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AGO D/A ltr, 3 Feb 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 3 Feb 1976

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3 Feb 76

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IN REPLY REFER TO
ACDA (M) (8 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701254 12 June 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (II)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
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16 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RC5 CSFOR-65 (R1)

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SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970. During the past quarter the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued in its participation of Operation Kentucky Cougar under the operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

The provinces of Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Tay Ninh were the focus of Regimental action during the period. In Binh Long Province the populated areas of Loc Ninh and An Loc were at the core of Regimental operations; while in Phuoc Long Province it was the critical Bu Dop/Bo Duc area.

The role of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the past quarter has been mainly one of re-positioning of forces to interdict the NVA lines of communication (LOC) originating in Cambodia and combating local force units. During the month of November, elements of the Blackhorse Regiment embarked on Operation Long Reach I (7-9 Nov) and Operation Texas Traveler (24-28 Nov). Long Reach I was initially designed to relieve the pressure from the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area by providing an axis by which the critical area could be reinforced and by interdicting the enemy supply lines. While Long Reach I took the 2nd Squadron to the northeast, Texas Traveler brought the 3rd Squadron into eastern Was Zone C. Texas Traveler, which essentially was a long range reconnaissance operation, was designed to screen enemy units attempting to infiltrate from Cambodia as well as to block enemy routes of withdrawal, and to relieve FSB's Jackie, Jamie, or Vickie in the event of enemy attack.

In the early morning hours of 26 November, the 3rd Squadron made heavy contact with infiltrating enemy forces, thereby accomplishing the role of the reconnaissance operation. The Commanding General, 1st Air Cavalry Division, ordered the withdrawal of the 3rd Squadron. The Squadron, having fulfilled its mission, returned to FSB Jake where it secured the southern and southwestern AO boundary.

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while conducting limited reconnaissance operations. Toward the end of the quarter, when 11 FFV Artillery moved into FSB Jake, the 3rd Squadron then moved to establish FSB Jan nearby. From this location the 3rd Squadron has secured FSB's Jan, Thunder III and Thunder IV.

Although Operation Long Reach I wasn't a total success, it did set the stage for an extremely unique and unusual operation—Long Reach II. Long Reach II marked the first time that the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has used Rome Plows in an extensive land clearing operation. As a result of this operation, the treacherous Highway QL 14A was opened, providing a land access route to Bu Dop. The land clearing operation severed enemy infiltration and supply routes along the Serge's Jungle Highway (a maze of trails running south and southeast from Cambodia) and alleviated the pressure on the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area.

While the 2nd Squadron was conducting the Rome Plow operation to the northeast, the 1st Squadron CP was located at FSB Narge, in the Loc Minh District. By conducting reconnaissance operations around Loc Minh, the 1st Squadron was capable of reinforcing the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons, if the need arose, and blocking infiltrating NVA forces from the north and northwest. When NVA units attempted to infiltrate from Cambodia late in January and found that the Serge's Jungle Highway was severed by the reopening of QL 14A, the pre-1st highpoint was preempted. The Battle of the Crescent (20 Jan) and the Battle of the Cross Roads (21 Jan), as well as the border clashes of 24 and 27 December when Air Cavalry Troop (11th ACR) participated in massive air/ground battles, were very effective in that they greatly hampered the infiltration of enemy forces and supplies into Binh Long Province.

As the quarter closed, the 1st Squadron departed its AO for Tay Minh, OPCON to the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM). 2nd Squadron, having accomplished its primary mission in the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area, moved southwest to the Loc Minh area to fill the AO vacated by the 1st Squadron.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY:

A. General: During the quarter the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operated primarily in Binh Long Province; however, limited reconnaissance operations were also conducted in eastern War Zone C and northwestern Phuoc Long Province.

Throughout III Corps Tactical Zone, enemy offensive activity was generally light and scattered during the reporting period. Since the death of Ho Chi Minh, COVON's divisional forces have been oriented largely toward the protection of logistical supply routes and the disruption of the Vietnamization and pacification programs. To accomplish their mission, enemy units have
apparently changed their basic military tactics—instead of conducting battalion-sized ground attacks and being willing to engage Allied forces in large scale contact, the enemy now emphasizes economy of force measures such as sapper probes, attacks by fire, and heavy mining of the lines of communication. Whether this noticeable change in tactics was brought about by the implementation of a Lao Dong (Communist party of North Vietnam) resolution in April 1969 or the practical realities of heavy losses and few replacements or a combination of the two, is not known.

"COSVN Resolution 9," as it is known to the Allied intelligence community, sets forth the means by which the VC and NVA in South Vietnam hope to achieve total victory. Resolution 9 states that VC/NVA forces are to strive for the withdrawal of all American troops, to liberate the rural areas, to destroy the RVN pacification teams, and to upgrade and develop the Viet Cong revolutionary government (PRG). With these purposes in mind, Resolution 9 further states that an all-out attack strategy prevails. Engineer troops, sapper and armed reconnaissance troops, and secret guerillas are to be used extensively in tactical operations. The recent relocation of three main force regiments from III CTZ to IV CTZ underlines the enemy’s interest in the Delta region. The present attempts at training sub-region forces in sapper tactics and the emphasis of resupplying these forces lend credence to the belief that COSVN Resolution 9 is being implemented.

Due to this change in enemy activity, the Allied Intelligence collection effort had to be redirected somewhat. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, for example, has been virtually deprived of one of its best sources of hard intelligence—the prisoner of war. During the previous quarter, 29 prisoners were captured; only two prisoners were captured in this reporting period. For this reason, the S-2’s collection agencies have not been able to produce exploitable intelligence as rapidly as before. This and other problems to be discussed below do not indicate, however, a relaxation in the intelligence efforts of the 11th ACR. Whereas main force enemy units used to operate within the 11th ACR TAOR, this quarter has seen elements of the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions relocate to War Zone C and Phuoc Long Province respectively, and generally avoid contact in our area. The dearth of hard intelligence produced during the quarter is largely attributed to this relocation of enemy forces.

In November 1969, main force enemy units avoided encounter with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The slack was taken up by local force units whose main tactics are mining of LOC’s, attacks by fire, and small scale ground probes against RF/PP outposts. The high level of mining incidents continued throughout December; however, near the end of the month, elements of the 7th NVA Division were contacted as they relocated from northwestern Phuoc Long Province into their traditional base areas north and west of Loc Minh. All
OPERATIONAL REPORT


but one of the significant engagements during December 1969 and January 1970 were initiated by or resulted from the daily reconnaissance missions of the Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR. During January 1970, the 141st and 209th NVA Regiments, 7th NVA Division, maintained a presence along the northern perimeter of Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces and participated in the Corps-wide high point of 20-21 January.

With the advent of the dry season and significant decrease in rainfall after October 1969, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's capabilities have been greatly enhanced. Neither terrain nor weather have seriously hampered our operations during the reporting period as evidenced by the operation of 3/11th ACR in War Zone C—a nightmare for armored vehicles during the rainy season because of its lower elevation.

In general, as far as intelligence activities are concerned, the quarter has been a very fluid one. In response to the enemy's redirection of effort and adoption of small unit and economy of force tactics, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's intelligence effort has been forced to gear itself to the targeting of local forces and guerrilla activities—whereas main force units had previously been our primary target. Due to the proximity of Cambodia to the 11th ACR TAOR, a main force threat can and sometimes does exist to the population centers of Binh Long Province; however, when COSVN's divisional forces remain in Cambodia avoiding contact, the 11th ACR intelligence collection effort is forced to redirect itself.

One of the problems encountered is the development of a means of identifying and neutralizing the individuals or groups responsible for mining of LOC's, harassing attacks by fire, intimidation, and proselytizing of the local populace. All this had to be accomplished in conjunction with the Vietnameseization program. In short, the 11th ACR's intelligence effort during this quarter has operated simultaneously on two levels: targeting of main force units, where traditional intelligence techniques are still effective; and targeting of local force and guerrilla units, where new techniques had to be developed.

b. Order of Battle: During the months of November 1969 through January 1970, the three regiments of the 7th NVA Division were the only main force enemy units operating in the 11th ACR TAOR, and then only intermittently. Other identifications produced by US as well as Allied forces confirmed the presence of the Binh Long Provincial Force (Binh Long District), Han Quim, and Loc Minh Armed Forces, and the administrative areas of An Loc District. In addition, several specialized units were identified: the 225 Engineer Battalion, COSVN; the 10/70 Independent Battalion, a part of the COSVN border security regiment; elements of the 50th and 70th Rear Service Groups; and a rear service element of the 69th Artillery Command.
Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 January 1970  

Intelligence Sources: Although there were few significant changes in the number and type of intelligence sources utilized by the 11th ACR during the quarter, some sources were relied upon more than in the previous period for the simple reason that the best sources were usually unavailable. The Regiment's overall intelligence producing capability, however, was not seriously impaired by this readjustment.

(1) Visual Reconnaissance: Visual reconnaissance missions, flown on a daily basis by the Air Cavalry Troop of the 11th ACR, provide the bulk of the information used for the planning of B-52 strikes, TAC Air, preplanned strikes, armored ground reconnaissance operations, and ARP and LRRP insertions. The Air Cavalry Troop has also been instrumental in locating enemy units in the jungled areas as well as providing secondary evidence of enemy movement, fortifications, and general location. Visual reconnaissance missions have been used to confirm or disclaim the information obtained from SIAR, Suffolk, Rad Hase, and usually reliable agent reports.

(2) Enemy Documents: Captured enemy documents establish enemy unit identification and provide 11th ACR intelligence personnel with "nice to know" information concerning the past activities of various enemy units. Captured documents also give insight into the particularly political aspect of the enemy's military activities. Documents usually provide information from which general trends can be drawn rather than provide information that is immediately exploitable.

(3) P W/Ralliers: Prisoners of war and Hoi Chans, which would otherwise provide the 11th ACR Commander with his best source of intelligence, were of insignificant value during the quarter as only two PW's and two Hoi Chans were captured or received. The prisoners and ralliers were of low intelligence and knowledgeability; therefore, even rapid and accurate interrogation of these enemy soldiers did not result in any significant information.

(4) Agent Reports: Agent reports, especially those produced by Team 3ACX under the guidance of the 3rd Battalion, 525 MI Group, are passed to the 11th ACR on a daily basis. Agent reports were also produced by the Special Forces and National Police Office in An Loc, but in a less prolific manner than Team 3ACX. The latter two agencies have occasionally produced reports which are fairly reliable and have provided the 11th ACR with low level intelligence on the activities of local guerrillas and VCI. Team 3ACX's reports, on the other hand, have been of very little value to the 11th ACR collection effort. Their reports are often exaggerated, usually untimely, and of doubtful validity.
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(5) ICAP's: The information gleaned from ICAP reports since late November 1969, have proved useful in the establishment of more accurate blacklists and the targeting of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. ICAP's have also been useful in reporting enemy activity which is often not reported, such as small VC bands entering villages for food and supplies and light ground probes or mortar attacks on RF/PP outposts. The ICAP is also an excellent means for the dissemination and collection of information resulting from the Voluntary Informant Program, which has not been employed extensively by the Regiment in the previous quarters. ICAP's and the VIP are potential sources of low intelligence information; however, their effect and worth can only be accurately gauged after more extensive use.

(6) FAC's: Daily missions flown by the Air Force Forward Air Controllers are an occasional source of intelligence and have proved helpful in the accurate mapping of enemy lines of communication.

(7) Technical Detectors: Technical detectors include SLAR, Red Haze, Sniffer, ground radar and ground sensors. As a general rule, these devices are only useful as intelligence indicators. The usual reaction to a detector activation is the firing of artillery and/or a visual reconnaissance. Technical detectors, especially ground sensors, have a limited value in the plotting of enemy movements at night or in heavily jungled areas, but their limitations must always be kept in mind. For example, fires in the AO negate readings by Red Haze and Sniffers.

d. Enemy Personnel and Material Losses:

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3. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation of Operations:

   (1) Bu Dop/Bo Duc: In late October and early November, enemy activity was greatly increased in this area. On 4 November, NVA forces launched widespread rocket and mortar attacks and FSB Ellen, southeast of Bu Dop, was the object of a fierce ground assault. On 5 November, CIDG forces near Bu Dop encountered and had skirmishes with what was believed to be the C-18 Anti-Aircraft Company, which is part of the 165th NVA Regiment. On 8 November, an NVA soldier was captured. He was a member of the C-20 Engineer Company, 141st Regiment, and stated that the mission of his unit was to build a road from FSB Ellen to somewhere around FSB Jerri. This was thought to be either a route back to Base Area 350 or an avenue to stage an attack against FSB Jerri. It appeared that at least two battalions of the 165th Regiment were north and west of Bu Dop, while the 141st NVA Regiment had two battalions to the south.

From the Cambodian border leading south and southeast, the NVA had developed an infiltration route for troops and supplies. This intricate maze of trails and pathways, which passes very close to the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area, has been named Serges Jungle Highway. Also, to the west of the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area and contiguous to Cambodia is the enemy Base Area 350; and, to the northeast is Base Area 351. Here the NVA have built many base camps and bunker complexes to store supplies and allow men to rest while infiltrating along the Serges Highway. Because this logistical artery is so vital to enemy operations, it has been defiantly protected. This defense has been so effective that QL 14A, the main highway that cuts through Serges Jungle Highway, has been closed for nearly two years.

The Bu Dop/Bo Duc area and FSB Jerri were faced with a large enemy force which could be quickly reinforced in much larger proportions with elements in nearby Cambodia. Special Forces advisor and CIDG forces were located at Bu Dop, while elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) were at FSB Jerri. The 3rd Mobile Strike Force and the 36th Ranger Battalion were situated at Bo Duc. So, it was not surprising when elements of the 11th ACR embarked on Operations Long Reach I and II.

   (a) Long Reach I: Initially, elements of the 11th ACR were to move into the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area by air and later by road to open Highway QL 14A, interdict enemy supply lines, and relieve some of the pressure on Bu Dop. There were many variables to be considered in deciding how the Regiment could best fulfill this mission. Airlifting forces of the 2nd Squadron to the Bu Dop airstrip was one consideration. This feat had been accomplished a month earlier by A/1/11th ACR with very effective results. Within in the month,
however, the condition of the airfield at Bu Dop had been allowed to deteriorate quite noticeably. It was now questionable if the large, four-engined C-130's, loaded with such extremely heavy cargo could land there. Another important consideration was the fact that the NVA had employed .51 caliber machine guns around the village of Bu Dop, and their fire was proving quite deadly to aircraft in the area. The alternate choice was C-130A. This highway had been heavily mined by enemy and had not been traveled for practically two years. The highway was flanked by soft ground that would not support the weight of a tracked vehicle. This ground was covered by jungle so dense and close to the highway that any area along the way was a likely ambush site. This dangerous cul-de-sac was finally chosen as the axis of advance for the majority of the ground forces while one armored cavalry troop was to be airlifted to Bu Dop.

Late in the morning on 7 November, G Troop departed from Fire Support Base Large (CP of Second Squadron, 11th ACR), northeast of Fire Support Base Deb. Prior to G Troop's departure, E Troop had swept the road to FSB Deb and then had returned to the west, where the troop established an IOP. Throughout the day, F Troop remained at the Loc Minh airport and waited for the expected air lift to Bu Dop. During the afternoon, H Company escorted three 155mm Howitzers to FSB Deb to support the G Troop movement. Headquarters, 2/11th ACR, remained at FSB Large with the remaining Howitzers from their battery.

By 0700 hours on 8 November, E Troop had started on its morning sweep of the roads and G Troop was rumbling along QL14A toward Bu Dop and Bo Duc. At 0900 hours, Headquarters, 2/11th ACR was moving on its way from FSB Large to FSB Deb. Here they were to set up a new command post from which they would control the road march of G Troop and the air lift of F Troop to Bu Dop. G Troop made fairly slow progress throughout the day; however, to insure this progress, the job of sweeping the road and detecting the enemy mines had to be done, and it was slow and exhausting work. At noon, G Troop realized that the mine sweeping teams were very tired and the troop requested that they be given additional teams and mine detectors. This was done, and during the afternoon, G Troop moved still farther up the road.

By evening, G Troop had progressed to a point approximately two kilometers north of FSB Deb, and was ordered to establish a fire support base in that area to support FSB Jarri by fire. From this new base, which later would be named Joel, the norther portion of QL14A would be covered by artillery.

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On the morning of the 9th of November, G Troop was sweeping a portion of the road back in the direction of FSB Deb, to the site where FSB Joel would be established. During this move two additional mines had been discovered on the same ground which had been swept on the previous day; but, a third destroyed a Sheridan and wounded one individual.

While G Troop was establishing FSB Joel, F Troop was being airlifted from Loc Minh to the Bu Dop airstrip. The air lift operation was running smoothly until the first C-130 attempted to land. The C-130's engine was hit by .51 caliber fire and the engine was in flames. The C-130 was unable to land at Bu Dop and had to return to Loc Minh. The second C-130 bounced too hard upon landing and had to take off again because the pilot feared a broken landing gear. Fortunately, by the end of the day the rest of the planes landed safely with F Troop's tracks, minus Sheridans.

During the following week, the 2nd Squadron had worked to develop FSB Joel and conducted reconnaissance operations in the area. QL 14A from FSB Deb to FSB Joel had been kept open. The Hoviters, which were now in place at FSB Joel, would have the capability to support FSB Jerri.

Although the 2nd Squadron made only limited contact with the enemy forces in the area, the purpose of this demonstration of force had been a success. By airlifting F Troop to Bu Dop, establishing FSB Joel to aid FSB Jerri and the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area, and by conducting reconnaissance over a large area contiguous with QL 14A, the enemy pressure and dominance in the area had been greatly lessened.

(b) Long Reach II: On 3 December 1969, the wheels of progress started churning once more and the long awaited Rome Plow - Land Clearing Operation began. Although heavy resistance was expected as the 2nd Squadron plowed its way to Bu Dop, the enemy refrained from mounting any significant assaults. The number of mining incidents were not unusually surprising. As the Regiment expected, the 2nd Squadron encountered a heavily mined QL 14A, although a portion had been cleared during Long Reach I.

When the operation started, engineer elements, reinforced with ACAV's, led the column clearing QL 14A of mines and obstacles. The 984th Land Clearing Company, which was DS to the 2nd Squadron, was secured by ACAV's as the Rome Flows cleared each flank of the highway to a distance of 200 meters. The Rome Flows were further secured on each flank by infantry elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), which were OPCON to 2nd Squadron. The 2nd Squadron's Zippo section, which was secured by a reconnaissance platoon, followed the Rome Flows burning the debris. Engineer construction teams made essential field expedient repairs to bridges and culverts, and conducted road service as necessary to permit rapid and easy passage of combat vehicles.
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In this manner the operation proceeded, smashing, plowing, cutting, and burning for approximately 50 days. There were no impressive lists of enemy killed or captured; however, the mission of clearing a vast swath of land had been accomplished. As a result of Long Reach II, the Sargue Jungle Highway had been severed. But more important than this, an axis by which FSB Jerri, Ba Dop and Bo Duc could be reinforced had been established. Thus, enemy pressure in the area had been relieved.

(2) Eastern War Zone C: There are two routes by which enemy personnel and supplies can be infiltrated into this zone: the Saigon - Michelin Corridor along the river basin and a system of trails and caches running diagonally from the "Dog's Neck" to the Saigon River (southeast to XT4553). Traditionally, War Zone C has been an inviolable area from which the enemy has provided manpower and materials to the battlefield. High level headquarters, rear service installations, training centers, and hospitals are located in this area. Base Areas 352 and 353, straddling the Cambodian border into Zone C, not only contain the Headquarters of Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), but also provide rest areas for main force enemy units. Main force units also infiltrate and initiate the preparatory phases of offensive operations from these base areas.

(a) The Threat: From mid-September until early November, enemy initiated activity was characterized by scattered attacks by fire, light ground probes, ground to air firings and logistical operations. However, during the early morning hours of 4 November, FSB Ike and FSB Jamie received ground probes, while FSB ST. Barbara and FSB Vicky received attacks by fire. Although the K2 Battalion of the 271st Regiment was identified as participating in the attack on FSB Ike, no other unit identification was made. On 20 November, the future intentions of the 9th VC Division were unknown; however, it was believed that the 4 November attacks, as well as others throughout III Corps, signaled the beginning of the first phase of the Winter - Spring Offensive.

According to documents captured in III Corps, the initial phase of the campaign would be from 2 to 25 November. In War Zone C the 9th VC Division was believed to be located in the northeastern quarter of the area of operations, with the mission of attacking FSB's Carolyn and Ike. The 271st VC Regiment was believed to be in the central portion of the area of operations and prepared to attack fire support bases in the central and eastern areas. Although its exact intentions were unknown, the 272nd VC Regiment was tentatively placed in southwestern War Zone C and it was believed to be destined for Base Area 355. Attacks in War Zone C would be supported by the 9th VC Division's organic artillery and sapper units, and possibly the K-16 Armor Office, COSVN. Resupply activity continued and was expected to increase.
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(b) Texas Traveler (24-28 November 1969): On the basis of the above information, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was directed by the 1st Cavalry Division (A/1) to conduct area reconnaissance in the eastern sector of War Zone C. This sector was designated AO Dallas. The operation called for the reinforced Third Squadron, 11th ACR, to conduct a multiple route, cross country penetration through AO Dallas along the axis of Route 216, executing combat assaults along Route 266 to clear it of obstacles. The First Squadron, 11th ACR, would be prepared to reinforce by moving into the area and conducting operations.

Texas Traveler began on 24 November, with the tracks of the Workhorse Squadron rumbling into the area of operation as planned. As they progressed, it became evident that the terrain would limit their speed considerably. As they pushed even deeper, they encountered increasing signs of the enemy’s presence; finally, a few minor contacts were initiated. On 25 November, progress had been greatly decreased and the Third Squadron’s sweeps to the north in pursuit of small groups of enemy forces took them further away from their primary axis of march.

At 0342 hours on the morning of 26 November, enemy RPG’s struck several key vehicles in the Command Post NDP. Fire and secondary explosions destroyed a number of vehicles and caused numerous casualties. By 0550 hours, it was estimated that there were four US killed and thirty-four wounded. One M557, two H551’s, two H09’s, four H648’s, five 14-ton trailers, and two 1-ton ammunition trailers were lost. Four NVA were killed. For the remainder of the day the Third Squadron worked, trying to recover from the pre-dawn attack.

On 27 November, the Third Squadron was directed to move east with the goal of leaving AO Dallas by 28 November. On 28 November, the elements of the Third Squadron returned across the river toward FSB Jake and Operation Texas Traveler ended.

(3) Pro-Tet Highpoint: During the middle of January, enemy forces started infiltrating from secure areas in or along Cambodia into Phuoc Long and Binh Long Provinces. Slowly, varied reports and incidents were pieced together and a picture of a large force opposing the Blackhorse forces in the area was visualized.

(a) Battle of the Crescent (20 January 1970): During the early morning hours on 20 January, FSB Ruth, OP for 2/11th ACR, was the object
of sporadic mortar attacks. During each occurrence, the mortars were countered by artillery and Pink Teams. It wasn't till late morning, when LTC Brookshire's (CO, 2/11 ACR) command and control ship received .51 caliber machine gun fire, that the enemy's position was fixed. Fortunately, LTC Brookshire's ship had not received any hits. Soon after this, a Pink Team from Air Cavalry Troop was flying over the area trying to discover the enemy situation. A short time later, it was reported that the white element (LOH) was shot down. While Air Cavalry Troop's Cobras and Blue Max scrambled into the area, LTC Brookshire was repositioning his ground forces. H Company was to come in from the north while F and G Troops moved up from the south. While the ground elements were maneuvering, a Cobra piloted by Capt. Carl Marshall, landed despite heavy volume of fire and rescued the lone LOH survivor.

Artillery, TAC Air, ACT Cobras and Blue Max pounded the area as F and G Troops were coming on line. The only time the artillery was lifted was when elements of the 33rd Chemical Detachment were flown over the target area and dropped CS AG-108 Clusters. The CS clusters routed the enemy forces from their secure bunkers—panic stricken. A few moments later artillery resumed pounding the area while gunships and TAC Air poured it on.

Ground forces continued to maneuver and the major fighting continued until 1640 hours. The entire contact had ended by 1836 hours. It was difficult to determine the enemy's actual strength because, after the contact, the troops were only able to sweep a portion of the area. Elements of the 2nd Squadron did not re-enter the contact area until two days later because of a requirement to reinforce 1st Squadron when the enemy carried the battle to the district of Loc Nhi the next day. By the time elements of 2/11 ACR were able to sweep the crescent, the area had been well "policied". Unfortunately, no documents or prisoners were captured to accurately reveal the size of the enemy or the extent of his losses. Because there were anti-aircraft elements, heavy mortars and probably infantry, it was estimated that the enemy strength probably consisted of two battalions and had been positioned in a classic airmobile ambush.

(b) Battle of the Cross Roads (21 January 1970): On the basis of special agent reports, it was decided that B and C Troops would conduct ground reconnaissance north of FSB Dennis on 21 January. The Troops would follow the northern road and then turn off at the cross road to sweep the ridges that protruded north to one of the suspected enemy locations.

That morning C Troop led the way. Shortly after they turned from the road and headed for the ridge line, the lead element received recoilless rifle, MG and small arms fire from the northeast. C Troop reacted quickly and soon they were on line, slowly advancing up the hill toward the enemy emplacements.
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In the meantime, B Troop proceeded along the road and finally turned off, heading for a small bridge over a stream running northeast to southwest. As soon as B Troop had crossed the bridge, the lead element came under fire. Rapidly B Troop was on line advancing to the southwest toward C Troop, but then reversed direction toward the enemy positions. The Troops had changed directions several times, over pursuing the enemy, before they were finally able to link up. They proceeded slowly, advancing toward the enemy positions, always maintaining fire superiority.

While the ground troops were skillfully maneuvering, artillery, TAC Air, and gunships were pounding the target areas as well as likely routes of withdrawal. It had become evident that the NVA were well equipped when several .51 caliber machine guns started to deliver a heavy volume of fire. It was now also apparent that the enemy forces had RPG's, 57mm recoilless rifles, mortars and AK-47's.

The contact continued throughout the day and, although B and C Troops were reacting very effectively, two M551 Sheridans and two ACV's had been literally blown away by a combination of RPG and recoilless rifle fire. C Troop had lost one trooper while nine were wounded. B Troop had suffered six wounded.

F and G Troops had been called early during the contact. As they moved from Bu Dop, G Troop reported seeing evidence of an estimated enemy company moving south. G Troop continued as quickly as possible to the 1st Squadron contact site. G Troop made brief contact with the enemy but continued to push on to C Troop's location. When G Troop arrived in the C Troop contact area, they started to sweep and found two bundles of documents. Meanwhile, F Troop pushed north to the area of a suspected enemy base camp. B, C, and G Troops continued to sweep the area and pursued trails in an effort to maintain contact with the fleeting enemy.

When the contact had finally ended and the area had been swept, it was found that the X1 and X2 Battalions of the 141st NVA Regiment, as well as the Q22 Transportation Company, had been encountered. Forty-one NVA soldiers lay dead. The enemy, who was well armed and who had a superior number of forces, had been beaten. The enemy had chosen the battle site and was well prepared, but the NVA had not anticipated the expertise which was exemplified by the men of B and C Troops.

(4) Northern Binh Long Province: During the reporting period, Air Cavalry Troop staged two significant border clashes in northern Binh Long Province which were unrelated to the above mentioned operations. The Air Cavalry Troop had been conducting visual reconnaissance along the border in an attempt to interdict infiltrating enemy forces, and on 24 December its efforts...
proved successful. A LOK, flying west of Loc Minh (XU570056), received automatic weapons fire and in the ensuing battle, gunships, artillery, and TAC Air all converged and pounded the enemy positions. Although no unit identification was obtained, 30 NVA had been killed.

The second clash took place north of Loc Minh, about one and a half miles from the Cambodian border. The contact area had been under close observation since 16 November, when Air Cavalry Troop gunships spotted and destroyed what was believed to have been a stone crushing device. It was thought that possibly a stone quarry was being operated in the area.

On 27 December, while a Pink Team was conducting a VR in the area, two NVA were spotted in a lightly wooded area. Seconds later the white element (LOK) received automatic weapons fire. While the red bird (Cobra) and LOK returned fire, it became apparent that there was a large NVA force in the area. Minutes later Air Cavalry Troop scrambled gunships. Blue Hawk and ZLC-AR were called on station and artillery pounded the target area. As this massive day long air/ground battle continued, the 1st Squadron alerted A Troop and D Company, which were conducting a combined operation with the 196th RF Company. By late afternoon, ground elements were approaching the hill on which the NVA had been planted. The RF company dismounted and began sweeping the area. Soon they encountered a heavy volume of fire. In this brief period four were wounded. A Troop and D Company immediately came on line and began suppressing the fire of the fleeing enemy. When the contact area was swept, captured documents identified elements of the 141st NVA Regiment. These elements included the 21st Sapper Company, 19th Engineer Company, C-24th Convalescent Company, C-23rd Transportation Company and a finance Section.

When darkness came the NVA had been routed back toward Cambodia, Air Cavalry Troop had been credited with 29 of the 50 NVA killed.

b. Done Tian (Go Forward Together) Program:

(1) Combined Operations: While the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has worked tirelessly to secure Binh Long Province and the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area during this past quarter, the effort toward the Vietnamization program has not faltered. In fact, combined operations have become a common occurrence in the Blackhorse AO. During the past three months, the Regiment has conducted seal and search, reconnaissance, road security, and ICAP operations with ARVN/RF/PP/CIDG forces. The regiment has also secured landing zones during airborne operations with the RVNAF.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and OPCON units have conducted the following number of combined operations in which a US company/troop has worked with an RVN/RF/PP/CIDG unit during a 24-hour period. Represented below are combined operations from 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970.

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COMBINED OPERATIONS

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NOTES:

1. * This figure denotes road security operations along QL 13.
2. There were also eight airmobile operations conducted with 11th ACR assistance during the quarter: ARVN = 1, CIDG = 1, RF/FP = 6.

(2) Training: Over the past reporting period, the 11th ACR has conducted formal training in various fields: mechanics, mortar crew proficiency, sniper training, drivers training, preventive medicine and aircraft training. The joint ICAP's are also significant, for they are part of a GIT program for ARVN and provincial medical personnel. The chart below indicates the number of formal classes given during the quarter:

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<tr>
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<th>2/11 ACR</th>
<th>3/11 ACR</th>
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<tr>
<td>ICAP's</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>30</td>
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NOTE:

1. During the past quarter, the Regimental S-5 has conducted 45 joint ICAP's.

2. Training:

(1) Replacement training was accomplished throughout the quarter to prepare replacements for the role they must fill as Blackhorse troopers. Monthly attendance was as follows:

- NOVEMBER: 580
- DECEMBER: 523
- JANUARY: 548

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(2) Specialized Training:

(a) Armor School: One individual from the 919th Engineers
attended a four day course at Phuoc Vinh.

(b) Artillery School: Four Blackhorse troopers attended a
one week fire direction center course. The course was given by the 5/42nd Artillery
at Long Binh.

(c) LOH Transition: One individual from Air Cavalry Troop
attended LOH Transition at Vung Tau.

(d) Cobra IP School: One individual from Air Cavalry Troop
attended Cobra IP School at Vung Tau.

(e) Cobra Qualification: Three individuals from Air Cavalry
Troop attended Cobra qualification classes at Vung Tau.

(f) Cobra Armament: Three individuals from Air Cavalry
Troop attended Cobra armament classes at Vung Tau.

(g) PLL School: During this quarter 15 Blackhorse troopers
attended PLL School. The course was given by the 185th Maintenance Battalion
at Long Binh.

(h) External Airlift Procedures: Ten individuals from the
Regiment attended classes at Quan Loi on C-47 airlift procedures. The classes
were given by the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

(i) Generator School: Twenty individuals attended generator
school at Long Binh. The classes were given by the 185th Maintenance Battalion.

(j) Field Sanitation Training: The Regimental Surgeon con-
ducted field sanitation classes at Quan Loi during the past quarter. Thirty-
nine attended from the Regiment.

(k) Sniper School: Eleven troopers completed the 1st Team
Academy's two week sniper course at Bien Hoa. Six individuals also attended
refresher training at 1st Team Academy during the reporting period.
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4. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:
   a. Chemical:
      (1) General: The 33rd Chemical Detachment continued to provide direct chemical support and technical advice to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

      (2) Personnel Detection: During the period 173 Sniffer missions were flown. A number of Sniffer sensings were confirmed by independent means. Intelligence readings such as SLIP, RVR's were obtained in the vicinity of our readings on a number of occasions. For example, a FAC observing artillery being fired in one of our Sniffer readings observed a secondary explosion resulting in two bunkers destroyed and two more bunkers and three .51 caliber positions uncovered.

      In cooperation with the S-5, the detachment has continued to drop leaflets during our Sniffer missions. This procedure saves "coke time" and the low level flying with which the Sniffer missions are run allows pinpoint delivery of leaflets on trails, bunker complexes and other areas used by the VC/NVA.

      (3) CS Drops: There were three persistent CS drum drops in the Regimental AO. They were coordinated by the detachment and supported by the 1st Cavalry Division's Chemical Section.

      There were ten drops of 155mm Canister Clusters during the quarter. Approximately half were on intelligence targets, the remainder being dropped during actual contact. The effectiveness of this combat technique was demonstrated on 20 January 1970, when an Air Cavalry Troop LOH received ground fire near the Cambodian border east of Bo Duc. The NVA were in bunkers and, despite heavy artillery shelling, their casualties were light. A load of CS Canister Clusters was dropped on the enemy positions. The NVA left the safety of their bunkers and fled across an open field. Cobra gunships rolled in and tactical airstrikes followed taking a heavy toll in enemy lives.

      The detachment continued to make bunker bombs filled with persistent CS. The bombs are employed to prohibit the re-use of discovered bunkers by the enemy.

   b. Signal: Strong command emphasis was placed on the net control station supervision of correct operating procedure. This has resulted in an overall improvement in the quality of traffic on nets and significantly diminished misuse of net air time. The new SOI published in January 1970, reduced the amount of stations in the command net, thereby increasing the efficiency of the net.

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The Regimental Relay Station, which had been operating on Gia Ray Mountain ever since the Regiment moved into Blackhorse Base Camp in October 1967, proved to be inadequate for the Regiment's new area of operations. The best site in this area is Nai Ba Den Mountain near Tay Ninh City. Its 986 meter elevation provides line-of-sight communication potential to include the Regiment's present positions. Due to the lack of physical space on the mountain, the move has been postponed until the 1st Infantry Division withdraws from its site and space becomes available.

The procurement of secure voice circuits continued to be a problem area due to a shortage of KY-38/VRC-12 interconnect cables, and pending modifications on ARC-54 Radio Sets for the installation of the KY-28 Speech Secure Machine. At the end of this reporting period, modifications on ARC-54 Radios were beginning to be applied but the shortage of interconnect cables persisted. Speech secure equipment increases network capabilities by effectively denying information to VC/NVA radio intercept teams; furthermore, fewer security violations would be committed.

c. Artillery: During the quarter, the 11th ACR operated in a variety of fire support missions. The 1st Squadron operated primarily in the northwest portion of Binh Long Province out of FSB Marge. Due to the range of the 155mm Howitzers, not all of the AO could be covered; even 175mm from A/6-27 in Quan Loi could not cover the extreme northwest portions. Consequently, on several occasions a platoon of 155mm Howitzers was sent to a FOB to conduct either an artillery raid or to support troop maneuvers in areas previously not covered by artillery support. On 27 December, during a contact near the Cambodian border, a platoon was sent north of Tay Ninh to support the contact. Also in December, two platoons were sent to FSB Duffy to conduct an artillery raid on an old French fort in AO Shortstop. On 17 January, 1st Howitzer Battery moved from FSB Marge to FSB Dennis which permitted greater coverage of the northwest portion of Binh Long Province. On 29 January, the 1st Squadron moved to FSB Christine, north of Tay Ninh.

Second Squadron spent much of this period involved in Rome Plow operations along QL 14A. This operation consumed large amounts of ammunition in the way of suppressive fires in order to hold down the mining of the highway. The operation was successful and the mining incidents decreased as the plows moved up the road to Bu Dop. Second Howitzer Battery also used platoon displacement to cover either logistical convoys or maneuver elements of the 2nd Squadron. During the contact of 20 January, they supported with over 650 rounds of HE.

On 30 January, they moved into FSB Wade, just north of An Loc.

Third Squadron has been conducting operations primarily in eastern War Zone C since mid-November. They have been located at FSB Jake during the period except for a brief move to the center of War Zone C. The battery has fired mainly...
in support of maneuver elements. They have had a larger number of contact
fire missions and counter-mortar missions than the other two batteries. At
the end of November, 1st and 3rd Howitzer Batteries combined at FSB Jake to
conduct a 707 on a base camp in War Zone C.

In the middle of December, the 8" guns from A/6-27 moved from Quan Loi to FSB
Merge to support operations in northern Binh Long Province until 1st Squadron
moved FSB Dennis. On 12 January, C/6-27 moved their 175mm guns from Phuoc Vinh
and their 8" guns from FSB Thunder III to FSB Jake. Other support has come
from C/2-13 at FSB Thunder IV and C/2-12 at Quan Loi. The FSSC and clearance
of fires has been provided by 6-27 Arty. An MTOE change has been approved by
USARV authorizing the 11th ACR additional personnel and equipment to est-blish
a fire support element organic to the Regiment.

**MISSIONS FIRED**

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d. **Engineer:**

(1) General: During the reporting period, elements of the 919th
Engineer Company (Armored) participated in operations Kentucky Cougar, Texas
Traveler, and Long Reach I and II, while providing direct combat engineer
support to elements of the 11th Armored C-valry Regiment. In each of these
operations, the separate platoons of the 919th Engineers were OPCON to in-
dividual troops or teams of the 11th ACR on a mission-by-mission basis to
insure maximum utilization and speed of mission execution. Engineers were
capable of demolition work, ford and AVLB construction, reconnaissance,
NRP construction, tunnel exploration, security, mine detection and combat as
an armor element.

(2) Operations: During the quarter, the 919th Engineer Company

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(Armored) was employed in many diversified missions which took the members
of the Company into every corner of the IIICTZ. In supporting - unit as mobile
as the 11th ACR, the individual platoons usually found themselves working as
separate units. To do justice to each platoon and their accomplishments, the
events of the last three months will be reported by platoon.

(a) During the first eleven days of the reporting period,
the 1st Platoon was located at FSB Gwyn, engaged in a maintenance stand down
during which they also provided security for convoys to FSB Berge. On 12
November, the Platoon was again engaged in engineer projects with the re-in-
forcement of a Bailey Bridge on QL 13 (XT722973). On the night of 15 November,
while temporarily based at the 501st NDP (XT9999), the Platoon was ambushed
by an enemy force of unknown size. Fire was returned in the brief contact
in which no friendly casualties were sustained. The Platoon moved to Quen-
tel on 19 November for a two week maintenance stand down.

On 3 December, after departing Quan Loi Base Camp, the 1st Platoon was ambushed
while sweeping the road between FSB Deb and FSB Joel. During this engagement,
one man was killed in action and one was wounded. The following day the Pla-
toon returned to the ambush site to recover an ACAV that had been damaged
during the engagement.

After spending several days at FSB Joel, the 1st Platoon moved to FSB Bunice
and there provided security for Romeo Plows operating in the area. The unit
was regularly engaged in improving fields of fire around the fire sup-port
base and conducting mine sweeps from Bunice to Joel. While at FSB Bunice,
the Platoon had removed more than 250 trees, destroyed old ammunition, main-
tained their vehicles, and pulled security at the base. Before departing
FSB Bunice for FSB Ruth, the engineers destroyed the base.

While at FSB Ruth, the Platoon was assigned the project of improving base
defenses. On 11 January, a triple standard concertina fence was laid around
the perimeter. That same day, the engineers reconnoitered a culvert site north of
Bu Dop on QL 14A, classified a M15 fixed open bridge in the same area, in-
stalled a gate in the concertina surrounding FSB Ruth and destroyed three
M-15 AT mines. On 14 January, the platoon departed FSB Ruth for Quan Loi
and a maintenance stand down.

The remainder of the month was spent at Quan Loi. The Platoon was engaged
in daily mine sweep operations and culvert repair and construction along
QL 13.

(b) During the first two weeks of November, the 2nd Platoon
was engaged in cutting trees in preparation for the construction of a corduroy
bridge and also undertook the construction of an NDP at XT823842. On 14
November, while on a reconnoissance mission, the platoon discovered nine
abandoned bunkers along the tree line at X624835 and made plans to destroy
the positions at a later date. The engineers were engaged in regular mine
sweeping operations until 18 November, and during this time they discovered
seven 23lb Chicane pressure type mines. All were blown in place.

On 27 November, the Platoon was engaged in repairing a ford site at X625809
and during this operation two engineers were WIA. The remainder of November
was spent conducting daily mine sweeps in the An Loc/Loc Minh area.

The first part of December was spent reconning for bridge and ford sites and
conducting daily mine sweep operations. On 13 and 17 December, the Platoon
spread a total of 50 gallons of perma-prime on a landing zone at XU730652. During
this period, the engineers served as security for various missions--
water point security, medical evacuation security, and security for NI de-
tachments engaged in interrogating villagers.

On January first, the 2nd Platoon constructed a radar control emplacement
for II Field Force Artillery Units at XU738069. From 6 through 8 January,
the engineers were engaged in the construction of a Class 60 timber trestle
bridge at XU752106. Following completion of the bridge, the Platoon moved to
FSB Dennis and continued construction and enlargement of that base. On 28
January, the Platoon departed FSB Dennis for Tay Minh and arrived there with
the 1st Squadron on 31 January.

(c) On 30 October, the 3rd Platoon conducted a reconnaissance
mission in the vicinity of X624815, surveying possible ford sites and check-
ing the serviceability of an already existing Bailey Bridge. On 9 November
the Platoon was attached to M Company and conducted reconnaissance operations
for ford sites in the vicinity of X6483. From 11 to 15 November, the engi-
neers constructed a crossing site at X378282. For the remainder of November,
the Platoon provided mine sweep operations in the An Loc area.

From 16 to 19 December, the 3rd Platoon constructed a Class 60 timber trestle
bridge at X682901. On 27 December, they moved to FSB Jake to make improve-
ments on that position. While at FSB Jake, the engineers pulled security and
placed a barrier across the stream to protect the newly constructed bridge
from charges floating down the stream.

During the month of January, the Platoon was involved in the reinforcement
of the wire entanglement around FSB Jake, using 66 rolls of concertina wire.
They also cut trees around the base to improve fields of fire. On 25 Jan-
uary, the engineers constructed ford sites along the Prek Trou River.

(d) During the month of November, the 4th Platoon was COPCON
to the 2nd Squadron and was involved in daily mine sweep operations. From
29 December to 14 January, the Platoon was located at Quan Loi Base Camp for a
maintenance stand down. While there, they participated in a variety of projects to improve the base camp area. On 14 January, the Platoon departed Quan Loi and was relocated at FSB Puth. From 15 January to the end of the reporting period, the engineers were engaged in daily mine sweeps along QL 14A to Bo Duc. No mines were found during this time.

On 21 January, the 4th Platoon was involved in a major engagement as part of 2nd Squadron. The engineers discovered and destroyed ten 61 x 8' enemy bunkers. Though the fighting was heavy, the engineers suffered no casualties.

On 29 January, the 4th Platoon moved to FSB Wade where they remained through the end of the reporting period.

(3) Base Camp Development: During the quarter, the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) was engaged in several projects designed to improve the defenses of Quan Loi Base Camp. Much of this work was concentrated in the Red and Blue Sectors of Base Defense and consisted of utilizing the equipment organic to the engineer unit for the construction and improvement of bunkers and emplacements.

In addition to considerations of defense, the 919th Engineers were responsible for the administration of the Regimental S-4 yard from which were issued a multitude of materials. Initially, it was the practice of the unit to load requested material using equipment as required by the size and weight of the item. Since the first of the year, however, the demands of the elements in the field prohibit the continuance of such an operation. This alteration in normal procedure resulted in no appreciable degeneration of S-4 yard procedures.

5. (C) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. Logistics:

(1) General: During the reporting period, combat service support showed significant improvement in almost all areas. Since the beginning of the quarter, there has been a complete rotation of logistics personnel. This has resulted in an influx of new ideas and techniques with emphasis placed on identifying problem areas and establishing a usable system to cope with these deficiencies.

The results of this effort, both in maintenance and supply, has produced a more effective system for the management of the Regiment's resources. Actual details as to where these improvements were made will be discussed in the remainder of this section.

(2) Supply and Maintenance:

(a) Class I - Food: During the reporting period the Class I resupply was accomplished in much the same way as during the previous period. All food stuffs were through-put from Long Binh to the 15th S&S Battalion in Quan Loi by means of a daily convoy. Units then drew their raw rations as well as their "C's" and prepared them here at Quan Loi for shipment to combat trains locations in the field. This procedure was extremely suitable to the needs of the Regiment and no major problem areas were encountered.

Suggested areas of improvement: It was felt by many units that the disposable food containers should be reintroduced into the supply system. Its particular effectiveness becomes apparent when another unit becomes OPCON to the Regiment. With a shortage of the merinite metal cans, it is not always possible to supply another unit from our own resources. This particularly true of an infantry company. The disposable merinite can offers two very practical solutions in that it serves as a container in which to keep food hot, and it eliminates the need for backhauling the empty metal merinite cans.

(b) Class II and VII - Clothing and Major End Items: No major problems were encountered in the area of Class II supplies. A new policy was established for the replacement of clothing within USARV in that all types of clothing become obtainable only on a direct exchange basis. This produced some difficulties for units at first; however, the policy is now accepted and seems to be working satisfactorily.

In the Class VII category there are still some difficulties with regard to vehicle replacement. The following vehicles are still short within the Regiment and, although we have received some relief on several of the items, we still are not satisfied with the fill we are getting:

- Carrier Cargo 6-ton M548
- Truck Cargo 5-ton M54A2
- Truck, Utility ½-ton M151A1
- Flamethrower Service Unit XM45E1 (Note: This item is no longer being shipped to SVN units.)

The problems encountered with the Self-propelled Howitzer M109 has been eased somewhat and replacement vehicles are now available within depot stock. Units are now changing over from the M106 Mortar Carrier to the M125 Mortar Carrier. Second Squadron, 11th ACR, has been completely outfitted with the new weapon. The 1st Squadron has already drawn their 81mm mortars and are now awaiting the carriers.

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(c) Class III - POL: Problems were encountered with the 15th S&S Battalion in that they were unable to meet the needs of the Regiment for certain critical items of POL—OE-30, OHC, and LSA. In order to solve this problem each squadron was asked to provide a listing of all POL products used and their weekly expenditures. This information was then consolidated and a copy was forwarded to the 3rd FSSE as a required stockage level for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Since this action, no problems have been encountered.

(d) Class IV - Construction and Barrier Material: Construction and barrier material, although in limited supply, has not been a problem during the past three months. All command controlled items, such as concertina wire, chain link fence, and engineer stakes, have been controlled at Regimental level and, generally, all needs have been met. Recently, the Regiment was given an allocation for all small size lumber and plywood. Requests for these items come through the Regimental S-4 and are screened for validity. Requests are then sent to the NRE in Bien Hoa for processing and shipment. This system is functioning well and so far all requests have been filled promptly.

(e) Class V - Ammunition: The shortage of certain ammunition items presented a significant problem during the reporting period. One item, G900, Incendiary Grenade, was critically short. Assistance was requested from II Field Force and additional quantities were made available. Another item, green bag propellant charges for the 155mm Howitzer projectile, were in continual short supply at Quan Loi. This resulted in several instances of stringent control on artillery fires. Continuous monitoring of the stockage levels at the ASP enabled us to anticipate these problems and request assistance before they impaired our capabilities. Additional command emphasis on ASP controls enabled the Regiment to operate within its ASP on most items without major difficulty.

(f) Aerial Resupply: The primary means of resupply continued to be by air. Fixed wing resupply was utilized to its maximum capability into all primary log ports, and then moved from the port by hook (CH-47) or by overland convoy.

Blade time continued to be a problem with the Regiment consistently over-flying its allotted time of 15 hours. In order to alleviate this problem, a new control system was initiated. Essentially, each unit is given a block of hours for each day, instead of a number of sorties. The burden is then placed on the unit to make the maximum utilization of the aircraft in the time allotted. So far, this program has worked well and the problem seems to have been solved.

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(g) Maintenance: During the quarter, increased command emphasis resulted in significant improvements in the effectiveness of the Regiment's maintenance program. An augmentation to the S-4 section of an additional captain to handle the daily administration of the maintenance officer has allowed the maintenance officer to devote his time and effort toward the improvement of the maintenance program. During January, an extensive review of the system was completed. The problem areas identified were: lack of specific, formal maintenance standards; the squadron's PLL's are too large and do not appear to be responsive to requirements; and, the TAERS system is not being utilized. Specific solutions are being developed and will be implemented during the next reporting period.

Repair parts supply has become increasingly more critical during this period. This shortage has included most major assemblies and direct exchange items. A list of the most critical repair items was developed by each of the squadrons and consolidated at Regimental level. This list is presently being checked against all PLL's to identify those items that are critical throughout the Regiment and to insure that they are on valid requisition.

b. Medical:

(1) Significant diseases diagnosed during the quarter are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISEASE</th>
<th>ADMIN RATE PER/1000/YEAR</th>
<th>PREVIOUS QUARTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Hepatitis</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>130.62</td>
<td>84.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>35.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal</td>
<td>150.22</td>
<td>157.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>23.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The most significant problem encountered during the quarter was the increase in the number of cases of malaria within the 11th ACR, particularly the relatively high percentage of F. vivax cases as compared to the total number of malaria cases. Admissions to USARV hospitals alone were larger than any other reportable category, including those hospitalized as a result of battle action.

The following are malaria statistics for the reportable period:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL CASES</th>
<th>P. vivax</th>
<th>% P. vivax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) At the request of the Commanding Officer, 11th ACR, a survey was made of the evacuation capacity of the medical platoons of each squadron. It was found that the tank company of each squadron did not have an evacuation track (M-113) for its company aidmen to conduct medical operations. The lack of a M-113 evacuation track often forced the company aidmen to ride inside or on the outside of a tank during combat operations. In addition, there is no way for the aidmen to adequately protect casualties from further injury from small arms fire, except to load the patient into an adjacent tank, often creating further complications. This problem was solved by obtaining a M-113 evacuation track for the tank company on a 180 day temporary loan, which was based on the "health of the sick and injured troops" who were exposed to the elements of hostile fire. The addition of this M-113 evacuation track to each of the tank companies has received extremely favorable comments. It is recommended that an additional M-113 be added to the medical platoon, armored cavalry squadron, for the tank company of that element in any future TOE changes.

(4) Evacuation of the injured by helicopter has not recently been a problem in the 11th ACR due to the excellent coverage provided by the Air Ambulance Platoon, 15th Medical Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (A/M). However, it was noted that when units were placed outside the operating area of the 15th Medical Battalion, there have been instances of considerable delay in evacuating patients from air ambulance units that operated strictly on a basis of geographical area coverage rather than assigned to cover specific units.

With the projected withdrawal of troop units, the 11th ACR will probably operate independently of division units that have organic air ambulance support. To meet this situation, an air ambulance detachment should be considered as an augmentation or integral part of the TOE of the 37th Medical Company, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

6. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. Strength: The Regiment's overall strength picture is very good. Our current aggregate strength is 4470, putting us at 99.8% of our authorized strength. The Regiment is at 110% on officer strength. The following are strength figures by month:

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RCS CSFOR-65 (R)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASGD</th>
<th>PDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>1464</td>
<td>4027</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>4403</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>4420</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th>NFD</th>
<th>NEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. MOS Shortages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASGD</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 B Engineer</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 B Artillery</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 G Commo Chief</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 B Radio Mch</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Replacements: The overall quality of the Regiment's replacements is good. They seem to be more attentive and more eager to learn. The environment probably has a lot to do with this attitude.

d. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Statistical Summary of US Awards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star, Service</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation, Service</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star, Valor</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal, Valor</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation, Valor</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Statistical Summary of Vietnamese Awards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Order of RVN, 5th Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Dist'd Service Order, 2nd Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Service Medal, 1st Class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Palm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Gold Star</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Silver Star</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Bronze Star</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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18 February 1970

AWARDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st Class</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor Medal, 2nd Class</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action Honor Medal, 1st Class</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action Honor Medal, 2nd Class</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Badge</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Maintenance of Discipline:

(1) Courts-Martial Status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRIED</th>
<th>CONVICTIONS</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Offenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UCM Article No.</th>
<th>No. Times Charged</th>
<th>No. Convictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: The past three months have seen a continually effective PSIOP's program conducted by the Regiment. Over two and a half million leaflets have been dropped and 135 hours of aerial broadcast missions flown. The

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decline in leaflet drops and aerial missions is noted by the lack of enemy activity within the TAI.

b. Rolliers: The Chieu Hoi Program received the largest amount of aerial loudspeaker time with leaflet and loudspeaker missions being flown during and after every contact. A ground tactical mission was conducted in War Zone C during Operation Texas Traveler in late November. This was done to determine the effectiveness of conducting Chieu Hoi broadcasts from night defensive positions. Additionally, Chieu Hoi missions were flown on all intelligence missions.

During the reporting period, the Regiment received three ralliers. This figure is low because most ralliers have a fear of rallying to US units. It is well to note that during this same period, Binh Long Province is credited with over 200 ralliers. A great many of these have stated that loudspeaker missions and leaflets had a large impact on their decision to rally.

c. Mining Incidents: An extensive effort was made to combat mining incidents on QL 13 in November and December with special leaflets and tapes provided to stop the mineings. This effort helped reduce the number of civilians injured and killed on the highway. This proved extremely valuable and resulted in one member of the VC Mining Team rallying to the Regiment.

An attitude of cooperation has been noted among the population within the AO. The continued input of information as to enemy units and locations of mines and booby traps, as well as the acceptance of GVN programs, reflects their willingness to cooperate.

8. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General: Civic action activities during the quarter were continued at the increased rate reached during October. Through the joint effort of the Regimental S-5, 37th Medical Company and 541st Military Intelligence Detachment, the Integrated Civic Action Program (ICAP) was expanded. Over 15,000 civilians received medical treatment and significant intelligence was gained. The program was carried out in the An Loc and Loc Ninh Districts of Binh Long Province, and the Bo Duc District of Phuoc Long Province.

The Regiment was engaged in the joint project of construction of a dry room for the Binh Long Provincial Hospital. The dry room was completed in early December. Other civic action projects consisted of bridge and road repair, distribution of foodstuffs, and the construction of playground equipment and the improvement of schools.

b. Commodities Distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>1,400 lbs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTED:

Clothing 325 lbs.
Health Items 375 lbs.
Cement 1050 lbs.
Tin 75 sheets
Lumber 2000 bd. ft.
Paint 25 gal.
Send 400 lbs.

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:
   
   a. Personnel: None.
   b. Operations:

   (1) OBSERVATION: There is a need for a new anti-mining device.
   
      EVALUATION: Over the years weather conditions have caused mines to sink into the ground along infrequently used trails and roads. The depth of the mines makes them undetectable to present day mine sweeping devices. Because of the depth and age of the mines, it is not uncommon for several vehicles to pass over them before they finally detonate.

      RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a new anti-mining device be considered for development to counter the present problem.

   (2) OBSERVATION: Constant pressure must be maintained during engagements with VC/NVA forces.

      EVALUATION: While being supported by another troop during a contact, a troop commander disengaged his entire troop to medivac his wounded. This practice can cause supporting units to become extremely vulnerable.

      RECOMMENDATION: Do not disengage an entire troop to medivac wounded.
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(3) OBSERVATION: Recently, because of a late sweeping operation, a unit established a hasty NDP during the hours of total darkness. No trip flares or Claymores were set out.

EVALUATION: This practice can cause NDP's to become extremely vulnerable to enemy sapper attacks.

RECOMMENDATION: Units must assume a solid defensive posture whenever establishing NDP’s.

(4) OBSERVATION: Because sufficient time for maintenance to be conducted was not given prior to a squadron-size road march, eleven vehicles developed mechanical difficulties.

EVALUATION: If prior warning had been given, a concentrated maintenance effort could have been exerted.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend, where tactically feasible, that 72 hours of concentrated maintenance be the prerequisite for excessively long squadron-size road marches.

(5) OBSERVATION: Basic skills are not used but are still the key to success.

EVALUATION: In armored cavalry units the basic skills demonstrated by the individual are still essential to achieve success.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that basic skills be stressed during all phases of training.

(6) OBSERVATION: Aggressive and constant patrolling keeps the enemy off guard.

EVALUATION: Aggressiveness during patrolling keeps the enemy from establishing positions and often pre-empts his planned attacks.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend to continue aggressive and constant patrolling.

(7) OBSERVATION: AP's are not effective if noise and light discipline are not maintained.

EVALUATION: During the past quarter, the effectiveness of ambush patrols has suffered from the lack of proper noise and light discipline.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the basic principles of ambush patrols be stressed in training.
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(8) OBSERVATION: Regional Forces in demand.
EVALUATION: Because of the progress of the RF infantry companies, squadron commanders now request more combined operations.

(9) OBSERVATION: Armored vehicles suffer from random mining.
EVALUATION: It has become quite common for trucks to be lost while busting jungle. Since it is not practical to mine sweep while busting jungle, the VC/NVA random mining tactics have been costly.

RECOMMENDATION: There is a need for the development of a track mounted mine detector.

(10) OBSERVATION: On 20 January 1970, a LOH was shot down near a large, open landing zone.
EVALUATION: The normal procedure when an aircraft is shot down is to scramble the Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP). If the LOH pilot had not been rescued heroically by a Cobra pilot, the ARP would have sprung an NVA ambush. The geographical setting in this instance should have made commanders suspicious.

c. Training: None.
d. Intelligence:

(1) OBSERVATION: Increased enemy mining.
EVALUATION: Enemy mining incidents have sharply increased during the quarter, and at times mining was the only enemy initiated activity directed at the Regiment. Approximately one out of every three mining incidents results in either casualties or damage to Allied equipment. The individuals or groups responsible for the mine laying, except in rare instances, are unidentified and unlocated.

RECOMMENDATION: Emphasis should be placed on more effective and frequent mine sweeping of roads, as well as the Volunteer Informant Program in order to identify where the mines are and who is laying them. More dismounted ambush patrols should be used since tanks and ACAV's are too noisy for AP's.

(2) OBSERVATION: Increased use of sappers.
EVALUATION: In recent months, sapper attacks have been on
the increase in III CTZ. In many cases, the enemy has been successful in penetrating defensive perimeters. Prisoner interrogations and document read-outs indicate that the enemy is making a concerted effort to train all, or at least a portion, of its units in sapper and special action techniques.

RECOMMENDATION: Comprehensive training programs should be initiated to train personnel in the effective methods of countering the sapper. More effort should also be expended in fortifying semi-permanent fire support bases.

3) OBSERVATION: Decrease in the number of prisoners and documents captured.

EVALUATION: As engagements with the enemy decrease, so do the number of prisoners and documents captured. Since these are primary sources of immediately exploitable information, this void must be filled.

RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis should be placed on psychological operations, especially those oriented toward local guerrillas.

4) OBSERVATION: Problems of visualizing new areas of operation.

EVALUATION: A picture is worth a thousand words.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue the use of hand held aerial photography by trained imagery interpretation personnel of the 51st MD to provide commanders with more realistic views of terrain, roads, and villages.

5) OBSERVATION: Enemy freedom of movement in border areas.

EVALUATION: AO Shortstop has rarely stopped or even curtailed the movement of enemy forces along border areas in Binh Long Province.

RECOMMENDATION: Devices that restrict or might tend to restrict enemy movement also restrict Allied movement along the border. AO Shortstop has been proven not to be effective in limiting enemy movement. Instead, it has brought the border closer to the populated areas of Binh Long Province.

LOGISTICAL: OBSERVATION: There is insufficient heavy equipment transporter capability available to support the Regiment.

EVALUATION: Throughout the reporting period, extensive delays were encountered in delivery of replacement vehicles and of combat loss and maintenance evacuation vehicles due to a lack of transporters. This...
problem resulted in increased down time on dead-lined vehicles requiring DS maintenance at Long Binh and nonavailability of replacement vehicles to combat units. Although all support units have cooperated to the maximum extent possible, it appears that sufficient assets are just not available. This problem has been presented to II Field Force, Vietnam.

RECOMMENDATION: That this problem be evaluated at Ist Logistical Command level to determine if the most effective utilisation is being made of existing assets and if additional transporters are required.

f. Signal: None.
g. Medical: None.
h. Base Camp Development: None.
i. PSYOP/Civic Action:

(1) OBSERVATION: PSYOP in support of contacts are continuously ineffective because the speaker aircraft are forced to work in and around artillery, gunships, and TAC Air.

EVALUATION: This creates an atmosphere of confusion and enemy soldiers cannot hear the full content of the message being broadcast.

RECOMMENDATION: That when the tactical situation permits, the PSYOP effort be allowed a period of time in which to broadcast the message.

(2) OBSERVATION: Increased accurate intelligence is gathered from ICAP's.

EVALUATION: Local populace gains the feeling of helpfulness from giving information and feels more involved in GVN.

RECOMMENDATION: ICAP's should be conducted daily on a scheduled basis. RF, PF or ARVN medical personnel should be used where possible for the treatment of civilians. On-the-job training can be given by accompanying US medical personnel.
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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 incl
as
Incl 2 wd HQ, DA

DISTRIBUTION:
1 OCMI
2 CINC USARPAC
3 CG, USARV
1 CH, USARV
3 CG, II FFV
3 CG, 1st CAV DIV (AM)
1 USAIS
1 USAARMS
1 USAARMC
1 Army War College
1 USACGSC
1 CO, 11th ACR
1 XO, 11th ACR
1 Staff, 11th ACR
1 CO, 1st Sqdn, 11th ACR
1 CO, 2nd Sqdn, 11th ACR
1 CO, 3rd Sqdn, 11th ACR
1 CO, Air Cav Trp, 11th ACR
6 28th MND, 11th ACR

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AVDACT-DT (18 Feb 70) 1st Inf
SUBJ: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), ATTN: ACoS, G3, APO San Francisco
96490 20 Mar 70

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO San Francisco 96266

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from the
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
ROGER C. TABAR
CPT, AGC
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CF:
DA CSFOR
AVYB-PS (18 Feb 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFCR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ II FFGCIV, APO San Francisco 96266, 20 Mar 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC(DRT), APO 96375
   Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concur with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for the period ending 31 January 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. BARTEL JR.
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG
AVHEC-DST (18 Feb 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 09 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "Class VII Category", page 23, paragraph 5a(2)(b):

      (1) Reference Carrier Cargo 6 Ton M548 and 5 Ton Series Truck, page 23, paragraph 5a(2)(b): nonconcur. Assets are available; however, this unit has no requisitions on the above items. Unit has been so advised.

      (2) Reference Truck, Utility, 1/2 Ton M151: concur. This headquarters has been advised future availability of truck, 1/2 ton M151 series vehicle is contingent upon AMC testing of the new M151A2 model.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning "Insufficient Maintenance Time", page 32, paragraph 1b(4): concur. Sufficient maintenance time should be given prior to a squadron-size road march. However, there is no substitute for a sound organization maintenance program in order to maintain a high state of combat readiness during the unpredictable situations encountered in SVN. No action by USARPAC or DA recommended.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "Increased Use of Sappers", page 33, paragraph 1d(2): concur. "COSVN Resolution 9" includes the statement that sapper activity is to be used extensively in tactical operations. Programs to train personnel in the effective methods of countering the sapper should be encouraged. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   d. (U) Reference item concerning "Problems of Visualizing New Areas of Operation", page 34, paragraph 1d(4): concur. The use of hand-held photography can be a valuable aid to the commander. The primary advantage of this program is the rapid reaction that can be provided to the commanders' request. It must be remembered, however, that image interpreters do not receive formal training in the operation of hand-held cameras. Therefore, if image interpreters are selected to perform this function, some OJT may be required. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.
e. (U) Reference item concerning "Insufficient Heavy Equipment Transporter Capability", page 36, paragraph 1: concur. There is a current shortage of 50 Ton Semi-trailer transporters. This shortage is expected to continue until Sep 70. Smaller capacity transporter trailers are not generally in critical supply; however, no additional comment can be made since this report does not address specific types. Unit has been so advised.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Increased Accurate Intelligence is Gathered From ICAP's", page 35, paragraph 1(2): nonconcur. A policy of conducting ICAP's daily on a scheduled basis would be a violation of CPSEC. It would be an open invitation to enemy units within the area to coincide a ground/artillery attack on an area where the populace would congregate. Unless the ICAP team travels by air, the danger of enemy ambush is very real. The enemy can also threaten the populace to stay away. In very secure areas, little danger exists from regularly scheduled daily visits. In remote or semi-secure areas, however, it is recommended that the notification of an ICAP visit be disseminated by an aircraft with loudspeakers, approximately one hour before the arrival of the team. No action by DA or USARPAC is required.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.W. OZAKI
CPT, AG
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

Annex A

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armored)
*140th Maintenance Battalion
*206th Supply and Service Company
1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion
5th Field Team, Company B, 6th PSYOP Battalion
7th Army Postal Unit
17th Public Information Detachment
28th Military History Detachment
33rd Chemical Detachment
124th Composite Support Maintenance Detachment
202nd Military Intelligence Detachment
398th Transportation Detachment
409th Radio Research Unit
541st Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Company
Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
E Troop
F Troop
G Troop
H Company
Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
I Troop
K Troop
L Troop
M Company
Howitzer Battery

*Attached support unit

Incl 1	42

CONFIDENTIAL
Annex C

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) during the entire quarter.

2. Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

   a. During the reporting period the following major units were OPCON to the 11th ACR for the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 Nov - 30 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 Nov - 31 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 Nov - 31 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2-7 Cav</td>
<td>24-28 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2-7 Cav</td>
<td>24-28 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Co, 1/9 ARVN Regt</td>
<td>4-5 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Co, 1/9 ARVN Regt</td>
<td>4-5 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/1-5 Cav</td>
<td>7-17 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 14th Co, 4/9 ARVN Regt</td>
<td>8-9 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1-5 Cav</td>
<td>17-29 Jan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. During the reporting period the following units were GS to the 11th ACR for the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/6-27 Arty</td>
<td>1 Nov - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2-12 Arty</td>
<td>1 Nov - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2-12 Arty</td>
<td>1 Nov - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2-13 Arty</td>
<td>1 Nov - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0/6-27 Arty</td>
<td>2 Jan - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1-21 Arty</td>
<td>27-29 Jan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. During the reporting period the 964th Engineer Company was DS to the 11th ACR from 3 December 1969 to 25 January 1970.

3. HQ, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

   a. F/2/11 ACR was OPCON to 1/11 ACR from 8-9 November 1969.

   b. The 1/11 ACR was not OPCON to the 11th ACR from 30 January to the end of the reporting period. During this time 1/11 ACR was OPCON to the 1st Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at Tay Ninh.

   c. The following organic troop/company size units of 1/11 ACR were not under its operational control during the period indicated:

Incl 3
d. Task Force ABE: Task Force ABE was a special task organization under the operational control of the 1st Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (A), 3/11 ACR and Command Group comprised Task Force ABE to secure the 301st Land Clearing Company from 13 to 30 January.

4. HQ, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. During the indicated period the following troop/company size units were (DS) OPCON to the 2/11 ACR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>9-24 Nov</td>
<td>3/11 ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/1-7 Cav</td>
<td>4-20 Dec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Co, 1/9 ARVN Regt</td>
<td>4-5 Jan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Co, 1/9 ARVN Regt</td>
<td>4-5 Jan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/1-5 Cav</td>
<td>7-17 Jan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>984th Engr Co (DS)</td>
<td>3 Dec - 25 Jan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1-5</td>
<td>17 Jan - 29 Jan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The following troop/company size units were not under the operational control of 2/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>8-9 Nov</td>
<td>1/11 ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>9 Nov - 19 Dec</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>20-26 Dec</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>26 Dec - 7 Jan</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. HQ, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. The following units were OPCON to 3/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>4-6 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>12-13 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2-7 Cav</td>
<td>22-28 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2-7 Cav</td>
<td>22-28 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 14th Co, 4/9 ARVN Regt</td>
<td>8-9 Jan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. The following organic troops/companies were not under the operational control of 3/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I/3/11 ACR</td>
<td>30 Oct - 12 Nov</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div (2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/3/11 ACR</td>
<td>19-22 Nov</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/3/11 ACR</td>
<td>15 Dec - 3 Jan</td>
<td>Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/3/11 ACR</td>
<td>22 Jan - present</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (2nd)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Task Force Bradin (27 Nov - 19 Dec 1969) was a special task organization composed of B/1/11 ACR, F/3/11 ACR and a command group from Regimental Headquarters. It was under the operational control of the 3rd Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (2nd) while conducting operations in the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area.
Annex D

ARMY AVIATION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. Sorties Flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>CH-6A</th>
<th>CH-6AA</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>3556</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3533</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Lift</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>2067</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Number Passengers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>5189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6AA</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>15205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Tons Cargo:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6AA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Hours Flown by Aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>2184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>1257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6AA</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>3963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimated. incl 4
5. Results of Fire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA KBA (BC)</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Ammunition Expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIZE</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>117,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>7,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>5,263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Aircraft Availability (% Operational Ready):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Aircraft Non-Operational Ready (Supply):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Percent of hours downtime due to supply.
9. Aircraft Non-Operational Ready (Maintenance):\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\)Percent of hours downtime due to maintenance.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

18 February 1970

701254

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

UNCLASSIFIED,