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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (5 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701072

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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AWDAH  

15 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM),  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General  
II Field Force  
ATTN: AVMF-RE-H  
APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. MISSION: During the reporting period the 1st Cav Div (AM) continued  
operations throughout the TAOI to interdict enemy infiltration routes through  
Toa Minh, Huoc Long, Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces in order to deny enemy  
access to the population center, and to neutralize enemy forces operating  
throughout the area. Division elements continued to support the GVN Pacification  
Program and conducted Long Tien operations with RVNAF forces operating  
within the Division TAOI.

b. GENERAL:  

(1) The November 1969 through January 1970 period saw continuation of  
the roles, missions, and functions of the last reporting period, but with an  
increase in combined ARVN-US operations. The success of interdiction operations  
caused the enemy to shift his infiltration routes. All available surveillance  
methods were then employed to locate new enemy LOC's. The Division also  
revived the concept of employing light, temporary fire support bases. These  
were designed to keep the enemy off balance by extending artillery covers and  
ground reconnaissance operations beyond that of permanent fire support.
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bases and to maximize the effects of surprise, shock action and air mobility. Infantry and artillery units conducted air assaults into these temporary fire bases without a follow-up heavy base construction kit commonly used. "Minimal infantry forces provide security, while the remainder of the infantry battalion conducts extensive ground reconnaissance and ambush operations designed to locate the enemy, develop the situation, and bring destructive fire power to bear upon the enemy. The temporary fire base is occupied for a short duration, normally three to seven days, depending on the enemy situation, and relies heavily on mobility for security. Construction is limited to clearing of gun positions, fields of fire and overhead cover, usually from natural materials.

(2) A continued build-up of intelligence culminated with an enemy offensive on the night of 3-4 November that consisted of attacks on most of the fire support bases (FSB) in the division's area of operations (AO). Significant ground attacks were launched against FSB Iko, FSB Buttons and FSB Ellen. Full details of this offensive are provided in paragraph 1, (2).

(3) The period 4-11 November saw an enemy offensive against the Bu Dop Special Forces Camp and the Bo Duc District Headquarters. This precipitated the reinforcement of the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area. On 7 November, C/1-5 Cav air assaulted into and opened FSB Jerri (70963222) 2 km south of Bo Duc. This was followed by a battery of 105mm howitzers, the 2d En, 3d Mobile Strike Force in the late afternoon, and the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion in the evening. One ACAV troop from the 2-11 ACR moved up QL14A to Bo Duc on 8 November. On 9 November, a second ACAV troop, F/2-11 ACR, began an airlift by C-130 to Bu Dop. Between 11 and 13 November additional US and MSF units and a composite (105mm-155mm) artillery battery moved into the area. From 8-11 November, FSB Jerri was the target of numerous indirect fire attacks and three ground attacks. The reinforcement of the Bu Dop-Bo Duc area brought to light an unusual command and

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control situation which may arise again during a combined operation involving RVNAP and US Forces. At the peak of reinforcement, forces in the area included two US armored cavalry troops from the 11th ACR; the 36th ARVN Ranger Bn; two battalions from the 3d Mobile Strike Force; 4th Bn, 9th ARVN Bn; and RF/FP and CIDG units together with one US airborne infantry battalion. Until the 5th ARVN Division was able to deploy sufficient forces and a command and control element, CO, 3d Bde, thru CO, 1-5 Cav controlled and coordinated not only the combat operations of all RVNAP and US Forces, but also combat support and combat service support activities. On 2 December 1969, the 9th ARVN Regiment established headquarters at Bo Duc, and the command and control of the area, with the exception of CIDG and MSF units, was turned over to CO, 9th ARVN Regiment. As elements of the 9th ARVN Bn deployed to the Bo Duc area, US infantry units were phased out.

(4) Combined operations involving a multitude of RVNAP units with possible separate command loyalties require a clear delineation of the command structure. Responsibilities for combat and combat service support must be carefully planned and clearly spelled out. Command and control of the various units in the Bu Dop-Bo Duc area was formally unified on 7 January 1970. A Provincial "forward" CP (having both political and military power) was established at Bo Duc and RVNAP and US forces were placed under the command of the Deputy Province Chief, an ARVN lieutenant colonel. This forward CP was then placed OPCOM to 1st ACD with CO, 3d Brigade monitoring all activities and operations.

(5) Dong Tien Operations:

(a) For some time the 1st ACD has conducted limited Dong Tien operations, consisting primarily of short term operations with 5th ARVN Division, RF/FP
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970 and CIDG elements. On 17 October 1969, the 2d ARVN Abn Bde began extended combined operations in War Zone "C" with the 1st Bde, 1st ACD. A combined brigade tactical operations center was established with the 1st Bde at Tay Ninh and combat operations for the two organizations were planned and directed by the co-located brigade commanders. Fire support coordination was centralized for all of War Zone "C". In early December, the 1st ARVN Abn Bde commenced combined operations with the 2d Bde, 1st ACD in Phuoc Long Province. Command, control and coordination of fire support are handled in the same way as in War Zone "C". ARVN and US brigades exchanged OPCON (less command) of maneuver battalions with no significant problems resulting. Missions and orientation of efforts are the same for US and ARVN brigades.

(b) To facilitate control of the two ARVN Abn Brigades, the ARVN Abn Div headquarters was established near the 1st Air Cav Div headquarters at Phuoc Vinh. To increase their understanding of our operations, selected staff members of the ARVN Abn Div worked in the 1st ACD TOC until their CP was operational. Close coordination for the planning and conduct of combined operations is effected on a daily basis between the two division staffs. Combined planning and operational guidance is issued by both divisions on a bimonthly basis to insure unification of effort.

(c) In keeping with the spirit of Dong Tien (Progress Together) operations, the 1st ACD familiarized members of the ARVN Airborne Division with its methods of employing fire support, automatic ambushing, CS munitions, surveillance and night observation devices, techniques of attack against bunker complexes, and airmobile operations. As a result, the ARVN Abn companies and battalions conduct combat operations in essentially the same manner as 1st ACD units, thus enhancing combined operations.
On 14 November 1969, the Division initiated a unique type of combat operation for an airmobile division - land clearing. Utilizing two direct support land clearing companies, 11,797 acres were cleared in AO Chief, the Duc Phong and Bu Dop areas, and War Zone "C". Plans have been prepared for road upgrading and land clearing projects for Phuoc Long and Binh Long Provinces and priorities have been established for other areas throughout the TAOI. Forces required to secure a land clearing company normally consist of an armored cavalry troop and one infantry rifle company, although less security has been used in relatively low risk areas.

The most significant pre-TET enemy offensive occurred in War Zone "C". During the period 20-27 January 1970, the enemy initiated 16 indirect fire attacks, most of which were aimed at ARVN fire support bases or night defensive positions. Friendly casualties were very light. However, during this time frame there were a total of 74 NVA KIA by ground troops and 63 NVA killed by aircraft ordnance.

o. 1st Brigade Operations:

(1) Mission: 1st Brigade continued operations in War Zone "C" to interdict enemy lines of communication and supply and to destroy enemy forces, installations and equipment.

(2) Execution:

(a) The 1st Brigade continued operations into November with the 2-5 Cav, 1-12 Cav, 2-7 Cav and the 2d ARVN Abn Bde (consisting of the 3d, 9th and 11th ARVN Abn Bns) to interdict enemy operations and destroy all major enemy forces in War Zone "C". With the relocation of the 2d ARVN Abn Bde with the 1st Bde and the completion of PSC's for the ARVN bns, the job of completely familiarizing the Abn battalions with the airmobile concept of operations was
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accomplished. While assisting the ARVN Abn Bde, 1st Bde troops sought out the
enemy and continued interdicting his LOC's.

(b) During December, the 1st Bde (with the 2-5 Cav and 2-7 Cav) and
the 2d ARVN Abn Bde (with the 24, 3d, and 7th ARVN Abn Bns) continued offensive
operations to interdict enemy resupply and communications systems. This month
was relatively quiet, therefore the better part of the month was spent in trying
to locate the enemy in War Zone "C". Some intelligence indicated enemy
forces in the extreme western and northwestern parts of the AO. In light
of this intelligence, two extended artillery operations were conducted in the
western portion of the AO northwest of FSB St. Barbara and southwest of FSB
Carolyn. However, results were inconclusive with contact either very light or
nonexistent.

(c) The 1st Bde (with 2-5 Cav and 2-7 Cav) and the 3d ARVN Abn Bde
(with 2d, 5th, and 7th ARVN Abn Bns) continued to interdict enemy infiltration,
communication and resupply lines in anticipation of a possible TET or pre-TET
offensive in War Zone "C". The expected attack took place between the 20th
and 27th of January in the form of large scale, indirect mortar and rocket
bombardments of both FSB's and units in the field. It is felt that through
efficient tactical utilization of heavy artillery combined with a preplanned
ground operation, much of the pre-TET offensive was pre-empted.

(3) Discussion and Analysis of Significant Events:

(a) 4 NOV: FSB Ike received an indirect fire attack followed by a
ground attack by a reinforced NVA battalion. For details, see paragraph 1, j(2).

(b) 18 NOV: FSB Jackie at 0243H observed movement in the wire to the
northeast and engaged it with artillery and mortars. At 0450H more movement to
the northeast was heard. At 0630H, the FSB received small arms and 3-40 fire
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from the woodline to the north followed by a probe of an estimated sapper company from the north. The enemy was engaged with organics, ARVN, and direct fire artillery. Contact broke at 0700H with 12 NVA KIA, 3 NVA FW, 5 AK-47's, 3 2-40 rocket launchers and assorted equipment and munitions captured.

(c) 15 DEC: An extended artillery operation began with the temporary establishment of FSB Rose. A and B Companies of 2-5 Cav air assaulted to an area directly west of FSB Carolyn on the 1st Cav boundary and conducted reconnaissance of the area. However, after two days of no results, FSB Rose was closed and the 2d Co, 2d ARVN Abn and E/2-5 Cav, who were securing the base, were airlifted back to their respective FSB's at 171725H. The artillery were returned to FSB Iks.

(d) 23 DEC: A new temporary FSB Maria was built by 2d Co, 7th ARVN Abn and supported by 3x105 howitzers from FSB Jamie. Several companies operated around the FSB and to the north, hoping to make contact with the enemy reporter to be in that area. As at FSB Rose, there were no major contacts and on 24 Dec at 1715 H, the 3x105 howitzers returned to FSB Jamie and the 2d Co returned to its own AO.

(e) 2 JAN: At 0900H, 3x105 howitzers were airlifted to temporary FSB Jud, already secured by the 2d Co, 7th ARVN Abn. Again, several companies were inserted northwest of FSB Sandra in reaction to intelligence, but as before, contact was light. On 4 Jan, the 105 howitzers were lifted out and the operation terminated with negative results.

(f) Pre-TET Offensive (20-27 Jan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect Fire Incidents</th>
<th>Friendly Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diana @ 2300H</td>
<td>KIA, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2x107 rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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21st
Vicky @ 013CH
3x107 rockets
Carolyn @ 002CH
3x107 rockets
Sandra @ 0045H & 1055H
20x82mm, 3x82mm

22d
Carolyn @ 0121H & 1810H
5x82mm, 3x82mm

23d
Carolyn @ 1550H
5x82mm
NDP, 2d ARVN Abn @ 0101H (XT451777)
1 ARVN WIA
Diana @ 2325H
1x107, 15x82mm
Sandra @ 1045H
10x82mm

24th
Sandra @ 1200H & 1750H
5x82mm, 1x120mm

25th
Carolyn @ 1550H
2x82mm

26th
NDP 7th ARVN Abn @ 0001H (XT225797)
1 ARVN WIA
50x82mm, B-40

27th
Sandra @ 0200H
5x107, 20x120mm

During this time frame there were a total of 74 NVA KIA by ground troops and 63 NVA killed by air-delivered ordnance. In addition, there were 13 .50-47's.
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captured, and 10 crew-served weapons captured or destroyed, of which 7 were
.51 caliber machine guns.

d. 24 Brigade Operations:

(1) Mission: During this period, the 2d Brigade conducted ground and
air reconnaissance in the area of operations, focused on locating and eliminat-
ing the 174th NVA Regiment, 275th NVA Regiment and the K25 and K17 Local Force
District Units, interdicting and neutralizing enemy infiltration routes, denying
the enemy use of known and suspected enemy base areas and cache sites;
supported the GVN pacification program; and conducted combined operations to
promote the Dong Tien program.

(2) Execution:

(a) The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry became OPCON to the 2d Brigade on
14 December 1969 and constructed FSB Lee. It commenced operations in its AO
on 17 December 1969, targeting against the Jolley Road complex and enemy LOC's
in the eastern portion of the 2d Brigade AO. It also assumed the overwatch
and pacification responsibilities of the Duc Phong area. During the period 5
to 10 January and 10 to 18 January 1970, 1-12 Cav established temporary fire
support bases and displaced to FSB's Boot and Catcher respectively.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry continued operations in the vicinity
of FSB Judie conducting ground reconnaissance and interdiction of infiltration
routes from the north and northeast into the Song Be area. On 1 December 1969
the 2d Battalion, 12th Cav displaced to FSB Don and on 7 December to FSB But-
tons. The battalion's mission was to interdict major approaches to Song Be,
eliminate the K25 local force unit and support pacification in the Song Be area.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 9th Cavalry became OPCON to the 2d Brigade on 18
December 1969 replacing the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry at FSB Mary. It com-
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The 2nd Brigade conducted operations in its AO targeting against the K25 and K17 local force units and interdicting the Jolley Road complex. It further had overwatch responsibility of convoys between Phuoc Vinh and Song Be. During the periods 3 to 8 January, 8 to 14 January, and 14 to 17 January 1970, 2-8 Cav established temporary fire support bases and deployed to FSB's Chris, Colby and Westphal respectively. On 31 January 1970, 2-8 Cav was released OPCON from the 2d Brigade.

(3) Discussion and Analysis of Significant Operations:

(a) The month of November was a highly successful month for the 2d Brigade. There were numerous contacts, mostly involving air cavalry elements. Also during the month there were five significant indirect fire attacks on 2d Brigade fire support bases. On 3 November, Brigade Scouts, while conducting a visual reconnaissance, received ground-to-air fire consisting of small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire on two occasions in the same area. The enemy was engaged with organics, B/1-9 Cav, artillery and Tac Air resulting in 21 NVA KIA. On 3 & 4 November, the enemy launched a battalion (-) sized attack on FSB Buttons. For details, see para. 1, j, (2). On 16 November, in the vicinity of FSB Judie, the Brigade Scouts, while conducting a visual reconnaissance, received approximately 500 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire from 40 to 50 individuals in a bunker complex. They spotted an additional 30 to 40 individuals near the Song Be river. The area was engaged with organics, artillery, Tac Air and Spooky. While conducting a first light check of the area on 17 November, the Brigade Scouts sighted 20 to 30 men on a burial detail - 55 bodies were seen in the immediate area. The Scouts received small arms and automatic weapons fire, and engaged with organics weapons and air strikes. A total of 80 NVA were killed during the day and a
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Half of activities. On 19 and 20 November, 34 individuals from Phu Van Village rallied to A Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, OPCON to 2-12 Cav. On 22 November, a convoy travelling from Phuoc Vinh to Song Be received mortar and small arms fire. Personnel on the convoy returned fire with organics and were supported by C/1-9 Cav, Brigade Scouts, ARA and Tac Air, resulting in 14 NVA KIA.

(b) The month of December resulted in heavy enemy activity with numerous contacts involving both ground troops and air cavalry elements. During the month, there were significant indirect fire attacks on 2d Brigade and 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade fire support bases. Three large caches were also found by elements of the 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade. On 11 December, the 2d and 3d Companies, 6th Airborne Battalion were operating north of FSB Judy and made contact with an unknown sized enemy force firing small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rockets. They engaged with their organic weapons, artillery and Tac Air. Results of the day included 27 NVA KIA, 4 AK-47's, 1 RPG, 7 rocket launchers captured, 9 ARVN KIA and 37 ARVN WIA. At 2110H and 0150H, near the area of these previous contacts, Hightail received ground-to-air fire consisting of small arms, B-40 rockets, .30 and .51 caliber machine gun fire. The firing sites were engaged with organics, artillery and armed C-119 resulting in 34 NVA KIA. On 12 December, again near the area of previous contact, the 2d and 3d Companies, 6th Airborne Battalion made contact with an unknown sized enemy force and received small arms, automatic weapons, B-40 rockets and mortar fire. They engaged with organics, artillery and ARA resulting in 14 NVA KIA and 4 ARVN WIA. On 13 December, the 18th ARVN Cav, while conducting road clearing operations, established contact with an estimated battalion size force and received small arms, B-40 rockets and 82mm mortars from both sides of the road. It
engaged with organics, artillery, ARA, Brigade Scouts, B/1-9 and TAC A1r, resulting in 32 NVA KIA, 3 ARVN KIA and 20 ARVN WIA. On 22 December, B/1-9 Cav, while conducting visual reconnaissance, observed and engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 17 NVA KIA. On 23 December, FSB Buttons received four indirect fire attacks at 0629H, 0925H, 1050H, and 2156H consisting of 20 to 30 rounds of 122mm rockets and approximately 27 rounds of 120mm mortar. Results were 5 US KIA, 8 US WIA, 1 UH-1H helicopter and 1 C-130 damaged, and the rocket rearm point destroyed. Artillery counter fires engaged the suspected firing grids with unknown enemy losses. On 27 and 28 December, the 4th Company, 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion, while conducting ground reconnaissance, found two large caches consisting of 1 AK-47, 1 SKS, 11 GKS rifles, 20x92mm, 30x60mm, and 48x120mm mortar rounds, 16x75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 147 3-41 rockets, 50 claymore mines, 2 flamethrowers, 25 cases of 7.62mm ammo, 2000 rounds AK-47, and 51 antitank grenades. On 30 December, the 3d Company, 6th Airborne Battalion, on ground reconnaissance, made contact with an unknown size enemy force engaged with organics and ARA, resulting in 17 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47’s, 1 light machine gun, and 30 B-40 rockets captured, 7 ARVN KIA and 21 ARVN WIA. That night, the 2d and 3d Companies, 6th Airborne Battalion, in the same vicinity, engaged an unknown size enemy force with organics, artillery, Night-hawk, Spooky and Shadow, resulting in 21 NVA KIA, 5 AK-47’s, 2 B-40 rocket launchers and 1 light machine gun captured.

(a) During January there was moderate enemy activity throughout the 2d Brigade A0, mostly involving ground units. There were 9 significant indirect fire attacks on 2d Brigade and 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade fire support bases. On 1 January, NE of FSB Tim the 1st Company, 8th Airborne Battalion established contact with an unknown size enemy force four times during the day.
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The enemy fired small arms, RPG rounds, and about 200 mixed mortar rounds while the 1st Company engaged with organics and artillery. There were 39 NVA KIA, 5 AK-47's, 1 B-40 rocket launcher and 1 radio captured, 5 ARVN KIA and 18 ARVN WIA. On 7 January the 3d Company, 8th Airborne Battalion made contact NE of FSB Tim with an unknown size enemy force firing small arms, B-40 rockets and 100 to 150x82mm mortar rounds. The 3d Co engaged with organics, artillery, ARA, and Tac Air resulting in 32 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47's, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, and 1x.51 caliber machine gun captured. That same day, B/1-9 Cav, on visual reconnaissance, spotted an unknown size enemy force in a bunker complex and engaged with organics and artillery resulting in 16 NVA KIA. On 20 January, the 2d and 4th Companies, 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion made contact with an unknown size enemy force on three separate occasions. Small arms fire was exchanged and the enemy was attacked with artillery, ARA and Tac Air. The result was 40 NVA KIA, 8 AK-47's and 1 light machine gun captured, 6 ARVN KIA, and 16 ARVN WIA. On 21 January, there were four indirect fire attacks on FSB Buttons, totaling 5x120mm mortar rounds, 12x75mm recoilless. Results were 3 US KIA, 10 US WIA and 6 ARVN WIA. The suspected firing sites were attacked with artillery, Nighthawk and Shadow at various times with unknown enemy losses. On 31 January, the 1st ARVN Cav, while escorting a convoy between Lam Son and Song Be, received small arms, B-40 rocket, machine gun and 75mm recoilless rifle fire from an unknown size enemy force. It engaged with organics, artillery, ARA and Tac Air resulting in 14 NVA KIA, 2 trucks destroyed and 1 ARVN WIA.

e. 3d Brigade Operations:

(1) Mission: The principal efforts of the 3d Brigade continued to be directed toward interdiction of the Seres Jungle Highway and neutralization...

The Brigade continued overwatch responsibility for Bo Duc District and continued contingency planning to reinforce the Bo Duc area in the event of an increased NVA main force threat directed against GVN installations and population complexes in that area. The Brigade continued to support pacification programs in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces, emphasized Dong Tien operations in support of the Vietnamization effort and intensified psychological operations in support of GVN pacification and Chieu Hoi programs.

(2) Execution: Tactical operations during this period emphasized combined/coordinated operations with RVNAF targeted against main force infiltration, defense of populated areas in Bo Duc District, support of land clearing operations and neutralization of the VC Infrastructure and local force units.

Contacts with main force units in Bo Duc District levied heavy losses on elements of the 7th NVA Division, to include its three regiments. Simultaneously, element of the 1-5 Cav, 1-7 Cav, and 1-8 Cav continued interdiction of the Serges Jungle Highway and closed it to significant enemy movement. As the main force threat diminished and greater emphasis was directed toward neutralization of the local force units and VCI, significant inroads were made into the Loc Ninh District infrastructure, resulting in the identification of a number of key personnel. In addition, major base areas and support facilities were uncovered in the operational areas of the D168 and D368 LF Battalions and the C31 Company with losses inflicted upon the enemy.

(3) Discussion and Analysis of Significant Operations:

(a) A significant increase in enemy activity was initiated on 4 November as an estimated Bn size NVA force attacked FSB Ellen. A heavy barrage of fire was followed by a ground attack. For details, see para. 1, j, (2)b.
That same morning, Bu Dop Special Forces Camp received a stand-off attack between 0230-0726H consisting of 3x120mm and 3x60mm mortar rounds. Bo Duc District Headquarters was also subjected to a light stand-off attack consisting of 1x120mm, 3x60mm and 2x82mm mortar rounds. Both incidents produced negative casualties. Several instances of ground-to-air fire were reported by B/1-9 Cav in the vicinity of Bu Dop/Bo Duc during the early morning hours and the target areas were attacked with seven air strikes. Enemy losses totalled 23 NVA KIA, 16 KBA and 2 KBAR.

(b) On 4 November, liaison teams from the 1-5 Cav moved to the Bu Dop Special Forces Camp and the Bo Duc District Headquarters in anticipation of the upcoming offensive and coordinated plans with RVNAF and GVN local forces to facilitate any required reinforcement. On 7 November, the 1-5 Cav liaison team was supplemented with additional personnel and was established as the 3d Brigade FWD CP at the Bu Dop Special Forces Camp. This CP was operated under the supervision of the CO, 1-5 Cav and functioned as the coordinating headquarters for allied operations in the Bo Duc District.

(c) On the morning of 7 November, C/1-5 Cav air assaulted into and re-opened FSB Jerri to counter the increasing enemy threat. The first RVNAF reinforcing unit, the 334 RF Company from Song Be, had arrived previous to this time and reinforced the 113 RF Company at Bo Duc District Headquarters, providing additional security for the local population. The 2d Bn, 3 MSF and 36th ARVN Ranger Bn were airlifted to FSB Jerri on 7 November and were further assigned the mission of conducting security operations to the west and east of Bo Duc District Headquarters respectively. The 3d MSF arrived at Bu Dop Special Forces Camp on 12 November, established a command post and was followed on 13 November by its supporting artillery battery, D/2-13 Artillery.
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The "Jungle Battery", consisting of 2x105mm and 2x155mm howitzers. Artillery support at FSB Jerri was provided by 6x105mm howitzers of B/2-13 Artillery, which arrived on 7 November and 4x155mm howitzers of A/2-12 Artillery which arrived on the 6th. E/1-5 Cav, previously OPCON to 1-7 Cav for operations north of Quan Loi Base Camp, was also airlifted to FSB Jerri on 6 November to conduct local security patrols around the FSB. To counter indications of a possible armor threat, F/2-11 ACR was airlifted from Loc Ninh to Bu Dop, closing on 10 November. All NVNAF units in the Bo Due District were placed OPCON to the 3d Brigade.

(a) FSB Jerri received 30x82mm mortar rounds, 5 B-40 rockets and a light ground probe commencing at 0240H on 6 November. Friendly casualties totaled 7 US WIA, 9 MSF WIA, and 1 MSF KIA. At 0643H, while conducting a first light reconnaissance, the 2-3 MSF made contact with an unknown size enemy force northwest of the FSB. The contact resulted in 4 NVA KIA and the capture of 1 NVA PW. He was a member of the C-19 Engineer Company and his unit was assigned the mission of cutting a trail to support an attack of FSB Jerri by the 2d Battalion, 141st Regiment.

(b) On the morning of 10 November 1969, FSB Jerri was again attacked by mortar and B-40 rocket fire, and a squad sized probe. A first light check of the area revealed 4 NVA KIA. There were no friendly casualties. While on ground reconnaissance west of Bo Due, the 2-3 MSF made contact with an estimated battalion size enemy force on Hill 153. Contact was continuous and heavy throughout the afternoon and well into the night as the 2-3 MSF assaulted the prepared positions on Hill 153. F/2-11 ACR reinforced at 2310H. Contact broke at approximately 2400H. Enemy losses included 30 NVA KIA and 2 PW captured. Friendly casualties included 5 MSF KIA and 12 MSF WIA.

(f) On 11 November, FSB Jerri received another heavy stand-off attack.

consisting of 15x120mm and 15x82mm mortar rounds and a ground probe from the southwest. Friendly losses included 5 US KIA and 7 US WIA; there was negative enemy assessment. B/1-9 Cav near Bu Dop found 15 NVA killed as a result of a B-52 strike.

(a) On 17 November, Cuan Loi Base Camp received 4x122mm rockets at approximately 1800H with two rounds impacting inside the perimeter. There were 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA. At 2300H, FSB Ellen was subjected to another standoff attack and a light ground probe. Although numerous B-40 rockets and 82mm mortar rounds were fired, the enemy was unable to mount an effective ground attack. Artillery and 81mm mortar counter battery fire was directed at suspected mortar sites and enemy locations. NVA losses totalled 6 KBARTY, 4 KBARA, 2 KBR and 16 KIA. Friendly casualties included 3 US WIA and 1 KCS WIA.

(b) On 18 November, an OH-6A from B/2-9 received heavy ground-to-air fire and made a force landing 5 kilometers northeast of FSB Jerri; the crew was extracted. Artillery and 3 air strikes attacked the target resulting in 3 KBARTY, 16 KBR and 9 KBA.

(i) The 9th ARVN Regiment (-) closed at Bo Duc on 2 December and began coordinated operations with the 3d Brigade. At 0355H, while in a night defensive position (NDP) 4 kilometers southwest of Bu Dop, F/2-11 ACR was attacked by an estimated platoon of NVA. The contact resulted in 7 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47's, 10 B-40 rockets, 1 B-41 rocket, and 11x60mm mortar rounds captured; there were 2 US KIA and 6 US WIA. Bu Dop received 20-30 rounds of 120mm mortar at 0437H resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 CIDG KIA and 4 US WIA. Bo Duc District Headquarters also received an indirect fire attack with 10 rounds of 120mm mortar impacting in the ammo dump, producing 2 ARVN WIA and 5 ARVN KIA. Five hundred rounds of 105mm howitzer and 50x81mm mortar WP rounds were destroyed.
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Also on 2 December, B/1-8 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force in a bunker complex with organized, artillery, ARA and 2 air strikes. Enemy losses were 17 NVA KIA; friendly casualties totalled 7 US WIA and 4 US KIA.

(j) Contacts on 9 December included five friendly-initiated ambushes and contacts with platoon or smaller size NVA elements. The total casualties from these contacts included 24 NVA KIA, 2 US KIA, 8 US WIA and 1 ARVN WIA.

(k) On 14 December, C/1-7 Cav found a large weapons cache 6 kilometers southwest of FSB Jerri. The most significant items included 50x9mm Chicom sub-machine guns, 6 SKS, 3 AK-47's, 1 M-1 carbine, 1 BAR, 1 82mm rocket launcher, 1 M-60, 1 Chicom MG, 1 Soviet flamethrower, 269 B-40 rounds, 67 B-41 rounds, and 450x60mm mortar fuses.

(1) B/2-11 ACR and 2/1-9 ARVN, while on a combined operation, engaged an estimated reinforced NVA company 4 kilometers south of Bu Dop at 0625H on 15 December. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, B-40 and 60mm mortar fire and at 0845H B/1-11 ACR reinforced the operation. The withdrawing enemy was pursued by the allied forces. Artillery, B/1-9, 11th ACR gunships, and one air strike supported the contact which broke at 0932H. Results of the contact were 41 NVA KIA, 10 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW and 2x60mm mortars, 2 RCK-2, 1 RCK-7, 2 Chicom MG, 2 CKC rifles, and 4 AK-47's captured. There were 18 US WIA and 4 US KIA while ARVN forces suffered 2 KIA and 9 WIA. Five additional NVA were killed as a result of two unrelated ambush actions.

(m) Enemy activity during January was characterized by light and sporadic contact with small (four to six individuals) NVA/VC elements. Stand-off attacks and ground-to-air activity during January were minimal. Upon relinquishing the responsibilities for Home Flow operations in Bu Dop District to the 11th ACR, the 3d Brigade placed primary emphasis on interdicting the Serges Jungle Highway. The apparent lack of enemy activity in the southeastern and
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Southern portions of the AO resulted in a decision to realign forces in order to focus on the northern and northeastern entrances to the Serges Jungle Highway. FSB Kathleen was closed and FSB Bill was established north of Quan Loi Base Camp. The 1-8 Cav assumed the mission of countering attacks targeted against Quan Loi Base Camp during the TET Holiday Season. The 1-5 Cav closed FSB Vivian and reopened FSB Pt. Granite, then targeted main force infiltration from Base Area 350. The 1-7 Cav continued interdiction operations from FSB Pt. Compton where it was positioned to best counter infiltration along the northeastern reaches of the Serges Jungle Highway. The 1-8 Cav became the 3d Brigade's "swing" battalion to be used to exploit significant intelligence and counter increased enemy activity anywhere in the Brigade AO. Results for the month of January were 60 NVA/VC KIA, 2 FV, and the capture or destruction of 15 AK-47's, 3 SKS and 26 bicycles reinforced to carry heavy loads.

f. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) during the reporting period. The Regiment conducted operations in Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces, provided convoy security, and provided security for Rome Plow land clearing operations in the Division's AO. At the close of the reporting period, the 11th ACR was operating with its 2d and 3d Squadrons. The 1-11 ACR was OPCON to the 1st Bde, 1st ACD. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment prepares and submits a separate ORLL.

g. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations:

(1) The 1-9 Cavalry Squadron continued reconnaissance operations throughout the tactical area of responsibility. A Troop remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade and the balance of the Squadron provided general support to the Division with priority of effort shifting on a day-to-day basis as required.
(2) During the first portion of the current reporting period, priority of effort was directed toward the Bu Dop area. While continuing to restrict enemy use of the Serges Jungle Trail through the 3d Brigade AO, B Troop's primary effort was displaced eastward where suspected enemy resupply was running to avoid division reconnaissance efforts. B Troop quickly validated these suspicions by discovering and exploiting the infiltration network known as the Jolley Road. Meanwhile, C Troop was concentrating most of its efforts in the 2d Brigade AO to prevent enemy use of the Adam's Trail, as well as providing convoy cover for division resupply to Song Be.

(3) Squadron assets were reshuffled in January to better utilize existing facilities. B Troop was given all reconnaissance responsibilities west of the TU/TT 24 grid line while C Troop took the eastern portion. B Troop was instructed to form an umbrella shaped coverage a few kilometers north of a line from FSB Bill to FSB Pt. Compton to the east of FSB Tim. C Troop performed north-south reconnaissance along the Jolley Road and west to FSB Judie. This configuration was adopted to provide early detection of any enemy build-up or attempted advance during the critical TET period.

(4) The reporting period was concluded with the Squadron in this configuration; however, the priority of effort had shifted again to A Troop which was being reinforced by one pink team each from B and C Troops. Enemy losses inflicted by the 1-9 Squadron can best be described as devastating. A Troop had sporadic contacts in War Zone "C" resulting in severe enemy losses from elements of the 271st, 272d and 95C Regiments. Troops B and C had contacts with elements of the 161st, 209th Regiments, and the 81st, 84th and 86th Rear Service Groups. Specific results were:

(a) Enemy: 1051 killed by helicopter, 40 killed in action, 20 prisoners of war.
(b) U.S.: 14 KIA, 125 WIA.
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b. Division Cumulative Results:

Results of operations from 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970 are as follows:

(1) Enemy: 4171 KIA, 39 FW, 46 Hoi Chanh, 172 crew-served weapons captured, 558 individual weapons captured, 3015 large caliber rounds captured, and 148,999 small caliber rounds captured.

(2) US: 131 KIA, 1054 WIA (of which 295 required medical evacuation), 15 OH-6A destroyed, 7 UH-1H destroyed, 3 AH-1H destroyed, 1 CH-47 destroyed, 1 1-ton truck destroyed, 1 2½-ton truck destroyed, 19 AAV7's destroyed, 2 tanks destroyed, 1 VTR destroyed, and 2 M-109/155 Howitzers destroyed.

1. Combat Support Elements' Operations:

(1) Division Artillery: Submitted Separately

(2) 11th Aviation Group Statistics

(a) During the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970, the 11th Combat Aviation Group rendered extensive aviation support to elements of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades of the Division throughout the northern portion of the III Corps Tactical Zone. Non-divisional support was provided to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 9th ARVN Regiment, CIDG, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, ARVN Airborne Division, and the 1st Aviation Brigade.

(b) Support of the listed units involved participation in the following operations:

1 Operation Kentucky Cougar, initiated 24 July 69 and still in progress.

2 Introduction of the ARVN Airborne Division into the division AO

3 Miscellaneous operations: The 11th Combat Aviation Group assisted in the opening, closing, or relocation of 30 FSB's.
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(c) On 11 November 1969, an INFANT Team was attached to the 11th CAG. This team consisted of 3 UH-1M aircraft (UH-1C models equipped with the Iroquois Night Fighter and Night Tracker Systems). This system is used nightly and supports the 1st Air Cavalry Division, has supported the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and was OPCON to the 1st Aviation Brigade for testing in the Mekong Delta. This system is also used as a protective measure against small units operating around the remotely situated FSB's. Initially, the problem of how to best utilize this system was encountered. This was solved by giving an orientation to the ground unit supported by the INFANT. The necessary personnel were made aware of the capabilities and limitations that characterized the INFANT system. An evaluation of the INFANT is being made by the ACTIV NET Team.

(d) During the last quarter the following support has been provided ARVN Forces in conjunction with Dong Tien operations:

- CF47
- AH1G
- UH1H

(e) Air Traffic Control elements of the 11th CAG have provided the following support at the Division Base Airfield for the past quarter:

1. VFR Landings & Take-offs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B/W Day</th>
<th>R/W Night</th>
<th>F/W Day</th>
<th>F/W Night</th>
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<td>110,394</td>
<td>20,514</td>
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<td>1,587</td>
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</table>

2. GCA = 3,095

(f) Tactical units of the 11th CAG are deployed as follows:

Phuoc Vinh: HHU, 11th Combat Avn Gp
- 11th GS Company
- 227th AHU (-)
- 228th ASHU (-)

Tuy Nhiep: 229th AHU (-)

Dau Tieng: Co B; Co D; 229th AHU

Benz Cat: Co A; Co B; 228th ASHU

Lai Khe: Co A; Co D; 227th AHU
(g) Aircraft statistics for the quarter are as follows:

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<th></th>
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<th>ARIO</th>
<th>CE47</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft Recoveries</td>
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<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) 13th Signal Battalion Operations

(a) During the reporting period, the 13th Signal Battalion continued to provide communications in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Significant signal highlights include:

1. 5 November: A joint systems control office was established at Phuoc Vinh to monitor and direct activities on communications systems servicing the Phuoc Vinh area and the Division. Personnel from the 13th Signal Battalion represent the Division at this systems control office on a 24-hour a day basis. The activities of six different signal battalions that support the Division and Phuoc Vinh area are controlled and monitored from this control center.

2. 5 November: The Phuoc Vinh cable plant (started in October) was completed and turned over to the 13th Signal Battalion by the 40th Signal Battalion (cable construction). The cable plant includes over 28,000 feet of multi-pair buried cable running throughout the Phuoc Vinh area. It allows the 1st Air Cav Div to separate its tactical communications from the area communications circuits.

3. 8 November: One AD-577 telescope antenna was airlifted to Du Dap to support the 1-5 Cav which was having difficulties reaching its brigade headquarters at Quan Loi. After erection of the antenna, communications were readily
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established with no further interference.

4 9 November: The 31st Engineers started construction on the new
communications complex which will house the division tactical switchboard, the
main distribution frame, the VHF multi-channel radio system, and the secure
voice radios. This facility will provide much greater security to the equip-
ment and personnel.

5 10 November: In support of the Provisional FSE established at Bu
Dop, the 13th Signal Battalion airlifted and placed into operation one VSC-2
SSB, RTT radio.

6 18 November: The Battalion placed into operation a twelve channel
VHF system between Division Headquarters and the 2d Bde Headquarters, using an
AN/CRE-69 radio relay terminal.

7 1 December: The four channel VHF voice system between 3d Bde
Headquarters and FSB Wescott was terminated as a result of the closing of the
FSE. The AN/CRC-163 and personnel were airlifted back to Phuoc Vinh.

8 6 December: The four channel VHF voice system in support of FSE
Grant was terminated and the AN/CRC-163 was moved back to Tay Ninh as a result
of the FSE closing down.

9 14 December: In support of the 3d Bde advance CP established at
Bu Dop, the 13th Signal Battalion activated a four channel VHF system between
3d Bde Headquarters at Quan Loi and 3d Bde advance CP at Bu Dop.

10 9 January: The AN/CRC-163 four channel VHF system between 3d Bde
Headquarters at Quan Loi and 3d Bde advance CP at Bu Dop was terminated and
the equipment and personnel were returned to Phuoc Vinh.

11 11 January: A switchboard, SB-86, capable of terminating 60 local
or trunk circuits was installed in the forward LCC at Phuoc Vinh to provide
better telephone switching capabilities.
15 January: The JRC-101 airborne relay was placed into operation as a result of Nui Da Dien being off the air. This airborne relay in a C-7A aircraft relayed D-1 and D-2 secure radio nets at Phuoc Vinh Headquarters at Tay Minh.

22 January: The 40th Signal Battalion from Long Binh started the laying of burying all overhead cable in the Phuoc Vinh area to protect it against indirect fire.

Significant activities of the Division Signal Officer Included:

- In November, a message review board was initiated by the DSO to reduce message processing. The Division Communications Center. Each major section has a representative on this board, and their recommendations have reduced the handling time on message traffic originating at the headquarters.

- During November, new MARS equipment was purchased and planning was made to establish new MARS stations at FSB Buttons and the Bien Hoa VIP. Work on both sites was scheduled to be completed by the middle of December. With the addition of these two sites, the 1st Air Cavalry Division now holds capability at all brigade headquarters and at both Division Headquarters.

- Through this reporting period, command emphasis and strong efforts by the DSO office resulted in the securing of 79% of the tactical radio net in the division at this reporting date. The only nets left to be secured are one artillery net and several aviation nets. The artillery net is expected in the very near future, but the aviation net cannot be secured until the aircraft have been modified by USARV.

- A provisional company was established in December on Nui De Ra. This company provides administration, logistical support, and a coordinated radio relay.
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were completed on a mission request basis. Priority projects completed at Tay Ninh included the construction of overhead cover for the 1st Bde's CO trailer, construction of a radar tower (GCA) for FSB Jamie, construction of aircraft revetments for 1st Brigade Aviation, and construction of a TOC for the 1st Airborne Brigade (ARVN).

(d) Company B remained in direct support of the 2d Brigade with its base camp at FSB Buttons. Company B during this period was involved in the construction and improvement of FSB's Mary, Thomas, and Lee and technical assistance to FSB's Joan and Tim. It also contributed to the success of four temporary FSB's, Boots, Colby, Catcher and Westphal. In addition to these operations, it was involved in the build-up of FSB Buttons wire network, penepriming of the base camp, and technical assistance on all engineering tasks. Direct combat support also included daily minesweeps and demolition support to infantry units in the field.

(e) Company C remained in direct support of the 3d Brigade with its CP at Quan Loi. Minesweeps and demolition support were provided to the infantry on an as required basis. The construction, rehabilitation, and closing of FSB's in the 3d Brigade AO was the company's main concern during this period. New fire support bases were constructed at Jerri, Ft. Compton, Kathleen, Dillon, Bill and Ft. Granite (FSB Westcott and Vivian were maintained). Other construction in support of the brigade was furnished on an as required basis, and included upgrading the Quan Loi Green Line, the 3d Brigade TOC, and the Special Forces Camp at Bu Dop.
defense plan for all 1st Cavalry Division (AM) communications personnel using
Mui Ba Ra as a relay site for radio.

The distance between Saigon and Phuoc Vinh is such that radio re-
ception from the AFVN radio located in Saigon is poor. To alleviate this problem,
a new rebroadcast station was established at Phuoc Vinh on the AM broadcast
band. This station broadcasts material from the Saigon AFVN radio station which
arrives by a dedicated telephone line.

(4) 8th Engineer Battalion Operations

(a) During the reporting period the majority of the 8th Engineer Bat-
talion's effort was directed toward support of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).
The Battalion, being involved in operations for 92 days during the period, con-
structed or reopened 19 FSB's for the Division, upgraded 5 other FSB's which were
controlled by the Division, and dismantled 10 FSB's which were no longer re-
quired for tactical operations. Non-divisional engineer effort in the division
area of operations was mainly directed toward upgrading roads and airfields at
Duc Phong and Da Dop, along with the facilities at Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Quan
Loi, An Loc and Song Be. This effort by non-divisional engineer units was co-
ordinated by the 8th Engineer Battalion and was significant in enabling the 8th
Engineer Battalion to devote the majority of its time to direct combat support
of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

(b) HHC remained at Phuoc Vinh during the reporting period. The equip-
ment platoons were involved in several construction and maintenance projects
in the division area of operations. During November and December, HHC was in-
volved extensively in runway repair projects. Large holes created from point
detonating rockets and delayed fuse mortars and rockets caused excessive damage
to the Da Dop airfield. It was discovered that for point detonating rounds, where
the depth of the crater is only a few feet, a small dozer can be used to cut
a slot enabling removal of all fractured soil particles. Compaction is then conducted using several lifts until the soil reaches the correct density. When laterite or other suitable materials were not available, the use of soil cement proved very effective. For delayed detonating rounds, due to the deeper hole created, the most effective method is to use a 3414 backhoe to remove ruptured material and refill in lifts. Compaction can be accomplished utilizing cobra drills, pneumatic tampers, or similar devices. Again soil cement may be utilized when desirable fill material cannot be obtained. HHC also supported line company elements at FSB's with construction equipment and at the same time maintained and upgraded vital road networks and drainage systems throughout AO Chief. A total of 322 CH54 and CH47 sorties were required to move airmobile engineer equipment and material throughout the division area of operations in support of widespread construction efforts. At Camp Gorvad, engineer equipment and personnel maintained existing road and drainage systems. The divisional water points, operated by HHC personnel, produced over one million gallons of potable water.

(c) Company A remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade with its base camp at Tay Ninh. Direct combat support included demolition and minesweep teams to support the infantry. Major assistance was given to the 1st Airborne Brigade (ARVN) during this period. Most of the work consisted of providing technical assistance to the ARVN engineers. Although problems of a language barrier developed often, it was infrequent that the American engineer and the ARVN engineer could not work together towards the common solution of a problem. Company A also used a good portion of its engineer effort in support of the 11th ACR. During this period, the company was involved in assembling large quantities of culverts suitable for sling out. It was determined that such a cargo should be carried internally on a CH47 to alleviate load rotation and oscillation created by an external sling out. In Tay Ninh, limited construction projects
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were completed on a mission request basis. Priority projects completed at Tay
Minh included the construction of overhead cover for the 1st Bde's CO trailer,
construction of a radar tower (GCA) for FSB Jamie, construction of aircraft re-
vetments for 1st Brigade Aviation, and construction of a TOC for the 1st Air-
borne Brigade (ARVN).

(d) Company B remained in direct support of the 2d Brigade with its
base camp at FSB Buttons. Company B during this period was involved in the con-
struction and improvement of FSB's Mary, Thomas, and Lee and technical assis-
tance to FSB's Joan and Tim. It also contributed to the success of four temporary
FSB's, Boots, Colby, Catcher and Westphal. In addition to these operations, it
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camp, and technical assistance on all engineering tasks. Direct combat support
also included daily minesweeps and demolition support to infantry units in the
field.

(e) Company C remained in direct support of the 3d Brigade with its CP
at Quan Loi. Minesweeps and demolition support were provided to the infantry
on an as required basis. The construction, rehabilitation, and closing of
FSB's in the 3d Brigade AO was the company's main concern during this period.
New fire support bases were constructed at Jerri, Ft. Compton, Kathleen, Dillon,
Bill and Ft. Granite (FSB Westcott and Vivien were maintained). Other construc-
tion in support of the brigade was furnished on an as required basis, and in-
cluded upgrading the Quan Loi Green Line, the 3d Brigade TOC, and the Special
Forces Camp at Bu Dop.
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J. Operational Highlights:

(1) 3 November: Ranger Team 45, at 1730H, 5 kms west of FSB Buttons, observed 24 NVA soldiers. B/4-9 Cav was directed to the area. Supported by artillery, Troop B engaged the enemy and received heavy ground-to-air fire. The engagement resulted in 40 NVA KIA and 1 NVA KEarty.

(2) 4 November: The lull in enemy activities that had lasted in the 1st Air Cav area of operations for approximately seven weeks came to an abrupt end with a widespread series of indirect and direct attacks on US, GVN and ARVN installations. Activity centered mainly around three Cav firebases - Ike, Ellen, and the 2d Brigade Hqs at Buttons. An enemy attack of this scope had not been experienced since 11 Aug 69, when an offensive was launched against Binh Long Province.

(a) Tay Ninh Province:

1. In the 1st Cav's portion of War Zone "C", stand-off attacks were launched by the enemy against FSB St. Barbara (0220H), the 9th ARVN Abn Bn at FSB Vicky (0220H), and the CIDG Corp and 5th MSF at Katum (0355H) with casualties being 3 ARVN WIA at FSB Vicky. The 2d Bn, 7th Cav at FSB Jamie was probed numerous times during the night with radar sightings and movement sightings to the north of its perimeter, but no attack resulted.

The center of activity was FSB Ike, manned by the 2d Bn, 5th Cav. Radar detected movement to the north at 2240H, and at 0040H the enemy was observed outside the wire and on the log pad. The firebase received mortar, B-40 and small arms fire, with a ground attack at 0205H. The defenders returned fire with direct fire artillery and their organic weapons, supported by ARA, artillery and AC119 gunships. The NVA were repulsed and left behind 54 killed and 5 WIA. A first light sweep found 10 AK-47's, 8 B-40
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rocket launchers, 1x30 caliber machine gun, 1 field telephone and a large
amount of assorted ammunition. Friendly casualties were 1 killed and 11
wounded.
(Enemy identification: 2d Bn, 271st Rgt; 95 Sapper Recon Co.)

2 A/1-9 Cav accounted for an additional 35 NVA KIA in the
general vicinity of the firebase and found 9 NVA who were KIA and KIA.
(b) Phuoc Long Province:

1 The CIDG Camps at Bu Dop, Dong Xoai and Durnerd were the tar-
gets of mortar attacks with Bu Dop being attacked on four separate occasions
by 120mm mortars. The 1st ARVN Armored Cav made contact with an estimated
enemy company just southwest of Durnerd on QL 14.

2 The 2d Brigade Hqs at FSB Buttons received an intense bar-
range of 107mm rocket, mortar, B-40 and small arms fire beginning at 0115
hours. A ground attack followed. ARA, AC47 gunships, artillery and flare-
ships supported the defenders. At 0530H the enemy withdrew. Enemy losses
were 63 NVA KIA; friendly casualties were 2 killed and 26 wounded. In addi-
tion, 2 Kit Carson Scouts were wounded; 3 ACAV's and 1x3/4 ton truck were
destroyed.
(Enemy identification: 5th Sapper Battalion(-), J-16 Armor Office)

2 The attack on FSB Ellen began at 0125H with an attack by
fire consisting of 107mm rockets, 82mm mortars, B-40's and small arms fire. A
ground attack by a reinforced battalion followed. C/1-8 Cav, with ARA, flare-
ships, AC119 gunships, Nighthawk, air strikes and artillery in support, drove
the attackers off, and sporadic firing continued until 0500H. A sweep of the
area around the firebase found 35 enemy KIA, 3 AK-47's, 4x107mm rockets and
assorted munitions. Two prisoners were taken, one of them seriously wounded.

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Fourteen US personnel were wounded and two 105mm howitzers were damaged. (Enemy identification: K2 En, 141st Bn; 1st Co, 5th Sage; J-16 Armor Office)

(3) 10 November: The 1st Brigade Scouts, while conducting aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations northwest of FSB Jess, discovered an occupied enemy bunker complex at 1310 hours. The target was observed fleeing the area. They were engaged by the Scouts with organic weapons, supported by ARA, a CS drop and two additional air strikes. Results: 22 KIA and 15 KEB.

(4) 11 November:
(a) Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry while on ground reconnaissance north of FSB Jess, engaged an unknown size enemy force and received heavy automatic weapons fire in return. ARA, TAC Air and artillery were directed against the enemy position. A sweep of the area revealed 5 NVA KIA, 5 NVA KBARTY and 8 NVA KEB.
(b) Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry conducted a Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) of a B52 strike west of Bo Duc and found 15 NVA KBA in the target area.

(5) 15 November: While flying a Nighthawk mission in the vicinity of FSB Duc between 2130H and 0025H, a UH-1H from Co C and an AH-1G from Co D, 229th AEB, observed numerous lights. The areas were engaged with organic weapons resulting in 9 NVA KEB.

(6) 18 November: At 1430H, 4 kms east of Bo Duc, an OH-6A from Troop B, 1-9 Cav received heavy automatic weapons ground-to-air fire. Troop B engaged enemy firing positions with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes. A check of the area revealed 16 NVA KIA, 9 NVA KBA and 3 NVA KBARTY. One OH-6A received numerous hits and made a precautionary landing; it was extracted. 

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(7) 23 November: Eight km southeast of FSB Mary, 2d Brigade Scouts observed 6 NVA. The Scouts engaged the enemy and received heavy small arms, .30 and .51 caliber machine gun fire. The enemy was further engaged with artillery, organic weapons and air strikes. Enemy losses were 6 KIA and 11 KEB.

(8) 24 November: At 1130H, 7 km north of Bo Duc, an OH-6A from Troop B and an AH-1G from C/227th AHB received heavy .30 and .50 caliber fire. The area was engaged with organic weapons, ARA, and artillery. The contact resulted in 3 NVA KIA, 3 NVA KBIRTY and the destruction of 1x .30 and 1x .50 caliber machine gun. At 1550H, while conducting a DCA of air strikes and artillery firings, an OH-6A spotted 8 NVA KIA, 3 NVA KBA, 3 NVA KBIRTY, and 1x .30 caliber and 1x .50 caliber machine gun, 2 RPG launchers and 5 AK-47 rifles destroyed. The aircraft again received heavy fire and engaged the source with organic weapons, artillery, air strikes and ARA, resulting in an additional 7 NVA KIA, 6 NVA KBIRTY and 2x .51 caliber machine guns destroyed. Total losses: 35 NVA killed.

(9) 25 November: At 0712H, while in ambush posture 3 km west of FSB Jomj, elements of C/1-7 Cav observed several individuals moving along a trail; they were engaged with claymores and organic weapons. Results of the contact were 6 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47 rifles, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 4 B-40 rounds, 9 Chicon grenades and 270 AK-47 rounds captured.

(10) 26 November: At 0710H, 7 km north of FSB Carolyn, an OH-6A and an AH-1G from Troop A received heavy automatic weapons fire. Suspected firing sites were engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery and air strikes. At 0940H, the OH-6A found 13 NVA KIA and 6 NVA KBIRTY.
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(11) 27 November: At 0830H, 11 kms SSE of FSB Ellen, 2d Brigade Scouts received heavy automatic weapons fire. The suspected enemy firing sites were engaged with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes. The contact resulted in 2 NVA KIA. At 1120H, an OH-6A and an AH-1G from Co D, 229th AHB returned to the contact area and found 10 KIA and 11 KIA.

(12) 28 November: At 1320H, 2d Brigade Scouts spotted a large force of NVA 6 kms SSE of FSB Mary and engaged with organic weapons, receiving heavy automatic weapons fire in return. Artillery and air strikes were placed on the enemy. At 1730H, upon completion of the artillery and air strikes, the Scouts returned to the contact area and found 15 NVA KIA and 2 KIA.

(13) 29 November: Five kms SSE of FSB Mary, 2d Brigade Scouts received heavy .30 caliber machine gun fire. The Scouts engaged the firing sites with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes. Upon completion of the artillery fire and air strikes at 1300H, the Scouts found 20 NVA KIA, 10 KIA, 10 KIA, and 1x .30 caliber machine gun destroyed. At 1440H, while conducting aerial reconnaissance 1 kilometer south of the previous area, the Brigade Scouts received .30 caliber machine gun fire. The enemy firing position was engaged with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes. A BDA of the area was made and 15 NVA KIA were found.

(14) 3 December: At 1755H, approximately 3 kms east of Bo Duc, an OH-6A from 1-9 Cav observed several enemy soldiers in the open and engaged them with organic weapons and air strikes. At 1820H, a BDA of air strikes found 7 KIA and 17 KIA.

(15) 5 December: While conducting Night Hawk operations at 0030H, 10 kms northeast of FSB Vicky, a UH-1M (INFLY) from Co D, 227th AHB received automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force. Utilizing the night

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trackng equipment, the aircraft engaged the firing positions, killing 15 NVA.

(16) 6 December: While conducting ground reconnaissance 5 kms NNE of
FSB Jamie, A/2-7 Cav and the Minh Tanh CIDG engaged an unknown sized enemy
force, receiving small arms, .30 caliber machine gun and RPG fire in return.
Artillery, ARA and air strikes supported. Heavy contact continued until
1515H when the enemy retreated. The action resulted in 23 NVA KIA, 15 KIA
and 7 KIA, and 12 AK-47 rifles, 1x60mm mortar, 1x.51 caliber machine gun and
1 Chicom radio destroyed; 70x60mm mortar rounds were captured. US casualties
were 4 WIA.

(17) 7 December:

(a) At 1730H, the Recon Platoon, E/1-8 Cav, 3 kms southwest of FSB
Pt. Compton, spotted and engaged an unknown sized enemy force and received
automatic weapons and E-40 rocket fire in return. Tac Air, ARA and artillery
were employed and a sweep of the contact area found 6 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47 rifles,
2 RPG rocket launchers, 6 RPG rounds, and 1x.51mm pistol. There were no friendly

(b) At 1523H, 4 kms northwest of FSB Jamie, Co D, 2-7 Cav spotted
several enemy soldiers and engaged them with organic weapons, receiving auto-
matic weapons, RPG and .30 caliber machine gun fire in return. ARA, artillery
and air strikes supported the contact. There were 8 NVA KIA, 6 KIA and 5
KIA, and 1x.30 caliber machine gun destroyed. Friendly casualties were
4 US WIA.

(c) During a Nighthawk (INFANT) operation at 0245H, 7 kms southeast
of FSB Vivian, a OH-1H from D/227th AHC received automatic weapons fire. Util-
izing the night tracking equipment, the aircraft engaged the enemy positions
with organic weapons and artillery. Results: 10 NVA KIA.
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(a) At 1715E, 60 meters northwest of Bu Dop, while conducting aerial reconnaissance, an A-10C and an AH-64 gunship from B/1-9 Cav received heavy machine gun fire. Suspected enemy firing positions were engaged with organic weapons, artillery, and air strikes resulting in 8 WIA, 3 KIA, and 5 KIA.

(b) At 1820E, while conducting aerial reconnaissance, 300 meters northeast of FMD Jamie, A/2-7 Cav and an AH-64 from A/2-9 Cav received heavy automatic weapons and .50 caliber fire. Co A (-) engaged suspected enemy firing positions with organic weapons, B-40, .30, and .50 caliber fire. With the support of artillery, B-40, and air strikes, Co A (-) pressed the attack and cleared the PZ. The remaining enemy elements surrendered toward the east. Co A (-) received no casualties.

(c) At 1820E, 60 meters northeast of Bu Dop, while conducting aerial reconnaissance, an A-10C and an AH-64 gunship from B/1-9 Cav received heavy machine gun fire. Suspected enemy firing positions were engaged with organic weapons, artillery, and air strikes resulting in 8 WIA, 3 KIA, and 5 KIA.

(d) At 1820E, while conducting aerial reconnaissance, an A-10C and an AH-64 from B/1-9 Cav received heavy machine gun fire. Suspected enemy firing positions were engaged with organic weapons, artillery, and air strikes resulting in 8 WIA, 3 KIA, and 5 KIA.

(e) At 1820E, while conducting aerial reconnaissance, an A-10C and an AH-64 from B/1-9 Cav received heavy machine gun fire. Suspected enemy firing positions were engaged with organic weapons, artillery, and air strikes resulting in 8 WIA, 3 KIA, and 5 KIA.
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(19) 17 December: The Infantry Platoon, C/7-9 Cav attacked a .51 caliber machine gun position 3 kms north of FSB Judie. Heavy automatic weapons fire was received on insertion and was returned with organic weapons as the platoon was extracted. The area was engaged with artillery, ARA and air strikes and the results were 3 NVA KIA, 10 KBH, 10 KBARGY and 15 KBH.

(20) 12 December:

(a) At 0100H while conducting Nighthawk (INFANT) operations 8 kms north of FSB Janie, a UB-IH from D/227th AHR and a UB-IM from D/227th AHR, utilizing night tracking equipment, spotted two enemy vehicles. The targets were engaged with organic weapons resulting in 5 NVA KBH, 1 vehicle destroyed and 1 secondary explosion.

(b) While in support of elements of the 6th ARVN Abn Bn at 0715H, 2 kms north of FSB Judie, an AH-1G from C/2-20 Art engaged several enemy soldiers in the open and engaged them with organic weapons. Results of the engagement were 10 NVA KIAR.

(c) At 0155H during the conduct of Nighthawk operations 4 kms NNE of FSB Judie, a team from AAD/227th AHR and an AC47 aircraft engaged enemy firing positions with organics and the combined US-Vietnamese operation accounted for 4 NVA KBH and 7 KBA.

(21) 13 December: While conducting Nighthawk operations at 0350H, 13 kms north of FSB Joan, a team from AAD/227th AHR received ground-to-air fire. The enemy firing positions were engaged with organics resulting in 12 NVA KBH. At 0630H, 2 kms southwest of FSB Grant, during the conduct of Nighthawk (INFANT) operations, a team from AAD/227th AHR spotted two lights near a road. The area was engaged with organic weapons. Small arms and .30 caliber machine gun fire were received in return. The team engaged the area with organics, result...
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In two secondary explosions and 5 NVA KIA. At 2205H 10 kms NNE of FSB
Julie, an INFANT team from AAD/227th AEB spotted a camp fire. The area
was engaged with organic weapons and the aircraft received heavy automatic weapons
and .51 caliber machine gun fire in return. The enemy firing positions were
engaged with organics and artillery, resulting in 6 NVA KIA.

(22) 15 December: During ground reconnaissance at 0625H 3 kms east of
Bo Duc, F/2-11 ACR and 2/1-9 ARVN observed an unknown size enemy force and
engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery, ARA, LFT's and air
strikes. The enemy returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons and B-40
fire. B/1-11 ACR reinforced the friendly forces and contact broke as the enemy
withdrew. A pursuit followed and contact was reestablished. When he finally
retreated from the area the enemy left behind 41 KIA and 10 KHI, and 2 PW,
2x60mm mortars, 2 light machine guns, 2 SKS rifles, 1 B-41 rocket launcher,
2 B-40 rocket launchers and 4 AK-47 rifles were captured. US casualties were
4 KIA and 18 WIA.

(23) 17 December:

(a) At 0945H, while on ground reconnaissance 4 kms southwest of FSB
Jamie, D/2-7 Cav observed several individuals and engaged with organic weapons
on LFT and air strikes. They received small arms and automatic weapons fire
in return. Contact broke as the enemy withdrew and the company begun a sweep
of the contact area at 1350 hours. Snipers were spotted in trees and engaged
with organics and artillery. The enemy returned fire with small arms and
artillery, air strikes and organics were employed. Contact broke at 1430H and
the sweep continued. Results were 7 NVA KIA, 6 KHI, 4 KBA. Friendly
losses were 5 WIA.

(b) At 1700H, 4 kms south of FSB Jamie, an OH-6A from the 1st
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Brigade Scouts and an AH-1G from D/229th AHB spotted 15-20 enemy soldiers in the open. The enemy force was engaged with organic weapons and an air strike. The action resulted in 10 enemy KIA and 5 KUH.

(24) 24 December: At 0745H, 12 kms NNE of Loc Ninh, aircraft for the 11th ACT spotted several enemy soldiers moving across an open area. They were engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery and air strikes. Results were 30 NVA killed.

(25) 27 December: At 0720H, 12 kms NNE of Loc Ninh, an OH-6A from the 11th ACN observed, engaged and killed an enemy soldier. Continuing reconnaissance in the area, the aircraft spotted 7 more individuals and engaged them with organic weapons, receiving automatic weapons fire in return. Air strikes were employed, resulting in an additional 2 NVA killed. At 0755H, 2 kms to the east, the ACT aircraft spotted a large enemy force and 2 trucks in a treeline. This target was engaged with organics, with artillery and air strikes in support. The immediate response to the ACT sightings resulted in 69 NVA killed and 1x1½ ton truck destroyed.

(26) 28 December: While conducting aerial reconnaissance at 1325H 8 kms northwest of FSB Judie, C/1-9 Cav aircraft received heavy automatic weapons, .30 and .51 caliber machine gun fire from several positions. The enemy firing positions were engaged with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes. Results were 5 NVA killed. At 1720H, 4 kms to the east, C Troop spotted several enemy soldiers and engaged them, supported by artillery and air strikes. This action resulted in 41 NVA killed and 1x.51 caliber machine gun destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.

(27) 30 December: At 1515H in an area 10 kms northwest of FSB Lee, an OH-6A from B/1-9 Cav drew heavy automatic weapons fire and engaged the firing
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positions with organic weapons. There were 7 NVA KIA. The aircraft sustained three hits and made a precautionary landing. The B Troop Infantry Platoon was inserted to provide security for and assist in the extraction of the downed aircraft. A series of ground-to-air firings occurred throughout the remainder of the afternoon and resulted in an additional 22 NVA KIA. The aircraft and the platoon were extracted by 1755H.

(28) 2 January: While occupying a defensive position, 7 km southwest of FSB Judie, the 1st Co, 8th ARVN Abn Bn received automatic weapons, B-40 and 60mm mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force at 0315H. The enemy fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and ARA. Throughout the day and into the night, the contact continued as the 1st Co employed all forms of fire support, to include air strikes and one RVNAF AC47 gunship. Contact was broken at 1935H as the enemy retreated. A check of the contact area found 45 NVA killed, 5 AK-47 rifles and 1 B-40 rocket launcher. There were 5 ARVN KIA.

(29) 5 January:

(a) Approximately 7 km northwest of FSB Pt. Compton, the 1st Platoon, A/1-7 Cav established an automatic ambush near a well-used trail. At 0815H, the ambush was activated, resulting in 2 NVA killed and 1 AK-47 rifle captured. A 2d Platoon, A/1-7 Cav automatic ambush was activated at 1040H and resulted in 2 NVA killed and 2 AK-47 rifles captured.

(b) Three km west of FSB Diarn, the 3d Co, 3d ARVN Abn Bn received sniper fire from an unknown size enemy force at 0845H. It returned fire with organic weapons and the enemy retreated from the area. Artillery and air strikes were placed on the enemy routes of withdrawal. A sweep of the contact area at 1715H found 25 NVA killed, 6 AK-47 rifles and 1 B-40 rocket launcher. There were no friendly casualties.

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(30) 6 January: At 0820H, 6 km northwest of FSB Jude, Co D and the Recon Platoon/2-5 Cav engaged an enemy force with organic weapons, artillery, ARL and air strikes. Heavy automatic weapons and B-40 fire was received in return. The enemy withdrew. At 1330H, all elements began to sweep the contact area and Co B and the Recon Platoon engaged several individuals, receiving automatic weapons fire in return. Contact broke and 6 NVA KIA were found. Friendly casualties were 2 US WIA. At 1445H, continuing the sweep of the area, Company B and the Recon Platoon engaged a second enemy force and received automatic weapons fire in return. The results were 5 NVA KIA and no friendly casualties. At 1450H, the two units found 6 B-40 rocket launchers and 5 AK-47 rifles. At 1500H, D/2-5 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force with organics, receiving automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire in return. Artillery and ARL supported the contact which broke as the enemy withdrew. There were 6 NVA KIA. Friendly casualties were 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA. At 1515H, Co B and the Recon Platoon found 4 NVA KIA. At 1900H, the sweep of the contact area was completed. An additional 52 NVA killed were found for a total of 73 NVA killed. The sweep found 24 AK-47’s, 4 SKS rifles and 1 RPD machine gun.

(31) 7 January: At 0710H, 9 km NNE of FSB Jude, an unknown size enemy force placed heavy automatic weapons, B-40 and 82mm mortar fire on a 3d Co, 8th LRTN Abn BN NDFP. The enemy fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, ARL and air strikes. Contact broke at 1120H. A sweep of the contact area found 32 NVA KIA, 1x.51 caliber machine gun, 3 AK-47 rifles, 1 B-40 rocket launcher and 15 RPG rounds. There were no friendly casualties.

(32) 10 January: At 1115H, 6 km northwest of FSB Jude, D/2-7 Cav and the Ninth Thanh CIDG CRP observed 5-6 snipers in trees and engaged them.

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with organic weapons. They received heavy automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire from the snipers and an unknown size enemy force in bunkers. The U.S.-CIDG force, supported by artillery, LRL, and air strikes, engaged the snipers and the force in the bunkers. The action resulted in 41 NVL killed, 1x.30 caliber machine gun destroyed and 1 AK-47 rifle captured. Friendly casualties were 3 US WIA, 1 US MIA and 1 CIDG WIA.

At 174001, while continuing ground reconnaissance, the combined force re-established contact. Intense fire caused the enemy to retreat, leaving an additional 20 NVL killed and 1x.30 caliber machine gun destroyed. Friendly casualties were 4 CIDG WIA and 1 CIDG MIA.

(33) 11 January: At 131001 D/2-7 Cav and the Minh Thanh CIDG, while continuing their sweep of the 10 January contact area 5 kms northwest of FSB John, spotted several enemy snipers in trees and engaged them with organic weapons, artillery, LRL, a LFT and air strikes. The enemy replied with automatic weapons fire. At 132001, a sweep of the area was made and another enemy force of unknown size was observed and engaged by organic and supporting fires. Automatic weapons and .30 caliber machine gun fire was received from the NVL force. The enemy withdrew from the contact area leaving 15 NVL KIA and 2 RPD machine guns. There were no friendly casualties.

(34) 15 January: At 014501 FSB Carolyn, A/1-11 LCR and the 2d Co, 8th LAVN Bn began to receive 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. At 020001 the indirect fire attack was followed by a ground attack. The enemy force, an estimated company size unit with support support, was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, LRL and flareships. Contact broke at 030001 as the enemy withdrew, leaving behind 11 NVL killed, 1 NVL WIA, 3 B-40 rocket launchers, 1 2-41 rocket launcher and 5 AK-47 rifles. US casualties were 1 US KIA and 7 WIA.

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(35) 17 January: At 1950H 10 kms north of FSB Catcher, an unknown size enemy force activated an automatic ambush established by the Recon Platoon, 1-12 Cav. Shortly afterward, enemy movement was detected near an occupied ambush position. The suspected enemy location was engaged with claymore mines and fragmentation grenades, artillery, LRA and LC119 gunships. A second automatic ambush was activated at 2200H by the enemy force as it retreated from the area. A first light check of the ambush sites found 24 NVA killed, 5 AK-47 rifles and 1x7.9mm machine gun. There were no friendly casualties.

(36) 19 January:

(a) At 1500H 9 kms southeast of FSB Lee, aircraft from B/1-9 Cav observed several individuals and engaged them with organic weapons, resulting in 2 NVA killed. Continuing the mission, at 1525H the OH-6L again spotted an enemy force and engaged it with organics supported by artillery. At 1710H, the Troop B Rifle Platoon was inserted, and a sweep of the area found an additional 12 NVA killed. Upon completion of the sweep, the Platoon was extracted, at 1835H.

(b) At 0730H, XU973014, an enemy force activated an automatic ambush emplaced on a well-used trail. The Recon Platoon, 1-8 Cav swept the area and found 6 NVA killed.

(37) 20 January:

(a) At 1710H, 9 kms south of FSB Sandra, D/2-5 Cav spotted several enemy soldiers in a bunker complex, engaged them with organic weapons, artillery, LRA and air strikes, and received heavy automatic weapons fire in return. A sweep of the area at 1000H found 18 NVA killed.

(b) During the conduct of ground reconnaissance operations at 0945H 8 kms northeast of FSB Joan, the 2d and 4th Cos of the 8th LRBV Lbn 3n spotted 43
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An unknown size enemy force and engaged it with organic weapons, artillery and MA, and received heavy automatic weapons and D-40 rocket fire in return. The contact broke when the enemy retreated. The action resulted in 50 NVA killed, 6 AK-47 rifles and 1 light machine gun captured. Friendly casualties were 6 ARVN KIL and 16 ARVN WIA.

(c) At 1230H, YU400170, in response to reported ground-to-air firings, aircraft from C/1-9 Cav and C/2-20 Arty observed several individuals moving across an open area. The enemy force was engaged with organic weapons and 17 NVA killed resulted.

(d) Troops F and G, 2-11 ACR, in response to indirect firings at FSB Ruth and reported ground-to-air firings in the area, swept an area to the west of the FSB. Company H established blocking positions to the north. At 1530H, the Troops established contact with an unknown size enemy force and engaged it with organic weapons, 5 sections of MA and 14 air strikes. Automatic weapons and .51 caliber machine gun fire was received in return. The contact broke at 1645H. The action resulted in 27 NVA killed. Darkness precluded a complete search of the area.

(e) 21 January:

(a) In the 1st Cavalry Division AO on 21 January, there was a significant increase in enemy activity. There were 22 attacks by fire and 11 ground-to-air firings. The enemy employed 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars, 107mm rockets, and 75mm recoilless rifles against 13 different locations, including 6 IACD fire bases and field positions. FSB's Sandra and Buttons and the MLCV compound at Song Be received the greatest concentrations of fire attacks. The heaviest damage was inflicted on the old MLCV compound which took hits on its ammo dump and FOI point. Both were destroyed. Total casualties in these
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Attacks were: 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA from the 1ACD, and from other units there were 2 US KIA, 2 US WIA, 2 civilians WIA and 15 ARVN WIA. Total enemy losses for the day were 43 NVA killed by the 1st Cav Div, 35 NVA killed by the 11th ACR, and 17 NVA killed by ARVN Abn troops. Friendly casualties in all actions during the day were: 1ACD - 1 US KIA, 7 US WIA; 11th ACR - 1 US KIA, 13 US WIA; ARVN Abn - 15 ARVN WIA; 5th ARVN Div - 13 ARVN WIA.

(b) At 1800H 3 kms northwest of FSU Vicky, 8 aircraft from Troop A, 1-9 Cav, supported by LRA, began a search of an area in reaction to numerous reported ground-to-air firings. During the search the aircraft received automatic weapons and .51 caliber machine gun fire from an estimated 17 enemy positions. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes. Results were 15 NVA killed and 1x.51 caliber machine gun destroyed.

(c) While conducting ground reconnaissance 6 kms northeast of Loc Minh, C/1-11 ACR established contact with an unknown size enemy force and engaged it with organic weapons, LRA and a LPT. The enemy returned fire with heavy automatic weapons, .51 caliber machine guns and D-40's. Troop B, moving to reinforce Troop C, established contact with the enemy and engaged with organic weapons. Troop B continued to move to the Troop C position and the link-up was effected. The Troops continued to engage the enemy with organic and supporting weapons. Contact broke when the enemy retreated from the area. As Troops F&G/2-11 ACR moved to the contact area, Troop G received sporadic automatic weapons and RPG fire and engaged the enemy with organic weapons. Contact broke immediately and Troop G continued to move to the Troop C position. Upon arrival in that area, Troop F&G began a sweep to the east and made sporadic contact with the enemy. At 1650H, all contact was broken as the enemy retreated. Results were 35 NVA killed, and 1x.57mm recoilless rifle, 1x60mm
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mortar, 4 RPG-2 rocket launchers, 7 AK-47 rifles, 9x32mm mortar rounds, 16
60mm mortar rounds and 6 D-40 rounds captured. Friendly casualties were 1 US
KIA and 9 US WIA.

(39) 25 January: Companies C and D/229th ARVN, approximately 4 kms northwest of FS3 Vicky, received .51 caliber machine gun fire. The aircraft engaged
the enemy firing position. Nine NVN were killed and 1x.51 caliber machine gun
was destroyed.
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2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel
   (1) Awards and Decorations
      (a) OBSERVATION - The number of Army Commendation Medals for Valor processed this quarter has increased drastically to the point that the current method of processing is inadequate to cope with the volume.
      (b) EVALUATION - A new system has been developed which utilizes standardized pre-cut General Orders Forms and the Xerox reproductive process rather than stencils which had to be individually typed. Recommendations need not be delayed for rewrite or stencil typing and reproducing. Through a utilization of the pre-cut General Orders Forms and the Xerox 720, the processing of the ARCOM Valor Awards has been greatly simplified and expedited in spite of significantly increased volume.
      (c) RECOMMENDATION - None. The new system has proven to be highly successful.
   (2) Christmas Personnel Augmentation.
      (a) OBSERVATION - To process the increased mail during the Christmas season, additional personnel were assigned to the LPO and adequately trained to prevent mail mishandling and delay.
      (b) EVALUATION - Based on after-action reports of the 1969 Christmas mailing period, the Division Postal Officer requested forty additional personnel. The Christmas augmentees arrived between 1 October and 15 November 1969 and were assigned duties to allow on-the-job training with experienced postal clerks. Thus, Christmas mail for the Division was not delayed due to inexperienced personnel and lack of training.
      (c) RECOMMENDATION - That Christmas augmentees be assigned prior to the Christmas mail increase and be given sufficient on-the-job training to insure that mail is processed without delay.
   (3) Special Services
      (a) OBSERVATION - The most important aspect of the Division's Special Services operations is supplying entertainment for troops on the forward Fire Support Bases. Over a period of months, it became apparent that there were difficulties in coordinating the visits of these shows. Lack of transportation, lack of suitable performance area and lack of details to assist in handling baggage and equipment were some of the more severe symptoms of this problem.
      (b) EVALUATION - In order to assure that proper coordination was being made with the appropriate office, Special Services prepared and distributed an Entertainment Coordination Checksheet. This form insures that vital area such as name of show, name and duty position of person notified, date of performance, electrical requirements and transportation requirements are covered in the coordination for each FSB to be visited. In addition, coordination is now made only on an officer-to-officer or senior non commissioned officer-to-senior non commissioned officer basis. This system has been in effect for several weeks, and a marked improvement in coordination has resulted. Facilities and transportation at FSB's have been substantially improved since this new system was implemented.
      (c) RECOMMENDATION - None
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(4) Chaplain Rotation
(a) OBSERVATION - The policy of rotating Chaplains to another unit after six months was implemented this quarter.
(b) EVALUATION - Commanders were initially reluctant to concur with the change of a Chaplain in whom they had confidence. However, once the change took place, commanders found that new Chaplains brought with them new insights and enthusiasm resulting in improved service.
(c) RECOMMENDATION - That wherever possible, the policy of rotating Chaplain after six months be used.

(5) Officer Management
(a) OBSERVATION - In order to reduce the large summer rotation hump of non-rotated combat arms majors, the Division instituted an infusion program. Nine officers with a DEROS in July of August were selected for transfer outside the Division during a four-month period (October 1969 - January 1970).
(b) EVALUATION - Although the concept of an infusion program is excellent, in practice it did not achieve all of the desired goals. USARV was unable to replace the transferred majors on a man-for-man basis, resulting in a shortage of combat arms majors since the first of November.
(c) RECOMMENDATION - That an infusion program be carefully evaluated before being used in the future. The problems of the summer rotational hump can be dealt with by distributing the personnel who rotate in the summer throughout the Division. This will prevent a particular unit or staff section from losing all its key people at one time.

(6) Central Post Fund (CPF)
(a) OBSERVATION - In the past, it seemed to be the practice of the Central Post Fund Council to restrict the maximum amount of income each year, thus leaving no funds available for special grants to units in need, and other worthwhile Division projects. This restriction was implemented on an annual basis and predicated on the annual budget and request for funds that participating agencies submitted. This practice resulted in an overrestriction of CPF funds for the year. At the end of the year, it was also noted that some participating agencies were actually using far less money than had been allocated to them.
(b) EVALUATION - A more realistic approach to this situation would be to restrict funds on a quarterly basis. Units and agencies requesting grants will be more aware of their needs for each quarter than they are for a complete year. This approach was applied to the third quarter FY 1970 with the result of 7 grant requests being approved that would have had to be refused in the past.
(c) RECOMMENDATION - That Central Post Fund Councils evaluate requests for grants at the beginning of each quarter, based on the previous quarter's expenditures.

(7) Malaria Control
(a) OBSERVATION - Interviews with recently assigned in-country transfers revealed that personnel from certain areas of Vietnam were not previously required to take the prophylactic treatment for Ptochoparum Malaria. Additionally, certain hospitals (ie., 95th EVAC HOSP) do not issue the daily Dapsone tablet.
(b) EVALUATION - It cannot be assumed that in-country transfers realize the requirement or the need for taking the Dapsone tablet. Constant supervision, early orientation and frequent reminders are necessary to ensure personnel comply with the lst Cavalry Division (AM) requirements.
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(a) RECOMMENDATION - That an orientation briefing concerning malaria and the necessity for following the prescribed prophylactic treatment be conducted for all in-country transfers. Control measures must be established at the basic unit level to insure the treatment is followed.

b. Intelligence

(1) Hoi Chanhs

(a) OBSERVATION - Exploitation of Hoi Chanhs.

(b) EVALUATION - When Hoi Chanhs are placed in the Provincial Chieu Hoi Center, they are reluctant to talk and will not divulge information of intelligence value until they become accustomed to their new environment. Too many times, after initial interrogation, these personnel are often forgotten or ignored.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - Daily follow-up targeting to the Chieu Hoi Center by IFW or Intelligence Teams in order to obtain intelligence information, once the Hoi Chanhs feels free to talk.

(2) Efficient Utilization of Hoi Chanhs

(a) OBSERVATION - Hoi Chanhs are exploitable and often provide information of tactical significance.

(b) EVALUATION - The Hoi Chanhs is one of the best sources of timely information concerning enemy units. Every effort should be made to capitalize on his knowledge immediately after he rallies. The preferred method is to place the willing Hoi Chanhs with an American unit, dressed in an American uniform, functioning as a guide while the unit exploits his knowledge of the enemy. Care should be taken to provide the necessary security to dispel the Hoi Chanhs's fear of returning to his former unit's location.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That every effort be made to immediately exploit the Hoi Chanhs's knowledge of an area. When eligible for payment, Hoi Chanhs should be promptly rewarded. Prompt payment will often encourage other less cooperative Hoi Chanhs to volunteer information.

(3) Reproduction of Captured Documents

(a) OBSERVATION - Coordination of intelligence efforts with GVN officials and higher and adjacent headquarters requires that documents be forwarded without sufficient time for detailed readout.

(b) EVALUATION - In general, coordination with GVN officials requires passing captured documents to them for evaluation and exploitation. Additionally, current policy for handling of captured documents requires forwarding to higher headquarters within a limited time frame. The availability of photo copy processing equipment or other rapid reproduction means would permit brigade size headquarters to duplicate these documents without damaging them, yet retaining the full details of the document. Copies of the original document could be used for lateral dissemination and retention at the brigade while original copies are forwarded through normal intelligence channels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That photo copy equipment be made available to brigade intelligence sections for rapid reproduction of captured documents.

c. Operations

(1) Automatic Ambush

OBSERVATION - The automatic ambush has significantly increased the number of successful ambush contacts.
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(b) EVALUATION - Since the automatic ambush is an unmanned position, it is effective economy of force measure, maximizing area coverage and increasing interdiction capabilities along enemy infiltration and logistics routes. The automatic ambush eliminates possible compromise of the ambush site, precludes the employment of counter ambush techniques, and results in a highly favorable casualty rate.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That this ambush technique be employed in every case where the tactical situation permits.

(2) Ambush Technique

(a) OBSERVATION - The majority of successful ambushes have been initiated in the early morning hours from first light until approximately 1000 hours.

(b) EVALUATION - Units which have repeatedly left ambushes in position throughout the morning hours have accounted for the majority of the enemy casualties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That the technique of conducting a night ambush include leaving night ambushes in position until mid-morning to exploit enemy patterns of early morning movement.

(3) Stay-Behind Ambush

(a) OBSERVATION - The stay-behind ambush has proven successful in discouraging enemy tracker teams.

(b) EVALUATION - The enemy is quite adept in the art of tracking and often utilizes this technique to maintain surveillance of friendly units. One offensive security measure to counter this threat is the stay-behind ambush. It is normally employed after departing a log site or a night defensive position or when departing a contact area, but can also be utilized while on the move. If used while moving, the lead element moves to the side, establishes a hasty ambush and allows the remainder of the friendly unit to pass through the position. Further, the stay-behind ambush of platoon size may be left in place upon extraction of the company. Unmanned automatic ambushes may also be employed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That stay-behind ambushes be employed frequently as a security measure during ground reconnaissance operations and should be considered as appropriate during extraction operations and as a follow-up to enemy contact.

(4) Storage of Mortar Ammunition

(a) OBSERVATION - Several accidents have occurred as a result of an inadvertent selection of an improperly charged 81mm Mortar round. The majority of these incidents occur at night.

(b) EVALUATION - Despite the fact that squad leaders are required to check each round prior to firing, accidents have occurred through human error. A recently adopted system to assist in eliminating this liability involves the separation of differently charged rounds in the storage rack. Rounds of different charge are stored separately using an identifiable placement system, i.e., nose out for charge one, fin out for another.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That units establish a system for separating rounds of varying charge.
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(5) Meeting Engagements
   (a) OBSERVATION - Quick kill techniques and rapid engagement of
targets at close range (unaimed fire) are not producing the desired results.
   (b) EVALUATION - Too frequently the enemy is engaged with negligible
results in a meeting engagement. Contributory factors include inadequate
skill in quick kill and unaimed fire techniques. One brigade intends to
re-evaluate the shotgun for use by point men in operations in dense
vegetation to provide area coverage fire power.
   (c) RECOMMENDATIONS - 1. That quick kill techniques be stressed
during fire base training. 2. That the shotgun be utilized by point per-
sonnel to provide area coverage fire power.

(6) Close-in Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) Support
   (a) OBSERVATION - The use of railroad flares facilitates close in
support by ARA during darkness.
   (b) EVALUATION - The marking of a unit’s perimeter is imperative
to attain close-in ARA support. Units have used the railroad flare to
mark NDP’s during ARA support and have been told it is highly desirab-
by the ARA pilots. The flares are easily seen and do not disclose friendly
elements to the enemy.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION - That unit commanders consider the use of rail-
road flares to mark positions when requesting close-in ARA support.

(7) Communication Between Combined Staffs
   (a) OBSERVATION - Communication between combined staffs can be
increased by utilization of dual language forms.
   (b) EVALUATION - By utilizing dual language spot reports (made in
duplicate) in a combined TOC and dual language charts in a combined
briefing, communication can be facilitated between units speaking different
languages. Additionally, frequently used abbreviations can be listed with
the corresponding Vietnamese next to it to aid in the communication effort.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION - That emphasis be place on duality in all forms
of communications during combined operations.

(8) Lending Panels
   (a) OBSERVATION - Lending panels at a fire support base expedite
airmobile operations.
   (b) EVALUATION - Brightly colored panels have been staked to the
ground at selected Fire Support Bases. The panels are spaced to mark the
position of each aircraft in a flight and are installed in a suitable
landing area. Flights can land directly to the panels with proper spacing.
The panels also assist the organization of troops on the PZ.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION - Similar panels should be installed on assault
strips at FSB’s whenever practical.

(9) Preplanned Fires on Log Sites and NDP’s
   (a) OBSERVATION - Enemy personnel normally move into log sites
and NDP’s after the unit has vacated it in an attempt to salvage rations,
equipment, etc.
   (b) EVALUATION - By placing artillery fires on NDP’s and log sites
at varying times 24-48 hours after departure of friendly units, the enemy
is "kept honest" and very probably suffers casualties. Stay-behind
ambushes have been effective, but often require a unit remaining in place
for extended periods, normally 48-72 hours.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION - That artillery fires be used in lieu of, or in addition to, stay-behind ambushes to inflict casualties on enemy personnel moving into vacated log sites or NAP's.

(10) Use of White Phosphorous Grenades by Scouts
(a) OBSERVATION - When marking targets for air strikes or ground-to-air firing, the white phosphorous grenade is more effective than the colored smoke grenade.
(b) EVALUATION - Some units have experienced instances where effective fires were not brought on enemy targets because of the use of colored smoke. The smoke filters up too slowly through the jungle canopy and then disperses too quickly. When white phosphorous grenades are employed there is a large volume of smoke that can be seen immediately. The white phosphorous is also an effective means for destruction of bridges and bamboo huts.
(c) RECOMMENDATION - White phosphorous grenades should be carried by about aircraft and be used for marking. The personnel should be trained in their use, and the dangers involved in handling white phosphorous. The white phosphorous must also be protected from small arms fire with armor plating.

(11) Expedient Emplacements
(a) OBSERVATION - The requirement exists for an expedient way to dig emplacements for TOC's, DOC's and medical bunkers on artillery raids.
(b) EVALUATION - The large number of artillery raids being conducted has resulted in a lack of bulldozers for many of them.
(c) RECOMMENDATION - Cratering charges (employed in the relief-faced crater method) provide an adequate, fast method of digging such an emplacement. A two man chainsaw with earth auger attachment is used to dig the charge holes. The cratering charges are emplaced and back filled. After detonation there remains a hole, requiring only to be shaped by hand shoveling, which provides an excellent emplacement for the required structure(s). This method serves to reduce the logistics and "blade time" required to support an artillery raid, and is more responsive to the commander.

(12) Scout Dog Teams
(a) OBSERVATION - A scout dog working at or near the point tires after approximately 30 minutes and becomes largely ineffective; however, after a rest his effectiveness is restored.
(b) EVALUATION - The scout dog can be an important asset to the ground unit provided the dog is rested every 30 minutes by moving it back to the middle of the column. The handler can then convey to the dog that he is off duty and may rest. If another dog team is with the unit, it can be brought forward, thereby providing full time scout dog support to the point element. Some handlers feel that the "resting" dog rests better knowing that another dog is up front working.
(c) RECOMMENDATION - That scout dog teams be employed in pairs.

(13) Protection for Explosive Components Used in the Construction of Flame Fougasse
(a) OBSERVATION - Weathering effects on detonating cord and dynamite have caused flame fougasse to malfunction.
(b) EVALUATION - It has been found that by eliminating the detonating cord and placing three sticks of dynamite along with a WP grenade in a 2.75" rocket warhead canister, these explosive components would be protected from the weathering effects and the flame fougasse will function for a longer time.
period of time. Included with the explosives in the workings canister is an electric blasting cap and a ball of C4 (approx 1.5" diameter). The C4 is molded around the cap which is placed between the three sticks of dynamite and taped together. The system is placed to the rear of the drum and forty sandbags are placed over the explosive canister and drum. When the device is detonated, flame is projected over the target area. (See Figure A)

c) RECOMMENDATION - That weathering protection be given to munitions used in the construction of flame fougasse.

(14) Firing Box for Electrically Detonated Defensive Devices

(a) OBSERVATION - Many firing wires run into the bunkers on the various perimeters. It has become difficult to determine the firing wire needed to detonate any given one of the several defensive devices.

(b) EVALUATION - It has been determined that a better system was needed to electrically detonate fougasse and other devices around perimeters. A firing box was fabricated using existing materials readily available. This box has one common ground for all firing points and will accommodate from one to fifteen different electrical firing systems. Each terminal is labeled as to the location and type of firing system. (See Figure B)

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That firing boxes be constructed for each bunker that has numerous firing wires running into it.

(15) Chemical Flame Field Expedients

(a) OBSERVATION - Fougasse and Husch flares are commonly used to augment fire support base defenses. More often than not, they are added to the defensive perimeter weeks after the base is constructed and fall into a "nice to have" category. This situation generally decreases the potential effectiveness of these flame devices.

(b) EVALUATION - Husch flares, constructed from 175mm powder cans and 55 gallon drums of napalm with culvert reflectors, are capable of illuminating large, predesignated sectors of fire forward of the defensive wire. The use of these devices allows the commander to use all direct and indirect fire assets in a defensive fire role. Since Husch flares will burn for as long as eight hours, continuous observation of the forward area is facilitated and the probability of sapper infiltration is decreased. Husch flares are reusable and easily replenished, provided they are emplaced in areas accessible to personnel of the fire base. Fougasse, constructed by filling 55 gallon drums with napalm, can deliver massive flame on the attacking enemy. The fougasse is a command detonated weapon and must be integrated into the base defense fire plan to be effective. Personnel manning the perimeter should be made aware of what the fougasse can accomplish and when to use it. The device requires little maintenance but must be checked periodically to insure that the electrical connections are secure. Sappers are wary of fougasse, and will disarm them given the chance. On 4 November 1969, a fire support base came under attack by sappers and every fougasse in the sector attacked by the main enemy body had been disarmed. The devices must be kept under constant surveillance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That fougasse and Husch flares be considered during planning stages of fire base construction and refurbishing. The planners must coordinate with the engineers to provide access for the maintenance and replacement of flame devices. The emplacement should not be
Electric Blasting Cap

WP Grenade

Lead Wires

Piece of C-4

3 Sticks of Dynamite

55 Gal. Drum

2.75" Rocket Warhead Shipping Container with the Following:

- 3 Sticks Dynamite
- 1 WP Grenade
- 1 Electric Blasting Cap
- 1 Piece C-4

Electrical Lead Wires to Power Source

Ground Level

FIGURE A
Bolts for securing Gunson Ground Plate

Lead Wire to common ground

Claymores; Pouches, Etc.

Lead Wire to firing post

With hot Lead Wire make contact with any firing post, 1 through 12 and the corresponding mine will detonate

FIGURE 3
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- **Naphazad, but integrated into the main defense plan. The use of fougasse and Hush flares should be encouraged and they should be fired often to familiarize troops with their capabilities. Hush flares should be used on the dark nights of the new moon phase of the month. Flame devices should be installed as soon as possible, preferably immediately after the final protective wire is strung.**

**d. Organization**

1. **Medical Supplies for the Maneuver Battalion**
   - **Observation** - Difficulty in providing medical supplies to the maneuver battalions through the medical companies has been experienced.
   - **Evaluation** - Problems encountered in providing medical logistics support to maneuver battalions are due primarily to the fact that trained medical supply personnel are not authorized at company level.
   - **Recommendation** - That the medical supply MOS authorization for the Medical Battalion (AM) be increased by four (4). That required medical supplies be issued to the maneuver battalions directly by the Division Medical Supply Officer and that only a pick-up point for medical supplies be established at the medical companies.

2. **Training**
   - **Observation** - The critical lack of trained NCO's must be overcome.
   - **Evaluation** - The selection of a few experienced NCO's who have less than 30 days to teach an NCO training course at the fire support base would be very beneficial. Basically, they would teach the squad to potential squad leader how to be a better combat leader. Our junior enlisted men need someone with experience to show them what must be accomplished each day; how to account for equipment; how to anticipate supply needs; how to handle the myriad of common problems which repeatedly arise in any squad. In addition, the maintenance of these facilities and other training sites needed to take advantage of the training opportunities that fire base duty affords.
   - **Recommendation** - That small training cadre be established at each fire support base.
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(2) Boat Operation and Maintenance Training

(a) OBSERVATION - Training in operations and maintenance procedures is essential for small watercraft.

(b) EVALUATION - During the period 4-6 November 1969, selected supervisory, operational and maintenance personnel from 2-8 Cav, 1st Cav Division Artillery, and Maintenance Support Detachment from the 27th Maintenance Battalion were instructed and supervised by Mr. Grossman, Technical Representative from Customer Assistance Office, USAVMECOM in the fundamental techniques of small watercraft operations, and the procedures for organizational and direct support maintenance of Johnson 40 HP outboard motors. The instruction was geared toward teaching operator personnel how to use the Kenner Ski Burg and Boston Whaler safely during waterborne operations. Maintenance personnel were instructed and shown how to make the required adjustments, how to trouble shoot, what to disassemble and what not to disassemble on the 40 HP outboard motors. The direct support maintenance personnel and supervisors as well as organizational mechanics and supervisors were given an identity by Federal Stock Number of the prescribed load list repair parts necessary for maintenance support of the 40 HP outboard motors. During this period, initial requisitions for the necessary repair parts were submitted to Marine Maintenance Activity, Dot4, Saigon. Coordination was made to insure continued direct support and a constant source of serviceable 40 HP outboard motors as required for support of tactical waterborne operations. Each boat operator was given a 30 minute period at the controls of the boat using the techniques previously explained in class. The operators performed a series of entries into the Song Be River, executed turns and maneuvers up and down the river and made a series of landings designed to maintain maximum controllability and maneuverability of the boat while approaching river banks or docking sites.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That a standard operations and maintenance course be designed and presented to units designated to operate and maintain small watercraft.
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f. Logistics.
   (1) Change from Class Officer Concept to Commodity Manager Concept.
       (a) OBSERVATION - Considerable difficulty was being encountered in obtaining various types of supplies from Long Binh Depot.
       (b) EVALUATION - A change in the organization of the Division Supply Office from the Class Officer concept to Commodity Manager concept allows closer supervision and management of all supplies. It also insures close coordination with the managers of Depot, ICCV and USARV G-4.
       (c) RECOMMENDATION - That the Commodity Manager Concept be used wherever possible.

   (2) Project Trim.
       (a) OBSERVATION - Project Trim was established by the C3, 1st Cavalry Division, to reduce vehicle accidents and the number of ¾ ton vehicles on hand in the division, and to eliminate "joy riding" and the misuse of government vehicles.
       (b) EVALUATION
           1. To implement Project Trim, the following actions were taken:
              a. A systematic scheduled inspection program was initiated to identify ¾ ton vehicles eight years or older, mileage in excess of 50,000 miles, cracked or bent frames, unserviceable engines or transmissions.
              b. The C3 established the authorized level of ¾ ton vehicles in each unit, and in practically all units the authorized level was adjusted to less than MTOE authorization.
              c. Vehicle assets above unit authorized levels were redistributed within the division or turned in.

           2. Project Trim accomplished the desired objectives and has proven to be an effective tool to identify vehicles for salvage and retrograde, thus eliminating potential maintenance problems.
       (c) RECOMMENDATION - That Project Trim be used periodically to cull vehicles that are potential maintenance problems from a unit's fleet.

   (3) Aircraft Parts Delivery From Depot to DSU.
       (a) OBSERVATION - The lack of an effective distribution system for delivery of aircraft parts required the establishment of procedures that would preclude unnecessary delay in the movement of aircraft repair parts from AMMC depot, 34th Group in Saigon to the DSU's located at Long Thanh and Phu Loi.
       (b) EVALUATION
           1. A concept was developed that specified that under no circumstances would an EDP repair part remain in the Saigon Depot overnight. In accordance with this concept, provisions were established whereby if ground transportation was not available to move EDP parts from the Depot, organic air transportation, to include CH-47, would be used if necessary. The air mission would be provided on a continuing stand-by basis and would be available immediately upon request by the support maintenance battalion.

           2. This procedure has greatly expedited the delivery of essential repair parts and is considered to be a significant factor in reducing the division NGBS rate.

           3. Since it is essential that the NGBS rate be kept to a minimum to ensure maximum operational ready rates, this plan is considered vital. A continuing review should be made of parts movement procedures to insure that there is no unnecessary delay in getting parts when they are needed.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION - That the system for the distribution of aircraft repair parts be reviewed periodically and upgraded to satisfy mission requirements.

g. Communications,

Radio Telephone Communications,
(a) OBSERVATION - The AN/GRC-163 multichannel radio issued as an interim measure to replace the antiquated AN/MRC-112 is inadequate for use in the airborne division. In addition, the multiplexer TD-856 (P/TOC), another component of the AN/GRC-163, is experiencing a high deadline rate. Out of twenty-four (24) AN/GRC-163's on hand, ten (10) are currently deadlined because of these multiplexers. This item of equipment must be shipped to Sacramento, California to be repaired, and the turn around time is from 35-100 days which is totally unacceptable. Recently, the 13th Signal Battalion acquired two (2) MRC-69 radio relay terminals to alleviate the AN/GRC-163 problem. These MRC-69's are currently in operation and provide a highly reliable communications system.
(b) RECOMMENDATION - That the Signal Battalion (AM) be issued fifteen (15) AN/MRC-69 radio relay terminals as replacements for the AN/GRC-163's.

h. Material,
(1) Analysis of the TMRS Program.
(a) OBSERVATION - General improvement in TAERS knowledge and procedures.
(b) EVALUATION -
1. Reports from unit commanders indicate that classroom instruction in TAERS procedures is proving to be valuable within the division. Reports from CWM and technical assistance teams also indicate that unit personnel show improvement in TMRS knowledge and procedures.
2. The monthly Senior Aviation Commanders Seminar has been used to supplement the TMRS program for the 1st Cavalry Division. Each seminar includes a TMRS related problem and presentation. This program has been considered to be quite worthwhile in improving TAERS knowledge for commanders and supervisors as well as the overall aviation maintenance posture.
(c) RECOMMENDATION - That maintenance, instructions and seminars continue to include TAERS procedures.
(2) Dropping the 10" Sling (FSN: 2240 075 5001) From Use in the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).
(a) OBSERVATION - Several sling loads were dropped due to doughnut failure.
(b) EVALUATION - After investigation, it was discovered that the stitching in the 10" endless slings deteriorated in use before the webbing showed signs of becoming unserviceable. Several slings were found to appear in good condition, yet when taken apart exhibited weak and broken stitching between layers of webbing, therefore greatly reducing their lifting capacity with no visual sign of deterioration. This deterioration was not found with the 3 foot, 3 loop sling. In October, 10" endless slings were replaced by 3 foot, 3 loop
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Since this replacement, there have been no loads dropped through their failure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That the 10' endless sling be replaced by the 3 foot, 3 loop sling (PSN: 1670 753 5786).

(3) Required Maintenance on CH-47 and UH-1H Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION - A recent change in Aviation System Command (AVSCOM) policy extends the time factor on all CH-47 and UH-1H aircraft prior to retrograde for overhaul. This change in policy directs that the 10th Preventive Maintenance Periodic Inspection (PMPI) on CH-47 aircraft and 22d PMI on UH-1H aircraft must now be performed in-country. It also states that the time prerequisites are extended to 2400 hours on CH-47 and 3300 hours on all UH-1H aircraft. An overload of 18th PMI on CH-47 and 22d PMI on UH-1H aircraft requires an augmentation of qualified personnel due to the large number of man hours required.

(b) EVALUATION - In order to perform the required maintenance as a result of an increase in the time factor for retrograde, special tools and qualified personnel are required. In order to increase the overall Direct Support Company's capability, certain civilian contact terms were requested and subsequently made available by the 34th General Support Group. As a result of the high turnover rate in the division inventory, CH-47 aircraft are more capable of being adequately scheduled for their PMI than the CH-1H. It is anticipated that all Direct Support Detachments will perform the PMI with sufficient back-up support by Direct Support Companies of the Division.

(c) RECOMMENDATION -
1. That contact terms be made available to absorb excess PMI's beyond the capabilities of the Direct Support Companies.
2. That controlled scheduling techniques be practiced to insure proper utilization of the contact terms.
3. That advance scheduling for PMI should start four months prior to the required date.

4. Repair of Truck, 2d Con, 6x6, Dark, Fuel.

(c) OBSERVATION - Heavy use over rough terrain caused seven(7) each M-49M-49C fuel tankers to become inoperative due to cracked frames.

(b) EVALUATION - Special permission was obtained from higher headquarters to expand normal repair capabilities of the 17th Maintenance Battalion to weld the cracked frames of the deadline vehicles. Normal operation would be to salvage these vehicles and requisition replacements. Current availability of M-49-49C trucks is at a minimum.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That drivers of these vehicles be instructed on the importance of crossing small ditches straight on, rather than at an angle. The frame is capable of withstanding the weight of heavy loads on an even basis, but will not hold up under a twisting caused by angling across a ditch.

1. Other.

(1) Utilization of Night-Run Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION - Recent rollers have stated that aerial loudspeaker missions are more easily understood and have greater impact during the hours of darkness.

(b) EVALUATION -
1. During the hours of darkness, VC/NVA cadre cannot make noise to counter ASVOP broadcasts or they will be detected.
2. Villagers are not working at night and are usually centrally located.
3. A message repeated time after time during a period when a individual
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is trying to sleep has a greater psychological impact.

(3) RECOMMENDATION - PSYOP aerial loudspeaker missions should be continued during periods of darkness in areas of known VC/NVA units and/or VC controlled villages.

(2) Evaluation of Rally Point and Safe Area.

(a) OBSERVATION - Many villages under VC control do not rally because of unfamiliarity with terrain between their villages and VC-controlled areas. Rallyers are also afraid to move into open areas for fear of being fired on by helicopters.

(b) EVALUATION - A terrain feature familiar to the target audience is selected as a rally point. The point is identified by aerial loudspeaker broadcasts and broadcasts from a 250 watt loudspeaker on the rally point. The area selected for the rally point is designated a no fly/no fire zone in coordination with the local ground commander. The absence of artillery fire and aircraft, with the exception of the PSYOP aircraft, lends credibility to the Chieu Hoi appeals.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That a rally point be selected which is familiar to the target group or can be readily identified by the group. The rally point and surrounding area should be designated a no fly/no fire zone.

(3) Program Schedule for MEDCAPS/ICAPS.

(a) OBSERVATION - Scheduled MEDCAPS/ICAPS are meeting with greater success due to greater participation of units and more frequent visits to hamlets.

(b) EVALUATION - Prior to November 1969, units would participate in MEDCAPS/ICAPS on their own initiative. Greater emphasis has been placed on MEDCAPS/ICAPS and more coordination has been made between the 1 LCH Brigades and Province Officials. Battalions were notified that they would conduct more frequent MEDCAPS and were given a schedule of hamlets and dates on which they would be conducted. A battalion visits the same hamlet on repeated MEDCAPS, developing rapport with the villagers. This program has developed to the point that residents are being treated and the overall atmosphere between Vietnamese and US Forces has improved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - Scheduled MEDCAPS/ICAPS should continue to increase in frequency with the same units conducting them in the same hamlets to provide continuity.

(4) Inadequate Planning for Agricultural Civic Action Projects.

(a) OBSERVATION - Soil analysis studies should be conducted prior to planting crops in an unknown area to determine the correct crop for the soil and proper fertilizer to use.

(b) EVALUATION - A large crop of peanuts was planted on a farm in Phu Giao District by a civic action team in the hopes of obtaining a cash crop for the local hamlet. Initially, the peanut crop appeared to be growing well. The growth soon stopped and the crop made no further progress. The peanuts were obtaining insufficient nutrients because of the poor composition of the soil. The peanut crop was plowed under and a sorghum crop was planted in its place. This crop has done very well since sorghum requires less nutrients and the sorghum root structure penetrates deeper into the soil than peanuts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That a study of the soil be conducted prior to planting a crop to include natural soil drainage, composition and nutrient value. Soil test kits can be obtained to conduct these tests.

(5) Proper Identification of Kit Carson Scouts.

(a) OBSERVATION - Kit Carson Scouts on authorized leave have been arrested by Vietnamese Police for failure to have a Vietnamese civilian ID card.
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(b) EVALUATION - The Chieu Ho Center is required to issue a civilian ID card to each returnee while he is undergoing the GVN political indoctrination course. The time required to process ID cards at the Chieu Ho Center often exceeds the time the returnee is required to remain in the center. The 1 LCD recruits Ho Chi Minh at the Centers before the indoctrination course is finished. Immediately upon graduation the Ho Chi Minh are hired as Kit Carson Scouts. To obtain an ID card after release from the Chieu Ho Center, an application must be made at the Province capital. The application must be accompanied by a draft deferment. This deferment alone requires about two months to process.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - Close coordination with the Chieu Ho Center must be effected to insure that it issues civilian ID cards to Kit Carson Scouts prior to release from the Center.

(6) Inadequate Facilities for Kit Carson Scouts.

(a) OBSERVATION - Kit Carson Scouts were billeted in an overcrowded classroom co-located with US barracks in the First Team Academy area. Conflicts between US personnel and KCS trainees created an unfavorable impression on both groups.

(b) EVALUATION - The US personnel at the First Team Academy area are for the most part new arrivals in-country with no previous contacts with the Vietnamese. The KCS trainee is also making his initial contact with US personnel. The easy access to US billets enabled the undesirable KCS trainees to rummage and steal from the Americans. The impression conveyed was that all KCS trainees were untrustworthy. A new area was located outside the FTA providing improved facilities and separating US and Vietnamese personnel. The facility is close enough to the FTA to receive support for both mess and supply.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - Kit Carson Scout training facilities should be located in a separate area from US personnel. This permits the Scout's initial contact with Americans to be with his "Buddy" from the unit to which he will be assigned. The US soldier thus has his initial contact with a trained Scout and does not form an initial poor impression of the KCS program.

(7) Civic Action.

(a) OBSERVATION - In an area in which several different units are co-located, close and continuous coordination is necessary in establishing an effective civic action program.

(b) EVALUATION - The recent Youth Festival held in Tay Ninh by the Provincial Youth Service was supported by three major US units: 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group. The joint effort was extremely successful, due in part to the coordination effort by MACCMIIS personnel in the early stages of planning.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That emphasis be placed on the use of MACCMIIS personnel in the area as a coordinating agency in planning and executing civic action projects. This use of area advisory personnel also increases the probability that US units' efforts will support the GVN Pacification Program to the maximum extent.

(81 Kit Carson Scouts.

(a) OBSERVATION - The effectiveness of Kit Carson Scouts can be increased by overcoming two problem areas: One, the lack of communication between Scouts and US supervisors, and two, the lack of knowledge of many junior leaders as to the exact job of the KCS.

(b) EVALUATION - The major cause of dissatisfaction among Scouts is that they claim they are being required to do things they do not feel they should, such as being permanent point men or helping to fill sandbags. Many junior
leaders apparently feel they can communicate better by raising their voice or pushing the Scout in the direction they want them to go. The end result is ill will and an unwillingness on the part of the Scout to do anything that might call attention to himself and cause another unpleasant incident. Eventually, this leads to a desire for transfer or discharge. The initiation of a buddy system wherein a US "Buddy" goes to the First Team Academy for the last three days of the KCS training program should improve this situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That additional training in English be included in the Kit Carson PCT at training centers and that more extensive and intensive efforts be made to familiarize US junior leaders with the purpose, capabilities and limitations of the Scouts and procedures for their proper employment. The US-KCS "Buddy System" should be continued and closely monitored both at training centers and in the field to increase the effectiveness of the Scout.

(g) Psychological Operations - Materials.

(c) OBSERVATION - There is a lack of adequate Montagnard loudspeaker and broadcast tapes in the appropriate dialects, and pictorial leaflets.

(b) EVALUATION - Lack of these items has presented problems during psychological operations in areas populated by Montagnards.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That CPOC III CTZ devote considerable effort to developing such material and keep adequate supplies on hand.

(10) Back Filling Above Ground Perimeter Bunkers.

(a) OBSERVATION - Back filling above ground perimeter bunkers with a dozer frequently results in horizontal displacement or structural damage to the bunker.

(b) EVALUATION - Dozer operators tend to push fill with the blade at ground level. This causes considerable pressure on the bunker when the base of the fill material being pushed reaches the base of the bunker. This pressure results in horizontal displacement of the bunker or structural damage. The operator's view of the critical portion of the work area is restricted by the dozer blade and the pile of fill being pushed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - A dozer operator back filling bunkers should be closely supervised by an engineer guide. The guide should be placed off to the side of the bunker where he has an unrestricted view of the work site. The guide should stop the dozer when the leading edge of the pile of fill being pushed reaches the bunker. On subsequent pushers, the guide should direct the operator to work the fill over the first pile by elevating his blade. This method allows the dirt to roll against the bunker without generating unacceptable pressure. Final back filling and dressing of the back fill should be accomplished with shovels.

(11) Pneumprine Sprayer.

(a) OBSERVATION - Dust control is a major problem at the Cav's PEB's.
The solution is to find an effective method of pneuprimeing all areas where dust build-up is most prominent.

(b) EVALUATION - An attempt was made to connect spreading pipes onto 55 gallon drums of pneuprime and transport the result on the back of a ½ ton truck (mile). This method proved to be ineffective as the weight of the spreading pipes caused too much of a strain on the barrel fitting and was stripping the threads. A solution to this problem is to modify unserviceable water trailers in a manner that they can be used as pneuprime spreaders. By using the standard N-valve on the trailer, a pipe is run from the front of the trailer to the rear and led into a spreading pipe approximately five feet in length. This spreading pipe is braced from the frame of the water trailer, thus eliminating undue strain of the device.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970

(o) RECOMMENDATION - That unserviceable water trailers be appropriately modified so that they can be used as penprime spreaders at FSB's.

(1) Penpriming Sandbags.

(a) OBSERVATION - Sandbag emplacements were deteriorating much too fast, causing valuable time to be wasted on replacement of worn sandbags.

(b) EVALUATION - By using a broom and barrel of penprime, a fast, effective method is made available to apply a layer of penprime on sandbags, giving up to five times longer life to the structures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That all the units utilizing sandbags penprime completed structures.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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TAB C: Surveillance Information—

TAB D: Intelligence Activities—

TAB E: Training/Combat Developments—

TAB F: Key Personnel Reports—

TAB G: G-1 Activities—

TAB H: Division Quarterly Strength Report—

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TAB J: Replacement Report—

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TAB AE: Chemical Activities—

Incl A - U, W, X and Z wd HQ, DA

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AVHOC-RE-H (15 February 1970) 1st Inf
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
Period Ending 31 January 1970, ROC CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the period
ending 31 January 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
W. G. BARTEL, JR.
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
13 APR 1970

ATHOC-DST (15 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AN),
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFM-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATT: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 1st
Cavalry Division (AN) and concurs with the comments of endorsing head-
quartesrs.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Officer Management", page 47, paragraph
      2(3): noneoncur. The infusion program for the 1st Cavalry Division was
carefully evaluated, planned, and coordinated. The program involved 24
combat arms Majors with July 1970 DEROS and 13 with August 1970 DEROS.
The 1st Cavalry Division indicated that 15 non-rated combat arms Majors
would be retained with July 1970 DEROS, the remaining nine Majors would
be transferred during the period October 1969-January 1970 and be replaced
with incoming Majors. The program was implemented with eight Majors
infused and replaced and one Major extending his foreign service tour.

   (1) USARV records on the 1st Cavalry Division reflect the following:

      (a) With the transfer of two Majors under the infusion program during
      October 1969, plus DEROS losses and gains, the unit carried Majors over
      authorised on 1 November 1969.

      (b) With the infusion of two Majors plus DEROS losses and gains the
      unit carried two Majors over authorised on 1 December 1969.

      (c) Losses for the month of December far exceeded their gains.
      Although the two Majors under the infusion program were replaced, the two
      normal DEROS's and three UPs were not. This was due to the limited input
of combat arms Majors during the last two months of the reporting period.
Consequently, it was necessary to equitably distribute the available assets
in USARV.

      (d) All 1st Cavalry Division combat arms Major losses were replaced
during the month of January 1970.

   (2) Based on the above facts, the infusion program from October 1969
to January 1970 and the combat arms Major shortage from November 1969 to
January 1970 are totally unrelated.
b. Reference item concerning "Central Post Fund (CPF)", page 47, paragraph a(6): concur. While it apparently was the practice of the Phan Thiet CPF to restrict funds on a yearly basis, all other CPFs and the CPF have been restricting funds on a quarterly basis. This policy has been encouraged by the USARV CPF Council to provide tighter control of budgets and expenditures.

c. Reference item concerning "Hoi Chanh", page 48, paragraph 2b(1): concur. Hoi Chanh are one of the best sources of information and a continuous effort to capitalize on his knowledge is encouraged. Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

d. Reference item concerning "Efficient Utilization of Hoi Chanh", page 48, paragraph 2b(2): concur. This technique of immediate exploitation of a willing Hoi Chanh by placing him with an American unit can be extremely effective. However, MACV Directive 381-11 states that the unit can only detain a Hoi Chanh up to 48 hours. Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "Reproduction of Captured Documents", page 48, paragraph 2b(3): concur. A reproduction capability in brigade intelligence sections would permit the careful and detailed readout of captured documents as well as lateral dissemination. In response to a MACV request, the US Army Intelligence Material Support Office has accepted action to develop a portable copier suitable for field use. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

f. Reference item concerning "Medical Supplies for Maneuver Battalions", page 53, paragraph d(1): nonconcur in increasing medical supply MOS authorizations for the Medical Battalion by four spaces. Handling of medical supplies at company level does not warrant a trained medical supply specialist; 76F20, since minimal records and procedures are to be used. Concur in portion of the recommendation on medical supply pick-up and distribution. The Division Surgeon should establish through his MOS a method of distribution that best meets the local situation. Unit has been so advised.

g. Reference item concerning "Radio Telephone Communications", page 56, paragraph g: sufficient information is not available in the CRLL to evaluate the performance of the AN/GRC-163. The AN/GRC-163 is issued with three antenna configurations: a vehicle mounted whip; a mast mounted ground plane; and a mast mounted log periodic. If the unit is using the
AVROC-B? (15 Feb 70) 2d
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

AM/GERC-163 in situations beyond the design capability of the radio, results could be as reported. The TS-836 P/TCC Multiplexer is a repair and return item. USAECOM Area office verified that all of the Multiplexers have been returned to the unit. It should be noted that the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) is scheduled to receive 11 each AM/GERC-127s (6-12 channel equipment), as replacements for the currently authorized AM/GERC-163 Radio sets. The Radio AM/GERC-127 is the newest 2d generation Army Area Communication System (AACOMS) equipment. EIRs should be submitted on the performance of the AM/GERC-163; additionally, a separate request should be submitted for the AM/GERC-69. Unit has been so advised.

h. Reference item concerning "10 inch Sling", page 56, paragraph 2h(2): nonconcur. Insufficient information is presented to support a decision to replace the 10 inch sling. USARV Reg 725-7 states that an EIR will be submitted in the event of a sling failure. Engineering evaluations resulting from an EIR would determine future use of the item. This information has been passed to the unit. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

i. Reference item concerning "Required Maintenance on CH-47 and UH-1H Aircraft", page 57, paragraph 2h(3): concur. Civilian contract maintenance teams have been established within USARV to augment direct support companies in the performance of 18th and 22d PKP inspections accruing from the new retrograde criteria. These items are available upon request by a direct support company. The other recommendations presented concern unit programming for these inspections; the recommendations are considered as valid techniques. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

j. Reference item concerning "Proper Identification of Kit Carson Scouts", page 58, paragraph 21(5): concur. This recommendation can only be influenced or assisted by US Forces because GM establishes policies and guidance for issuing Civilian ID Cards. MACV letter, subject: Kit Carson Scout Summary of Activities, 15 October 1969, contains specific procedures on how KCS's register for the National ID Card. USARV Regulation 525-9 provides further guidance in this area. Unit has been so advised.

1. Reference item concerning "Civic Action", page 54, paragraph 21(7):concurs. Coordination of all civic action projects must be initiated with MACVORDS advisors at province and district level and local GVN officials to insure that projects are needed and support the GVN Pacification Program. The requirement for coordination of civic action projects is contained within existing directives and regulations.

2. Reference item concerning "Kit Carson Scouts", page 59, paragraph 21(8):concurs. Units utilizing KCS's publish their own POI for training centers. If the English language instruction needs to be increased, the unit should take steps to do so. MACV Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 12, 1 November 1969; MACV Directive 525-6, and US Army Regulation 525-9 establish the guidelines on how to utilize and the methods for employing KCS's. Unit has so been advised.

3. Reference item concerning "Punishing Sandbags", page 61, paragraph 1(12):concurs. Controlled tests have indicated that sandbags treated with punise-prime decay at a rate not different from that of sandbags which have not been treated. The use of punise-prime or used engine oil therefore appears to serve no purpose.

4. Reference item concerning "Ambush Techniques", page 49, paragraph e(2); "Storage of Mortar Ammunition", page 49, paragraph e(4); "Close-in Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) Support", page 50, paragraph e(6); "Expedient Emplacements", page 51, paragraph e(11), and "Secret Dog Teams", page 51, paragraph e(12); these items have been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of Time for Commander.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[signature]
L. D. MURRAY
CPI; AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy from:
II PROFORV
1st CavDiv

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, SEC CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970
TAB V: Provost Marshal Activities

1. During the reporting period, the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of seven hundred and forty-five offenses.
   a. Offense Statistics:
      Crimes against persons/property: 258
      Miscellaneous offenses: 115
      Military offenses: 133
      Traffic offenses: 239
      TOTAL: 745
   b. Breakdown of offense statistics:
      (3) Crimes against persons/property: murder 1; aggravated assault 18; assault 31; larceny over $50-183; larceny under $50-20; fraud 1; other 7.
      (4) Miscellaneous offenses: disorderly conduct 25; drunkenness 4; marijuana 61; drugs 2; black market 3; other 10.
      (5) Military offenses: AWOL 41; off-limits 39; desertion 9; disrespect to a commissioned officer 4; communicating a threat 1; trespassing 2; discharge of a firearm 9; failure to obey a direct order 4; impersonating an ECO 2; unauthorized weapon 1; security violation 8; interfering with the duties of an E2 2; other 12.
      (4) Traffic violations: speeding 126; failure to stop 39; unsecured vehicle 34; parking in a prohibited area 24; overloaded vehicle 8; no driver's license 7; reckless driving 1.
   c. Comments on offender statistics:
      (1) The overall offense rate increased 13% over the preceding reporting period.
      (2) In respect to the four (4) major reportable categories, crimes against persons/property increased by 11%, military offenses increased by 17%, and traffic offenses increased by 52%, whereas miscellaneous offenses were down 28% from the previous period.
      (3) Significant changes with regard to particular offenses reported during the previous period are as follows: larcenies over $50 increased from 165 to 133; speeding violations increased from 90 to 126; failure to stop for posted stop signs increased from 16 to 39; unsecured vehicle violations increased from 9 to 34; parking violations increased from 11 to 24; whereas the number of marijuana cases dropped from 106 to 61.
      (4) The significant increase in traffic offenses was caused by a division-wide crack-down in this area. The decrease in marijuana offenses is attributed to normal emphasis in troop orientation; CID mobile training teams and sustained enforcement during the period covered. No definite pattern or conclusion can be established from other fluctuations.

2. During the reporting period, the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of thirty-two detainees:
   a. Detainee Statistics:
      Returns: 1
      Prisoners of War: 11
      Civil Defendants: 0
      Innocent Civilians: 0
      TOTAL: 14

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Medical Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970

Tab 1: Surgical Activities

1. Disease and Injury statistical data
   a. Non-battle injuries: 297
   b. Disease: 1348
      (1) Malaria: 400
         (a) Falciparum: 276
         (b) Unknown: 27
         (2) F/U: 250
         (3) Psychiatric Cases: 70
         (4) Others: 510
   c. Examine in hospital (In-country): 134

2. Discussion of Disease:
   a. Malaria cases: A total of 400 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this Division from 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70, inclusive. Of them, 97 (24.25%) cases were due to Plasmodium vivax and were caused in most U.S. Forces by failure to take the weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.
      (1) The malaria incidence is as follows:

      | UNIT      | MAY | DEC | FEB | TOTAL |
      |-----------|-----|-----|-----|-------|
      | 1st Bde   | 0   | 1   | 0   | 1     |
      | 1-6       | 18  | 21  | 9   | 48    |
      | 2-3       | 10  | 4   | 15  | 29    |
      | 1-12      | 4   | 12  | 13  | 29    |
      | 2-5       | 4   | 2   | 4   | 10    |
      | 2-12      | 30  | 13  | 11  | 54    |
      | 3d Bde    | 1   | 3   | 5   | 9     |
      | 1-7       | 21  | 27  | 12  | 60    |
      | 2-7       | 12  | 3   | 0   | 15    |
      | 5-7       | 12  | 16  | 7   | 35    |
      | 6th Arty  | 6   | 5   | 2   | 13    |
      | 9th       | 0   | 2   | 1   | 3     |
      | 5th Arty  | 5   | 5   | 2   | 12    |
      | Sig Bn    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0     |
      | Eng Bn    | 1   | 1   | 0   | 2     |
      | 5th Div   | 3   | 2   | 5   | 10    |
      | 3rd Inf   | 6   | 3   | 2   | 11    |
      | 545th MF  | 1   | 0   | 0   | 1     |

      TOTAL: 164 136 100 400

      (2) The malaria rate has decreased substantially since the last reporting period, 1 Aug 69 - 31 Oct 69. This decrease is due to the effort of the commanders supervising the Malaria Preventive Program.
b. Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immersion Foot</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat Exhaustion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poisoning</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Bites</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dengue Fever</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Meningitis</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub Typhus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. WIA: From 1 Nov 69 through 31 Jan 70, the 15th Medical Battalion treated a total of 839 U.S. Army Personnel who were WIA. Of these, 575 were admitted and 274 were CRO.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970
TAB AA: Logistic Operations (Cont)

(a) The element at Bu Dop supported not only the 3d Brigade, but also elements of the 9th ARVN Regiment and the 3d Mobile Strike Force. Assistance was rendered in civic action projects designed to help villagers in the Bu Dop area.

(b) Aerial resupply was coordinated for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment units operating in the vicinity of Loc Ninh and Tonle Cham.

b. During the reporting period, the 27th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply for all ground equipment (less medical and cryptographic) of THE FIRST TEAM. This "Anywhere-Anytime" support was evident in the fact that the following percentage of equipment was operational at the end of the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>% OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>98.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>93.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>95.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) During the quarter there were 34 technical assistance visits conducted by units of the Battalion.

(2) The Battalion's AIM Team visited a total of 11 units during the reporting period.

(3) The disposition of elements of the Battalion as of 23 January 1970 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head quarters and Company A</th>
<th>Bien Hoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Support Detachment</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Detachment</td>
<td>Quan Loi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Detachment</td>
<td>FSB Buttons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Detachment</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The consolidated Battalion production for the period shows the following completed jobs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HQ&amp;Co A</th>
<th>MSD</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1551</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>4587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament (Artillery)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Small Arms)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Instruments)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>3694</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>8741</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: "Other" categories of completed work order requests shown above include machine shop work, welding, canvas repair, glass cutting, office machine repair, and fuel and electrical component repair.

(5) Summary of supply data for the quarter reveals the following:

(a) Total ASL requests received 24,848
(b) Total Fringe requests received 3,065
(c) Demand accommodation 88.0%
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970

T&D AAB Logistics Operations (Cont)

(d) Demand satisfaction
65.3%

(e) Average ASL lines stocked
5446.66

(f) Average zero balance lines
3070

(g) Average fringe lines on hand
0

(h) Units supported by ASL
95

(i) Lines inventoried during the period
4850

(6) Receipt of repair parts at the supply base at Bien Hoa for the quarter was as follows:

Red Ball Receipts
182,858 lbs

Parcel Post
32,000 lbs

Normal Stockage
457,669 lbs

c. The 15th Supply and Services Battalion continued to support the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) during this reporting period. The Battalion operated from a base area in Bien Hoa and forward locations in Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi and Song Be. Major operational achievements were:

1) Establishment of Self-Service Supply Center: The Self Service Supply Center was opened on 1 November 1969. Hours of operation were established and distributed to 1st Cavalry Division (AM) units. There are 605 items stocked in the SSSC.

2) Relocation of Refuel Point: Fire Support Base Grant was closed and the JP4 helicopter refuel point moved to Fire Support Base St. Barbara without any interruption of the helicopter refuel capability.

3) Training of Rigger Personnel: Personnel of this Battalion conducted training classes on external helicopter sling-out procedures. A total of twenty-two (22) classes were presented to newly arrived personnel at THE FIRST TEAM Academy. This class and subject matter have since been deleted from the program of instruction at FTA. Four (4) rigging classes were also presented to the ARVN Airborne troops in the field.

4) Class I Issues:
(a) Rations
"A" Rations
2,213 tons
2,505 tons

"B" Rations
1,035 tons
1,412 tons

"C" Rations
1,039,973 meals
940,085 meals

LRRP Rations
461,313 meals
408,708 meals

(b) Ration Supplements
Ice
4,026 tons
17,262 tons

Sundry Packs
368 tons
5,517 tons

Milk
2,427,677 pints
1,734,577 pints

Ice Cream
13,353 gal
34,427 gal

5) Class II & IV Issues:
Quarterly Total
3,246 tons
5,493 tons

6) Class III Issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fuel Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP4</td>
<td>7,246,000 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>305,000 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGGAS</td>
<td>1,239,000 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-2</td>
<td>1,649,200 gal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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TAB AA: Logistics Operations (Cont)

(7) Number of Petroleum Analyses Conducted:
(a) Samples received 85
(b) Suitable for use 83
(c) Not suitable for use 2
(d) On grade 83
(e) Not tested (sent to 64th QM Lab) 5

In order to supply the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) with a more comprehensive and coordinated aviation maintenance support program, the 15th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) headquarters and one aviation maintenance company relocated from Ben Cat and Long Thanh (N) to Phu Loi. The entire sequence of events was initiated on 6 January 1970 when advance elements of Co A, 15th Trans Bn (AM&S) moved to Phu Loi and were followed by the main and trail parties, which closed as Phu Loi on 17 Jan 70. Throughout the entire move, the 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) supported the mission. Tractors and SAP (Stake and Platform) trailers were furnished by the 62d Transportation Company, 7th Transportation Battalion, 48th Transportation Group. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 15th Trans Bn (AM&S) initiated its move of personnel and equipment on 19 January 1970. All elements of the Battalion had completed their relocation by 23 January 1970. The following is a complete list of personnel and equipment of Co A, HHC, 15th Trans Bn (AM&S) moved by the 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) during the period 6-23 January 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of SAPs Used</th>
<th># of CONEX's Moved</th>
<th>Weight of CONEX's Moved</th>
<th>Cu Ft Moved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of Co A Used</td>
<td># of HHC Used</td>
<td>Co A</td>
<td>HHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>TOTAL 338</td>
<td>TOTAL 1,520,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crated Equipment Moved

- Weight: 202,000 lbs
- Cube: 26,400 cu ft

Non-Crated Equipment Moved

- Weight: 212,000 lbs
- Cube: 26,400 cu ft

Total Personnel Moved: Military - 262
Civilian - 24

Total miles driven in support of the move of Co A and HHC, 15th Trans Bn (AM&S): 13,930

Significant problems encountered: NONE

(1) Maintenance Operations:
(a) Production Control:
   - Aircraft received: 510
   - Aircraft released: 490
(b) Production Maintenance Man Hours (DA Form 2407): 95,942
(c) Recoveries: 0
(d) HIR's Submitted: 48
(e) Technical Assistance Visits to Units: 32

(2) Unit Locations:
(a) HHC - Phu Loi
(b) Co A - Phu Loi
(c) Co B - Phu Loi

(3) Tech Supply:
(a) Lines on ASL: 8,728
(b) Zero Balance: 2,544

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970

TABLE: Logistics Operations (Cont)

| (a) Percentage at Zero Balance | - 29.1% |
| (d) Total Requests Received | - 57,932 |
| (e) Denial Accommodation | - 72.4% |
| (f) Denial Satisfaction | - 60.9% |
| (g) ASL Requests Received | - 41,960 |
| (h) ASL Requests Filled | - 25,549 |

During the reporting period, the 15th Medical Battalion continued to provide division level and limited unit level medical support to THE FIRST TEAM. The 15th Medical Battalion was deployed as follows:

- Hq & Spt Co: Camp Gorvard
- 1 Co: Tay Ninh
- B Co: Quynh Loi thru 11 Dec 69
- B Co: FSB Buttons 11 Dec 69 - 31 Jan 70
- C Co: Quynh Loi

(1) The Battalion Headquarters provided administrative and logistic support to elements of the 15th Medical Battalion, as well as psychiatric, veterinary, ortho-paedic and medical supply service for all units of THE FIRST TEAM.

(2) Headquarters & Support Company provided medical support to the division base camp at Phuoc Vinh, division rear at Bien Hoa, and back-up support to the latter companies of the 15th Medical Battalion. The Air Ambulance Platoon provided aeromedical evacuation for the 1st Air Cavalry Division as well as non-divisional units working within the division’s area of operations. During this reporting period, the Air Ambulance Platoon flew 1826 missions, totaling 2112 hours flying time, and evacuated 4150 casualties. Fifteen Medevac aircraft were damaged by hostile fire, and three crew members were killed and eight wounded.

(3) A Co supported the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division during the entire period. After the departure of the Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam, from the Tay Ninh Base Camp, the 1st Brigade and most of its support units moved to and occupied this area. A Co conducted the move in two phases over a period of two days and remained operational during the entire period.

(4) B Co provided medical support for the 2d Brigade and all OPCON units from Quynh Loi Base Camp until 3 Dec 69. This time, movement to FSB Buttons was implemented. Full operations were resumed at FSB Buttons on 11 Dec 69. Initial operations at FSB Buttons were hindered by delays in approval and construction of an adequate medical treatment bunker and a helipad in proximity to it. During December, patients had been flown into the main helipad and transported by ground vehicles to the temporary treatment bunker. Plans were finalized in December for the construction of a new medical treatment bunker, with a helipad immediately adjacent.

(5) C Co provided medical support to the 3d Brigade and all OPCON units, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. During the period of 3 Dec 69 to 11 Dec 69, the company provided support for both the 2d and 3d Brigades while B Co completed its move. On 10 Dec 69, the 37th Medical Company became operational in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(6) Strong personal relationships have been established with the Medical Battalion of the ARVN Airborne Division. Medical support in the 1st Brigade AO is closely coordinated with the medical company supporting the 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade. The medical company which supports the 2d ARVN Airborne Brigade is co-located with B Co, 15th Medical Battalion at FSB Buttons. Both units are operating in a common medical treatment facility. The close working relationship has proven highly successful in the treatment of casualties. The rapport...
established between the two Battalions has been excellent.

(7) The MEDCAP and LENTCAP programs have been areas of emphasis throughout the quarter. The companies of the 15th Medical Battalion have participated in 90 MEDCAP's with a total of 3618 patients and 18 LENTCAP's with a total of 349 patients.

(8) During the reporting period the 15th Medical Battalion was called upon to reinforce the existing medical resources at Bu Dop. A Medical Team consisting of one MC Officer, one NCO, and four EM, with medical supplies, was deployed to the camp. Aeromedical evacuation support was provided from the Medevac aircraft located at Quan Loi Base Camp.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970
TAB AB: Civil Affairs

1. (C) Population and Resources Control
   a. Refugees
      (1) During the reporting period, 1091 refugees were resettled in Phuoc Long Province, and 41 resettled in Phu Giao District, Binh Dang Province.
      (2) Refugee homes in the vicinity of Bo Duc that were damaged by VC/NVN indirect fire in December 1969 were repaired.
      (3) The Division assisted GVN authorities in the construction of a new Chieu Hoi Center and Refugee Center in Song Be. The leveling and preparation of ground was accomplished by the Division.
   b. Security Control
      (1) The Division provided supplies for the upgrading of PSM defenses in An Loo and Loc Ninh Districts, Binh Long Province, and Bo Duc District, Phuoc Long Province.
      (2) Joint Cordon and Search operations were conducted in Chon Thanh and Loc Ninh Districts, Binh Long Province and Phuoc Binh District, Phuoc Long Province. NPF and PF troops were employed in the search while US units formed the Cordon on the outer perimeter.

2. (U) Civic Action
   a. Through the Division Commodity Distribution Program, 1,060,610$VN worth of supplies were contributed from military resources to villages and hamlets throughout the AO.
   b. Financial support amounting to 289,135$VN was provided for the building or repair of 29 schools, 10 hospitals/ dispensaries, 5 orphanages and various smaller self-help projects.
   c. Division engineer units provided technical/material aid in the construction of 21.8 kms of road, the repair of 3 bridges, the beautification of one market place. They provided technical assistance in the construction of numerous buildings.
   d. During the reporting period, the Division conducted 806 MEDCPS, treating a total of 41,699 patients.
   e. A Boy Scout festival was held in Phuoc Vinh during the month of December. The Scouts were housed in tents provided by the 15th Medical Battalion. Division Artillery and the 19th Civil Affairs Platoon provided food and transportation.
   f. A five year old Vietnamese girl with a deformed hip was discovered during a MEDCP. The girl was transported to the 93d Evacuation Hospital for a corrective operation. The girl is in good condition at the end of the period.
   g. The Division sponsored Christmas parties for children throughout the AO. Vietnamese families in Song Be invited 60 US soldiers to their homes to celebrate the Christmas Holidays.
   h. 1316 board feet of lumber, 1200 Education kits, 18,200 lbs of excess food, 405 lbs of clothing, 295 lbs of soap and other health items, and 270 lbs of cement were distributed through GVN authorities to families and GVN organizations throughout the 1ACD TAQ.
   i. A total of 2654 man days were devoted to Civic Action by the 1ACD during the reporting period.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970

TAB AC: Psychological Operations

1. (C) General
   a. As the quarter commenced, THE FIRST TEAM was actively engaged in intensified campaigns directed against the 95C Regiment of the 9th VC Division, the 275th Regiment of the 5th VC Division, the 141st Regiment of the 7th NVA Division and the people of the VC controlled floating villages of Duc Bon, Phu Van, Duc Honh and Dak Ki. General campaigns directed against major enemy units and local force units continued.
   b. The Duc Bon, Phu Van and Duc Honh campaigns ended on 26 November when 115 villagers rallied from the Phu Van and Duc Honh areas. During the entire campaign PSYOP utilized 2,827,000 leaflets, 8 hours of groundspeaker broadcasts and 51 hours of aerial broadcasts. The results of this campaign were 671 ralliers.
   c. Following a successful 1ACD PSYOP campaign against the village of Phuoc Song in July 1969, the villagers were split into small groups by the VC and dispersed into the jungle. During the first week in December, 48 villagers rallied from Phuoc Song.
   d. On the 15th of December, an extensive PSYOP campaign was initiated against the village of Duc Ki. Aerial loudspeaker missions using tapes made by ralliers from Duc Ki prepared the area for the insertion of a ground PSYOP team consisting of an RF Company, Armed Propaganda team, US Recon Platoon, a vehicle loudspeaker (HB) team from the 3d Brigade, and the 1ACD PSYOP officer. The rally team was inserted on 22 December, established a rally point, and broadcast rally instructions. Aerial loudspeaker missions were flown using 1ACD UH-IH aircraft with AH-1G escort aircraft from the night missions. Additional aerial loudspeaker missions were flown by the 9th SOS flying Air Force O2B aircraft. At 1600H, 23 December, the ground team was extracted and the aerial missions were terminated. Although the operation produced no ralliers, it did demonstrate the feasibility of a joint US-Vietnamese mission in Psychological Operations.
   e. The Tinh Thuong Campaign (Affection) was conducted in selected areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces to test the effectiveness of intensified PSYOP efforts in inducing NVA troops to rally or surrender. Results were inconclusive.

2. (C) Support
   a. The 6th PSYOP Battalion, located at Bien Hoa, continued to provide general support to THE FIRST TEAM operations by printing a total of 9,583,000 special request leaflets.
   b. During the reporting period the 9th Special Operations Squadron dropped 35,970,000 leaflets and broadcast 68 hours of loudspeaker time in support of the FIRST TEAM PSYOP program.
   c. 1ACD Brigades and Division Artillery HB teams operating from UH-IH helicopters and USA "Beaver" aircraft broadcast 627 hours and dropped 43,379,000 leaflets. 1ACD operations included pre-planned and daily planned target areas as well as quick reaction PSYOP exploitation of contacts. Brigade and battalion command and control aircraft were used to drop leaflets and to supplement regular PSYOP missions. Nightsnark (night loudspeaker broadcasts) operations were initiated to extend PSYOP loudspeaker exploitation to hours of darkness.
   d. The quarter closed with all Brigades of THE FIRST TEAM assisting the AFR Airborne Division in exploiting contacts in their AO.
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970
Title: Kit Carson Scouts

1. Recruiting: The recruiting program within the 1ACD AO continued to be excellent. Those Scouts recruited within the AO usually develop into the best KCS in the program. Thirteen KCS were recruited at the Phuoc Long Chieu Hoi Center. Binh Long Chieu Hoi Center continued to be the outstanding recruiting area, producing 43 KCS. Twelve Scouts were recruited at the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon. The large number of units recruiting in Saigon has resulted in less than satisfactory results.

2. Training: The overcrowded facilities at the First Team Academy necessitated the establishment of a new area for use as the Kit-Carson Scout Academy. The new area has billeting spaces for 70 KCS, classrooms, dormitory/game room, and volleyball court. It is staffed by senior KCS and an LRVN instructor/ liaison LCO. The improved facilities have the capability of training 50 KCS recruits every month.

3. Administration: The processing of draft deferment applications was improved during the reporting period by eliminating the processing at Long Binh CPO. Applications are now sent directly to the Mobilization Advisor in Saigon; the Long Binh CPO is notified when the draft deferment is received. The new procedure has reduced the processing period from 3 months to 6 weeks. It is often possible to issue a draft deferment to KCS prior to their graduation from training. At the end of the quarter, the division KCS strength was 209. One Scout was killed and four wounded in combat operations during the quarter.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970

TAB AD: Kit Carson Scouts

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TAB AE: Chemical Activities

1. Operations: During the reporting period 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70, Division Chemical along with the 184th Chemical Platoon (18) and the 26th Chemical Detachment conducted chemical support activities for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 1st ARVN Airborne Division. A sharp increase in chemical support activity took place.

   a. Personnel of the 1st ARVN Airborne Division were instructed on chemical combat support operations for the purpose of establishing a division chemical section. The instruction was practical in nature with sufficient technical background information given to enable the students to instruct, supervise, and perform the chemical operations of the Airborne Division.

   b. A new BURB* (Bunker Use Restriction Bomb) filling factory was constructed which increased the filling capability of 50 BURBS a day to approximately 150 BURBS a day. The new facility also reduces the outside contamination and downwind CS cloud travel.

   c. Chemical personnel continued to make courtesy inspections upon request and to provide inspectors to the Division IG team. Gas chamber exercises were also conducted as required.

   d. Chemical personnel installed a new munitions system in all fougasse at Camp Gorad. Also, 27 fougasse were relocated, nine new Husch flares installed and all fougasse firing-circuits inspected.

2. Operational Totals: Totals for the reporting period includes most, but not all of the wide variety of Chemical support given the FIRST TEAM.

   CS Drum Drops
   90 missions for 2,682 drums (214,560 lbs.)

   Sniffer Missions
   1,007

   Fougasse Installed
   360x55 gallon drums

   E-158 CS Canister Clusters Dropped
   758 CS Canisters dropped (includes only those dropped by chemical personnel)

   *Bunker Use Restriction Bomb (BURB)
   2,648 manufactured and delivered to the field

   Napalm dropped from CH-47
   423x55 gallon drums

*Field Expedient used to contaminate enemy bunkers with persistent CS. Details on ORJ for period 1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69.
TAB AE: Chemical Activities (Cont)

- Flares
  - 96 Installed

- Defoliation Operations
  - 15 Missions using 1,260 gallons of Agent Orange

- M-17 Map Renovation
  - 100 Repaired
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CG, 1st Cavalry Division