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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery
(11 January 1970)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96225

AVICDA-HD

15 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970, HCS OSFOR-6 (R2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

   a. General. During the period, 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, the 25th Infantry Division Artillery continued combat operations in support of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) IV.
   c. Operations and significant activities.
      1) 7th Battalion 11th Field Artillery
         (a) During the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970 the 7th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery continued Phase IV of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) in the Tay Ninh area. The period was marked by a decline in enemy activity. The battalion remained headquartered at Tay Ninh Base Camp and its mission continued as direct support to the 1st Brigade. On 1 November the batteries were deployed as follows: Battery A at FSB Crook, Battery B at FSB Ruell, and Battery C at FSB Hunter. In addition to providing direct support to the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, the battalion also provided artillery support to ARVN elements operating in the Tay Ninh area and the US Navy patrolling the Van Go Dong River. During the quarter, further emphasis was placed on platoon and squad-size patrols and ambushes. The following maneuver elements were present in the 1st Brigade AO and received their artillery support through the 7th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery: 2/22 Inf (M), 3/22 Inf, 4/5 Inf, 4/23 Inf (M), and 2/34 Armor (-).

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 25th Infantry Division
Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970, NOS CFS08-6 (22)

(b) Expenditures for the period were: 7/11 FA 68,317; other units
tiring in support of 1st Brigade - 72, 994; total expenditures - 141,311.

(c) The brigade boundary was changed effective 21 Dec 69, which necessitated
moving several artillery units. FSB Wood passed to control of 2d Brigade and
3/7/9 moved to Tay Ninh Base Camp; 2/22 Inf (M) was returned to control of 3d
Brigade.

(d) On 24 Dec 69, B/7/9 moved from FSB Rawlins to Tay Ninh Base Camp and
subsequently departed the AO. C/3/13 moved from Tay Ninh Base Camp to FSB
Rawlins.

(e) FSB Crook was closed on 31 Dec 69 and A/7/11 moved to Tay Ninh Base
Camp.

(f) The battalion began using barge artillery on 6 Dec 69. C/7/11
was selected to operate as the riverine battery. This concept has proven suc-
cessful within this AO. Otherwise inaccessible areas can be reached with light
artillery in support of the infantry without the problems of airlift techniques.
Minor difficulties were originally encountered in Navy support, loading and off-
loading, resupply, and space utilisation but were rapidly overcome as experience
and additional knowledge of this mode of transport were gained.

(g) The brigade conducted Operation Cliff Dweller IV from 4 through 11
Jan 70. Effective artillery support required movement of several artillery
batteries. On 3 Jan 70, 0/3/13 displaced to FSB Bragg and A/7/11 to FSB Rawlins.
On 4 Jan 70, 3 howitzers of B/7/11 moved to FSB Bragg. The remainder of B/7/11
was moved on 9 Jan 70 to FSB Bliss (X2262614). All units returned to respective
home stations on 12 Jan 70.

(h) The Combined Fire Support Coordination Center began active operation
on 24 October 1969. On that date, the US artillery element took over the job
of passing coordinating clearances between US units and Provincial units.
The ARVN artillery, US Navy, USAF, and USNAP elements also began their operations
within the CPSCC at this time. Since beginning operation, the center has
gradually moved more into its intended role of fire support coordination.
Although the passing of clearances constitutes a major part of the daily work-
load within the center, this should not be construed as the main purpose of
the organization. During the period 1 - 30 Nov, 2360 requests for clearances
were submitted by US elements of which 1316 were cleared. 687 requests were
submitted by Vietnamese elements of which 608 were cleared. US artillery is
requesting more and more ARVN artillery support as the center continues to coordi-
date the use of both US and Vietnamese firepower. During the month of November,
ARVN artillery assistance was requested by the US artillery on 10 Red Haze targets, 2 Duffillages, and 5 SLAR readouts. As a result of coordination with the Province TOC by the CFSCC, the Vietnamese are requesting US artillery support to a greater extent on intelligence reports and contact missions. US and ARVN artillery have been used together successfully on a number of occasions since the CFSCC began operation. Some examples from the month of November follow:

On 19 November, the CFSCC received an intelligence report of a probable rocket, mortar, and sapper attack on To Ninh Est. The CFSCC immediately passed this information to US elements, and through close coordination with the MACV advisors and the Sector TOC developed a joint plan of fire support utilizing both US and ARVN artillery in order to prevent a major attack from the north as the intelligence report had indicated. An area was planned in which interdiction fire was to be placed by US and ARVN artillery throughout the night, beginning with a TOT on the primary suspect enemy location at 1200 hours. Small contacts were made during the night south and northeast of the city. US and ARVN artillery were once again used successfully in order to provide both HE and illumination in support of those contacts. Another example of fire support coordination which is accomplished on a day to day basis by the CFSCC: on 30 November both a US request for ARVN artillery and a Vietnamese request for US artillery were processed. The sector duty officer requested US artillery in support of a 216th Regional Forces contact vicinity XT2752. US artillery expended 76 HE in blocking fires. In a like manner, ARVN artillery was requested in support of the 3d Battalion 22d Infantry contact vicinity XT1748. ARVN artillery expended 10 illumination. The CFSCC planned coordinated defensive targets with a common identification and numbering system to be used in defense of hamlets and outposts by both US and ARVN artillery.

(2) 1st Battalion 8th Field Artillery

(a) The Battalion continued support of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in Operation Toan Thang Phase IV. On 5 November, a 3/4 Cavalry Squadron helicopter received small arms fire at grid XT548185. Gunships and artillery were employed on the target. A, B, and D/3/13 expended 107 HE rounds and C/1/8 expended 66 HE rounds on the contact area. C/1/8 was credited with 4 secondary explosions and D/3/13 with 4 secondary explosions.

(b) On 11 November, B/1/8 fired the one millionth round fired by the Battalion in Vietnam. SPC Crosby, Chief of Firing Battery, issued the commands and BG Henderson pulled the lanyard firing the round.

(c) On 10 December, an AP from A/1/5 Nach spotted movement at grid XT650270. A light fire team engaged the area with rockets and mini-guns, while a flare ship furnished 18 illumination rounds on the area. A/1/5 reported an 5
explosion similar to RPG's, but later it was found to be an AVVN claymore mine set off accidentally. Later that evening A/1/5 found 6 WC BC KIA credited to the claymore mine, and several blood trails.

(d) After a relatively quiet period 6/1/8 was given march order at 0845 hours on 22 December from FSB Devins. The battery departed FSB Devins at 0912 hours and the main body closed FSB Wood at 1045 hours. The guns were laid and ready to fire at 1105 hours.

(e) On 26 December, US Navy patrol boats while heading north on the Saigon River to set up AP's received a B-40 rocket and small arms fire at grid 670240. One boat (US) sustained a direct hit by B-40 rocket and sank with 1 man missing. The Navy requested illumination; A/1/8 expended 86 II and A/3/13 expended 21 III.

(f) Coupled with the upswing in heavy radar sightings on 16 December, TSB-25 radar detected personnel at grid Xr6'15816. A/1/8 Artillery expended 24 rounds (HS). On 29 December A/2/14 Infantry found 25 BC OA on grid Xr6'15219 and A/1/8 was credited with 25 WC KIA.

(g) At 0610 hours, 8 January, a significant Yellow Jacket target was passed to the Battalion for engagement. A B-52 strike and subsequent artillery TOT were exploited by a 3/4 Cavalry troop insertion resulting in the discovery of equipment and food in the objective area.

(h) During the quarterly reporting period the three batteries of 1st Battalion 6th Field Artillery were credited with 87 WC/VWA (HC), destruction of 1 building and 51 bunkers, and 78 secondary explosions.

(3) 2d Battalion 77th Field Artillery

(e) At 1220 hours, 30 December 1969, Company B 2/22 Inf, in a combined operation with the 504th HP Company, received EA and AW fire in the vicinity of Xr4'7143. LT Bickell, FO B/2/22 Inf, immediately called for artillery support; however, due to close contact, artillery could not be effectively employed until later in the afternoon. The enemy, in well fortified, heavily booby trapped positions, was engaged with small arms, automatic weapons and helicopter light fire teams. At 1405 hours, LT Bickell began adjusting A/2/77 on enemy positions and at Xr4'40142 observed one secondary explosion. At 1507 hours, CPT John Jordin, LNO 2/22 Inf, adjusted artillery from A/2/77 on enemy positions at Xr4'40141. At 1815 hours, the infantry broke contact with the enemy and at 1900 hours A/2/77 Artillery begun firing illumination rounds for the extraction of friendly from the contact area. Throughout the night of 30 December 1969, the artillery continuously pounded the area of contact and
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-6 (E2)

enemy positions. Artillery units firing on these targets were D/3/13, A/3/13, A/2/77, and B/2/77. Casualties were 1 WIA (2/22 Inf). The RF Company sustained 1 KIA. A final sweep of the area of contact yielded the following surveillance: 22 enemy body count (6 credited to artillery) and 28 bunkers, 100 miscellaneous booby traps and 7 AK-47 rifles, 1 LMG, 1 RPG (L), 6 hand grenades, 5 lbs of web gear, and numerous AK magazines. Total artillery expenditures for the action were:

\[
\begin{align*}
A/2/77 & : 105\text{mm} - 487 \text{ HE} & 29 \text{ WP} & 84 \text{ Ill} \\
B/2/77 & : 105\text{mm} - 204 \text{ HE} \\
A/3/13 & : 155\text{mm} - 70 \text{ HE} \\
D/3/13 & : 8\text{"} - 40 \text{ HE} \\
\text{TOTAL} & & & 801 \text{ HE} 29 \text{ WP} 84 \text{ Ill}
\end{align*}
\]

(b) During the months of Nov 69, Dec, 69, and Jan 70, the Batteries of the 2d Battalion 77th Artillery supported 69 US or VN contact missions, and fired in response to 251 radar pickups, 347 Duffelbag activations, and 30 S/R, Sniff, and Red Haze pickups. Total expenditures were:

\[
\begin{align*}
A/2/77 & : 8,122 \text{ HE}; 693 \text{ FG} ; 500 \text{ Ill} ; 42 \text{ WP} ; 12 \text{ GS} \\
B/2/77 & : 7,075 \text{ HE}; 544 \text{ FG} ; 521 \text{ Ill} ; 9 \text{ WP} \\
C/2/77 & : 6,231 \text{ HE}; 484 \text{ FG} ; 415 \text{ Ill} ; 10 \text{ WP} ; 8 \text{ GS}
\end{align*}
\]

(c) Personnel and Logistics.

1. The Battalion maintained 97% of its authorized strength during the quarter. A total of 6 valor awards, 45 achievement awards, and 187 service awards were recommended for members of the battalion for the 3 months.

2. During the past quarter, logistic operations consisted of coordinating resupply activities in support of the firing units. Ammunition expenditures approximated those of the last quarter. Emergency resupply of Class V by air was not necessary.

(d) Intelligence Operations and Civil Affairs. The availability of intelligence information has increased greatly over the past few months. Through active Civil Affairs programs, the people are becoming more and more aggressive in supporting the Americans and the Government of South Vietnam, and are, therefore, more willing to pass worthwhile information on to us.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970, HCS CSFOR-6 (R2)

(4) 3d Battalion 13th Field Artillery

(a) During the past quarter, Battery A moved from Fire Support Base Houston II to Fire Support Base Houston. This move was completed on 28 December 1969. The battery's mission for November and most of December was General Support-Reinforcing the fires of the 1st Battalion 8th Field Artillery. The mission of Battery A at Fire Support Base Houston was General Support-Reinforcing the 2d Battalion 77th Field Artillery. Two howitzer sections were detached and sent to FSB Hampton under the operational control of Battery B. During the reporting period Battery A was credited with 72 secondary explosions; the destruction of 59 bunkers, 130 sections of hedges, 3 foot bridges, 15 tunnels or tunnel complexes, 5 hooches, and 3 fighting positions; starting one major fire; and killing 59 of the enemy.

(b) Battery B spent November and most of December in a split configuration with four howitzer sections at Fire Support Base Houston and two howitzer sections under the operational control of Battery B at Fire Support Base Hampton. The mission of the battery (--) was General Support-Reinforcing the 2d Battalion 77th Field Artillery. On 28 December the battery was reunited by completing a move to Fire Support Base Patton II, where the mission of General Support-Reinforcing the fires of the 1st Battalion 8th Field Artillery was assumed. The fires of Battery B during this period were credited with killing 14 of the enemy, destroying 34 bunkers, and causing 15 secondary explosions.

(c) Battery C spent the entire reporting period with the mission of General Support-Reinforcing the fires of the 7th Battalion 11th Field Artillery. The battery operated entirely in Tay Ninh Province moving often from their home base at Tay Ninh Base Camp and effective 24 December 1969, from Fire Support Base Rawlins to support the operations of the First Brigade. Battery C moved to Gao Xai, 5 – 8 November, to support US troop operations along the Cambodian border, and to Fire Support Base Rawlins 16 – 20 November to support First Brigade operations in Eastern Tay Ninh Province. During December the battery moved once, 14 – 15 December, to FSB Rawlins to again support operations in Eastern Tay Ninh Province. On 24 December 1969 Battery C moved its home base of operations from Tay Ninh Base Camp to Fire Support Base Rawlins. January 3 – 12 were spent at Fire Support Base Bragg supporting First Brigade operations on Kui Di Don, returning to Fire Support Base Rawlins upon completion. Only limited surveillances of missions fired have been received by Battery C. During the reporting period they have been credited with one secondary explosion.

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AVDODA-80

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970, HHS CHFOR-6 (H2)

(a) Battery D has remained based at Fire Support Base Hampton for the period with the mission of General Support to the 25th Infantry Division. Numerous times during the period two sections of the battery and a reduced Fire Direction Center have displaced to various fire support and patrol bases. There were nine displacements to Fire Support Base Devins: 4 - 6 November, 11 November, 15 November, 20 - 21 November, 29 November - 3 December, 9 - 10 December, 11 December, 12 December, and 14 - 23 December. Two displacements were to Fire Support Base Hull for the periods 13 - 15 November and 27 - 29 November. The battery displaced two howitzers to Patrol Base Harris on 25 January for a five day operation, returning to FSB Hampton on 30 January. During the period there were no recorded surveillances directly credited to Battery D.

(e) Mortar training was conducted by the 3d Battalion 13th Field Artillery for elements of the 3d Battalion 4th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion 34th Armor during the period 28 November - 6 December 1969. The instruction presented covered all aspects of mortar training and a live firing exercise was conducted to give students experience in computing and firing HE missions.
2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.


(1) Observation. In many MOS's, especially those of a technical nature (i.e., Radar, FADAC operators, etc) school trained personnel are not available. This necessitates one person, who was himself OJT trained, training other non-qualified personnel. In some cases, this chain of job trained personnel training others stretches back over many cycles. This degrades the total effectiveness of a section.

(2) Evaluation. At least one man in each technical section should be formally school trained. By so doing the other personnel in the section could be trained in the most up to date techniques and the overall efficiency of the section would improve.

(3) Recommendation. That units take advantage of as many in-country schools as possible to overcome the problem of skill degradation resulting from secondary, tertiary, and more remote forms of transfer of knowledge.

b. Intelligence: none

c. Operations.

(1) Medcaps Conducted at Battery Level

(a) Observation. One battalion has begun to have battery medics and other personnel perform Medcaps in small villages close to the fire support base at which the unit is located.

(b) Evaluation. It has been found that this has greatly improved relations between the troops at the fire support bases and the neighboring indigenous personnel.

(c) Recommendation. That battery level Medcaps be employed to further extend the existing Medcap program.

(2) Refinement of FADAC Procedures

(a) Observation. The selection of matrix function B-4 (OT Line adjust) establishes a fixed direction from which the computer will apply observer corrections. This procedure is fine for a stationary target. If an aerial observer is adjusting on a moving target or makes a large deviation change (500m or greater) the actual OT Line will change; however, the FADAC will continue making corrections on the basis of the original gun target line. The observer will use the new OT Line to make his adjustments, and the computer must do likewise.
(b) Evaluation. The solution to this problem is quite simple. By using the enabling procedure for matrix function D-4 (CT Line adjust) after a large shift in deviation, the computer will use the new sun target line on subsequent corrections. The chart operator in the FDC must also reorient his target grid to the new CT line after large shifts in deviation to account for the new CT line.

(c) Recommendation. That consideration be given to use of the enabling procedure for matrix function D-4 (CT Line adjust) after large shifts in deviation to account for the new CT line.

d. Organization. Augmentation of Ammunition Section.

(1) Observation. A battalion ammunition section as organized by the TOS does not have sufficient resources to perform its mission in a Vietnam type of environment without an augmentation of personnel and communications equipment.

(2) Evaluation. The organization of the battalion ammunition section is based on the personnel and equipment required to support the firing batteries in a conventional situation where the batteries are in close proximity to the battalion headquarters. In that type of situation the battalion ammunition section picks up Class V from the ASF and delivers it to the battalion holding area. This type of re-supply generally requires that the section operate as one element and movement is radio in a single convoy. In the Vietnam type environment, with great distances between the batteries and battalion headquarters, the section is usually responsible for 3 or 4 convoys to separate locations each day. All ammunition is delivered by the battalion ammunition section because the firing batteries supply their own vehicles for pick up of the other classes of supply. It is not always practical to combine or coordinate these ammunition convoys with the firing battery convoys and each separate convoy must have an escort vehicle to provide communication and security. Since the battalion ammunition section is authorized only one 1 ton with radio, the other escort vehicles must be provided from other sections. This seriously detracts from the other sections' capability to perform their mission.

(3) Recommendation. That battalion ammunition sections working in a Vietnam-type environment be augmented by the addition of three (3) AN/PRC-25 radios.

e. Training: none

f. Logistics: none

g. Communications: none
h. Material.

(1) Fabricated Portable Power Supply for AN/FFS-5 Radar Set.

(a) Observation. A critical shortage of component battery boxes for the AN/FFS-5 Radar Set created the need for a field expedient battery container.

(b) Evaluation. Investigation by the Division Artillery Signal Officer revealed that a 50 cal Ammunition Box (Metal) could be employed to house two of the standard AN/FFS-5 batteries (Battery, Storage BD-622D/U). The normal component battery box for the Radar Set houses only one such battery. Use of two batteries allows both dual (one battery used for one AN/FFS-5, one battery stand-by or being charged. Also two (2) AN/FFS-5 can be operated simultaneously using both batteries and both power cables) and parallel (two batteries connected in parallel) operation. (See enclosures 5 and 6) The most outstanding characteristic of the configuration is that when wired in parallel, the Radar Set is allowed to operate continuously for up to a 14 hour period. This eliminates the need for changing the battery after six (6) hours of operation during the hours of darkness as is the practice with the AN/FFS-5 component battery assembly. Two economy factors also were evident: the relatively low cost of materials for the fabricated power supply and the fact that battery life of the BD-622D/U can be doubled with parallel operation. Battery life of the BD-622D/U is in terms of total number of charging and discharging cycles. Because both batteries may be charged simultaneously and discharged together over a fourteen (14) hour period, as compared with the normal six (6) hour period in single battery configuration, twice the usable life span of the battery in the normal configuration may be expected.

(c) Recommendation. That the above field expedient battery configuration be used where necessary, and that a twin battery configuration be adopted in place of the present single battery component power supply for the AN/FFS-5 Radar Set.

(2) Ancillary Equipment for M102 Howitzer.

(a) Observation. Ancillary equipment for the M102 howitzer is limited. To enhance speed and accuracy and contribute to crew efficiency several items not provided with the weapon must be fabricated.

(b) Evaluation. Units of one battalion have developed several techniques to assist the cannoners of M102 howitzer sections in performing their duties. Listed below are three items which may prove helpful to other units having the same type weapon.
1 Loading Rack for M102 Howitzer. A loading rack has been constructed to be employed on the trails of the M102 howitzer. Rounds may be fused, charges out, and stacked on the loading rack. This is especially helpful during the firing of preparations or other missions requiring that several rounds be fired quickly. Additionally, several units in this AO have certain acquired targets which, because of range and location will be fired on by the unit 99% of the time. Having several rounds prepared for quick reaction will result in better response to targets which present themselves briefly. (See sketch, Incl 2)

2 Collimator Bunker. The collimator bunker has been constructed to protect the collimator from the elements, helicopter rotor wash, and damage from hostile fire. The requirements for construction of this bunker are obvious. (Incl 3)

3 Gunner's Seat. During contact fire missions a gunner may be required to remain at his post for extended periods. As the M102 howitzer is a low silhouette weapon, sighting through the panoramic telescope for long periods of time can be most difficult and tiring. The gunner's seat provides the gunner with a platform which will facilitate his operation of the telescope over extended periods. (Incl 4)

(e) Recommendation. That the field expedient devices depicted in Inclusions 2, 3, and 4 be considered as excellent means of upgrading the efficiency and precision of M102 howitzer crews.

6 Incls
1. Organization for Combat
2. Loading Rack for M102 Howitzer
3. Collimator Bunker
4. Gunner's Seat
5. AN/MB-5 Battery Box
6. AN/MB-5 Battery Box

HARRY A. BUZATT Colonel, FA
Coordinating
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 25th Infantry Division Artillery
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORECEV, APO San Francisco 96266 17 MAR 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AWHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending
31 January 1970, with the following exception: Reference paragraph 2c(2).
The procedures outlined in this paragraph were tested by this headquarters
using a FADAC and the results obtained did not conform with the results
indicated in the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. BARTEL, JR.

CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Copy furnished:
25th Inf Div Arty
DA, HQ 25th Inf Div, APO San Francisco 96225

TEMS: Commanding General, II FCORCW, ATTN: AVPAC-RH, APO San Francisco 96266

Commanding General, UNAYV, ATTN: AVPAC/DDF, APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, UNARPAC, ATTN: GFOR-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the DIVARY Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES M. COOKER
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-6 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 30 MAR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Augmentation of Ammunition Section", page 9, paragraph d(1); concur. Artillery units within the division should be surveyed to determine specific equipment requirements for each unit. Appropriate MTOE change documentation, together with complete justification, IAW AR 310-49 should be submitted to USARV Headquarters, ATTN: AVMEC-PDO. Unit has been so advised.

   b. Reference item concerning "Fabricated Portable Power Supply for AN/PPS-5 Radar Set", page 10, paragraph h(1); Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of Tips for Commanders.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

L. D. MURRAY
CPT. AOG
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furr: HR. II PYORGEY
25th Inf Div Arty
GPOP-DT (15 Feb 70) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CPOR-6 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.H. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

Organic Units

1/8 Artillery (105 How, Towed) (DS)
2/77 Artillery (105 How, Towed) (DS)
3/13 Artillery (155/8" SP) (CS)
7/11 Artillery (105 How, Towed) (DS)

General Support-Reinforcing

C/7/9 Artillery (-) (105 How, Towed)
A/B/1/27 Artillery (155 SP)

General Support

B/2/32 (8" SP)
B/5/42 (2 tubes) (155 towed)
B/5/2 (AW) (SP)

Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL
COLLIMATOR BUNKER

Roof consists of ammo box lids covered with one layer of sand bags.

CONFIDENTIAL
GUNNERS' SEAT FOR 105MM HOWITZER

END VIEW

Note to Builder: Because of lack of materials and facilities in the construction of this experimental seat, improvements and minor changes could be deemed necessary. The seat hooks on the trail of the howitzer so it can quickly be removed — no bolts fasten it to the gun.

Materials:
- Engineer stake
- Plywood

All joints are welded.

Small stop needed to keep seat from slipping forward on trail of gun.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 25th Infantry Division Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 25th Infantry Division Artillery

15 February 1970

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701281

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

N/A

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