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AGDA (M) (15 May 70) FOR OT UT 70B011 21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL Taro Katagiri, CO, 4th Psychological Operations Group, Period 4 October 1969 to 13 March 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of COL Taro Katagiri, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - Colonel Taro Katagiri

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

ATTN: FOR OT-UT

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by Colonel T. Katagiri. The report covers the period 4 October 1968 - 13 March 1970, during which time Colonel Katagiri served as Commanding Officer, 4th Psychological Operations Group, APO SF 96243.

2. Colonel Katagiri is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. Murray
CFO, AGO
Assistant Adjutant General

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Inclosure
1. (C) **Causative Factors of the Insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN):**

   a. (U) Basic causes for the insurgency are manyfold. These need not be elaborated, for so much has already been written concerning them. To cite some, the stability of the GVN remains to be tested. There is a lack of identity of the people to the government. Economic problems, especially one of inflation, remain critical. So do sociological problems. Progress has been made, but many are problems of the sort that cannot be solved in a year or two, or for that matter, in generations. The psyoperator must recognize such problems and operate within the limitations of the existing problems. The challenge to the psyoperator is to seek opportunities for psychological exploitation within the limitations.

   b. (U) The GVN is attempting to alleviate the problems, as reflected in its pacification development plans. Although much remains to be done, progress has been made as indicated not only by official GVN and US reports, but by the enemy's deep concern over the progress of pacification. The much publicized GOSVN Resolution #9 and other captured enemy directives constantly remind their cadres of the urgent need to "defeat the enemy's rural pacification scheme". A crying need exists to advertise the GVN's pacification development programs so that the local GVN officials and the people become aware of them. In this connection, as the level of combat operations subsided, the 4th PSYOP Group and its field elements adjusted their operations to support more and more the pacification development programs. In making the shift, I found members of this organization unfamiliar with the specifics of the pacification development programs and hence ill-prepared to shift their attention to PSYOP support to pacification development. I found it necessary to orient the personnel on pacification development.
c. (C) The policy of Vietnamization seeks not only to improve and modernize GVN's military structure but to allow redeployment of US troops out of Vietnam. To alleviate possible concern of the people for their security, PSYOP exploited the theme that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) were replacing US troops. Also exploited were themes enhancing the image of the Regional Forces/Popular Forces, Peoples Self-Defense Forces, National Police, and other agencies providing security to the people. Happily, the available evidence suggests the Vietnamese people accept redeployment as evidence of progress in the war and the maturity of their government. The enemy has launched offensives against ARVN forces in an attempt to discredit them for psychological purposes, but ARVN forces, with US air and artillery support, have acquitted themselves victoriously. Undoubtedly the enemy will try again to discredit the ability of the GVN to provide security. PSYOP should continue to build up the image of the GVN security agencies. Additionally, and more importantly, some means must be found to get the people to report intelligence information on the enemy. PSYOP should urge the people to report such information as a part of their civic responsibility of policing their own affairs. PSYOP materials encouraging people to report information on the enemy are being developed at this time.

d. (U) The ultimate aim of PSYOP in Vietnam has been to influence the people to support the GVN. I think too many of us, however, in our haste to "sell the GVN" have tended to overlook some of the fundamental political realities. First of all, the Vietnamese are still, for the most part, bound by traditional political values which means that their loyalties are focused on their families and extend little beyond the limits of their villages. Secondly, a process of political development or "modernization" has been taking place and this process has been upsetting the entire system of traditional political values. The ultimate aim of both the GVN and the communists and the critical issue between them, have been to control this process of political development. Both sides, in a sense, are fighting to win the support of a body of rural peasants bound by traditional political values and reluctant to commit themselves to any new form of government. Appeals by either side to anything other than local interests have seldom been effective. In the short run, therefore, our PSYOP should tend to exploit local loyalties and encourage the people to oppose the communists, the NLF, and their supporters. Although we should recognize the fact that not all NLF supporters are communists, we should also understand that a lack of understanding of communism among the people dictates that we identify all NLF supporters as enemies and threats. Our long range objective, then, should be to develop this local opposition against the enemy into general support for the GVN. Perhaps the most striking example of opposition to the enemy not being matched for enthusiasm for the GVN has been in Hue where after the attacks of Tet '68, the people turned strongly against the communists and NLF but we must be careful in construing this stand as being support for Saigon. In line with the foregoing thought, PSYOP materials have been developed exploiting the theme "Enemies of the People".

3. (C) Enemy Propaganda Capabilities

a. Communist propagandists in the Republic of Vietnam are able to quickly and efficiently mobilize their assets to exploit various situations for the following reasons:

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(1) They rely heavily on face-to-face "grassroots" propaganda.

(2) Propaganda is viewed within the basic framework of communist ideology which gives general guidance as to how to exploit almost any given situation.

(3) There is a well-coordinated, clearly defined propaganda organization established which reaches from COSVN to the small, remote hamlets.

(4) They do not hesitate to use terrorism, "show of force", and other military operations in support of their propaganda.

(5) They are willing and able to "act" as the initiators of propaganda, while often friendly agencies rely upon "reacting" to their activities.

b. (C) The enemy places great value on the use of "nonverbal" propaganda techniques—that is, acts which carry their own propaganda messages and exploit conditions already created by previous propaganda efforts. An example is the enemy's exploitation of the "TET psychosis"—anticipation of an enemy offensive during TET. Although I do not have any supporting evidence, I suspect that during the recent TET the enemy was able to create a greater apprehension than their actual military strength by planting false documents and maneuvering units. Terrorist acts in the recent past appear to have been calculated to demonstrate VC presence in various areas, rather than result in any significant military gains. The use of terrorism by the VC brings home their propaganda message to the target audience with an immediacy that should not be underestimated. Activities of this type are aimed at convincing the population of SVN that the VC remain a strong, viable force with which the GVN cannot cope. This contributes directly to the communists' political objective of creating both a sense of uneasiness and a distrust in the ability of the GVN to control the countryside and thus to win the war.

c. (U) The key factors in the enemy's ability to react more rapidly than friendly forces to exploit various situations are the single well-established propaganda structure that exists as a permanent, viable part of the communist infrastructure at all levels and the fact that they play some themes over and over even though they may not come close to reality. And more often than not, they are simply flagrant lies. In short, with ideological guidelines pre-established in accordance with communist doctrine as spelled out by one central authority (COSVN), the enemy's propaganda structure can commence work immediately upon exploitable conditions. An excellent example of VC ability to beat the Allies to the punch with psychological operations concerns the US troop redeployment announcements. Communist doctrine had consistently predicted a "withdrawal" of "defeated US aggressor troops" and VC propaganda simply added a few figures to the already established theme and began to exploit the redeployment to their advantage. Meanwhile, US agencies at the national level were attempting to determine how best to publicize the redeployment and how to combat VC propaganda (already being disseminated) exploiting the redeployment.

3. (C - NOFORN) GVN's Political Action - PSYOP:

a. (C - NOFORN) GVN's propaganda effort is fragmented. Principal agencies are the Ministry of Information on the civilian side and the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) on the military side. Additionally there are
numerous other GVN ministries and agencies involved in propaganda. Generally each proceeds on its own course pursuing its own interests. Perhaps a remedy to the problem is forthcoming if and when the recently established National Political Mobilization Committee becomes functional. Established by a decree issued by the Prime Minister on 2 October 1969, the National Political Mobilization Committee is an interministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised of various ministers such as those of Information, Rural Development, National Defense, Chieu Hoi, and Social Welfare. The decree calls for similar committees at the province, prefecture and municipal levels. The purpose of the committee is to mobilize or activate the entire nation and to strengthen its resolution, commitment, and determination. It is easy to establish a committee. To make it functional is another matter. But more challenging is the question of whether the committee can solve problems. It certainly is not a panacea. Nevertheless, the formation of the committee is a step in the right direction. It is an expression of the GVN's concern on the critical need for national resolution and cohesion.

b. (U) On the civilian side, the principal agency is the Ministry of Information (MOI) with a two-fold mission. Firstly, it keeps the people informed on current news and explains programs and developments of national interest. Secondly, it seeks to motivate the people to appreciate and participate in the GVN sponsored programs. In accomplishing their mission use is made of all available communications media to include radio, TV, and all forms of printed materials (newspapers, posters, booklets, leaflets, etc.). While policy and country-wide campaigns are determined at the national level, emphasis is placed on face-to-face communications.

(1) The MOI is headed by the Minister of Information, a government official appointed by the Prime Minister. He is assisted by a Vice Minister and a Director of Cabinet who coordinates the activities of the three principal staffs in the Ministry. The three staffs are comprised of Administration and Logistics, Research and Training, and Operations and Assistance. The first of these controls personnel services and the MOI printing plant, provides accounting service, and supervises foreign aid service. Research and Training is responsible for research and planning undertaken by MOI and controls the operations of the four MOI training centers. These training centers provide technical training in mass communications media and maintain repair facilities for equipment. Finally, the Operations and Assistance staff section is responsible for television production, the Press Directorate, MOI Motion Picture facilities (MOPIC), and the Directorate of Information. The Directorate of Information in turn is responsible for control of the province, village, and hamlet operations of the Vietnamese Information Service. Control goes directly from the national level to the province level in most cases. However, there are also intermediate control units at the regional level. These exist to facilitate projects which can be handled more effectively on a regional level. At the provincial level, the Province VIS Chief is a member of the province staff.

(2) In addition to the national and province campaigns the Directorate of Information transmits each day, one half hour of news from Saigon radio and TV stations to outlying stations. At the hamlet level the VIS cadre member is the one responsible for the final dissemination of the news. He is in charge of the hamlet television set. He also operates hamlet or village information installations (usually a reading room where magazines, pamphlets and other
materials are available). One of his most important duties is to see that
the material gets to the right people, the heads of families who can in turn
distribute it to the other members of the family. He is also responsible for
maintaining the hamlet bulletin board where he daily posts information which
he receives from radio broadcasts. Furthermore, provincial centers are ex-
pected to publish a newspaper every two weeks.

(3) In fulfilling these duties the VIQ uses many types of media-distribution
equipment from simple amplifiers at the hamlet level to nationwide
radio and television networks. Each hamlet is to have a small amplifier
system which can be used while addressing small groups. Each village is ex-
pected to have an information hall suitable for meetings. Most audio-visual
equipment such as projectors is handled at the district level. Wife and
mobile entertainment teams are at provincial level depending on budgetary
availability through the national center.

c. (C - NOPORN) The major agency on the CVM military side responsible
for PSYOP is the RVNAF’s General Political Warfare Department and its five
POLWAR battalions. It must be made clear that CVM and its battalions are
engaged in political warfare, which embraces not just PSYOP or POLWAR but
a wide spectrum of activities ranging from command information, public informa-
tion, social welfare, special service, to chaplains’ services. Much of their
PSYOP effort—and as it should be—is focused on the armed forces and their
dependents. Some PSYOP effort is targeted to the general populace and to the
enemy, but hardly coming close to the scope of the AID I SYOD Group and its
battalions. Considering POLWAR battalions taking over the role of US Army
PSYOP battalions in the field, the differences in capabilities must be recog-
nized. For instance, a US Army PSYOP battalion in Vietnam is authorized
eight Model #1200 Multilith presses and two sheet-fed 17” x 22” presses as
compared with two Model #1200 Multilith presses for an AID I SYOD battalion.
In view of the foregoing, if POLWAR units are to take over the role of US
Army PSYOP units, they must change their doctrine or modify their TOEs. Notion-
ally on the immediate horizon for a change in either direction.

d. (U) In a recent development, steps have been initiated to provide
each sector (province) a POLWAR company with a mission of: supporting pac-
ification, supporting Chieu Ho programs, providing cultural support to
Regional Force/Popular Force units, motivating RF/PF personnel, and informing
the populace on CVM policies and programs. It appears that no provisions
have been made to provide printing support to the sector POLWAR companies.
Undoubtedly, US Army PSYOP battalions will be asked and should provide
printing support to these POLWAR companies.

4. (C) US PSYOP Agencies:

a. Organizations:

(1) The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) is the US mission agency
in Vietnam responsible for overall US PSYOP policy guidance.

(2) COMUSMACV is responsible for the execution of PSYOP programs in both
tactical and pacification/development areas at the CTZ/region and I level.
According to MACV Directive 10-1, dated 12 June 1966, COMUSMACV controls and

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directs psychological operations through a single manager. The MACV directive calls for the single manager concept extending from the MACV level to the field level with the objective of integrating tactical and pacification/development PSYOP into “a coordinated, cohesive and unified effort”. At the MACV level, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (MACVJ3) is the staff PSYOP single manager. Chief of PSYOP Division (MACVJ3/11) is the PSYOP executive single manager, responsible for PSYOP support to pacification/development as well as US/FRMAF tactical operations.

(3) 4th PSYOP Group and its four battalions are the principal US military PSYOP support agencies resources, with the capability for PSYOP research, development, production, and field team operations. Organised under MTOE 33-500G, the 4th PSYOP Group is a USARV asset under the operational control (OPCON) of COMUSMACV with staff supervision being exercised by MACVJ3. The group commander exercises command and control, less OPCON, of its battalions. The senior US force commander in each CTZ exercises OPCON of the respective battalion. In addition to US military personnel authorized by the MTOEs, key elements in the group’s operations are the high skill Vietnamese civilians and ARVN interpreters. In connection with US troop reduction in Vietnam, 4th PSYOP is undergoing reduction.

b. (U) US Army PSYOP Organizations for Support of Future Stability Operations:
The type of US Army PSYOP organizations required for support of future stability operations depends on the situation, PSYOP assets and capabilities of the host government, and those of US civilian agencies operating in the area. For the benefit of future planners, I wish to offer certain recommendations. These are based on not just my personal observation but those of supported force PSYOP staff officers, division PSYOP staff officers, and PSYOP battalion commanders. Although I realize that experiences in Vietnam cannot be directly applied for future situations, perhaps they will be useful as a basis for planning. In general, I consider the MTOE for Group Headquarters adequate except in the maintenance area (to be discussed later). Battalions, however, could use more assets:

1. Each PSYOP battalion supporting a corps or a force of similar size should be provided with a capability to support each combat division with a PSYOP company. This company should have some capability for propaganda development and printing for quick reaction and local requirements at the division level. The company should have enough teams to support each brigade with an audio-visual team and each maneuver battalion with a combat loudspeaker team. In comparison, in Vietnam, audio-visual teams and loudspeaker teams are allocated on the basis of one per division and one per brigade, respectively. Finally, the PSYOP company should have some capability for supply and maintenance of special equipment for PSYOP. The PSYOP companies should be assigned to a PSYOP Group and attached to each battalion depending on the requirements of each corps area.

2. Additionally, each PSYOP battalion should have a capability to provide general support on an area basis to be rendered in support of pacification/development. I visualize the support to be in the form of field detachments capable of not just audio-visual operations but acting in the capacity of liaison and support to US pacification/development.
(3) Finally the battalion headquarters and headquarters company should have its own aircraft for command and control and movement of personnel and light cargo to the field; mess personnel and equipment; and increased capability for maintenance of low-density equipment such as printing presses, loudspeakers, motion picture projectors, and the like.

c. (C - NOFORN) Command Structure and PSYOP Coordination:

(1) A major deficiency in the PSYOP effort in Vietnam has been the lack of adequate systems for coordination and integration. Directives and instructions have been issued but words have not been adequately translated into action.

(2) As noted before, the GVN's PSYOP effort is fragmented. So is it also on the US side. Prior to 20 June 1969, PSYOP staff responsibility within MACV was split between a CORDS PSYOP officer and a military PSYOP officer. In an attempt to unify the PSYOP effort, MACV has promulgated the so-called "Single Manager Concept". While much improvement has been made, the concept still remains a concept.

(3) Prior to 1 January 1969, only a loose structure existed for coordination and integration of PSYOP effort among GVN, US, and other Allied PSYOP agencies. The year 1969 saw a beginning in a step toward integration of effort when PSYOP coordination systems were established at the CTZ level and in Saigon.

(a) Now at each CTZ level there is a combined PSYOP center (CPOC). Each CPOC differs somewhat, differing not only in composition and functions but in name as well. Generally speaking, CPOCs integrate the PSYOP effort of US and Vietnamese military agencies but not civilian agencies. Each is headed by a Vietnamese with an American acting as a deputy. In I CTZ it is the Joint Propaganda Development Center, dealing primarily with propaganda development and testing and evaluation. In this center at Da Nang are representatives of the 7th US Army PSYOP Battalion and of the 10th ARVN POLWAR Battalion, and a representative of the Vietnamese Information Service. In the II CTZ there are two regional coordination centers—one at Nha Trang and another at Pleiku. Represented by not just ARVN and US Army psyoperators, but Republic of Korea Army personnel as well, the Nha Trang Regional PSYOP Coordination Center coordinates a wide range of activities, including research, development, targeting, and air dissemination. The center at Pleiku, which is supposed to function similarly as the one at Nha Trang, exists only on paper. In III CTZ there is the Combined PSYOP Coordination Center. In IV CTZ the center is known as the Combined PSYOP Center. Both are represented by personnel of the US Army PSYOP battalions and of the ARVN POLWAR battalions, both are responsible for research, development, targeting, and air dissemination.

(b) In Saigon, the progress for establishing a coordination system has not been as impressive as they have in the CTZs. But the day is close at hand when research, development, and testing and evaluation assets of the 4th PSYOP Group and the PSYWAR Department of the General Political Warfare Department will be combined. Meanwhile, since March 1969, the 4th PSYOP Group and the PSYWAR Department have coordinated propaganda development through weekly combined panel meetings and through a liaison officer from GPWD. Moreover,
since September 1969, the GPWD/MACV PSYWAR Policy Committee, comprised of representatives of GPWD, MACJ3/11, and 4th PSYOP Group, under the chairmanship of GPWD Chief Major General Trung, has met once a month with the objectives of assessing situations of PSYOP exploitation, establishing policies, and evaluating PSYOP programs.

(c) The coordination systems noted in the foregoing still do not come up to the standards they ought to be. But they represent a step in the right direction. So far, they have put the knowledge and experience of represented agencies at each other's disposal, thereby improving the quality of the finished product. They have enhanced unity of effort. And, finally, they serve as an excellent means of Vietnamization.

(d) Much more needs to be done for better coordination. A means must be found to integrate efforts of both civilian and military agencies. Moreover, a functional coordination center is required in each province.

(3) From time to time, the question has arisen as to whether PSYOP battalions should be placed under OPCON or under some other arrangement such as direct support to the supported force commanders. Proponents of the "direct support" idea base their arguments on occasional conflicts emanating from command decisions resulting in production of PSYOP materials considered by PSYOP unit commanders to be either counter-productive or contrary to policy guidance. In my judgement, PSYOP battalions can best serve their purpose in an OPCON role as opposed to an area or direct support role. I predication my argument on the grounds that PSYOP is a command function encompassing political, military, economic, ideological, and other actions.

d. (C - NOFORN) Levels at which US Personnel are Located: Elements of the 4th PSYOP Group operate from the Saigon level to the hamlet level. In essence, the mission of the 4th PSYOP Group is to sell GVN to the Vietnamese people. An immediate question arises as to why an American is doing the job. The question is indeed a valid one, particularly in respect to American psyoperators operating in the hamlets and villages. I agree that Americans should not be involved directly. They should be in the background in a support role. In fact, there is no need for field teams if Vietnamese field teams are available. Unfortunately, Vietnamese field teams (i.e., Vietnamese Information Service) have been reluctant to go to the hamlets and villages where security is not good. In the early days 4th PSYOP Group's field teams often operated unilaterally. Recent months have seen much change for the better. It is now the general policy that field teams would operate only in combined efforts with Vietnamese agencies. In such combined operations, US teams act in a support role.

e. (U) Functions Actually Performed: During early days of US Army PSYOP involvement in Vietnam, much of the effort was operations unilaterally conducted. Eventually, as noted previously, there was a shift to combined effort. More importantly, a program was initiated in 1968 to provide on-the-job-training (OJT) to ARVN P0LWAR personnel. The OJT program is facilitating the present on-going Vietnamization.

f. (U) PSYOP Effectiveness:

(1) A point raised repeatedly is the question of effectiveness of PSYOP. First, I wish to say that we have had research agencies attempting to devise
a means to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP. We are hardly nearing the brink of getting a measuring device. And, even if such a device is found, I am not convinced that we would get a device that can be administered by laymen and in a combat situation.

(2) It is extremely difficult to obtain data on results of PSYOP efforts that lend themselves to quantification, or, for that matter, qualitative analysis. One can argue that the Hoi Chanh rate is an indicator. It is an indicator, but Hoi Chanh rates must be accepted with certain reservations. It must be clearly understood that not one but many variables influence an enemy to rally. Among these are: military pressures; shortages of food, ammunition and other supplies; internal adversities such as poor leadership or undue harsh demands by cadres; GVN's reform programs; security for the prospective rallier and his family; and, of course, PSYOP programs. What I am saying here is that it is not propaganda alone that prompts the enemy to rally. It is a combination of many factors, adequately publicized through propaganda.

(3) In some instances, it is almost impossible to ascertain results. For instance, take the case of propaganda directed against the enemy with the objective of malingering or creating doubts in the minds of enemy soldiers, but not necessarily getting them to rally or surrender. If allied PSYOP has had any effects, unfortunately they are difficult to ascertain.

(4) We cannot and do not try to "measure" effectiveness. Rather, we try to obtain information concerning "effects" and then qualitatively assess the effects. Through intelligence and any other sources, we collect information concerning "effects" of PSYOP, to include such information as audience reaction and/or behavior, enemy counterpropaganda and enemy countermeasures against friendly PSYOP.

Analysis of Effects of Allied PSYOP in 1969

(1) During 1969, the number of Hoi Chanhs exceeded 47,000—more than 2½ times as many ralliers as in 1968. While a wide variety of factors may induce an enemy to rally, PSYOP has demonstrated its importance by informing the enemy of the existence of this alternative to continued fighting. Interrogation reports indicate that more than 90% of ralliers have seen and heard PSYOP leaflets and tapes. There have been repeated examples of ralliers responding specifically to the appeals transmitted through PSYOP media. The following examples illustrate various responses:

(a) A combined ARVN/US operation in Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province during October resulted in 150 Hoi Chanh. Elements of the US 173rd Abn Bde, ARVN 22nd Division, 202 POLWAR Company and an Audio-Visual team from the 8th PSYOP Bn along with Provincial units conducted and supported face-to-face, broadcast, and aerial operations. This operation principally targeted relatives of known VC and encouraged them to appeal to their VC relatives to rally. The combination of tactical pressure and intense PSYOP initially resulted in individual and small groups of ralliers.

(b) Fifty-seven people rallied from a VC controlled hamlet in late September and claimed that they had been influenced significantly by
Chieu Hoi leaflet drops. Residents of Canh Thien Village openly kept, read, and discussed the leaflets despite threats from VC cadre. Finally, after continuous exposure to leaflets and coordinating their reception by ARVN units, the villagers rallied in three separate groups.

(2) Inducing the enemy to rally is but the first step in effective PSYOP utilization in the Chieu Hoi program. The intelligence community has obtained valuable intelligence information from ralliers. Such intelligence has led to the discovery of enemy positions, supply caches, hospitals, and the like. More recently, single ralliers or small groups of ralliers have led PSYOP field teams back to their villages in an effort to induce others to rally.

(3) PSYOP effectiveness through the Chieu Hoi program has resulted in widespread concern among the enemy. For example, a document captured during 1969 by the 25th Infantry Division in Tay Ninh Province appeared to be another in a series of directives and communiques which cites the results of psychological operations, especially the Chieu Hoi program, and attempts to instruct enemy cadre on how to counteract these programs. This document paraphrased a COSVN party directive issued for general guidance on the subject of psychological operations. The communique stated that not all cadre realized the influence psychological operations were having on the troops or knew how to cope with these operations. These and other enemy reports and captured documents testified to PSYOP Chieu Hoi effectiveness and the sustaining measures necessary to counter its influence. Penalties meted out for reading PSYOP leaflets remain commonplace throughout South Vietnam.

(4) The enemy's reaction gives an insight into the results achieved by friendly PSYOP. This reaction has appeared in the targeting of PSYOP personnel and equipment, intimidation and increased proselyting of remaining troops, written resolutions and documents, and radio broadcasts. The object of these has been to eliminate effective PSYOP campaigns and provide warnings on the dangers of heeding PSYOP appeals. COSVN resolution #9, distributed by the Party in July, contains the enemy's overall analysis of the war situation. One of the most important vulnerabilities admitted by this resolution was the fact that lower ranking cadre do not understand the overall situation in Vietnam as well as the high ranking cadre and, therefore, are highly vulnerable to continued Allied PSYOP. Another case in point is a captured enemy document, issued October 1969 probably by a North Vietnamese Army division, in which the commander complains of ideological deficiencies and lowered combat effectiveness. The document complains of "rightist thoughts" and makes clear that sluggishness, surrender, self-inflicted wounds, even suicide, are the real combat faults which result from "ideological sins". The document blames the Allies of "cunning plots and maneuvers, especially...psychological warfare activities". (Directive #101/1340, Unit 491, dated 1 October '69, "Ideological Tasks for the Quarter of 1969", as reported in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, Document #77, dated February, '70, US Mission in Vietnam, subject: Ideological Deficiencies and Lowered Combat Effectiveness)

(5) Areas of Inadequacy of Training:

(1) Before discussing PSYOP training, it seems essential that we examine the kind of personnel needed in PSYOP organizations. I cannot emphasize enough the point that officers to be selected for PSYOP training must be intelligent and have a good academic background. The best of PSYOP training
will not make an effective payoperator out of the unintelligent, uneducated officer, for PSYOP cannot be taught by rote. A need exists for those with experiences and/or academic background in a wide variety of disciplines, including those from the field of creative and communication arts, and not just from the social science disciplines. It is interesting to note that for awhile, officer replacements were being assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group simply on the basis of academic background in psychology. This is understandable because the phrase psychological operations is misleading. When the needs of the 4th PSYOP Group were brought to the attention of assignment officers, this organization began receiving officers with varied backgrounds. With such officers, a significant improvement in operations followed.

(2) Enlisted skills required for PSYOP are not specifically identified. At present the basic enlisted MOS for PSYOP is 96B. These personnel have had little or no training in PSYOP unless they have had prior PSYOP assignments. As I understand, there is a study going on in CONUS on the enlisted MOS and grade structure. I hope that the study will not die on the grapevine. The TOEs for PSYOP units call for 96B for company first sergeants. This has been most unfortunate. Many of the 96B NCOs are not prepared for troop leading and in some cases, I have found 96B NCOs unwilling to assume duties of company first sergeants.

(3) My experience has shown that PSYOP staff and unit officers do not have an appreciation of the problems of the various phases of the propaganda cycle—research and analysis, development, testing and evaluation, production, transportation, targeting, dissemination, and assessment of the effort. Too often, because the development officer ignores the problems and the lead time required for other phases, the final products reach the users too late. More emphasis is required in PSYOP training on the need for backward planning. More training is needed in the areas of production, targeting and air dissemination.

(4) Absolutely essential is the need for doctrinal development and training on systems for coordination and integration of US civil and military PSYOP efforts, and of total US effort with those of host government PSYOP agencies.

(5) For additional comments, see Annex A.

h. (U) Inadequacy of Supply and Maintenance:

(1) A major problem that I experienced during my tenure of command of the 4th PSYOP Group is one of supply and maintenance. Many factors underlie the problem. But, as I see it, the basic factor is the fact that the 4th PSYOP Groups uses non-standard, low density equipment such as 1250W Multilith presses, Hess and Barker presses, paper cutters, platemakers, AN/UIH-6 public address systems, a 50,000 watt radio station and the like. To alleviate supply and maintenance difficulties, the 4th PSYOP Group took it upon itself to maintain authorized stockage lists (ASL) for the radio station and other non-standard, low density equipment.

(2) To alleviate supply and maintenance problems, there is a need for standardization of equipment for use by PSYOP units. At least equipment adopted for use by PSYOP units should be compatible with other standard
equipment even if it is necessary to sacrifice some of the desired capabilities
or characteristics. If a non-standard equipment item is absolutely necessary,
a provision should be made to back it up with adequate supply and maintenance.
As an illustration of what I have said, I would like to cite the AN/TRT-22,
a 50,000 watt radio station operated by the 4th PSTOP Group. It is a radio
station unit designed specifically for PSTOP use. I cannot see why the equip-
ment for a PSTOP radio station cannot be the same or at least compatible with
those of the Armed Forces Radio Networks. But the AN/TRT-22 has little com-
patibility with those used by the Armed Forces Radio and Television in Vietnam.
There is no direct or general support capability in Vietnam for the AN/TRT-22
and most of its associated equipment. Sources of power for the AN/TRT-22 are
75KW generators—low density, non-standard generators for which there is no
float or repair capability in country. The only capability in country for
maintenance and repair of the radio transmitter and the generators are per-
sonnel assigned to the radio team.

(3) Even after an all-out attempt at standardization, there would prob-
ably be some non-standard equipment. Besides, even if an equipment item is
standardized, it would still be of low density (for example, printing presses)
found mostly in PSTOP units. Therefore, a consideration should be given to
authorize a Direct Support platoon in the PSTOP Group Headquarters. This
platoon should consist of personnel knowledgeable in the repair of selected
equipment found in PSTOP units, as well as personnel qualified in the oper-
ation of direct supply support activities.

(4) A lifesaver for the 4th PSTOP Group's maintenance and supply problems
has been the Quick Reaction Procurement System (QRPS), a system for acquisition
of non-standard items of special warfare (unconventional warfare and psych-
ological operations) activities. This system is to satisfy requirements for
non-standard items, generally by direct procurement under contract, on an
expedited basis to logistically support special warfare activities. At one
time QRPS was a major source for certain items such as printing supplies and
repair parts. In August 1969, many of the items were given Federal Stock
Numbers; hence the usage of QRPS by the 4th PSTOP Group has been reduced by
90%. Currently QRPS is used for repair parts (for example, repair parts for
deadlined printing presses) needed immediately, for non-standard end items of
equipment (for example, copy cameras), and for non-standard, low usage, but
critical expendable supplies (for example, Texalon cement). For the moment
and until a better system is found, QRPS is a must for continued operations
of the 4th PSTOP Group.

b. (U) PSTOP Intelligence:

(1) The problems of collecting and producing PSTOP intelligence in Viet-
nam are inextricably bound to the nature of the war itself which encompasses
a range of factors far wider than even those implied by the term psychological
operations. The people involved in PSTOP intelligence in Vietnam must under-
stand the basic political, social, economic, and military issues on a variety
of levels, and the interrelationships among them in order to produce effective
propaganda and achieve desired behavioral goals. Too often valuable intell-
ligence has been ignored by both intelligence and PSTOP personnel who fail
to realize that it falls within the category of PSTOP intelligence. For
example, when the enemy destroys a bridge on a key LOC, we recognize that
It's effect may well be to cut off a strategic town or city militarily, but we must also recognize that it will probably have an adverse effect on the area's economy which may in turn undermine the influence of a local political leader. PSIOP intelligence personnel must recognize such chains of events and sensitize these agencies and sources to such needs.

(2) PSIOP intelligence must approach its effort not just in the narrow scope of audience analysis but in the broader concept of research and analysis. The concept of audience analysis of seeking target vulnerabilities for PSIOP exploitation is valid. But equally important is the need of analyzing situations, such as troop redeployment or Ho Chi Minh's death, which can be psychologically exploited or which require PSIOP actions.

5. (U) Recommendations:

a. Doctrine and guidance need to be developed on systems for coordinating and unifying the PSIOP effort. Plans for commitment of US forces in support of future stability operations should have provisions for coordinating and unifying the PSIOP effort not only among US agencies but among host government, US, and other Allied agencies. Meanwhile, to enhance unity of PSIOP effort in Vietnam, I recommend:

(a) A consideration be given to transfer PSIOP staff responsibility from MACV headquarters to MACCORDS, and in force headquarters from the so-called military staff to the CORDS side. With the continuing change of the complexion of the war in Vietnam from one emphasizing combat operations to that of political warfare, it seems a greater total effort needs to be focused on pacification/development. Likewise, it seems that emphasis on the PSIOP effort should be shifted from support to combat operations to pacification/development.

(b) Every effort be made to make the Political Mobilization Committees functional.

(c) Attempts to improve the existing Combined PSIOP Centers should be continued. Moreover, efforts should be made to encourage civilian PSIOP agencies to participate in the combined centers.

b. It seems that many of us, including those of us in the PSIOP community, tend to consider PSIOP as a separate and distinct function unrelated to other functions. This is hardly the case. PSIOP involves the application of all resources and not just communications to influence the attitudes and behavior of target audiences. Recognizing this point is the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication #1, which defines psychological operations: "These operations include psychological warfare, and in addition, encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly groups the emotions, attitudes or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives." It is clear that PSIOP involves not just verbal communication but non-verbal as well. It is also equally clear from the lessons learned in Vietnam that success in stability operations depends on not just military combat operations but application of all resources integrated for a common objective. PSIOP is a command function. I believe senior commanders and staff officers (general and flag officers) understand this. But evidence suggests otherwise in the case of lower ranking officers.
For instance, one US brigade commander boasted that his Chieu Hoi program consisted of two 105mm howitzers—one marked Chieu and the other, Hoi. For another example, when a senior Forward Air Controller was asked to drop leaflets during missions, he replied: "That's mixing politics and war". It is apparent that a crying need exists to provide adequate instruction on PSTOP at all military schools, ranging from the basic officer courses to the senior war colleges. (Parenthetically, I should note that I, like many others, have been guilty of using the word PSTOP throughout this report in the narrowest concept—verbal communications.)

c. It is my opinion that an unnecessary and undue obsession is devoted to search for a measuring device with which effectiveness of PSTOP can be assessed quantitatively. Much money has been spent in a quest for such a measuring device. In my judgment, I question whether further research will produce such a device that can be used in a combat situation. Moreover, even if it could be developed, I wonder whether it could be administered by laymen. I, therefore, recommend that researchers turn their attention to a search for a technique of assessing PSTOP results qualitatively, using, for instance, the technique of the sort used in historical research.

d. An appropriate Department of the Army agency should study the experiences in Vietnam for the purpose of determining the adequacy of organizations and force structures of PSTOP units that may be deployed in future stability operations.

e. The Institute for Military Assistance, if it has not already done so, should consider recommendations in paragraph 4g for improving PSTOP training.

f. Every effort should be made to standardize equipment for use by PSTOP units. If a non-standard equipment item is accepted, a provision should be made for adequate supply and maintenance. Meanwhile, for the moment, QSGS must be continued.

Annex A:
Letter, 5 Mar 70
T. KATAGIRI
COL, Armor
Commanding
PURPOSE: The purpose of this Fact Sheet is to evaluate PSYOP training based on the experiences and problems encountered by the PSYOP community in Vietnam.

FACTS:

1. A brief review of the training received by officers assigned to the 4th PSYOP Gp as of February 1970 revealed that of 166 officers, approximately one half have received formal PSYOP training. Sixty-six have been through one of the two PSYOP classes (PSYOP unit and PSYOP staff), seven have been MATA trained, three attended the Special Forces Officer Course and three had received Polwar training. Fortunately, the 4th PSYOP Gp has been relatively well blessed with college and graduate level educated personnel. One-hundred four officers have Bachelor's Degrees, sixteen have Masters, there are two PHD's and one lawyer. Because of their relatively high level of education, Group personnel have been able to adapt themselves to their jobs through on the job training when necessary. At the same time, however, many school trained officers also have had to learn much of their jobs in Vietnam simply through experience.

2. PSYOP problem areas in Vietnam

   The source of all PSYOP problems in Vietnam has been the lack of centralised PSYOP direction from above and this lack of direction probably can be best described as a "Doctrinal Void". There has been no single unified body of US PSYOP doctrine applicable to Vietnam.

   a. The results of this lack of doctrine can be seen in the poorly co-ordinated military and civilian PSYOP efforts. These efforts vary not only from region to region but from province to province. There is also no centralised direction to the combined PSYOP efforts of US and GVN agencies.

   b. An important consequence of this "Doctrinal Void" in Vietnam has been the failure to consolidate and to give any sense of common objective to the functions of PSYOP, Civil Affairs, and Information. The functions of these three important activities ideally should reinforce each other. (They do under the Communists' system of warfare.) Instead they have operated in isolation with consequent loss of effectiveness.
c. Another important consequence of the "Doctrinal Void" has been the failure to recognize that PSYOP must be a command function. PSYOP as a weapons system must be recognized as an important complement to the commander's choice of weapons and commanders as well as staff officers must be trained to use it effectively.

d. In the area of staff operations, PSYOP personnel in Vietnam have not been integrated adequately into the normal activities of military staffs. Certainly the average staff officer does not appreciate fully the importance of PSYOP but PSYOP staff members have also tended to isolate themselves and have failed to utilize the staff resources which are available to them. This lack of staff integration has been especially critical in coordination with G2 and S2 sections because in Vietnam there has been a tendency to isolate so called PSYOP intelligence from the normal intelligence gathering process. The intelligence required for effective PSYOP, however, is an all encompassing type of intelligence which requires an integration of all factors bearing on the conduct of the war. Intelligence officers in PSYOP must be aware of this fact themselves and impress it upon their counterparts in G2 and S2 sections.

e. In Vietnam, there have been serious PSYOP deficiencies in the coordination of PSYOP activities through the use of standard operating procedures. There is no SOP to which a commander can turn and call for PSYOP support, certainly nothing equivalent to SOP's for calling air or artillery support. This deficiency is only another reflection of the lack of centralized direction to PSYOP in Vietnam.

3. Problem areas pertaining to individual training

a. Perhaps the most important point to consider in PSYOP training is the selection of the personnel to be trained. These personnel must be highly intelligent and have a solid educational background because PSYOP is a complex field and training for it must assume a basic level of education. Emphasis should be placed on obtaining people with well rounded liberal arts backgrounds, people from a wide variety of disciplines, and those from the field of creative and communication arts, and not just from the Social Science disciplines.

b. Actual training should assume a basic level of education while providing a review of the theories of communications, behavior and attitude influence. The focus on training should be more pragmatic and concentrate on cross training personnel for all aspects of PSYOP and propaganda development. Such training would simply allow any PSYOP officer to step into a job anywhere within the propaganda cycle and to operate efficiently within a minimum of adjustment.

c. PSYOP officers must also be taught the principles involved in the conduct of integrated operations such as those involving a variety of US, Vietnamese, military and civilian agencies. This area of operations has often been ignored with the result that US PSYOP efforts have not been as well coordinated with Vietnamese efforts as they should have been. Under certain conditions, the operations of a specific command may be planned around a PSYOP campaign or a desired psychological warfare objective. Past experiences and lessons learned in interrogation and
combined/coordinated operations should be presented to give PSYOP trainees a useful frame of reference.

d. Although "audience analysis" has great importance on the tactical level of psychological operations, the concept itself produces a limited outlook on PSYOP personnel, especially on the national level. This concept must be reoriented to the broader scope of "research and analysis" and recognition, at all levels, of the situations which lend themselves to PSYOP exploitation. This is closely allied to the ability to have sensitivity for a situation and to plan for the probable course of future events. A goal to establish is the ability to act, instead of being forced to react to enemy PSYOP initiatives.

e. The 4th PSYOP Gp has found that, in general, officers who are school trained are not as familiar with the basic social, political and economic issues of the Vietnamese war as they could and should be. Lack of knowledge in these areas cannot help but handicap even the most enthusiastic young officer involved in psychological operations. At the very least, because the bulk of PSYOP trainees are bound for Vietnam assignments, the specific issues in Vietnam should be used as a teaching vehicle in explaining how PSYOP must integrate military, economic, political and social aspects of a war in order to be effective.

f. School trained officers assigned to the 4th PSYOP Gp, in general, lacked an understanding of the propaganda organization, operations and technique of the communists with the result that they often have not recognized enemy propaganda activities and their effects on the people. Also, many opportunities to exploit enemy weaknesses through counter-propaganda have been missed.

g. Like any other military activity in Vietnam, PSYOP requires experienced personnel and perhaps experience is an even more critical factor for PSYOP because of the high standards of education and training required to conduct effective psychological operations. Also, experience in dealing with the people of the host country, in this case, Vietnam, is absolutely vital in the development and conduct of psychological operations.

T. KATAGIRI
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

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**ABSTRACT**

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