<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD509172</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
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<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
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<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO, D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980; AGO, D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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1 Field Force Vietnam Artillery
Chief of Military History
AVFA-AT-D

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1970, RCS CFOR-65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

I. (C) SECTION I: Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

a. General: During the reporting period, I FFORCEV Arty continued support of ARVN, RF/PF, ROK, US and USSF/CIDG forces in II CTZ. The I FFORCEV Arty organization as of the close of the period is as outlined in inclosure 1. Two field artillery groups, one battalion group, two separate battalions, one separate target acquisition battery and thirteen radar detachments support operations conducted by allied maneuver units in areas of operations (AO)1 indicated below:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I FFORCEV ARTY</th>
<th>MANEUVER UNIT</th>
<th>AO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/13th Bn Group</td>
<td>22d ARVN Div Cap ROK Inf Div</td>
<td>Dan Cuyen/Hine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7/13)</td>
<td>173d Abn Inf 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>Dan Quong/Lee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7/15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CRID AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Arty Gp</td>
<td>42d ARVN Regt 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>Dan Quyen/Hines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3/6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>24th STZ AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6/14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1/92)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Arty Gp</td>
<td>23d ARVN Div Task Force South</td>
<td>Dan An/Sheridan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5/22)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23d Div AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5/27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2/17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>22d ARVN Div Cap ROK Inf Div 9th ROK Inf Div AO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9th ROK Inf Div</td>
<td>CRID AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22d ARVN Div AO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 4th Bn, 66th Arty (AW) (SP), with Btry B, 7th Bn, 29th Artillery (SLT) and Btry E, 41st Arty (MG) attached, and HHS, 8th Bn, 26th Arty (TAB), ten attached countermortar radar detachments, two GSR (TPS-25) detachments, and one GSR (PPS-5) detachment, continued operation in support of allied forces throughout II CTZ.

1 See Inclosure 2

Inclosure

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
b. Intelligence:

(1) Hostile artillery attacks during the month of November reached the highest sustained level since the Ben Het campaign during May and June of 1969. Over 50% of all the attacks occurred in Quang Duc (P) as elements of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment and the K-394th NVA Artillery Battalion supported the 28th and 66th Regiments at Bu Prang and Duc Lap. The month and a half long offensive failed in its attempts to incur serious losses on the ARVN. By body count over 1500 North Vietnamese troops were killed during the campaign. Since mid-December, the major elements taking part in the offensive have been moving north in Cambodia, refitting and recuperating. Intelligence has not indicated major offensive plans in the Highlands for the near future. In the Coastal Provinces, enemy activity remained at an extremely low level. 3d NVA Division elements began a southward move in November from I CTZ into Binh Dinh (P). By the end of the quarter, an estimated 6000 troops of the 3d Division's 2d, 18th and 22d Regiments and support battalions were massed in Binh Dinh (P). Prisoners captured during the period indicated that the division would conduct an offensive during TET of 1970 in the central and northern districts of the province. Enemy activity in the Southern Provinces remained at a low level although selected targets in the Phan Thiet area of Binh Thuan (P) saw high points near the beginning of each month. Standoff attacks during the last half of the quarter decreased significantly as enemy artillery units conserve their ammunition for high points to occur around TET of 1970.

(2) The enemy capability increased from the previous quarter. The 130th NVA Artillery Battalion was identified in Binh Thuan (P) and the 300th NVA Artillery Battalion and 200th NVA AA Battalion moved down into Binh Dinh (P) from I CTZ. This adds considerable firepower in Binh Dinh (P) as the new units possess a rocket capability - 107, 122 and 140mm, and also 120mm mortars.

(3) Enemy artillery attacks and expenditures (daily average) throughout II CTZ for the reporting period are indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ATTACKS/DAY</th>
<th>ROUNDS/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>13 (8)</td>
<td>154 (90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>8 (4)</td>
<td>59 (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures in parentheses are for the Bu Prang - Duc Lap area during the Quang Duc offensive).

(4) The enemy was thought to have employed 105mm howitzer fire at Bu Prang on several occasions. However, only once, on 28 November 1969, were fragmentation techniques employed to confirm these attacks. Attacks by 85mm field guns were suspected at Bu Prang during November, but never confirmed.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(5) During the quarter there were 272 rounds of 107mm rocket, 160 rounds of 122mm rocket and three rounds of 140mm rockets fired at friendly elements in 100 separate attacks. The greatest number of the 107 and 122mm rockets were employed during the Quang Duc offensive. All the 140mm rockets were fired in the Coastal Provinces of Khanh Hoa and Binh Dinh. There were no new weapons or variations of the standard enemy munitions employed in II CTZ.

(6) Radar Operations: During the quarter, 15 radar moves were conducted. A total of 30 enemy weapons locations were made and 671 ground surveillance sightings were made. 312 sightings were engaged representing total artillery expenditures of 8849 rounds.

(7) Survey: Extension of survey control in this last quarter has been limited due to enemy activity. However, survey control was reestablished between Phan Rang and Ca Son, with a total of 50,080 meters of 4th Order survey being completed and 15 4th Order SCPs being established. To date, 4,643, 363 meters of 4th Order Artillery survey have been completed in II CTZ and 799 SCPs have been established.

d. Operations and Training Activities:

(1) Operations:

(a) During the reporting period, artillery units with I FFORCEN continued support of US, ARVN, ROK, RF/PF, RD Teams and USSF/CTDG forces in II CTZ. I FFORCEN Artillery units continued support of I FFORCEN maneuver forces in providing maximum participation in pacification, fire planning, and artillery protection for the greatest number of villages and hamlets in the II CTZ.

(b) Phase II Redeployment: In accordance with Phase II Redeployment plans, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 41st Artillery Group was released from operational responsibilities on 1 November. An inactivation ceremony for the Group was conducted at Camp Fidel on 11 November. Seven officers and 57 enlisted personnel from the unit departed Vietnam on 15 November 1969 as a result of this inactivation.

(c) Operation Metro Media: During the quarter a plan for repositioning I FFORCEN Artillery assets was initiated. This plan was approved on 7 Dec 1969 by the CG, I FFORCEN. The purpose is threefold: (1) to better support the maneuver elements, (2) reduce span of control difficulties, and (3) better support of lines of communications. In order to achieve these goals, it was necessary to relocate seven light and medium batteries, two heavy batteries, and three battalion headquarters. Future moves are planned during the next quarter to complete this operation. Construction of six new firebases was necessary to support these moves. Moves to support Metro Media, as of 31 January 1970, are listed below:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>INITIAL LOCATION</th>
<th>FINAL LOCATION</th>
<th>GRID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/1/92</td>
<td>24 Dec 69</td>
<td>Nhun Co/Plei Djereng</td>
<td>Plei Mong/Arty Hill</td>
<td>ZA1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/17</td>
<td>30 Dec 69</td>
<td>St. Frang/Ban Me Thuot</td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot</td>
<td>AQ8702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/7/15 (2-175)</td>
<td>4 Jan 70</td>
<td>Blackhawk/Plei Mong</td>
<td>Camp Radcliff</td>
<td>BB8747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/7/13</td>
<td>12 Jan 70</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>LZ Action</td>
<td>BR2648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/17</td>
<td>13 Jan 70</td>
<td>LZ Action</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>CP9351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ/7/15</td>
<td>17 Jan 70</td>
<td>LZ Uplift</td>
<td>Camp Radcliff</td>
<td>BB8747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/17</td>
<td>20 Jan 70</td>
<td>LZ Schueller</td>
<td>Dalat/Duc Trong</td>
<td>BF400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ/2/17</td>
<td>23 Jan 70</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot</td>
<td>AQ8702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ/5/22</td>
<td>26 Jan 70</td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot</td>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>BN7357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/7/15</td>
<td>28 Jan 70</td>
<td>LZ Zager</td>
<td>LZ Two Bits</td>
<td>BR3595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/93 (4-1-54)</td>
<td>31 Jan 70</td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot</td>
<td>LZ Blackhawk</td>
<td>BR0454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/5/27 (2-135)</td>
<td>31 Jan 70</td>
<td>Pike Smith/Dalat/Duc Trong</td>
<td>Soda Springs</td>
<td>BN5248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Fire Support Coordination Element:

(a) Naval Gunfire support for II CTZ was provided by an average of two ships each day. The following is a summary of naval gunfire support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During the reporting period, a daily average of 94 immediate reaction and hangfire targets were developed; of which, a daily average of 71 were fired. The following is a summary of targets developed and fired:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVELOPED</th>
<th>IMMEDIATE REACTION</th>
<th>HANGFIRE</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7904</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>3241</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRED</td>
<td>6155</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>2318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) During the quarter, I FFORCEV FOCE issued a daily average of six 175mm gun suppressions for B-52 strikes.

(d) The area harassment program continues as a working application of economy of force. Critical evaluation of intelligence, knowledge of enemy habits and effective employment of available firepower resources have harassed the enemy in his base areas and sanctuaries. Currently the program monitors 13 areas of which six are targeted twice daily. It had been noticed that the enemy moved to the maximum range limits of artillery and naval guns seeking new secure areas. As intelligence provides his position, air strikes are executed against the enemy serving to effectively disperse his forces, to prevent build-up for the attack and to deny the sanctuaries needed to conduct training, resupply, and command activities. As intelligence indicates enemy activity moving out of a defined area of harassment, the area is moved to encompass the new area of enemy activity. Every five days the entire program is reevaluated to select new priorities of engagement and to consider proposals for relocation of areas. The following is
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

the Fire Support Summary 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70:

A/C SORTIE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDINANCE</th>
<th>SPOOKY/SHADOW/STINGER (RDS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>484-750#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172-500#</td>
<td>73,260 - 7.62mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Napalm</td>
<td>400 - 20mm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) A total of 149 B-52 targets were struck with 537 aircraft during the quarter. The following is a summary of province support by type of target:

PRIMARY TARGETS

PROVINCE:            TARGETS:   AIRCRAFT:

Binh Dinh          12        42
Kontum              18        94
Quang Duc          84        326
                   114       464

SECONDARY TARGETS

PROVINCE:            TARGETS   AIRCRAFT:

Binh Dinh          9         13
Darlac             10        20
Kontum             13        30
Quang Duc          2         10
                   35        73

(3) Training:

(a) The I FFORCEV Arty Forward Observer Training Course (FOTC) and the Fire Direction Officer Training Course (FDOTC) continued to train artillery lieutenants and other US personnel.

(b) RVNAF Assistance Program:

1. Training assistance to ARVN artillery units continued throughout the reporting period with particular emphasis being placed on air mobile training. On five occasions, during the reporting period, ARVN artillery platoons were airlifted to temporary firebases to fire in direct support of ARVN maneuver elements.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

The movements were all made under Vietnamese supervision with US personnel furnishing aircraft and minimal advice only.

2 Training assistance to Civilian Irregular Defense Group units has been continued throughout the reporting period.

3 At present a coordinated program among US artillery units, MACV artillery advisors and Province and District Advisors is underway to Vietnamese artillery assistance to RP/FP units. The goal of this program is to have ARVN artillery units train RP/FP forward observers and assist Province/District Chiefs in fire support planning.

4 Other:

(a) Artillery Safety: The Artillery Safety Office processed a total of three incidents and eight accident reports of investigation during the three month period. The following I FFORCEV Arty units were not charged with an incident or accident for the three months: 2d Bn, 17th Arty; 1st Bn, 92d Arty; 7th Bn, 13th Arty; 7th Bn, 15th Arty; 3d Bn, 6th Arty; 6th Bn, 14th Arty; and 5th Bn, 27th Arty.

(b) Meteorological Quality Control Team (MQCT): To maintain the quality of ballistic meteorological data in II C/L the I FFORCEV Artillery MQCT checked the following number of soundings during the reporting period with the results as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NO OF SOUNDINGS CHECKED</th>
<th>NO UNSATISFACTORY</th>
<th>% UNSATISFACTORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 69</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 69</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 70</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Personnel:

(1) Personnel strength of HQ & HQ Btry, I FFORCEV Arty on 31 Jan 70 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asg</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres for dy</td>
<td>57*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>188**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes one Colonel, one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major and two Captains assigned to HHE for duty with Prov Arty Cp. In addition, two Captains are assigned to this headquarters and attached to Task Force South.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

** Includes two enlisted men attached to HHB for duty with Prov Arty Gp.

(2) Overall Strength of Command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05B20</td>
<td>Radio Operator</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13A10</td>
<td>FA Basic Crewman</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B40</td>
<td>Section Chief</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13Z40</td>
<td>FA Ops/Intel Asst</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13Z50</td>
<td>15G/Opns/Intel NCO</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16F40</td>
<td>FAW Section Chief</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17E20</td>
<td>Fld Illus Crewman</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31B50</td>
<td>Tactical Com Chief</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36K20</td>
<td>Wireman</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71B30</td>
<td>Clerk-typist</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71T20</td>
<td>TAERS Clerk</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91320</td>
<td>Medic</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) There exists a critical shortage of aviators, MOS 100B0. This command is authorized a total of 22 aviation warrant officers. At present, 12 are assigned. Although this shortage is partially off-set by an excess of three officer aviators, overall aviator strength is short seven aviators. Of those aviators assigned, eight are scheduled to rotate in the next four months. Additionally, the command has a shortage of 32 lieutenants which restricts the effectiveness of Forward Observer sections throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone.

(4) Enlisted personnel status has decreased during the reporting period with the overall command strength currently at 94.5%. Critical shortages exist in the following MOSs:

(5) The following accidents were recorded during this period for I FFORCEV Artillery units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle fatal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Non-fatal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) The following awards and decorations were approved for I FFORCEV Arty units:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF AWARD</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM V</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACH V</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C of A</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Morale and discipline continued to be excellent throughout the period.

2. (C) SECTION II: Lessons Learned - Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Countermortar Radar:

(a) Observation: Maintenance problems are a source of continual concern in the employment of the AN/MPSQ-4A countermortar radar at firebases subjected to frequent and heavy mortar attacks.

(b) Evaluation: In an area subjected to frequent mortar attacks, countermortar radar operation is required on a 24-hour basis. A back-up generator is required for continuous operation. Radar components can be adversely affected by shock from nearby artillery firings.

(c) Recommendation: That plans to emplace a countermortar radar in an area include the transfer of back-up power equipment to allow 24-hour operation. The radar should be emplaced at a safe distance from gun positions to minimize possible shock damage. The recommended distance is 100 meters, however, this distance is dependent upon soil composition and other factors which will vary the transmission of shock waves. All radars should be thoroughly checked prior to employment and a supply of spare parts should accompany the set into positions.

(2) Ground Surveillance Radar:

(a) Observation: There have been reported incidents of electronic interference of the AN/PPS-5 by return signals of the countermortar radar, AN/MPQ-4A.
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY FOR PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER TO 31 JANUARY 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Evaluation: It is highly unlikely that a return from a pulse modulated radar (CMR) would be picked up by a continuous wave radar (GSR); however, the frequency generated by the 400 cycle generator powering the CMR could produce a change in the received signal of the PPS-5 radar.

(c) Recommendation: That selective sighting be employed when the CMR and GSR are co-located to decrease the possibility of the PPS-5 receiving false signals.

3. Ground Surveillance Radar:

(a) Observation: During a recent operation, the AN/PPS-5 GSR was successfully utilized to vector an ARVN patrol to an estimated VC squad. This contact resulted in 3 VC KIA.

(b) Evaluation: The PPS-5 ground surveillance radar is not limited to the acquisition of targets. It can be used to vector friendly patrols while maintaining position data on the acquired target.

(c) Recommendation: That units exercising operational control of a PPS-5 radar consider its use in guiding friendly patrols.

4. Countermortar Radar:

(a) Observation: Valuable time was lost in a recent operation in the preparation of an operations bunker and site requirement for emplacement of a countermortar radar at a firebase subjected to frequent mortar attacks.

(b) Evaluation: Over one week was spent in preparing a site for the CMR. During this time, the firebase was continually subjected to mortar attacks that could have been located by the CMR had it been in place and operational.

(c) Recommendation: When intelligence reports indicate that a firebase is likely to come under enemy mortar attacks, a countermortar radar position should be prepared immediately. Consideration must be given to the following:

1. Safe distance from friendly artillery positions to prevent vibration damage.

2. High ground emplacement to provide minimum masking to the radar, but also providing protection from enemy fire.

(c. Operations:

1. Communication Trenches at Firebases:

(a) Observation: The accuracy of enemy gunners often severely restricts movement within firebases.
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AVFA-AT-D
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Evaluation: In this case bunker openings are targeted and precision fire is directed against anyone leaving a bunker or moving within the position area. As a result, personal stay within bunkers or behind revetments which normally can withstand direct hits. This affords the enemy the opportunity to launch ground attacks relatively unimpeded by friendly defensive fires. This also restricts rapid movement by officer and NCO supervisors between key installations, such as the fire direction center and howitzer positions.

(c) Recommendation: That communication trenches be constructed between key installations and defensive positions on the perimeter. This will enhance survivability and permit the safe deployment of reaction forces on firebases.

(2) Location of FM Radios and Antennas at Artillery Firebases:

(a) Observation: FM radios and radio antennas at firebases should be physically separated as much as possible, consistent with the tactical situation.

(b) Evaluation: Enemy attacks on firebases indicate that one of the initial targets has been the simultaneous destruction of unit communications. These attacks have been directed at fire direction centers, executive posts, radio vehicles and antennas. If this tactical achieves initial success, a unit can be without outside communications after the initial phase of the attack.

(c) Recommendation: That FM radios and radio antennas be separated within a battery position, consistent with the tactical situation, to reduce the possibility of losing all FM communications during the initial phase of an attack.

(3) Employment of Smoke:

(a) Observation: A recent firing accident involving US artillery in II CTZ has indicated a need for additional caution in the employment of smoke during adjustment.

(b) Evaluation:

1. In this particular accident the observer used two rounds of smoke, determined each to be safe and requested “Repeat, HE”. The round was fired using the same data; however, it impacted approximately 600 meters short of the last smoke round fired and wounded two US soldiers, both of whom later died.

2. Subsequent investigation and test firings of various lots of smoke ammunition produced extremely erratic results in range dispersion. The smoke rounds tested impacted from 200 to 600 meters beyond HE fired at the same data. The weapons used for all firings were 105mm howitzers, M101A1 and M102.

(c) Recommendation: To preclude a similar occurrence in the future, the following procedures should be used:
1 All smoke and other non-casualty producing ammunition should be segregated by lot.

2 Upon completion of normal HE registrations, one check round from each lot of smoke ammunition should be fired on the registration point to ascertain the existence of any major deviation in range for each lot.

3 When the firing of check rounds is not possible, the location of friendly units with respect to the gun-target line and possible erratic performance of the smoke round must be considered before firing HE in adjustment.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: CBR Training.

(1) Observation: It is essential that Unit Commanders continuously stress CBR training within their organizations.

(2) Evaluation: During a recent standoff attack against an I FFORCEV Artillery firebase, CS gas was employed.

(3) Recommendation: Each individual must be made aware of the NVA/VC capability to employ CS gas. Personnel must be prepared to repel ground attacks and continue the support mission while utilizing protective masks. Commanders must insure that all personnel possess a protective mask, that masks are properly fitted and that adequate alarm systems are present in the battery position.

f. Logistics: None.

g. Communications: None.
h. Material: None.
i. Other: None.

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHAG-C-DST
4-CG, I FFORCEV, ATTN: AVFA-GC-D
5-II FFORCEV
5-XXIV Corps
5-USAFAS
5-USAADS
3-ea IFFV Arty Gp/Sep Bn
1-FSCE

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DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATT: AVHGC-6ST, ARO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and concurs, except as noted below.

2. (U) Reference Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) paragraph 2b (2) (b): Nonconcurs. The AN/FPS-4 and AN/TAS-5 have operating frequency ranges of 16.5 to 17.0 GHz and 16.5 to 16.7 GHz respectively. Interferences between the two sets could disrupt components as well as cause interference during operation. To minimize or eliminate this problem the radar sets should be separated by a minimum of 50 meters and located so that the antennas are not directed at each other during operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CF:
2 - ACSFOR, DA
1 - CG, IFFORCE ARMY
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (31 Jan 70) 2d Ind

RCS GFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

28 MAR 70

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (U) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Ground Surveillance Radar", page 9, paragraph 2b(3): concur. This is a good example of imaginative commanders and staff officers attempting to gain full exploitation of the potential of the AN/PPS-5. Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Location of FM Radios and Antennas at Artillery Firebases", page 10, paragraph 2c(2): concur. The physical location of antennas provides the enemy with a reliable indicator of the presence of US/Allied troops. Units can enhance their operations security by physically separating antennas from respective radios and troop locations at the greatest possible distance; thereby, denying to the enemy this common source of foreknowledge/forewarning. Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

I. D. MURPHY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn;
HQ, I FFORCEV
I FFORCEV ARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
GPOP-DT (31 Jan 70) 3d Ind (U)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. Cline
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

14
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

270th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
272d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW)(SP)
Battery B, 7th Battalion, 29th Artillery (SLT)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (MC)

6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8" SP)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (TAB)
504th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar)
77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery Battalion Group

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105 T)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175/8" SP)

52d Artillery Group
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105 SP) (-8 Btry, 105 SP)
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175/8" SP)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155 T)
I FFORCEV Provisional Artillery Group

2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105 T)
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175/8" SP)
5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105 T) (with B/3/6, 105 SP, attached)

Divisional, Brigade and Separate Battalion

4th Infantry Division Artillery

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105 T)
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155/8" SP)
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105 T)
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105 T)

173d Airborne Brigade

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105 T)
3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Division (A)
Battery D, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105 T)
1. DAN CUYEN/HINES
2. DAN CUONG/LEE
3. GRID
4. 9th ROK INF DIV
5. DAN AN/SHERIDAN
6. 24th STZ

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

Incl 2
1. (C) Artillery strength as of 31 Jan 70 included 72 - 105mm howitzers, 21 - 155mm howitzers, 23 - 8" howitzers, and 25 - 175mm guns for a total of 141 tubes.

2. (C) Ammunition expenditures by target category:

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<thead>
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<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>NOVEMBER ROUNDS</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>DECEMBER ROUNDS</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>JANUARY ROUNDS</th>
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<td>CONFIRMED</td>
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<td>730</td>
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<td>595</td>
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<td>ACQUIRED</td>
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<td>283</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>128</td>
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<td>111</td>
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<tr>
<td>PREPARATION</td>
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<td>1,323</td>
<td>9,862</td>
<td>1,381</td>
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<td>SPECIAL PURPOSE</td>
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<td>7,722</td>
<td>953</td>
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<td>OTHER</td>
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<td>480</td>
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<td>19,656</td>
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<td>76,949</td>
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3. (C) Ammunition Expenditure by Caliber:

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<th>CALIBER</th>
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<th>RDS/TUBE/DAY</th>
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<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8 inch</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>21*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>105mm</td>
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<td>155mm</td>
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<td>8 inch</td>
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<td>175mm</td>
<td>11,601</td>
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<td>Sub Total</td>
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<td>105mm</td>
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<td>155mm</td>
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<td>8 inch</td>
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<td>Sub Total</td>
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GRAND TOTAL 263,212

* Prorated Average
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

31 January 1970

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310