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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 13 FEB 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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214th Aviation Battalion

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 214TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96357

A\GC-IG 13 February 1970

SRA\JIICT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) Period ending 31 Jan 70, RCS G\SR -- 65 (R2) (U)

SUB\JECT: Commanding, General, USAVN, ATT\: AV\:AG (DC), APO 96357

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Description of Operations:

(1) The 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) supports the 7th and 9th
ARVN Divisions and the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Provinces with daily tactical and administrative airborne
support to include aerial observation and reconnaissance by fixed wing
aircraft.

(2) The 135th and 335th Aviation Companies (Assault Helicopter)
support the 7th ARVN Division along with a platoon from the 199th Aviation
Company (Utility Airplane). The two airborne companies provide a tactical
element of eight UH-1D/H troop transport helicopters, three CH-13/C armed
helicopters and one UH-1D/H command and control helicopter daily. In
addition, the 135th Aviation Company provides the Senior Advisor's command
and control helicopter and one Province DCS helicopter, while the 335th
Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) provides three Province DCS
helicopters.

(3) The 114th and 175th Aviation Companies (Assault Helicopter)
prior to 1 January 1970 provided aviation support to both the 9th ARVN
Division and the 44th Special Tactical Zone. On 1 January 1970, the 114th
Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) was placed OPCOM to TF Blackhawk
(7/1st Air Cavalry Squadron) and provides daily support to the 44th
Special Tactical Zone. The daily commitments are five UH-1D/H troop
transport helicopters, two AH-1G armed helicopters and one UH-1D/H
command and control helicopter along with a Night Hunter Team consist-}

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

The 214th Aviation Battalion, the Senior Advisor's command and control helicopter, and two DCS helicopters for Province use to the 9th ARVN Division. The 199th Aviation Company (Utility Airplane) provides one platoon to the 9th ARVN Division and one platoon to the 4th Special Tactical Zone.

b. Mission: To provide tactical and administrative aviation support to the 7th and 9th ARVN Divisions as directed by Senior Advisors, 7th and 9th SCATS and to provide administrative aviation support to Senior Province Advisors of An Giang, Sa Dec, Vinh Long, Kien Hoa, Go Cong, and Dinh Tuong Provinces as directed by DEPCORDS.

c. Change to Operations Concept: On 1 January 1970, the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was reorganized under the Task Force concept (Task Force Cougar) in order to provide dedicated support to the 7th and 9th ARVN Divisions and An Giang, Sa Dec, Vinh Long, Kien Hoa, Go Cong, and Dinh Tuong Provinces. Two Air Cavalry Troops from the 7/1st Air Cavalry Squadron; 2nd Detachment, 2nd Platoon, 221st Aviation Company; and 2nd Platoon, H Battery, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) were placed OPCO to the Task Force to provide the Divisions with a cross section of required support. AAE's were established at both Divisions to provide aviation management and planning assistance.

d. Organization:
1. There were no changes to the TOE of the organic units during this reporting period.
2. There were no changes in the organizational structure of the battalion during this period.

e. Personal Changes:
1. Commanding Officer - LTC Larry J. Baughman, IN, 512-24-5141.
4. S-2 - Capt Raymond Heilin, IN, 037-26-2519.
5. S-3 - Maj Leo A. Kramer, Jr., IN, 230-44-2701, replaced Maj Bobby R. Adams, IN, 254-58-6172, on 10 Jan 70.
6. S-4 - Capt Terry M. McClain, IN, 429-45-0373, replaced Capt George M. Edwards, FA, 229-56-2216, on 9 Dec 69.

f. Unit strength as of 31 January 1970:
1. The authorized strength of the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) is 127 commissioned officers, 209 warrant officers and 1054 enlisted men for a total authorized strength of 1390. A critical
shortage continues to exist in the areas of warrant officer aviators, helicopter technical inspectors, Battalion supply warrant officers, and Pathfinders. It is now considered more acute than it was three months ago.

(2) The Battalion is authorized:

(a) Military:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
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<td>HHC</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>99</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>186</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
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<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>288</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Include: 35 Australian E/W and 11 Officers
** Attached Units

(b) Civilian: The 214th Aviation Battalion is under the freeze imposed by USAFRV on hiring of Direct Hire and Program 6 personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PAC</th>
<th>VH</th>
<th>34 PATROL</th>
<th>CONTRACTOR</th>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>335th</td>
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<tr>
<td>75th</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned

13 Feb 70

G. (C) Administration:

(1) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hostile</th>
<th>Non-Hostile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lightly Wounded . . . . 13</td>
<td>Lightly Wounded . . . . 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGI . . . . . . . . . . . 0</td>
<td>WGI . . . . . . . . . . . 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA . . . . . . . . . . . 5</td>
<td>KIA . . . . . . . . . . . 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA . . . . . . . . . . . 0</td>
<td>WIA . . . . . . . . . . . 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) During this period the battalion had eighteen emergency leaves and no compassionate leaves.

(3) Two hundred and twelve enlisted personnel were promoted: eighty-eight to E-4, one hundred and fifteen to E-5, six to E-6, and three to E-7.

H. (C) Intelligence: Security - A total of 969 classified documents were processed by the S-2 section during the reporting period, of which 934 were Confidential and 15 were Secret. During the period there was one SOI compromise which was reported to higher headquarters and investigated.

I. (C) Operations and Training:

(1) HHC, and the 199th Aviation Company (Utility Airplane) were operational for 92 days of the reporting period. The remaining companies of the battalion were operational as follows:

(a) 114th Avn Co (AH) - 66 days. Six maintenance standdown days during the period.

(b) 135th Avn Co (AH) - 79 days. Thirteen maintenance standdown days during the period.

(c) 175th Avn Co (AH) - 88 days. Four maintenance standdown days during the period.

(d) 335th Avn Co (AH) - 80 days. Twelve maintenance standdown days during the period.

(2) Training: Training as required by USARV Regulation 350-1 is being conducted as the tactical situation allows. Range firing is conducted through coordination with post facilities at both Bearcat and Vinh Long.
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j. (c) Logistics:

(1) During the quarter, additional SPH/4 flight helmets were issued, which brought the 214th Aviation Battalion (CBT) up to 87% of its authorized allowance.

(2) On 24 November 1969, work began to shorten 11 revetments on ramp 1, Vinh Long AAF, so that the hover lane could be made wider. The hover lane is still below acceptable safety standards. A project for rebuilding ramp 1 has been approved and funded.

(3) On 3 January 1970, upgrading of mini-port facilities, and implementation of erosion control measures at Vinh Long AAF were begun. A rock foundation was laid, concrete pades poured, and the area prepared to receive a black top surface.

(4) A building to accommodate all POL pumping and filtering equipment at the mini-port area was erected in January.

(5) During the period 20-23 December 1969, 64,000 pounds of unserviceable ammunition was retrograded from the Delta Stage fields by the 214th Aviation Battalion. Retrograde points have been established for the orderly collection of any additional Class V material.

(6) Orientation programs and classes were conducted by personnel of the Battalion S-4, to familiarize unit supply personnel with basic policies and procedures and to insure prompt, timely and accurate supply reporting.

(7) Driver orientation classes and a driver testing program were initiated by the Battalion Motor Maintenance Officer for unit motor maintenance personnel.

k. (c) Aircraft Maintenance:

(1) Aircraft assigned as of 31 January 1970 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>UH1B</th>
<th>UH1C</th>
<th>UH1D</th>
<th>UH1H</th>
<th>A1H</th>
<th>O-1</th>
<th>USA</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>199th</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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13 Feb 70

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(2) Overall availability of assigned aircraft for the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>UH-1B</th>
<th>UH-1G</th>
<th>AH-1H</th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>O-1</th>
<th>UH-6A</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. (U) Safety:

(1) During the reporting period, the Battalion flew 31,953 hours as compared to 34,659 hours for the previous reporting period. Six accidents were experienced as compared to nine for the previous period. The accident rate for the period was 15.4, a drop of 10.5 from the previous period of 25.9.

(2) Maintenance and material failure were the primary causes for five accidents while pilot error caused the remaining accident. Pilot error cause factors were down by 75% from the previous quarter. This is due primarily to the command emphasis placed in this area coupled with an attempt to educate pilots in proper procedures. An increase in maintenance and material failures was experienced over this last reporting period. This is due primarily to a lack in experienced maintenance personnel and school trained technical inspectors. Dust was a problem in the wear of parts, in that the dry season began during this period. In order to upgrade maintenance quality control a maintenance test pilot standardization school was conducted by the Battalion Maintenance Officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
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<th>RATE</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12,776</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>13,779</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative rate for fiscal year 70 - 19.4

(3) A Vinh Long Post Safety Council was organized which consisted of all unit commanders and safety officers located on the airfield. Commanding Officer, 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) is the president. In addition to monthly meetings, roving safety patrols were conducted twice weekly in order to detect and correct safety hazards, potential hazards, and safety violations. The post safety council is a valuable accident prevention tool in that it allows discussion of mutual problems, coordination of corrective actions and a direct line for disseminating information.

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2. (c). Lessons Learned. Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

   a. (c) Personnel:

   (1) Shortage of school trained clerical personnel.

   (a) OBSERVATION: Personnel and operations reports as well as recurring unit reports were submitted late and were in many cases inaccurate.

   (b) EVALUATION: The Battalion Personnel Section and unit operations sections have been manned with a critically low number of school trained personnel and operation specialists. There was also a lack of experienced aggressive leadership. Subordinate units experienced similar problems in their clerical areas. Lack of competent personnel and insufficient emphasis on administrative details contributed largely to the problem.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: Efforts should be made to obtain more qualified personnel to staff unit administration and operations sections.

   (d) COMMAND ACTION: Personnel records have been screened and the best qualified personnel have been placed in positions in need of improvement; however, a critical shortage of administrative personnel still exists.

(2) Untrained Maintenance Personnel:

   (a) OBSERVATION: Personnel are assigned to crew chief slots with no prior maintenance experience on the OH-1 helicopter.

   (b) EVALUATION: The above situation required all maintenance to be performed by the Service Platoon. As a result of having to perform all organizational maintenance, the aircraft maintenance section was divided into scheduled and unscheduled maintenance crews. This action resulted in a decreased work capability of the scheduled maintenance crew and they were unable to keep up with the increased number of periodic inspections induced by the increased number of flying hours.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That the utilization of maintenance personnel be evaluated to determine if they are performing unnecessary unscheduled maintenance.

   (d) COMMAND ACTION: It was directed that the crew chief be given the responsibility for performing organizational maintenance. This concept no longer required a large unscheduled maintenance section. Personnel in the section were divided into three groups. In the first group, personnel were assigned to crew chief duties. These personnel had acquired maintenance experience on the OH-1 helicopter and had proven that...
they could work with a minimum of supervision. The second group were senior mechanics who remained as supervisors and instructors to assist in the transition. Finally, the remaining personnel were assigned to the scheduled maintenance section.

(3) Shortage of Morale Facilities at Vinh Long:

(a) OBSERVATION: A lack of morale facilities exists at Vinh Long Airfield.

(b) EVALUATION: A survey was conducted to determine what facilities were available on post for troop recreation. The survey revealed that facilities were inadequate and all but non-existent.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That post recreational facilities be evaluated to determine if they meet the requirements for officer and enlisted personnel.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Based on the survey, this battalion assisted, and in most cases, sponsored the following projects: Post theater, ice cream stand, construction of a swimming pool and the sponsoring of the post service club.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Use of Chaplain and Surgeon as intelligence agencies:

(a) OBSERVATION: It was observed that the Chaplain and Surgeon have close and direct contact with the Villagers. The Chaplain has local support because of his civic action programs and the Surgeon through the med-cap program.

(b) EVALUATION: In order for the VC to be successful, good relations with the local people must be maintained. Conversely, if we are to gather information pertaining to local enemy activity, we must gain the confidence and support of the people. Programs such as the civic action and med-cap programs afford a means of obtaining accurate and valuable intelligence information.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The Chaplain and Surgeon should be utilized as collection agencies for gathering intelligence information.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Daily contact has been made with the Surgeon and Chaplain concerning the actions of the villagers and the influx or depletion of people in an area which has proven a valuable source of information.

(2) Posting of O-1 SITREP:

(a) OBSERVATION: O-1 sightings when posted over a period of time produce trends of enemy activity.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned  
13 Feb 70

(b) EVALUATION: This process of posting these sightings enables both individual aviators and commanders to quickly grasp which areas are sensitive. This information when incorporated into ground gained intelligence has provided a complete picture upon which action could be taken.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all reconnaissance/surveillance type aviation units keep posted, recent and past records of their sightings, and make these available for the development of trends.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The 199th Aviation Company (Utility Airplane) has initiated this system.

O. (C) Operations:

(1) Coordination of Night Hunter Operations:

(a) OBSERVATION: Night Hunter Killer Airmobile Task Force Commanders have inadequate knowledge of friendly positions and enemy activity and affect poor coordination with their ARVH counterparts.

(b) EVALUATION: The Airmobile Task Force Commander's inability to react quickly in giving his aviation support element accurate information and clearance to engage targets leads to misuse of aviation resources and wasted effort by personnel involved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Airmobile Task Force Commanders conduct detailed planning prior to receipt of aviation units and brief the aircrews thoroughly before takeoff and establish better coordination between ARVH units and U.S. advisors concerning rules of engagement and clearances to fire.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Unsatisfactory mission reports have been sent to the 164th Aviation Group (Combat). This deficiency has been discussed with the Airmobile Task Force Commanders and has been included as a part of the Airmobile Task Force Commanders Orientation Course conducted by this Battalion.

(2) Night target engagement and operation of armed helicopters:

(a) OBSERVATION: AH-1G pilots are experiencing loss of visual reference to cockpit instruments during night target attacks. This is due to firing fixed weapon systems mounted on stub wings (XM1C, 2.75 FF AR).

(b) EVALUATION: Pilots are not taking full advantage of instrument lighting capabilities in the AH-1G.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders of AH-1G units place additional emphasis on night firing techniques and the use of instrument lights.
(d) Command Action: The 114th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) has conducted night training classes on instrument lighting procedures while conducting night attacks with the AH-1G helicopter.

(3) Use of sirens on gunships:

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of sirens on gunships during firing runs on enemy positions has proven to be effective due to its psychological effect.

(b) EVALUATION: One unit of this command experimented with the siren system while supporting the 9th ARVN Division. Reports from ground commanders indicated that the siren has a great psychological effect on the enemy. This condition affords a tactical advantage to the fire team and has on one occasion assisted in aiding a friendly unit that was ambushed by a Viet Cong element to break contact.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a siren be evaluated for use on the lead helicopter of armed helicopter flights.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: An EIR has been submitted to authorize the use of the siren.

(4) Use of OV-1 aircraft with operations:

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been observed that ground elements are not utilizing the OV-1 aircraft effectively to gather intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION: The 7th and 9th Divisions are not utilizing the OV-1 aircraft effectively to gather intelligence information. It appears that there lies a lack of information as to the capabilities of the aircraft and a belief that the availability of OV-1's is limited.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ground commanders make maximum utilization of OV-1 aircraft and that aviation elements brief ground commanders on the capability and availability of the aircraft.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This headquarters in conjunction with AAE's established at the two divisions has emphasized the importance of the OV-1 and explained the procedures for acquiring the aircraft on a mission basis and the capabilities of the OV-1.

(5) Caution while using SPH-4 helmets:

(a) OBSERVATION: Aviators were observed making take-offs to a hover without the throttle being completely rolled on resulting in a loss of engine and rotor RPM.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of the decrease in the noise level when we ring the new SPH-4 helmet, aviators are not able to hear
the engine operating level. In some cases, aviators were operating their aircraft with the low RPM circuit breaker out and not cross-checking instruments and throttle position before take off.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That aviators be directed to fly with the low RPM circuit breaker in and that command emphasis be placed on the importance of pre-take off checks.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Use of checklists is a matter of command interest on battalion inspections and 90 day standardization check rides. Emphasis has been placed on operating the aircraft with the low RPM circuit breaker in. Aircraft Commanders and pilots have been directed to call the before take off and landing check over the inter-communication system before each take off and landing.

(6) Use of the helmet visor:

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been observed that aircrew members are flying without using the helmet visor.

(b) EVALUATION: There has been an increase in the number of facial wounds received from shrapnel. In most cases the visor was not being utilized. Crewmembers have the tinted visor installed on their helmets and consequently are not able to use a visor at night.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the clear visor be installed on all helmets.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Emphasis has been placed on the use of the clear visor while flying. The requirement for using the clear visor at night is an item of command interest.

d. (U) Organization: None.

e. (U) Training: Instrument training:

(1) OBSERVATION: During the wet and dry seasons, aviators were encountering inadvertent instrument conditions in the IV Corps area.

(2) EVALUATION: Instrument conditions are encountered during the wet and dry seasons in the Delta due to such a high air moisture content or dust and smoke conditions. Aviators of this battalion, for the most part, are not instrument-rated and have little or no experience in flying under instrument conditions.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That an instrument training program be established in order to acquaint aviators with the procedures for flying under instrument conditions.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: An instrument training program was established within the battalion that requires aviators to perform two
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

hours of hooded flight and two instrument approaches per month. In addition, two instrument approaches and basic instrument procedures were included as part of the 90 day standardization check rides.

f. (C) Logistics:

   (1) Use of the hydraulic mule - FSN 4920-141-8801.

      (a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, the battalion had numerous hydraulic failures.

      (b) EVALUATION: By the use of a hydraulic mule, or test stand, to test hydraulic lines, pumps and actuators prior to aircraft maintenance operational checks (100) and test flights, many hydraulic deficiencies could be detected and failures prevented.

      (c) RECOMMENDATION: That airmobile units be authorized the test stand, FSN 4920-141-8801.

   (d) COMMAND ACTION: A letter has been submitted to 164th Aviation Group (Combat) recommending that the test stand be authorized for use in airmobile unit.

(2) Shortage of Supplies:

   (a) OBSERVATION: During the last quarter direct support units were unable to deliver requested class II and VII on a timely basis. Many items of self service supplies, i.e., mimeograph paper, stencils, soap, steel wool and scouring pads, were often issued on a rationed basis, and in most instances, in insufficient quantities. Average fill of requisitions was 25% for units at Vinh Long and 50% for Bearcat companies.

   (b) EVALUATION: Direct support units were unable to stockpile items at local distribution points in sufficient quantities to handle normal supply loads, due to two reported factors. The first being an inadequate stockage level at the Long Binh Depot, and secondly, poor transportation for delivery of gross quantities of supplies from the Long Binh Depot to local distribution points.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That a lateral transfer from the Cam Rahn Bay and Qui Nhon Depots to Long Binh Depot be effected. In addition, effect a more suitable transportation schedule for delivery of supplies from the Long Binh Depot to local distribution points.

   (d) COMMAND ACTIONS: Liaison with DSU Commanders with a view to improving supply posture was effected by Battalion S-4.

   (g) (C) Communications:

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(1) Installations of TSOC/KX-28 in 0-1 aircraft:

(a) OBSERVATION: The TSOC/KX-28 is installed in the 0-1 aircraft in such a manner that the set must be removed in order to key it.

(b) EVALUATION: The TSOC/KX-28 is installed behind the back seat in the cargo compartment, in a very confined area, accessible only by removing the back seat of the aircraft. In order to key the set, the KX-28 must be removed from the mount, keyed, re-installed to the mount, and then the back must be replaced. This is time consuming and cumbersome. If the set could be keyed without removing it from the mount, much time would be saved, and possible damage to the set due to frequent removal and installation could be eliminated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an AWO be published authorizing a small access panel to be placed on the left side of the fuselage (as in the battery compartment on the US) where the key for the KX-28 could be inserted in the set from the outside of the aircraft.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Action has been initiated by this headquarters to receive authority to modify the 0-1 aircraft to meet the above recommendation.

(2) Proper radio procedures:

(a) OBSERVATION: Proper radio procedures are not being used throughout the Battalion.

(b) EVALUATION: Aviators have a tendency to become lax in the use of proper radio procedures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all command units adhere to correct radio procedures to minimize air traffic.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Command emphasis has been placed on this deficiency. Frequencies are being monitored by the Battalion Signal Officer and the Battalion Operations Center with corrections being immediately effected.

(3) Teletype Communications:

(a) OBSERVATION: The existing Land-Line Teletype communications between Battalion Headquarters at Vinh Long and two subordinate units at Bearcat (a distance of 80 miles) are not responsive enough to adequately facilitate the expeditious conveyance of mission essential messages.

(b) EVALUATION: Present routing of messages from Vinh Long to Bearcat requires retransmission through six communication centers before the message is received by the companies. Handling times of normally precedentned messages are balloononed into an unacceptable length of time.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a direct radio teletype net be established between Battalion Headquarters at Vinh Long and the companies at Da Nang to facilitate the speedy transmission of messages.

(d) ORDERED ACTION: A teletype net was set up utilizing an AN/GRC-142 at Battalion Headquarters and an AN/VSC-2 at the company location. To date the net has not been operational due primarily to inoperative equipment, which has been turned into support maintenance. Utilizing borrowed equipment, and an ECM TECH REP, action is being taken to get the net operational as soon as possible.

h. (U) Material: None.

i. (U) Safety:

(1) Safety program:

(a) OBSERVATION: Individual unit safety programs do not cover all aspects of safety at Vinh Long Air that should be covered by some type of program.

(b) EVALUATION: Hazardous conditions exist where no particular unit or person can be charged with responsibility for correcting the hazard.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Representatives from each unit on the airfield should be organized into an airfield safety council effecting a safety program where all areas might be included.

(d) ORDERED ACTION:

1. By direction of the 164th Aviation Group Commander, an airfield safety program has been established.

2. Presently, a safety council of all unit commanders and safety officers with the 214th Aviation Battalion Commander as president, meets monthly.

3. An Airfield Pre-accident Plan has been prepared and a Ground Safety Plan has been submitted for approval of the Airfield Safety Council.

4. Roving safety patrols are conducted twice weekly in order to detect and correct safety hazards, potential hazards, and safety violations.

(2) Engine failures:

(a) OBSERVATION: Over the past quarter there have been reported engine failures causing four major accidents.
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(h) EVALUATION: Maintenance personnel must take extra care in ensuring that engines receive proper lubrication and areas around engines are kept clean to prevent excessive wear on bearings. Pilots must also make a thorough pre-flight and report hot starts.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. That pilots take extra caution in pre-flight inspections and insure all deficiencies are written up, especially hot starts. Maintenance supervisory personnel should insure all required inspections are completed on time. Further recommend emphasis be placed on engine area cleanliness and proper, timely lubrication of all parts with proper lubricant. Recommend additional inspections be required as necessary to insure cleanliness, and proper lubrication.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Command emphasis has been placed on the importance of pilot pre-flight and post-flight inspections. Close supervision of maintenance by experienced personnel is required. Crews are also required to perform additional inspections during stand-by time. All units have been directed to use protective covers on all aircraft during periods of inactivity.

2 Inc
1. Organization
2. Operational Report - wd. HQ, DA

LARRY J. RAUGHMAN
ITC, IN
Commanding

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AVBACE (13 Feb 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, ECS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, 164TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96215, 2 April 1970

TO: Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSFOR
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC-O, APO 96384

1. (U) The attached 214th CAB ORLL for the period ending 31 January 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (U) The following corrections are made to the report:
   a. (C) Para 1 k (1), page 5: Aircraft assigned as of 31 January 1970 is changed as follows:
      (1) The 114th AHC UH-1H aircraft on hand should be 6 rather than 7 as shown.
      (2) The 335th AHC UH-1H aircraft on hand should be 21 rather than 22 as shown.
   b. (C) Para 1 k (2), page 6: Overall availability of assigned aircraft for the reporting period is changed as follows:
      (1) Nov UH-1D should be 78% rather than 80% as shown.
      (2) Dec UH-1H should be 82% rather than 81% as shown.
      (3) Jan UH-1H should be 79% rather than 82% as shown.

3. (C) The following comments are made on the report:
   a. (U) Para 2 a (1), page 7: Concur.
   b. (C) Para 2 a (2), page 7: Concur with command action. It is true that many aircraft maintenance slots must be filled by inexperienced maintenance personnel. This situation exists in all battalions/squadrons throughout the group. However, it is not necessary or feasible to combine all echelons of maintenance due to this shortage of experienced personnel. The appropriate levels of aircraft maintenance responsibility must be adhered to. Additional supervision and guidance as well as a strict quality control program supervised by the aircraft maintenance officers will insure safe aircraft are available to complete the assigned missions.
   c. (C) Para 2 (3), page 8: Concur that attention must be continued on upgrading all morale and welfare facilities throughout the group. The initiation of new programs and facilities continues as well. During the period a post library was re-established. Nonconcur that facilities are non-existent. There are adequate officers and EM clubs and a service club as well as athletic
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AVBACE (13 Feb 70) 1st Ind 2 April 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

facilities. The post swimming pool has been relocated and reopened since
the report was rendered.

d. (C) Para 2 b (1), page 8: Nonconcur. Under no circumstances
should personnel associated with the Chaplaincy become involved in intel-
ligence gathering activities. Use of medical personnel operating in con-
junction with the Medical Civic Action program is appropriate. However,
an effective technique is the placement of trained intelligence personnel
in the MEDCAP party.

e. (C) Para 2 b (2), page 8: Concur. All units have integrated 0-1
sightings into an all source intelligence map.

f. (C) Para 2 c (1), page 9: Nonconcur. It is not felt that this
is a valid lesson learned. The task force concept provides an aviation
liaison officer at each division forward command post whose duties include
those mentioned in the recommendation.

g. (U) Para 2 c (2), page 9: Concur.

h. (C) Para 2 c (3), page 10: Nonconcur. Although the use of sirens
on gunships may have an initial psychological effect on the enemy forces,
such an advantage is certain to be temporary and would soon be relatively
ineffective.

i. (C) Para 2 c (4), page 10: Concur. Each incoming officer assigned
to the Delta Military Assistance Command in the grade of major or above is
now scheduled to attend the Command and Control orientation course presented
by the 164th Aviation Group. This is a four day course that includes a de-
tailed briefing of the OV-1 company and its capabilities to include a break-
down of the proper requesting channels.

j. (C) Para 2 c (5), page 10: Nonconcur. As stated, this is not a
valid lesson learned. A more closely supervised standardization program at
the Battalion level would insure that aircraft commanders operate the air-
craft with the low RPM circuit breaker in and check to insure that the
throttle is full open and operating RPM is correct before attempting take
off. The SPH-4 was designed to reduce the noise level but does not appear
to be a factor in this problem.

k. (U) Para 2 c (6), page 11: Concur with the command action. The
use of the clear visor is a requirement from the 1st Aviation Brigade.

l. (U) Para 2 e, page 11: Concur. Group policy requires all aviators
with the exception of those assigned to 0-1 and L0H positions to perform two
hours hooded flight and two instrument approaches per month. Additionally,
two instrument approaches and basic instrument procedures are required on the

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AVBACE (13 Feb 70) 1st Ind 2 April
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

90 day standardization fig. 1's.

m. (C) Para 2 f (1), page 12: Nonconcur. The Hydraulic Test Stand,
FSN 4920-141-880, is a component part of the shop set, aircraft maintenance,
airmobile, company size, direct support. The requested equipment is presently
authorized. The battalion has been advised of this authorization and the
correct requesting procedures.

n. (U) Para 2 f (2), page 12: Concur.

o. (C) Para 2 g (1), page 13: Concur. Further recommend that the
access panel be made large enough to allow for the insertion and removal
of the entire KY-28 rather than just the KYK-28 (key).

p. (U) Para 2 g (2), page 13: Although this is a continuing problem,
it is not a valid lesson learned.

q. (U) Para 2 g (3), page 13: Concur.

r. (U) Para 2 i (1), page 14: Concur. The safety program at Vinh
Long Airfield is progressing satisfactorily. See para 1 (3) of page 6.

s. (U) Para 2 i (2), page 14: Concur.

/S/ William J Maddox Jr.
WILLIAM J. MADDOX JR.
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

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DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96394 10 APR 1970

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIAGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96598

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents and indorsement except as noted below.

2. The following comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 1f, page 2, addresses the shortages of Warrant Officer Aviators, Technical Inspectors, and Pathfinders. The 164th Aviation Group (Combat) has an aggregate aviator posture of 93% of PRA. This strength is comparable with other units in the 1st Aviation Brigade. This command has a continuing problem with assignment of qualified helicopter technical inspectors. The 164th Aviation Group (Combat) shortages are common to all other 1st Aviation Brigade units. USAV is aware of this difficulty. The 109th Aviation Group (Combat) is authorized 27 pathfinders and has 20 assigned. This headquarters is directing the 164th Aviation Group (Combat) to review pathfinder assignments and ensure there is equitable distribution among the battalions.

   b. Paragraph 2a(1), page 7, addresses the low quality of clerical personnel. The 164th Group enjoys an excellent authorized/assigned ratio of clerical personnel. Unfortunately, the lack of highly qualified clerical personnel is prevalent throughout this command. Supervisors at all levels must become thoroughly knowledgeable of current regulations and directives and conduct an "on-the-job" training program for clerical personnel.

   c. Paragraph 2f(2), page 12, discusses shortages of supplies at Long Binh Depot. Nonconcur with the recommendations to effect lateral transfer from other in-country depots. United States Army Inventory Control Center Vietnam (USAICCV) is taking necessary supply action to obtain an adequate quantity of Self-Service Supply Center (SSSC) items for all depots in Vietnam. The Saigon Support Command is surveying SSSC facilities and is coordinating with 1st Logistical Command for release of depot assets to fill shortages at all locations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGC
Asst AG. 19
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AVHGC-DST (13 Feb 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Period Ending 31 Jan 70, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Untrained Maintenance Personnel", page 7, paragraph 2a(2), and paragraph 3b, 1st Indorsement: concur with the 1st Indorsement. Whenever possible, newly assigned, inexperienced mechanics should be assigned to a maintenance team. As soon as they obtain sufficient experience they may be assigned as crewchiefs.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of Helmet Visor", page 11, paragraph 2c(6), and paragraph 3k, 1st Indorsement: concur. The Safety Division, USARV Aviation, has requested USABAAR to evaluate the double visor kit for possible Army procurement. This would permit the use of either a clear or tinted visor, depending on the natural light environment.

   c. (U) Reference item concerning "Instrument Training", page 11, paragraph 2e, and paragraph 3l, 1st Indorsement: concur. USARV Supplement to AR 95-1 requires unit commanders to conduct an instrument training program for aviators under their command. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning "Installation of TSEC/KY-28 in O-1 Aircraft", page 13, paragraph 2g(1), and paragraph 3o, 1st Indorsement: concur. Recommend that this matter be addressed by AVSCOM.

   e. (U) Reference item concerning "Safety Program", page 14, paragraph 2l(1), and paragraph 3r, 1st Indorsement: concur. The requirement for the establishment of airfield safety councils within USARV will be outlined in the soon to be published USARV Supplement to AR 385-10.
AVSEC-DST (13 Feb 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (214th Aviation Battalion (Combat)) Period Ending 31 Jan 70, RCS CSFOR - 65 (RZ)(U)

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Engine Failures", page 14, paragraph 21(2), and paragraph 3s, 1st Indorsement: concur. Instructions concerning the proper procedures for cleaning aircraft turbine engines have been published on numerous occasions by the 34th General Support Group. Technical representatives from the 34th Group also provide on-the-scene assistance to requesting units. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Avn Bde
214th Avn Bn
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Inclosure 1 (C) Organizational Chart and troop list to 214th AB (CC) Operational Report
Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1970.

214th AB (CC)
Vinh Long

HHC
Vinh Long

114th AC (AH)
Vinh Long

135th AC (AH)
Bien Hoa

175th AC (AH)
Vinh Long

335th AC (AH)
Bien Hoa

199th AC (UA)
Vinh Long

* Attached Units.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 214th Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 214th Aviation Battalion

13 February 1970

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification