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AGDA (M)  (4 May 70) FOR OT UT 701215  14 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Kenneth G. Wickham
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters 212th Combat Aviation Battalion
"Wings of Freedom"
APO SF 96319

AVR-BCF

14 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSGOR-65 (R2)(U)

2 - CG, USARPAC
3 - CG, USARV
5 - CG, 1st AVIATION BRIGADE
1 - EA, CO, 212th Aviation Battalion (Combat)

1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities:

a. The unit mission of the 215th Avn Co (SL) was expanded to include two sorties daily around the Da Nang "Rocket Belt" by Infra Red equipped OV-1C Mohawks from 2100 - 0600 hours. This mission was added as a deterrent to rocket attacks in the Da Nang area during the high threat period of the 1970 TET.

b. During the reported period, tasking of the 131st Avn Co (SL) was changed by deleting one Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) and one Infra Red (IR) mission from its remote detachment and adding a SLAR mission that is flown from Phu Bai. These changes allowed this company to bring one OV-1B and one OV-1G aircraft back to Phu Bai, reducing the aircraft at the remote detachment to one OV-1B and two OV-1C.

c. Organizational structure and location are listed at inclosure 1.

d. Personnel changes of command and principal staff positions within the battalion for the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

e. The 212th CAB and subordinate units authorized and present for duty strength are listed at inclosure 3.

f. Type aircraft, number authorized, and on hand for battalion and subordinate units are listed at inclosure 4.

g. Results of operations conducted by subordinate units during the reporting period are at inclosure 5.

h. During this reporting period the 212th CAB engaged in operations against the enemy on 92 consecutive days, flying a total of 47,468 sorties.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, HCS SOFOH-65 (R2) (1)

1. Events of Historical Significance:

(a) On 3 November 1969 at 0010 hours, the area occupied by units of this command at Marble Mountain Air Facility (MMAF) received 9 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The attack lasted for approximately four minutes and resulted in heavy damage to one UH-1D and one UH-1H; moderate damage to one UH-1H and light damage to one UH-1B, one UH-1D, and five UH-1H's. Light fragment damage was incurred by an ICBM jeep, one aircraft hanger, one PX building, one troop billet, one C-130X and one barrell bunker. A temporary loss of communications was experienced with no Class A phone and partial loss of a Class B and C phone. Two enlisted personnel were hospitalized and four others were treated and released for duty.

(b) On 6 December 1969 at 0130 hours, the area occupied by units of this command at HMLF received five rounds of 82mm mortars. The attack lasted approximately two minutes and resulted in light damage to one U-6A and one O-1G aircraft.

2. The following significant flight operations occurred during the reporting period:

(a) On 6 November 1969, a UH-1B gunship of the 252d Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) employing the M-22 guided missile system engaged enemy positions in the vicinity of BT 1048; final count assessment was fourteen bunkers destroyed.

(b) On 22 November 1969, a light fire team of the 282d AHC flying escort for Swift Boat operations at grid coordinates BT 1178, engaged enemy targets inflicting seven enemy KIA, ten structures damaged, and four structures destroyed.

(c) On 13 November 1969, a light fire team of 282d gunships flying escort for Swift Boat operations at grid coordinates BT 1251 engaged NVN troops resulting in eight enemy KIA.

(d) On 19 November 1969, an O-1 aircraft of the 131st Avn Co (SA) on a visual reconnaissance (VR) and photo mission was struck by ground fire resulting in total power loss of one engine and partial power loss of the other making it impossible to sustain flight. Both crewmembers successfully ejected and were safely rescued by Jolly螺on aircraft within an hour and forty minutes.

(e) On 21 November 1969, a single O-1 from the 220th Avn Co (NA), while on a VR mission for the 101st Airborne Division in the Ah Shau Valley, discovered 4 NVN personnel camouflaging a bunker position. Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) was employed resulting in 4 NVN KIA.
On 23 November 1969, the Mortuary Unit Commandation (First Oak Leaf Cluster) was presented to the 21st Aviation Company (UA) by Major General Allen N. Burdett Jr., Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade. Receiving the award for the 21st Avn Co (UA) was Major Sam L. Seave, Commanding Officer.

On 5 December 1969, a heavy fire team of the 282d AHC provided gunship escort and landing zone preparation for a VNAF Combat Helicopter Assault.

On 14 December 1969, a single O-1 of the 220th Avn Co (UA) received small arms fire and light damage in the vicinity of YD 2179 and YD 1152. Artillery and tactical aircraft were called for resulting in 14 KIA, KIA, and four bunkers destroyed.

On 21 December 1969, a light fire team of the 282d AHC was employed against an enemy position at grid coordinates AT 8851, resulting in seven structures destroyed and five structures damaged.

On 23 December 1969, a heavy fire team of the 282d AHC, flying escort for Swift Boat operations engaged enemy positions, resulting in twenty structures destroyed and ten structures damaged.

On 17 January 1970, a heavy fire team and UH-1H of the 282d AHC extracted the crew of an OH-6 aircraft of the Airmobile Division shot down at AT 993610. While the OH-1H extracted the crew to safety, the fire team covered. An OH-6A (SN 67-16185) received combat damage to a total extent when it was shot down by enemy fire in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Airstrip (Abandoned) on 17 January 1970. The passenger was killed by gunfire, and the pilot uninjured managed to land the aircraft. After evading capture for 24 hours, he was rescued by a CAV unit. The OH-6A had to be sling-loaded to Quang Tri Airfield on 19 January 1970 from coordinates XD 715142 (FSB Geiger).

On 23 January 1970, a single O-1 of the 220th Avn Co (UA) spotted four NVA in a treeline and directed Cobra gunships from the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) resulting in 3 enemy KIA.

On 25 January 1970, a light fire team of 282d AHC was scrambled for troops in contact. The mission results were seven enemy KIA.

On 25 January 1970, a flight of two O-1s of the 220th Avn Co (UA) sighted an enemy position and directed AAA of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) on the target resulting in six enemy KIA and six bunkers destroyed.

On 31 January 1970, a single gunship of the 282d AHC was flying support for an OH-6 Helicopter on a reconnaissance of the Da Nang "Rocket Belt". This mission resulted in 10 enemy KIA and the capture of ten NVA soldiers.

On 31 January 1970, the 282d AHC participated in a troop lift of 250 troops for the 51st ARVN Regiment. The lift consisted of four UH-1H lift ships, one command and control UH-1H, and three UH-1B gunships.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

no enemy resistance was encountered in the operation.

2. LESSONS LEARNED: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel: None
   b. Intelligence: None
   c. Operations:
      (1) Operation of the OV-1 Mohawk.

         (a) Observation: New technical operators and aerial observers are not familiar with emergency procedures, navigational equipment, communication equipment, and the autopilot system aboard the Mohawk aircraft. Consequently, in the event the pilot is injured or temporarily incapacitated the aircraft is lost.

         (b) Evaluation: In the event the pilot was incapacitated a trained observer could sustain flight under normal conditions, declare the emergency situation and navigate to a safe area. This would also allow time for the observer to utilize the emergency equipment stowed in the cockpit to assist the pilot.

         (c) Recommendations: That all technical operators and aerial observers be trained to accomplish the above.

         (d) Command Action: This unit has adopted the recommendation.

      (2) Artillery Clearances:

         (a) Observation: Artillery clearances are granted for unnecessary lengths of time.

         (b) Evaluation: Artillery clearances for flights through most areas require extensive re-routing to remain clear of announced fire missions. Normally, a fire mission does not exceed one hour; however, clearances are forecast for two and four hour increments. The artillery units concerned often fail to notify the clearance authority at the end of the fire mission.

         (c) Recommendation: All units should be required to notify the artillery advisory agency at the completion of missions.

         (d) Command Action: All pilots of the 212th CAB have been instructed to notify an air clearance agency when artillery missions, in which they are involved, are completed.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, REG GSFDAC-U C (R2)(U)

(3) Reconnaissance of Borders of Northern I Corps:

(a) Observation: The 220th RAC is the only unit performing daily reconnaissance of the Laotion and North Vietnamese Borders contiguous to South Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation: In the past, the 220th RAC has supported units that have an interest in certain points or areas along these borders. Sixteen flights of unarmed O-1's recce these borders daily with little or no fire support readily available. Aircraft frequently receive ground fire and sustain damage in areas which cannot be reached by artillery. Normally, the only source of fire support consists of USAF tactical fighters and then only when an Air Force FAC is available to direct the strike.

(c) Recommendation: Since the Marines have vacated Northern I Corps, 220th RAC aviators are no longer permitted to act in the capacity of Target Identification Pilots (T.I.P.). Air Force pilots normally assume the role of Forward Air Controllers. If the 220th were given Tactical Aircraft to retaliate against hostile targets, as was the case under Marine Control at Dong Ha D.S.C., damage to the enemy would be significant. Additionally, while flying VA missions along the Laotion and North Vietnamese Borders, the 220th RAC aircraft should have armed helicopter support on call.

(d) Command Action: Coordination efforts with D.S.C. VICTOR, the USAF Tactical Fighter Controlling Agency in Northern I Corps have been initiated, but to this date no success obtained in timely engagement of enemy targets. In the area of highest threat, in the vicinity of the junction of the North Vietnam and Laotion Borders, a program which consisted of attempting to adjust high altitude attack aircraft onto anti-aircraft positions proved unsuccessful. As conceived, the attack aircraft would utilize single bomb drops on each pass as the O-1 pilot directed the ordnance onto the target by sending corrections to ground radar control. Once on target, the aircraft would salvo remaining ordnance. This method was actually attempted, however, it failed because aircraft did not have enough fuel endurance to make single passes and had to salvo his ordnance on the first pass. The targets were not hit.

(4) KI39AL Wing Mounted Camera:

(a) Observation: The 220th RAC has been extremely successful in aerial photography employing the KI39AL wing mounted camera.

(b) Evaluation: The 220th RAC has utilized the KI39AL with a high degree of success in quick response photo missions of various targets along infiltration routes in South Vietnam. The camera is mounted in a pod.
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AVASCP-BO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons learned of the 219th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period ending 31 January 1974, AOS CSPAC- 5 (R2)(U)

on the right wing of the O-1, and is actuated by coupling the pilot's rocket firing trigger to the camera system. Capable of taking one picture every 12 seconds, the camera system provides up to 60% overlap of a linear target, such as a road, trail, or stream. Quality of this photography has been exceptionally good when taken under, or in fill, lighting.

(c) Recommendation: That other reconnaissance airplanes Companies be advised of the success of the 220th's employment of the camera system.

(d) Current Action: A report of employment with samples of pictures taken with the M39RL system is being prepared.

(5) Successful Implementation of Ground Sensors by the O-1 Aircraft:

(a) Observation: The implanting of ground sensors by the Air Force and Marine Corps high speed aircraft requires excessive coordination and time consuming delays.

(b) Evaluation: The 220th RAC was requested to implant ground sensors to detect enemy personnel movement. The requesting agency was the O-2 Ground Surveillance Section of XXIV Corps Headquarters. In the past, sensors had been implanted by jet aircraft of the Air Force and Marine Corps, however, in order to obtain required information for the sensor drop, the drop area had to first be photographed. Under ideal conditions, photography missions take two or three days to complete. Employing the O-1 aircraft, this load time was eliminated. The Ground Surveillance Section now notifies the 220th of the coordinates of implant and within two hours after receiving the mission, the sensors are implanted.

(c) Recommendation: That the O-1 aircraft be considered an excellent means for rapidly implanting sensors within AVN.

(d) Command Action: To date, the 220th RAC has implanted seven (7) strings of four (4) sensors each at various locations in the Northern I Corps area. This method of employment has been documented and submitted through XXIV Corps.

(6) (C) Panoramic Photo Missions

(a) Observation: Panoramic camera missions flown over fairly wide rivers (100-200 ft) at the normal altitude of 30 to 50 feet provides useless photography of the water and little else.
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(b) Evaluation: Missions flown at 200 - 400 feet provide excellent quality, however, this is the most dangerous altitude for small arms fire. Keeping the courses of the photo run as short as possible provides less opportunity for hostile fire and flying random patterns also aids in deception. Some form of air cover over the target area is desirable; i.e., helicopter gunships, aircap, etc.

(c) Recommendation: That the above technique be adopted to minimize the hazard of enemy fire during the panoramic camera missions.

(d) Command Action: The techniques described have been adopted by units of this command.


(a) Observation: Glare from illumination light table of the SLAR RO-166 Recorder reflects off the wind screen of the cockpit blinding the pilot to outside view.

(b) Evaluation: The intensity of the light table of RO-166 recorder causes an intolerable reflection inside the cockpit that severely restricts outside view. This condition causes a safety hazard in flight. The light reflections can be reduced by using map boards as a shield between the pilot and light table.

(c) Recommendation: Cardboard covers be made to restrict reflection from the light table.

(d) Command Action: Units of this headquarters have been informed of this technique and are using such a shield.

(8) (U) SLAR Developer Tanks and Blocks.

(a) Observation: Imagery can be recorded on film in spite of faulty or leaking tanks and blocks.

(b) Evaluation: Serious leaks in tanks and blocks have caused missions to be aborted. In order to continue missions under these circumstances, a procedure was developed to allow continuation of imagery recording and develop the film after landing. The following procedures apply to operations of the RO-166 recorder in flight to accomplish this technique:
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, COSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

(1) Press the standby button on the recorder control.

(2) Turn the 110-166 on and press the map button on the recorder. (red cockpit lights will not affect the film, however, all other light sources must be eliminated).

(3) Do not use the manual data expose.

(4) To remove the film, first run a longer than normal leader.

(5) Place the unexposed take-up into a film can.

(6) Process the film through normal processing.

NOTE: This procedure can only be used at night.

(c) Recommendation: All units using 110-166 recorders be advised of this procedure.

(d) Command Action: Units of this command have been advised of and are employing this procedure.

d. Organization: None

e. Training:

(1) RVN Replacement Training:

(a) Observation: Initial RVN replacement training could not be coordinated successfully with the Americal Division.

(b) Evaluation: A program of infusion into the combat center training conducted by the Americal Division was attempted in order to fulfill the requirements for in-country orientation training as directed in USARV Regulation 350-1. Space problems and lack of successful coordination with the Combat Center caused numerous unacceptable delays in the accomplishment of training. The 212th Battalion S-3 organized an instructional team comprised of instructors from assigned units, under the supervision of the Battalion Staff, to conduct required classes. In addition to required subjects, an orientation is given by the battalion commander on the background and policies of the Battalion.

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AVNACF-BC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

This orientation provides the battalion commander an opportunity to influence each replacement at his initial introduction to the battalion. There are two sessions of classes held each week thus insuring timely processing and subsequent assignment to the job of each replacement.

(c) Recommendation: That each command be advised of this technique for in-country replacement training.

f. Logistics:

(1) KA39A1 Camera Film.

(a) Evaluation: The ASA rating of the film now available for the KA39A1 camera is too slow for the required shutter speed.

(b) Discussion: The only film now being issued to this unit is FSN 6750-579-2104 which has an ASA rating of 80. This precludes using a shutter speed greater than 1/150 sec., even on bright days. The results is the inability of the unit to do photography on overcast days without underexposing the film or causing camera motion to distort the film image because of slow shutter speed.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that only ASA 200 film, FSN 6750-265-7671, be procured and issued for use in the KA39A1 camera.

(d) Command Action: This unit has requisitioned the ASA 200 film, however, none has been received.

g. Communications:

(1) Observation: Unclassified callwords and suffixes were being used on classified tactical frequencies.

(2) Evaluation: The use of unclassified callwords and suffixes on a classified tactical frequency is a security violation and is in violation of USARV Regulation 380-3.

(3) Recommendation: Units be assigned an unclassified non-tactical frequency to be used for air traffic control, flight information, and other administrative traffic.

(h) Command Action: Non-tactical radio nets have been established by units of the 212th CAB for transmitting messages pertaining to air traffic control, flight information, and administrative traffic. Those radio nets utilize unclassified call words, suffixes, and frequencies. Frequencies were assigned by III MAF for the purposes stated above. A tactical net has been established for classified traffic, using classified callwords, suffixes, and frequencies. This net is used when units are placed in alert condition IIIA or higher at which time classified callwords, suffixes, and frequencies are used.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

h. Materiel: Transponders for O-1 aircraft.

(1) OBSERVATIONS: The only navigation aids presently installed in the O-1 aircraft are LF-MF, ADF and FM homing. These nav-aids are of only limited value in the I Corps area. The signal reflection from the mountainous terrain makes the reliability of the LF-MF, ADF questionable. The FM homing has limited range and is also subject to signal reflections. Within I Corps there is extensive radar coverage, however, the "Skin Paint" signal reflected from an O-1 can only be detected by ground stations for a distance of approximately twenty miles. This distance is reduced considerably when there are rain showers in the area.

(2) EVALUATION: The unpredictable weather during the wet season makes the possibility of inadvertent IFR flying a constant threat. Uncontrolled IFR flying is hazardous at best. The mountains and the high density air traffic make it even more dangerous in this area. The extended radar pick-up range and reduced time required for positive identification provided by a transponder would significantly reduce this hazard. Additionally, a transponder would increase the mission capabilities for the O-1. It would provide a means of precise navigation and pinpoint target location at night when positive ground references are not visible. For radio relay missions where high altitude is required it would provide a means for controlled climb and descent through overcast conditions and navigation while VFR on top. The value of a transponder in an emergency is well known and would be of tremendous value for this purpose alone.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That transponders be installed in the O-1's operating in the Republic of Vietnam.

i. Other: None.

C. M. HICKERSON
LTC, FA
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOM-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96394

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVEGC-DVY, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents except as noted below.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 2g, page 9, discusses the use of unclassified frequencies and call signs for administrative traffic and using classified frequencies and call signs only when certain alert conditions exist. This practice creates prime conditions and attitudes to cause frequent compromises during use of classified frequencies and call signs. The use of secure voice equipment will obviate the requirement for unclassified frequencies. All communications traffic should be passed using secure node when the capability exists. This headquarters will direct the 212th Aviation Battalion (Combat) to re-evaluate the need for unclassified frequencies and call signs in view of their existing secure voice capabilities.

   b. Paragraph 2h, page 10, discusses the desirability for transponders in O-1 aircraft. This headquarters requested on 16 December 1969 an ENSURE project for transponders for O-1 aircraft based on a previous request from the 212th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and success of US Eighth Army with ENSURE request 317K. US RV forwarded the request to CINCUSAF with information to DA on 30 January 1970. The request was for 400 transponders, one per O-1 in US RV plus maintenance float. Action is continuing.

   c. Paragraph 2f(d), page 9, addresses the need for high speed film (ASA-200) for the KA39/A1 Camera. The commodity manager at the US ACC-V requisitioned the film on 8 December 1969. This speed film is not now in use in Vietnam. The Defense Supply Agency replied that subject film was at zero balance with a production lead time of six months.

   d. This OR-LL does not address Aviation Safety. Records at this headquarters indicate that the 212th Aviation Battalion (Combat), with all assigned subordinate units, flew 22,317 hours during the reporting
period with one accident in the HHC for a battalion accident rate of 4.5. This headquarters will direct all subordinate commands to address aviation safety in future OR-LZ reports.

0. Paragraph 2c(1), page 4, discusses the fact that non-OV-1 technical operators and observers are not knowledgeable of emergency procedures and operation of OV-1 navigation and communication equipment. This headquarters is preparing a letter to USAF requesting that appropriate OCS training bases be apprised of this situation.

f. Paragraph 2c(2), page 4, addresses problem of artillery clearances covering an unnecessary length of time. This headquarters is effecting coordination with major tactical commands for review of control procedures and duration of artillery missions as regards air traffic.

g. Paragraph 2c(4), page 5, discusses success of OV-1 aerial photography utilizing Kl-3901 camera. This headquarters is disseminating this information to appropriate subordinate units.

h. Paragraph 2c(5), page 6, discusses use of OV-1 to implant ground sensors. This headquarters is notifying subordinate units of this additional capability of the OV-1 aircraft.

i. Paragraph 2c(7), page 7, addresses problem of wind screen glare from RO-106 recorder in OV-1 cockpit. The use of cardboard shielding eliminated this problem. This headquarters is advising appropriate subordinate units of this solution.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Arthur W. Little
CPT, USA
Asst Adj Gen

12
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AVNAC-DEST (14 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (BZ)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with the comments of issuing headquarters.

2. (U) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "Operation of the OV-1 Mohawk", page 4, paragraph 2c(1) and the 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c: concur. Technical operators and aerial observers should be trained. Nonconcur that the autopilot system be included. Recommend this matter be addressed by USCONARC.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Reconnaissance of Borders of Northern I Corps", page 5, paragraph 2c(3): concur. During the period that the DASC in Northern I Corps was under USMC control, aviators assigned to the 220th Aviation Company (Reconnaissance), who were qualified as Target Identification Pilots (TIP), were permitted to direct tactical USMC air strikes in support of USMC forces. With the DASC now under USAF control, these same aviators are not permitted to direct USAF tactical air strikes. If targets, located out of artillery range, are sighted by 220th aviators, a USAF Forward Air Controller (FAC) is sent to the target area by the DASC. The USAF FAC assesses the target, obtains the strike aircraft from the DASC, and subsequently directs the air strike. USAF Manual 2-7 states that only in an emergency will an individual, who is not a qualified FAC, mark or identify targets for USAF attack aircraft. It further states that for emergency situations, such as immediate missions, procedures should be established by the USAF and Army component commanders. This matter will be forwarded to MACV for resolution. The recommendation also states that the 220th Aviation Company should have armed helicopter support on-call. This support is available and is responsive to the requirements of the 220th on an on-call basis. No action by higher headquarters is required.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHEC-DST (14 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOH-65 (R2)(U)

2. (C) Reference item concerning "Panoramic Photo Missions", page 6, paragraph 2c(6); concur. However, a command-wide application of this particular technique is not considered valid. Techniques used in the accomplishment of panoramic photo missions vary with the tactical situation, enemy strength and disposition, weather and terrain, and are limited only by the requirements of a ground commander and the imagination of the photo unit. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "SLAR developer tanks and blocks", page 7, paragraph 2c(8); concur. The 1st Aviation Brigade is disseminating this information to all OV-1 units within USARV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

I. D. MURRAY
CPF, AQC
Assistant Adjutant General

C/O FURN
1st Avn Bde
212th Combat Aviation Bn

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (14 Feb 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

2. Reference 2h, page 10, of basic and paragraph 2b, 1st Indorsement. US Army, Vietnam, in message AVHG3-DST, DTG 302251E Jan 1970 submitted an ENSURE request for 400 commercial (lightweight) transponders for installation in 0-1 aircraft. The ENSURE request was forwarded to Department of the Army by US Army, Pacific, message GPOP-DT, DTG 142002E Feb 1970 recommending approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

212th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
APO SF 96349 (Marble Mountain Air Facility)

HHC 212th GBN
APO 96349 (MMAF, Da Nang)

519th Medical Detachment
APO 96349 (MMAF Da Nang)

21st Aviation Company (UA)
APO 96374 (Chu Lai)

1st Platoon
APO 96349 (MMAF Da Nang)

2nd Platoon
APO 96374 (Chu Lai)

3rd Platoon
APO 96374 (Chu Lai)

62d Aviation Company (Corps)
APO 96308 (Phu Bai)

131st Aviation Company (SA)
APO 96308 (Phu Bai)

220th Aviation Company (UA)
APO 96308 (Phu Bai)

59th Signal Detachment
APO 96308 (Phu Bai)

134th Medical Detachment
APO 96308 (Phu Bai)

215th Aviation Company (SA)
APO 96349 (MMAF Da Nang)

282d Aviation Company (AH)
APO 96349 (MMAF Da Nang)

Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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## 212th CAB OPERATIONAL STATISTICS
QTR ENDING 31 JANUARY 1970

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion

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