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AUTHORITY
OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD509150

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

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28 Feb 1982, DoDD 5200.10

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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- US Army Transportation School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Commanding General
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-R-T-MHD
APO 96345

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. The 1st Infantry Division Artillery continued to support operations TOAN THANH (Phase IV), DANGER FORWARD (Phase I & II) and CHAMELEON. Artillery support for these operations was characterized by frequent changes in the artillery organization for combat (incl 1) and frequent tactical moves. Direct support (DS) batteries (105mm) were positioned as required to support the maneuver elements. General support (GS) batteries (155/8") were positioned to reinforce all DS battery fires, when possible, and provide counter mortar/rocket fires in defense of Lai Khe (X7736) and Dau Tieng (X74947). The roving gun concept was frequently used to provide heavy artillery support against enemy base camps and similar targets. Enemy activity remained light throughout the reporting period with enemy initiated actions being stand-off attacks with rockets, mortars, recoilless rifles and RPGs; defensive fires when surprised in base camps and during movement; mining and boobytrap incidents.

b. 1st Infantry Division Artillery was engaged in tactical operations and training every day of the reporting period.

c. Fifty-nine firing battery moves (46 overland and 13 rotary wing) were conducted during the reporting period.

d. The 1st Infantry Division Artillery has participated in the artillery DOAN TIEN (Forward Together) training of the 51st ARVN Artillery Battalion. The program was designed to improve ARVN artillery fire support by standardization and training in fire direction and firing battery procedures. A Battery and B Battery, 51st ARVN Artillery Battalion have completed initial training. C Battery, 51st ARVN Artillery Battalion, and B Battery, 52nd ARVN Artillery Battalion, have begun initial training.
2. (c) Lessons Learned; Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel. None.

   b. Intelligence. None.

   c. Operations.

   (1) Corrections to firing data for 6400 mil environment.

      (a) Observation: FDC personnel should be fully aware of the necessity of correcting for non-standard conditions throughout the entire 6400 mil zone of fire.

      (b) Evaluation: There are several ways to determine these corrections, some require long tedious computations and multiple GFT settings; while others are simplified by using FADAC. In the event FADAC is non-operational, 1st Infantry Division Artillery has developed a rapid technique utilizing wind cards which permit accurate corrections to be determined in a minimum amount of time. Total corrections are determined in the normal manner by registration. The concurrent met is then solved less the corrections for cross and range winds. The met corrections are subtracted from total corrections to determine constants which will subsequently be used. By assuming that rotation corrections are constant (valid for light artillery), wind cards are used to determine the corrections to range and deflection every 800 mils. These values are recorded on a chart for each charge. The final step is to subtract the corrections for wind (in the direction of the registration point) from the total corrections derived from the registration and construct a GFT setting on the stick using the sub-total range correction. The sub-total deflection correction is placed in the appropriate drift block. The total corrections depicted on the stick account for all non-standard conditions except wind. When a mission is to be fired, it is a simple step to add the recorded wind corrections (for the appropriate direction) to the chart data and use the GFT setting to determine firing data. When a subsequent met is solved to update the firing corrections, the same procedure of not computing wind corrections on the met data correction form is followed. The constants determined from the registration with concurrent met are added to the new met to determine a new GFT setting and deflection correction scale. Once again wind cards are used to determine the wind corrections which are recorded in chart form. The advantage to this technique is speed. The entire computational sequence will take less than 30 minutes for 5 charges once the sequence is mastered.

      (c) Recommendation: That this technique receive wide dissemination to all artillery units as an accepted procedure.

   (2) Survey Control by Aerial Resection.

Inclosure
(a) Observation: A four (4) battery fire support base (FSB) was carved from the jungle seven (7) kilometers from the nearest survey control point (SCP). The only access to this area was by convoy over an unsecured trail over five (5) kilometers long. Establishment of accurate survey control in this location would be extremely difficult and time consuming task, if in fact, not an impossibility. Providing survey control within a tactically feasible time frame necessitated the use of new or rarely used survey procedures. It was decided to employ aerial resection as a means of establishing a survey control point at the FSB. This procedure is nothing more than a modification of the same survey technique used in the fall-of-shot calibration. First a hub was driven into the ground within the FSB and a known direction was established by means of astronomical observation. Employing a LOR and a surveyor to identify various known SCP's, it was possible to obtain survey control from five (5) widely separated points. Once a SCP was identified, the helicopter would hover above it at a known altitude. The survey party at the FSB would take fire (5) readings from the FSB to the helicopter. Next these readings, both for direction and vertical angle, would be meaned. The LOR would then fly to the next station and the procedure would be repeated. Using the mean azimuth and vertical angle from all five stations it was relatively simple matter to compute the coordinates and altitude of the new SCP at the FSB. Once the SCP had been established, control was taken to the four firing batteries by performing a normal position area survey.

(b) Evaluation: Utilizing this method of survey, it was possible to establish control to four (4) firing elements in an inaccessible area in less than 24 hours. The only positive check available on this survey data has been derived from registrations. The small registration corrections experienced, (i.e., R1 to L6 VE's in the -5.0 m/s bracket) tend to verify the accuracy of this survey.

(c) Recommendation: That aerial resection be utilized to establish survey control at isolated fire support bases. Extensive study should be conducted by Target Acquisition Battalions to determine the accuracy of this method for establishing survey control points.

(3) Field Artillery Survey in RVN.

(a) Observations: The field artillery survey problem in RVN has been made more complex because of frequent changes in firing battery locations, employment in insecure areas, and the fact that firing units are spread out over large distances. In some cases, there is no practical way to extend survey control to firing batteries located in remote areas many kilometers from SCP's.

(b) Evaluations: When survey control is extended to remote position areas, more often than not, no accurate means of registration is available. Radars are not nearby, flash bases cannot be established without security and observed registrations are only as accurate as the maps used to identify registration points. Moreover, a high degree of firing accuracy is required to engage sensor activations and radar sightings, hence the need for accurate target area survey.

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IWDB-RAT 5 February 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Infantry Division
Artillery for period ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPDR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendations: The helicopter, along with distance measuring equipment (DME) can be used effectively to obtain accurate survey data. A team of six infantry men is placed aboard a UH-1D Helicopter and inserted into an LZ where they immediately secure the objective area. After the LZ is secured, another chopper brings in a lightweight tower approximately thirty (30) feet tall with suitable outriggers to steady it. After this tower is emplaced on a flat piece of ground, one DME operator exits the helicopter onto the top of the tower and emplaces the DME. Both helicopters then return to a secure area. The DME is turned in the direction of a known point to determine the exact distance of the new point. When electronic line of site is obtained, a plumb bob is dropped to the ground and a canister is driven into the ground. When the survey is complete, the helicopters return and pick up the tower and infantry and proceed to the next location. In order to identify the canister from the air, a large area of red paint can be sprayed around it and a car body dropped on it to make a suitable registration point. By this technique, survey control may be extended over great distances and through insecure terrain.

(4) Illumination Safety Calculation.

(a) Observation: Much emphasis is placed on safety procedures for firing shell illumination. A device is needed to provide a rapid graphic illustration of the canister impact and "trash box" for illuminating rounds.

(b) Evaluation: A graphical indicator was fabricated on a scale of 1:25,000 meters (see Fig 1). The device has a center line through its entire length. On the end is an expanded rectangular box underneath which is placed a 1000 meter diameter red circle with a tab so that it can be moved back and forth within the rectangle. Superimposed within the rectangle, made of clear acetate, are fixed "trash-pattern" boxes for 105 and 155 illumination rounds. When a fire mission is received, it is passed to the fire unit. The battery determines the canister impact for the given illumination burst grid. The device is aligned so that the center line is over battery center. The "Trash box" is superimposed over the burst grid, and the center of the red circle is placed over the announced impact grid. A graphic safety box is immediately visible. When required to shift the burst grid to ensure safety, this device can be rotated about the battery center and a safe grid selected without asking for a new impact grid from the fire unit.

(c) Recommendation: That this technique receive wide dissemination to all artillery units as an accepted procedure.
8UWJ2OTt Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Infantry Division
Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

1000 Meter Circle

Max Illumination Range

105mm "Trash Box"

155mm "Trash Box"

Fig. 1

d. Organisation. None.

e. Training. None.

f. Logistics.

(1) Container for Ice and Frozen Rations.

(a) Observation: Recently it became necessary to transport ice and rations over long distances. When these rations arrived, they were occasionally spoiled and the ice melted.

(b) Evaluation: A thermal container was designed to reduce food spoilage and ice melting. A conex container was placed on a 1½ ton trailer. The conex interior was lined with 3/4-inch plywood on top and 1-inch plywood on the sides and floor. A space was provided between the plywood and conex and filled with the styrofoam filler found in artillery fuse cans.

(c) Recommendation: This fabrication will permit transportation of large quantities of ice over great distances with little melting. Suggest this be adopted in units transporting rations over long distances.

g. Communications.

(1) Use of Radio Consoles.

(a) Observation: The time for emplacement of communications equipment has been excessive.

(b) Evaluation: An expedient was necessary to derecate the
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5 February 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Infantry Division
Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (II)

Time necessary to set up radio equipment. Two (2) large consoles were constructed with a sloping top covered with plexiglass for making notes using grease pencil (See Fig. 2). On the front were attached four (4) radio mounts. Inside and underneath the consoles were placed four (4) 24 volt truck batteries. All electrical connections were made in advance. Upon arriving in the new area, the commo section placed the radios on the mounts and connected the DC power source. After antennas were erected, the radios were instantly operational.

(c) Recommendation: That this technique be adopted by DS battalions. It is estimated that these two (2) consoles with four (4) radios each will save ten (10) or more man-hours of work in the new area.

Fig. 2

Material

(1) AN/PQX Radar Generator.

(a) Observation: Radar personnel experienced difficulties with the generator overheating and running erratically.

(b) Evaluation: The problems encountered were traced to improper oil changing procedures. Due to the long daily load on the generator, radar personnel began changing oil daily which eliminated the overheating and erratic functioning previously noted.

(c) Recommendation: That this procedure be disseminated to all units experiencing generator overheating problems.

(2) AN/PQR Generator.

(a) Observation: Impurities in the gasoline resulted in the fouling of spark plugs, necessitating frequent changes.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1970, REG CMNN-02 (M4) (U)

5 February 1970

(b) Evaluation: The installation of two filters in conjunction with the 24 volt electrical pump from a PU 107 generator has resulted in the removing of all impurities from the gasoline. Spark plugs are now changed every 90 days instead of a former 14 day period.

(c) Recommendation: That generators operating in areas where fuel contamination may exist be modified as stated above.

1. Other.

(1) Field Sanitation.

(a) Observation: There must be continuous emphasis on field sanitation in base camps and fire support bases. Mess halls must be subjected to frequent and careful scrutiny. A fool-proof system must be devised to prevent consumption of non-potable water.

(b) Evaluation: The only way to assure that required field sanitation procedures will be carried out is by command emphasis at all levels. Frequent inspections by the battalion surgeon and daily inspection by the battery officers will eliminate most problems in this area. Water must be checked for adequate chlorine residual before it is placed into containers for consumption. This can easily be done by assigning one individual the responsibility for testing all water brought into the unit.

(c) Recommendation: Sanitation should be inspected as often as necessary to preclude neglect of required procedures. That one individual per unit be provided with a water testing kit (FSN 6850-972-9489) and assigned the responsibility to examine all water brought into the unit for consumption. A complete record should be kept reflecting the results of his inspections.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S. G. JOHNSON
MAJ, FA
Adjutant

2 Incl
1. Artillery Organization
   for Combat
-2- Artillery Machine Gun
- Displacement
   Incl 2 wd HQ, DA
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, 1st Infantry Division Artillery (HQ GFOR-65) (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, 1st Infantry Division, APO 96345

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: 7th MFRD, APO 96266

1. (U) The 1st Infantry Division Artillery Operational Report - Lessons Learned has been reviewed and approved by this headquarters.

2. (U) This report is forwarded in compliance with USARV Sup 1 to AR 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
J.F. Cali
CPT, AGC
A&R NG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Infantry Division Artillery
For Period Ending 31 January 1970, HQ CSPOR - 65 (Ac) (c)

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending 31 January 1970, with the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2c(1)(b), lines 7-9 should read: The concurrent met is then solved and the met corrections are subtracted from total corrections to determine constants which will subsequently be used. By assuming...

b. Reference paragraph 2c(1)(b), lines 20-24 should read: When a subsequent met is solved, the corrections for cross and range wind are not computed. The constants determined from the concurrent met are added to the new met less wind corrections to determine a new GFT setting and deflection correction scales. Once again...

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. C. BARNET, JR.
CPT, AG
Asst AG

Copy furnished:
1st Inf Div Arty
II FFV Arty
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-1-NT, APF 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with the comments of indorsement.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Illumination Safety Calculations", page 4, paragraph c(4): concur. However, these procedures should not be accepted as standard. Recommend this item be forwarded to the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill Oklahoma for concurrence/comment regarding procedural changes.

   b. Reference item concerning "Use of Radio Consoles", page 5, paragraph 2g(1): concur. The console concept for communications and test equipment where the application can be used has numerous advantages. Some of the advantages are:

      (1) Usually conserves space.

      (2) Decreases the normal wear and tear on cable connectors and connectors on the equipment.

      (3) Decreases the possibility of damage to mounts and cable while transporting.

      (4) Decreases the possibility of damage to cable by routing the cable within the console.

This item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of Tips for Commanders.

   c. Reference item concerning "AN/PQR Generator", page 6, paragraph h(1) and (2):

      (1) Concur with page 6, paragraph h(1). The recommendation of changing oil more frequently in generators when they are operated in adverse conditions is sound. It is within the latitude of each unit commander to change lubricants more frequently than the DQ calls when in his judgement conditions warrant such action. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.
(2) Nonconcur with page 6, paragraph h(2). Modification of equipment in this manner is not authorized. The unit should take more precaution in handling fuel to insure that impurities are kept to a minimum. Periodic cleaning and flushing of the fuel tank and lines will also help eliminate the problem. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. Murray
CPT, AD
Assistant Adjutant

Cy furn:
HQ, II FFORCEV
HQ, 1st Inf Div Art
GPOP-DT (5 Feb 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (K2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
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ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT (U)

DATE MISSION

1 Nov
1/5 Arty (-) DS 1st Bde (105mm Howitzer, Divisional)
B/1/5 Arty reinforcing 2/33 Arty positioned by Div Arty

1/7 Arty (-) DS 2d Bde (105mm Howitzer, Divisional)
P/1/7 Arty reinforcing 2/33 Arty, positioned by Div Arty

2/33 Arty DS 3d Bde (105mm Howitzer, Divisional)

8/6 Arty GS 1st Inf Div Arty (155mm/8" Howitzer, Divisional)
A/8/6 Arty (3T) GSR 2/33 Arty, fizes planned by 2/33 Arty
A/8/6 Arty (3T) reinforcing 1/5 Arty, positioned by Div Arty
B/8/6 Arty (3T) GSR 2/33 Arty, fizes planned by 2/33 Arty
C/8/6 Arty GSR 1/7 Arty, fizes planned by 1/7 Arty
D/8/6 Arty GS

E/8/6 Arty reinforcing 1st Cav Div Arty, positioned by
1st Inf Div Arty
F/8/6 Arty reinforcing 1/7 Arty, positioned by Div Arty

5 Nov
C/1/7 Arty reinforcing 2/33 Arty, positioned by Div Arty
B/1/5 Arty released from reinforcing 2/33 Arty to PUG
1/3 Arty

F/1/7 Arty released from reinforcing 2/33 Arty to PUG 1/7 Arty

1 Dec
1/5 Arty DS 1st Bde (105mm Howitzer, Divisional)

1/7 Arty (-) DS 2d Bde (105mm Howitzer, Divisional)
C/1/7 Arty, reinforcing 2/33 Arty, positioned by Div Arty

2/33 Arty, DS 3d Bde (105mm Howitzer, Divisional)

8/6 Arty GS 1st Inf Div Arty (155mm/8" Howitzer, Divisional)
A/8/6 Arty (3T) reinforcing 1/5 Arty, positioned by Div Arty
A/8/6 Arty (3T) GSR 2/33 Arty, fizes planned by 2/33 Arty
B/8/6 Arty GSR, 2/33 Arty, fizes planned by 2/33 Arty
C/8/6 Arty GSR, 1/7 Arty, fizes planned by 1/7 Arty
D/8/6 Arty (3T) GSR 2/33 Arty, fizes planned by 2/33 Arty
D/8/6 Arty (2T) GSR, 2/33 Arty, fizes planned by 8/6 Arty
E/8/6 Arty reinforcing 1st Cav Div .Arty, positioned by
1st Inf Div Arty
F/8/6 Arty reinforcing 1/7 Arty, positioned by Div Arty

12 Dec
B/1/7 Arty reinforcing 2/33 Arty, positioned by Div Arty

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Infantry Division Artillery**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

**CO, 1st Infantry Division Artillery**

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5 February 1970

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