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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96230

14 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period ending 31 January 1970, RCS GSPOR-65 (2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. General: Operation WASHINGTON GREEN II continued as the 173d Airborne Brigade's primary operational effort during the reporting period. Operation WASHINGTON GREEN II, begun on 11 Oct 69, is the second phase of Operation WASHINGTON GREEN begun on 15 April 1969. The operation is designed to provide regular force support to SVN agencies and territorial elements as they carry out the pacification program in the Brigade's Area of Operations, AO LEE, AO LEE, consisting of the northeastern four districts (TAI QUAN, HOAI NHON, HOAI AI, and PHU MY) of BINH DINH Province, is shared by the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 22d ARVN Infantry Division. Under the second phase of the operation, the 173d Airborne Brigade continues to conduct operations in cooperation with ARVN and American forces, and GVN authorities in order to accelerate the pacification program and to maintain the security of lines of communication. On 22 January 1970, Operation WASHINGTON GREEN II went into effect to counter the expected 1970 Tet Offensive while still providing security for the populated pacification areas in the AO.

b. The main force element opposing the Brigade in the 3d NVA Division, consisting of the 2d, 18th, and 22d NVA Regiments. The 3d NVA Division Headquarters and the 22d NVA Regiment deployed to BINH DINH (P) in late September and late October respectively. By late December the 2d NVA Regiment was located along the northern boundary of AO LEE in the area of the BINH DINH (P) - QUANG AI (P) border and the upper AN LIEO Valley. The 18th and 22d NVA Regiments currently occupy locations in the VINH THU loan Mountains and numerous local force units operate in the mountainous areas contiguous to the populated areas. The 3d NVA Division has an estimated strength of 6000 personnel and is well armed, to include both medium and heavy indirect fire weapons. The enemy made no concerted efforts to disrupt the pacification program during the reporting period; however, enemy movement, mortar attacks, and platoon to company size contacts have increased with the approach of the expected Tet Offensive 1970 as the reporting period came to a close. The local force guerrillas continued their attempt to harass US/GVN installations, property and personnel. Their methods were mortar attacks, sapper attacks, small unit ambushes, and an active program of booby trap emplacement.
The Brigade's security screen, which restricts enemy movement and influence on pacification operations, is essentially a program of intense small unit actions. Employing fire teams and squads, usually combined with territorial forces, the Brigade saturates the populated areas of the AO with numerous patrols and ambushes. This technique, dubbed the HAWK concept, daily employs up to as many as 110 separate HAWK patrols dispersed throughout the AO, and has been extremely effective in severely restricting the enemy's freedom of movement, particularly during the hours of darkness.

d. On 13 December 1969, the 3d Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry was released from its pacification responsibilities in northern PHU My District which it shared with 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry. The 1-503d (Abn) Inf took over the pacification mission for the entire US Area of Operations in the district, moving into the area vacated by the departing 3-503 (Abn) Inf. The purpose of the AO change was to free the 3-503d to conduct combat operations throughout AO LEB. The 3d Battalion with its rear remaining at LZ UPLIFT (SR957594) was initially redeployed with the mission of reconnaissance in force in the VINH THANH Mountains with its forward tactical command post located at P39 AXY (SR713821). On 18 January the 3-503d relocated to the AN LAO Valley, establishing its forward CP at LZ TEAMER (SR767794). The rifle companies deployed on reconnaissance in force missions against the NVA units in the lower AN LAO Valley with the mission to disrupt enemy movement and to capture or destroy all NVA personnel, equipment, and supplies found, thus denying enemy access to the populated areas of HOAI (D), HOAI (D), and TAI QUAN (D).

e. The 3d Battalion (AIRMOBILE), 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division was placed under operational control of the Brigade on 23 December 1969. The forward CP of the 3-506th was initially located at LZ AXY collated with the forward CP of the 3-503d (Abn) Inf. The unit's mission paralleled that of the 3-503d in reconnaissance in force operations in the VINH THANH Mountains. On 17 January 1970 the 3-506th relocated and occupied LZ TAPE (357151534) which was vacated upon the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry when the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division withdrew from the AN LAO Valley to return to AN KHE. The rifle companies undertook reconnaissance in force missions to deny enemy forces routes of access to the AN LAO-AN DO Valley areas from the north and west.

f. One contact during November is worthy of mention. On 5 November 1969, while on a screening mission involving the 3-503d C Troop, 17th Air Cavalry spotted five VC running into a cave located in the western NUI MEU Mountains (G0528766). The 17th Air Cav immediately inserted their A Troop, 75th Cav, into the cave, sealing off escape routes in the vicinity. Elements of the 3-503d reacted and established blocking positions and effected a cordon around the area. A search of the area resulted in 1 VC KIA (5), 28 VC CIA, and 15 small arms and miscellaneous equipment captured. The VC captured were later identified as one platoon of C-1 Company, PHU MY (D) Local Force.
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AVBE-SC/MED 14 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned. Headquarters, 173d Airborne
Brigade, Period ending 31 January 1970, HCS OSHA-65 (H2)

The statistical results of Operation WASHINGTON GREEN since its
beginning on 15 April 1969 through 31 January 1970 were: US - 1044 KIA and
1085 WIA; enemy - 692 KIA, 65 POW, and 261 small arms captured.

District Operations: The following is a synopsis of operations by
districts:

(1) Tam Quan District: The 4-503d Inf TOO remained at LZ NORTH ENGLISH
while its Tactical Operations Center (TOC) remained collocated with the
District TOC at LZ TON, TAM QUAN (D). By 17 October, battalion elements had
completed their final expansion effort and all inhabited portions of the District within
the US AO were under the security influence of troopers of the 173d Airborne
Brigade. In general, operations by the 6th Battalion during November,
December, and January were primarily combined "corron and search" as elements
of the Battalion joined the territorial forces and in several occasions elements
of the 10th Army Rgt. Extensive combined H&K operations with RF/PF also
continued during the reporting period. The 6th Battalion made increased use
of the RF/PF in many corron and search operations, employing them as the search
element along with the H&K. The RF/PF also combined with the 6th Battalion
on joint RF/PF/US checkpoints established on QL-I. Training assistance continued
to be provided to the RF/PF and PDSF. Artillery FOS attached to the Battalion
continued to achieve encouraging results from instruction presented to the local
forces. Rifle companies and battalion Security Training Assistance Groups (STG)
continued to assist the 3 district MAT teams in the training of RF/PF and the
instruction of PDSF in small unit tactics and weapons familiarization.

(2) HDAI NHON District: The 2-503d Inf TOO remained collocated
with the District TOC at SON SON (H). This arrangement as in all districts,
facilitated planning, coordination and execution of operational and intel-
ligence activities and expedited clearance for support fires. The DI/OC
established in April, has continued to be effective in gathering, processing,
and disseminating intelligence. A large measure of the effectiveness is
attributed to the efforts of the 2d Battalion staff. US and territorial forces
participated in a number of combined operations. The training program for
territorial forces focused mainly on the subjects of small unit tactics and
weapons familiarization. During the reporting period the 2d Brigade, 173d
Infantry Division had responsibility for the AN LAO Valley portion of HDAI NHON
District. On 17 January the 2d Bde was relieved of responsibility for the
Valley and began relocating to the 6th Inf Div TAOR. The 2d Bde again assumed
responsibility of the AN LAO Valley, deploying the 3-503d and 3-506th to
LZ BRENNER and TAF respectively.

(3) HDAI AN District: 2-503d (Abn) Inf became the Brigade's coordinating
headquarters in HDAI AN on 29 October. In this responsibility Co D, 2-503 (Abn)
Inf continued support to HDAI AN in a coordinating capacity, providing joint
operations with local forces and LOC security to populated areas of the district.

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14 February 1970

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Territorial forces continued to provide their own security for hamlets and villages. On 13 November the 3-503d was released of pacification responsibilities in PHU HY District, and began reconnaissance-in-force operations in southern Hoai District. On 23 Dec, 3-506th came under operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade, established a forward CP at FS 2, and their rifle companies conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations in the southern VWH MOUNTAINS. On 17-18 January both 3-503d and 3-506th relocated to the AN Lao Valley of Hoai District.

(1) PHU HY District: The 1-503d (Abn) Inf assumed operational control of the entire US AO in northern PHU HY (D) with the redeployment of the 3-503d (Abn) Inf. The district chief, Captain Can, aided the Phu Loc out of the 3d Battalion by appraising the situation and shifting territorial forces as required to ensure complete coverage of the vacated area in conjunction with the entering 1st Battalion. The 1-503d forward TOC remained collocated with HU HY District Headquarters and continued coordinated operations with territorial forces. The Battalion undertook more extensive training of Regional Force/People's Defense Force personnel by instituting formal and informal training programs to increase their effectiveness.

1. Combat Support:

(1) Artillery: Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 319th (Abn) Field Artillery, the Brigade's organic artillery battalion, remains at LZ Sardish. Its firing batteries continue to support the Brigade from fire support bases dispersed throughout the AO. Det 7, 2-320th FA gives direct support to the 3-506th (Abn) Inf.

(2) Air: The Brigade Forward Air Controllers flew 716 hours while controlling 198 airstrikes in support of Brigade operations. Limited visibility due to poor weather conditions limited the number of airstrikes during the reporting period. A total of 63 combat Skyraider sorties were flown on "Shadow" or "Stinger" aircraft, 40-119 aircraft equipped with sophisticated target acquisition systems and heavy air-to-ground fire capabilities, were employed on 28 occasions.

(3) Naval: Naval gunfire support for AO LEE was coordinated by Team 2-2, SUB UNIT ONE, 1st Amphib. During November, December, and January, 4 US Destroyers and 1 Australian Destroyer were on station for a total of 12 days. 639 5 inch observed rounds were fired on 32 targets and 531 5 inch H and I rounds were fired in 165 targets.

2. Combat Service Support:

(1) Engineer: Though deeply involved in the many civic action projects inherent in a pacification program, the 173d Enn Company continued to provide direct support to all Brigade units. This support included daily...
minesweep operations along the major roads in AO LEE, the operation of 3 water
tanks along with the LZ ENGLISH water point operated by the 299th Engr Bn provid-
ing a total daily capacity of 52,000 gallons, furnishing of technical advice and
support of unit self-help projects, and the attachment of one squad of engineers to
each maneuver battalion for routine engineer missions.

(2) Chemical: The Brigade Chemical Section, in conjunction with the 51st Chem-
cal Det, executed the following missions in support of Brigade operations:

(a) Airborne Personnel Detection: 59 missions were flown for a total of 62 hrs.

(b) Herbicide Missions: 181 hectares of crops and dense vegetation were
defoliated.

(c) Riot Control Agent: CS was employed against known enemy base camp and
tunnel complexes and was used prior to tactical airstrikes to restrict enemy move-
ment. A total of 9,280 pounds of CS2 were air delivered from UH-1H helicopters in
terrain denial operations and 2,864 pounds of CS2 were ground employed in tunnel
contamination operations.

(d) Incendiary Missions: A total of 7,865 gallons of thickened fuel incen-
diary was expended employing CH-47 and UH1H helicopters as delivery aircraft in
instances when TAC air was not practical or not available.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(a) OBSERVATION: In some instances there has been a delay in obtaining illumi-
nation from supporting units when a chance night contact is made by a Ranger team
in their night laager position. This is particularly true when the team's area of
operations is out of range of artillery illumination.

(b) EVALUATION: Delay in obtaining illumination can be eliminated if the team clears
the grid of their location for illumination and requests that the artillery data be procompured as soon as the laager sites are reached. If the grid is out of range
of artillery, the TAC makes a notation and is prepared to request a helicopter flare
ship immediately should the team make a contact.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Prior preparation should be made for use of illumination
in night laager sites.

(2) Silent Bridge Security:

(a) OBSERVATION: A method was needed to release troops from bridge security
for other operations while still maintaining adequate security for bridges.

(b) EVALUATION: The 173d Airborne Brigade is employing 4coubouy 2018 as means
of establishing security on certain bridges within its AO. With an increased responsibility of a larger AO, one battalion needed a method of securing certain bridges which would require less troops yet maintain adequate standards of security. The troops released from the selected bridges could then be used for more active combat role in the battalion's AO. The concept of employing sensor fields around the bridges was considered and several different types of sensor devices were tried without finding an acceptable solution. Finally an acouboy sensor was suspended from the stringers of a bridge and tests were conducted. A 100% activation rate for 360 degrees around the bridge was obtained. The acouboy has proven so sensitive that individuals talking on or about the bridge have been monitored as far away as twelve kilometers. The "D" model acouboy has the added advantage of being able to shut itself off during the day when the threat is reduced and normal traffic is heaviest and to activate itself at night. This timing prolongs the sensor's life to 45 days. The acouboy will self-destruct if subject to tampering. The sensor was on a bridge used in detecting movement near the bridge which in turn brings a reaction from night patrols in the area and reaction forces at nearby strong points. By employing the acouboy the battalion has been able to reduce the force required to secure bridges from 72 personnel to 18 personnel and 4 APC's. The APC's provide the mobility to react to acouboy sensations and bring rapid troop security to the bridge.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That acouboy sensors be used as an aid to bridge security where the situation permits, thus freeing troops for more active operations.

(3) Double Sweep Cordon and Search

(a) OBSERVATION: Using stay behind forces has not yielded satisfactory results due to compromise by local inhabitants and enemy OP's.

(b) EVALUATION: In cordon and search operations, VC and local guerrillas have consistently been foiled of US presence in a hamlet area through observation posts and local agents. They have therefore been highly successful in avoiding contact simply by avoiding the area of friendly activity. The VC have also established a pattern of returning to an area shortly after friendly troops have departed. In order to take advantage of both of these situations the 1st Bn (Abn), 503d Inf has developed a "double sweep" technique. An element moves into a village, conducts a sweep or cordon and search, and remains in or around the village for one or two days. A second element of comparable size operates several kilometers away. The search force makes preparations to leave the village in full view of the population and then departs around mid-afternoon, in full view of possible enemy OP's. After dark the second force moves around the village and establishes ambushes for unsuspecting VC returning home to what they now consider a safe area. The "Double Sweep" technique has produced several profitable contacts. If troop strength or density does not permit the use of two forces, the force departing an area can backtrack to the same area after dark. These techniques have proven more successful than stay behind forces which are too easily compromised by inhabitants of the village.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units should use the doubke sweep cordon and search method of operation in lieu of leaving stay behind elements.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

4) Combine Cordon and Search Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of territorial forces on cordon and search operations significantly aids in the results of the mission.

(b) EVALUATION: On a cordon and search operation involving one US rifle company and one RF company, the RF soldiers were used as the primary search force. This concept of using RF to search is not new and this instance is not intended as a new technique, but rather as an illustration of the importance of its use. During the operation, with a large measure of credit to the RF, 3 VC/VVA were WIA and CIA, and 26 VC/VVA suspects were detained, rather significant results for a routine cordon and search. On several occasions the US troops accompanying the RF on the search bypassed VC suspects and hidden tunnel entrances that were immediately obvious to the RF.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Territorial forces should be used in conjunction with US forces in cordon and search operations since they are usually familiar with the area of search, the customs of the people, and the language.

5) Scout Dogs on Listening Posts.

(a) OBSERVATION: Scout dogs proved valuable as early warning systems on listening post.

(b) EVALUATION: Scout dogs proved valuable to the security of fire support bases of the 173d Airborne Brigade when they were utilized on night listening posts. One night in November a dog team on LP security detected movement outside a FSB perimeter at 2310 hours. The battery commander was notified and the unit was placed on alert. While no other basis for alarm other than the dog's warning was noted, the base was attacked at 0100 hours by a platoon size unit. Thanks to the early warning provided by the dog, the enemy was engaged while still outside the wire. As a result the enemy lost 9 KIA and numerous weapons CIA.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Scout dogs should be used on listening posts in isolated areas providing they receive the same rest considerations as other sentries and the duty does not distract from the dog's primary mission of patrolling.

6) LZ Construction Using 750 Pound Bombs.

(a) OBSERVATION: The location of friendly troops or the nature of the terrain often prevents the use of heavy ordnance to clear landing zones in vegetated areas.

(b) EVALUATION: A battalion of the 173d Airborne Brigade was successful in constructing a one helicopter LZ in moderate vegetation using 750 pound bombs with three foot extensions delivered by TAL air. LZ's had previously been constructed in the 173d Air Bde AO using 10,000 and 20,000 pound bombs. This particular LZ was to be constructed on a narrow ridgeline with moderate vegetation. Trees in the area were 20 to 50 feet high with diameters of 6 to 12 inches. Single canopy existed and scrub brush on the ground was 2 to 8 feet high. Heavy bombs were not favorably considered for the mission since delivery aircraft had to fly in proximity to the target in order to achieve the required accuracy. Therefore, 750 pound bombs with three foot extensions were selected as best ordnance for the mission. A very adequate one ship LZ, the desired result, now exists in an area previously available only by ladder or foot.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period ending 31 January 1970, RCS CS FOR-65 (H2)

14 February 1970

(c) RECOMMENDATION: 750 pound bombs with 3 foot extensions should be used for LZ clearance when heavier ordnance cannot be used.

(7) Fixing the Enemy.

(a) OBSERVATION: One of the major problems associated with the war in Vietnam is the finding and then fixing of the VC long enough for friendly troops to close in and destroy them.

(b) EVALUATION: Recently while conducting a search and clear operation in an area known to be a haven for VC, a unit of the 1-503d made contact with 3 VC in lightly vegetated terrain at a range of 400 meters. The unit had to maneuver thru 100 meters of newly planted rice paddy in order to close with the enemy. During previous contacts in the same area the enemy had ample warning and time to escape into the mountains. The circumstances of this contact suggested that the same escape would occur. Yet when the element arrived at the area of the sighting, the enemy was still there and one was killed. While trying to establish a reason for the enemy staying in the area instead of running, it was remembered that there had been an observation aircraft overhead on another mission during the contact. It was therefore surmised that the VC had failed to run for fear of being spotted by the airplane and having artillery or gunships called on them. With this in mind a subsequent operation in the same general area was conducted with an observation aircraft purposely overhead. Visual contact was again made at an extended range and again the VC remained fixed until the friendly elements closed with them resulting in one VC KIA. The VC had ample warning of the friendly approach and could have easily run for cover.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When possible, an observation aircraft should be used in conjunction with ground troops when a lightly vegetated area is suspected of harboring enemy troops.

(8) Use of NPFF.

(a) OBSERVATION: The addition of National Police Field Force Teams to US units greatly enhances both tactical and pacification objectives in populated areas.

(b) EVALUATION: National Police Field Force perform specific operations against Viet Cong infrastructure as an action arm of the Special Branch. They establish police operations to prevent VC activities, maintain civil security and order, and serve as a reserve force for the National Police in the control of riots and other civil disturbances. NPFF may be attached to US units on a daily operational basis or a specific mission basis, such as a Cordon and Search.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Combined US/NPFF operations improve rapport with the local populace as well as provide effective coverage of rural populated areas. NPFF should be requested through District channels and used whenever feasible in support of US operations.

1. ORGANIZATION: None

2. TRAINING: None
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AVB-SC/M

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (H2)

f. LOGISTICS: None

g. COMMUNICATIONS: None

h. MATERIAL: None

i. OTHER: Listening to the Grievances of the Local People.

(a) OBSERVATION: Taking time to listen to the local people near friendly positions can solve problems important to the natives with little effort on the part of the Commander.

(b) EVALUATION: An old woman was seen to stand near a rifle company's helipad each time a helicopter would land. She would speak and wave her arms at the soldiers working at the helipad. The previous Commander had said she was crazy and not to bother with her. The Regional Forces had said essentially the same thing. The new Company Commander tried to talk to her through an interpreter, but the interpreter said he could not understand her. This questioning was tried again several days later with instructions to the interpreter to translate the woman's conversation literally, word for word. It was learned that she was upset about the soldiers kicking dirt in her water supply as they moved to or from the helipad. The Company Commander asked where the path could be moved and moved it to the area she indicated. The old woman was subsequently pleased with the new arrangement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Consider the feelings of the local people. Often with small effort on the Commander's part, what seems a dire problem to Vietnamese can be easily solved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

T.W. SROCCZINSKI

2 Incl
1. Organizational Chart
2. Roster of Key Personnel
Incl 2 wd HQ, DA
AVFA-GC-HIST (14 Feb 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS, CSP-R-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO SF 96350 28 MAR 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, AMN: AVHIC-DS2, APO SF 96375

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

DAVID M. MCKENZIE
CPT, ASC
Asst AG

CP:
2 - ACSFOR, DA
1 - CG, 173d ABN BDE (LESS ORLL)
AVHGC-DST (14 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Silent Bridge Security", page 5, paragraph 2c(2): concur. This is another example of imaginative use of the sensor program to enhance the intelligence-gathering/surveillance effort in RVN. Item will be considered for inclusion in next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Double Sweep Cordon and Search", page 6, paragraph c(3): concur. The success of the double sweep techniques gives support for unit commanders to vary tactics and methods of operations from the routine. However, to establish the double sweep techniques for all units in lieu of leaving stay behind elements would limit commanders to an unvarying procedure for cordon and search operations. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "Cordon and Search Operations", page 7, paragraph 2c(4): concur. In addition to favorable results gained in a tactical sense, this is also a giant step forward in the Improvement and Modernization Program. Item will be considered for inclusion in next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning "Scout Dogs on Listening Posts", page 7, paragraph 2c(5): concur. Item will be considered for inclusion in next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   e. (C) Reference item concerning "Fixing the Enemy", page 8, paragraph 2c(7): concur. However, this is quite an expensive decoy and should be used only when dictated by less pressing needs. Item will be considered for inclusion in next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.
AVHGC-DST (14 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of National Police Field Force (NPFF)", page 8, paragraph 2c(8): concur. This is in keeping with the goal of Vietnamization. Additionally, the NPFF can perform important functions in the area of Population and Resources Control by conducting unannounced census checks in populated areas. Point is well taken and item will be considered for inclusion in next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of NPFF", page 8, paragraph 2c(8): concur. Missions of the NPFF are contained in MACV Directive 381-51, National Police Field Force, and USARV Pamphlet 515-1, Civic Action Guide for the S5, which establishes guidelines on utilization of NPFF.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Listening to the Grievances of the Local People", page 9, paragraph 21: concur. This guidance is contained in USARV Regulation 515-2, Community Relations, and USARV Pamphlet 515-1, Civic Action Guide for the S5.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT, AFG
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
I FORGEY
173d Abn Bde
GPOP-DT (14 Feb 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 173d Airborne Brigade for Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
D.D. CLINE
MG, AGC
Abst AG
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 173d Airborne Brigade

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.**

- **CG, 173d Airborne Brigade**

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