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FROM: Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 307TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96215

AVB-F-FC

15 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFDR-65 (K2) (1)

Commanding General, CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: CPDP-DT, APO 96558
Commanding General, USAVE, ATTN: AVMACC-DST, APO 96375
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVEACC-O, APO 96374

1. (C) SECTION I OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

   a. (C) MISSION: No change.

   b. (C) ORGANIZATION: There has been a change in the battalion organization since the last reporting period. The battalion has been designated “Task Force Phantom” for operational purposes. The 162nd Avn Co (Aslt Hall), 191st Avn Co (Aslt Hall) and the 2nd Platoon 221st Avn Co (MRAC) were placed under operational control of Task Force Phantom on 1 January 1970.

   c. (C) COMMAND GROUP PERSONNEL:

      (1) The battalion has had nearly a 100% turnover in principal staff and command positions.

      (2) Composition of the Battalion Command Group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>NAME/SSN</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>RELEASED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>TC</td>
<td>William H. Culton</td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
<td>20 Dec 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Theodore E. Mathison</td>
<td>20 Dec 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Off</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Karl A. Krugger</td>
<td>27 May 69</td>
<td>1 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Off</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>INF</td>
<td>John T. Colson</td>
<td>1 Jan 70</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Jerry L. Black</td>
<td>24 Jun 69</td>
<td>2 Dec 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1

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6 February 1970

Operational Report - 1st some Details, 307th Aviation Battalion (Coast) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, No. 1-70-123 (US) (2) (C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Name/Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>KIT</td>
<td>Robert L. Smith</td>
<td>2 Jan 70</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>James L. Kozelka</td>
<td>26 Apr 70</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>IF</td>
<td>John F. Colson</td>
<td>15 Sep 70</td>
<td>1 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Thomas V. Strop</td>
<td>1 Jan 70</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5</td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Thomas V. Strop</td>
<td>27 Jan 70</td>
<td>1 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Frank F. Strop</td>
<td>1 Jan 70</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Subordinate Unit Commander Changes:

(a) None of the subordinate unit commanders changed during the reporting period.

(b) Composition of subordinate commanders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name/Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>114th Avn Co</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>James L. Murphy</td>
<td>15 Jul 69</td>
<td>7 Jan 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>114th Avn Co</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Roger J. Osborn</td>
<td>7 Jan 70</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117th Avn Co</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Marvin J. Cox</td>
<td>16 Oct 69</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th Avn Co</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Kenneth L. Putowsky</td>
<td>20 Dec 69</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Avn Co</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Paul J. Strop</td>
<td>6 Jul 69</td>
<td>27 Dec 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Avn Co</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Gerald L. Putowsky</td>
<td>27 Dec 69</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Avn Co</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Milton M. Strop</td>
<td>30 Jul 69</td>
<td>20 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Avn Co</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Lenny Strop</td>
<td>20 Jan 70</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Subordinate unit executive officer turnovers were as follows: CPT Ronald L. Miller, L/4, replaced CPT Jerry L. Miller...
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15 February 1970

J3 H-FC

SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for period until 31 January 1970, Re: 1500h-05 (32) (C)


d. (C) UNIT AND MAN AS OF 31 JUL 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>A.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th Avn Co</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>274th Avn Co</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Avn Co</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th F. Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th F. Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobra F. Det</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIC, 207th Avn Co</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307th Avn Co (Sat)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,059</td>
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e. (C) CIVILIANS

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<th>AUT: 0/1</th>
<th>0/1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>167th Avn Co</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th Avn Co</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th Avn Co</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Avn Co</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th F. Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th F. Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobra F. Det</td>
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<td>KIC, 207th Avn Co</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307th Avn Co (Sat)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
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</table>

f. (U) ACHIEVEMENTS: For 05 to 31 Jan 70:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievement</th>
<th>167th</th>
<th>235th</th>
<th>274th</th>
<th>271st</th>
<th>KIC</th>
<th>307th Avn Co</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.V.O.C.A.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>151</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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C. (C) AIRCRAFT STATUS PRESENTED 1 NOVEMBER 1969, TO 31 JANUARY 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U-1</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>AT-16</th>
<th>CV-1</th>
<th>U-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st 7th Avn Co</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>35th Avn Co</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Avn Co</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobra 1st Team</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Avn Co</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Avn Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1: 1 on Hand rest in Can Tho 1234 [45] to support of the operations.
**LOC's in the battalion are maintained in the 27th Avn Co.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langiok</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingao</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND EVENTS:

(1) VC incidents in the Can Tho Army Airfield, Sth Thuy Air Base, Can Tho City complex remained at a low level. During the month of November, two VC initiated incidents occurred in Can Tho City. On 6 November 1969, at 2005 hours, the VC fired six (6) rounds of 75RR at Can Tho City. The results were five (5) civilians and one (1) ARVN wounded. All the rounds impacted at or near WS 855082. At 0200 hours on 23 November 1969 the VC placed a hand grenade in the gas tank of an ARVN jeep parked in Can Tho City. The jeep was destroyed and one (1) ARVN Lieutenant was wounded.

Agent reports reflected an expected rise in enemy terrorist activity in the Delta in the reporting period; however, the increase did not materialize and the overall number of terrorist incidents was slightly lower than the previous period. The high point of activity occurred on 6-7 November 1969.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (K2) (1)

when 73 enemy initiated incidents were reported. Infiltration of VC/NVA troops continued to take place throughout the Delta. Five of the eight VC main and local force battalions that normally operate in Phong Dinh Province moved from the province to other areas of the Delta. Agent, PW and Hoi Chanh reports indicated that the units were located in the U Minh Forest for resupply and to receive filler personnel, most of whom are NVA.

A sharp rise was noted in the number of battalion aircraft receiving hits from enemy ground fire. The average number of hits per month during the last reporting period was 15, as compared to 22 for this period. In the month of January 1970, 31 battalion aircraft were hit. PW and Hoi Chanh reports have indicated a change in the tactics being employed by the VC against aircraft. Most PW's and Hoi Chanh's stated they were told to fire at aircraft flying low and slow or if the aircraft were attacking them directly. It is suspected that the change of tactics by the VC/NVA is attributed to the fact that experienced NVA personnel are now being used in local and main force VC battalion.

(2) Airfield Security:

During the reporting period several changes were made concerning the airfield defense and security. On 17 January 1970, the 4.2 inch mortar, located on the airfield and manned by 5th Special Forces personnel, was fired for registration into the free fire zones southwest of the airfield. Both illumination and high explosive concentrations were plotted on the most likely avenues of approach into the airfield perimeter. M-16's and M-79's were fired regularly at night from the perimeter bunkers into the free fire zones surrounding the airfield. The times of the firing were varied nightly to avoid establishing set patterns. All perimeter firings were controlled by an officer from the battalion S3 section as a safety measure.

The battalion's OV-1 Mohawks were utilized to provide late afternoon photo coverage of the area surrounding the airfield to locate possible enemy staging areas and fortifications. This proved quite successful and resulted in the capture of a weapons cache. A battalion OH-6 was employed to make a last light reconnaissance around the outer wire of the airfield perimeter to locate breaks in the wire and prepared enemy firing positions. This also proved quite effective in locating weak points in the perimeter.

A significant incident occurred on 13 November 1969, at 0220 hours, when one of the perimeter guards spotted several people moving in the free fire zone in front of their position. The airborne light/flare ship, a UH-1H, investigated the sighting and located 6 to 8 personnel dressed in blue shirts and black pants. The personnel took evasive action and fired upon the flare ship. The fire was returned by the flare ship and an AH-1G utilized for
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15 February 1970

(Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, 405, 410-1/2 (32) (C)

airfield defense. Results were four (4) KBA credited to the Flare ship and
two (2) KBA credited to the AH-1G Cobra.

On 14 January 1970, five personnel, three of which were armed, were observed
by the Flare ship moving through the Free fire zone. The aircraft engaged
the personnel and was credited with two (2) KBA. The remaining personnel
escaped before a Regional Force unit could be deployed into the area. The
following night personnel were again observed entering the Free fire zone.
The Flare ship fired upon the individuals who took evasive action in the treeline. A reaction force of forty men from the 4th Mobile Strike Force was
airlifted into the area where the enemy personnel has been observed. The
reaction force swept the area with negative results. This was the first
time a reaction force had been inserted at night in the Free fire zone.
The Mobile Strike Force reaction force was available on a temporary basis
from 15 January 1970 until the end of the reporting period.

(3) Phantom III (Day):

The battalion's offensive operation, Phantom III, continued to
obtain significant results in the number of enemy killed and structures
destroyed. A slight increase in KBA, WBA and secondary explosions was noted
over the previous period. Phantom III results for the period 1 November 1969
through 31 January 1970 are as follows:

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>OVS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>21/0</td>
<td>15/0</td>
<td>152/0</td>
<td>232/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>17/0</td>
<td>105/0</td>
<td>152/0</td>
<td>107/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>76/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>351/130</td>
<td>3/140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT L.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>121/0</td>
<td>123/0</td>
<td>205/173</td>
<td>175/20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Night Phantom South:

Due to the success of the Night Phantom III in the Tram, a similar
operation, Night Phantom South was initiated in the U Minh and Nam Can
Forest areas of the Delta. VC/NVA forces have used the U Minh and Nam Can
Forests as base areas and during the hours of darkness have been free to move
about almost at will. Night Phantom South utilizes one OV-1C aircraft, one
OH-1C C&C ship and two AH-1G Cobra gunships. The U Minh - Nam Can Forests
are virtually devoid of predominate terrain features which are easily identifi-
table at night. This makes it extremely difficult to accurately locate
and identify enemy targets. Consequently, a TPN/18 radar was located at Ca
Mau to provide a means of pin-pointing suspected targets.

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Initial enemy sightings are obtained by having the TPN/18 radar vector OV-IC (IR) aircraft back and forth across the target area at 1500 feet AGL. Read-outs from the aircraft sensors are then data-linked to the radar site and this information correlated with the position of the aircraft on the radar scope to obtain an accurate target fix. Target location (azimuth and distance from the radar site) is converted to grid coordinates and passed to the sector TOC for clearance to fire. Once the OV-IC has completed its sweep of the area, a light fire team of AK-1G's and a command and control aircraft, which are held on strip alert near the radar site, are launched into the area of operations. The C&C is vectored to within 1/16 of a mile of the target area and drops flares on instructions from the radar controller. The Cobras are then vectored into the target area and make their final strike adjustments visually from the light of the flares. The Cobras use flechette rockets for maximum area coverage and psychological effect on the enemy. When no targets are picked up by the OV-IC aircraft, the package of OH-1 and AH-1G's fire upon targets obtained previously from OV-1 photo reconnaissance or other intelligence sources. An OH-1 aircraft makes a first light BDA the following morning on all targets hit. After three months of continuous operation in the U Minh and Nam Can Forest, results indicate that Night Phantom South has seriously challenged the enemy's use of the U Minh and Nam Can Forest as base camp and rest areas and has forced him to move during daylight hours. The results for Night Phantom South from 3 November 1969 to 31 January 1970 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>W</th>
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<td>227</td>
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<td>0/0</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>77/0</td>
<td>121/0</td>
<td>57/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Special Coast Guard Mission:

In late November 1969, a slightly modified concept of Night Phantom South was tried and found to be very effective. The area of operation was the west coast of the Delta where it borders the U Minh Forest. As with the Phantom South mission, targets are located by an OV-IC aircraft, however, the radar control is provided by a Coast Guard cutter which is part of the Market Time, or coastal patrol fleet.

As there is no data-link between the OV-1 and the ship, the pilot of the aircraft indicates to the ship's radar when he has obtained an IR target sighting. This information is plotted and relayed to the ship's fire direction center. Sightings are usually taken under fire within three to five minutes of the time of sighting.
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AVB157N-PC 15 February 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Numerous secondary explosions from the targets hit have been reported by the OV-1C. The advantages of this mission are the instant response of the ship in placing fire on the target and the fact that the ship can move up and down the coast and thus provide radar coverage into those areas which the ground radar site at Ca Mau cannot reach. The mission has proven highly satisfactory.

(INFANT)

During the month of January 1970, the 307th Avn Bn (Cbt) was given the mission of testing a new night surveillance device mounted on a UH-1M helicopter. The system, the Iroquoi Night Fighter and Night Tracker or "INFANT", combined a low light level TV system with the XM-21 armament system. The INFANT Team arrived at Can Tho on 31 December 1969, with one aircraft, while two additional aircraft arrived on 2 January 1970.

The first operational mission was flown on the night of 1 January 1970, in conjunction with the Night Phantom South operation. The INFANT aircraft was the fire team lead and operated at an altitude of 600-800 feet AGL to pin-point and identify enemy targets picked up earlier by an OV-1C aircraft. The AH-1G's flew above and behind the INFANT aircraft to provide cover for the lead ship, while the UH-1H operated at 2,500 foot AGL. The primary mission of the UH-1H was crew pick-up, if needed; however, it did retain a flare capability. Targets located by the INFANT aircraft were marked with rockets and then engaged by the AH-1G's. Following each strike a DDA was made utilizing the INFANT system. This technique proved to be very effective and was utilized on later missions.

A new technique was tried during the test period and it proved highly effective. Two UH-1M's equipped with the INFANT system, one AH-1G Cobra and one UH-1H were utilized. The INFANT aircraft flew as a light fire team with the lead ship operating at 400-600 feet AGL, while the wing aircraft flew at 1,000 feet AGL behind the other aircraft. The AH-1G flew at 1,500-2,000 feet AGL, behind both INFANT aircraft. The UH-1H operated at 2,500 feet. The lead INFANT aircraft was utilized to pin-point and identify targets. Targets were marked for the second aircraft with mini-gun fire using subdued tracer fire (tracer ammunition used by the INFANT aircraft is not visible to the naked eye and can only be seen utilizing the special surveillance equipment onboard the INFANT aircraft) while the wing INFANT ship engaged the targets with rockets thus marking them for the Cobras.

On the night of 6 January 1970, a strike was made utilizing this technique and 30 VC were killed.

The INFANT Team worked in the Delta from 1 January 1970, to 10 January 1970. Known results of these strikes are as follows:

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A BDA of all strikes was not possible due to the tactical situation and weather conditions.

Two incidents of significant importance occurred during the test period. On the night of 2 January 1970, an INFANT aircraft crashed and burned while engaging an enemy target in the U Minh Forest. The crash was fatal to all 4 crew members and the aircraft, along with the INFANT system, was completely destroyed. On 8 January 1970, at Can Tho AAF, two 2.75 inch Folding Fin Aerial Rockets were accidently fired from an INFANT aircraft while the crew was preparing for a mission. One rocket lodged in a revetment adjacent to where the aircraft was parked, while the second rocket passed through the revetment and landed in the ASP for Can Tho Army Airfield, setting off numerous explosions. The ASP was partially destroyed and one man killed. Improper cockpit procedure was the suspected cause of the accident. The INFANT Team departed IV Corps on 11 January 1970.

(7) Safety Statistics 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970:

A total of 16,085 hours were flown by the battalion during the reporting period. The unit's accident rate decreased during the period from 31.8 to 18.9 per 100,000 flying hours.

(8) The 147th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel), located at Vung Tau, continued to support operations throughout the IV CTZ. The 147th Avn Co flew a total of 4,808 hours during the reporting period and completed 36 aircraft recoveries. The unit suffered 6 hits by enemy fire and experienced 3 precautionary landings. The 147th carried 9,405.7 tons of cargo and 37,891 troops during the reporting period. The unit is currently flying toward 14,500 accident free hours.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 February 1970

SME: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 207th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, ANC, CFPO-55 (R2) (U)

(9) During the reporting period the 235th Avn Co (Attack Hel) furnished the IV corps tactical engagements with aerial helicopter support. Operational statistics (sorties flown, kill no) indicated a slight drop in enemy activity from the last reporting period. The company was committed for eleven (11) to fifteen (15) aircraft per day for mission assignments which included Phantom III, support of VIP, VIP escort, and non-escort, escort of defoliator missions (supporting both army U-1's and Air Force C-123's), night security of Can Do, army infantry and night Phantom missions. The unit achieved an average aircraft availability of 85% for the reporting period. The 235th Avn Co suffered the loss of 5 aircraft and 5 crew members. During December 1969 an AH-1G and three crew members were lost as a result of enemy ground fire. On 13 January 1970 an AH-1G crashed in Cao Bằng Province and was evacuated for repairs, while on 27 January 1970 an AH-1G crashed in Dien Bien Province resulting in the death of both crew members. During the period 235th aircraft received a total of 35 hits from enemy ground fire. Results for the reporting period appear on the operational statistics chart, chart at end of 2.

(10) The 287th Avn Co (outu AvnOps) flew side looking airborne radar (SLAR) and infrared (IR) missions nightly in support of IV corps CTZ. The intelligence information received was disseminated by telephone and teletype to various agencies and included directly from the aircraft to the various stations concerned. Visual and photgraphic missions were flown daily on a preplanned reconnaissance and a request basis. In addition to the regular reconnaissance missions the 287th Avn Co accomplished the following special missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY/AGENCY</th>
<th>SLAR</th>
<th>PHOTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G-2 Air</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207th CTZ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st SBARF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Special Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-2 Air, 21st CIAB</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2 Phu Quoc</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Agencies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the period no aircraft or personnel were lost in any action and the unit had no aircraft accidents.

(11) The 271st Avn Co (Combat Hel) continued to provide the IV Corps with tactical mobility in support of army troops. The majority of the
unit's aircraft were allotted to the 21st A.W. Division operating in the southern portion of the Delta. The unit carried 10,570.2 tons of cargo and 50,765 troops during the reporting period. A total of 112 aircraft recoveries were completed by the 271st which was a slight decrease from the first quarter. The 271st is approaching 17,000 aircraft flight hours.

2. (C) SECTION II -- MISSIONS COMPLETED -- COMBAT OPERATIONS -- MISSIONS -- MISSIONS

a. (U) PRIORITY: None.

b. (U) PRIORITY: None.

c. (C) PRIORITY: None.

1. Rigging of Light Seal Support Craft (LSSC)

(a) OBSERVATION: LSSC's have been dropped by this unit due to improper rigging procedures and the use of improper rigging equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: This unit tried unsuccessfully, on two separate occasions, to airlift LSSC's (10,000 lbs. gross weight) rigged by Navy personnel with cotton belly bands which are designed for lifting the boats out of the water in dry-docks. The excessive weight of the boats and wind pressure created by flight caused the bands to break and on both occasions, an LSSC was lost.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the following rigging, equipment and procedures be used when moving LSSC's. Six (6) 16 ft. nylon aerial delivery cargo slings, (FSN 1670-823-5042), two (2) 10 inch endless slings (FSN 3940-675-5001) and four (4) size 5 clevis assemblies (FSN 1670-090-5354) are required. Four (4) of the 16 ft. nylon slings, by means of the clevis assemblies, should be attached to the four shackle points on the LSSC. The two nylon slings attached to the bow of the boat are then attached to one of the endless slings, and the two 16 ft. nylon slings, attached to the aft section of the boat, should be attached to the other endless sling. The remaining two 16 ft. nylon slings are then rigged as safety belts underneath the LSSC. This rigging technique has proven satisfactory and should be disseminated to other assault support helicopter companies.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Qualified riggers from the attached Pathfinder detachment were sent to advise and aid the Navy riggers in the above mentioned rigging technique.
Net Dumping Technique:

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the shortage of nets in the IV Corps area, it has been necessary for this battalion to backhaul nets after each sortie. This results in excessive ground delays between sorties.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to reduce ground delay this battalion has instituted a policy of dumping ammo loads. A net is rigged with a double nylon donut, with each donut being attached to two of the four corners of the net by two nylon aerial delivery cargo slings. Both donuts are attached to the hook by ground personnel as the aircraft picks up. In the drop zone the load is placed on the ground, the hook is opened and one of the donuts released. The other donut is held on the hook by a shepherd's hook. The hook is then closed and the net is lifted by the aircraft dumping the load. In this manner nets can be backhauled with a minimum of delay and unloading by ground personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Copies of this report be distributed to other CH-47 units in the Republic of Vietnam and command emphasis be placed on the use of this method to reduce non-productive time.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The teaching of this technique is part of the program for new pilots and is used throughout the IV Corps area.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBCE (15 Feb 70) 1st Ind


DA, NC, 164TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96215, 5 March 1970

TO: Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSFOR
    Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVEBCC-O, APO 96384

1. (U) The attached 307th CAB OML for the period ending 31 January 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (U) The following corrections are made to the report:

   a. (C) Para 1, g, page 4: "(C) Aircraft status presented 1 November 1969, to 31 January 1970" should read "(C) Aircraft status as of 31 January 1970". Additionally, the chart depicting aircraft authorization and O/H is changed as follows:

      (1) 271st Avn Co CH-47 aircraft on hand as of 31 Jan should be 17 rather than 16 as shown. Consequently, the total CH-47 aircraft on hand would be 33 rather than 32 as shown.

      (2) 244th Avn Co OV-1 aircraft on hand as of 31 Jan should be 16 rather than 15 as shown. Consequently, the total OV-1 aircraft on hand would be 16 rather than 15 as shown.

   b. (C) Para 1, i, (4), page 6: Night Phantom South. The first sentence should read: "Due to the success of the Night Phantom III in the Tram Forest (VS 6542), a similar operation, Night Phantom South, was initiated in the U Minh (VR 9538) and Ham Can Forest (VU 1080) areas of the Delta."

   c. (C) Para 1, i, (6), page 8: INFANT. The INFANT team was a New Equipment Test Team (NETT) in country under the auspices of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) and assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The team was placed OPCON to the Delta Military Assistance Command and further placed OPCON to the 164th Aviation Group (Combat) for testing the INFANT equipment in the Delta environment. The 164th Aviation Group (Combat) assigned the mission of testing this equipment to the 307th Combat Aviation Battalion.

   d. (C) Para 1, i, (7), page 9: Safety Statistics 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970. The chart should have indicated 3 precautionary landings for the 147th Avn Co, rather than the 2 shown. The total precautionary landings for the battalion would therefore be 9 rather than the 8 shown.

3. (U) This headquarters concurs with the two lessons learned as stated.

WILLIAM C. KADAM, Jr.
Commanding

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RUS CSFOR-65 (M2) (U)

DA, HQ, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHUC-UST, APO 96375

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 2c(1)(c), page 11, addresses the problem of rigging a Navy Light Seal Support Craft (LSSC) for CH-47 sling load. This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and is notifying subordinate units of this solution.

   b. Paragraph 2c(2), page 12, discusses the necessity to back haul sling load nets after each sortie due to a shortage of slings. This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and has recently provided USARV with input for a revised regulation on the basis of issue for air items (slings and associated hardware).

   c. Paragraph 11(8), page 9, the total hours figure is in error. The 147th Aviation Company flew a total of 3,931 hours during the period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGC
Asst AG.
AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 70) 3d Ind


TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GCPF-D,

APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and concurs with the comments of endorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "Net Dumping Technique", page 12, paragraph 2c(2), and paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement: concur. The procedure described in the evaluation is one technique of rapid delivery, and it is particularly applicable when there is no material handling equipment at the delivery site. Extreme care must be exercised with this technique to prevent damage to both cargo and the delivery aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy furn:
1st Avn Bde
307th Avn Bn

Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (15 Feb 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 7 APR '70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
AAG AG
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
307th Avn Bn (Ct)
1st January 1970
307th Avn Bn
APO 96215

247th Avn Co
(Ant. Spt Bn)
APO 96291

235th Avn Co
(Attack Bn)
APO SF 96215

244th Avn Co
(Sgt. Major Bn)
APO SF 96215

277th Avn Co
(A-1t Spt Bn)
APO SF 96215

HHC, 307th
Avn Bn (Ct)
APO SF 96296

Pathfinder Det
APO SF 96215

774th Med Det
APO SF 96215

78th FA Det
APO SF 96215

69th Inf Bn
APO SF 96215

345th ASD
APO SF 96215

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ASSIGNED LESS OPCON

ATTACHED

ATTACHED FOR SUPPLY
AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOU BM 9500.10
# Operational Statistics

1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970

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<th>TRANSPORT</th>
<th>ACFT Recovery</th>
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<th>STRUCTURES DEST</th>
<th>DNI</th>
<th>SLIPANS DEST</th>
<th>DNI</th>
<th>HITS DEST</th>
<th>DNI</th>
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OBO ON 1984.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 307th Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 307th Aviation Battalion

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310