UNCLASSIFIED

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| FROM:   | confidential     |

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AUTHORITY

28 Feb 1982, DoDD 5200.10, per doc marking; AGO d/a ltr, 2 May 1975

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AVCA CRB-CO-O

17 February 1970


THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA CRB-CO-O, APO San Francisco 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVFGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. ACFs, Personnel and Administration

(1) Personnel Management: On 10 December 1969, USAGCPOR-75 issued notice of a reduction in civilian employee authorizations. This reduction decreased the authorized DAC spaces from 57 to 45, and all authorized Local National Direct Hire spaces.

(2) Personnel Services Division (NSP): Previously the Personnel Services Division monitored nonappropriated funds, discipline, morale and welfare activities and the command health report and provided guidance to the custodians of central post funds. Personnel Services Division (PSD) also provided staff supervision and guidance for the education program. Immediately prior to the end of the reporting period, PSD realigned the areas...
AVCA CRB-GO-O

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 January 1970, ROC (C) (R2) (U)

of responsibility and two major divisions were formed: Nonappropriated Funds (NAF) Division and related activities, and PSD assuming all other functions. These two separate divisions should prove more efficient, especially the NAF.

(3) Safety Division: A three hour Defensive Driver Training Course has been established. The objective is for all personnel who operate military vehicles to know the hazards of driving in Vietnam by providing the principles and purposes of "Defensive Driving". Target date for completion of this phase of training is 30 April 1970. Additionally, all new arrivals are required to complete the course prior to operating an Army motor vehicle.

(4) Information Office: During the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, the following information activities were accomplished by this office:

(a) Hometown News Releases dispatched:
   - Pictorial 393
   - Editorial 762

(b) News Releases dispatched:
   - With Photos 57
   - Without Photos 22

(c) Photo assignments covered: 143

(d) Radio programs produced: Thirteen - 15 minute programs aired over AFVN-Radio twice weekly.

(e) TV programs produced: Four - 5 minute programs viewed three times weekly over AFVN-TV. (This activity was implemented in January, 1970).

(f) Visiting Correspondents: Gary Sheppard, CBS; Joe Yue, CBS; P.B. Cuong, CBS; Alan McGary, SBS; Dan Hurst, Overseas Weekly; SP5 Gun W. Woo, DASPO; SP4 Rodney T. Brackett, DASPO; SP4 David T. Davis, DASPO. (The DASPO team visited here twice during January).

Inclosure
AVCA CRB-GO-0


(g) Visiting VIPs: The Honorable Howard Bennett, Assistant Deputy to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Rights).

(g) Base Postal Office (BPO): The mission of the 39th Base Post Office remains the same as previously stated in report of 31 October 1969. Postal operations conducted at the 39th Base Post Office and its outlying detachments fall into two areas: (1) Operations which reflect movement of mail, and (2) Financial Operations.

(a) Mail Movements Operations:

1. Locator - This area reflects improperly or incompletely addressed pieces of mail which must be worked by comparison with locator cards and IBM rosters in order to identify the addressee.

   (a) "No Record Mail" - Mail returned by unit of address.
   November - 6,725
   December - 5,200
   January - 4,405

   (b) "Scanned Mail" - Incorrectly addressed APO/FPO or addressed to nonexistent units.
   November - 9,250
   December - 8,840
   January - 5,480

   (c) "Mail Addressed" - Mail which has a recognizable defect which can be corrected at this level.
   November - 7,330
   December - 6,150
   January - 3,285
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2a. Incoming Mail
   November - 1,095,135 pounds
   December - 855,366 pounds
   January - 328,393 pounds

(b) Financial Operations

1. Money Order Sales
   November - $1,304,363.61
   December - 921,991.29
   January - 921,298.71

2. Stamps and Postage Meter Sales
   November - $28,661.00
   December - 26,502.40
   January - 18,885.00

(6) Chaplain: The percentage of chapel attendance at religious services has remained constant. A combined effort by the Chaplain and Mental Hygiene Specialists has brought about an effective program regarding drug abuse. Emphasis was placed on the level of direct troop contact employing a lecture-movie format. In addition, local Chaplains in conjunction with Civil-Military Operations are devoting increased time to the assistance of Father Thé and other area civilian clergy.

(7) Casualties: See inclosure 1.

(8) Congressional Inquiries: See Inclosure 2.

(9) Promotions: See Inclosure 3.
AVCA CRB-0-0


(11) Visitors: See Inclosure 5.


(1) Logistical Operations: USASUPOCM-CRB continued its mission of supporting the Southern II Corps Area. Additionally, USASUPOCM-CRB supported a Joint US-ARVN Tactical Operation that took place in Daklac and Quang Duc Provinces (SW II CTZ) during the period 31 August - 31 December 1969. (See After-Action Report - Inclosure 6).

(2) Unit Moves:

(a) Under Keystone Cardinal, the 564th Transportation Platoon (Lt Tr.) was inactivated, and the 377th CS Company (Lt Maint) was deployed to CONUS.

(b) The 518th Signal Detachment (Radar Maint) was reassigned from the Saigon Support Command and further reassigned to the 54th General Support Group.

(c) The 511th Maintenance Detachment was reassigned to the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command after activation, and further reassigned to the 54th General Support Group.

(3) Training:

(e) One of the most important training programs in the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay is Operation Buddy. Operation Buddy is a training program designed to improve the logistical capability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). This program started in this command in September 1969 and is progressively gaining momentum. During November, December, and January, this command conducted three classes in the Care and Preservation of Depot Stocks, training a total of 13 ARVN personnel. Each class averaged 21 days in length and was conducted at the Vinnell Corporation. On 19 January 1970, an Instruct and Advise (I & A) Team composed of six personnel from this command was attached to MACV Team 11 in Nha Trang to assist ARVN personnel while they are working on the job. The I&A Team is presently assisting the 852nd Ordnance Company (Direct Support) in Nha Trang.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters 63 Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGB CPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) SKILLS I is a training program designed to improve the support capabilities of this command by orientation and indoctrination of newly assigned personnel and by placing additional emphasis on formal and informal logistical training. The number of personnel in training during the reporting period are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bravo</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>1,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlie</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Security and Intelligence:

(a) Clearance Actions:

1. During the reporting period, a total of 347 requests forpersonnel security action were received, and a total of 353 clearances were granted or validated. As of 31 January 1970, 68 clearance actions were pending.

2. USARV Message, DTG 171043Z Jan 70, pertaining to paragraph 20a, USARV Reg 604-5, amended the paragraph to read: "It is imperative that commanders/supervisors at all echelons immediately suspend access to classified information of any individual upon discovery of significant derogatory information within the criteria of paragraph 17a, AR 604-5. The above change specifically applies to the possession or use of marijuana even when the individual concerned claims possession or use as a first offense. Suspension of access will remain in effect pending inquiry/investigation per paragraph 20d, USARV Reg 604-5. Whether the illegal use or possession of a narcotic was an isolated first time offense will be a factor for consideration by the clearance granting authority as to whether the clearance will be revoked or the access to classified information restored..."

(b) Document Security: Scheduled 10% inventories of SECRET documents were conducted on 20 November 1969, 10 December 1969, and 20 January 1970, respectively. Additionally, a 100% inventory of all SECRET documents was conducted on 2 October 1969.
(c) War Trophy Registration: A total of 92 war trophies were screened for intelligence value in accordance with USARV Reg 643-20, during the reporting period.

(d) Ground Defense: A secure voice FM radio net was established on 10 January 1970, utilizing a KY-3/TSEC set. This net links secure communications between the Joint Defense Operations Center (JDCC), 13th Engineer Brigade, and the Combined Tactical Operations Center (CTOC). The Net Control Station is with the 18th Engineer Brigade CTC. A revised alert code system has been disseminated by I Field Force-Vietnam (IFFV) and implemented by the Cam Ranh Peninsula.

(e) Intelligence: On 9 January 1970, a summary of enemy initiated activity in 1969 was published in the Weekly Intelligence Review. The following is an excerpt from that summary: 1969 witnessed the highest enemy activity in the Cam Ranh Bay area since 1954. There were a total of 17 significant shellings, four sapper attacks or probes, and two incidents of harassment or terrorism. The enemy expended some 362 rounds of various types of ordnance resulting in light property and equipment damage. There were three US personnel killed (KIA) by hostile action and 102 US personnel wounded (WIA). Vietnamese casualties were 12 killed and 10 wounded. The ROKA forces in the area suffered one killed and one wounded. Enemy casualties due to Allied reaction were one NVA killed (KIA) and two swimmer/sappers captured. Fire attacks were predominant for the first half of the year, then beginning in August, sapper activity as part of a coordinated indirect fire sapper attack began to appear. The enemy also began using larger caliber weapons, specifically 107mm and 140mm rockets as well as 82mm mortar and occasional recoilless rifle fire. For the most part, the attacks occurred between 2300 and 0300 hours on holidays and weekends and normally during the periods of low lunar illumination. Because most of the fire attacks were launched from the same general area, the local Vietnamese military officials are of the opinion that the attacks are conducted by small VC/NVA cells which infiltrate the launch areas as part of the local population engaged in woodcutting, etc., and remain in the area overnight taking refuge in caves or other hiding places, setting up the mortars or rockets, launching the attack, and then mingling with the populace to exfiltrate the launch area either back to the local villages or to the security cleared or saturated by combat and reconnaissance patrols, the VC/NVA in the area will retain the capability to harass the DEIT/CPB complex with mortar and rocket attacks.
AVCA CRL-CR-O

(f) Chronological Listing of Attaks Against Cam Ranh Army Com

[Page missing]

(c. AC of S, Supply)

(1) Representatives of the AC of S, Supply made liaison visits to the following areas and customers in these areas on the dates indicated below:

(a) 2 November 1969 Ban Me Thuot
(b) 5 November 1969 Phan Rang
(c) 8 November 1969 Bao Loc
(d) 11 - 13 November 1969 Ban Me Thuot
(e) 15 November 1969 Bao Loc
(f) 15 - 16 November 1969 Bao Loc
(g) 22 November 1969 Nhon Co
(h) 23 - 24 December 1969 Nha Trang
(i) 29 December 1969 Phan Rang
(j) 1 January 1970 Nha Trang
(k) 6 January 1970 Phan Thiet - Phan Rang
(l) 7 January 1970 Ban Me Thuot - Dalat
(m) 12 January 1970 Nha Trang
(n) 14 January 1970 Phan Rang
(o) 25 January 1970 Bao Loc
(p) 26 January 1970 Phan Rang
Liaison visits were made to 1st Logistical Command on the following dates for the purposes indicated:

(a) 15 - 16 November 1969
   POL Accountability Conference
(b) 20 - 22 November 1969
   Subsistence Seminar
(c) 10 December 1969
   Count Alway Conference
(d) 19 December 1969
   Resources Review Board
(e) 22 - 24 January 1970
   ADP Watch Committee Conference
(f) 29 - 31 January 1970
   POL Conference

Special assistance visits were made to the following locations on the following dates:

(a) 14 January 1970
   Phan Rang
(b) 16 January 1970
   Ban Me Thuot

A 2,100 cubic feet reefer box was constructed at the Phan Thiet LSA. The reefer box improved existing facilities and added additional reefer capacity to provide supported troops with the perishable components of the A ration.

Christmas Trees: Twelve hundred Christmas trees donated by the States of Washington and California and Pan American World Airways arrived in Cam Ranh Bay on 19 December 1969. The Subsistence Division transshipped these trees to locations throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Trees destined for locations in the II CTZ South were distributed through Class I channels utilizing regular ration shipments. Air flights were arranged with Traffic Management Agency (TMA) for the trees shipped out of II CTZ South area.

Tailgate Distribution: A test of tailgate distribution of subsistence is being conducted. Three battalion size units are participating in the test, each of which have two mess halls in the test. Perishables are being delivered by a reefer van to all mess halls by Class I personnel. Each of the participating battalions sends one truck to Cam Ranh.
Bay (CRB) Ration Breakdown to pick up nonperishables for its mess halls. The test is to conclude in mid-February.

(7) Subsistence Excess: A project to identify and turn in excess subsistence items was initiated. All items on hand in quantities double the locally established stockage objective were considered as excess. Maximum use of substitutions and transfer to other Logistical Support Activities (LSA) were made. Items that still remained in an excess position were retrograded to USAD-CRB. A total of 420,865 items valued at $390,425.23 were retrograded. A program of inter-depot movement of excess supplies has been initiated and is continuing.

(8) Self Service Supply Centers (SSSC):

a. During the 2nd Quarter, FY 70 the Self Service Supply Centers began operation under the 1st Logistical Command Self Service Supply Center Credit Control System. The Cam Ranh Bay SSSC served 130 customers and issued $73,156.31 worth of supplies. The Nha Trang SSSC served 73 customers and issued $44,712.67 worth of supplies. Both stores issued supplies against credit allocations computed and established by the ACCPR Supply, this headquarters.

b. The 1st Logistical Command goal for SSSC demand satisfaction was established as 90%. The Cam Ranh Bay SSSC attained this goal on 20 December 1969 with 95%. The Nha Trang SSSC attained the goal on 3 January 1970 with 97.1%. The Cam Ranh Bay SSSC was the first store in Vietnam to surpass the 1st Logistical Command goal. The two SSSC's in this Command are rated as the best in country.

(9) POL Tankers: Effective 1 January 1970, the use of foreign flag T-2 GP tankers for distribution of petroleum fuels to I and II Corps (North) coastal terminals was discontinued. Replacement of the commercial tankers by MSTS chartered T-5 class tankers has been accomplished. The MSTS T-5 tankers will be discharged afloat or cross-loaded into T-1 and T-2 MSTS shuttle tankers at Cam Ranh Bay for the support of the entire II Corps area, and supplementary support to I and III Corps areas.
(10) Contractor DSU Operations: In early November, the Vinnell Corporation completed assumption of the Class II, IV and VII Direct Support Unit Mission (DSU) at Cam Ranh Bay. During the past several months, there has been an increasingly favorable trend in the performance statistics of the DSU as evidenced the increase in demand satisfaction and accommodation.

(11) Additional Missions: In January, USASUPCOM-CRB was given the mission to support II CTZ North for Class VII items. This mission is being accomplished without a corresponding increase in personnel staffing. This increase in mission is adversely affecting contractor performance. The additional personnel requirements necessary to enable the contractor to perform at an acceptable level have been forwarded to 1st Logistical Command.

(12) Lumber Allocation: The initial shortage of lumber has been partially alleviated by arrival of small size lumber in-country plus anticipated future arrivals. USARV has established a procedure which provides a monthly allocation ceiling of lumber. The allocation received for the period 15 January - 15 February was below that required for USASUPCOM-CRB operations. For the period 15 January - 15 February, 816,842 board feet were required and 477,500 sheets allocated. USASUPCOM-CRB is currently preparing data to be submitted as basis for recomputations of the current ceiling by 1st Logistical Command and USARV.

d. ACofS, Maintenance. GS Overhaul Programs: The lifting of the hiring freeze on contract Local National (LN) employees will allow full implementation of the 1st Logistical Command Rebuild Program and will greatly enhance its successful completion. Ninety-five additional LN’s will be hired. As a result of intensive management studies and observations, the Engine Rebuild Production Lines were revamped. With the addition of overhead trolley systems, conveyor line alteration, and rearrangement of handling procedures, production has been increased to one engine per hour. At a time when fewer engines are scheduled into country from COMUS, the productivity increases at minimal cost is noteworthy.

e. ACofS, Transportation

(1) Project TOSCA: In conjunction with the US Army Material Command (USAMC), this command recently conducted a test of the effectiveness of shipping ammunition in container ships as opposed to conventional break
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bulk vessels. The test began with a shipment overland of 226 containers from five US Army Ammunition Facilities to Port Chicago in Concord, California. The containers arrived 23 December 1969 and the SS Anacortes City was unloaded and departed for Cam Ranh Bay, arriving 17 January 1970. By 19 January 1970, containers of ammo were being delivered to forward ASP's. On 22 January 1970, the test was completed and control of the vans was returned to Sealand.

(2) On 27 February 1970, 10 MILVAN chassis will arrive at Cam Ranh Bay on the Seatrian Ohio. These chassis will be used for training purposes to prepare for the initial shipment of MILVAN's. Final selections are being made for the MILVAN Marshalling Yard and the MILVAN Control Element (MCE).

(3) Starting 1 January 1970, CRB and other outports in this Support Command changed from the manual format for the TCMO to the automated TCMO format, in accordance with Mini-MILSTEMP, TMA/MACV publication.

(4) Terminal and Water Transportation:

(a) Total port activity this quarter again showed a slight increase over last quarter. December's bad weather and high winds hampered stevedoring activities. Also in December Sealand set a new record of total tonnage handled.

(b) During December 1969 and January 1970, new monthly records were set at South Beach for shallow draft tonnage handled. The January record was 92,305 S/T. The previous record was 53,109 S/T during December 1969.

(5) Highway Operations: The highway assets continued to be heavily taxed during this reporting period. Tonnages stated in millions of ton-miles for the months of November, December and January were 2.3, 2.3 and 2.1, respectively.

f. AGO's, Ammunition. The Class V Stockage Objective (SO), Management Levels (ML), and Safety Levels (SL) on hand at the beginning and end of the reporting period in short tons:

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<table>
<thead>
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<th>LOCATION</th>
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<th>END (S/T)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet LSA</td>
<td>SO 636</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ML 604</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SL 373</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Me Thuot LSA</td>
<td>SO 1388</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ML 1222</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SL 764</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalat LSA</td>
<td>SO 229</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ML 702</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SL 176</td>
<td>171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cam Ran Bay ASD</td>
<td>SO 45,265</td>
<td>45,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ML 39,833</td>
<td>40,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SL 25,094</td>
<td>25,433</td>
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Stockage Objectives are based on weapons densities, issue experience, storage capacity, and usage experience. The Cam Ran Bay Stockage Objective includes a 25 day back up for Da Nang Support Command and a 15 day back up for Qui Nhon Support Command. During the months of December and January a substantial increase in Class V shipments in support of the Da Nang Support Command were experienced as a result of the inability of deep draft vessels to discharge at Da Nang Port during the monsoon season. For the months of December and January these quantities were as noted below.
AVCA CRB-GO-0

LOCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Quantity (Short Tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
<td>7,000.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>6,079.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>5,205.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>3,590.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Evans (I CTZ)</td>
<td>1,051.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,927.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. ACoS, Services

(1) Engineering:

(a) During this period the 497th Engineer Company (Port Const), 1st Engineer Brigade, started work on several critical construction projects. Repair of the bulkhead started with the area between Piers 2 and 3, Cam Ranh Port. This portion was completed during the reporting period and repair was started between Piers 3 and 4, Cam Ranh Port. Operational support repair of the POL storage tanks at CRB was also started. Repair consists of pouring a concrete slab in the bottom of unserviceable tanks and coating the slab with epoxy compound.

(b) Contractor effort continued on the construction of Ammunition Storage Area "Charlie". Design changes were recommended to improve the drainage system on the roads and storage pads. Damage to the construction during the monsoon rains emphasized the need for these design changes. Water and wind erosion caused a considerable impact on the contractors progress, resulting in delay and added construction costs.

(c) The road connecting the "Yankee" and "Charlie" ammunition areas was completed during this report period and opened to vehicular traffic.

(2) Graves Registration: The remains of 131 US Armed Forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) personnel were processed through USASUPCON-CRB collecting points during the reporting period.

(3) Laundry: Contract laundry costs were $28,116.59 below the imposed ceiling of $318,779.80 for the reporting period. This trend is expected to continue. Field laundry production increased from 1,350,000 pounds.
AVCA CRB-GO-O


last reporting period to 2,150,000 pounds for this reporting period.

(4) Food Services: During the latter part of this quarter the "Star Plaque Award Program" was changed. The Five Star Plaque is now presented to the best mess in the Support Command, the Four Star Plaque to the second best mess and the Three Star Plaque to the third best mess.

(5) Bakery: During the reporting period a total of 993,884 pounds of bread were produced and distributed by the Cam Ranh Bay and Khe Trang field bakeries.

(6) Property Disposals:

(a) During the reporting period a Property Disposal Company (Prov) was formed, and a Directorate of Disposal was established in the US Army Depot, CRB.

(b) The scrap returned to government accountability by termination and default of the Stainless Processing Company contract was offered for sale and awarded during this reporting period. Removal of the 20,000 gross tons is expected to begin early in the next quarter.

(c) During the reporting period the Property Disposal Yard processed 1,672 short tons of usable property and 3,826 short tons of scrap. Approximately $1,238,760 of usable property was returned to various units within this command's area of operation.

h. Cam Ranh Special Troops

(1) In accordance with USARPAC General Order Number 736, dated 21 November 1969, the 135th Engineer Detachment was inactivated on 20 November 1969. As directed by USASUPCOM-CRB General Order Number 357, the 29th Quartermaster Detachment was activated on 20 November 1969. The 29th QM Detachment will serve as a carrier unit for the purpose of assigning individuals to Cam Ranh Special Troops (Provisional).

(2) On 27 December 1969, LTC Robert L. Moore assumed command of Cam Ranh Special Troops upon the DEROS of LTC Peter L. Houck. LTC Houck had been in command since 22 March 1969.
During the previous eight (8) months, the Transportation Motor Pool accrued a total of 2.3 million accident free miles.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel

(1) Observations: A sharp decline in open mess revenue occurred during the reporting period. On 30 August 1969, USARV dispatched a message requiring all contracts to be terminated for four companies with notice to be given NLT 15 September 1969. One of these, SARL Electronics, was the sole company that had maintenance contracts for all slot machines for open messes of this command. This short notice, the lack of qualified personnel to perform maintenance on these machines and the lack of an authorized source of repair parts were responsible for the decline in sales and income from the machines.

(2) Evaluation: Slot machine receipts dropped in all four open mess systems (AV 2403, 2410, 2365, 2365). The Nha Trang NCO/EM Open Mess System reflected the greatest decline in the slot machine profit:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Slot Machine Income</th>
<th>Gross Payout</th>
<th>Gross Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 Sep-25 Oct</td>
<td>$39,877.35</td>
<td>62,085.00</td>
<td>$27,792.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct-25 Nov</td>
<td>$45,974.95</td>
<td>50,212.30</td>
<td>$20,062.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Nov-25 Dec</td>
<td>$19,244.45</td>
<td>9,604.35</td>
<td>$ 9,619.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The problem as stated has been rectified by a blanket contract negotiated by USARV to cover all slot machine maintenance. In the future it is recommended that a blanket contract be negotiated prior to the cancellation of an existing contract to avoid an interim lapse in maintenance services as experienced during the last quarter of CY 69.

b. Intelligence. None
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a. Operations. None

d. Organization. None.
e. Training. None

f. Logistics

(1) Requisitioning procedures for Class IV Fast Moving Items stocked at Logistical Support Commands (LSA).

(a) Observation: The ACofS Supply staff, when required to issue formal supply directives for emergency support, becomes overtaxed and is reduced to that of an "operator".

(b) Evaluation: It was apparent during the support to tactical operations in Southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone (Inclosure 6) that the existing requisitioning procedure that employed a formal supply directive issued by the ACofS Supply was cumbersome and overtaxing on the ACofS Supply staff. In addition, it necessitated that all such requirements be processed as hand carried requisitions through the USA Depot. To alleviate this problem, the responsibility was placed on the 54th General Support Group to process special requisitions to the depot to expedite movement through transportation channels.

(c) Recommendation: That staff sections restrict their activities to that of planning, coordinating and monitoring of subordinate command operations.

(2) End of Period (EOP) MRO's on hand in Depot:

(a) Observation: There are a certain number of Material Release Orders (MRO's) that will always be on hand and unprocessed at a particular End of Period. The expected number to be on hand EOP is dependent upon the number of requisitions reviewed, the number of MRO's being processed as a possible Material Release Denial (MRD) and the number of MRO's frozen as a result of Project COUNT ALWAYS.

(b) Evaluation:
1. The number of MRO's on hand EOP is directly dependent upon the number received for a given day. For computational purposes, a figure of 2,500 MRO's per day will be used as the hypothetical number of MRO's received on an "average day".

2. The 1st Log Cond goal for location accuracy is 95%. It can be expected that 5% of all MRO's received will have to be inventoried due to inaccurate locations, or .05 x 2500 = 125 per day. Once an item cannot be found on location, that particular line item is frozen for a period up to 72 hours. If it takes a day or two to check multilocations prior to this freeze period, the depot could have a 4 to 5 day supply of MRO's on hand at any one time being processed as a denial. Using a mean time of 4.5 days, there could possibly be 4.5 x 125 = 562 MRO's on hand being processed as possible denials.

3. COUNT ALWAYS is a wall-to-wall inventory that is conducted every six months by the depot. COUNT ALWAYS has a certain number of lots or cycles that cover all lines in the depot. Hypothetically, let us say that for a particular depot COUNT ALWAYS is divided up into 15 equal lots. Thus, the depot could expect that 1/15 of the number of MRO's received would be frozen under COUNT ALWAYS, or 1/15 x 2500 = 167 MRO's frozen per day. COUNT ALWAYS, however, utilizes a 10 day freeze period. Thus, the depot could possibly have 10 x 167 or 1,670 MRO's as a maximum frozen as a result of COUNT ALWAYS.

4. Using a hypothetical average of 2,500 MRO's per day, the depot could possibly have on hand EOP 562 MRO's being processed as a possible denial and possibly 1,670 MRO's frozen under COUNT ALWAYS for a total of 2,232 MRO's open EOP. This number does not take into account other factors such as a late cycle run by the computer or MRO's for USARV and 1st Logistical Command Controlled Items that require a release from the US Army Inventory Control Center Vietnam.

(c) Recommendation: That any analysis of depot performance must be done in light of the fact that there will always be a certain number of MRO's open at any given time as indicated in paragraph 4. above.

(3) Lumber Requirements for the Care and Preservation Facility.

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(a) Observations: Up until the past few months adequate lumber authorizations were unavailable to support the container requirements of the Care and Preservation Facility.

(b) Evaluations: A critical shortage of lumber authorizations resulted in a reduction in the number of items being recouped at USAD-CRB. As a result of this shortage, many supplies that required reboxing were left exposed to the elements, resulting in deterioration and PDO action.

(c) Recommendations: That plans and procedures be prepared to insure that sufficient authorizations for lumber are available to the C&P Facility. It is important that lumber authorizations be evaluated well in advance (at least 6 months) of the monsoon season to insure that recouping operations can keep pace with the deterioration of outside storage containers.

g. Communications. None.

h. Materiel. None

i. Maintenance.

(1) Observations: Maintenance Float Transactions.

(2) Evaluations: The decline in maintenance float transactions stems from CRB's experience that equipment is received, repaired and returned to the customer so rapidly that a Maintenance Float Transaction is not justified. As a result, the majority of float assets are only a maintenance burden to DSU's and result in tying up expensive items of equipment for no purpose. Due to float regulations, this equipment can be "floated" only when the exchange piece is repairable at DSU level. Also, it is conceivable to have a using unit with a critical shortage for the same piece of equipment that sits unused at a DSU.

(3) Recommendations: That the entire float system be reviewed in light of the experience gained in Vietnam.

j. Transportation

(1) Vehicle Turn-in:
(a) Observation: During the past quarter there was a relatively high percentage of vehicle nonavailability because of a shortage of drivers.

(b) Evaluation: A study was conducted that disclosed some drivers were reassigned from 5-ton tractor/cargo trucks to operate 30-35 ton Kenworth combinations. (Commercial design vehicles)

(c) Recommendation: Whenever personnel are diverted from assigned TO&E equipment to augmented equipment, it is necessary that the TO&E equipment density be reduced or adjusted by at least the number of pieces received by the augmentation. Additionally, as the personnel strength authorization or assigned strength is reduced, the density of equipment should be adjusted to bring the unit's ability to maintain its equipment in line with the number of personnel assigned as operators and maintenance personnel.

(2) Vessel Utilization:

(a) Observation: Some vessels are being utilized for other than their intended use. An example of poor vessel utilization is the use of RO/RO and Seabrain vessels for shipment of drums of asphalt and loose lumber, instead for their intended purpose of carrying vehicles and RO/RO trailers. Also, overstowage of cargo for this port by cargo for another port has decreased the efficiency of the port operations.

(b) Evaluation: Poor vessel utilization has resulted in additional time and labor being needlessly expended on the pier and increased vessel turn-around time.

(c) Recommendation: That Eastern/Western Area Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (ETMIDS) take necessary action to preclude recurrence of the examples indicated.

k. Ammunition

(1) Observation: Increased ammunition shipments to the Da Nang Support Command area in December and January demonstrated the need for close liaison among the AGosS Ammunition and Transportation, and Transportation Management Agency (TMA). Misunderstandings relative to the offering and
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Booking of Class V could be averted were such liaison undertaken.

(2) Evaluation: Experience encountered during the increased movements in December and January demonstrated the need for additional lead-time for the issuance of supply directives by 1st Logistical Command.

(3) Recommendation: That an increased period between supply directive issuance and required delivery date be established for the effective movement planning of ammunition.

7 Incl

as

Incl 1 - 5 and 7 wd HQ, DA

Commanding

R. B. DEL MAR
Colonel, TC
AVCA GO-MN (19 Feb 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command
Cam Ranh Bay for period ending 31 January 1970 HCS GPOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96364 10 Mar 70

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DST
APO 96375


2. (U) Pertinent comments follow:
   a. Reference item concerning sharp decline in open mass revenue, page 16, paragraph a. Nonconcur with paragraph 2a(3). The problem as stated has not been rectified by a blanket contract negotiated by USAV to cover all slot machine maintenance. The situation has been somewhat alleviated since USAV conducted two slot machine maintenance courses for both military and LV personnel in which each open mass system was encouraged to send personnel. In this way each open mass system would be able to perform maintenance on their own slot machines. The blanket contract negotiated by USAV is for slot machine repair parts only.

   b. Reference item concerning end of period MROs on hand in depot, page 17, paragraph f(2). It is recognized that Material Release Denials, inventory freezes lots, location errors, etc., will influence Material Release Orders(MRO) at the end of the period. These are taken into consideration during an analysis of depot performance and MROs on hand are questioned only if there is a sharp deviation from the previous reporting period.

   c. Reference item concerning lumber requirements for the care and preservation facility, page 18, paragraph f(3). There were problems in the past with the procurement and supply of lumber, however, procedures have been developed to alleviate these problems. Since January of this year, lumber has been received on a more timely basis. There is still some shortage of certain types of lumber and plywood thus requiring a ceiling on quantities issued. This is due to an actual shortage of material and not caused by requisitioning methods. Ceilings are determined by USAF and allocations will be increased as additional resources become available in the command.

   d. Reference item concerning maintenance float transactions, page 19, paragraph 1. Nonconcur. TO Reg 750-17 grants authority to support command commanders to review and reduce, if necessary, the maintenance float stockage quantities based upon experience factors. This regulation also states that float equipment may be issued on an emergency basis even when the unserviceable end item cannot be repaired at DA level. The item must be necessary for accomplishment of the supported unit's mission.
e. Reference item concerning vehicle turn-in, page 19, paragraph j(1).

Concur. A HOE charge to reduce the unit's equipment authorization should only occur when there is a corresponding decrease in personnel authorization. In the case of equipment augmentations or a reduction in assigned personnel, neither of which is documented by a HOE charge, the unit should initiate a request to turn-in unused equipment in accordance with USAF Regulation 310-23. This regulation provides the unit with a means of reducing quantities on hand without affecting TOS equipment authorizations. The equipment can then be requisitioned in the event that the augmented equipment is removed from the unit or the assigned strength increases.

f. Reference item concerning vessel utilization, page 20, paragraph j(2).

Concur. This headquarters has forwarded correspondence on this subject from COM PAC NAV to MARPAC and the 9th Log Comd who are responsible for the ports.

g. Reference item concerning ammunition, page 20, paragraph k. Nonconcur. Increased lead time reduces the flexibility and responsiveness of the resupply system presently in effect. Increased lead time would not meet the need for timely response to fluctuating TOS requirements.

3. (B) Concur with the basic report as modified by this endorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Twilling 1962

DONALD R. WILLIAMS

LTC, ACC

Depot AG

GF:

USAFPAC, COM

Br, AGSFOR
AVHCC-DST (19 Feb 70) 2d Ind 


TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Sharp Decline in Open Mess Revenue", page 16, paragraph e(1): concur. USARV has recognized the slot machine maintenance problems. Courses have been programmed for repairmen and parts are being procured as stated. No further action required at this time.

   b. Reference item concerning "Maintenance Float Transactions", page 19, paragraph k(1): concur. Revised DA policy has recently been received and guidance will be distributed upon receipt of implementing instructions from USARPAC.

   c. Reference item concerning "Ammunition", page 20, paragraph k(1): concur. There must be an optimum use of the time allotted from the issuance of the supply directive to the RDO. There should be no degradation to supply flexibility associated with long lead time, but there also should be sufficient time allotted to insure proper shipment planning. Insufficient shipment planning leads to the use of an expedited mode of transportation rather than a slower and, possibly, more cost effective mode.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy thru:

1st Log Cmnd
US Army Support Cmnd Cam Ranh Bay
GCOP-DT (19 Feb 70) 3d Ind (U)

Bay for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AG
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-GO-O

30 January 1979

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - Logistical Support to Tactical Operations in Southern II Corps Tactical Zone (U)

Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-O
APO 96384

1. (C) PURPOSE.
   a. The overall purpose of this after-action report is to summarize the logistical support provided to IFFV through the Logistical Support Activity (LSA) at Ban Me Thuot, Petroleum Supply Point (SP) at Gia Nghia and the Contact Team (CT) at Nhơn Co. In addition, an attempt will be made to recapitulate pertinent statistics assembled during the course of the support to the tactical operation in support of the Joint US-ARVN tactical operation that took place in SW II Corps during the late August to late December 1969 timeframe.
   b. This after-action report is intended to assemble in a single document those aspects of coordination and lessons learned that permitted the support of this tactical operation to be conducted in a relatively smooth and efficient manner.

2. (C) DISCUSSION.
   a. The timeframe of this after-action report is from 31 August 1969 through 31 December 1969. This period covers the initial buildup at Ban Me Thuot which began with marked increased enemy activity in the Bu Prang - Nhơn Co - Ban Me Thuot area in southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone and the request for reconstitution of the ASP at BMT; and terminates with the departure of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to northern II Corps which coincided with the close of calendar year 1969. The operation was never given a specific name.
   b. The principal US Forces supported during the timeframe are contained in Annex A to this report.

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c. Extracts from the Daily Journal of the Operations Division, ACoS Security, Plans and Operations, this headquarters, are contained in Annex B.

d. The principal activities that standout during the total period of support are noted below:

(1) Initial announcement by IFFV of the enemy buildup and request that the BMT ASP be reconstituted. Increased helicopter density from 7/17th Combat Aviation Battalion. (Late August - early September)

(2) Announcement of increased buildup in the Bu Prang Special Forces - CIDG Camp area that threatens the camp. Request for increased stocks of POL and Class V at Ban Me Thuot and establishment of a refueling point at Nhon Co (later to include a rearm point). (Late October thru mid-November)

(3) Movement of the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry (Air Mobile) and 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from Phan Thiet and Northern II Corps, respectively, and the increased requirements for their support. Supported strength exceeded 5,000 during this period. (November timeframe)

(4) Phase-out of US activity and departure of 3/506th and 1st Brigade, 4th Division. Adjustment of LSA stocks and retrograde of excess stocks from Ban Me Thuot to Cam Ranh Bay, Close out of Nhon Co Contact Team. (Late December and continuing)

e. Observations and Lessons Learned:

(1) It is significant that there be single points of contact at this headquarters and the tactical headquarters receiving/ coordinating the logistical support of the committed combat elements. During this operation the Operations Division, SP&O and the Supply Division, G-4, IFFV were points of coordination between our two headquarters. Through the judicious use of a Liaison Officer this headquarters was able to create an interface for the earliest receipt of requirements and jointly plan for the logistical support that was provided to and from the Ban Me Thuot LSA.

(2) As a corollary to the above paragraph, by establishing a close rapport with the tactical headquarters throughout the operation, this headquarters was able to plan concurrently and in fact contribute significantly to the logistical planning, establishment of requirements and solutions to problem areas.

(3) The use of small convoys on a near-daily basis between Cam Ranh Bay and the Ban Me Thuot LSA provided responsiveness to daily requirements and flexibility in this Command's responsibilities to sustain support.
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to five other LSA's and other locations while providing support to Ban Me Thuot. Additional factors pertinent to the conduct of convoy operations during the support operations to the Ban Me Thuot area are as noted below:

(a) Resupply to Ban Me Thuot was accomplished entirely with organic assets.

(b) Resupply was accomplished without adverse effect on the resupply activities to other LSA's.

(c) Adjustments to include switching modes of transport were implemented to provide additional highway assets to support increased operations to Ban Me Thuot.

(d) Assets normally assigned to port and beach clearing were diverted without an adverse effect on port and beach operations.

(e) During the period of near daily convoys to Ban Me Thuot, only a minimal quantity of cargo passed RDD. To date all accrued "red" cargo has been delivered.

(f) Small convoys were conducted to Ban Me Thuot to:

1. Minimise the number of transportation units committed, while maximising the effective utilisation of available assets.

2. Provide effective and timely response to daily requirements from the forward area.

3. Prevent overtaxing of the receipt capability of the Ban Me Thuot LSA. The number of task vehicles assigned each convoy were gauged against the receipt, accounting, and warehousing capability of the LSA for daily shipments of dry and bulk fuel cargo.

4. Prevent traffic congestion in and around the Ban Me Thuot area. It was specifically requested by the MACV Advisers and IFFV that convoys entering and leaving Ban Me Thuot be kept to a minimum and limited in size.

(h) During the course of the Support Command support to IFFV, the latter requested that certain items of materiel be prepositioned at the Ban Me Thuot LSA for replacement of combat losses in the area of operations. The list of the items requested is contained in Annex C. Items prepositioned were selected on the basis of equipment density in the AO, criticality to the operation and adherence to the criteria set by the CG, IFFV that combat
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Losses be replaced within two (2) hour timeframe. Release of controlled items followed existing depot release procedures.

(5) During the early phase of the operation the 17th Combat Aviation Group (CAG) operated the rear point at Nhon Co. Because of operational and control problems at Nhon Co. IPPV requested CEBSC dispatch a CT from the BMT - LSA for the continued operation of the JP-4 POL refuel point and operation of the rear point for helicopter ammunition. Principal DODIC’s were A-165 (minigun), B-572 (40mm link), H-490 (2.75" flechette rockets), and H-490 (2.75" HE rockets). A lesson learned immediately was that the rear point and refuel point be separated for operation as two distinct facilities. This serves to avoid congestion and provides the necessary dispersion to reduce the probability of large material losses in the event of an enemy attack.

(6) Because of the close liaison and parallel planning on the part of this headquarters and IPPV, it was possible to “prepare the battlefield” by moving stocks of material in anticipation of future requirements. This enabled the tactical commander to employ his forces with available materials at times when his forces were available, and avoided the necessity of time delays while waiting for supplies to be delivered.

(7) A summary of the statistics collected during the intensive support period of 29 October 1969 through 31 December 1969, inclusive, are as follows:

(a) Total number of line haul convoys conducted
   37
(b) Total number of SAP trips
   909
(c) Total SAP tonnage hauled (STONS)
   9,476
(d) Total 5000 gal tankers hauled
   224
(e) Total fuel (bulk) hauled (gal)
   2,620,000
(f) Average dry cargo (STONS) hauled per convoy
   255
(g) Average POL (gal) hauled per convoy
   76,800
(h) Breakout of POL delivered:
   JP-4  1,610,000
   AVGAS  115,000
   MCGAS  345,000
   DIESEL  550,000

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After-Action Report - Logistical Support to Tactical Operations in Southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone

(1) Included Class V tonnage (TONS) 4,272

(8) A very important resource that contributed significantly to the efficient and timely support to this operation was the ready availability of IFPV dedicated C-7A conventional aircraft. The availability of this mode of transportation made it possible to react almost instantaneously to crash requirements that came in from the forward area. Common user US Air Force aircraft or convoys could not have reacted as effectively as the C-7A aircraft. On more than one occasion aircraft were diverted to Cam Ranh Bay for loading, and dispatched to Ban Me Thuot. The real value of this mode is not to be underestimated.

(9) A logistical lesson learned from this first large joint US-ARVN operation in Southern II Corps was that one can no longer estimate the total logistical requirement based solely on the density of "people" and land bound vehicles committed to the operation. In this operation the troop commitment to conduct actual combat operations was minimal. Ground security was provided by the Vietnamese (ARVN, CIDG and/or MIKE Strike Force Battalions). The density of artillery and helicopters committed was disproportionate to the number of US troops in the AO. Large quantities of helicopter and artillery Class V and JP-4 fuel were required on a daily basis and in several areas in the AO. During the height of the operation this command supplied Class III and V to Ban Me Thuot, which operated as a hub for logistical support; to Nhon Co, a C-130 airfield which was used to stage fuel and supplies to Bu Prang, and for the conduct of rearm and refuel operations; to Gia Nghia, which provided a backup for Nhon Co and also sustained the CORDS and other activities in support of the Province Senior Advisor for Quang Duc Province; and to Duc Lap, a CIDG camp which received continuous support throughout most of the operation but at a lower level than Bu Prang and other areas. Forward staging, extensive CH-47 "hook" operations and distributed rearm/refuel points for rotary wing aircraft were quickly integrated into this Support Command's operating repertoire. By supporting such areas as Nhon Co and Gia Nghia with airlift resupply by Special Mission Airlift Requests (SMAR), continuous resupply of JP-4 and helicopter ammunition was assured to these locations. Large scale 500 gallon collapsible drum operations were located at Ban Me Thuot and Nhon Co to support the outlying areas noted above. Continuous resupply of these commodities enabled the total area to be supported from several "hubs", namely Cam Ranh Bay, Ban Me Thuot and other Air Force Bases, as origins for bulk air delivered fuels. The Ban Me Thuot support operation pointed out the requirement for new resupply techniques to include instant resupply techniques needed for "float" or "swing" battalions and brigades. No longer can resupply be staged over a period of days. Supplies must be ready for drop on a daily basis, be delivered with the artillery tubes from which they will be fired, and in general be continuous so as to preclude having more supplies at a particular location than the commander...
of that area can secure within a tight perimeter or afford to lose if his
area is overrun and evacuation is directed. The concept of "inventory in
motion" is obviously applicable and must be developed for forward support
areas. A problem exists in that artillery units that must maintain sufficient
stocks for sustained firing if resupply is delayed for up to several days.
The danger of overstocking is apparent in light of the increased danger of
major destruction of the Fire Support Base in the event of a direct hit
by enemy artillery or mortar fire. Additionally, rapid extraction from
the FSB becomes increasingly more difficult.

(10) During early December the CO, IFFV, directed that a new Fire Support
Base be constructed in the vicinity of the former FSS Kake, near Phu Prang.
Because of the absence of a standard design of a FSB, large quantities of
timbers and other construction and barrier materials were airlifted from
CRB to Phu Co for later transshipment to the new FSB. It was later
determined that the quantities shipped were unbalanced because they were
not able to provide a complete structure, and in quantities beyond the
immediate capability of the constructing force. The net result was that
valuable USAF assets were committed to haul materials from Cam Ranh Bay
to Phu Co in quantities far in excess of the constructing unit's immediate
capability and the capability of CH-47/CH-54 aircraft to transship from
Phu Co to the FSB site. In this instance it is obvious that a set of
standard FSB designs are required to facilitate future FSB construction
in a more orderly and efficient manner.

(11) It was apparent during the support of this operation that current
planning data contained in such common references as FM 101-101-1/2; USARPAC
Class V Forecasts, etc., were not accurate in forecasting requirements for
artillery and helicopter Class V stockage requirements at the BHT - ASP
and at rear points in the AO. On more than one occasion a "10 day"
stockage level was removed by a single request from an air cavalry troop
making a one or two day pickup from the BHT - ASP during the height of
the operation. Requirements for artillery were based on the Ben Het -
Dak To (69) experience as 75 rounds/tube/day for 105mm howitzer and 60
rounds/tube/day for larger tube sizes. Supported tube densities varied
during the course of the operation. Maximum supported tubes: 5 - 105mm
How; 8 - 155mm How; 2 ea - 8 in How; 3 - 175mm gun.

(12) It became apparent early during the period of intensive support
that the existing requisitioning procedure that employed a formal Supply
Directive issued by the ACoS Supply was cumbersome, overtaxing on the
Supply staff, and reduced this staff section to that of an operator. To
alleviate the additional workload on the ACoS Supply the responsibility
was placed on the 54th General Support Group for this action. In turn the
Group prepared and set into operation (during the latter phase of the
support operation) a procedure for the expeditious process of emergency
requests for materiel to include direct coordination with the respective

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commodity managers at the Cam Ranh Depot. A copy of the procedure is contained in Annex D.

(13) If a similar operation is to take place in the same area of operations or in an area where a large dependency is placed on the helicopter as a primary resupply mode, it is recommended that the "battlefield be prepared" by incorporating the following actions into the initial planning:

(a) Plan for the immediate installation of rearm/refuel points at strategically located airfields, especially those that can support C-130 Air Force aircraft. It is more economical to resupply bulk fuel by air with a C-130 than with a C-123. A single sortie by a C-130 can carry 4,000 - 4,500 gal/sortie versus 1,000 - 1,300 gal/sortie with a C-123. Similar ratios exist for bulk cargo shipments. Crews that operate the points should be qualified personnel. In addition, norms of police and efficient operation should be implemented with the initial installation.

(b) Sufficient quantities of 50 gal collapsible drums should be on hand at all times to support closed-loop containerized refuel operations such as were conducted between Phouc Di and Bu Prang, and Ban Ma Thuot and Duc Lap. "It is important that the tools be available when the worker is ready to start work."

(c) Provisions for such "morale" items as fresh fruit and ice cream should be included in the logistical planning. As was demonstrated during this operation these items when pushed to the FSB's proved to be a tremendous morale booster to the troops up front.

(d) For each task force committed to the operation there should be prepared a list of "prepositioned" material to be laid at the supporting LSA or Forward Support Element for the quick replacement of combat losses. The quantity and type will depend on the proximity to the nearest depot, urgency for recovery after a combat loss, transportation, etc. - but regardless of conditions, should be included during initial planning and be included in the Operation Order Logistical Annex.

(e) It is imperative that the "new tactic" wherein the US provides long range artillery and helicopter support be promulgated to all concerned so that all understand the varying magnitudes of logistic effort required for Joint US-ARVN operations of the type herein reported. Coupled with this should be the understanding that although land lines on communications exist in the AO, the cost of securing/keeping these LOC's is not worth the diversion of ARVN tactical combat forces and not within the realm of commitment planned for US Forces in Vietnam during the conduct of the Joint Operations.
(14) It is incumbent upon the LSA Commander to continuously monitor the status of his stocks and when excesses are generated to institute positive retrograde actions or otherwise adjust his stockage levels. The LSA Commander must maintain continuous liaison with the supported units to obtain information at the earliest possible time of unit moves and relocations. Intensive management of Class I and V is essential to the efficient conduct of logistical support of a tactical operation of this nature. Back-haul must make maximum utilization of empty trailer space from incoming convoys. A positive policy of "reverse flow" must be readily available for rapid implementation when unit relocations lower the population/equipment densities among the units supported.

3. CONCLUSIONS. The overall conduct of this operation was a success for the following reasons:

a. From the outset of increased operations there existed an environment of joint planning, a continuous exchange of information, and mutual support between points of contact established between the logistical support headquarters and the corps-level tactical headquarters.

b. All requests for support were channeled through a single office at both headquarters noted above. A single stream of requirements and solutions was established and maintained throughout the operation.

c. Judicious planning and utilization of surface and air transportation provided flexible and timely shipment of all classes of supply.

d. A "can-do" attitude at all echelons of this command enabled the SUPCOM Commander to support this operation with a minimal effect on the support required to other points/activities throughout the remainder of this SUPCOM's area of responsibility.

F.M. THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT W. REITZ

4. incl
1. Task Organization
   Supported
   CPT. AGC
   ASST. AGC
2. Extracts of Daily Journal
   (is attached to last 3rd letter only)
3. List of Prepositioned Material
4. 4th Group Supply Procedure
   Incl 4 w/ HQ, DA

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Annex A (Task Organization Supported)

Task Force FIGHTER

Forward Mobile Staff (Hq, IFFV)

1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

1st Bn, 14th Inf
2nd Bn, 35th Inf
Supporting artillery, engineers, combat service support

3rd Battalion, 306th Infantry (Air Mobile)

Supporting artillery

IFFV-Artillery

2nd Bn, 17th Arty (105mm How; tow)
3rd Bn, 22nd Arty (8" How/175mm gun, SP)
1st Bn, 92nd Arty (105mm How, tow)

35th Engineer Group (Const)

19th Engr Bn (Obt)
70th Engr Bn (Obt)
687th Engr Co (Land Clearing)

17th Combat Aviation Group (CAC)

7th Sqdn, 17th CAG
139th Aviation Co (Assault Hel)
Composite Co (CH-47, UH-1) (from Pleiku)

Military Assistance Teams

MAG Adv Ts 25
MAG Adv Ts 33

5th US Special Forces Group

INCLOSURE 1

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Annex C (List of Prepositioned Material)

In response to an urgent IFMV requirement, the following items were identified for prepositioning at the Ban Me Thuot Logistical Support Activity (LSA). While all the items hereon listed were not actually located at the LSA, these items were cited as requirements and positive supply action was initiated and all items available at the Can Ranh Bay Depot were positioned at Ban Me Thuot. The items available within the SUPCOM were placed at Ban Me Thuot and remained on the Depot’s base file. Prepositioned material was hand-receipted to the 54th General Support Group for pre-positioning, proper safeguard and for the performance of the proper and necessary maintenance. Normal release and supply procedures were adhered to throughout the period of operational support for the replacement of combat loss items.

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<th>Federal Stock Number</th>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>U/T</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>1005-605-7710</td>
<td>Munition .50 7.62mm, M60</td>
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<td>1005-726-6131</td>
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<td>Thermometer, pow temp</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay

19 February 1970

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