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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborne
Division (A) Period Ending 31 January 1970

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AMPHIBIE)
Office of the Chief of Staff
APO 96383

AVDG-CS 13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne
Division (Amphibie) for Period Ending 31 January 1970,
RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

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[Signature]

HUGH A. MACDONALD
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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1 - CO, 101st Abn Div Artillery (Amphib)
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1 - ACOFS, G5, 101st Abn Div (Amphib)

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AVG-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January, 1970, ROCS CPOR-65 (R2) (U)

SECTION I

OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. (C) Operations.

1. During the reporting period, a major portion of the division's assets were placed in support of US/GVN combined operations and training to upgrade the effectiveness of GVN forces; to seek out and destroy VC/VPA forces; to interdict enemy base areas and infiltration routes; to detect, capture, or destroy members of the local Viet Cong infrastructure and their sympathizers; to disrupt routes of supply between mountain base camps and rice-producing lowlands and population centers; and to support the Thua Thien Province Accelerated Pacification Program. During the latter part of the reporting period, division forces were repositioned in preparation for quick reaction to enemy attempts to harass the populated lowland areas during the Tet holiday period.

2. The Combined Campaign Objectives Plan, formulated in cooperation and close coordination with officials of the 1st ARVN Division, Thua Thien Province and sector, was implemented under OPORD 13-69 (RANDOLPH GLEN) to make available the resources of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) at province and district level in a resourceful and responsive manner in order to strengthen and accelerate efforts by the Government of Vietnam. The objectives of the plan are to establish a coordinated system of territorial security, increase the level of hamlet security and development, develop a dependable and responsive communications system, deny resources to the enemy, and assist in coordination between US and GVN agencies (See Operation RANDOLPH GLEN).

3. The chronological sequence of combat operations for the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970 is as follows:

a. Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE (29 September - 6 December 1969) was concluded during the reporting period. The primary missions of the operation were:

   (1) Repositioning of forces within the assigned area of operation to provide maximum protection for the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province.

   (2) Conduct of operations west of the piedmont in reaction to hard intelligence indicating the presence of NVA/VPA units and cache areas.

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(3) Screening of the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division (Operation NORTON FALLS) (U).

(4) Continued combined US/VN operations to defeat NVA/VC forces and infrastructure.

(a) Reconnaissance and surveillance.
(b) Support of the pacification and development plans and program.
(c) Civic action.

(8) Assistance to Government of Vietnam forces in assuming greater responsibility for combat and pacification in the division area of operation.

5. Operations NORTON FALLS and SATURATE were included in the overall division operation during the reporting period. The operations are summarized as follows:

(1) Operation NORTON FALLS (29 September - 8 November 1969).

(a) Task organization:

1-506th Inf
2-506th Inf

2d ARVN Regiment

2-2d ARVN Bn

3d Brigade Control

3d Bde Air Cavalry Troop (Prov)
Security Platoon
A/2-17th Air Cav (DS)
2-319th Arty (DS)
A/2-11th Arty (GSR)
G/4-77th Arty (GSR)
B/326th Engr Bn (DS)
Co/158th AHB (DS)
TACP 20th TASS
Support Team, 501st Sig Bn (DS)
3d FSSE, DISCOM (DS)

(b) Operation NORTON FALLS continued to terminate during the reporting period. During the operation, controlled by the 3d Brigade in coordination with the 2d Regiment of the 1st ARVN Division, the 1-506th and 2-506th Inf Battalions were deployed north to Quang Tri Province to conduct screening and quick reaction operations west and northwest of Vandergrift Combat Base (ID002488) to support the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division (-). Operation NORTON FALLS was targeted
against elements of the 246th and 31st NVA Regiments. In phase I of the operation, the 3d Brigade moved by USAF C123 aircraft from Camp Evans to Mai Loc Special Forces Camp (YD909512). In phase II, the 3d Brigade initiated screening operations with a two battalion combat assault into areas west and northwest of Vandergrift Combat Base.

The operation was characterized by extensive use of six man reconnaissance patrols throughout the AO to monitor enemy activity. Additionally, battalions conducted continuous airmobile reconnaissance-in-force operations in areas of suspected enemy activity. These tactics enabled the brigade to maintain a screen with minimum forces over an unusually large area of operation while retaining the flexibility required to react to intelligence.

On 2 October, the 1-506th Inf and 2-506th Inf air-assaulted into multiple LZs and established CPs at fire support bases at XD857591 and XD923623, respectively. Both units conducted extensive RIF operations in their AOs.

No contact was made in the 1-506th Inf AO.

At 021600 hours, vicinity of XD923623, C/2-506th Inf received A47 and RPG fire from an estimated enemy platoon occupying fortified positions. Results of the fire were four US KIA and two US WIA. At 091700 hours, one aero-rifle platoon from 2-17th Cav engaged an enemy force of undetermined size occupying caves in the vicinity of XD783641. Contact was broken at 1733 hours. Results were six NVA killed, one US KIA and one US WIA. At 180942 hours, a recon team from 2/3/1-506th Inf observed an estimated force of 30 enemy cutting trees and constructing bunkers in the vicinity of XD901467. ARA, artillery, and tac air were employed, resulting in an estimated 20 enemy killed. During Operation NORTON FALLS, the enemy generally avoided decisive engagement and relied upon stand-off attacks consisting of RPG and mortar fire. Friendly casualties were light. Results of Operation NORTON FALLS were: 65 enemy KIA, one FW, 29 individual and crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 5 US KIA and 19 US WIA.

(2) Operation SATURATE (29 September - 4 December 1969)

(a) Task organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Forces</th>
<th>3d ARVN Regiment</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-327th Inf</td>
<td>2-54th ARVN Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-320th Arty (DS)</td>
<td>Supporting Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>326th Engr Bn</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, PCS 8SF06L5 (R2)

Subject: Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, PCS 8SF06L5 (R2)

Sector Forces:
- 12th River Assault Group
- 13th River Assault Group
- Delta Group Task Force Clearwater
- National Police
- 3d Combined Action Group
- Mobile Combined Intelligence Center

(b) Operation SATURATE, conducted in cooperation and coordination with ARVN and Thu Thien Sector forces, targeted against elements of the 5th "V"/1 Regiment's K4 Battalion and VC infrastructure in Phu Thu District, was terminated during the reporting period. The primary missions of the operation were to conduct combined US/GVN operations and training to increase the effectiveness of GVN forces, destroy enemy forces, installations, and equipment, counter enemy attacks on military installations and populated areas in Phu Loc District; and assist in pacification and development operations. On 6 October, during sweep operations, C/1-327th Inf observed eight VC sitting on top of a hut (YD867190). The enemy force was engaged with small arms fire, but did not return the fire. A sweep of the area revealed one VC KIA, seven POW, and seven individual weapons captured. The eight enemy personnel included the leader and four remaining members of the 3d District Special Action Unit, a political cadre member of the 5th District Party Committee, and two local hamlet guerrillas. The interrogation of the 3d District Special Action Unit leader provided information which led to the capture of three members of the 3d District Party Committee, one of whom was also the leader of the 5th District Special Action Unit. The interrogation of these three individuals eventually led to the capture of nineteen other VC sympathizers, support personnel and communication-liaison agents.

Information received from three members of the Phu Vang District Special Action Unit, a VC local force unit, of whom two had rallied and one had been captured during Operation SATURATE, revealed that of the eighteen original members operating in Phu Thu prior to Operation SATURATE, only three to six remained in the district at the completion of Operation SATURATE. As a result, the activities of the lowland component of the Phu Vang District Special Action Unit were severely disrupted and the unit's combat effectiveness greatly reduced.

The operation significantly affected the party leadership of Phu Luong Village and its subordinate hamlets. The village party chairman and one of his party cadre members were killed during October by the reconnaissance platoon.
and Company D of the 1-327th Inf. Interrogation of the VC returnees disclosed that the economic finance chairman of Phu Luong Village was killed by a US Claymore mine on 9 Oct. In addition, the hamlet chiefs from three VC hamlet organizations subordinate to Phu Luong Village rallied to the GVN during Operation SATURATE. Documents found on the body of the Phu Luong Village Party chairman provided information which led to the capture of a VC communication-liaison agent working in the village.

The Vinh Thai Village guerrilla unit leader was captured with two other guerrillas during October and a member of the village security section rallied to the GVN. The success of Operation SATURATE is reflected in a significant reduction in the overall number of enemy forces operating in Phu Tho District.

During Operation SATURATE, there were virtually no enemy initiated activities. Of 56 contacts, only 5 were enemy initiated and most of those occurred during the hours of darkness. The enemy's offensive activity was generally limited to the employment of mines and booby traps, and most of these had been emplaced long before Operation SATURATE. Operational totals for the 1-327th Inf during Operation SATURATE were eight VC KIA, nine PV, and 16 individual weapons captured. The battalion suffered one US KIA and 31 US WIA.

Cumulative totals for Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE.

(a) Enemy losses:
KIA: 254
Captured: 16
Individual weapons: 172
Crew-served weapons: 10
Rice: 13,080 tons
SA ammunition: 16,308
GS ammunition: 2,525
(b) Friendly losses:
US KIA: 16
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

US VIA: 86

a. Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (7 December - continuing).

(1) Task organization:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Brigade</th>
<th>2d Brigade</th>
<th>3d Brigade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327th Inf</td>
<td>1-501st Inf</td>
<td>1-506th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-337th Inf</td>
<td>2-501st Inf</td>
<td>2-506th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502d Inf</td>
<td>1-502d Inf</td>
<td>3-187th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-520th Arty (105mm towed) (DS)</td>
<td>1-371st Arty (105mm How)</td>
<td>2-319th Arty (105mm How) (DS) (DS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A(-)/326th Engr (DS)  C(-)/326th Engr (DS)  B(-)/326th Engr (DS)
1st FSSE, DISCOM (DS)  2d FSSE, DISCOM (DS)  3d FSSE, DISCOM (DS)
Tw, 101st MID (DS)  Tw, 101st MID (DS)  Tw, 101st MID (DS)
1-265th RRU (DS)  2-265th RRU (DS)  3-265th RRU (DS)
42d Inf Flt (Set Dog)  47th Inf Flt (Set Dog)  58th Inf Flt (Set Dog)
TACP USAF  TACP USAF  TACP USAF
Spt Tw 501st Sig (DS)  Spt Tw 501st Sig (DS)  Spt Tw 501st Sig (DS)
2-17th Cav  101 Avn Co  Div Troops
Co L (Ranger) 75th Inf  163d Avn  501st Sig Bn (-)
DISCOM  101st AHB  326th Engr Bn (-)
426th S4S BN  158th AHB  101st MP Co
801st Maint BN  159th AHB  265th RRU (-)
326th Med BN  478th Avn Co (-) (DS)  10th Cal Flt
5th Trans BN  101 Avn Div Arty  20th Cal Det
2-11th Arty  101st MI Det (-)
5-77th (Aerial Arty)  517th Ombt Tracker Flt

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(2) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN is a division-wide operation developed in close coordination and cooperation with the 1st ARVN Division and Thua Thien Province and sector officials, to provide a single concept reflecting the full commitment of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) to assist in the accelerated attainment of province pacification and development objectives. During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, the concepts established during Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE have been expanded and formalized. The primary missions of the operation are:

(a) To conduct offensive operations to locate and destroy NVA/VC main forces and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province.

(b) To conduct operations to defeat VC/VCI in the populated lowlands.

(c) To conduct limited objective operations west of the piedmont in reaction to hard intelligence.

(d) To conduct periodic interdiction of the A Shau Valley and place fires on acquired targets on a continuous basis.

(e) To conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in the AO.

(f) To provide one airmobile infantry battalion as corps reserve.

(g) To support ARVN pacification and development plans and programs.

(h) To provide civic action assistance.

(i) To assist ARVN forces to assume full responsibility for combat, pacification, and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province.

(3) To accomplish these missions, the division, in cooperation and coordination with ARVN and paramilitary forces, conducts extensive operations along the periphery of the populated lowlands, primarily in the piedmont regions of Thua Thien Province. The division:

(a) Conducts pacification operations in designated districts with dedicated forces assigned to train and upgrade the territorial forces and to eliminate the VC/VCI operating in those districts.

(b) Conducts extensive patrolling, surveillance, and quick-reaction operations within assigned brigade zones.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Conducts quick-reaction, limited objective operations into designated areas of interest in the division reconnaissance zone in response to hard intelligence.

(d) Conducts reconnaissance and surveillance in the AO, with priority along the SHOMZ, A Shau Valley, Khe Sanh Plateau, Da Long Valley, Da Krong River Valley, and the Ruong River Valley.

(a) Assists GVN forces in the defense of Hue and providing security for the Vietnamese railway system within the AO.

(b) Assists GVN forces to achieve pacification objectives by:

1. Conducting combined operations and training territorial forces.

2. Supporting the improvement of the internal defense system within selected hamlets in order to raise the level of economic development and security.

3. Participating in the coordination and implementation of an effective resources denial program.

4. Participating in the coordination of the pacification and development of Thu Thien Province.

5. In Phong Dian (3-187th Inf) and Phu Loc (2-327th Inf) districts, where dedicated battalions are employed, division elements continue combined operations and training with RF/VP forces. Training is tailored to the specific requirements of the RF/VP units, as determined in coordination with the district chiefs. To the maximum extent possible, training is conducted on a unit-to-unit and man-to-man basis.

5. Mobile training teams (MTTs) have been established by each brigade to conduct programmed training for RF/VP in districts where 101st Arm Div (Air) elements do not habitually operate. During the reporting period, MTTs were employed in Phong Dian, Hau Ng Tra and Ruong Thuy districts. As experience is gained, coordination is improved, and techniques are refined, additional MTTs will be employed. Cumulative results of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN as of 31 January were: 301 KIA, 12 WN, 176 individual and 8 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 37 US KIA, 209 US WIA and 1 US WIA.

4. Other significant activities.

a. Night operations. "The High Price of Rice" continued to be a key slogan during a major part of the reporting period. The extensive employment of night ambushes throughout the coastal plains and piedmont regions
of Thua Thien Province severely hampered the enemy's attempts during the critical hours of darkness to gather food from the heavily populated lowlands.

b. "Get Set for Tet." During the latter part of the reporting period prior to the Vietnamese holiday of Tet, extensive preparations were conducted to prepare the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for possible renewed enemy activities during the holiday season. The motto, "Get Set for Tet," gained popularity throughout the division during the period.

c. Employment of radar raids. During Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE, quick-reaction teams were frequently employed to conduct radar raids. To augment the TEC operator personnel and equipment of the maneuver battalion, two teams were organized in the brigade headquarters company. Each team consisted of four men and one AN/FFQ-4 radar set. Radar raids were planned and executed to detect enemy movement and activities which were then reported either to artillery fire direction centers for the employment of indirect fires or to subsector headquarters for deployment of ground forces to intercept the suspected enemy.

d. On 13 November, the 2-501st Inf moved by air from Camp Sally to Quang Tri and passed to CPCC of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech.). On 18 November, the battalion was released from CPCC, returned to Camp Sally, and initiated refresher training.

e. On 9 November, the 326th Engineer Battalion (Airmobile) began construction of the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS) at Camp Evans.

f. Operation LIFEJUMP, a program to systematically improve landing zones in the division area of operation, continued throughout the period.

g. During the reporting period, extensive mine and booby trap clearing operations were conducted in NW Phong Dien District by the 3-127th Inf to prepare the area for resettlement by the Vietnamese. Flame dunks consisting of thickened fuel delivered by CH-47 aircraft were employed extensively to burn away the vegetation and to assist in the clearing process.

h. Improvement of maintenance procedures and a high level of material readiness, reflected in the division's consistently high aircraft availability rate, continued to receive command emphasis.

i. During the reporting period, the division rear was relocated from Bien Hoa to Camp Campbell, Phu Bai. On 7 December, LZ Sally was designated Camp Sally.
SIGHT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RG 3 CSR M-65 (R2) (U)

5. Enemy losses during the reporting period.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
<th>KIA</th>
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<th>KIA</th>
<th>CSW</th>
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<td>78</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>December</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,6950</td>
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<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,657</td>
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<td>710</td>
<td>431</td>
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<td>112</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>257</td>
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6. Friendly losses during the reporting period:

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<td>December</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>January</td>
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</table>

7. G3 air activities:

a. During the reporting period, close air support sorties were flown in the division area of operation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned sorties</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat sky spots</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>1,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flareships</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for period ending 31 January 1970, HC3 CORPS G-3 (H3) (C)

Sunships (Spooky, Shadow and Stinger)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunships</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total sorties 1,820

1. Tactical air dropped 1,300 tons of bombs and 57 tons of napalm, resulting in 29 KIA/VC KIA and the following damage:

a. 33 bunkers destroyed.
   b. 35 bunkers damaged.
   c. 120 military structures destroyed.
   d. 60 military structures damaged.
   e. 131 secondary explosions.
   f. 165 secondary fires.
   g. 34 ammunition fires.
   h. 95 huts destroyed.
   i. 11 bridges destroyed.
   j. Two bridges damaged.
   k. Routes 616 and 922 interdicted in 61 locations.
   l. Numerous trails interdicted.
   m. Two campans and one raft destroyed.

c. During the reporting period, 84 B-52 strikes were conducted against targets in the division AO.

2. (C) Training.

2.1 During the reporting period, the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS) moved from Bien Hoa Army Base to Camp Evans.
Training was terminated at Bien Hoa on 27 November. Four days later, on 1 December, training was resumed at Camp Evans. Following the relocation of I.D.T.S at Camp Evans, division schools were consolidated into the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School.

1. Battalion refresher training continued throughout the reporting period with minor interruptions caused by operational requirements. The program was suspended for the last 10 days of the quarter to permit maximum troop deployment in the division's effort to prepare for possible increased enemy activity during the Tet period. Refresher training will resume in late February.

In January, the fifth cycle of the division sniper school was graduated and new XM21 sniper weapons were received in the division. A similar instructor team was assigned to the division from the Army Marksmanship Training Unit, Fort Benning, Ga. The arrival of the instructor team and the new weapon system, renewed emphasis has been placed on the division sniper program.

Two cycles of the 101st Airborne Division Airmobile Operations Schools were conducted during the period. Commanders and staff officers from the division; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech); 1st Air Cavalry Division; and selected VN cadre members from the Dong De National Training Center attended the school. Attendance by ARVN commanders and staff officers is expected to improve coordination between the 1st ARVN Division and the 101st Airborne Division (airmobile) for utilization of division air assets.

Selected personnel of the 1st ARVN Division received Pathfinder Operations training conducted by the division Pathfinder Platoon. During the reporting period, three classes totaling 35 personnel were graduated. Three additional classes are programmed for the next quarter. Division Artillery conducted training for the 1st ARVN Division in preparation of artillery pieces for helicopter movement.

During the reporting period, the division initiated Operation LACKEY LEG. One primary objective of the operation is the upgrading of the effectiveness of territorial forces. As one technique of accomplishing that objective, mobile training teams (MTTs) have been established by each brigade to provide training for IF/TF/KSDF forces in areas where division units do not habitually operate. MTTs are composed of one team leader (O-3 or above), two non-commissioned officer primary instructors (E-5 or above), two enlisted assistant instructors, one RTO, one medical aidman, and one Vietnamese interpreter or Kit Carson Scout.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January, 1970, REG C5FOR-65 (L2) (C)

C. (C) Chemical.

1. General. During the reporting period, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Chemical section, exercising control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CBG) (AII) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (D3) (Separate) continued chemical combat support of the division.

2. Operations. During the reporting period, the following missions were accomplished:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Mission</th>
<th>Number of Missions</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne personnel detector</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame drop</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1685 drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical CS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27 .158R2 &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk CS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95 M7A3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosgene emplacement</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>530 positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busch flare emplacement</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8 positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial defoliation (herbicide)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5,230 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial defoliation (diesel)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16,280 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST servicing/inspection</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0/48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective mask inspection</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunker seeding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>180 lbs of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>powdered CS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. During the reporting period, the division received the XM191 weapon system consisting of the 66mm, 4-tube XM202 rocket launcher and the XM174 incendiary rocket in 4 round clips. 29 launchers and 240 clips were received for evaluation. The system is a lightweight, direct fire, flame weapon designed for employment against bunkers, foxholes, automatic weapons positions, and combustible enemy targets. A training team from Edgewood Arsenal conducted classes on the weapon for 23 personnel from tactical units. To date, the XM191 weapon system has been employed only in training.

4. During the period, the following new techniques were developed:

a. The airborne personnel detector (AID) was mounted in an OH-6A air-
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) for period Ending 31 January, 1970, RG 5 CFR-65 (2)

Craft to supplement the use of UH-1H aircraft. Use of the OH-6A required only minor modifications of the equipment and takes advantage of the increased maneuverability of the OH-6A, thereby providing improved area coverage in less time and with less stress on the aircraft. Substitution of the OH-6A increases the number of aircraft available for missions and increases UH-1H aircraft availability for other missions. Employment of the OH-6A on visual reconnaissance missions results in a more thorough search and reveals likely areas in which further reconnaissance should be conducted.

Bulk flame gives were employed to burn away foliage in areas believed to be heavily booby trapped. During the period, drops were made along trails and on proposed resettlement areas and landing zones. OH-47 helicopters were used to drop loads consisting of from eight to fifteen 55 gallon drums of fuel thickened with 4 percent or 6 percent of a thickener. The drums of thickened fuel were carried externally in cargo nets and dropped at a speed of 80 knots from a height of 300 feet or more above the target. The fuel is ignited by throwing smoke grenades or trip flares with the drums, or by firing tracer rounds into the target area after the drums have hit and burst. An area approximately 15 x 80 meters is covered by one drop. In addition to burning away vegetation, the flames may destroy trip wires and occasionally detonate a booby trap explosive charge.

c. The hazardous and inefficient airborne CS grenade racks mounted on helicopter skids were replaced by a system utilizing empty 2.75 inch rocket shipping containers, taped together in a cluster of four tubes each. Eight M7A2 CS grenades with safety pins pulled were inserted into each tube. Over the target area, the tubes were extended from the aircraft door, allowing the grenades to slide from the tubes. Using the system, up to 395 grenades could be dispensed in one sortie, compared to 192 using the conventional grenade rack. By manipulating the degree of tube slant, the expenditure rate of the grenades could be varied, thereby providing a means to adjust the target coverage. In an emergency, the grenade tubes may be jettisoned, providing greater safety to the aircraft and crew. The new tube system was employed during the period on four occasions, resulting in satisfactory coverage and distribution. The use of longer tubes with a capacity of 13 grenades was found to be unsatisfactory due to the difficulty experienced in manipulating the tubes in the aircraft troop compartment.
D. (C) Intelligence.

1. Enemy situation.

a. Location and strength of enemy units at the beginning of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH).

(a) Local force companies; C113, 100 personnel (vic YD 4233); C114, 45 personnel (reinforced by 1 Co/80th Br/6th Regt, vic YD 5420); C115, 30 personal (vic YD 5415); C116, 20 personnel (unlocated in the Nam Hu (D) canopy); 1st Wing Special Action Unit, 10 personnel (unlocated).

(b) The Phu Loc Armed Battalion with a strength of approximately 250 and operating out of the Phu Loc (D) mountains.

(c) The 4th Regiment was operating out of the Phu Loc (D) mountains (vic 3394) and making small unit incursions into the Truc Bridge and Phu Loc (D) HQ areas. The 5th Regiment was deployed with the 806th Infantry Battalion (vic YD6015), the 804th Infantry Battalion (vic YC 9295), the 32nd Rocket Artillery Battalion (unlocated in the "rocket-tilt"), and the Chi Thua I and Chi Thua II Sapper Battalions were believed to be collocated with the 5th Regimental HQ near the Laotian border. The 29th and 803rd Regiments/324th Division were believed to be in the vicinity of eastern Base Area 611 in Laos (vic YC 2598), west of the A Shau Valley. The 6th Regiment was deployed in the proximity of the Phong Dien (D) lowlands with one company from the 800th and one company from the 806th Infantry Battalions, operating in the lowlands. The regimental HQ was located to the rear in the vicinity of the Laotian border. The 7th Front was operating west of former Base Area 101 in southern Quang Tri (P) (vic YD 2030).

(2) In the B-5 (DMZ) Front, elements of five enemy regiments were conducting operations. The 2d Battalion, 246th Regiment was located in the western DMZ (vic XD 8383). The 2d Battalion, 27th Regiment was operating in the vicinity of YD 0568 in the central DMZ and the 31st Regiment was operating throughout the eastern DMZ area, with elements of its 27th Battalion located in the Mai Loc area. The 8th Rocket Artillery Regiment was deployed throughout the DMZ area in general support of the B-5 Front. The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment was located in the Vinh Linh Special Zone, NWW, conducting operations on the Cuu Vat River.

b. Enemy activity during the month of November was generally characterized by small unit contacts, as rice-gathering parties increased their infiltration into the lowland areas. On 31 October, west of the central A Shau Valley in the vicinity of YC 549939, elements of the 2-17th Cav contacted one NVA squad. Documents captured during this action indicated the presence of the 114 Recon Battalion, MRTTH, which had the mission of...
establishing a line of communication from the A Shau Valley along the general trace of Route 97 into the Menang. However, air and radar reports indicated formation of the infantry reconnaissance battalion (ARVN) from the 1st and 10th Independant Unit. The battalion was reported to have a strength of 200 men and was composed of four infantry reconnaissance elements, designated 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th sections. Significant contact during the week began on the Vietnamese elements of the 1-5th Tank Div contacted the 2d Battalion, 27th NVA regiment, in the vicinity of Y 34C1. The 107mm and 155mm field howitzers provided the infantry battalion (1st Ind) to reach the 1-5th Tank Div on 13 November. Contact terminated on 18 November with a total of 259 KIA (loss).

c. During the north of Vietnam, the enemy increased logistic activities primarily in the Khe Sanh and eastern salients and the Tuy Hoa area (Y 0625). Contact with small rice-gathering parties continued in the Truc Luu area (Y 1625) along the Hoa Vi and the 17th Infantry Battalion, 1st NVA regiment, reported to be taking initial rice-gathering incursions into Truc Luu area. On 7 December, the 112 Field Artillery Battalion fired 215 MM rockets into Camp Base. The 1st Infantry Battalion (1st Ind) returned to its traditional AO in the vicinity of former base area 114, after unloading resupply near the central A Shau Valley. The 104th Infantry Battalion was forced by allied pressure to redeploy from the Truc Luu area back into its traditional AO of Leech Island (Y 0625). Increased road construction activities and numerous sightings of large numbers of personnel in the Vietnamese salient area indicated renewed enemy activity. The build-up in the salient area and the northern A Shau Valley was necessary to prepare for future maneuver elements of the 5th regiment and the 7th Front for future offensive activities. The enemy increased attacks by fire in the eastern NVA area by shelling ARVN strong points C-1, C-2, Camp Carroll, and Dong Ha Combat Base.

d. Enemy activity during January was characterized primarily by a noticeable increase in logistic activity in the Vietnamese salient, northeastern base area 114 and the northern A Shau Valley. Concentrated activity in the northern A Shau Valley has been attributed to the return of the 5th Battalion, 27th NVA regiment which was last contacted between 10 - 20 May at Dong Ha Base. While conducting an ABN mission on 12 January, vicinity Y 34201, elements of the 2-17th Cav discovered twelve enemy trucks. On 21 January, 3d Force Recon teams reported twenty 24-ton trucks moving south through the A Shau Valley, indicating that Route 529 is again being utilized by the NVA as a major supply route. During the first two weeks in January, ARVN forces and the 2-17th Cav sighted and engaged company size enemy forces on six separate occasions. ARVN strong point C-2, Fe Rullier, Fe Annette and Camp Carroll experienced well coordinated attacks by fire resulting in light to moderate casualties and damage. On 21 January, FE Birmingham received three 122mm rockets. On 3 and 31 January, the CP of the 5th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment engaged a battalion size enemy force, re-
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AV: 0-6C

SUBJ: Operational Report - 117th Infantry, 11th Airborne Division

Airmobile Area, for Period Ending 31 January 1973, Cpl. LC. Co. 65 (F1)

In summary, 70 NVA/KPA. Ten PQW's captured during the contact continued the presence of the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, 2km northwest of Phu Loc. During the reporting period, enemy activity was directed primarily against ARVN forces in the central and northeastern sectors of the DMZ area. The majority of the activities were conducted by elements of the 27th NVA Regiment.

a. At the close of the reporting period, enemy units were in the following locations:

(1) In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH), local force companies were operating in their normal areas of operations in the following locations:

- 113 (YD 4033), 114 (YD 4019), 115 (YD 6217), 116 (YD 7904). The Quang Vang Special Action Unit remained unlocated. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion and the 4th NVA Regiment continued to operate out of the Phu Loc mountains, with activities centralized in the Phu Loc (D) headquarters and the Iron Bridge areas.

- The 5th NVA Regiment remained deployed in its traditional area, with the 804th Infantry Battalion in YC 8195, the 810th Inf Battalion in YD 5715, the K32 Rocket Artillery Battalion in YC 7299, and the Chu Thua I and Chu Thua II Sapper Battalions unlocated but believed operating in the vicinity of YC 6282. The 29th NVA Regiment was located east of the central A Shau Valley along the Rao La River Valley (vicinity FB Maureen).

- The 803d NVA Regiment was believed to be operating from eastern Base Area 681l into the A Shau Valley. Elements of the 6th NVA Regiment remained deployed in the proximity of the Phong Dien (D) lowlands, with elements of the K12 Sapper, 800th and 806th Infantry Battalions operating with the 1113 and 1114 local force companies. The maneuver battalions of the 7th Front, believed to have been refitted and reinforced, had returned to former Base Area 101.

(2) In the B-5 (DMZ) Front, the following eight enemy units were operating:

- The 52d Regiment, 320th Division was located in northwestern Quang Tri (P).
- The 2d Battalion, 246th Regiment was located in the west-central DMZ in the vicinity of XD8363. The 2d Battalion, 27th Regiment was operating in the vicinity of YD0468. The 36th Regiment was operating throughout the eastern area, with elements of its 27th Battalion located in the Me Lioc area.
- The 270th Regiment was located in the northeastern DMZ in the vicinity of YD1986. The 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment was deployed throughout the DMZ in general support of the B-5 Front. The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment was located in the Vinh Linh Special Zone, NNN.

2. Viet Cong Infrastructure activities.

a. The month of November 1969 reflected a slight increase in VC activity over previous months. Most of the VCI incidents involved the collection of rice and other foodstuffs in anticipation of an enemy
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(winter spring offensive.

(1) A decrease of VCI eliminations was noticed for the month of November 1969, with a total of 87 VCI cadre eliminated by GVN and Allied targeting operations in Thua Thien (P). Of this number, 35 were considered reportable under current MACV standards.

(2) The following is a table of VCI incidents, by district, for the month of November 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Fin/Sec</th>
<th>Pnd</th>
<th>Shtr</th>
<th>Intal</th>
<th>Dig</th>
<th>Assas</th>
<th>Torr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huong Dien</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Dien</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Dien</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Tra</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Huong Thuy</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Thu Vang</td>
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<td>Thu Thu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thu Loc</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Loc</td>
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<td>Sam Hoa</td>
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<td>Hue</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) During the month of November 1969, there was a total of 117 contacts in the lowlands. Of these contacts, 17 were enemy-initiated while 100 were initiated by friendly elements.

(4) Numerous P/M and Hoi Chanh reports indicated that the Hue City Municipal Unit was reorganized into the Hue City Reconnaissance Battalion (HC6). This reorganization was probably the result of an after-action report concerning TET 68, which indicated that a communication/liaison breakdown with local forces was experienced when the NVA entered the Thua
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AUG-GC

S. CT; Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (12)

Thien (P) lowlands. The establishment of HCRB is believed to be an effort by the political arm of Hue City to improve communications and liaison in the districts surrounding Hue.

b. The month of December 1969 showed a slight increase in reported VCI incidents. Closer liaison between the 101st Div (Airmobile) and the Thua Thien (P) National Police headquarters in Hue resulted in increased reports received by the division.

(1) Although the majority of reportable incidents involved rice collection, it is important to note that kidnapping and terrorism increased over the previous month, while assassinations remained at the same level. The increase in the number of incidents was a direct result of initial efforts by the VCI to prepare the lowlands for a reported enemy-initiated winter-spring offensive during early 1970.

(2) During the month of December 1969, 91 VCI cadre were eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, 38 eliminations were considered reportable under current MACV standards.

(3) The following is a table of VCI incidents by district for the month of December 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Fin/Boon</th>
<th>Prod</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Intal</th>
<th>Kidn</th>
<th>Assas</th>
<th>Terr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Phu Thu</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Loc</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan Hoa</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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During the month of December, a total of 161 contacts took place throughout the Thua Thien (P) coastal lowlands. Of these, 122 were friendly-initiated while the remaining 39 were enemy-initiated.

During the first two weeks of December, there were reports that the higher level VCI cadre had moved out of the lowlands into the plowed and canopy areas of Thua Thien (P) to receive political reindoctrination. During the third week of December, these cadre were reportedly back in the lowlands, conducting further reindoctrination meetings with the lower level VCI cadre. On 13, 15, 18, and 30 December 1969, 525th MI Group agent reports were received concerning village and hamlet-level meetings in Quang Dien (D), Huong Tra (D), and Phu Loc (D). The subject of these meetings seemed to follow that portion of CQVN Resolution Nine that deals with the GVN/KI Program. Resolution Nine states that, "the pacification and Chieu Hoi programs are most serious threats." The resolution stresses that these programs should be neutralized in order to prevent the "Vietnamization" of the war. All cadre were ordered to participate in terrorist and assassination activities. It was also decreed that local cadre must penetrate political and social organizations, to include the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF). It was further stated that "reactionary and stubborn persons must be purged."

c. The month of January 1970 showed a 30% decrease in reportable VCI incidents over the month of December 1969. The majority of the VCI incidents reported involved the collection of rice and other foodstuffs. The increase in intelligence collection incidents (as illustrated in December and January incident charts) was significant and probably indicative of the last phase of preparation for the winter-spring offensive of 1970.

During January 1970, 127 VCI cadre were eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, 39 eliminations were considered reportable under current MACV standards.

The following is a table of VCI incidents, by district, for the month of January 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Fin/Box</th>
<th>Pend</th>
<th>Shis</th>
<th>Intel</th>
<th>Kidn</th>
<th>Assas</th>
<th>Terr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the month of January 1970, a total of 97 contacts took place throughout the lowlands of Thua Thien (F). Of these contacts, 79 were friendly-initiated, while the remaining 18 contacts were enemy-initiated.

Rice collections in the La Chu (V) area (YD683243), Huong Tra (D), strongly indicated the presence of elements of the C-115 LF Company (Huong Tra District Unit) and possible elements of the Hue City Reconnaissance Battalion (HCRB). The C-115 LF Company is probably the primary group involved in the rice collections. An agent report (DCI 18 Jan 70) stated the HCRB had the mission of performing reconnaissance west of Hue City. The agent report further stated that the HCRB had also been tasked to establish and defend a communication-liaison route for the Huong Tra District Unit and an infantry battalion of the 5th NVA Regiment to facilitate movement by these units into the La Chu (V) (YD693243) and the Que Chu (V) areas (YD692252) to collect food.

On 12 January 1970, a raider from the Phu Loc (D) security section presented information concerning the mission of his organization. He stated the Phu Loc (D) security section had been tasked with organizing the Viet Cong infrastructure; keeping abreast of the US and ARVN situation; investigating village, hamlet, and government cadre; investigating police...
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RED 3065 (n) (2)

and medical personnel, and making a list of those to be killed or kidnapped. An agent report received in mid-January 1970 stated that the Phu Loc (D) security section was divided into four teams of 4-7 men each, operating in the Long Co Binh (AT) to the Long Co Binh (AT).

1. G2 air operations.

a. During this quarter, the G2 air section has increased its hand-held photography capability by providing the Imagery Interpretation Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company with a two and one-half hour G2 mission on a daily basis. Requests for hand-held photography are now processed through the section and a finished product delivered to the requestor within twenty-four hours.

b. Each brigade now possesses the capability to conduct airborne personnel detector (A/P) missions in its respective area of operation. Through coordination with the division chemical section, each brigade was issued an A/P machine, relieving the 2-17th Cav of the responsibility for conducting all A/P missions in the division AO.

c. During the month of January, the G2 air section assumed the responsibility for receiving and coordinating all aerial surveillance missions conducted within the division AO. The section receives a daily target list of missions to be flown within the AO from the Air Force liaison element at III Field headquarters. Upon receipt, the list is coordinated through the fire support element for artillery clearance and then passed to the division air liaison officer, who notifies the aircraft conducting the mission of the clearance status.

4. G2 ground surveillance operations

a. The division ground surveillance section consists of three officers and two enlisted men. Section personnel are provided by the division sensor platoon and the section is supervised by the division ground surveillance officer. A sensor officer has been assigned to Division to insure rapid
artillery response to sensor activations. Total sensor personnel assigned in the division are seven officers and forty enlisted men.

b. Four additional ground read-out monitor sites were established in the platoon region to extend coverage in the area and to increase the ability to detect infiltration into the populated lowlands. The number of available channels and tone codes is increased by making maximum use of available terrain mask.

c. During the reporting period, four enlisted men received on-the-job training with the 25th Inf Div in the operation and maintenance of the battlefield area surveillance system (BASS). The BASS is currently in operation, with the automatic relay position located at FB Fuller and the terminal portion located at Red Devil Combat Base. The four-man enlisted crew is integrated with the 1-5th Mech Div sensor element providing ground read-out of sensor strings in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) reconnaissance zone, as well as the 1-5th Mech Div AO. As a result of this operation, the combined monitor team at FB Fuller was no longer required, and personnel have been returned to their units.

d. During the reporting period, positive results have been obtained by ambushing sensor devices with Claymore AP mines. On 12 November 1969, thirty enemy were spotted near a sensor string. Fourteen Claymores positioned to cover the area were detonated simultaneously, resulting in two VC KIA, two individual weapons and miscellaneous documents captured.

e. The sensor analog relay system (SARS) reported in use during the last reporting period, has proven too fragile for employment on artillery fire support bases or on hills which experience high winds. During the period, the tower portion of the antenna has buckled on three occasions, twice due to high winds and once due to heavy artillery firing. A report of unsatisfactory equipment operation has been forwarded through channels and the SARS is no longer employed in the division AO.

f. EBD/WL line sensors are being employed around major base camps and firebases. Thus far, twenty-nine have been employed with others planned for employment in the near future. Both EBD/WL and PBH1 devices have proven reliable in providing early warning of enemy intrusion. This has been confirmed by sightings with Starlight scopes and night observation devices.

g. FPS4 and FPS5 ground surveillance radars have been redistributed in the division, providing two FPS5 radars for each infantry battalion and two FPS4 radars for each brigade HHC. Six additional FPS4 radars are maintained on hand by the 801st Maintenance Battalion to be used as "floats". Radar
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SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for period ending 31 January 1970, HC 537 FOR-65 (R2) (U)

operators are cross-trained in the operation of both types to provide each unit with continuous radar coverage.

b. Employment of radar raids. During the reporting period, emphasis was placed on the employment of quick reaction teams to conduct radar raids. In addition to the TOE radar team personnel and equipment of the maneuver battalions, two teams were organized in the brigade headquarters company. Each team consisted of four men and one AN/PS4 radar set. Based on current intelligence, radar raids were planned and executed for the primary purpose of detecting enemy movement or activities. Radar sightings were reported to artillery fire direction centers for the employment of direct fires or to subsector headquarters to facilitate rapid deployment of forces to intercept enemy movement.

5. Counter intelligence section.

a. During the reporting period, the CI Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile) engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the division from enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion. CI inspections of unit personnel, documents, and physical security programs were conducted to detect vulnerable areas subject to enemy exploitation. CI agents monitored the division base camp security program to detect enemy agents among VN personnel and third country nationals employed by the division. Frequent liaison was conducted with Allied intelligence agencies to obtain information pertinent to the division. Other types of investigation were conducted to increase personal security within the division.

b. Through information collected by a CI agent in Phu Loc (D), three successful ambushes were planned, resulting in 4 VC/NVA KIA and four WPNK.

c. Base camp security.

(1) The CI section continued to collect biographical data concerning local VN and third country nationals working for the 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and efforts to establish casual sources of information concerning enemy espionage were continued among VN personnel employed at Camp Eagle. Numerous spot checks were conducted to insure appropriate security clearances of VN and third country national employees.

(2) Close liaison was maintained with Industrial Relations Naval Support Activity, Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam, to assist base camp security in identification and control efforts.

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d. The CI section maintained liaison with XXIV Corps headquarters, Phu Bai; 525th MI Group, Phu Bai and Quang Tri; Pacification, Security and Coordination headquarters, Hue; Special Police Advisor, Hue; Province Interrogation Center Advisor, Hue; Static Census Grievance Advisor, Hue; Phoenix Committee, Hue; Combined Information Coordinating Element (CICE), Hue; 15th CIT, Dong Ha; 517th MID, Quang Tri, and all district intelligence operations coordination centers (DIOCC).

b. Interrogation Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company.

b. During the reporting period, the 101st Abn Div (Airborne) captured 16 prisoners of war (13 VC NVA and 3 NVA NVA) and received 2 NVA Hoi Chanh (returnees).

b. 122 batches of enemy documents were captured.

t. Weather.

b. Precipitation data (inches).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>14.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. November was a typical northeast monsoon month. The total rainfall was slightly below normal.

c. During December, long periods of overcast skies and light precipitation occurred, especially during the first half of the month.

d. January was a typical month. Overcast skies with light precipitation prevailed for the first twenty-one days, with generally good weather during the remainder of the month.

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1. During November and December, the division casualty rate continued at the same low level of the previous quarter. In January, increased enemy activity resulted in a rise in division casualties.

2. During November, the division experienced aDMCS hump of 3000 personnel. Overall divisional strength dropped below 100% but returned to 107% by the end of the month. The division received a sufficient input of 11 series ACS to provide the maneuver battalions with an average of infantrymen. The division maintained 107.6% of its authorized strength in the 11 series ACS at the end of the period.

3. The division gained five flight surgeons and provided each major unit with required surgeon personnel during the period.

4. Military police activities were concentrated on post, camp, and station operations, with emphasis on security patrols along major roads. The arrival of the 101st Airborne in the area, one of which was assigned to the personnel center to provide gate security and control of local national employees.

5. The relocation of the division personnel services support system from X to Y eliminated a 450 mile separation from the division proper, facilitated management, and increased the effectiveness of available personnel administration assets.

6. The division was provided highly efficient postal services during this time which included the Christmas peak mailing period. Postal statistics for the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Envelope/Brief</th>
<th>Number Sold</th>
<th>Mailing/Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>11,165</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>342,934.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>13,478</td>
<td>1,523</td>
<td>348,579.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>13,610</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>341,516.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48,262</td>
<td>4,746</td>
<td>1,343,920.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, HCS CUSC-65 (A2) (U)

Dollar value of stamps sold

November                      23,868.00
December                     26,817.00
January                      40,905.00
Total                        91,590.00

Fuel flow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Incoming</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>561,463 lbs</td>
<td>151,648 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>676,461 lbs</td>
<td>165,146 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>1,542,190 lbs</td>
<td>124,808 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,780,114 lbs</td>
<td>441,602 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. (C) Logistics.

1. General. During the reporting period, the division support command (DISCO) supported Division Operation FRA/LGC SQUAD (1 Nov - 6 Dec 69) and RANDOLPH GLENN (7 Dec 69 - present). Logistic support for these operations was provided through the DISCO. FSSs under the area support concept. Throughout the period, efforts were made to reduce CH-47 helicopter blade time through increased utilization of surface transportation to accomplish routine resupply.

   (a) 1st Brigade operations conducted during the period were supported from Camp Eagle using existing facilities. Additional aircraft refuel points were installed at FB Joy (20,000 gal JP4 capacity) and FE Birmingham (40,000 gal JP4) to meet the increased demands of divisional aviation assets flying in support of the 1-327th Infantry participating in Operation SAIL IED, a combined US/GVN battalion operation.

   b. Throughout the reporting period, support for the 2d and 3d Brigades was provided through FSS facilities at Camp Sally and Camp Evans respectively. The 2-501st Infantry deployed to strongpoint C-2 in Northern Quang Tri province for a short duration operation, and was supported by the 2d FSS from Quang Tri combat base.

   c. Quang Tri rearm/refuel point. A forward rearm and refuel point was established at Quang Tri to provide divisional aircraft with a rearm/refuel
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CAFOR-85 (K2) (U)

capability for air operations in Quang Tri province. The refuel point, operated by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), augmented by DISCCO, is capable of servicing 12 aircraft simultaneously from a fixed storage facility with a capacity of approximately 100,000 gallons of J74. The rearm facility consists of four points capable of rearming eight aircraft. Ammunition is stored in the following quantities:

- 2.75 inch rockets: 4,920 rounds
- 40-mm: 14,400 rounds
- 7.62 mm linked: 132,000 rounds

4. Super contact team operations. Super contact teams (SCT), organized and provided by each brigade FSL, were dispatched on an average of once every three days to troops returning for stand down from unit operations. The number of company-size marshalling operations conducted between 1 Nov 69 and 31 Jan 70 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Super Contact Team</th>
<th>Partial Contact Team</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-502</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-501</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-501</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-506</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-506</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Transportation.

a. There were no major unit moves conducted by 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) personnel during the reporting period.

b. The division received 7,630 short tons of cargo through the US Navy facilities at Tam Ky.

c. Aircraft sorties flown in support of the division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>CH47 Sorties</th>
<th>CH47 PAX</th>
<th>C130 PAX</th>
<th>C130 Cargo (s/t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 69</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>12,222</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1,212 2,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 69</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>8,177</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>312 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 70</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>8,520</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>653 4,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2865</td>
<td>28,919</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>2,177 7,136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. IFR airdrop test program. During the reporting period, the division instituted a program to test the feasibility of resupplying ground troops by airdrop under IFR conditions. This program is being supported by the 834th Air Division, Tan Son Nhat. The program was developed after an unsuccessful resupply drop by CH47 was attempted under conditions of limited visibility. To counter the inability to resupply by CH47 under IFR conditions, this test program was initiated to explore Air Force IFR resupply capabilities. CH47 drops have been continued in an attempt to provide the division with an "in-house" IFR resupply capability. To date, a total of four separate airdrops have been conducted under simulated IFR conditions with both C130 and CH47 aircraft. Twelve CH47 loads were dropped an average of 351 meters from the desired impact point, while 23 C130 loads averaged 169 meters from the desired impact point.


a. During the period 1 November 1969 thru 31 January 1970, the 426th Supply and Service Battalion (Airmobile) continued to provide supply and transportation support for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

b. During the quarter,igger support was provided by Company B for ap-
approximately 3,364 sorties of Class I, II, III, IV, and V supplies to units of the division. All units authorized air items under Division Regulation 725-1 were inspected by an air items inspection team.

c. The division supply office provided required logistic support to insure continued operations during the movement of the division administration company and Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS) from Bien Hoa to Camp Evans.

d. On 25 December, the Bob Hope Show visited Camp Eagle. In preparation for the event, approximately 75,000 board feet of heavy tactical lumber was temporarily displaced to provide audience seating.

e. In late November, a contingency resupply load and a rear point were established at the Quang Tri LSA pad and the Quang Tri airfield.

f. A system of pre-stocking cold/wet weather gear for the winter season was successful in providing personnel with the required items.

g. During the period, an ECOR representative visited the division to inspect and to determine the effectiveness of 84 4386 batteries. The visit proved beneficial in eliminating inoperative batteries prior to issue and in identifying operational batteries, by lot number, on hand in the supply system.

h. Project Edit/Challenge concerning high priority requests and requests for inordinate quantities of nice-to-have items, continued with an average of 0.001 percent of all requests received being rejected as a result of Edit/Challenge procedures. The low percentage resulted from a training program concerning direct support unit procedures which was initiated to advise customer units on logistic operations.

i. The battalion continued participation in the division support command (DISCOM) civic action program. Under the program, firewood, clothing, soap and food were distributed to the Kim Long Orphanage.

j. During the reporting period, emphasis was placed on perimeter improvement. Trenches and secondary fighting positions were improved, fighting positions adjacent to each bunker were constructed, and concrete capping and structural improvements of bunkers were continued. Anti-sapper classes were conducted by base defense personnel. Division G2 conducted a class for all battalion personnel, E6 and above, concerning the enemy situation in the area of operation.

k. Increased emphasis was placed on safety and fire prevention.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, ROC CSFOR-65 (R.2)

Monthly inspections were conducted to ensure that adequate fire prevention controls were established. Weekly fire drills were conducted at all major refuel pads.

1. The water supply problem continued. Congestion at water points, as well as lack of adequate water carriers, necessitated a twenty-four hour a day water resupply operation to meet existing requirements.

4. Ground maintenance.

a. During the quarter, the 801st Maintenance Battalion continued to maintain communication, electronic, armament, and automotive deadline rates below the IIARV goal.

b. Deadline percentages in major commodity areas were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>5.80%</td>
<td>5.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Mr. Johnston, a representative of the Airborne Instrument Laboratory, provided invaluable assistance in radar repair. The average radar deadline rate was approximately five percent.

d. Technical supply activities.

(1) The 801st Maintenance Battalion's technical supply activity continued to experience a high request rate. The increase in requests was initially due to AGI and CMXI inspections during the past quarter and to increased interest in unit PIAs during the present quarter. Supply requests totaled 17,533 for November; 20,276 for December; and 24,401 for January. Demand remained at approximately 80%, while demand satisfaction increased to 52.9%. The number of zero balance lines decreased from 3628 to 2121 during the period.

(2) Expanded IX and new self-service supply operations were initiated during this period. Thirty items were added to the IX list.

(3) A monthly reconciliation of Red Ball due-out was initiated to assist customer units and the DBU in determining requirements.

e. During this quarter, the 801st Maintenance Battalion continued technical assistance visits to battalions during standdowns. Armament teams continued a 100% inspection of M60 machine guns in the division.
A. (U) Civil affairs.

1. At the beginning of the reporting period, 173 pacification projects were in progress. During the period, 74 projects were initiated, 121 were completed, and 126 were in progress at the end of the period. A civic action priority list was published by Thu Thien Province and served as a guideline for selecting projects. A supplementary list was published in November 1969.

2. January marked the 18th consecutive month in which no new refugees were generated in Thu Thien Province. The refugee population at the end of the reporting period was 13,374. Land clearing operations to promote refugee resettlement in Phong Dien District began in January with assistance by the 3d Brigade. Resettlement of refugees into the area is scheduled for the period following Tet 1970.

3. The division MEDCAP program was expanded, with each battalion conducting a minimum of one MEDCAP each week. 34,600 medical and dental patients were treated by division medical teams assisted by Vietnamese health workers. In addition, 2,342 immunizations were administered, and 47 Vietnamese were evacuated from hamlets to hospitals for medical care. A division circular was published in January to provide guidance for the conduct of MEDCAPs. In addition, the division surgeon conducted personal interviews with each division doctor concerning the MEDCAP program.

4. Coordination with civil officials.

a. During November, the bodies of 232 Vietnamese, victims of VC terrorism during the 1968 Tet offensive were discovered in mass graves in Phu Thu District. Through arrangements with province officials, lumber was furnished by the division for use in construction of coffins.

b. In December, the division support command initiated a program to upgrade the sector maintenance and direct support logistics company (SM & DSLC) of Thu Thien Province. The SM & DSLC supports and services all regional forces/popular forces personnel and equipment in the province. The division provided technical advice, assistance, and training of operator and maintenance personnel.

c. The division provided Christmas support to several orphanages in Thu Thien Province. Candy and toys were delivered to orphanages by the following units:

(1) 101st Aviation Group - Bao Sinh Orphanage, Hue

(2) 801st Maintenance Battalion - Kim Long Orphanage, Hue
during the reporting period, local VN officials conducted three significant dedication ceremonies.

(1) On 19 November 1969, ceremonies were conducted commemorating the completion of construction of Tay Loc Orphanage. The project was sponsored by the 51st Signal Battalion with many of the materials furnished through the division CS. The ceremony was attended by local VN religious, political, and military leaders.

(2) On 7 December, during ceremonies in Hue, 132 Kubota tiller tractors were presented to local hamlet chiefs to increase rice and crop production. The 101st Air Div (Airborne) was represented during the ceremonies by Brigadier General James C. Smith, assistant division commander (support). Eight men from the division assisted in assembly of the tractors.

(3) On 29 December, BG Smith and COL Howard K. Moore, Div Artillery CO, attended the dedication of Gia Le Chanh Health Station, a civic action project sponsored by the 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airborne).

(4) On 21 January, MG John W. Wright, Jr., Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), attended the dedication ceremony of Phu Vang High School, a civic action project for which the division provided construction materials.

5. The following major projects were completed during the reporting period:

b. Vinh Loc school furniture (ID66123), Vinh Loc.
c. Le Xa Dong school repair (ID82322), Phu Vang.
d. Van The, Health Station repair (ID821240), Huong Thuy.
e. Gia Le Chanh Health Station construction (ID627246), Huong Thuy.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 11th Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. Vinh Nguyen water reservoir (W517336), Phong Dien.
g. Vinh Ha village office repair (W624112), Phu Thu.
h. Vinh Thai school repair (W947163), Phu Thu.
i. Huong Dian school furniture (W633429), Huong Dien.
j. Huong Can school gym construction (W714475), Huong Tra.
k. Vinh Luu school construction (W894215), Phu Thu.

6. A total of 121 projects were completed during the reporting period, including 58 schools, 37 wells, 7 dispensaries, 4 markets, 4 village headquarters, 3 orphanages repaired, and 8 other projects.

7. Current projects:
a. Schools - 42.
b. Administrative buildings - 6.
d. Wells - 37.
e. Markets - 6.
f. Others - 4.

8. Commodities issued during the reporting period:

- Tin 2,316 sheets
- Paint 55 gallons
- Rebar 7,298 feet
- Cement 4,434 bags
- School desks 329 desks
- School benches 329 benches
- Construction lumber 20,323 board feet
- Scrap lumber 6,945 board feet
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS OPORD-65 (R2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>3,840 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>1,840 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational kits</td>
<td>36 kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>3,328 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo boxes</td>
<td>2,768 boxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand</td>
<td>54 cubic meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School kits</td>
<td>1,765 kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravel</td>
<td>33 cubic meters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. Psychological Operations

1. Statistics. Type and quantity of propaganda media employed:
   a. Leaflets disseminated: 164,792,700
   b. Loudspeaker broadcasts: 1,458 hours
   c. Movies shown: 178 hours
   d. TV programs estimated: 13
   e. Quick-reaction leaflets: 481,000
   f. PSYOP mobile teams: 16

2. During the past quarter, aerial broadcasts, standard tapes, and leaflets were employed in the PSYOP program. Several new themes were developed by JNSPAC, the 7th PSYOP Battalion, and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The PSYOP effort during the months of November and December emphasized the "High Price of Rice" theme and was targeted against known and suspected NVA and VC locations. Leaflets and posters were disseminated and ground broadcasts were conducted in GVN controlled areas to gain, maintain and strengthen popular support of the GVN, insert a wedge between the enemy and the people, and to inform the people of the gains made by the ARVN and the GVN.
3. Twenty-four Hoi Omasha rallied to the GW in Than Thien Province during the period, a reduction of approximately fifty percent from the number of ralliers during the last reporting period. Interrogation reports of ralliers and FMs indicate that NVA cadre members are placing increased controls on subordinates and that political officers are concentrating on thorough indoctrination of replacements. Many of the Hoi Omasha stated that they heard and believed the aerial broadcasts, but that their leaders kept a close watch over them to insure that they did not attempt to rally. Psychological efforts during this period were directed toward creating dissension between the VC and NVA in an attempt to cause malingering and desertion from units.

4. Continued support was provided to cordem operations during the period through employment of ground loudspeaker (GB) and audio-visual (AV) teams, aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops, MEKCAPs, armed propaganda teams, and cultural drama teams.

5. The division PSTOP printing capability was used to produce quick-reaction leaflets in response to Hoi Omasha and other exploitable PSTOP situations. VC leaflets were printed for use during cordem operations.

6. On 15 January 1970, the division began its Tet 1970 campaign. The campaign utilized special Tet leaflets designed to decrease the enemy's morale and effectiveness. The leaflets were distributed in conjunction with aerial broadcasts and were targeted against known and suspected VC/NVA locations. The theme stressed during this campaign was that the VC/NVA would be away from their families and friends during Tet and would not experience a happy new year unless they rallied to the GW or returned to their families in North Vietnam.

7. During the quarter, the AN/UH-55 aerial loudspeaker system was modified to improve the utilization of the system in a UH-1H aircraft (See Indisguise 2).

   a. In the system's original configuration, the following problems were encountered:

   (1) Each of the four 250 watt systems required a 12 to 15 amper power source, but only one cord rated at 35 amps was provided.

   (2) Aircraft vibration resulted in metal fatigue of the major components.

   (3) The system was not designed for attachment to the floor of a
helicopter troop compartment. Miscellaneous straps were required for installation in the aircraft.

b. The modified system uses two power cords, each providing power for two of the 250 watt amplifiers from the 70 ampere power source of the aircraft through the use of the heater blanket jacks. Proper polarity is maintained by using "go-no-go" plugs on each power cord.

c. To eliminate the vibration problem, a lighter frame assembly was constructed and eight shock absorbers mounted on the four legs of the frame. Vibration was further reduced by placing rubber grommets between the major components and the frame of the system.

d. Quick-disconnect plugs were installed on the base of each leg of the frame assembly to expedite the installation and removal of the system from the troop compartment.

e. Additional improvements were achieved by using aluminum components, reducing the weight of the system by 25%. Radio frequency (RF) loss was eliminated by shortening cables and power cords, resulting in increased signal output for the system. Remote controls were positioned in a more protected area on the frame assembly to prevent possible damage to components, and a tape recorder was hooked directly into the system, providing a capability for live and taped broadcasts.

I. (U) Medical.

1. During the reporting period, the 326th Medical Battalion experienced a major turnover of command and staff officers. Three of the lettered companies received new commanders, one of whom is an Air Force medical corps captain. On 25 January, Colonel Joseph F. Peers, the division surgeon, assumed command of the battalion.

2. During the reporting period, the tactical deployment of the battalion remained unchanged from previous periods with Company A providing direct support to 1st Brigade, Company B in direct support of 2d Brigade, and Company C in direct support of 3d Brigade. Headquarters and Support Company continued to provide area medical support for division personnel located at Camp Eagle.

3. Medical statistics for the 326th Medical Battalion for the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970 are as follows:
AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, BGS GSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diseases</th>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co B</th>
<th>Co C</th>
<th>Sp Co</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUOs</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin diseases</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>1,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/P</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td>1,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot problems</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat injuries</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Logistics.

a. During the reporting period, the division medical supply office (DMSO) continued to provide efficient medical supply support, maintaining
A/DC-CC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

a. A 92% fill for the period. The DMSO provided supplies for 23 units, including B and C Companies, 326th Medical Battalion, which provide direct medical supply support to the 2d and 3d Brigades. Supplies for 1st Brigade units and Company A were provided directly by the DMSO at Camp Eagle.

b. During the period, weather affected requests for certain classes of supplies. The demand for medication for treating upper respiratory infections and other damp weather afflictions increased significantly.

c. Mid-January was designated as the "Get Set for Tet" period. During the week beginning 12 January 1970, the DMSO processed over 550 requests for medical supplies.

d. Battalion medical services. The air ambulance platoon continued to provide aeromedical evacuation support to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Mechanized, and to ARVN forces. The majority of the support was furnished from Camp Eagle. However, two UH1H air ambulances were positioned at Camp Evans to provide quick response to requirements in the northern regions of the division area of operation.

J. (U) Signal.

During the reporting period, the 501st Signal Battalion continued to provide communications-electronics support for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). A manned retransmission station remained deployed at Quean Tri to support 3rd Brigade contingencies. Four-channel radio carrier teams supported the three brigade headquarters by providing communications to battalion CPs on Firebases Roy, Saber, Rifle, Pieter, Birmingham, Bastogne, Jack, Carmona, at Eagle Beach, and to the district headquarters of Phong Dien and Tam Loe. AM/SSB RATT teams remained in support of the division, the three brigades and DISCOM. The Admin-Log RATT net was expanded to include all battalions. AM and FM RMI stations were also maintained. In fulfilling the direct support crypto maintenance mission, the 501st Signal Battalion completed 521 work orders. PA support was provided for the Bob Hope Show and 37 other commitments. The four division MARS stations completed 6,725 phone patches.
1. General. During the reporting period, the 326th Engineer Battalion (Airmobile) continued to provide general and direct support to the division. Several firebases were reopened, access roads to firebases were maintained, the majority of the Phu Thu road upgrade was accomplished, and extensive mine sweep and clearing operations were conducted along LOC and in the Mai Loc, Camp Carroll, and Phong Dien areas. Combined TOCs were constructed in the Phong Dien and Phu Loc districts in support of combined US/GVN operations. Project LIFESAVER continued during the period, with a total of 41 landing zones constructed or improved. The battalion continued to provide boats and operations in support of riverine operations in the Phu Thu, Pohl Bridge and An Lo Bridge areas.

2. Civic action and combined operations.
   a. Civic action during the period was primarily of a derivative rather than a direct nature, with the exception of the MEDCAP activities. The battalion surgeon conducted tri-weekly visits to Hue Hospital, where he provided surgical assistance and instruction to medical students in training. The MEDCAP team conducted weekly visits to the Cu Chanh refugee village. Approximately 35 people were treated on each trip. A health worker has been trained through this program. Three BEA huts were relocated from the Gia Le area to the Hue Boy Scout Camp by Company B for use as an administration and mess facility.
   b. Upgrading of the Phu Thu Road from the vicinity of the O'Reilly Bridge along the trace of Route 552 was initiated during the period by Company A. When complete, the road will be a class 12 fair weather route extending 12 kilometers to the southeast of Phu Thu District headquarters and will provide an improved transport route for rice production and marketing.
   c. Company B, in support of the 3-187th Infantry, cleared mines and booby traps along the "Street Without Joy" in the Phong Dien area and cleared two villages of booby traps, thus opening this highly productive area for resettlement and rice production.
   d. At the Nam Hoa District headquarters, one squad from Company C provided technical assistance to the RF/VT forces improving the defenses of the district compound. 400 feet of RGP screen were installed, defensive positions constructed and improved, and defensive wire was emplaced and rehabilitated.
   e. At FB T-Bone, Company C provided assistance and advice to the 1st ARVN Engineer Battalion in the construction of bunkers. Assistance included the operation and maintenance of chainsaws.
HHC: Headquarters Company continued to provide general support to the division. In addition to providing equipment support to the line companies, HHC was tasked with several independent projects as follows:

a. The FB Birmingham helicopter training area was rehabilitated and upgraded. Drainage in the area was improved and the surface was reclassified, compacted, and treated with dust palliative. The airstrip was subsequently marked and is now open to traffic. The training area will receive additional spot compaction and further dust palliative treatments as a result of frequent use and effects of wet weather.

b. Responsibility for maintenance and upgrading of the FB Birmingham access road was assumed by Company C during the period. The project is being held at 30% completion due to the saturated soil conditions. Equipment assets were diverted to higher priority projects. This project will be completed during the next reporting period.

c. Work on the Eagle Personnel Center hook pad was initiated, but was delayed due to saturated soil conditions and diversion of equipment to higher priority tasks.

d. Under favorable weather conditions, maintenance of Camp Eagle roads continued throughout the period. Dust palliative operations were continued on roads and helicopter landing areas.

e. A fuel transfer point was constructed at the "Eagles' Rest" refuel area for the 426th Sapper Battalion, and assistance was furnished to the 2-320th Artillery in constructing an ammunition storage area. A small arms range for individual training was constructed in conjunction with the 2-17th Cavalry.

f. Total water point production for the period was 794,500 gallons. Water points were located at Camp Eagle, Mai Lao, FB Bastogne, Noc Ngot Bridge, Lang Co Bridge and FB Saber.

4. Co A: Company A provided direct support to the 1st Brigade during the reporting period and furnished general support to the division as required.

a. From 1 November to 4 December 1969, the 1st Platoon provided direct support to the 1-327th Infantry during Operation SATURATE in Phu Thu District. Support consisted of demolition teams, mine sweep teams, and technical assistance. The demolition and mine sweep missions were normal operations and resulted in no new concepts or unusual events. Technical assistance was provided to aid in the relocation of two hamlets, Than Lu, Lang and Che Luong Vien, in...
In the Thu district. These villages were originally located in very low terrain and were relocated approximately 300 meters to higher ground. The 14th troop support consisted of land clearing, village layout, and fence construction.

b. On 13 November, the 2d Platoon started construction of the stage and satellite facilities of Eagle Entertainment Bowl and completed construction on 25 December 1969. The project, designed to accommodate the Bob Hope show, consisted of constructing a 40'x36' stage with roof and seating area.

c. The construction of a 22'x42' TOC for Thu Loc District headquarters was begun on 31 December 1969 and completed on 13 January 1970. The TOC was of standard design with minor alterations to accompany the non-standard site and layout. The only significant change was the roof, which consisted of a sub-roof covered with three layers of sandbags, over which a corrugated metal roof was placed to provide protection from rain.

d. During the first part of December 1969, work was started on the widening of J552 (Thu Thu Road). The project was temporarily suspended on 23 December due to inclement weather. It was renewed on 31 December. At that date, simultaneous construction of all culverts and bridges was started with required materials airlifted to the job sites. At the close of the reporting period, the project was approximately 70% complete.

e. With the relocation of the Eagle Personnel Center to Thu Dai, additional postal facilities were required. A former aircraft facility at the Thu-Dai airfield was rehabilitated and remodeled for use as the division aid, the project required construction of curtain walls, movable partitions, and secure storage areas and office space. With the exception of minor difficulties in material procurement, no problems were encountered. This project will be completed early in the coming quarter.

f. A TOC measuring 20'x32' was constructed for the 501st Signal Battalion at Camp Eagle, and a 20'x32' TOC was constructed at FB Roy.

g. During the initial part of the reporting period, Company A provided one squad to project LIFESAVER. Inclement weather hampered the project until late December. At that time, weather conditions improved and L2 teams were furnished on a daily basis.

5. Co B:

b. The company's efforts during the period were directed primarily toward support of combat operations by the 3d Brigade in Phong Dien District, Camp Carroll, FB Cheilivy and FB Phaksaan. In the Phong Dien area, a combined US/GVN TOC was constructed to facilitate combined operations and training.
Throughout the period, one platoon was committed to the 3-177th Infantry in support of these combined operations. Demolition teams, mine sweep teams, and booby trap clearing teams were employed on a daily basis. Two villages and their supporting road/trail networks were cleared in support of the re-settlement program.

b. At the beginning of the period, support was provided at Camp Carroll, P. O. Beally, and P. O. Akkman. At Camp Carroll, the OP complex initiated during Operation KUNGILLO was completed. Two firebases were repurposed and TOCs, gun pads, log pads and defensive wire and positions installed in support of these activities.

c. With the relocation of 1-3a3 to Camp Evans, Company B was tasked with construction of several facilities to support the training program. Former living quarters were converted to classrooms, rappel towers constructed, bleachers erected, and demolition pits and runs constructed.

d. Also in general support, Company B constructed a chapel for the use of the 2-17th Cavalry Squadron and the 136th Engineer Battalion at Camp Eagle. Several H20 huts from the Hia Le area were utilized to provide a place of worship for the personnel of both units. An addition was made to the Camp Eagle H-1 Value Store to facilitate service.

e. An airborne observation tower was constructed by the company for employment on firebases. The tower provides a stable platform 12' in height with an integral roof to protect personnel from weather conditions. The tower remains stable in flight at 50 knots, although difficulties were experienced in obtaining bolts and angle iron required for construction, modification of materials available in the supply system sufficed for the prototype. However, production of these towers is being postponed until component items become available.

6. Co C:

a. During the reporting period, Company C continued to provide direct support to combat elements of the 2d Brigade. Activities included LC clearing missions, mine sweeps, support of combat assaults and artillery raids. A large proportion of the company's efforts was directed toward improvement of defensive positions and installation of wire at Camp Daily.

b. At FS Bartone, extensive fields of fire were cleared, improvement and expansion of the TOC accomplished, and additional defensive wire emplaced. These projects were supplemented by the construction of 20 bunkers on the perimeter to be utilized as defensive positions and troop billeting areas.
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AVDD-GG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS GSPR-65 (R2)
(U)

a. With the assistance of non-divisional engineers, Company C repaired and replaced portions of the national railway system track through Camp Sally.

d. Quarry operations were conducted at FSB Boyd on an experimental basis. Utilizing cobra drills, approximately 500 cubic yards per week were produced. The rock was not suitable as a surface course but was excellent for stabilization on fair weather roads.

L. (C) Army aviation.

1. General.

a. During the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970, the 101st Aviation Group provided continuous aviation support for combat operations of the division.

b. Operations during the reporting period included missions for USMC, OGN, and normal five-minute standby for dustoff escort and other emergency missions.

2. (C) Statistical data for the period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Hrs flown</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>Cargo - tons</th>
<th>Refuel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101st AHB</td>
<td>12,935</td>
<td>30,183</td>
<td>32,299</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158th AHB</td>
<td>17,088</td>
<td>60,094</td>
<td>79,103</td>
<td>2,058</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159th AHB</td>
<td>7,333</td>
<td>20,011</td>
<td>65,827</td>
<td>24,240</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163rd Avn Co</td>
<td>3,931</td>
<td>13,608</td>
<td>6,634</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41,287</td>
<td>123,896</td>
<td>183,863</td>
<td>27,244</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Twenty-two incidents of ground fire were recorded during the period, an increase of one over the preceding period. A summary of incidents by mission is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>CH-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat assault</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I resupply</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (fire, flare, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS OPORD-65 (R2)

4. Aircraft losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combat</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Significant personnel changes: During the quarter, the following changes of command occurred within the 101st Aviation Group:

   a. LTC George N. Stemhagen replaced LTC Joseph H. Kastner as Commanding Officer, 158th Aviation Battalion (AH) on 25 Jan 70.
   
   b. LTC Rupert F. Glover replaced LTC David A. Carroll as Commanding Officer, 159th Aviation Battalion (AB) on 27 Jan 70.
   
   c. MAJ Kenneth A. Come assumed duties as Commanding Officer, Co B, 159th Aviation Battalion (AB) on 8 Dec 1969.
   
   d. MAJ Harris Flamlin replaced MAJ Roy H. Leggett as Commanding Officer, 478th Aviation Company on 6 Jan 70.
   
   e. MAJ Ronald R. Gooden replaced MAJ Eugene H. Grayson as Commanding Officer, Company D, 101st Aviation Battalion (AH) on 22 Dec 69.
   
   
   g. CPT Curtis B. Dumes III assumed duties as Commanding Officer, HHC, 159th Aviation Battalion (AB) on 21 Jan 70.

6. Combat operations.

   a. During the period 8-30 November, A/158th Avn Bn remained in GS of the division. The company also provided support to the 1st-5th Inf (Mech) and special forces. On 6 December, A/158th Avn Bn assumed a BS role to the 3d Bde.
   
   b. B/159th ABn remained in general support of the division through 14 November 1969. On 15 November 1969, Company B assumed the mission of direct support for the 2d Brigade. During the period, the 2d Brigade operated in

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AVDC-3C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS GSFOR-65 (R2)

By 27 January, 158th Aviation Battalion (AH) was providing support to the 3d Brigade at LZ Sally. The daily commitment normally consisted of six combat assault aircraft, three logistic aircraft, and a PSYOP aircraft. One aerial flare drop aircraft remained on standby status from 1930 to 0600 hours. Combat assaults were normally company size or smaller and as many as 18 air moves were scheduled daily.

c. During the period 8 through 30 November, C/158th Avn Bn provided DS to the 3d Brigade. On 1 December, Company C reverted to GS of the division.

d. Throughout Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE, the 158th Aviation Battalion (AH) provided five lift aircraft plus two light fire teams to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). To fulfill the requirement, a forward operations section was established at Quang Tri. Although maintenance facilities of the 1-5th Mech Div Aviation Section were used on several occasions, organizational maintenance was usually performed on station at Quang Tri. A maintenance crew was kept on standby status to be airlifted to Quang Tri if required. Aircraft were returned to the direct support maintenance unit at Camp Evans for periodic maintenance and extensive non-scheduled maintenance. The majority of the missions was flown for logistic resupply of troops on combat operations. Combat assaults were conducted for the insertion and extraction of six-man ranger teams along known NVA infiltration routes. Visual reconnaissance, sniffer, and aerial flare drop missions were also conducted. Light fire teams were frequently employed to provide suppressive fires for ground units in contact, to exploit known enemy positions, provide cover for medevac aircraft, and to deliver preparatory fires into LZs.

e. On 11 November, 4/158th Avn Bn, augmented by four WAF UH-1H helicopters, provided six UH-1H aircraft to support combat assaults by units of the 1st Regiment, 1st ARVN Division. The 1st phase of the operation consisted of air-lifting three companies from a field location at TD387393 to an LZ at TD354775. During the 2d phase, the remainder of the unit was airlifted from FSB Nancy to a field location west of FSB Binh to LZ Sally at TD261337.

f. On 14 November, 15 aircraft from the 158th Aviation Battalion (AH), augmented by six WAF UH-1H aircraft, supported a combat assault of one US infantry battalion and one ARVN battalion into FSB Naway and four other landing zones.

g. On 18 November, the 158th Aviation Battalion (AH) supported the air move of the 2-501st Inf and one artillery battery from FSB C-2 to LZ Sally.

h. On 21 November, the 158th Aviation Battalion (AH), in support of the
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

3-187th Inf and attached RF/FF forces, participated in a night cordon operation in the area of FSB Jeans (TD552395).

i. An artillery raid on 22 November from FSB Bradley was conducted, utilizing UH1H aircraft from the 101st and 158th AV RA and three CH54 and 19 CH47 aircraft from the 159th AV RA (ASH).

ii. On 050900 December, B/158th AV RA, augmented by seven UH1H aircraft from the 101st AV battalion and two CH47 aircraft from the 159th AV RA (ASH), supported a combat assault by the 1-327th Inf battalion into FSB Normandy and two other locations (Y688024 & Y652977). The combat assault into FSB Normandy was completed as scheduled. The other operations were delayed by weather conditions. When operations resumed, the LZ at Y652977 was found to be extremely tight, one-ship LZ with dense overgrowth and overhang, making it impossible for the aircraft to land. The size and condition of the LZ, combined with poor weather and light conditions, resulted in five main rotor blade strikes during the operation.

k. Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (070001 Dec 69 - continuing).

(1) During the operation, B/101st AV battalion (AH) continued to provide DZ to the 1st Brigade.

(2) C/101st AV Battalions (AH) provided DZ to the 2d Brigade from 1 to 15 Nov 69 and from 1-31 Jan 70. During the period 1 through 15 November, 916 hours were flown in support of the 2d Brigade, and 20 combat assaults with company and platoon size elements were conducted. In addition, combat assault aircraft were frequently employed for extractions and troop movement. On 15 and 18 November, ten UH1H aircraft were provided to support an operation by the 2d RA, 2d Bn, 1st AVN Div. near the IBC.

(3) Company D, (Aerial Weapons), 101st AV battalion (AH) logged approximately 775 combat assault missions in support of the division. Frequent missions during November and early December were flown in support of the 1-5 Inf Division (Mechanised).

(4) The 159th AV battalion (ASH) provided medium and heavy lift support to the division.

(5) On 12 December 1969, B/158th AV RA (AH), with elements of the 159th AV battalion (ASH), conducted an extrication mission to return the 1-327th Inf, its supporting artillery, and

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logistic supplies, from five field locations to Camp Eagle.

(6) On 19 December, A/158th Aviation Battalion (AH), reinforced by B/101st Aviation Battalion (AH), conducted an air move of elements of the 2-506th and the 1-506th Inf Bns and the 24-54th ARW Regiment.

(7) On 16 January 1970, C/158th Aviation Battalion supported a 3d Brigade artillery raid conducted from FSB Sheepard (X936412).

(8) On 29 January, Companies B and C of the 158th Aviation Battalion inserted 500 ARW troops into Laos in the vicinity of YD03662.

7. Formation of Troop F (Provisional), 2-17th Cavalry. During the period 1-30 November, Company A, 101st Avn Bn (AH) provided general support to the division. On 1 December, the unit was redesignated Troop F (Provisional) and was placed under the operational control of the 2-17th Cavalry. Of the 20 UH-1H aircraft organic to Company A, eight were retained to accomplish the cavalry mission, and the remaining 12 were transferred to other units and replaced by eight OH-6A and nine UH-1C aircraft for employment as aero-scout aircraft and gunships.

8. New techniques.

a. The OH-47 helicopter, due to its inherent flight stability, load-carrying capacity, and endurance, has been found to be well suited for the aerial delivery of supplies under instrument flight conditions. The use of radar to guide the aircraft over the intended target permits the air drop of supplies into otherwise inaccessible areas. Based upon experience gained during actual air drops and test controlled field trials, a significant problem during the operation is locating the cargo after delivery into dense vegetation. In order to build up a data base, field trials are continuing to include tests of audible and visual signal devices to develop techniques to assist ground forces in locating the cargo after impact.

b. CH-47 aircraft are currently being employed to provide illumination under VFR or IFR weather conditions. The CH-47 carries 92 H-45 flares which provide approximately 15 hours of continuous illumination. During adverse weather, the flareship is vectored to and controlled in the target area by GCA radar.

c. During the period, CH-47 aircraft were employed on an emergency basis to refuel other helicopters, utilizing the aircraft’s organic refueling capability. By attaching a 125 foot aviation fuel hose and nozzles to the refueling point located at the right hand aft section of the aircraft, the CH-47 can deliver in approximately five minutes, sufficient fuel to permit a downed aircraft to fly to a refueling point. Refueling may also be accomplished while the CH-47 hovers above the downed aircraft.
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AVDG-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS C5FOR-65 (R2)

9. Air traffic statistics for the quarter are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Airsie</th>
<th>Sally</th>
<th>Liftmaster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>33,282</td>
<td>11,380</td>
<td>7,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>46,290</td>
<td>16,067</td>
<td>8,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>46,323</td>
<td>19,316</td>
<td>11,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>119,995</td>
<td>46,763</td>
<td>27,646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M. (C) Air cavalry operations.

1. The mission of the 24th Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry, is to provide reconnaissance and security and to perform in an economy of force role when required.

a. During the reporting period, the squadron performed a general support mission in the division reconnaissance zone. The area included the Argonne Valley area below the the western portion of the southern half of the DMZ, the Plei Sanh plateau, the Da Krong River Valley, the Vietnamese and Laotian salient areas of western Quang Tri Province, the A Shau Valley, and the Bong Rong Valley of Thuan Thien Province.

b. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance activities of the squadron were supported by ranger teams from Company L (Ranger) (Amb), 75th Inf assigned to reconnoiter major enemy infiltration routes and base areas where aerial observation was restricted by jungle canopy. Ranger teams were employed primarily in the northern A Shau Valley and areas adjacent to the Laotian salient and the Da Krong River basin. The teams were assigned deep reconnaissance missions, frequently beyond the range of supporting cannon artillery to provide the division with hard intelligence concerning enemy movement and locations.

c. During the quarter, the 2-17th Cavalry operated in close coordination with the USMC 3d Force Recon Company during deployment of six to twelve man teams in the A Shau Valley, in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) intelligence collection effort. The recon teams and armed aerial reconnaissance squadron crews monitored enemy activity in the A Shau Valley, and, on 8 January 1970, confirmed the movement of the NVA 29th Infantry Regiment into the A Shau Valley.
d. Missions of the squadron included reconnaissance and surveillance of primary enemy infiltration routes into the division area of operation. Eleven infiltration routes were reconnaitered daily by air cavalry armed aerial reconnaissance teams and by fixed wing aircraft of the 230th Reconn Airplane Company, utilizing observers from the squadron. The 2-17th Cavalry also employed organic firepower, artillery, and tactical air to interdict the major enemy lines of communication. On one occasion, elements of the squadron located a suspect enemy battalion base area consisting of 200 to 400 bunkers and more than 300 foxholes and tunnel entrances. Maintaining surveillance of the area, the squadron employed attack helicopters and tactical air support to interdict the area, substantially damaging it by repeated air strikes and employment of CS chemical agent.

2. Troop A:

a. During Operation HORTON FALLS (29 Sep - 8 Nov) Troop A was placed in direct support of the 3d Bde at Mai Loc, 110951. Operating from a forward tactical operation center (TOC), the unit conducted screening operations on the flanks of the ground elements and provided early warning. The screening mission was accomplished with aircraft hunter/killer teams in a relief-on-station role to provide constant screening during daylight hours. Additional teams were held in reserve to support contacts by ground elements and to reconnoiter ahead of maneuver units. Fire coordination was accomplished through the LNO at the brigade TOC. Maintenance of troop aircraft was provided by the 3d Bde TOC Detachment, which was located at a forward maintenance point at Quang Tri.

b. During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, Troop A provided general support to the division. Although aircraft and troop operations were located at Camp Eagle, aircraft hunter/killer teams were committed to the 3d Bde each day to conduct required missions. The teams frequently operated in close support of company-size ground elements, providing visual reconnaissance ahead of the maneuver elements and screening to their flanks and rear. The teams were also employed to check intelligence information, SPAR, and sensor activations. The remainder of the troop's assets were targeted toward areas of interest extending from the DMZ to the southern Huong River Valley, vicinity TC 8681. Visual reconnaissance teams assigned to the area consisted of one LCH, two AH-1Gs, and one UH-1H for command and control. During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, Troop A deployed four hunter/killer teams and the aero-rifle platoon to Mai Loc for a three day cav/artillery raid in conjunction with the 3d Bde direct support artillery. Coordination was effected with the artillery by collocating the forward TOC and the artillery FAC at Mai Loc. The target area was divided into quadrants and, while the artillery fired at predesignated targets in one quadrant, the troop searched for targets of opportunity in other quadrants. As arty fires were shifted, the troop also shifted to continue WP and HMA missions. The troop further provided visual reconnaissance outside artillery range, seeking tar-
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Mission Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Mobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, 61-3 CEC-65 (Un)

(1) The combined efforts of cavalry, artillery and air produced 17 enemy kills.

2. Troop A: During the reporting period, the troop provided general support to the division, conducting visual reconnaissance, security for armed aircraft, sniper missions, LC selections, RL, and insertion and extraction of ranger teams. Reconnaissance and security missions were accomplished with "pink teams" (one OH6A and one or two AH1G's), with a UH1B as a control and command ship. During these missions, the aero-rifle platoon with its organic lift section was maintained at Camp Eagle on standby for insertion to develop targets located by RL and to secure downed aircraft. The troop also conducted first and last light recon missions in the rocket belt and in the highland and coastal plain areas.

3. Troop B: During the reporting period, the troop performed missions in support of the 2d brigade, utilizing "pink teams" and "cav teams" (two OH6A's and two AH1G aircraft) to conduct reconnaissance and security missions. The troop also participated in numerous artillery raids in conjunction with the 3d Artillery Support artillery and the 10th Airborne Group.

4. Troop C: During the reporting period, the troop conducted 14 combat assaults during reconnaissance in force (RIF), ranger support, armed aircraft, and economy of force operations. On 11 December, the 3d Platoon, on a sweep of C Sector at Camp Eagle, discovered an enemy compound. The site included sleeping positions, one M147, magazine, medical and cooking supplies, food, tools, blasting caps, and RG boosters. In addition, a number of documents were discovered which identified several VC in the Hue/Thu Bai areas. On 6 Jan 70, while sweeping H Sector, at Camp Eagle, the 1st and 2d platoons captured one M1A1 discovered hidden in brush. The capture and interrogation of the VC provided the division with valuable intelligence concerning enemy movement around Camp Eagle. Another sweep of the area the following day revealed 80 105mm shells, three 105mm WP, and 20 105mm illumination rounds. On 20 Jan 70, the 2d Platoon discovered 200 pounds of rice, food, and documents in H Sector. Major troop operations during the period included a cordon of Nhu Long Village and the insertion of LC's and LC's along Highway 547 between FSB Bastogne (YD6209) and FSB Blaze (YD5302). Throughout the reporting period, Troop D conducted assigned missions as sector sweep and ambush force, squadron reaction force and provided an aero-rifle platoon to Troop F (Prov). The mortar crews of Troop D also provided fire support for Camp Eagle base defense and for friendly patrols in the vicinity.

5. Company L (Angler) (Amb), 75th Infantry: During the reporting period, the ranger company provided long range reconnaissance to obtain intelligence concerning enemy activity in the division area. Aviation support for the -
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LESSONS LEARNED. COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Personnel.

2. Intelligence.

a. Observation: Aerial delivery by OI aircraft has proven an effective method of placing sensor devices.

b. Evaluation: Techniques have been developed by which sensor devices can be accurately emplaced by a team of two OI aircraft flying in tandem formation. The lead aircraft, with the door removed, is maneuvered into position over the target area. The observer, at the command of the pilot, drops one smoke canister and three sensor devices, followed by a second smoke canister, all in rapid succession. The trail aircraft photographs the ground location of the sensor string, each end of which is indicated by the smoke. Emplacement of sensors using the technique has consistently resulted in accuracies within 30 meters of the desired point of impact.

c. Recommendation: That commanders consider the use of the above techniques with OI aircraft to emplace aerially delivered sensor devices.

2. Effect of TPS25 radar on portatale equipment.

a. Observation: Portatales emplaced in close proximity to TPS25 radars have become inoperable.

b. Evaluation: Portatales emplaced near TPS25 radars are subjected to interfering signals from the radar which decrease the effectiveness of the portatale and result in early malfunction of the equipment. RF energy transmitted by the radar is received by the portatale, resulting in a constant signal, which blocks the signal from the sensor device.

c. Recommendation: Siting consideration for portatale equipment must include adequate separation distance from TPS25 radars to preclude electronic interference.

3. Quick reaction intelligence data base read-out.

a. Observation: A more rapid and accurate method is required for compiling and disseminating targeting information for the order of battle (OB) data base.
b. Evaluation: The system used previously to obtain OB data base readouts by hand-copying information filed on cards was time-consuming and did not facilitate analysis of geographical patterns of incidents. A revised system has been implemented for recording data base information in folders. Each folder pertains to an area ten kilometers square and contains a data sheet on which are recorded the date, location, description, and means of acquiring the intelligence concerning each incident in the area. Geographical locations of incidents are plotted on graph paper and keyed to incident numbers on the data sheet. Included in the folder is a topographic map of the area for use in terrain analysis. Using the system, a data base read-out can be provided rapidly in the form of photo copies of the folder contents.

c. Recommendations: That commanders consider the use of data base area folders to facilitate rapid development of accurate read-out information.


a. Observation: GVN forces possess numerous intelligence sources which can be made accessible to US forces.

b. Evaluation: To understand and appreciate the techniques of GVN intelligence gathering and processing, US forces must continually work with GVN forces. Close coordination will enable US forces to stay abreast of the situation, provide reciprocal assistance and establish rapport with the GVN agencies. US forces should not dissolve liaison with GVN forces upon redeployment from a district. A properly oriented team should remain collocated with the GVN agencies and continue liaison.

c. Recommendation: Liaison team members should be given several days of training in the brigade TOC concerning communications and reporting procedures and must understand the individuals whom they will replace. The brigade commander and staff must frequently visit these teams in order to update them and to insure their efficient operation. The overall effort is designed to create an integrated liaison team that understands the ramifications of its mission and can efficiently support both the GVN and the US headquarters.

C. (C) Operations.

1. Land mine blast protection of ½ ton vehicle passengers.

a. Observation: An improved method is required to provide blast protection for personnel riding in the front seats of ½ ton vehicles.

b. Evaluation: Personal riding in the front seats of ½ ton vehicles are vulnerable to effects of mines detonated under the vehicle because the space between the seat and the battery box and fuel tank is insufficient for sandbags. Use of unserviceable protective body armor vests, or portions thereof, provides an acceptable degree of protection and is sufficiently compact to fit into the space under the seats.
c. Recommendation: That commanders consider the use of unserviceable protective body armor vests to improve land mine blast protection of personnel in 9-ton vehicles.

2. Cordon operations.

b. Observation: A tendency exists for cordon operations to become stereotyped and to establish predictable patterns.

evaluation: Unless specific efforts are made to avoid standardizing cordon conduct, the actions of the enemy becomes predictable immediately the cordon is employed. An additional problem encountered with cordons is that of 'normal' operations initiated during the early morning hours or in the increased degree of activity which results from disruption of normal enemy patterns of increased activity during that period. The confusion further reduces the effectiveness of the cordon, increases the probability of regular収 recipients against the 90mm recoilless rifle during the panning process.

c. Recommendation: That the conduct of cordons be scheduled at varying times to avoid establishing patterns which reduce the effectiveness of the operation.

3. Improvement of regional force (RF) soldiers.

b. Observation: When RF soldiers congregate during combined operations, they frequently violate sound tactical procedures.

evaluation: Poor dispersion during movement, violation of noise and light discipline, and reduced alertness often occur when RF soldiers are not properly integrated with US units. The establishment of a "buddy system", or US soldier with one RF soldier, allows the RF soldier to observe proper techniques and encourages him to participate in all aspects of the operation. When the RF soldier performs the same tasks as his US counterpart, his overall effectiveness increases.

c. Recommendation: That, during combined US/GVN operations, a "buddy system" be established and the RF soldiers encouraged to perform the same tasks as their US counterparts.

4. Employment of the 90mm recoilless rifle in ambush operations.

b. Observation: The 90mm recoilless rifle provides highly effective fire power for ambush operations.
b. Evaluation: Although the recoilless rifle was designed primarily as an anti-tank weapon, it has proven effective when firing flechette (beehive) ammunition in ambushes. The 90mm recoilless rifle is ideally suited for lowland operations where the fields of fire are relatively flat and clear. Troop concentrations and enemy supporting weapons (RPG and RPG) firing positions are appropriate targets for the weapon. The 90mm recoilless rifle can be effectively utilized to engage a fleeing enemy outside the ambush killing zone and to provide covering or suppressive fires during follow-up sweeps of the killing zones. The psychological effect of recoilless rifle fire provides an advantage to the ambush force and will often enable an ambush party to successfully engage a numerically superior force.

c. Recommendations: That the 90mm recoilless rifle should be employed during ambush operations in the lowland portion of the division area of operation.

5. Use of tracer ammunition.

a. Observation: After action evaluations indicate that normal techniques of fire fail to obtain a reasonable number of enemy kills.

b. Evaluation: The most common situations in which enemy contact is made are night ambushes and meeting engagements (trail watchers and reconnaissance rice-carrying parties) along trails within the canopy area. Usually, the enemy is fleeing and, when alerted to danger, he becomes an ill-defined, evasive target. The individual soldier, when engaging the enemy during periods of darkness, has a tendency to converge his fire into the trace and strike of machine gun tracer fire.

c. Recommendation: That normal techniques of engaging a target be constantly practiced. These include assigning sectors of fire, shooting low, utilizing stable firing positions, the employment of quick-kill techniques and semi-automatic fire. All of these techniques must constantly be stressed. In addition, the maximum use of tracer ammunition is encouraged. A high ratio of tracer to ball ammunition (1:2 to 1:3) will provide significant advantages to the rifleman. When the rifleman is able to observe his own rounds, he significantly reduces the tendency to converge his fire with the machine gun fire and better covers his assigned sector. Tracer rounds provide the rifleman with a visual point of reference from which he can adjust his fire. Also, by observing the tracer rounds, a fire team or squad leader can more effectively control the fire distribution of his men. Another advantage is gained by the psychological impact of tracer rounds falling on the enemy position.
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SUBJECT: Operational report - Lesson Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, REDacted (R2)
(U)

6. Identification of pyrotechnics during periods of reduced visibility.

a. Observation: During periods of darkness or poor visibility, it is
often difficult to select the appropriately colored pyrotechnics required
for rapid signalling.

b. Evaluation: The employment of artificial light in signalling is
likely to disclose a position to the enemy, and the confusion of battle
may lead to an erroneous selection, thereby causing incorrect pyrotech-
nics to be employed. The metal pyrotechnic shipping containers are marked
on each end with raised letters indicating the type of pyrotechnic, i.e.,
"SF, JL, ZG, etc. However, letters are difficult to discern by touch;
moreover, the pyrotechnic is seldom carried in the container.

c. Recommendation: That, in conjunction with prepositioning pyrotechnics
by color groupings, bands of tape be placed on the cylinders, with
a predetermined number of bands corresponding to a certain color. By
running the thumb or fingers over the bands of tape, a positive identifi-
cation can be made.

7. (U) Organization. None.

8. (U) Training:

1. Training of territorial forces.

a. Observation: Responsiveness of RF/PF soldiers improved signifi-
cantly when training was conducted in the vicinity of the soldiers' home
village and when approximately 12 hours were allowed for real prepa-
ration.

b. Evaluation: Effectiveness of RF/PF training improved significantly
under the conditions described above. Response by troops of the 17th and
221st RF companies was such that, following a period of training, the
units were successfully deployed into the canyons to participate in combined
US/GVN operations.

c. Recommendation: That local customs, habits and characteristics
be closely observed and incorporated, when possible, into RF/PF training
programs.

2. Availability of medical personnel.

a. Observation: During saturation type operations, sufficient medical aidmen
are not always available to administer immediate medical treatment.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RC3 CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

b. Evaluation: Saturation operations which emphasize fire team and squad operations create a situation whereby the four medical airmen normally attached to a rifle company cannot always provide immediate medical attention to all personnel. The dispersion of small units makes it highly impractical for a medical airmen to move to the site of every emergency. Additional MOS qualified personnel are not available to resolve this potential problem.

c. Recommendation: That selected personnel within each patrol be given intensive medical training under the supervision of the company airmen. Special medical bags ("ready bags") should be equipped with sufficient medical supplies to treat common wounds and injuries and should be carried by the specially trained infantrymen/medics.

F. (U) Logistics: IFR Test drops.

1. Observation: A test of aerial resupply techniques under IFR conditions was initiated in response to a need for an all-weather emergency resupply capability.

2. Evaluation: Tests to determine the feasibility of ground control radar to guide resupply aircraft to desired drop zones have been initiated. Initial results indicate that the technique is feasible and will improve the division's capability to deliver or arrange the delivery of emergency supplies to isolated units during periods of poor weather.

3. Recommendation: That the IFR supply drop evaluation be continued.

G. (C) Communications.

1. VHF Capability for firebases.

a. Observation: Organic FK radios are inadequate to support communication requirements for operational and administrative activities.

b. Evaluation: Non tactical radio traffic overloaded FK radio nets established by battalions on firebases and degraded the capability of the nets to meet operational traffic requirements. To reduce the traffic over FK nets, the 501st Signal Battalion installed four-channel VHF systems. Three of the channels were allocated to the infantry battalions and one was allocated to the direct support artillery battery. In addition to reducing FK traffic, the VHF system provides a reliable back-up communications capability.

c. Recommendation: That four channel VHF systems continue to be employed to the maximum extent on firebases.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RSO CIWOR-65 (R2) (U)

2. Communications during artillery raids.

a. Observation: During artillery raids into the A Shau Valley, reliable FM communications were difficult to maintain.

b. Evaluation: The line-of-sight characteristics and range of FM radios make it difficult to establish reliable communications when operating in mountainous areas. As a result, aircraft radio relays are frequently required to maintain communications.

c. Recommendation: That units conducting artillery raids make maximum use of HEC74 radios to maintain communications with the controlling headquarters.

H. (U) Material. None
I. (U) Other.

j. (U) Chemical.

a. Observation: A requirement exists for a flame consumable container to replace 55-gallon metal drums.

b. Evaluation: Employment of bulk flame drops on landing zones, utilizing metal 55-gallon drums, results in an aviation safety hazard created by the residual debris from the drum. A consumable container which would leave no debris would eliminate the problem. To be effective, the flame drop containers should have a capacity of at least 55 gallons of thickened fuel (mogas or JP4). A suitable container has been found in supply channels. A request for procurement under the Munsec program is being submitted.

c. Recommendation: That a flame consumable container be developed or procured for use on flame drops.

2. (U) Psychological Operations. Employment of aerial broadcast systems.

a. Observation: Utilization of 1000-watt aerial broadcast equipment requires special employment considerations.

b. Evaluation: Employment of the broadcasting system in mountainous terrain during low level flight results in a fragmentation of the broadcast sound waves. Dispersion of the waves is also caused by rotor wash and results in interrupted broadcasts. The undesirable effects of

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terrain and rotor wash can be minimized by use of the following techniques:

(1) Maintain air speed of 60 knots.

(2) Maintain altitude between 900 and 1200 feet above ground. Over level terrain, the upper limit may be increased to 1500 feet.

(3) Execute 40 second right hand orbits.

(4) Maintain 1000 meter distance from the target.

c. Recommendation: That commanders employing aerial broadcasts utilizing the 1000 watt system follow the techniques listed above to achieve maximum effect in the target area.
AVII-GCT (13 Feb 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R2) (T)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The OHR of the 101st Airborne Division has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (C) Except as noted below, HQ, XXIV Corps concurs without further comment on Commander's observations, evaluations, and recommendations listed in Section 2 of the report. Comments follow:

a. Reference Section II, Lessons Learned.

   (1) Para B1, page 53, Sensor Implantation.

      (a) Caution should be exercised to preclude accidental activation of smoke cannister inside aircraft. Another possible means of delivery is to wing drop the smoke and/or sensors.

      (b) The 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (RAC) devoted considerable effort to perfecting this method of ground sensor implantation. They discovered that approximately 1000 feet is the best drop altitude. Dropping at lower altitudes does not provide sufficient time for the sensor to stabilise prior to ground impact. Stabilisation must be achieved as the sensor will self destruct if it strikes the ground at more than a 40 degree angle from the vertical. One problem encountered when dropping from 1000 feet versus dropping from 500 to 700 feet is drift of the sensor. This, too, is important since the maximum effective range of the sensor is 30 meters for detecting personnel. To compensate for the drift, one aircraft overflies the drop zone and drops smoke, permitting the sensor drop aircraft to observe and make necessary flight path adjustments prior to dropping the sensors.

   (2) Para B2, page 53, Effect of TPS 25 Radar on Portable Equipment. Recommend that a study be conducted by qualified technical personnel to determine minimum separation distances and/or specific siteing restrictions.

   (3) Para C1, page 54, Land mine blast protection of ½ ton vehicle passengers. An improved method is required to provide blast protection for personnel riding in the front seats of ½ ton vehicles. However, protective body armor vests are non-expendable property per the Army Management Data List and as such must be turned in to the supporting DSU for technical inspection, repair or salvage, when the item becomes unserviceable. For protection of this type an EIR should be initiated for the addition of armor plate to the bottom of ½ ton vehicle seats WABTOC.

(b) DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
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AFII-GCT (13 Feb 70) 1st Inf

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RO: CSFORCE-65 (R2) (U)

(4) Para 3.1, page 58, IFR Test drops. IFR air drop evaluation should be continued in conjunction with MACV mandatory monthly combat essential (training) air drop missions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

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AVI-CJ-DST (13 Feb 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Air-mobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, ROE USFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375
04 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 101st
Airborne Division (Air-mobile) and concurs with the comments of indorsing
headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "New Techniques", page 48, paragraph
L3. These three techniques are indicative of both the versatility of the
CH-47 and the flexibility of helicopter employment. The continual develop-
ment of new techniques of helicopter employment contributes significantly
to the capabilities of Army aviation.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Sensor Emplacement", page 53,
paragraph B1, and paragraph 2a(1), 1st Indorsement: concur. This head-
quar ters is presently examining techniques of sensor delivery to include
which aircraft are most suitable and what additional equipment is required.
Recommendations for the employment of Army aircraft in the sensor delivery
role are being developed. The particular technique described in the evaluation
is being examined. Item will be included in next issue of USARV Combat
Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Effect of TPS25 Radar on
Portatable Equipment", page 53, paragraph B2: concur. Although use of radar
in conjunction with sensor equipment enhances the intelligence gathering
effort, care must be taken to ensure against negation due to electronic
interference. Item will be considered for inclusion in next issue of USARV
Combat Intelligence Lessons. This item is being forwarded to MACV for consideration.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Quick Reaction Intelligence Data
Base Readout", page 53, paragraph B3: concur. This system is apparently
finding favor in several units in RVN. This is the third such system of its
type to be reported in a lesson learned publication, in the past 6 months.
Previously it was felt that 10km square areas were too small for trend
analysis; units are apparently able to use the system to good advantage.
Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat
Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

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AVHCC-DES (13 Feb 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile) for Period Ending: 31 January 1970, RCS C3FOR-65 (E2)(U)

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Combined US/GVN Intelligence
Operations", page 54, paragraph 34i: concur. This becomes especially
important in view of our efforts regarding the Improvement and Redeployment
Program. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV
Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by Di or USARPAC is recommended.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Flame Consumable Containers to
Replace 55 gallon Metal Drums", page 59, paragraph II: concur. Action
being taken to obtain a flame consumable container under the ICWIL program
is considered appropriate.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Availability of Medical Personnel",
page 57, paragraph B(2): concurs. Intensive first aid training of unit
personnel with the company aidman's capability is encouraged. However,
every effort should be made to utilize school trained medical personnel on
all operations. When a need exists for augmentation of the company aidmen,
medical resources within the Division should be readjusted to meet the
requirement.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Employment of Aerial Broadcasting
System", page 59, paragraph 12: nonconcur. While the recommended techniques
of employment are applicable in the 101st Abn Div TACh, they may not be
effective throughout ROIC. ACTIV conducted extensive tests on methods of
employing aerial loudspeakers. Recommended methods are contained in ACT IV
Final Report, Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in
Vietnam, 7 June 1969.

FOR THE CONSIDER:

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy: from:
XXIV Corps
101st Abn Div

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, Us Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.W. OZAKI

CPT, AGO

Asst AG
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Inclosure 1 (Task Organisation) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned,
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(C) 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC 1st Bde
1-327 Inf (1 Nov - 4 Dec)
(14 Dec - 17 Jan) (26 Jan)
2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf (1 Nov - 17 Jan)
(28 Jan - )
1-501 Inf (1 Nov - 6 Dec)
(18-21 Dec) (11 Jan)
2-320 Arty (-) (DS)
A/326 Engr (DS)
FSSR (Fwd Spt Elem)
A/326 Med
B/801 Maint
Fwd Spt Pltf/A/426 3A3
1/265 RRU
FST/A/501 Sig
TACP 20 TASS
4-2 Inf Pltf (Set Dog)
57 Inf Pltf (Cbt Tracker)
Team 101 MI Det

3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC 3d Bde
1-501 Inf (2 - 10 Jan) (12 Jan - )
1-506 Inf
2-506 Inf (1 - 10 Nov) (10 Dec - )
3-187 Inf (8 Nov - )
2-319 Arty (DS)
B/326 Engr (DS)
FSSR
C/326 Med
D/801 Maint
Fwd Spt Pltf/A/426 3A3
1/265 RRU
3/101 MP Co
58 Inf Pltf (Set Dog)
Team 101 MI Det
FST/A/501 Sig
TACP 20 TASS
25 PI Det
Cbt Weather Team 3/OL6-5 (Att)

Div Arty

101st Abn Div Arty
2-11 Arty
4-77 Arty
266 Trans Det
331 Trans Det
388 Trans Det
A/377 Arty (Avn)
650 Trans Det
266 FA Det (Radar)

Div Troops

HHC 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
2-17 Cav (-)
Co L (Ranger), 75 Inf
332 Trans Det
21 MI Det
507 Trans Det
326 Engr Ba (-)
501 Sig Ba (-)
101 MP Co (-)
265 RRU (-)
10 Cal Pltf
20 Cal Pltf
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Inclosure 1 (Task Organization) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned,
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1970,
RGSPOR-65 (R2) (D)

101 Avn Co
HHC 101 Avn Co
101 ANB
499 Trans Det
510 Trans Det
516 Trans Det
527 Trans Det
158 ANB
159 Trans Det
168 Trans Det
273 Trans Det
169 Trans Det
157 ASHB
625 Trans Det
327 Trans Det
649 Trans Det
476 Avn Co (-)
38. Trans Det
163 Avn Co
530 Trans Det
359 Avn Spt Det

Day Troops
22 Mil Hist Det
Det 16, Subunit 1, 1st ANGLICO (CN)
101 Mil Det (-)
101 Post Exchange Det
Operation Location 6
5th Weather Det (-) (USAF) (Att)
20 TASS (USAF)

DISCON
HHC and Band
101 Admin Co
5 Trans Bn (Acft Maint)
326 Med Bn (-)
426 S&S Bn (-)
801 Maint Bn (-)
800 (-) 507 Sig Bn

Task Force 2-506 Inf
(OPCOM 1 FFV Phan Thiet)

D/2-320 Arty (DB)
Plat/Hq/326 Engr

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 101st Airborne Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 71.

CC, 101st Airborne Division

13 February 1970

N/A

N/A

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