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This page is unclassified
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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- US Army Infantry School

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Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Introduction:

(1) During the reporting period, 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operations in Long An Province and the border areas of the four adjacent provinces; Hau Ty, Gia Dinh, Dinh Tuong and Kien Tuong. The brigade headquarters remained at Tan An.

(2) The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was involved in combat operations every day (92) of this reporting period. There were two (2) twenty-four (24) hour cease fires during this reporting period; 2400-0000 December 1969 and 0100-0700 January 1970. Only base defense operations were conducted during these two periods.

(3) During this reporting period, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division participated in Operation Toan Thang (Phase IV). The objective of Operation Toan Thang IV (Complete Victory) is to seek out the enemy with combined operations to prevent his employment of men and equipment.

b. (C) Organization:

(1) The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was organized as a Separate Light Infantry Brigade on 20 July 1969. Under the provisions of TSAPF 243, dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969, the following units were assigned to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division:


**SUBJECT:** Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (T)

**UNIT** | **OFF** | **NO** | **ENT** | **ACC**
---|---|---|---|---
HHC, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division | 40 | 8 | 155 | 203
2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mechanized) | 40 | 2 | 865 | 907
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry | 43 | 2 | 875 | 920
2d Battalion, 60th Infantry | 43 | 2 | 875 | 920
5th Battalion, 60th Infantry | 43 | 2 | 875 | 920
2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery | 52 | 3 | 576 | 611
39th Chemical Detachment | 1 | 1 | 5
19th Public Information Detachment | 2 | 3 | 5
19th Military History Detachment | 1 | 1 | 2
264th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) | 1 | 7 | 8
45th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) | 1 | 27 | 28
United States Army Air Cushion Vehicle Platoon | 2 | 33 | 35

(2) Additionally, the following units were provisionally organized and assigned to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division under the provisions of USARV GD 2434, dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969:

**UNIT** | **OFF** | **ANC** | **NO** | **ENT** | **ACC**
---|---|---|---|---|---
Composite Service Support Battalion (Prov) | 41 | 1 | 9 | 190 | 541

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (Prov) | 12 | 1 | 53 | 66
Company A (Prov) | 12 | 3 | 177 | 192
Company B (Prov) | 9 | 5 | 184 | 198
Company C (Prov) | 8 | 1 | 76 | 85

Inclosure 2

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Engineer Company (Prov) 5 160 165
Signal Company (Prov) 3 99 102
Military Police Platoon (Prov) 1 30 40
MFC-4 Radar Detachment (Prov) 1 8 9
Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker) (Prov) 10 10
Company, Infantry (Ranger) (Prov) 2 59 61
Military Intelligence Detachment (Prov) 9 2 24 32

(3) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, provisionally reorganized during the period 20 July 1969 to 1 October 1969 under the provisions of USARV CO 2234, dated 6 July 1969, was reorganized under the provisions of USARPAC CO 705, dated 24 September 1969, effective 1 October 1969. The unit was organized under MTCE 77-102T PAC 2/68. Strength authorization remained the same.

(4) Due to the aircraft configuration (four LOH's and four TH-1H's) a sixteen man augmentation to the Brigade Aviation Section is authorized under MTOE 77-102T.

(5) On 20 July 1969, operational control of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was given to the Commanding General, II FFRFORCEN, who in turn placed the 3d Brigade under the operational control of the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division.

(6) Effective 1 October 1969, USARPAC CO 705, dated 24 September 1969, granted authority to activate and organize the following units with manning strengths as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>ENL</th>
<th>ACC</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56th Signal Company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>571st Engineer Company</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th CS Support Battalion</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>483d Military Police Platoon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
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</table>

Inclosure 3

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SUBJECT: Operation Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS C5R-65 (R2) (M)

65th Infantry Detachment (Combat Tracker) 10 10
Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger) 2 8 11
493d Military Intelligence Detachment 9 2 21 32
276th Artillery Detachment (Radar) 1 8 9

(7) Effective 1 October 1969, USARV D O LL7, dated 15 December 1969, further assigned units (reference paragraph (6) above) from USARV to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, with no change to authorized manning strengths.

(8) Organization Structure - Inclosure 1

(9) Task Organization and Unit Locations - Inclosure 2

(10) Roster of Key Personnel - Inclosure 3

(11) Brigade TAOI - Inclosure 4

c. (C) Personnel and Administration

(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength: During this reporting period the 3d Brigade experienced a general reduction in enlisted strength as a result of the effort to reach the authorized strength level. Although more replacements were received during this period, the brigade experienced much greater losses, thus permitting the reduction in strength. During the period many of the remaining personnel from the 9th Infantry Division who had elected to remain in Vietnam completed their tours and returned to CONUS, thereby contributing to the lowering of unit strength. In contrast to the general reduction in enlisted strength, officer and warrant officer strengths show a slight increase. Commissioned officer strength averaged about 104% while warrant officer strength averaged about 102% for the period. Casualty figures for this period were slightly lower than last period. Inclosures 5 and 6 depict Brigade Strength, Replacements, Rotnees and Casualties for the reporting period.

(2) Personnel and Manpower Management.

(a) Reenlistment: During the last month of the reporting period there was a decline in the number of first term reenlistments. This can be attributed to two main factors: Many individuals who would have reenlisted...
in January, reenlisted in December to take advantage of leave during Christmas; speculation about redeployment has caused a number of personnel to put off reenlistment for other units in Vietnam because they want to go home with the 3d Brigade.

2. Continued emphasis by the brigade's full-time career counselors is being placed on giving information about Army career opportunities to the individual soldier.

2. In addition, several projects were developed to improve command interest in the reenlistment program at all levels. These include a reenlistment newsletter now being distributed monthly and a Department of the Army Fact Sheet describing redeployment criteria which was distributed to each soldier in the brigade in order to reduce the amount of speculation about redeployment and possible curtailment of Vietnam tours.

4. First Term Reenlistment statistics are listed in Inclosure 7.

(b) During the period, two major projects were completed:

1. The AG Records Management team visited each unit in the brigade and assisted each assigned individual in updating the information in his DA Form 201 File.

2. The AG Strength Management team visited each unit in the brigade and assisted unit clerks in correcting and updating unit strength reports.

(c) Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(a) Special Services Activities.

1. The following USO shows were provided during the period:

   The Tony Diamond USO Show
   Boxing Champions Handshake Tour
   Tom Tulley Handshake Tour
   The New Christy Minstrels and Sally Blair USO Show
   The Holiday Soul Special USO Show
   Johnny Grant Handshake Tour
The Dean Davis & Paula Stieff USO Show

2. Rest and Recuperation (R & R) Allocations and Utilization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUT-OF-COUNTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocations</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilized</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>113%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>111%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN-COUNTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocations</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilized</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Special Services Movies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Attendance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>23,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>24,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>29,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>79,942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Postal Activities,

1. During the period, APO 96371 received the annual postal inspection and, on a rating system of Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory, was given a Satisfactory rating.

2. The following statistics indicate the amount of business conducted by APO 96371 during the reporting period:
SPECIAL REPORT—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RSC CSFR-65 (h2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money Order Sales</td>
<td>$256,572.02</td>
<td>$239,891.39</td>
<td>$137,359.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamp Sales</td>
<td>$7,642.00</td>
<td>$10,474.00</td>
<td>$5,711.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail Received</td>
<td>289,362 lbs</td>
<td>294,221 lbs</td>
<td>101,672 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail Dispatched</td>
<td>44,896 lbs</td>
<td>76,535 lbs</td>
<td>50,394 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. All postal activities increased greatly during this period due to the Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years holidays.

(c) Awards and Decorations. Awards presented to 3d Brigade personnel appeared to increase greatly since the last period; however, this is actually due to the establishment of the Brigade AG Awards and Decorations Section and the stabilization of the awards processing system after the disruptive effects of the 9th Division redeployment during the previous period. Awards presented during this period are listed in Inclosure 8.

(d) Chaplain Activities.

1. In November, chapels were completed at Tan Tru and Can Ciuoc.

2. Two new chaplains joined the brigade during the period, one Presbyterian and the other Baptist.

3. Numerous special services were conducted at Thanksgiving and Christmas at all of the 3d Brigade base camps.

4. Total services for the period were 411 with attendance of 7902.

(c) Surgeon Activities. During this reporting period, the Brigade Surgeon’s Office has taken steps to improve its capability of detecting parasitic diseases such as malaria and has also coordinated with the 9th Medical Laboratory for support in drug sensitivity testing of resistant strains of VD-causing bacteria. A program has been initiated to assist in tuberculosis screening for the Vietnamese National Police Forces. Statistics on significant medical cases during the period are presented in Inclosure 9. In general the figures are much higher than those of the previous period. This is explained by the fact that reporting procedures have stabilized now after the initial disruption caused by the redeployment of the 9th Division and the formation of the 3d Brigade as a separate brigade. As a result of this, more complete and accurate reports were received during the current reporting period.
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(f) Finance Activities. The Brigade Finance Section has continued to provide complete financial services throughout this reporting period. During the period the following significant activities also occurred:

1. All the MPC series 661 which had been taken out of circulation in August 1969, was verified and destroyed.

2. W-2 Forms for all members of the command were prepared and placed in each individual's Finance Records.

4) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(a) Provost Marshal.

1. During the period the Military Police continued to conduct joint patrols with the Vietnamese Military Police and National Police. This has proven to be a very effective means of maintaining good rapport with Vietnamese authorities and also provides a good image of mutual cooperation to Vietnamese citizens.

2. Continued emphasis has been placed on marijuana suppression. The Criminal Investigation Section conducts lectures for all replacement personnel and has given guidance to the Brigade Drug Suppression Committee, as well as to commanders and senior NCO's.

3. Statistics or offenses committed during the reporting period are listed in Inclosure 10. Traffic Accidents are listed in Inclosure 11.

(b) Staff Judge Advocate.

1. During the reporting period the following number and types of courts-martial were processed and tried:

   1  Summary Court-Martial
   47  Special Courts-Martial
   1  General Court-Martial
   3  Special Courts-Martial authorized to issue
      Bad Conduct Discharge

2. During the period the SJA reviewed 304 Nonjudicial Punishments under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ, against personnel as follows:
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63 Enlisted Personnel, grade E-5 and above

241 Enlisted Personnel, grade E-4 and below

During the period the SJA also handled legal matters, such as, wills, powers of attorney, citizenship, taxes, civil suits, and counseling of personnel accused or suspected of criminal acts.

(6) Headquarters Commandant Activities. During the reporting period the 3d Brigade has had four different officers as Headquarters Commandant.

(a) Security. Burkers on the perimeter have been reinforced and in some cases, rebuilt. Chain link fence has been secured and is being installed as protection against B-40 rockets. New primary and alternate claymore positions have been established and the compound has been ringed with chain link fence. The perimeter lights have been relocated and additional lights added so as to give the guards greater fields of vision forward of the wire at night.

(b) Sanitation. New drainage systems have been constructed to drain standing water off the compound and fill has been brought in to fill in depressions, thus preventing the accumulation of stagnant water. Latrine facilities have been relocated and stringent measures have been taken to insure the rapid elimination of waste material and the daily cleaning of latrines.

(c) Roads in the headquarters area have been regraded, filled in with rock and sealed in order to keep dust to a minimum during the dry season and eliminate erosion during the monsoon season.

(c) Intelligence:

(1) Discussion:

(a) General: Enemy activity against US Forces in Long An Province during this reporting period continued at a low level. The Dong Xuan Offensive in mid-November was directed mainly at SVN elements with a moderate high point occurring between 6 November and 9 November. Generally, enemy forces engaged in scattered, low level attacks by fire against isolated targets of opportunity and concentrated on disrupting the SVN Pacification Program. The enemy has placed greater emphasis on camouflaged tactics as shown by the formation of the K7 SVN Sapper Battalion, 1st Ind VN Regiment which is composed of three sapper companies and a headquarters
Throughout the province, the lack of effective rear service support has hampered enemy capabilities severely. Main force units have received only scattered replacements and have difficulty recruiting within the province. To counter this reality, the enemy may have combined two main force units into one as shown by the possible merger of the 76th PFP Battalion with the 1st Long An PFP Battalion in Can Giuoc District. Local force companies are also lacking replacements and rear service support. These companies are mainly serving as local security and comms-liaison for replacements from Cambodia.

(b) November: Activity during the month of November was highlighted by a planned enemy mid-November offensive known as N-Lay. In addition, a PFP from the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment spoke of the Dong Xuan Offensive which was to start on 6 November and to last three months. However, the offensive was of low intensity as the enemy conducted attacks by fire directed against scattered RF/PF and ARVN units. The enemy launched twenty-two attacks by fire against GVN elements from 6 November to 9 November.

On 14 November, vic XS741619, A/6-31st Inf contacted the enemy resulting in ten NVA KIA. Documents captured in the area identified the VI Section, SR3, and the 520 PF Battalion.

On 15 November, vic XS6202594, D/6-31st Inf and A/2-47th Inf engaged the enemy resulting in seven NVA KIA. Captured documents identified the K6 NVA Battalion, 1st Ind. NVA Regiment.

On 19 November, vic XS474830, Recon/6-31st Inf working with ACV's found a cache containing 357 pounds of TNT, 30 82mm mortar rounds, 72 RPG-2 rounds, 74 rifle grenades, 160 Chicom grenades, 5000 AK-47 rounds, 282m mortar fuzes and 160 blasting caps.

In a scattered contact on 28 - 30 November, vic XS6858, 2-47th Inf engaged the enemy resulting in 18 enemy KIA and four prisoners. The PFPs stated that two aid stations had been destroyed in the contact. Also, captured in the contact area were large amounts of food, medical supplies, documents and other goods. The PFPs identified the C3:3 Chau Thanh LRC: C82 Medical Company, 1st Ind. NVA Regiment; and the Minh Phuc Medical Section.

(e) December: Enemy initiated activity reached a low point during the month of December. Enemy activity was characterized by limited attacks by fire and harassing actions. Direct contact with US or ARVN forces was avoided as the enemy remained dispersed. The main emphasis of enemy activity was focused on the GVN Pacification Program and isolated RF/PF outposts.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSF/CR-65 (R2) (U)

On 12 December, vic XS598590, Ranger Team 21 contacted the enemy resulting in one enemy KIA. The contact continued with 6-31st Inf, 3-17th Cav and Navy gunships resulting in 20 additional enemy KIAs, four K-54 pistols, two AK-47s, one complete 102mm ChiCom radio, one K-63 radio and miscellaneous documents captured, and one Hoi Chanh who rallied for the C20 Signal Company, 1st Ind. NVA Regiment. Documents taken from a KIA identified the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment Ordnance Section. These documents gave the strengths and weapons rosters of the infantry battalions of the regiment and some support companies.

(c) January: During the month of January, there was somewhat of an increase in enemy activity. The enemy attempted to resupply main force units and the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment in preparation for a possible Tet Offensive beginning in early February. Generally, limited attacks by fire, harassment and anti-pacification operations continued at approximately the same level as during the previous months of the reporting period. The most significant contact was the identification of a new sapper battalion of the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment.

(2) Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) Recapitulation: During this reporting period, VC/NVA combat effectiveness continued to deteriorate. The enemy's rear service was severely restricted, resulting in critically low strengths of many VC/NVA units. As a result, the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment, despite its own manpower problem, of necessity became the dominate enemy force in Long An Province. All main force units remained dispersed, extensively to wait for reinforcements and to avoid contacts that would further drain their strengths and supplies. Local force companies, also crippled by low strength, were used as guides and as security forces for the main force battalions and 1st Ind. NVA Regiment units.

The 6th MF Battalion of SR2 was identified in a contact on 5 December, vic XS56914, resulting in four enemy KIAs and two PWS. Another PW, Nguyen Van Bay, C2 Commanding Officer who was captured on 3 January, vic XS65817, by B/3-17th Cav revealed that his battalion was almost exclusively NVA. Bay was apparently made a company commander solely because he was a member of the Communist Party. He had no knowledge of his battalion's AC nor did he have any experience with maps.

The 303 MF Battalion remained in Ba Thu, Cambodia and has remained out of significant contacts since 3 August 1969. On 20 January a raider identified the battalion, although he had not seen his unit since March 1969.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPUR-65 (G) (U)

The 1st Ind. NVA Regiment to accomplish goals set within its area of operation was forced to take over almost all offensive actions in SR3. To help accomplish this end, the K7 NVA Sapper Battalion was organized in Pha Thu, Cambodia during July 1969 and was infiltrated sometime in the fall of 1969. The new sapper battalion was not identified in a contact until 12 January when Recon/6-31st Inf captured one PW via XS999593. The PW stated that the K7 Battalion is composed of three companies; the C25 C Company which operates with the K5 Inf Battalion, via XS65968, C25 B Company which operates with the K6 NVA Battalion, via XS51660, C25 A Company which operates with the K4 Battalion, via XS65668, and a headquarters section, via XS6260.

The 211 Sapper MF Battalion was identified only once during the reporting period when B & Recon/6-31st Inf captured documents on 27 January, via XS710646. In general, the subordinate companies of the 211 Sapper Battalion remained dispersed in an effort to conserve strength.

The 265 MF Battalion was engaged in a series of small but draining contacts. The lack of men became so critical that sometime to the end of 1969, the 265 MF Battalion may have been absorbed by the 1st Long An MF Battalion. The 1st Long An MF Battalion along with the 2d Long An Battalion and the Dong Phu Battalion remained dispersed awaiting reinforcements and supplies. The 1st Long An MF Battalion in particular reportedly has not received supplies since October 1969.

The 525 MF Battalion at the beginning of the reporting period was one of the strongest battalions in SR3, although it had only 175 men. At present it has no more than 50 members as indicated by a PW captured by 118th AHC on 13 January, via XS732647. Repeated contacts in the month of December accounted for most of the loss of men.

Almost all identification of local force companies came from ralliers who reported low strength and illness in their units. Generally, local force companies have been relegated to guiding main force units along lines of communication, emplacing booby traps, and conducting local security.

During the months of December and January, there has been a marked decrease in the number of enemy initiated incidents. This may be an attempt on the part of the enemy to conserve his forces while he tries to rearm and strengthen his forces for offensive operations sometime just prior to and/or just after Tet 1970. Documents, PWs and agent reports have all indicated that elements of the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment have been assigned the mission of attacking key US and GVN outposts in this coming highpoint.
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Of special significance is the new K7 NVA Sapper Battalion. This is further indication of the enemy's policy of causing as much damage on friendly forces as possible while exposing himself to a minimum extent.

(b) Current Holdings:

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<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>COORD</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>1st Ind. NVA Regt.</td>
<td>910 NVA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 NVA Bn</td>
<td>150 NVA</td>
<td>23 Jan</td>
<td>Eastern Rach Kien</td>
<td>K5 6671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 NVA Bn</td>
<td>150 NVA</td>
<td>10 Jan</td>
<td>Tan Tru</td>
<td>K5 5970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 NVA Bn</td>
<td>150 NVA</td>
<td>14 Jan</td>
<td>Binh Phuc</td>
<td>K7 6060</td>
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<tr>
<td>K7 NVA Sapper Bn</td>
<td>190 NVA</td>
<td>26 Jan</td>
<td>Rach Kien, Tan Tru &amp; Binh Phuc</td>
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Main Force Bn's:

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<td>25 Jan</td>
<td>Western Can Cuoc</td>
<td>K5 7073</td>
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<td>Long An City Force</td>
<td>23 VC/NVA</td>
<td>30 Sep</td>
<td>Eastern Binh Phuc</td>
<td>K5 7072</td>
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<td>23 Jan</td>
<td>Eastern Can Cuoc</td>
<td>K5 7072</td>
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<td>19 Jan</td>
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<td>27 Jan</td>
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Local Force Companies:

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<tr>
<td>C1 Ben Thu LPC</td>
<td>25 VC/NVA</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>Southern Ben Luc</td>
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(3) Discussion of Enemy Techniques and Tactics:

During the reporting period, enemy initiated activity remained at a low level of intensity. The month of December and the first week of January were particularly characterized by very few aggressive enemy actions.

The low level of enemy initiated activity continued to reflect the enemy's objectives of continuing only stand-off attacks by fire of a low

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intensity aimed primarily at isolated GVN outposts and poorly defended hamlets. His tendency to avoid contact is a function of his inability to resupply and recruit new members. US and GVN interdictory operations have placed tremendous pressure on the enemy's logistical and infiltration routes, forcing him to conserve his resources.

In addition, the enemy is gradually losing his numerous hiding places and security of his lines of communication as the pacification effort spreads throughout the province. He can consider but few places free to conceal himself from the ever increasing numbers of GVN forces as outposts are being built in areas once considered enemy controlled. As a result, he has adopted the concept of increased sapper operations which involve only a few personnel exposed at a time to recon, plan and conduct attacks while the main body remains dispersed.

This sort of sapper activity was demonstrated effectively by an attack on the Tan Tru District Artillery Compound on 19 November involving an estimated squad of sappers. They entered the compound through the wire, killed several ARVN soldiers, destroyed the fire coordination center and one artillery piece before being killed themselves. The concentration on sapper operations is further reflected by the presence of the newly organized K7 NVA Sapper Battalion, 1st Ind. NVA Regiment.

(4) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>NOVEMBER</th>
<th>DECEMBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>357</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>PW</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S Wpns</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/A Wpns</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
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<td>68</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>3.54 Ton</td>
<td>.013 Ton</td>
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<tr>
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(5) Intelligence Sources and Assets:

(a) Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of Counterintelligence;
1. The Counterintelligence Section (CIS) in keeping with its basic mission, employed during the reporting period six coded sources, four on-post informants (located at Tan An Main Base and Tan An Airfield) and three casual sources for the reporting of intelligence. The sources employed by the CIS produced 186 reports during the reporting period. These reports resulted in 81 enemy KIA, one FV, eight detainees, 15 pounds of documents and a quantity of enemy equipment, including the following:

- 10 AK47's
- 6 KSL's
- 1 SKS
- 1 RFG MG
- 1 M16
- 1 M1
- 15 pounds of medical supplies
- 15 pounds of Chicom grenades
- 2 Chicom radios
- 20 pounds of documents, WVA
- TVA
- 1 G. web gear

2. Copies of all reports have been furnished to S2, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, 2-4th Artillery, and E Company, 75th Infantry (Panther). These units, or units under their control have provided the combat response to intelligence reports.

3. During this reporting period, CIS initiated close cooperation with the S5, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Through coordination with the S5 office, the CIS has been informed of all ICAP missions of the 3d Brigade. The CIS has provided Special Agent and Interpreter personnel for support of ICAP missions. As a result, CIS has been solicited for suggestions on modifications in ICAP procedures which would maximize the intelligence gathering potentials of such missions. These suggestions will, it is anticipated, result in increased production of intelligence from this area. In January, CIS employed its first Tiger Scout. Working exclusively for CIS, the Scout has led combat units against intelligence targets. The results of this new program have been most gratifying. In two such strikes guided by the CIS Tiger Scout, elements of the 2-47th Inf produced 12 enemy KIA, two VCI eliminated and quantities of weapons, documents and medical supplies confiscated. In a further effort to aid the effectiveness of combat responses to intelligence reports, the CIS has, where applicable, provided a coded source, accompanied by a special agent, to fly in the C & C helicopter during strikes. This technique precludes compromise of either source or special agent and neither are in the area of conflict. The presence of the source and special agent in an advisory capacity to the commander has produced excellent results. Cooperation with the 525th MI Section in Long An Province has provided valuable verification of CIS reports and on occasion, supplemental information. Liaison with the advisors to the Vietnamese National Police, and through them with CSA and MSS personnel has provided CIS with other extremely useful source information. Cooperation has also been established with US Navy Intelligence and SEAL Teams located at Phu Luc. The 14th ARVN MI has continued to work very closely with CIS. Mutual
exchange of information has enhanced the functioning of both organizations.

(b) The Prisoner Interrogation Section:

During the reporting period, the IFW Section processed a total of 250 detainees. Of this total, 123 were classified Innocent Civilians, 69 were classified Civil Defendant, 37 were classified Pws and 21 were classified as Ho Chi Minh. In addition, the section processed 112 batches of captured documents of which eight were of significant tactical value and approximately 80% contained information useful to Order of Battle. At the same time, approximately 650 pounds of captured material, consisting primarily of captured weapons, clothing and equipment were processed.

(6) Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of Aerial Reconnaissance:

(a) The Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission, accomplished the following during the reporting period: 77 aerial photographic missions were received and plotted. From these missions a total of 34 photo interpretation reports were prepared and disseminated. A total of 65 Red Haze sorties were received, read out, and their results disseminated. Also 65 airborne Sensor Interpretation reports were prepared and disseminated. In response to specific requests, the II Section prepared five photo mosaics, 16 special targeting overlays, one trail overlay, distributed five photo enlargements of base camps, and flew two aerial photo missions.

(b) Thirty-four photographic missions have been cut and packaged with field plots for dissemination to 3d Brigade units.

(c) During the reporting period, the II Section assumed responsibility for photo planning and requesting. All brigade units and separate or attached units submit their requests for aerial photography through S2 Air (Bde) to the II Section or directly to the II Section. The II Section then prepares a formal photo request and forwards it to C2 Air, II FFORCENV where it is assigned to either an Air Force or Army flying unit.

(7) Weather and Terrain:

During the reporting period, the weather changed from wet, monsoon conditions to the dry season. As the flooded plains dry, both enemy and friendly forces are able to conduct more extensive ground movement.
As the puddles dry and the water table lowers, more hiding places become accessible to the enemy, and he is able to make more effective use of booby traps. This is countered by the ability of friendly units to conduct longer field operations without being plagued as much by immersion foot and by increasing mechanized operations. Also with a decrease in moisture there is a corresponding decrease in early morning fog which significantly increases the capability for night and early morning air mobile operations.

(a) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Possible Course of Action:

(a) The enemy has the capability to:

1. Conduct attacks on province and district seats, other key seats, and military installations.

2. Conduct brief attacks by fire, hide his equipment, and withdraw from the area prior to employment of counter-mortar techniques.

3. Conduct attacks by fire and harassment on towns, villages, harbors, outposts and other installations.

4. Conduct sniper and terrorist attacks on key bridges, roads, PRT projects and population areas.

5. Defend base areas and positions with local security forces and reinforce within a four kilometer area.

6. Disperse major units into platoon and squad size elements.

7. Withdraw and disperse easily.

8. Wage political and psychological warfare on the populace and hold control of any area where there is no friendly security at night.

(b) The enemy is vulnerable to:

1. Loss of support of the population.

2. Friendly superior artillery and air power.

3. Interdiction of the LOCs and loss of cached supplies.

4. Disclosure or capture of attack plan.
1. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.

2. A breakdown in his infrastructure by aggressive allied actions.

3. A lack of combat effective troops and a low morale due to heavy casualties and desertions.

4. A loss of logistical support which has resulted in a lack of food and medicine making him vulnerable to hunger, disease, and complication of wounds.

(c) From all appearances it seems the enemy will direct his main effort towards countering the Pacification Program and concentrate on sapper techniques as opposed to larger unit tactics.

(9) New Techniques:

Intelligence reports and PW readouts have indicated that enemy movement during the hours of darkness along lines of communication was being conducted by widely dispersed groups. It was apparent that resupply and replacement was being conducted in this manner, especially in preparation for Tet 70, and that large scale night operations were not effectively intercepting enemy movement. Consequently, 65% of the brigade's operations were conducted at night during the reporting period, concentrating on the technique of saturation ambushes. Forces were deployed in squad to half platoon size ambush patrols providing extended area coverage. This technique has proven effective in intercepting night movement as indicated in a document captured by Recon/6-3rd INF on 12 January, in which a member of the Headquarters element, 1st INDIAN REGIMENT relates the "Enemy" situation Sub Region 3:

"The enemy completely controls ((this area)) in the daytime; now he gradually exercises control at night. Before, the enemy usually moved out with a large personnel strength; now, his personnel strength is small. He also dares in darkness to land one or two aircraft to set up an ambush against us. Now, at some places in our operational area, the enemy has learned that we dare not operate in the daytime, so he relaxes during the daytime and begins to move out at nightfall. He tries to avoid our attacks and also sets up ambushes to obstruct our lines of communications. Our men run away when they meet the enemy." (Ref: CORDS BUL No. 29, 76/70)

(1) Techniques of Radar Employment:
During the reporting period, Brigade Ground Surveillance Radar aggressively pursued the brigade policy of aggressive radar operations. The eight organic AN/TPS-5 radars and one direct support AN/TPS-26 radar detected 470 sightings resulting in 656 artillery fire missions including illumination for troop insertions.

Because of the period of operations, 1900 to 0500 hours, artillery fire on radar detected targets is unobserved. The results of the fire are unobtainable until first light hours after the fire has ceased, and after the enemy has had a chance to remove or hide any bodies. The inability to assess radar by numbers killed does not alter the fact that radar has effectively denied the enemy regularly used lines of communication. This was witnessed by the marked shift in routes following radar employment at several locations in the Plain of Reeds with fire support bases, following the radar placement at FSB Shiloh, FSB Gettysburg and FSB Virginia after just several periods of operation. Airborne sensor patterns detected a noticeable shift in activity to areas outside the effective range of radar coverage.

In addition to the nighttime target acquisition and LOC interdiction, Ground Surveillance Radar has been effectively employed to accurately locate friendly units for artillery control and to aid ACV's in navigation in the Plain of Reeds where otherwise it would have been extremely difficult and time consuming.

(d) Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division entered Phase IV of Operation Toan Thang. The 3d Brigade accounted for 100 enemy killed, 37 prisoners of war and 21 Ho Chi Minh trail workers killed in this operation during the reporting period. The brigade conducted offensive operations in Long An Province with four maneuver battalions: 2-47th Inf (Mech), 2-60th Inf, 5-60th Inf, and 6-31st Inf.

(2) The level of enemy activity in Long An Province continued at a reduced level, and the Communists continued to avoid decisive engagements with brigade forces.

(3) Airmobile operations during the day and saturation ambush patrols at night continued to be the brigade's principle tactics for keeping the enemy on the defensive. The percentage of enemy eliminated at night during this reporting period is somewhat lower than in the previous period. It is felt that this is primarily a result of the technique of saturation ambush with many small ambush patrols. When this technique was initially employed...
the enemy outlined at night. There has been a significant increase; however, the
enemy has been forced to re-evaluate his activities during the hours of
darkness as his manpower capabilities have been effectively diminished.

(4) The brigade continues to conduct combined operations at the optimum
level. The effectiveness of these operations is evidenced by the fact that
GVN Forces in Long An Province are producing better results. Technical
aspects of such techniques as radar employment, duffel bag employment and
monitoring, etc. will be stressed in future operations and training programs
to assist the GVN Forces in total victimization.

(5) Combat Operations:

(a) On 090201 November Ranger Team 17 was inserted via KS 690692 on a
radar sighting of five personnel. At 0230 hours the team engaged three
enemy resulting in one Communist KIA (BC) and one AK-47 captured. At 0300
hours the team engaged three more enemy resulting in two Communists KIA
(BC) and two AK-47's captured. On 151100 November elements of 7/6-31st
Inf were inserted via KS 602591 in reaction to a Yellow Jacket report. They
engaged two enemy resulting in two Communists KIA (BC). That evening
A/2-47th Inf established AP's in the area. At 2200 hours A Co engaged a
reinforced squad of enemy with artillery firing illumination and HE in
support. A sweep in the morning revealed results of six Communists KIA
(BC) credited to artillery and five Communists KIA (BC) credited to A/2-47th
Inf. On 19 November Recon/6-31st Inf, working with the AVN's in the Plain
of Reeds found a cache in the vic KS 474830. The cache consisted of 72
B-40 rounds, 74 rifle grenades, 30 82mm mortar rounds, 357 pounds of TNT,
160 Chicon grenades, 5000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 100 blasting caps
and 82 82mm mortar fuses. That evening a Ranger Team from 5/75th Inf
(Ranger) was inserted at the cache site as a stay behind patrol. At 0025
hours the team engaged three enemy resulting in three Communists KIA (BC),
two sampans destroyed, 48 B-40 rounds, 20 containers of anti-tank grenades
and miscellaneous equipment captured. At 261615 November B/2-60th Inf
made contact with an unknown size enemy force via KS 542383, with negative
results. A false extraction of this B Co element was made, and the unit
established AP's in the contact area. At 1840 hours the unit made contact
with a squad of enemy. Air cavalry, artillery and Night Hawk were in support.
At 2000 hours contact broke resulting in seven Communists KIA (BC),
one AK-47 captured and one prisoner apprehended. At 281610 November
Recon/2-47th Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force via KS
68058C. Artillery and air cavalry were in support. At 1635 hours Recon
engaged and killed two Communists KIA (BC) and captured two AK-47's.
Contact broke at 1700 hours, and Recon established AP's in the area. The
following day at 0905 hours, Recon discovered an enemy base camp, capturing
numeous supplies and destroying a bunker and tunnel. Continuing the sweep through the area, a 47th Inf-Squad of Communists KIA (BC) credited to artillery, captured two small arms weapons and captured two prisoners. At 1910 hours five more bodies were found, credited three Communists KIA (BC) to Recon and two Communists KIA (BC) credited to B-3-17th Cav.

(b) On 02/15 December, two VC teams (KS 360075) were inserted via X's 360075 Recon/6-3rd Inf, working with the ACH's engaged approximately seven enemy personnel. Negative return fire was received, and a subsequent sweep at daylight revealed results of five Communists KIA (BC), one VC, and one 60mm mortar round. The team engaged in a firefight with the VC, with seven KIA captured, one prisoner captured, and one US WIA. On 02/15 December, a Ranger Team conducting paramilitary operations was inserted via X's 508590, and immediately engaged contact with the enemy. The team immediately established contact with the enemy and engaged and killed one VC killed KIA (BC). B-3-17th Cav gunships and AHC gunships and artillery were also in support. Contact continued throughout the day and broke at 2030 hours. Results of the operation were 28 Communists KIA (BC), seven small arms captured, and one prisoner captured, and two Chinese radios captured (one M102E and K63), and numerous documents captured. Document revealed that the enemy force consisted of elements of the regimental signal support unit for the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment. Friendly casualties were two US KIA and five US WIA. On 01/24 December, elements of B-2-60th Inf were inserted via X's 736658. During the insertions the 116th AHC gunships inserted and killed seven Communists KIA (BC). At 1315 hours, B Co received sharp fire from one VC KIA. 

At 1600 hours, B Co gained and maintained contact with the enemy force. Contact broke at 1900 hours with 17 additional Communists KIA (BC), eight small arms, 18 NVN backpacks, seven B-40 rounds, one mortar sight and one pound of documents captured. Friendly casualties were one US KIA and four US WIA. At 2145 December Recon/2-47th Inf came in contact with an enemy platoon in the vicinity of the right base (KS 682559). Fire was returned with organic weapons, and artillery, air cavalry, Night Hawk and Shadow aircraft were in support of the ground elements. Additional 2-47th Inf elements were inserted to the north of the contact area to act as a blocking force as
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Sporadic contact continued throughout the night. At 0200 December the contact area was swept revealing enemy losses of eleven Communists KIA (PC). At 2300 December the contact area was swept revealing enemy losses of eleven Communists KIA (PC) (seven for 2-47th Inf, three for B/3-17th Cav and one for artillery), three AK-47's, twenty 200 foot rolls of electrical wire and miscellaneous documents captured. At 2300 December the contact area was swept revealing enemy losses of eleven Communists KIA (PC) (seven for 2-47th Inf, three for B/3-17th Cav and one for artillery), three AK-47's, twenty 200 foot rolls of electrical wire and miscellaneous documents captured. At 0200 December the contact area was swept revealing enemy losses of eleven Communists KIA (PC) (seven for 2-47th Inf, three for B/3-17th Cav and one for artillery), three AK-47's, twenty 200 foot rolls of electrical wire and miscellaneous documents captured. 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night Tac Air and artillery continued placing fire in the contact area. The following morning A Co and Recon platoon swept the contact area, finding 26 additional Communists KIA (BC), one prisoner, three AK-47’s and ten pounds of medical supplies captured. At 261210 January vic X0 710630 two UH-1s and a Cobra gunship from B/2-17th Cav were conducting a VIF of a proposed airmobile target when all three aircraft received ground fire, each sustaining two hits with negative casualties and minor damage to the aircraft. 6-31st Inf, who observed the airmobile company for the day, immediately responded by inserting B Co into the area. Recon/6-31st Inf was already on the ground in the vicinity of the target area and swept towards the B Co elements. At 1320 hours B/2-17th Cav ships engaged and killed two Communists KIA (BC) evacuating. Recon platoon and B Co maintain sporadic contact with the enemy throughout the day with artillery, Tac Air and air cavalry in support. At 1600 hours Recon platoon sustained US WIA from gunshot wounds, and shortly thereafter, B Co engaged and killed two Communists KIA (BC) evacuating. Both 6-31st Inf elements established SFs in the contact area the evening with artillery and Tac Air continuing fires into the area. At 2050 hours B Co found one RPG launcher and destroyed five barrels, while at the same time nearby, Recon platoon engaged and killed one Communist KIA (BC) evacuating. The following morning, while sweeping the contact area, B Co engaged and killed one Communist KIA (BC). At 0740 hours Recon found one AK-47. At 1000 hours the Recon platoon found two AK-47s, one K-56 pistol, five RPG rounds, a small quantity of small arms ammunition and miscellaneous documents and equipment. While continuing their sweep, B Co found two Communists KIA (BC) credited to the Air Force at 1000 Hours. Shortly thereafter, the same element found two Communists KIA (BC) credited five to the Air Force and five to the ARVN. On 22 January another team of B Co found an ambush patrol vic X0 515799 after being inserted by UH-1s. At 1740 hours the team engaged four enemy resulting in four Communists KIA (BC) and one US slight wound. Artillery support with illumination fires and the Rangers swept the contact area capturing four homemade radio receivers, four NVG back packs, one AK-47 and miscellaneous clothes and documents. The team was extracted at 2010 hours.


(7) Combat Support Activities:

(a) Artillery support:

Artillery support for the 3d Brigade during this reporting period continued to be supplied by the 13th Battalion, 4th Field Artillery, the organic direct support artillery battalion, Battery A and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 42d Field Artillery with missions of general support priority.
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of fires to the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery continued to provide medium artillery support in the 3d Brigade TAOL. Heavy artillery support provided by an element of the 7th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery was withdrawn. A summary of the total missions and rounds fired are provided as Inclosure 14.

2. Significant operational activities of the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery is attached as Inclosure 20.

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support:

1. During the reporting period Troop B/3-17th Cav was in direct support of the 3d Brigade, providing an average of ten armed helicopters per day. This support consisted of four AG-IG Cobra gunships, three OH-6A LoHs, and three UH-1H slicks on a daily basis. Missions included support for 3d Brigade units in contact, aerial displacement of supplies, people sniffer operations, defoliation missions, screening and blocking operations, aerial reconnaissance, Ranger insertions, Ranger parachute flights and Ranger extractions. While in support of the 3d Brigade during this reporting period B/3-17th Cav flew 6048.3 hours and accounted for 105 VC KDA (DC).

2. The 3d Brigade elements also received gunships from the US Navy located at Ben Luc, Dinh Thoy, and Nha Be. The US Navy supported elements of the 3d Brigade on a mission basis with a light fire team (LFT).

(e) Tactical Air Support: A chart reflecting ordnance expended and results obtained by Tac Air in support of 3d Brigade units attached as Inclosure 15.

(d) Strategic Air Support: There were no B52 strikes conducted in support of the 3d Brigade during the reporting period.

(f) Training:

(1) During the reporting period the following training was conducted within the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division:

(a) Replacement Training.

(b) Battalion Refresher Training.

(e) In-country Specialized Training.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, REC CSMC-65 (1:2) (4)

(2) Replacement training consisted of five days of orientation and instruction training in many of the skills necessary to prepare an individual for combat duty in Vietnam. The "Go Devil Academy", a provisional organization within this command, conducted all replacement training during this period. Additional land acquired during October 1969 was put into use in mid-November as a training area for patrolling, booby traps, water safety, replacement personnel training during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>MPS</th>
<th>CWI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1,674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Battalion refresher training continued to be conducted by all subordinate maneuver units of this command. The primary emphasis was placed on training replacement personnel in these subjects of interest to the Battalion Commander. By continuous training and command supervision, all replacement personnel are given periodic practical training in combat related subjects. Commanders are required to conduct such training to give practical experience to these replacement personnel who have been trained in a non-combat MOS.

(4) The Brigade Sniper Training Program continued to produce highly qualified snipers for employment throughout Long An Province. All brigade snipers were trained at the 25th Infantry Division Sniper School located at Cu Chi, RVN. During the reporting period a total of 21 personnel were trained as snipers. Additionally, snipers accounted for 81 enemy eliminated in Long An Province during the period. A total of 79 kills were attained utilizing a starlight scope. The brigade sniper program will continue to accelerate as selected personnel are properly trained and utilized during all operations.

(5) Personnel from all battalions and separate companies have been sent to the following courses offered at Cu Chi, RVN:

(a) Generator Operator Course.

(b) Generator Operator Supervisors Course.

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Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFCU-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Small Arms Course.
(d) Mess Management.
(e) Explosives and Demolitions Course.
(f) Helicopter Load Preparation Course.
(g) Combat Leadership Course.

(6) In addition, personnel have been sent to the 1st Signal Brigade for technical instruction on radar, signal communications and audio-visual classes. Qualified personnel continue to attend the MACV Reconno School at Nha Trang and the Phoenix Orientation Course at Vung Tau.

(7) This headquarters has conducted specialized training in Generator Maintenance, PLL, and Demolitions at the "Go Devil Academy" and units utilizing instructors from out-of-brigade resources. This enables a greater number of personnel to attend and in the case of the Generator Operator and Maintenance Course, enhance training by utilizing local equipment.

g. (C) Logistics:

(1) General: (a) The logistical mission of providing planning, guidance and support for all organic and attached units of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was accomplished by the Brigade S4 during the reporting period. The major tactical units supported were five land based battalions.

(b) During the reporting period, a forward element of the Brigade S4 was attached to a Brigade Task Force located at FSB Gettysburg to coordinate the logistics requirements of the Task Force.

(2) Supply: (a) 3d Brigade units drew supplies for the 99th CS Support Battalion located at Tan An Airfield on a supply point distribution basis. Unit distribution of all classes of supplies was provided to FSB Gettysburg.

(b) A small rearm/refuel point for helicopters was established at FSB Gettysburg to allow greater flexibility in operations.

(c) A water point was established at FSB Gettysburg to provide potable water for the Task Force.

(3) Maintenance: (a) 99th CS Support Battalion, 56th Signal Company and 371st Engineer Company received the annual COMI during the reporting period.

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period. It was determined that maintenance control teams should be formed to provide assistance and advice to brigade units.

(b) Roadside spot checks and informal inspections were conducted by B Company, 99th CS Support Battalion, throughout the period. The spot checks, together with continuous command emphasis on vehicular maintenance, have resulted in a low deadline rate in most areas. Generator deadline continues to be one of the higher areas, due to constant operation, but increased emphasis has reduced this somewhat.

(4) Transportation: Organic transportation was adequate to meet limited tactical and most administrative requirements. However, in the latter part of the period (December-January) non-organic transportation was relied on heavily to support FSB Cuttysburg. CH-47 sorties for this purpose averaged 4-6 per day. These sorties were obtained for the 25th Infantry Division. 42nd Transportation Group provided backup truck support when organic transportation was inadequate.

h. (C) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs:

(1) Psychological Operations:

(a) The 3d Brigade PSYOPS effort continued to support the Long An Province Pacification and Development Program. The objectives of PSYOPS during the period have been:

1. Quick reaction broadcasts and leaflet drops to exploit enemy personnel and equipment losses and perishable intelligence information.

2. To convince the civilian population that the pacification and development program is an expression of the response of the GVN to the needs of the people.

3. To create dissention VC and NVA by exploiting personality differences.

4. Utilization of the Family Tree program to create dissention between higher and lower level of command.

(b) The continued use of PSYOPS during all combat operations is being emphasized. Combat units are giving the enemy a more open chance to Chieu Hoi rather than to be killed in his hole or bunker.

(c) Major themes during the reporting period were: Chieu Hoi, Family Tree, GVN image, VIP, Tet, surrender/scape hardship, health and sanitation, pest control, and pacification.
AVPU-KH
1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, ICF 081/65 (10) (U)

(d) Summary of FOB activities:

| TYPE MISSION | HOURS | TARGETS | MORTAR | QUICK RE-ACTION
|--------------|-------|---------|---------|---------------
| Air          | 157   | 947     | 20,303,250 | 1781          |
| Ground       | 1006  | 1156    | 2,515,133  | 1948          |

(2) Civil Affairs:

(a) Throughout the reporting period Civic Actions have been aimed at helping the province level 65 more fully use its assets and capabilities through combined operations. Two of these operations were held in remote areas of the province.

(b) Promotion of safety program in weapons and vehicles.

(c) Summary of KILCIP programs for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NITECAPS</th>
<th>ICAPS</th>
<th>LEDCAPS</th>
<th>PENTA-CAP</th>
<th>PATIENTS TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>88,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Civic Actions also included construction projects to improve living conditions within Long An Province. These were targeted for short duration-high impact results. The following is a list of projects completed:

1. Dwellings 12
2. Roads 3Km
3. Brigades 7 built, 3 repaired
4. Schools 6 repaired
5. Others 2 staircases repaired, District Headquarters office buildings

(e) Materials distributed for construction:

1. Cement 271 bags
2. Tin 51 sheets
3. Lumber 6006 board feet

(f) During the conduct of IMLCA'S the teams distributed various health items and commodities.

1. Health and School Kits 1406
2. Foodstuffs 2420 lbs
3. Clothing 1876 lbs
4. Other 2522 lbs, pencil, paper, sand bags, sand, rock, link fence, etc.

(g) Thirty-two English Pronunciation classes were conducted with a total of 300 students.

(h) Units of the 3d Brigade continued to arrange for medical treatment and corrective surgery for needy children at Cho Ray Hospital and amputee at the National Rehabilitation Institute. The following treatments were performed during the reporting period:

1. Tuberculosis 1
2. Post Op Hemia 2
3. Burns 1
4. Infection 1
5. Abscess 1
6. Club foot 5
7. Shrapnel wounds 2
8. Body Ulcers 2
9. Unknown diseases 8
10. Artificial leg 2

1. (c) Engineer Support

(i) Construction continued in support of the reorganization of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division as a Separate Light Infantry Brigade.
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AVB-49

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry
Division, Period ending 31 January 1970, RCS CESFR-65 (R2) (U)

Two administrative buildings remain to be constructed. This construction
is being performed by elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade.

(2) Construction continues on Operational Support Projects. These
include the following:

(a) Communications Bunker, Tan An Main (90% complete)

(b) Log kennels, Tan An Airfield (70% complete)

(c) Deep well point, Tan An Airfield (50% complete)

(d) Air Cushion Vehicle ramp, Ben Luc

(e) Earm construction, Tan An Airfield

(3) There are five MRR projects currently planned for Tan An Airfield,
to be accomplished by elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade. They include
fixed and rotary wing aircraft revetments, a rearm point, and a refueling
point.

(4) This period marked the end of the monsoon season. The major portion
of engineer effort is now concentrated on projects requiring borrow material
while the land is dry.

(5) During the period the major portion of the engineer effort in the
Brigade TACI was devoted to the Long An Province Secondary Road Program.
This program consists of opening or upgrading to all weather use 206 km
of roads within the province. Priorities of effort were agreed upon between
the Brigade Commander, the Long An Province Chief, and II Field Force. The
roads, permit greater economic contact between residents of the formerly
isolated villages and the larger cities of the area, and allows GVN services
and security to reach the hamlets. Work is underway on twelve of the roads,
and 28 km are completed. Road priorities are readjusted based upon the
overall pacification plan, with the last adjustment made on 31 December 1969.
The work is shared by elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade, the 571st
Engineer Company, Navy Sea Bee Team 1015, and the ARVN 39th Engineer Group.

J. (C) Signal Support:

(1) During the reporting period, the Brigade Signal Office continued
its normal operations to include advising the Brigade Commander on all
signal matters, coordinating and tasking the commitment of the 56th Signal
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

Company assets, coordinating the signal operations of the separate organic battalions, and preparing and managing the 3d Brigade Signal Operating Instructions (SOI).

(2) The communications systems within the brigade have not changed significantly since the last reporting period (see paragraph 1 of 56th Signal Company DRILL, Inclosure 25.)

(3) The major communications emphasis during the reporting period has been on upgrading Communications Security (COMSEC) with the 3d Brigade. This program has received increased emphasis since 20 December 1968 when the US Forces discovered conclusive evidence that the enemy is quite sophisticated in gathering vital intelligence from our careless use of the various communications media at our disposal. The brigade's program of upgrading COMSEC includes greater use of NESTOR secure voice equipment; greater use of authorized codes and discontinuance of unauthorized codes on non-secure media; and an education program to familiarize officers and RTO's with the enemy's capabilities, our weaknesses and necessary corrective measures to be instituted. The ultimate goal of the program is to virtually deny the enemy access to useable intelligence via our communications media. To attain this goal it is planned to have all the brigade and battalion level nets operate in secure voice. Other nets will operate secure voice when it is feasible; otherwise, maximum use of authorized codes as the situation warrants will effectively eliminate enemy Communications Intercept (COMINT) activities.

(4) Re-supply and maintenance has been very good with two notable exceptions. The supply system has a difficult time keeping up with the attrition rate of the AT-271 antennas which snaps off at the stem when caught in the nipa. Handsets (H-189) also have a high rate of attrition after becoming wet. These DX items however, DS maintenance is unable to repair many of the handsets and must send them to higher echelon. Requisitions have been submitted on these items, but they are a critical item countrywide.

k. (C) Chemical Operations:

(1) During the reporting period, the 39th Chemical Detachment continued personnel detection operations, application of RCA, defoliation missions, and flame operations in support of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

(2) Personnel Detectors X-3 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD):

(a) During the reporting period 147 missions were flown for a total flying time of 125.75 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1H.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Casualts Injured of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry
Division, Period ending 31 January 1970, KIA (5460-6)

Results of these missions were reported to Brigade C2 and/or air cavalry
units for inclusion in their intelligence reports.

(b) There is a continual problem with maintenance due to the unserviceable
ability of the power source which is necessary for trouble shooting the
sniffer equipment. The power source has been submitted to a different
sonic repair company in an attempt to regain the capability of main-
tenance at organizational level.

(3) Riot Control Agent Operations:

(a) During the reporting period there were no missions flown utilizing
back CS, due to lack of suitable targets.

(b) There were 53 B-158 tactical CS clusters expended during the
reported period. These were employed on point type targets developed
from sniffer readings and on "gas ambushes".

(4) Defoliation:

(a) During the reporting period no defoliation projects were forwarded
through channels. This was due to the fact that all area suitable for
spray have been submitted and there are 47 targets pending approval
which were submitted last quarter.

(b) All base camps have been supplied with herbicides for group
defoliation within their perimeter.

(c) From 4 January to 17 January three missions were flown for Can
Giuoc basecamp using diesel fuel as a substitute for herbicide. A total
of 890 gallons of diesel was dispersed in an attempt to kill the vegetation
around the perimeter in preparation for later burning.

(5) Flame Field Expedients: The "Flame Bath", an expedient delivered
by means of helicopter, has been largely discontinued because of possible
hazards to aircraft and crew. For the three month period six "Flame Baths"
were employed with excellent results on heavily vegetated areas.

(6) Instruction and Training: A fully qualified Chemical Staff special-
ists (CIST) is furnished as needed, to Go Devil Academy to instruct replace-
ments on Chemical Operations. He has replaced a non-school trained instructor
from the general subjects committee and has provided 21 classes for a total
of 23 hours of instruction during the reporting period.

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1 February 1970

Operational report—Lungson Lessoned, 9th Infantry Division, Period ending 31 January 1970, . . . (2) (S) (1)

I. (1) Lungson Lessoned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel: None

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Intelligence Reports:

EVALUATION: It has been observed that the principle communist tactic has been to disperse men in small units, which stay of the hour much of the time.

EVALUATION: This tactic has dictated the necessity of accurate intelligence reports which can be acted upon with speed and precision. When intelligence reports judged to have a good potential for combat response are received, the 92, 3d Brigade and E Company, 75th Infantry (Airborne) are informed verbally of the location and nature of the target immediately. If the combat response is deemed and appropriate by these responsible, the commander supports such a response by furnishing all required intelligence and makes the source and special agent available to brief the combat commander, or assists the commander by giving the strike from the C & G helicopter. This technique has proven highly successful on numerous occasions. Although it has placed a burden on CI, due to lack of personnel, it has greatly enhanced the quality of combat provided to the 3d Brigade by CI.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that other units employ this technique in responding to intelligence reports.

(2) Enemy Use of Signals to Indicate US Ambushes in Hootch Areas

EVALUATION: Report from an ICAP on 29 January 1970 stated that the enemy told the people in the vicinity of Tan Trach Village, Rach Kien District to indicate the presence of a US ambush in a hootch area by leaving the light on in the hootch within which or around which the ambush was set up. All other hootches should extinguish their lights. People should stay inside their bunkers, and the enemy would attack with AK's and R-40's.

RECOMMENDATION: That all ambush patrols be made aware of the possibility of this and other enemy signaling methods. That ambush patrols exercise special care and alertness when setting up near population.

*Counterintelligence Section

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b. (3) Operations

(1) Employment

OBSERVATION: The newly used "Gas Ambush" is being utilized in an attempt to force the enemy into established ambush sites.

OBSERVATION: There has been negative results from the operation so far.

OBSERVATION: Through coordination is necessary between the ground and aerial personnel taking the drop, a complete ground of each unit, it is necessary to assure accuracy on the target. Optimum drop altitude is approximately 800 feet to minimize coverage and dispersion. All ground units should carry protective tanks to the ambush site.

(2) Using Bangalore Torpedoes to Clear a Safe Path Through Ambush

OBSERVATION: When trying to penetrate dense, booby trapped nipa palm, the bangalore torpedo may be used to clear a safe path through the dense vegetation.

OBSERVATION: The VC/PA often use dense areas of nipa palm as resting or hiding places. The enemy will often protect these areas by surrounding it with booby traps. Units trying to penetrate these areas may effectively clear a safe path through the nipa palm by the detonation of Bangalore torpedoes. The bangalore torpedoes will clear any vegetation and destroy the booby traps in the path, a unit can either carry the bangalore torpedoes in sections or be supplied by helicopter.

OBSERVATION: That bangalore torpedoes be used to blast safe paths through thick nipa palm.

(3) Bunker Complex in Nipa Palm.

OBSERVATION: Many bunkers may be found in either heavy nipa, nipa nipa and are usually constructed to provide 360 degrees of security.

OBSERVATION: In two significant contacts it was discovered the enemy in bunkers which afforded him the capability to fire in all directions. On one occasion the bunkers were in a circle with firing ports in the front or rear of the bunker. On another, there were set in depth with firing port of the first line of bunkers facing to the sides and front, and these in the last line facing in 360 degrees.
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Paragraph 1

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The enemy bunkers were well constructed with the majority of the bunker being below ground level. In heavy rains it is impossible to detect a bunker until you are right on top of it.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: If contact is made and the enemy is in well concealed and constructed bunkers, the infantry should be used to seal the area while artillery and Air are brought into the area. It takes almost a direct hit with artillery to knock out a bunker, therefore, nothing could be spared in softening up the area. In cases where there are insufficient troops to provide a 360 degree seal, artillery and Air should be used to fill the gaps.

Night Air Mobile Insertion

Observation: The use of helicopters at night to deliver a raid force on a target concentrates on mobility and shock action to a greater extent than mechanized or foot mobile troops.

VALUATION: The use of helicopters at night for troop insertions is not a normal procedure. The enemy is not mentally or physically prepared to react to a night air mobile insertion. Certain conditions must be met in the area for night air mobile raid can be successful. A minimum of fifty percent natural illumination is necessary for navigation. Artillery or mortar illumination should be used after the element is on the ground. Gunships should fire suppressive fire on the target or as close as possible to pin the enemy down. A command and control aircraft is necessary to insure the correct landing zone is used and to control subsequent action.

RECOMMENDATION: That this technique be included in the appropriate training manuals.

Enemy Carelessness at Night

Observation: The enemy often talks loudly while moving, at night.

Evaluation: It has been reported many times recently by ambush patrols that they were alerted to the enemy presence by the loud talking of the enemy moving near the ambush site. It is unlikely that the enemy would be so careless if he were aware of friendly troops in the area.

RECOMMENDATION: That all friendly elements be made aware of this carelessness of the enemy and that they be urged to take special efforts at noise discipline moving into and occupying night positions to exploit this weakness.
(6) **Interruption of VC Tax Collection Activity.**

**Observation:** In areas where population is separated by many waterways, the VC collecting taxes travel primarily by sampan.

**Evaluation:** During the month of January 1970, reports were received from MEDCAPS and ICAPS that VC tax collection activity had increased. In Eastern Can Gioc district where population is split by small waterways, the VC were coming at night by sampan to collect taxes. An ambush was established in reaction to a report of this type of activity on 23 January which resulted in four enemy KIA's and one sampan destroyed.

**Recommendation:** That aquabushes be employed where VC tax collection activities are conducted by sampan. That MEDCAPS and ICAPS be utilized to determine times when the VC collect taxes and their direction of travel on waterways.

(7) **Employment of Snipers on Night Riverine Operations.**

**Observation:** Snipers located in the command turret of Alpha Boats are best positioned to engage enemy targets along the river banks during Night Riverine Operations.

**Evaluation:** Riverine Operations are conducted using two Alpha Boats, one rifle platoon, and one sniper team. The rifle platoon is equally divided between the Alpha Boats. One sniper is placed in the command turret of each boat. The boats will land at preselected targets with at least fifty meters between landing points. The rifle platoon may either remain on the boats or move into the hasty ambush position on the bank. The snipers from their elevated positions in the command turret can observe over the napalm and vegetation along the river bank and can detect enemy movement further inland. If the enemy is within one hundred meters of the ambush site, the enemy is engaged by the rifle platoon, the Alpha Boats and the snipers. If the enemy is more than one hundred meters from the ambush site, the enemy is engaged by the snipers only. Snipers firing from the boats in this manner consistently engage and kill the enemy at ranges between two hundred and three hundred meters; confirmed kills have been made at four hundred meters range.

**Recommendation:** That snipers be used more extensively from elevated positions in boats during night Riverine Operations.

(8) **Employment of Shell WP in Defensive Fires.**

**Observation:** The use of shell WP, zone 1, fuse time, "Killer Junior", was found to be effective at ranges 200 to 300 meters from the battery position.
EVALUATION: Excellent effect was observed using shell WP for close-in defensive fires with the same data used for HE "Killer Junior". Although the heavier weight of the HE projectile caused a lower height of burst, the burning effect on the ground was good. There is very little in the spray from the exploding round, thus permitting good protection to friendly troops while providing good, effective, close-in defensive fire on the enemy. Extreme care must be exercised during the dry season to prevent the round from starting an unwanted fire.

RECOMMENDATION: That commands concerned be informed of the use of shell WP for close-in defensive fires.

(9) Employment of HE "Killer Junior" for Maximum Effect.

OBSERVATION: The data on the standard "Killer Junior" chart was found to be inaccurate for the listed range.

EVALUATION: When the chart data for the HE "Killer Junior" was fired at each range, most of the rounds fired on impact. The same results were obtained with several different time fuse lots and several different projectile lots. Calibration was set on the range quadrants and extremely high heights of burst were observed. Generally it was found that by reducing the time setting by 0.3 to 0.4 of a second, the desired height of burst was obtained. The same results were obtained using the chart time, by increasing the quadrant approximately 10 mils.

RECOMMENDATION: That as soon as possible after moving into a new position, firing batteries verify their "Killer Junior" data. That adjusted data be placed on range cards and made readily available to all personnel near the howitzer.

(10) Utilizing the AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar to Verify Dufflebag Field Locations.

OBSERVATION: Verifying the location of dufflebag fields in areas of uniform terrain and few landmarks is extremely difficult.

EVALUATION: The accuracy of dufflebag field locations is extremely important if artillery fire is to be effective. The AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar, with its range capability of 18,000 meters, can sight on a hovering helicopter, or any other means used to emplace dufflebags, in order to give a more accurate location for each field.

RECOMMENDATION: That commands concerned be informed of this additional capability of the AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar.
1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

   d. (U) Organization: None

   e. (U) Training: None

   f. (C) Logistics:

      (1) Water Point for Remote Fire Support Base.

         OBSERVATION: Supplying water to a remote fire support base can cause problems, especially where organic transportation is limited.

         EVALUATION: To preclude this occurrence, a portable water purification unit was placed at FSB Gettysburg. This water point not only reduced transportation requirements, but also provided all the portable water necessary for the fire support base.

         RECOMMENDATION: That, whenever feasible, a water point be established at remote fire support bases.

      (2) Rearm - Refuel Point.

         OBSERVATION: When utilizing helicopters from remote base camps much time is wasted when they must return to main base camps to refuel and/or rearm.

         EVALUATION: To conserve time an blade ours a rearm/refuel point should be established at the remote base camp. Using a portable fuel pump and 500 gallons, collapsible, air transportable bladders, helicopters could be refueled at anytime. Also several pallets of various type rockets could be kept in stock, along with mini-gun ammunition, to rearm gunships. Due to this arrangement, the helicopters would not have to return to main base camps to refuel and rearm.

         RECOMMENDATION: That for extended operations utilizing helicopters in remote areas, a small rearm/refuel point be established at the fire support base.

   g. (U) Communications: None.

   h. (U) Material: None.

   i. (U) Other:

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(1) Countering Communist Propaganda against the Chieu Hoi Program

**Observation:** One of the basic themes of communist propaganda against the Chieu Hoi Program is that the Hoi Chanh will be mistreated to the extent of being beaten, tortured or even killed when they rally.

**Evaluation:** An effective technique in countering communist propaganda efforts in this area has been returning Hoi Chanh to their villages and hamlets to give first hand accounts of their rallying experience. By conducting periodic interviews in the local Chieu Hoi Center, it is possible to select and groom those individuals most capable of making a presentable and positive appearance. When the Hoi Chanh knows and can identify families of other VC or sympathizers, the program is much more effective. The mere fact the rallier is alive and well disputed the enemy's contentions. Ideally, the same Hoi Chanh should be returned periodically to demonstrate his continued good health and progress.

**Recommendation:**
(1) That Hoi Chanhs should be periodically and systematically interviewed by PSIOP personnel to secure exploitable material.

(2) That selected Hoi Chanhs returned to their hamlets to counter enemy propaganda themes.

(3) That cooperation with District Level PSIOP personnel is necessary to insure the program takes advantage of the specific local situation.
SUBJ: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Follow-up Interviews of Hoi Chanh.

OBSERVATION: Hoi Chanh have revealed significantly exploitable PSYOP information during follow-up interviews which was not revealed in their initial interrogation or interview.

EVALUATION: The fact that Hoi Chanh have withheld valuable PSYOP information during initial processing can be attributed to a combination of several factors. During these first hours of detainment the Hoi Chanh is very apprehensive of what will befall him. This fear often leads him to relate only what he expects will please his captors. The initial pressure also inhibits his relating of everyday information which may have no immediate tactical value but is of extreme importance to the long range PSYOP effort. Later, when he has experienced good treatment and no longer fears for his well being, this individual will open up and become most receptive to visitors and the opportunity to return to his local hamlet even if it does require going through the formalities of making a propaganda speech. Such interviews have resulted in obtaining information of VC and/or sympathizers and their known relatives. On subsequent visits to the Hoi Chanh's hamlet these relatives have been visited and encouraged to induce their wayward family members to rally.

RECOMMENDATION: That initial Hoi Chanh interviews be followed up by additional interviews within a month of rallying.

26 Incl
as
Incl 2 - 12, 16 - 20,
23 - 26 wd HQ, DA

ANDREW J. GATIS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
AVUCMH (1 Feb 70) 1st Inf

SUBJECT: Operational Report for 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFLR - 65 (R2)

DA, HQ 25th Inf Div, APO San Francisco 96225

THRU: Commanding General, II FF(RG)EV, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO San Francisco 96266

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC(UST), APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO San Francisco 9659B

TC: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31 January 1970 with the following exceptions:

a. Page 3, paragraph 1b (4); a sixteen man augmentation to the brigade aviation strength is authorized on an authorized overstrength basis by United States Army, Vietnam. This augmentation is not authorized under MTOZ 77-102T.

b. Page 3, paragraph 1b (5); operational control of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was assumed by II Field Force, Vietnam which further placed that brigade under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division on 26 July 1969.

c. Page 36, paragraph (8); Employment of Shell WP in Defensive Fires; the use of shell WP, zone 1, fuze time, Killer Junior, was found to be effective at ranges 200 to 300 meters from battery position. Fuze time will not function prior to 2.0 seconds time of flight which is equal to 400 meters range.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES M. CONNELL
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
AVFBC-RE-H (1 Feb 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, AGS CSFOR - 65 (II) (R)

DA, Hq II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(D), APO 96333

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GCI-F-LT, APO 96585

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31 January 1970, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. Barzel Jr
CPT AGC
Asst AG
AVHGC-DST (1 Feb 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from headquarters, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (U) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference items concerning "Response to Intelligence Reports and Enemy Use of Signals to Indicate US Ambushes in Hootch Areas", page 33, paragraph b(2): concur. Both of these articles have been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Utilization of the AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar to Verify Dufflebag Field Locations", page 37, paragraph c(10): concur. This radar can be utilized to vector aircraft to the desired emplant area or locate low flying aircraft to insure accurate air delivery of the ground sensors. The AN/TPS-25 can also be employed to guide and locate Dufflebag hand emplacement teams on the ground. This item will be published in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   c. (U) Reference item concerning "Countering Communist Propaganda Against the Chieu Hoi Program", page 39, paragraph 21: concur. The gathering of information from ralliers to use as PSYOP themes to combat enemy propaganda has proven effective. Returnees may be asked to volunteer to return to their hamlets, however, they cannot be forced to do so. Guidelines and policies for the exploitation of returnees is contained in MACV Directive 381-11.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

I. D. MURRAY

Commander

Cc: II FFORCEN
3d Bns, 9th Inf Div

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DES 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS C5FGR-65 (42) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AG
Asst AG
ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC, 3d Brigade
6-31st Inf
2-47th Inf (Mech)
2-60th Inf
5-60th Inf
2-4th Fld Arty
E75th Inf (Ranger)
US Army Air Cushion Vehicle Platoon
45th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
65th Inf Det (Combat Tracker)
19th Mil Hist Det
19th PI Det
39th Chem Det
493d MI Det
99th CS Spt Bn
56th Sig Co
571st Eng Co
483d MP Plt
264th FA Det (Radar)
276th FA Det (Radar)

Inclosure 1
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Inclosure 13

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## S3 AIR OPERATIONAL SURVEY

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<td>FIGHTING POSITIONS DEST</td>
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Inclsoure 15

50

CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Operational Report of Company E (Ranger) 75th Infantry Detachment

To: Commanding Officer
3d Bde 9th Inf Div
ATTN: WHO-4T
APO San Francisco 96371

From: Commanding Officer
Co E (Ranger) 75th Inf
3d Bde 9th Inf Div
APO San Francisco 96371

I. Section 1, Significant Activities:

1. Introduction: It is this unit's mission to provide the 3d Infantry Division with small unit specialized Ranger combat tactics and to act as an immediate reaction force for the Brigade on intelligence and targets of a perishable nature. This unit engaged in training and combat operations a total of ninety (90) days out of a possible ninety-two (92) days encompassed by this reporting period. The specific types of operations this unit engaged in during this reporting period were Ranger Raids, Night Hunter and Night Ambush patrols within the Brigade's TO.

2. Organization: Co E (Ranger) 75th Infantry is organized into four (4) sections; Headquarters, Operations, Forward Operations Base FOB platoon and two (2) Operational Field platoons consisting of three (3) Ranger teams each. Since we are in direct support of the brigade, our company is located at the basecamp of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Tan Son Nhut.

See Enclosure 1 for the graphic representation of the organization of this unit, and the key personnel roster.

3. Personnel and Administration: During this reporting period this unit experienced the loss of seventy-five percent of our combat experienced field troops to normal DRS. As a result we were forced to initiate a recruiting program at Brigade and battalion level to gain combat veteran volunteers to fill the void in our unit. During this void period this unit was only able to field four (4) operational teams, which in turn effected the number of combat missions we were able to run. Maintenance of unit strength is a constant problem because individuals must be volunteers for the unit, consequently we must constantly search for qualified volunteers to maintain our unit strength. Because this unit is comprised of strictly volunteers, morale and discipline do not pose any great problem areas. Discipline is maintained thru proper military procedures.

Enc 21
J. Intelligence: In the field of intelligence, this unit maintains in our Operations Section an Intel NCO whose duty it is to maintain and compile reports of enemy activity and locations. From this information we determine our targets and what type operation we intend to employ in the target area. During this reporting period enemy activity was most prevalent during the hours of darkness, and they attempted to establish secure areas where they could remain undetected and avoid engaging in major contact with U.S. and Allied Forces. This Brigade's T.OI is located to interdict the major Viet Cong enemy infiltration routes, and we concluded that the enemy was moving through our T.OI to other areas void of American Forces. With the exception of three major contacts, the enemy was well dispersed and only traveled in small groups of three to five personnel. Also, due to the fact that it was the wet harvest season, local Guerrillas and local forces were engaged in harvesting rice. The weather and terrain also affected offensive operations. Because of the monsoon season closing and the fact that the majority of the Mekong Delta region was underwater at this time, offensive operations were shortened in length to afford personnel the opportunity to properly "dry out" to avoid contracting fungus infections and "paddy foot". This unit draws its intelligence from numerous sources; 493d MI Detachment, USTRANLAC Detachment, Provincial Recon Unit (FRU) sources and from actual combat operations, and information gained from Hoi Chans and PC"US. To cope with the enemy's attempt to remain hidden and avoid major contact, we modified our offensive operations to meet the enemy's change in tactics. These operations and modifications will be explained in detail in Section I, paragraph E of this report, as will the recapitulation of enemy losses as a direct result of this unit's offensive operations.

E. Operations: Due to the flexible organization of this unit, we are able to "tailor" specific forces for specific operations to accomplish our mission within the Brigade T.OI. During this reporting period this unit conducted primarily Ranger Raid, Night Hunter and Night Brush Patrols. During this reporting period this unit ran a total of 290 combat missions in ninety days.

(1) Ranger Raid: This type operation was very successful during this reporting period. We modified our operational concept of this mission slightly to cope with the enemy's attempt to stay hidden and to avoid making contact.

(a) Using Hoi Chans on the insertion slick to give positive identification of intel targets or target areas.
(b) Inserting at night on targets of perishable intelligence.
(c) Using battalion airmobile targets, inserting first to evaluate the probable productivity of their targets.
(d) Using airmobile battalions to File-on once we have established contact in a target area.

Summation: This particular operation provided the Brigade with its two largest contacts of the reporting period. On 12 December and again on 12 January Ranger teams inserted on intel targets and on both occasions located the Headquarters element of the 1st RVN Regiment. After contact was initiated this unit was supported by the airmobile 6th Battalion, 1st Infantry with the File-on technique.
2. Night Ambush Patrols: Due to the fact that enemy activity was most prevalent during the hours of darkness, our major operation during this time was roving Night Ambush Patrols. Targets were chosen on known enemy infiltration routes, known or suspected cache sites, known or suspected areas of enemy troop concentrations, on or near areas where electrical sensing devices were installed, and in hamlets where the population was sympathetic to the communists' cause. This operation was our most productive, and our major concern was to vary our insertion methods and techniques to add deception to the actual operation. When using helicopters for insertion, we utilized a series of false insertions and extractions for deception purposes, and when operating in the Plain of Reeds we inserted after dark by ACV (Air-cushioned Vehicles) to avoid position detection by the enemy. Operating in this way we made contact or sighted with the enemy an estimated thirty per-cent of our missions.

3. Night Hunter Missions: This mission, where a Ranger Team is on 24 hour stand-by for instant reaction to Radar Sightings, "offbody" activations or Private directed targets, was utilized extensively producing few tangible results. When going into an area that is not populated we normally utilize "Hot Insertions." Artillery and/or supporting munitions are dropped in large quantities on the target area to prevent the enemy from detecting our presence. The insertion point is marked by artillery with a White Phosphorous (WP) round on the deck while illumination bursts simultaneously overhead.

When inserting into populated areas we modify the method of insertion from "Hot to Cold," without a L7 prep, to preclude wounding or killing civilians. This method also does not telegraph our intent to insert until the WP round and illumination burst on the target. The two contacts we had on this mission resulted from this method of insertion.

4. Recapitulation of Enemy Losses: The following statistics is a recapitulation of enemy losses as a direct result of this unit's offensive operations.

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<th>CONTACTS</th>
<th>KIA'S</th>
<th>KIA'S</th>
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<td>290</td>
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<td>46</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

During this reporting we also captured 25 PRKS, 13 individual and 1 crew served weapons, 40 pounds of enemy webgear and equipment, 6 enemy radios, and about 30 pounds of documents.

F. Training: This unit maintains a constant training schedule on the subject matter pertinent to Ranger Operational techniques, and subjects necessary for operating in the Mekong Delta, RVN. Our normal training cycle is set to completely rotate subject matter every three
months to accommodate the personnel turn-over in the unit. Our training program is establish on a twenty five per-cent formal instruction, and seventy five per-cent on the job training (OJT) basis. In our Operations Section we maintain a Training NCO (S9F-E6) whose responsibility is to establish and maintain an effective and up to date training program.

G. Logistics: The logistics system for this unit pose a constant problem. By our MOE we are authorized Simply, Commo and Motor Sergeants, but by the same document we are not authorized to maintain a full set of repair parts. This fact makes us completely dependent on our Parent Unit for repair work. Radios, Weapons and Vehicles are critically important items to us to maintain a combat effective rating. Repair work on radios, weapons and vehicles thru normal Army logistic channels is normally very time consuming and very often leaves us short critical items of equipment.

II. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

A. Personnel:
1. Observation: This unit is unable to rely on normal personnel replacement procedure due to the fact we require all members to be volunteers. It is also a virtual impossibility to take a "green" recruit, fresh in-country and expect him to face our normal combat experiences without prior combat experience and prior knowledge of enemy tactics.

2. Recommendation: When possible personnel with stateside Ranger and Airborne training should be assigned to this specific type unit when they arrive in-country. When this replacement system cannot produce the required personnel, this unit must be allowed to conduct monthly recruiting interviews to larger combat units to replace personnel losses.

B. Operations:
1. Observation: Some aspects of the different missions mention previously could be incorporated to the "Recon" units at battalion levels with very little effort and guidance from this unit as to the techniques of each type operation.

2. Evaluation:
(a) Ranger Raids: This type mission is an excellent way to react to perishable intel targets and to find and fix the enemy. After evaluating the specific target or if contact is made we can either exploit the target ourselves or call for reinforcement.
(b) Night Hunter: This mission is an excellent way to react to electrical sensing devices. Again this mission could be incorporated at battalion level, but the larger units would have to "tailor" a special force for this specific mission.

3. Recommendations: Night Hunter insertions on "Dufflebag" activations; due to the fact it normally takes between 30 to 45 minutes from notification to insertion of troops on target, "Dufflebag" activations should be eliminated as a target source for this mission, and should be
AVRO-LP

31 January 76

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (cont.)

Engaged by artillery. To date we have had negative results in photographic surveillance activations.

Edward A. Rocken

ALBERT C. ZYMON

CPT

I/P

Commanding Officer

DISTR:
25-copies address
10-copies unit file
1 each
**SPECIAL OPERATIONAL REPORT OF LESSONS LEARNED**

**ке 1, KEY Part 1, Section 1 Para 6**

**HEADQUARTERS**

- CO - CPT
- 1ST - E-7
- FIELD 1ST
- CO CKF
- 1ST CKF
- SUPPLY SGT
- ADJ SGT
- MEDIC

**OPERATIONS**

- OIC - 1LT
- NCOIC - E-7
- INTEL SGT - E-6
- INFO SGT - E-6

**FIELD PLT's**

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<td><strong>DM#</strong></td>
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<td>REAR GUNNER</td>
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**FOS PLT**

- NCOIC - E-6
- COMIC SGT
  1.
  2.
  3.
  4.
  5.
  6.
  7.
  8.

* Indicates KEY Personnel in the Company
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AIR CUSHION VEHICLE UNIT
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div
APO San Francisco 96371

AVBB-CV
31 January 1970


FROM: Commanding Officer
Air Cushion Vehicle Unit
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div
APO San Francisco 96371

TO: Commanding Officer
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div
ATTN: AVBB-MH
APO San Francisco 96371

Section I

1) SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES: During the period the ACV Unit conducted fourteen combat operations ranging in duration from two to six days and totaling fifty-six days in the field. All combat operations were conducted in the Plain of Reeds area in the western end of the Long An Province. In addition, two driver-training operations were conducted at Nha Be lasting six days. Units providing infantry Platoons that were attached to the unit for operations and the days each worked with the unit are indicated below:

Recon Platoon, 5/60th Inf: 4 days
Company C, 2/60th Inf: 1 day
Recon Platoon, 6/31st Inf: 20 days
Long An Province Intel Platoon (VN): (Combined) 4 days
Tu Tu District PF Platoon (VN): (Combined) 8 days
Company B, 5/60th Inf: 5 days
Company A, 5/60th Inf: 10 days
Company C, 6/31st Inf: 8 days
Company A, 6/31st Inf: 4 days

Two ACV's were used to support all of the indicated operations, except one operation where three ACV's were used. Platoon strengths ranged from seventeen to thirty-six personnel, the average compliment of mounted infantry being twelve troops per ACV. Twelve communists were KIA, three POW's were seized and five individual weapons were captured as a result of ACV reconnaissance and ambush operations in Western Long An Province.

Significant caches were found near FSB Shiloh on 19 November and 20 November. Included in these finds were: 99 82mm mortar rounds, 92 B-40 rockets, 36 B-41 rockets, 160 Chicom hand grenades, 40 Chicom anti-tank grenades, 172 lb cases of TNT, 4 Chicom claymores, 1 AK-47 and 6200 rounds of SA ammunition.

On 9 December near FSB Gettysburg, another cache was found consisting of 27 82mm mortar rounds, 24 B-40 rockets, 36 Chicom hand grenades, 8 Chicom rifle grenades.

Incl 22
and 2200 rounds of SA ammunition.

One ACV was destroyed on 9 Jan when it detonated what was believed to be a 500 lb bomb west of FSB Gettysburg. Although the ACV was completely destroyed, it is significant to note that none of the 17 personnel aboard were killed.

Operations during the period consisted of reconnaissance; security; night ambushes; reaction to infantry ambushes, radar sightings and dufflebag readings; and insertion and extraction of infantry ambushes. Operations were primarily conducted at night under illumination provided by artillery, mortars, and hand held flares. Forward bases for the operations were FSBs Shiloh and Gettysburg. Operations were closely coordinated and executed with the Commander, Task Group 1949, US Navy in the "Giant Slingshot" area of operations. Support from Navy "Seawolf" gunships and "Black Pony" OV-10 assault aircraft was readily available and used several times to cover ACV operations.

During this period, training and replacement of many critical personnel was accomplished. Included are the Unit C.O., Vehicle commander, all primary ACV drivers, and numerous other unit personnel.

Four formal ACV Orientations were conducted during the reporting period.
1. Nov 23 MG Rowny - DCS N&D
   BG Black - ACSFOR
2. Dec 17 Major of San Diego, Calif.
3. Dec 26 LTC Minh,
   BG Girard - CMAC
4. Jan 27 COL Inskeep,
   LTC Smith - ACTIV

II Commander's Report
(a) Problems
1. The loss of ACV USA# 6815902 on 9 Jan reduced the number of ACV's on hand to two. Since there is now no backup craft available, it can be expected that longer maintenance periods will be occasionally required. However, due to the much improved maintenance and logistical operations, the unit expects to continue operations at its present high rate of availability.

(b) Personnel and Logistical support
1. The unit has experienced an acceptable rate of personnel replacement. All primary drivers were trained and replaced during the period, along with one new vehicle commander. Although eleven key personnel will DEROS in the next 120 days, it is felt that no serious problems will arise if the present rate of replacements is maintained.

(c) Tactical and technical innovations.
1a Overland night operations: On 24 November 1969 two Air Cushion vehicles conducted a night ambush near FSB Shiloh. This ambush was conducted to verify the feasibility of utilizing the ACV in this role and in support of other ground infantry ambushes. The success of this and subsequent night operations has led the unit to operate primarily at night in support of infantry elements.

III Lessons Learned
(a) Training
1. Observation: Concerted driver training programs can be effectively conducted within capabilities of the unit in a relatively short period.
Evaluation: During December a concerted driver training program was conducted within the unit to replace the three departing primary drivers. After extensive classroom instruction and training, the unit conducted two three day driver training operations at Nha Be. After this extensive water training at Nha Be, the trained drivers will be integrated into combat overland operations under the close supervision of the experienced drivers. This extensive effort resulted in giving basic background instruction to new primary drivers with only a six day loss of combat availability.

Recommendation: The results obtained from a six day driver training operation greatly enhance the training of new drivers, and should be continued.

(b) Personnel

2. Observation: Survivability of personnel on board ACV's is outstanding.

Evaluation: On 9 January 1970, ACV 902 was destroyed when it struck what was believed to be a dud 500 lb. bomb. Although fourteen of the seventeen personnel on board the ACV were injured, no one was killed, and all but one man was quickly returned to duty. This man will fully recover.

Recommendation: That the effects of overpressure and turbulence be researched as a dissipator of an explosive force.

(c) Operations

Observation: Throughout the reporting period ACV's operated primarily at night in ambushes and as a reaction force to support ground infantry ambushes, radar sightings and dufflebag activations. The Plain of Reeds provides a very suitable terrain for the ACV operations and illumination provided by artillery, mortars and hand-held flares provides sufficient light to navigate and search for the enemy.

Recommendation: That the ACV Unit continue to expand its night operations in the Plain of Reeds area, and if sufficient support is available, in other suitable areas in Long An Province.

Observation: ACV ambushes are effective and provide excellent flexibility as a point of departure for subsequent night operations.

Evaluation: On the night of 1-2 December 1969 at 0435 hours a group of 10-12 Communists moved into the center of the prepared night location of the ACV Unit and the dismounted infantry elements. Five enemy were killed and one was captured from the ambush with no U.S. casualties. ACV ambushes located in the general area of other ground infantry ambushes provide fast and effective support to elements who have made contact.

Recommendation: That ACV ambushes be planned in close coordination with infantry ambushes so that reaction support can be utilized with a minimum of reaction time.

Observation: Two Air Cushion Vehicles are capable of sustaining insertion/extraction/reaction support for two rifle companies without additional support.

Evaluation: Throughout December and January the ACV unit, while operating out of FSB Gettysburg, inserted, extracted and provided the reaction force for the one/two company(s) located at the FSB. No major problems were encountered during emplacement or extraction of the ambushes and a C&C aircraft was required only on inserting in unfamiliar or rough terrain. The insertions and extractions can be completed relatively fast.
due to the speed of the ACV and its load carrying capability of one platoon (20-28 personnel) per craft.

Recommendation: That supported commanders continue to challenge the Air Cushion Vehicle Unit for support in imaginative combat and auxiliary combat support roles.

for DUANE B ROOT
MAJOR, Armor
Commanding

Best Available Copy
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division