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<td><strong>TO:</strong> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
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<td><strong>FROM:</strong> Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 13 FEB 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR 0T UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (U) Mission. There were no mission changes.
   b. (U) Organization.
      (1) During this reporting period there were no changes to the organization of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat).
      (2) An organizational chart depicting the composition of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) may be found at Inclosure 1.
   c. (U) Command and Staff.
      (1) Significant changes in the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) command and staff structure during this reporting period are:
      Staff
      (a) On 12 December 1969, Captain James E. Tomlin, IN, 459-62-8104, replaced Major John W. Johnson, IN, 253-52-0048, as Battalion SI.
      (b) On 2 January 1970, Major Earl L. Kailchow, IN, 338-26-1528, replaced Major Roby H. Mau, SC, 408-62-9305, as Battalion S3.
      (c) On 12 January 1970, Major Stanley Minkinow, IN, 215-38-7953, replaced Major Lanny Standridge, IN, 409-54-4467, as Battalion Executive Officer.
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**Unit Commanders**


(f) On 2 January 1970, Major Thomas A. Knudtson, IN, 533-74-0568, assumed command of the 128th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) from Major William H. Luther, IN, 399-28-0456.


(2) Considerable turbulence in key personnel assignments resulted from changes in five command and two staff positions within a 35 day period. Battalion staff vacancies were filled utilizing experienced personnel from subordinate units thus reducing the experience level available to the new unit commanders. A recent command policy change, concerning length of command tours, will preclude recurrence of this situation.

(3) The current command and staff structure is reflected at Enclosure 2.

d. (U) **Unit strengths (as of 31 January 1970).**
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(1) Military.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF AUTH PFD</th>
<th>WO AUTH PFD</th>
<th>EM AUTH PFD</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>HHC</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432d Med Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>759th Med Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 11th Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>130</td>
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</table>

(2) Civilian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>D.C AUTH PFD</th>
<th>VN AUTH PFD</th>
<th>3d M.T'L AUTH PFD</th>
<th>TECH REP AUTH PFD</th>
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<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432d Med Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>759th Med Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 11th Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(1) Personnel Records. An average of 1141 records were maintained during the period. Processing totals were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Processed</th>
<th>Out Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Awards and Decorations. The following awards and decorations were processed this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Bronze Star &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Air Medal &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Army Commendation Medal &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2219</td>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
i. (C) Intelligence and Security.

(1) Throughout this period weekly intelligence briefings were presented to the Battalion Commander and staff. In addition, periodic intelligence briefings were presented to subordinate units. Intelligence information was gathered from II Field Force, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Aviation Brigade, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) and the 23d Artillery Group. These sources provided intelligence coverage for the entire 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) area of operations.

(2) The 12th Aviation Group (Combat) program to provide current intelligence information to all Group aviators, for operation and mission planning, was implemented by the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) on 13 December 1969. Enemy information resulting from Infrared, "Sniffer" and other intelligence reports is updated at 24 hour intervals. This information, received by the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and passed by daily courier to the companies, is posted on the units situation maps for easy pilot reference. Data is kept posted for 72 hours and removed.

(3) Security. Previously established security measures for the defense of Battalion aviation assets were improved throughout this period. Significant improvements include:

   (a) The addition of M-72 LAW anti-tank weapons along the bunker line.

   (b) Utilizing sector guards to conduct daily patrols outside the Phu Loi perimeter.

   (c) Repositioning claymore mines and trip flares nightly.

   (d) Random emplacement and operation of portable maintenance lights (FSN: 6320-877-9172) along the unlighted portion of the aircraft parking area.

j. (C) Plans, Operations and Training.

(1) Plans. All 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) OPLANS remained in effect.

(2) Operations.

   (a) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) supported the following major tactical units: II Field Force, III ARVN Corps, 1st Infantry Division, 5th ARVN Division, 1st Australian Task Force, Royal Thai Army
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Volunteer Force (RTAVF), Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (UTAC), Capital
Military Assistance Command (CMAC), Military Assistance Command Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (MACORS), 5th Special
Forces Group, 5th Signal Group, 3rd Brigade 9th Infantry Division, 3rd
 Brigade 82d Airborne Division, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and the
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(b) Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) Phase IV initiated on
1 November 1969, continued throughout this period. In support of the
operation the 11th Aviation Battalion transported 175,072 passengers and
46,239 tons of cargo while flying 77,299 sorties in 23,669 flying hours
(See Inclosure 4). Mission results for this period are found at Inclo-
sure 4. Ammunition expenditures by type and amount are found at Inclo-
sure 5.

(c) Throughout this period airmobile combat assaults (CA), tactical
extractions and direct combat support (DCS) missions were conducted daily
by the Battalion. Two battalion assaults, involving two assault heli-
copter companies, were conducted during this period.

(d) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) continued primary support
to the 1st Infantry Division throughout this period. A substantial
increase in support for the 5th ARVN Division was also experienced. The
Battalions two assault support helicopter companies continued to provide
general and direct combat support to all major units in the III Corps
Tactical Zone.

(e) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was assigned 23 helibucket
missions (CH-47 "Chinooks" equipped with two 350 gallon buckets). Seven
of these missions, or 30 percent were canceled prior to the aircraft arriv-
ing on station. The remaining 16 missions were completed successfully.
A total of 121 sorties were flown and resulted in 84,700 gallons of water
being dispensed on various type fires during this period. Helibucket
operations are discussed in paragraph 2 c (2).

(3) Training.

(a) During this period 121 personnel (77 percent of those eligible)
completed Vietnam in-country training required by USARV Regulation 350-1.
Training conducted by the 1st Infantry Division Training Center at Di An
terminated on 19 January 1970, due to preparation for redeployment. Future
in-country training assistance will be provided by the 11th Armored Cav-
alry Regiment.

(b) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Pathfinder Detachment assisted
Battalion Mobile Training Teams (BMTs) in conducting 18 classes for infantry and artillery units. Instruction encompassed correct procedures for rigging external loads, maintenance of rigging equipment, aircraft capabilities, LZ/PZ requirements and proper aircraft utilization.

(c) Additional impetus to provide ARVN training in proper utilization of airmobile assets resulted in the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) conducting 11 airmobile training classes for ARVN units.

(d) The Battalion received two allocations for the Jungle Environment Survival Training School (JEIST) and at present, has three school-trained escape and evasion officers.

(e) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) experienced an overall decrease in allocations for Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) courses. An increase of three allocations in the T-55-L-7 Engine Repairman Course and allocations to the AH-1G/UH-1C Airframe Repair and the Enlisted Armament Repair Courses were provided. Twenty-two allocations were received for the following courses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>NO OF ALLOCATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer Armament Repair Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Inspector Course</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Supply Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Maintenance Supervisor Course</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Airframe Repairman Course</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55-L-7 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55-L-11 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55-L-13 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G/UH-1C Airframe Repair Course</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Armament Repair Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) During this period the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Pathfinder Detachment, consisting of 14 personnel, conducted a total of 38 parachute training jumps to maintain combat proficiency.
(g) During the period 1 - 31 January 1970, the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) conducted a comprehensive H-16 training program providing 883 personnel four hours of technical training and four hours of range firing for familiarization and servicing.

(h) Individual aviator and unit night flight training was conducted throughout this period. An instrument training program was initiated which incorporates nonproductive to/from flight hours. Emphasis was placed on upgrading pilot performance through effective training.

(k) Logistics.

(1) During this period H-16A1 rifles were issued to units of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat). At present the Battalion has 879 H-16A1 rifles on hand, 82 short of authorized total.

(2) All sizes of Nomex Flight Suits are in short supply.

(l) Signal. The Battalion continued to improve its communications security program throughout the period. All battalion aircraft have been retrofitted with ZES/ZYR modifications. Classes in communications security and the NESTOR program were conducted for aviators, and unit COMSEC and avionics personnel.

(m) Maintenance.

(1) For all units of the Battalion, the average aircraft density was 15 UH-1B/C, each operating an average of 65.7 flying hours per month, 46 UH-1D/H aircraft, obtaining an average 101.3 hours each and 32 CH-47A/C aircraft averaging 70.3 hours per month (See Inclosure 6). Eight UH-1 aircraft were turned-in, 14 replacements were received. The assault support helicopter companies turned-in three CH-47 helicopters and received five replacements.

(2) Based on MTOS authorization at the close of the reporting period, the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was short one UH-1B/C and four UH-1D/H aircraft. The 213th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) operated with 14 CH-47C aircraft, one short due to a major accident during a previous quarter, and one due to full "C" conversion. The 205th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) has assigned 18 CH-47s.

(3) A shortage of qualified Technical Inspectors MOS 67W/40 for UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft continued to present a problem. With a combined total of 17 authorized and only five assigned within the Battalion, the work of the Technical Inspector was placed increasingly upon the On-The-Job
training personnel and maintenance supervisors. With the expected rotational loss and predicted input of 67%40s the problem will become more critical during the next reporting period.

n. (U) Aviation Safety. One major accident, three incidents, six forced landings, and 24 precautionary landings resulted in a cumulative accident rate of 4.2 per 100,000 flying hours. This is a reduction of 20.3 from the last period. The only major accident was caused by material failure. One incident was caused by material failure, two were attributed to pilot error. Material failure was the major contributing factor in all forced and precautionary landings.

o. (U) Medical.

(1) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Dispensary provided support for a patient population of over 3,150 personnel throughout the period. This support included the 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division, when their medical facilities closed three weeks prior to redeployment, and the 1st Aviation Battalion, due to non-availability of a qualified flight surgeon. Medical treatment was provided for 1,739 military personnel at the Battalion's medical facility. In addition, 556 Vietnamese civilians were treated although the Battalion does not participate in a MELCAP program.

(2) One case of malaria was reported during this period. There were no incidents of serious disease. Three injuries were incurred from hostile fire and no deaths occurred among Battalion personnel.

(3) The Battalion Flight Surgeon performed 148 flight physicals resulting in a saving of 2,500 man-hours which would have been expended transporting aviation personnel to Long Binh for flight physicals.

p. (U) Religious and Personal Services. Inclosure 7 reflects a summary of religious activities during this period.

q. (U) Civic Actions.

(1) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) supported three civilian institutes within the Binh Duong Province during this quarter.

(a) The 125th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) supported the Lai Thieu Deaf Institute by donating educational materials (text books, paper, colored pencils, crayons, chalk), sewing materials, and a limited amount of money.
(b) The 205th and 213th Aviation Companies (Assault Support Helicopter) continued their support of St. Joseph's Leprosarium near Ben Son, by supplementing the diesel fuel supply for their generators. The leprosarium is attempting a self-support industrial program by manufacturing bricks, tile, and textiles.

e) The 173rd Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) continued its support of the Lai Khe Elementary School.

(2) Significant progress has been made toward ultimate turnover of self-help projects to Vietnamese agencies. A Donor Deposit Fund was established to provide financial assistance to various Vietnamese civic action programs. While no important intelligence data has been gathered as a result of civic action, the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) is continuing effort in this direction.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (U) Intelligence. None.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) (C) Nighthawk Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Nighthawk operations are extremely effective in the III Corps Tactical Zone. During the first 60 days, 51 confirmed enemy KIAs resulted from 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Nighthawk aircraft operations.

(b) EVALUATION: The Nighthawk aircraft is equipped with a N-134 automatic gun, an AN/VSS-3 Xenon light and a night observation device (NOD)—which utilizes available light, (See Figure 1-1)*. The Nighthawk aircraft is normally accompanied by a UH-1D/H chase aircraft which acts as a vector and rescue ship. The Nighthawk aircraft flies blacked-out at an altitude of 1,000-600 feet AGL and utilizes its AN/VSS-3 Xenon infrared capability to augment the night observation device. As a target is detected by the NOD, the light operator switches to white light and illuminates the target area. The chase ship verifies the target exact location and secures necessary clearances. Upon receipt of clearance to fire, the door gunner engages the target with the N-134 automatic gun. The Nighthawk denies the enemy unrestricted movement in its area of operations during periods of darkness.

*Fig 1-1 wd HQ, DA (Illegible)
13 February 1970

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That one aircraft per assault helicopter company be equipped with the Nighthawk system.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Refinement and review of operational procedures is continuous to insure optimum employment and utilization of the Nighthawk system.

(2) (C) Helibucket Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The operational effectiveness of helibuckets was severely limited due to lack of repair parts.

(b) EVALUATION:

1 The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) has daily mission commitments to provide helibucket support for the Saigon-Bien Hoa Fire Brigade to assist in extinguishing fires. This mission was severely hampered due to lack of repair parts for the three helibuckets maintained by the Battalion.

2 Helibuckets consist of two 350 gallon receptacles fastened to an X-frame mount. (See Figure 2-1). The helibuckets are carried as an external load by a CH-47 Chinook helicopter and are filled by immersing into any water source with a depth of at least six feet. A "Trap-Door" type device is utilized to release water over the target area. The door can be hydraulically or electrically operated. Age and usage requires that extensive maintenance be performed to maintain at least one set of operational helibuckets. This maintenance is performed at the unit level. No direct support maintenance is available.

3 There are no published technical manuals governing either operation or maintenance of the helibuckets. Repair parts are not available through normal resupply channels.

4 All maintenance has been conducted on a trial and error basis and limited replacement parts have been acquired through cannibalization of one non-repairable helibucket or local fabrication.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That helibuckets be adopted and issued to CH-47 units as required.

---

1 ORLL for Period Ending 31 January 1969, Headquarters, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), 13 February 1969, paragraph 1 (j) (2) (c) 2.

*Fig 2-1 wd HQ, DA (Illegible)
That technical manuals be established governing operation and maintenance of helibuckets.

That a repair parts PLL be established.

Command Actions:

1. Repair parts are locally fabricated to maintain a limited degree of operational effectiveness.

2. Inquiries made to higher headquarters concerning status of repair parts have received negative results.

3. Requests for assistance have been submitted thru channels.

Evaluation of procedures for releasing external loads (CH-47).

Observation: A major aircraft accident occurred when a CH-47A, carrying an external load, experienced an engine failure on short final and was unable to quickly jettison the load. The aircraft hit the ground with a high rate of descent, causing the rotor to flex down and hit the fuselage, resulting in major structural damage.

Evaluation:

1. Release of the load was attempted by means of the cargo release button on the flight engineer's winch/hoist control grip. This method of release does not open the hook to its fullest extent. Since the aircraft had forward speed, the load created friction between the hook and the nylon donut and caused the load to be slow in falling from the hook.

2. The manual method of cargo release, utilizing the D-handle, was not attempted. This is the only method of release which opens the hook to its fullest extent. The D-handle manual release is located on top of the hook forward of the swash beam on which the cargo hook rides. The normal position of the crew member monitoring the load is to the rear of the cargo hatch. In this position the crew member is not able to reach the D-handle, without re-positioning himself.

3. TM 55-1520-209-10 lists the electro-pneumatic cargo release as an emergency release when in fact it is an alternate method and not meant to be used in all emergency situations.

4. Procedures for normal release of external loads are not standard throughout RVN. In some cases load release is accomplished by the pilots and in others by a crew member who is monitoring the load in the rear of the aircraft. Procedures for emergency release, and knowledge of methods available also vary in each unit.
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SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That crews be educated in various methods of releasing external loads and the functioning of the cargo hook during each method of release.

2. That an engineering study be conducted to redesign the cargo hook to open completely during all methods of release.

3. That the placement of the D-handle (manual release) be changed to make it more accessible to the crew member monitoring the load.

4. That N55-1520-209-10 be revised to change the nomenclature of the electro-pneumatic cargo release on the overhead panel from emergency cargo release to alternate cargo release.

COMMAND ACTIONS:

1. The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) conducted a seminar at which representatives of all CH-47 units in the 12th Aviation Group (Combat) and a member of the 228th Aviation Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, were present. Methods of releasing external loads were discussed in detail and a demonstration of the different release mechanisms was conducted. The aforementioned recommendations are the results of that seminar and are being submitted thru channels.

2. A training program within the Battalion was conducted to insure crews were aware of the different methods of cargo release available to them and the functioning of the hook during each method of release.

(C) Organization.

(1) Necessity for a Supply Technician Within Aviation Companies.

(a) OBSERVATION: Present HTOBs do not provide for supply technicians at company level.

(b) EVALUATION: At present the position of property book officer is filled by a rated aviator as an additional duty. This procedure does not provide the unit commander with the experience required to manage an efficient unit supply. Proper supply management is a full time task and is essential for accomplishment of the units mission. Units are not receiving experienced JCOs holding a military occupational skill designation within the supply career field. Consequently, unit supply activities require constant added supervision from the aviator/property book officer or his unit commander.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACA-AC

13 February 1970

SUBJECT: ORL for Period Ending 31 January 1970, ROCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a Warrant Officer Supply Technician be authorized at company level.

(d) COMMAND ACTIONS:

1 This headquarters instituted a program of close coordination and supervision of subordinate units. However, the inexperience at the company level make this corrective action inadequate.

2 A proper ITOE change will be submitted after the moratorium for ITOE changes is lifted.

(2) Necessity for Security Forces.

(a) OBSERVATION: The operational effectiveness of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) is severely hampered by daily security requirements for Phu Loi Base Camp.

(b) EVALUATION:

1 The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) is presently tasked with the responsibility of manning the Eagle Foot Sector (1300 meters) of the Phu Loi perimeter. Responsibilities include the maintenance and manning of 13 bunkers and one observation tower, secondary defensive positions and ammunition distribution points and the placement of all mines, barbed/concertina wire, faugasse, husch and trip flares.

2 To accomplish this, the Battalion has organized a security platoon of 61 personnel from assigned assets. It is composed of clerks, mechanics, drivers and other MOSs organic to the Battalion.

3 As the Battalion receives replacement personnel they are initially assigned to the Security Platoon for a period of four to six weeks. Those personnel are then reassigned to subordinate units of the Battalion as additional replacements are received.

4 By assigning personnel in this manner, the Battalion is able to maintain the base defense commitment and accomplish the various in-country training requirements for replacement personnel. This relieves subordinate units of the daily requirement to provide personnel for perimeter guard duty.

5 Although this solution has several advantages, the utilization of personnel in the security platoon deprives subordinate units of the services of specialized personnel thereby reducing operational effectiveness.
6 Security requirements are critical at this time due to the absence of major combat units at Phu Loi Base Camp.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) be provided a security force to accomplish the required security requirements.

(d) COMPLIANCE ACTIONS:

1. The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) requested MTOE augmentation on 8 June 1969. This request was returned from 1st Aviation Brigade without action due to a similar request for augmentation processed by that headquarters on 29 January 1969. On 13 January 1970, the augmentation request submitted on 29 January 1969 was returned without action.

2. A request for MTOE change is being prepared for submission.

- (U) Training. None.
- (U) Logistics. None.
- (U) Communications. None.
- (C) Material.

The Automatic Gun, 7.62mm, M-134 in the Door Mounted Configuration.

(a) OBSERVATION: The M-134 Automatic Gun is a highly effective assault weapon when employed from a semi-rigid mount in the cargo compartment of a UH-1 helicopter (See Figure 3-1).

(b) EVALUATION:

1. The M-134 automatic gun is an authorized, integral component of the Highthawk weapons system. There are three distinct advantages in utilizing the semi-rigid doorway mounted weapons system:

   - Allows the gun to be controlled and fired in a direct fire role by the aircraft door gunner.

   - Allows the gunner a maximum time for target engagement even as the aircraft turns away from the target by providing up to 160° lateral traverse from 10° to 170° outboard.

   - Provides access for eliminations of malfunctions or stoppages that might occur.

*Fig 3-1 wd HQ, DA (Illegible)
2 Power is supplied directly to the drive motor and feeder delinking assemblies from the 28 volt DC non-essential bus. Firing control is provided by two trigger switches attached to the control handles at the rear of the gun mount and is monitored by a two position ON-OFF switch. This simplified power supply system eliminates the need for a complex XM-21 control box assembly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all Nighthawk and UH-1B/C aircraft be equipped with this weapons system.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None.

1. (U) Other: None.

7 Incl

1. Organisational Chart
2. Command and Staff Structure
3. Aircraft Status
4. Operational/Mission Results
5. Ammunition Expended
6. Aircraft Maintenance Statistical Summary

7. Chapal Statistics

Incls 2 and 7 wd HQ, DA

DISTRIBUTION:

5 copies to CO, 12th Aviation Group (Combat)
2 copies to CG, 1st Aviation Brigade
3 copies to CG, USAFR
2 copies to CG, CINCUSARPAC
1 copy to CO, 145th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 210th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav
AVBACA-9C (13 Feb 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, 11th CSFO, C-60 (B2) (U)

DA, HQ, 12th Avn Gp (Cbt), APO 96266 24 Feb 70

TO: Commanding General, 11 Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

1. (U) In accordance with USAV Reg 525-15, subject report is forwarded.

2. (U) Reference paragraph 1k(2). A Group Study is in progress at this time to determine the shortage of Nomex.

3. (U) Reference paragraph 2c(2). This Hq has received no such request to date. Coordination has been made with the 11th Avn Bn for resolution of this problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN W. JOHNSON
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, HCS 00H-65 (R2)(U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBC-G, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 January 1970, as indorsed, with the following comment: Reference paragraph 2d(2), basic correspondence. The unit is being advised through command channels against creation of provisional units for defensive purposes and requested to review the impact of their present security requirement with the installation coordinator at Phu Loi.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. L. BOSHANS
Asst. AG
AVBAGO-0  (13 Feb 70)  3d Ind
SUBJECT:  Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384  16 MAR 1970

THRU:  Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
        Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO:   Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.  20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with subject report as indorsed.

2. The following comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 1k(2), page 8, states that all sizes of NOMEX flight suits are in short supply. This headquarters has determined that there are only sufficient quantities of NOMEX flight suits for 2 sets per crew member. Subordinate units are being advised to stress close coordination between supply personnel at company and battalion level to alleviate the size problem. Recent approval has been obtained to issue four sets of NOMEX flight suits to each aircrew member. When available, additional NOMEX flight suits will be issued to all Brigade units.

   b. Paragraph 1m(3), page 8, addresses the problem of the shortage of Technical Inspectors. USARV percentage of fill is 62%. 12th Aviation Group (Combat) is 66.7% of fill. This headquarters is advising subordinate units to redistribute Technical Inspector assets to achieve a fair share in each battalion and company.

   c. Paragraph 2c(1), page 12, recommends that one Nighthawk system be authorized per Assault Helicopter Company. Although the present availability of the Nighthawk system is limited, its combat proven effectiveness is most significant in view of the intensive efforts being made to develop effective night observation devices and weapons systems. This headquarters recommends that two Nighthawk systems be authorized per Assault Helicopter Company at such time as the system became available in sufficient quantities to support such a basis of issue.

   d. Paragraph 2c(2), page 12, addresses the problem of maintaining helibuckets used by CH-47's to fight fires. This headquarters concurs with the recommendations and will request through USARV that action be taken at DA level to provide spare parts and technical manuals for the helibucket system.
e. Paragraph 2d(l), pages 15 and 16, recommends that aviation companies be authorized a nonrated Warrant Officer Supply Technician. This problem has been addressed in the past. A recommendation was sent through channels to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. The request was not favorably considered.

f. Paragraph 2h(e), page 19, recommends that all Nighthawk and UH-1B/C aircraft be equipped with the M-134 automatic gun in the door mount position. The advantages of the M-134 are recognized. However, for safety reasons the M-134 is not favorably considered for use on all UH-1B/C gunships. Additionally, the door gun ammunition requirements of the M-134 would preclude an adequate ammunition load for other weapons systems on the aircraft. Those Nighthawk systems that do not have the M-134 are equipped with the .50 cal machinegun for missions that are likely to encounter heavy targets such as sampans.

g. Reference: 2d Ind, HQ II FFORCEN. Concur with comment on provisional units. This headquarters is advising all subordinate units that the organization of a provisional security detachment is not authorized.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGC
Asst AG.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (13 Feb 70) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOH-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPO-P-DT, APO 96558

30 MAP 1970

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Night Hawk Operations", page 11, paragraph 2c(1), and paragraph 2c, 3d Indorsement. Concur with the recommendation as one solution to the basis of issue for this type of equipment. The Night Hawk provides USARV an interim capability for night denial operations. Based upon the recommendations of tactical commanders and an evaluation of the Night Hawk system by ACTIV, USARV has established a BOI for 64 Night Hawk systems. To provide for flexibility of employment, the BOI is to division, separate brigade, and aviation group level. Other night denial systems, such as INFANT and FLIR, are being examined. A final determination as to the optimum basis of issue for any of these items must be deferred until all evaluations have been completed. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Helibucket Operations", page 12, paragraph 2c(2), and paragraph 2d, 3d Indorsement: concur. Action will be taken by this headquarters upon receipt of requirements from the 1st Aviation Brigade.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "The Release of External Loads", page 14, paragraph 2c(3): concur. CH-47 external load operating procedures will be an agenda item at the USARV Quarterly Standardization Conference, 30 March 1970. It is recommended that the matter of system redesign be addressed by AVSCOM.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Necessity for a Supply Technician", page 15, paragraph 2d(1), and paragraph 2e, 3d Indorsement: concur with the 3d Indorsement. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (H2)(U)

(c) Reference item concerning "The M-134 in the door-mounted Configuration", page 17, paragraph 2h, and paragraph 2f, 3d Indorsement: nonconcur. All UH-1B/C aircraft should not be equipped with the door-mounted M-134 gun system. The weapons systems presently installed on these gunships are considered adequate, and the addition of the door-mounted M-134 would not significantly increase the effectiveness of a gunship. The door-mounted M-134 is authorized for all Night Hawk aircraft. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT. ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Avn Bde
11th Avn Bn
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 7 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Inclusion 1

11TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
AS OF 31 JANUARY 1970

11th Avn Br (Cbt)
APO 96289
Phu Loi, RVN

HQ & HQ Co
APO 96289
Phu Loi, RVN

128th Avn Co
(Aslt Hel)
APO 96289
Phu Loi, RVN

173d Avn Co
(Aslt Hel)
APO 96289
Lai Khe, RVN

205th Avn Co
(Aslt Spt Hel)
APO 96289
Phu Loi, RVN

213th Avn Co
(Aslt Spt Hel)
APO 96289
Phu Loi, RVN

Security Platoon
Phu Loi, RVN

Pathfinder Det
APO 96289
Phu Loi, RVN

432d Med Det
APO 96289
Phu Loi, RVN

759th Med Det
APO 96289
Lai Khe, RVN

* NOTE: Reflects functional organization as opposed to TOE.
### 11TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
#### AIRCRAFT STATUS
#### AS OF 31 JANUARY 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>UH-1</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
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<td>ON HAND</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
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<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11th Avn En (Cbt)</td>
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11TH AVIATION BATT-LION (COMB.T)
OPERATIONAL MISSION RESULTS
FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 1969 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 1970

a. Operational Results:

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<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>TONS LIFTED</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
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<td>1,324</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>475</td>
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b. Mission Results:

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<th>CBT LOSSES</th>
<th>ENEMY STRUCTURES KIA</th>
<th>DAM</th>
<th>DEST</th>
<th>SAMPANES DAM</th>
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Inclosure 4
11TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)

UNIT ACTION EXPENDED
FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 1969 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 1970

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Inclosure 5
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<td>12.3</td>
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<td>NORS (%)</td>
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Inclosure 6
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 11th Aviation Battalion

13 February 1970

N/A

701102

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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