td>28423</td>
<td>15621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A131</td>
<td>6192</td>
<td>9171</td>
<td>21922</td>
<td>15526</td>
<td>29422</td>
<td>20096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A537</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>3603</td>
<td>16670</td>
<td>15066</td>
<td>20096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D568</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>2224</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D572</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C256</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C485</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>1383</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>1493</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C146</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D572</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>D910</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D546</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D540</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D541</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D572</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D661</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D680</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D575</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D576</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C681</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>503</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C690</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C312</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D315</td>
<td>4/</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1694</td>
<td>2483</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D326</td>
<td>7/</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D375</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The usage for D592 was computed starting 9337 due to zero usage in month of November. The usage for D592, D576 and D675 at Dac Pho was computed from 9337 due to zero usage in the month of November.

(6) SHERIDAN, ARMY: the General Sheridan, ARMY (Armored Reconnaissance Armored Assault Vehicle), M551, was added to the weapons inventory in ICZP. On 13 November, issues to the Americal Division commenced. A total of six armored cavalry troops received the Sheridan for a total of 36 weapons systems. On 25 January 1970, issues commenced to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). A total of four armored cavalry troops are to receive the Sheridan for a total 36 weapons systems. The Corps Class V problem in conjunction with the issuance of this system was the suspension of all lots of D591 (142mm HEAT-AP). Adequate stocks of substitute items were not available in ICZP to support the planned training requirement for armored Division that resulted in their training requirement being reduced by approximately one-half. D591 remained suspended until 18
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January. Fortunately, the resupply rates for this item are small which minimizes the problem caused by the suspension and resultant shortage of 152mm ammunition.

e. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, MAINTENANCE:

(1) COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS:

(a) AN/PPS-6 Radars: The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) accepted Marine AN/PPS-6 radar sets without first checking the serviceability of the sets. The sets received a technical inspection and the required parts were requisitioned. Some of the sets were job ordered to the 578th Light Equipment Maintenance Company. Both the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 578th Light Equipment Maintenance Company are still in the process of bringing the sets up to an operationally ready condition.

(b) AN/PPS-5 Radars: The non-operational rate of AN/PPS-5 radars decreased substantially in January due to increased availability of repair parts such as commutators, klystrons, and modulators.

(2) ENGINEER EQUIPMENT:

(a) Engineer Construction Equipment: High non-operational rates were experienced by Allis-Chalmers 645M scoop loaders primarily due to brake failure. The brakes failed after having been operated in deep monsoon mud for extended periods. No replacements were available. A program was initiated to establish and fill Prescribed Load Lists (PLL) and Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL) for this item. The operational rate of D7E crawler tractors improved due to the prepositioning of major assemblies such as engines and turbodrivers. Receipt of engines and clutches from CONUS for road graders has significantly improved the operational rate of this item of equipment.

(b) Commercial Forklifts: The monthly non-operational rate for commercial forklifts is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>15.3</th>
<th>3.0</th>
<th>18.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Repair parts have been a problem for the various makes and models of this equipment. Lack of maintenance training on the equipment also has added to the non-operational rate. In the future, most of the maintenance performed on commercial forklifts will be performed by Faller-Ford.

(c) Rough Terrain Forklifts: The monthly non-operational rate of rough
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terrain forklifts is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7. KNS</th>
<th>7. NORM</th>
<th>7. NDR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Engine and brake failures have accounted for most of the non-operational rate of rough terrain forklifts. Requisitions for these items have been passed out-of-country resulting in equipment remaining deadlined for long periods of time. Engines have been sent to Vinme and Philco-Ford for rebuild and return.

(3) FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY:

(a) M607/M110 Phase II Modification: The total number of M607/M110 weapons in this command subject to Phase II Modification is 32. As of 1 January, all 32 weapons have had the modification performed on them.

(b) M607/M110 R&R Program: The M607/M110 Repair and Return (R&R) Program continued throughout the quarter. To date, 45 weapons have been through the R&R Program out of 52, which are subject to it. Four weapons which had been through the program were replaced this quarter. Two weapons which had been issued earlier went through R&R for the first time.

(c) Combat Tracked Vehicles: The non-operational rate for combat tracked vehicles (M8A3 and M3A1) improved slightly over the last quarter due primarily to a Direct Exchange Program for major assemblies such as engines, transmissions, transfer, and final drives.

(d) M551 Sheridan: On 3 November, M551 AR/A7 Sheridan vehicles were introduced into ICFR. The receipt, issue, and support of the vehicles required intensive coordination among ACOs, Maintenance, Supply, Transportation, Ammunition, and 1st Logistics Command. The supporting Direct Support Units sent mechanics to Long Binh for school and practical training on the vehicle. The New Equipment Trainer Test arrived at the receiving units at the same time that the vehicles and organizational and crew installed items arrived. The PIL, ASL, and test sets, special tools and technical manuals were shipped as push packages. However, due to country-wide shortages of the above items, the units did not receive a complete fill. The units were urged to inventory what they received and requisition what they needed. Throughout the reporting period, shortages of some repair parts such as recoil seats, air compressors, and motor generators remained a problem.

(4) AUTOMOTIVE: Tire-Recapping: The tire-recapping program continues to progress well. Production has increased substantially during the last three
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months. Recap production is now up to 4900 tires per month and Philco-Ford expects to average 5,000 tires per month in the future. This increase is due to the receipt of more equipment and the employment of double shifts. The Army is now receiving a larger proportion of the production. As of 31 January the Army has received a total of 10,902 tires.

f. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, SUPPLY:

(1) MILGAI BLACK BARREL/CHROME BARREL EXCHANGE PROGRAM: This program has met with continued success, and 1573 rifles have been exchanged. Because black barrel rifles are no longer present in the Quang Tri area, plans were initiated to transfer operations from there to Da Nang. This will allow rapid completion of the exchange program. The Quang Tri Direct Exchange (DX) point is operated by the 625th Supply and Service Company; the one at Phu Bai by the 148th Supply and Service Company; and the one to be established in Da Nang during February 1970 will be at the 85th Maintenance Company.

(2) PROJECT ORANGE BALL: Project Orange Ball is a system wherein batteries are kept in refrigerated storage and distributed with Class I perishable supplies. This project has been hampered by the lack of refrigerated storage facilities at the US Army Field Depot. A serious problem has been caused by units requesting batteries on a large scale, irregular basis, rather than on a 2-3 at a time draw, along with their Class I rations. In some instances, issues of batteries had to be rushed north to support tactical operations. To alleviate this situation, our supply and service units are recomputing their Requisitioning Objectives.

(3) RED BALL: The Red Ball Express and Red Ball Expanded Programs have been closely monitored to insure success. An analysis of the part leads of each deadlined piece has been initiated to ascertain possible ways to expedite handling of the Red Ball requisition. This has begun to reduce the overall percentage of items deadlined for lack of repair parts (NORS). Further, the results indicate that bad stock numbers and invalid document numbers contribute to extended NORS status.

(4) PROJECT COUNT ALWAYS: The US Army Field Depot, Da Nang completed the first complete cyclic inventory under this project on 20 November. The program resulted in Inventory Adjustment Reports of $3,166,736.71 worth of overages, and $6,208,783.22 worth of shortages. Location accuracy has risen to 93 percent. At a conference held on 14 December at the Long Binh USAF, it was revealed that the Da Nang US Army Field Depot was the only depot to complete Project Count Always in the prescribed time period.

(5) GARRISON MESS EQUIPMENT: Prior to 14 October 1969, garrison mess hall equipment was controlled by the USAF. A composite list of requirements submitted by the 80th and 26th General Support Groups was furnished the USAF for release. However, few releases were realized. Now, garrison mess hall equipment items

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AREA: LNS-30-MH


are to be requisitioned through normal supply channels as authorized by USARV Reg 30-10, dtd January 1969. Commanders and Food Advisors were informed to insure that garrison mess equipment is requisitioned as authorized. An increased amount of cantonment mess equipment is expected in IGZ under the new system.

(6) USE OF REFRIGERATED SEA-LAND VANS: In August, through-put of Sea-Land refrigerated vans from Da Nang to Phu Bai was initiated. This concept of operation proved highly successful and warranted further expansion of the use of Sea-Land Vans. In order to further increase the efficiency of resupply, as well as insure that chill and freeze items arrive at destination in top quality, an Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) was negotiated between the US Army and the US Navy that will allow refrigerated vans to be restuffed in Da Nang for over the road hauls to Class I supply points. Refrigerated van delivery is far superior to either refrigerated lorry or air freight delivery methods. In addition to chill and freeze subsistance items, dairy products produced in Da Nang will be delivered to Phu Bai and Quang Tri in refrigerated vans. Savings realized in reduced condemnation losses will more than offset the added cost of utilizing Sea-Land Vans.

(7) QUANG TRI CLASS I POINT: In November, the 26th General Support Group was tasked with taking over, from the USMC, the mission of providing Class I support to all Free World Military Assistance Forces from Camp Evans north to the DMZ. The over, per joint inventory, took place on 16 November. For security reasons, the Class I yard was then moved from Dong Ha to Quang Tri. This move took place over a two month period. First, the nonperishable rations were moved, followed by refrigerated rations. Storage space, both refrigerated and covered, is adequate to accomplish the present mission.

(8) BAKERY ACTIVITY: Receipt of new bakery equipment at the Phu Bai bakery has alleviated the problem of deadlined equipment that was prevalent during the previous reporting period. A new mixer make-up trailer was received in December. Upon arrival, the new make-up trailer was serviced and placed in the bakery.

(9) REPORTS OF SURVEY, CASUALTIES, AND QUANTITATIVE REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL LOSSES:

(a) To alleviate the problem of improperly prepared reports that have to be returned for corrections, an appropriately named team was sent to each battalion in the Support Command to present classes in proper preparation of reports. These classes have helped in obtaining properly prepared reports both in terms of technical points and evidence.

(b) This staff acted on 60 Reports of Survey during the reporting period. Total loss to the government was $289,486.62. Four individuals were found personally liable for a total of $4,195.10. One request for reconsideration was granted, in the sum of $164.00.

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AVCA DRG-GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(c) One Combat Loss Report was approved for a sum of $7873.00.

(d) Forty-four Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved during the reporting period for a sum of $4,478.01.

8. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, TRANSPORTATION:

(1) WEATHER EFFECTS: During the month of November enemy action and monsoon rains forced the closing of route QL-1 south of Da Nang to Hill 63. Even though the enemy was repulsed within 24 hours, the monsoon rains caused the road to be closed for an additional 11 days. This necessitated the utilization of aircraft for the transporting of Claas 7. Monsoon rains in I Corps caused the rivers to rise, and consequently, on 24 November 1969, the An Loa bridge was washed out. A by-pass was opened to military traffic with size restrictions and one-way traffic. The bridge was repaired three days later. During the months of November and December, the monsoon rains and rough water conditions forced the closing of port operations in I Corps for a total of 16 days. There were shortages of supplies reported from the field as a result of the tie-up of ships.

(2) ENEMY ACTIVITY: There was only one enemy initiated incident against U.S.A.V.I.W.EM, PhG motor convoys. On 9 January 1970, a five ton tractor trailer combination detonated a mine near Chu Lai causing damage to the rear wheels of the tractor, but no injury to the driver.

(3) FERRY LANDING: The US Navy inactivated the Ferry Landing on the Song Han river near Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force on 11 January. The landing will not be used in future operations of the Port of Da Nang unless an escalation of the war effort occurred that would necessitate opening of the ramp for logistical support purposes.

(4) MOVEMENT CONTROL CENTER (MCC) ACTIVITIES: During the reporting period 1 November to 31 January, the MCC and its field offices have processed 6,896 Transportation Control and Movement Documents accounting for 63,481 short tons being moved through both air and water ports of I Corps.

b. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, RETROGRADE AND DISPOSAL:

(1) RETROGRADE TONNAGE: For the three month period ending 31 January, this command was assigned a retrograde quota of 8,000 short tons. The command shipped 7,000 short tons or 87.5 percent of the assigned quota. Receipts of material at the 63rd Collection, Classification and Salvage (CC&S) Company amounted to 7,371 short tons, and the unit presently has an inventory balance of 3,894 short tons.

(2) CC&S OPERATIONS: A major effort was made to improve the efficiency of operations at the 63rd CC&S Company. Initially, the yard was closed to receipt of major items during the period 26 December 1969 - 16 January 1970. During this
period, a concerted effort was made to reduce the backlog of major assemblies and components at the 633rd CGCS Company and simultaneously to effect a general clean-up of the operations area. With the help of a 27 man detail, the unit was able to effectively recognize the entire operation, resulting in increased efficiency in traffic flow and handling of material.

(3) RETROGRADE OF COMPONENTS OF MAJOR END ITEMS: In order to promote efficiency in retrograde of components of major end items, the 403rd Transportation Company was assigned the mission of receiving, processing and shipping repairable engines and transmissions generated by units north of the Hai Van Pass.

(4) NEW WASHPOINT AND STAGING AREA: In November, the 633rd CGCS Company was allocated real estate near the Deep Water Pier (ZWP) for use as a washpoint and staging area. Prior to the acquisition of this land, limited washing facilities were being used at the Bridge Ramp and at a roadside washpoint near the 633rd CGCS Company. The new washpoint allows the washing and limited staging of retrograde cargo nearer to the shipping point and in larger quantities than previously possible. The washpoint is not improved, but has good drainage and an adequate water supply. A work order has been submitted to hard surface and generally improve the area.

(5) PROPERTY DISPOSAL COMPANY: On 10 December, USAF/JC/CH, DNG General Order 4945 was published activating the Da Nang Property Disposal Company (Provisional) with a proposed ETA strength of 11 officers, one warrant officer, 145 enlisted men and 50 local nationals. This represents an unprecedented move to organize a Property Disposal Activity with a TOE or TDA type organization. At present, the Property Disposal Company has an assigned strength of two Department of Army civilians, one officer, 40 enlisted men and 19 local nationals. Meaning strength will be increased as equipment is made available.

(6) SALE OF USEABLE PROPERTY: Sales of useable property at Da Nang Property Disposal Activity during the reporting period amounted to $36,693.00. Some 4,607 short tons of scrap were sold during the same period for a return to the US Government of $10,728.00. Transfers under the MAPER program during the period amounted to $133,337.00, consisting mainly of H-series vehicles and service excess stocks received from Free World Forces supply activities.

(7) SCRAP YARDS: In December, the 80th and 26th General Support Groups (GSG) were directed to establish a PPO scrap yard in the Hu Sai area to service customer price in northern I Corps. On 3 January, personnel from this headquarters, the 80th CG and the PPO visited the 26th GSG to inspect the proposed site for the yard at the Ny Rang. The area allocated for the scrap yard is approximately 300 x 600 feet square, has good security and will require further improvement, except for construction of scrap bins. A 15,000 pound forklift to handle property being turned in has been authorized on a 180 day loan. Two men from the Da Nang Property Disposal Company will be attached to the 403rd Transportation Company to operate the scrap yard. Operations at this yard are expected to begin as soon as needed equipment can be obtained and bins constructed.
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(6) PROPERTY DISPOSAL OFFICE AREA: On 13 January, a work order was submitted to the 1st Logistical Command for major construction at the Da Nang FDO. This work order encompasses all construction required in conjunction with the planned expansion of the FDO into the area presently occupied by 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company and the 633rd CC&S Company. Included in the work order is 48,000 square feet of covered storage, approximately 50 acres of improved outdoor storage area, an extensive road network, and sufficient security facilities to include fencing and perimeter lighting.

1. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, SERVICES:

(1) LAUNDRY AND BATH SERVICES:

(a) Field Laundry: The Field Laundry Eidal Unit at Chu Lai was replaced with new equipment.

(b) Bath: The field bath point at Camp Evans has been closed due to a reduced demand. Two mobile bath units were turned in as unrepairable. During January, the 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) increased support requirements. Two bath units are now being used on a full-time basis. Six additional bath units have been placed on requisition by the 143th Supply and Service Company, a subordinate unit of the 26th General Support Group.

(2) REAL ESTATE: Allocation and Control: Two 83-man barracks located at Camp Gig Lock Naval Support Activity (NSA) have been approved for use by personnel of the Da Nang Support Command.

(3) BASE DEVELOPMENT:

(a) Project requests for dog kennel construction have been initiated in coordination with the Provost Marshal's requirements for base security in I Corps. Projects are now being processed through command channels for approval and cost estimation.

(b) USAV Project 207, consisting of two 40-man SOQ was completed and accepted for the 80th General Support Group.

(c) A request for operational support was made through the III Marine Amphibious Force Engineers for the construction and upgrading of the roads in the FDO Yard, 633rd CC&S Company, and 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (HEM) yards.

(4) MCA PROGRAM:

(a) Installation of security lighting for the US Army Field Depot and the 34th Supply and Service Battalion is in progress.
USARV Project 194 (Covered Storage), consisting of an 88,000 SF warehouse and 12,000 SF of vehicle and equipment parking area, was completed by RMK-BRJ Civilian Contractors, during the period and turned over to the US Army Field Depot, Da Nang.

(6) MORTUARY SERVICES: 1 January 1970 - ACofS, Services assumed staff responsibility for the Da Nang Mortuary and Graves Registration Service.

(7) CASUALTY COLLECTION: 1 January 1970 - ACofS, Services assumed staff responsibility for a graves registration detachment. This unit was formed by direction of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command to participate in Operation Compass. This detachment consists of one officer MOS 3140 and two enlisted men, MOS 57F40. The unit's mission is to determine the status of, or recover the remains of some 300 Americans listed as missing in I Corps. Accordingly, necessary arrangements for implementation have been made with the American Division and with the casualty agencies in I Corps. Actual search and recovery operations should commence in February.

ADJUTANT GENERAL:

(1) PROJECT FILL III: During the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, a concerted effort has been put forth to improve the command personnel posture in the area of malutilization of personnel. The Project Fill III objective is to reduce the number of enlisted personnel who are assigned duties in areas other than their PMOS. The ultimate goal is to reduce malutilization in the command to not more than 2 percent of assigned enlisted strength. In order to accomplish this goal, the AG (516th Personnel Service Company) conducts a detailed monthly review. A study of 7,069 EM assigned as of 30 November 1969 reflected 630 EM reportable as malutilized, or 8.9 percent. A study of 6,742 EM assigned as of 25 December 1969 reflected 581 or 8.62 percent, reportable as malutilized.

(2) 7TH PROGRAMMED INSTRUCTION COURSE: On 10 November, the Adjutant General Section initiated a pilot 7th Programmed Instruction Course designed to teach the skills necessary for good unit administration. The course met with excellent response and enthusiasm from both students and commanders concerned. The 7th Course proved to be a successful approach to increasing the qualification and skill levels of personnel.

(3) PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE TEAM: In December, the Personnel Assistance Team (PAT) was reorganized to better assist subordinate units. The team is designed to visit units in the field and help solve personnel problems ranging from accurate preparation of morning reports and strength accounting to the issuance of ID cards and review of records. Because of the widespread configuration of the command, it is felt that the PAT Team will serve a useful and necessary function. In this way, unit commanders will be able to discuss their problems freely, constructive suggestions can be exchanged, and on-the-spot corrections can be made.

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(4) PERSONNEL INFORMATION ROSTER: On 6 January, a letter was dispatched to Commanding Officers of selected subordinate units requesting that the company clerks of their units report to the 516th Personnel Services Company (PSC) for a complete records check. The check included: latest Personnel Information Roster, Personnel Data Cards (DA 1475), Reenlistment Cards (DA 1315), and unit orders and morning reports. The purpose of this comprehensive records check was to ensure that all records for each man are up-to-date, complete and accounted for. In most cases, the company clerk is the initial link in the chain of personnel actions, and normally prepares most of the correspondence dispatched to the PSC.

(5) CASUALTY REPORTING: Prompt reporting of casualties is another item of concern to the Adjutant General. Casualty reports must be submitted within ten hours after the casualty, and any information that is not initially available must be reported within 24 hours. The AG ensures that the casualty desk is operated 24 hours a day. Hospitalized personnel deemed seriously ill (SI) and very seriously ill (VSI) are also reported. During the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970, there were 17 casualties reported.

(6) ELIMINATION FROM SERVICE: During the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, 19 individuals were eliminated from the service under the provisions of AR 635-212. This represents a significant decrease from the previous quarter when 48 individuals were separated for unsuitability or unfitness.

(7) REENLISTMENT: During the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970 the US Army Support Command, Da Nang Reenlistment Office has sponsored an extensive program to acquaint unit commanders and reenlistment personnel with the most effective methods of carrying out their responsibilities to the reenlistment program. The following areas of responsibility have been emphasized:

(a) DA Form 1315 (Reenlistment Data Cards).

(b) Reenlistment Options.

(c) Commanders Responsibility.

(d) Primary Duty Career Counselors Responsibility.

(e) Additional Duty Reenlistment NCO's Responsibility.

The success of the reenlistment program is dependent upon effective leadership and vigorous command support at all levels. The training program that the TRACCON, Da Nang, Reenlistment Office has initiated should help in the retention of qualified personnel in the Regular Army and the elimination of individuals who have proven themselves to be marginal and ineffective. With the proper use of this information, the objectives set forth by higher commands could and should be accomplished within this command.

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(8) POSTAL OPERATIONS: The Adjutant General exercises operational control over each of the Army Postal Units, and he insured that they were well prepared for the Christmas mailing rush. Advance publicity insured that everyone was aware of the necessity for mailing early, and the postal facilities extended their normal working hours to accommodate the increased demand for services. The 42nd Army Postal Unit (APU), in particular, opened two additional windows to provide more responsive service. The field commanders relieved the Army Postal Units of additional duties, provided 2 1/2 trucks to haul the mail, and supplied the APU with Christmas Augmentees to do the bulk handling of mail. Although the volume of incoming mail did not reach that predicted, the additional men and material were necessary to carry out the mission of the unit. Between 26 December 1969 and 5 January 1970, there was a large backlog of mail due to severe CONUS snow storms, civil holidays; but the troops were informed through the daily bulletin (DB) and electrical messages that the incoming mail would be slow.

(9) POSTAL UNIT SECURITY: Physical Security of the Army Postal Units has been an item of continual interest to the Adjutant General and he has monitored progress in obtaining the necessary precautionary measures. At the 43rd APU, wire mesh was installed around the building for reinforcement, metal doors constructed and a functional alarm system installed. On 16 January, an unannounced test of the alarm system was conducted and the response of the 80th General Support Security Police to the alarm was outstanding. Security checks have been conducted by local investigative agencies (CID) and personnel have been informed of the necessity for protecting accountable funds and equipment. Although much work has been accomplished in the area of physical security, the program is still being closely monitored. With the help of the field commanders, physical security should continue to improve.

(10) ATHLETIC AND RECREATION (A&R) PROGRAM: On 14 January, a letter was published establishing guidelines for unit sports programs. This letter directed the property/detachment commanders to appoint a unit A&R Officer and A&R NCO. The A&R Officers and NCO's will be responsible for establishing a vigorous comprehensive unit sports program, constructing adequate facilities and requisitioning supplies. Coordination of the program for the entire command will be provided by the Special Services Sports NCO. A good sports program at the unit level should allow for maximum participation and should be aimed to accomplish the following objectives:

(a) Constructive utilization of free time.

(b) Development of morale and esprit de corps.

(c) Strengthening the lines of communication between officers, NCO's and enlisted men.

(d) Improving the level of physical fitness.

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k. **JUDGE ADVOCATE:**

1. **SUMMARY OF MILITARY JUSTICE ACTIVITIES:**
   
   - (a) Article 32 Investigations - 2.
   - (b) Special Courts-Martial - 52.
   - (c) Summary Courts-Martial - 0.
   - (d) Article 15's - 555.

2. **SUMMARY OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE:** 498

3. **SUMMARY OF CLAIMS ACTIVITIES:**
   
   - (a) Number of US Claims at beginning of period - 1.
   - (b) Number of US Claims filed - 47.
   - (c) Number of US Claims forwarded - 1.
   - (d) Number of US Claims paid - 46.
   - (e) Number of US Claims withdrawn - 0.
   - (f) Number of US Claims at end of period - 0.

2. **LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

a. **PERSONNEL:**

   (1) **Item: WECON Technician**

   - (a) Observation: WECON Field Maintenance Technicians (FMT) are assigned to Vietnam for 90 days.
   - (b) Evaluation: WECON FMT cover all IGTZ. By the time the FMT knows locations and people, he is usually halfway through with his tour.
   - (c) Recommendations: It is recommended that WECON FMT be assigned to Vietnam for a 12 month tour.

b. **INTELLIGENCE:**

   (1) **Item: Communications Security.**
AVCA DNO-GO-MH

(a) Observation: On 20 December 1969 an entire enemy communication intelligence team was captured together with their intercept equipment and voluminous intercepted voice messages and operating instructions.

(b) Evaluation: The captured material included over 200 pages of verbatim English transcripts of US Voice Transmissions, revealing the compromise of air assault locations, unit locations and tactical operations. Operational plans and critical locations were compromised through plain text disclosures and the use of locally produced "Point of origin" grid codes. The weakness of "point of origin" codes was shown vividly by the fact that the intercept operator was able to record the true six digit coordinates immediately upon receipt of the intercepted coded equivalent.

(c) Recommendations: That commanders periodically review their communication security practices in order to insure that proper communication discipline is followed and that approved codes are used.

c. OPERATIONS:

(1) Item: Property Disposal Operations:

(a) Observation: On 23 December 1969, contractor removal of scrap from the Da Nang and Chu Lai PDO activities was stopped because of the contractor's failure to pay for scrap already removed.

(b) Evaluation: On the surface, this situation appeared to have arisen because of contractor's inability to pay his bills. Upon investigation, however, it was determined that the underlying cause of the problem was a lack of communication between PDO and the Sales Contracting Officer (SCO). The SCO had not provided the PDO with information as to amount of property authorized for release to the contractor, and PDO was not providing timely information on removals to the SCO. DD Form 1427's (Notice of Award or Release) for the months of November and December were not received at PDO until December. These documents did not indicate whether the property had been paid for. When release documents were finally returned to the PDO with removals indicated thereon, it was discovered that the contractor did not have sufficient funds on deposit to cover the property already removed, nor did he have enough on deposit to cover removals for the succeeding month. On 23 January 1970, the contractor produced the necessary funds to cover past and future removals. In order to preclude the recurrence of this situation, several control measures were established. The PDO will forward daily reports on removals by the contractor to the SCO. The SCO will insure that the DD Form 1427's are amortized or stamped to reflect the fact that the property to be removed during the month has been paid for. Additionally, the PDO has been instructed not to release quantities in excess of those listed on the release document without prior approval of the SCO. Strict adherence to these procedures should prevent this situation from recurring. Close coordination between the SCO and PDO is mandatory.
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for the maintenance of an effective and smooth running sales program.

(c) Recommendation: None.

(2) Item: Difficulties in Keystone Cardinal.

(a) Observation: During Operation Keystone Cardinal, directives from higher headquarters and report formats that were established by Operations Plans were altered frequently by message or telephone, causing confusion and delayed reporting. Also, special reports were required for data that was already at higher headquarters, and could have been extracted there.

(b) Evaluation: Changes in directives and unnecessary special reports added to the difficulties of the project.

(c) Recommendation: In future Keystone Projects, required data should be extracted from the basic reports submitted through this headquarters. This can be done with the ADP equipment available at higher headquarters. Reporting formats should be standardized and adhered to throughout the project.

(3) Item: Reports Formats.

(a) Observation: The four commodity sections used different formats for the daily reporting of non-operational status of selected items.

(b) Evaluation: The formats used are the ones required at lst Logistical Command. However, Automotive reports and some Engineer reports did not contain enough detail for intensive management. Also, it was harder to cross-train personnel using four formats instead of one. A letter of implementing instructions was sent to subordinate units which directed the use of one format, basically the format of DA Form 2406 (Materiel Readiness Report), for the commodities of all sections.

(c) Recommendation: That one standard format be used for all four commodity sections.

d. ORGANIZATION: None

e. TRAINING: None.

f. LOGISTICS:

(1) Item: PLL for Bakery Equipment

(a) Observation: Bakery equipment, refrigerated 7½-ton vans and ice cream
plants are extremely important to the Class I support mission.  

(b) **Evaluation:** Frequently, items listed above are deadlined for parts that should be in the prescribed load list (PLL).

(c) **Recommendation:** That emphasis be placed on insuring that PLL's for the above listed equipment are requisitioned and maintained in accordance with applicable manuals.

(2) **Item: Major Item Data Agency (MIDA) Listings.**

(a) **Observation:** MIDA listings seldom are in consonance with actual weapons density within the command.

(b) **Evaluation:** Weapons density supported is the basis for which the stockage objective (SO) is computed. The weapons density is multiplied by the ammunition supply rate which in turn is multiplied by the number of days to be stocked to give a total SO. The ammunition supply rate is computed every six months and is based upon actual usage. Therefore, if the weapons density as shown on the MIDA listings is incorrect, the stockage objective will be incorrect. This is serious when the MIDA density is less than the actual density. An example is the M551, General Sherman vehicle for which the MIDA listing for ICTZ in January 1970 was 54 vehicles, while the stockage should have been based upon 90 vehicles. The only way this situation can be corrected is to increase the number of days of supply to be stocked for those items. This will insure adequate stocks are in fact on the command SO.

(c) **Recommendation:** Extract actual weapons density from the monthly World Wide Ammunition Requirements and Assets Report (RCS-CSGLD-1322 (R1)). In addition, projected increases in weapons densities should be considered in SO computations. Shortage in SO could cause serious problems in Class V resupply in a combat environment.

(g) **COMPATIBILITY:** None.

h. **MATERIAL:**

(1) **Item: Economy in Building Revetments.**

(a) **Observation:** When constructing bunkers or protective walls, the most time-consuming portion of construction is the filling and placing of sandbags. Sandbags are also the most expensive item used in bunker construction.

(b) **Evaluation:** When computing material costs for construction of bunkers or protective walls, the cost of sandbags is 66 percent of the total bunker cost. Sandbags deteriorate more quickly than any other material used in constructing the bunker or wall and require constant replacement. A corrugated metal, bin
AVCA DNG-GO-MI
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Type revetment filled with sand, lasts longer, costs less, and can be constructed more quickly than a sandbag revetment.

(c) Recommendation: That corrugated metal revetments, adequately braced with "V" pickets or 4 X 4s and filled with sand, be used instead of sandbags. A trapezoid shaped, bin type is the best shape for a protective wall. A well braced hollow wall filled with sand should be used for bunkers.

1. OTHER: None.

R. D. SMITH
COL. GS
Commanding}

2 - Commander In Chief, USARPAC,
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

3 - Commanding General, USARV
ATTN: AVHEC(DST)
APO 96375

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DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96364

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report – Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning WECOM technicians, page 23, paragraph 2a(1). Concur. The problem of the limited tour of WECOM technical personnel has been discussed with the WECOM Logistics Assistance Office – Vietnam. Recommend that higher headquarters consider extending the tour for these personnel to twelve months.

b. Reference item concerning communications security, page 23, paragraph 2b(1). Concur. This command continuously places emphasis on communication security.

c. Reference item concerning difficulties in Keystone Cardinal, page 25, paragraph 2c(2). Concur. Certain formats and reports were changed from previous operations to provide required management data to command levels. This data was not readily available from established reports, thus requiring data solicitation from each support command. Under Keystone Bluejay, requirements for statistical data can be satisfied from the Weekly Statistical Report generated from a computer program. This report, however, does not negate the possibility of special "one-time" reports which may be required from support commands.

d. Reference item concerning reports format, page 25, paragraph 2c(3). Concur. USARV letter, AVHGC-WB, dated 13 May 1969, subject: Status of Selected Vehicles (RCS AVHGD-29 (R)) established that DA Form 2406 will be used by all elements of the command for reporting of selected items. This includes the four major commodity areas.

e. Reference item concerning PLL for bakery equipment page 25, paragraph F(1). Concur. Emphasis on composition and maintenance of PLLs by commanders of the QM detachments involved is essential.

f. Reference item concerning major item data agency (MIDA) listings, page 26, paragraph 2r(2). Nonconcur. USARPAC Regulation 710-15, Appendix B, paragraph 10 requires weapon density information and brigade equivalent information be extracted from the official DA Weapons Density List published by Major Item Data Agency (MIDA). However, where a difference exists between the total reported weapons, and the total on ground weapons, this office distributes the MIDA Quantities in proportion to the weapons on the ground.
AVCA GO-MH (3 March 70) 1st Ind

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Da Nang for period ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

g. Reference item concerning economy in building revetments, page 26, paragraph
2h(1). Concur. Message, AVCA, HQs, USAV, 090230Z Jun 1969, Subject: Reduction
of Use of Sandbags, states that sandbags will only be used for constructing combat
essential tactical fortifications. Letter, AVCA EM-EN, this headquarters, 24 Sep
68, subject: Protective Structures, states that when new or replacement revetments
are constructed they will be of bin-type construction of lumber and corrugated
sheet metal and filled with sand or compacted earth.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

M. E. CLARK
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

TEL: LBN 4862

CF:
DA ACSFOR
USASUPCOM, DNG
AVHEC-DST (3 Mar 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 27 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DZ,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "WECON Technician", page 23, paragraph a1 and paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement: concur. Ideally WECON technicians should be assigned on PCS on the same basis as other military and civilian representatives. The problem apparently is one of recruiting civilian technicians for a full tour. Recommend that DA make a determined effort to recruit technicians for extended periods.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY
Maj
CPI, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cyburns:
1st Log Comd
US Army Support Command, Da Nang
GPOP-DT (3 Mar 70) 3d Ind (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 MAY 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

2. Paragraph 2, page 23, and 3d Indorsement by US ARV, has been extracted and will be forwarded to USAWECOM with the recommendation that consideration be given to extending the tour of technical assistance personnel to 12 months.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
M. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
mission

A. PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ALL UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AND PROVIDE BACKUP SUPPORT AS DIRECTED TO ASSIST OTHER 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND SUPPORT COMMAND.

B. COMMAND ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND UNITS IN ASSIGNED AREAS EXCEPT DESIGNATED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DETACHMENTS FOR WHICH HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND EXERCISES COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Da Nang

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, US Army Support Command, Da Nang

3 March 1970

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N/A

N/A

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