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<td>TO:</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
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<td>TO:</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 13 FEB 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 222d Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat)
AFO San Francisco 96530

AVBACA-EC 13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Obt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)(U)

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1. (C) Sectional Operations: Significant Activities

a. Mission: The mission of the Battalion remained the same throughout the reporting period, that of providing combat and combat support with aviation assets to United States and other Free World Forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

b. Organization: The organization of the Battalion did not change during the period. Several MTOE changes were received for assigned and attached units. These changes constituted only minor and insignificant equipment authorizations. No reorganization of units was required. (See Inclosure 1 for the Organizational Structure).

c. Significant Personnel Changes:

(1) S2, 222d Aviation Battalion (Obt)

Date: 5 November 1969
Outgoing: WILLIAMS, Melvin Jr., Capt, 047-3439
Incoming: SEALE, Leopold K., Capt, 261-24-5463

(2) S3, 222d Aviation Battalion (Obt)

Date: 19 November 1969
Outgoing: THOMAS, Benjamin G., Maj, 521-44-3865
Incoming: DANIELSON, James D., Maj, 477-36-4311

(3) Commanding Officer, 273rd Aviation Company (Hvy Hel)

Date: 22 November 1969
Outgoing: WILHELM, Robert S., Maj, 361-30-6268
Incoming: SILVA, Warren R., Maj, 019-26-2073

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Inclosure

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DOD DIR 5200.10
13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(4) Commanding Officer, 117th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel)

Date: 1 December 1969
Outgoing: AVERY, Westley P., Maj, 237-62-2607
Incoming: HUSTON, Richard J., 279-26-8229

(5) CSM, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt)

Date: 20 January 1970
Outgoing: ORR, Evert E., CSM, 165-22-1934
Incoming: CROLEY, Thomas D., CSM, 416-40-5436

d. Unit Strength as of 31 January 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>Warrant Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH ACTUAL</td>
<td>AUTH ACTUAL</td>
<td>AUTH ACTUAL</td>
<td>AUTH ACTUAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 222d Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273d Avn Co (Hvy Hel)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93d Med Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>772d Med Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315th Asfld Sv Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th QM Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>652d TC Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>478th Aslt Spt Hel Co (Hvy)(Plat Atch from 1st Cav)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(II))

(2) Civilians:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>DAC</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>3d Nat'l</th>
<th>Tech Rfp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 222d Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>117th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>195th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>240th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273rd Avn Co (Hvy Hel)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>772nd Med Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73rd Med Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Aircraft Status as of 31 January 1970: (See Inclosure 2).

f. Operational Results for the Period are Included in Inclosure 3.

g. Awards and Decorations: Awards recommended and received by individuals of this Battalion during 1 November 1969-31 January 1970 as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Number Recommended</th>
<th>Number Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star Medal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal &quot;w&quot;</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Air Medal</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oak Leaf Cluster to Air Medal</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CPORL-65 (R2)(U)

G. Awards and Decorations: (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Number Recommended</th>
<th>Number Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. Personnel Gains and Losses During the Period:

Following reflects the personnel turbulence experienced during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gains/Losses</th>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. R & R Data: Quotas Received and Filled as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Quotas Received</th>
<th>Quotas Utilized</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. Casualty Information: Casualties experienced during the period are as follows:

1. Injured - Non Hostile 11
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SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CCFOR-65 (R2)(U)

j. Casualty Information: (Continued)

(2) Wounded in Action: 10
(3) Killed – Non Hostile: 0
(4) Killed in Action: 1

*HONOR ROLL*

Private First Class Edward R. SMILEY, Jr., 158-40-6875, 195th Aviation Company (Ass't Hel) killed in action 4 December 1969.

k. Enemy Action Against Bearcat: Following is a synopsis of enemy action against Bearcat during the reporting period:

(1) There were no standoff mortar/rocket attacks during the reporting period.

(2) Enemy interdiction of Highway 15 and the West Access Road to Bearcat occurred twice during the reporting period, however, the road was closed for only a short period each time.


m. Schooling (AARTS Courses): Following quotas were received and filled during the period:

(1) Officer:
   (a) Officer Armament: 2
   (b) UH-1 IP School (1st Bde): 1
   (c) FACAF Life Support School: 3

(2) Enlisted:
   (a) AH-1G/UH-1C Helicopter Repair: 7
   (b) UH-1D/H Helicopter Repair: 3
   (c) T-53-L-11 Engine: 2

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Obt) For Period Ending 31 January 1970 ACS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

a. Schooling (LHTS Courses): (Continued)

(d) T-53-1-13 Engine 4
(e) Enlisted Armament No 1 3
(f) Tech Inspector 2
(g) Tech Supply (PLL) 2
(h) Audio-Visual Projectionist 1

n. Aviation Safety: 3 aircraft accidents occurred during the period while flying 23,758 hours. The accidents described below dipped the accident rate of the Battalion to 12.6 per 100,000 flying hours.

(1) On 12 November 1969 a UH-1C gunship had an engine failure while at a low airspeed and altitude over a thickly overgrown area. The pilot autorotated to the best area, but the aircraft sustained major damage.

(2) On 17 January 1970 a UH-1H caught the right-rear skid shoe on a PSP pad while picking up to a hover. When the pilot attempted to set the aircraft down the PSP panels remained in an upright position and caused major structural damage to the underside of the aircraft.

(3) On 17 January 1970 a UH-1C gunship apparently experienced complete tail rotor failure while at a low altitude. The complete tail rotor assembly separated from the aircraft causing an extreme out of balance condition. The pilot attempted to keep the aircraft under control and entered autorotation. The aircraft initially hit a tree and then landed extremely hard resulting in major damage.

o. Chaplain's Activities: Worship services and troop visitations continued to be emphasised throughout the period. During the quarter 156 Catholic and Protestant opportunities for worship as well as 1442 visits to troop areas were conducted. 23 visits were made to hospitals and stockades. Other activities included:

(1) 144 men were counseled during the period. Counseling continues to receive emphasis and is of primary concern.

(2) As required all replacement and rotating enlisted personnel were interviewed by the Chaplain.
Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Ch) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS C8FD-65 (R2)(H)

(3) Lay Protestant study groups were started in the Bearcat, Long Thanh and Long Binh areas. Religious films by the layman in the company areas continued to draw interest of the men.

(4) Supervised visits were made to orphanages by Chapel groups.

(5) Character guidance attendance remained above the 90% present for duty strength.

(6) Memorial services were conducted for the 195th Aviation Company (Ass't Hel).

(7) Continuing to assist the education program after helping to establish the Education Center in Bearcat. Introduced 5 men to the University of Maryland extension resident program. Engaged in the resident instruction phase of high school GED program.

(8) Orphanages: As stated in the last ORL, the Vietnamese Government is reducing the number of orphanages. American forces are reducing their strength in Vietnam. In the future more and more emphasis will be placed on eliminating orphanages by establishing foster homes and enrolling children in day schools.

p. PIO: The information continued to provide the required news and photo coverage of awards and decorations, safety, special events, civic affairs activities and combat activity. Both local and national news media were utilized in publicizing the Battalion's activities during the past three months. The November-January period produced 147 home town news releases as compared to the August-October output of 180. Steps have been taken to improve this figure and reverse the downward trend. Approximately 30 news releases and feature stories were released by the Battalion Information Office to the 12th Aviation Group PIO office and 1st Aviation Brigade PIO. A number of the news stories eventually were published in military and civilian enterprise newspapers in the United States. Approximately 800 photographs, including awards and decorations, promotions, changes of command, accident safety and normal news photo were produced during this period.

q. SIGNAL: The Signal Section continued to provide the required communications support to the Battalion during this period. Concepts of operations were changed to implement Nester Equipment usage, and to begin to employ the Battalion's HF RATT capabilities. Communications Personnel continued to be in short supply. Critical shortages are
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13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion

in Communications, Chief of 316th personnel and Field Wireman MCR 36K20.

Due to this personnel shortage, communications personnel were required
to work longer hours in order to accomplish their mission. Battalion
Headquarters communications personnel attempted to compensate for personnel shortages by conducting more frequent assistance visits, and in some cases, training of incoming personnel.


r. Operations:

(1) General

(a) The Battalion continued daily support of operations with
tasks including combat assault, direct support and other combat support
missions each of the ninety-two reporting days. Missions included
airlift of troops, equipment, supplies, vehicular airlift, administrative,
command and control and artillery weapons and engineer equipment dis-
placement. Other support provided was that of providing light and
runship support (Night Hawk) to units in contact, reconnaissance,
surveillance and lighting LZs for Dustoff operations. Helicopter run-
ships also played an active role throughout the period by delivery of
live ordnance upon enemy positions in support of friendly ground force
operations. The normal mission profile for UH-1 helicopters for the
Battalion remained at 36 troop carriers and 12 gunships. An average
of three CH-54A helicopters were committed throughout the period in
support of III and IV Corps.

(b) On 18 December 1969, a major stand down day, the 240th Aviation
Company (Ass't Hel) received a scramble from AAE. This is a day in which
a minimum number of missions are flown and maintenance is performed on
remaining aircraft. Upon receipt of this alert, the 240th Aviation
Company (Ass't Hel) was prepared to launch all flyable aircraft in one
hour. Other missions of this type have been accomplished in the
Battalion with similar reaction time.

(c) Due to increased enemy activity and intense and continuous
small arms automatic weapons fire in the LZs and throughout their
entire operational area, the 195th Aviation Company (Ass't Hel) has
implemented the following changes in their tactics: utilization of
dummy drop points which confuse the enemy and prevent him from pin-
pointing their intended operational area, use of night para-drops,
larger landing zones being selected expediting both the dropping of troops and aiding in a rapid departure. Due to change in activities,
Headquarters, USAVEW, ATTN: R & D has been requested to design a night
landing devise that has the capability of penetrating darkness to give

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8
the pilot an overview of the landing zone without any lighting equipment or other means that would give away the position of the aircraft to the enemy.

(2) Letter of Understanding

(a) On the 13th of January 1970, the 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat) was assigned the mission of implementing the provisions of the MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING between the Commanding General, Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam and the Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade (Inclosure 6). This implementation was to permit pilots of the Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam to maintain flight proficiency in the UH-1D/H model helicopter and gain experience in U.S. Army Aviation Doctrine and Techniques. On the 16th of January 1970 an SOP was written establishing the procedures to be followed for the activation of this program. RTAVF aviators were permitted to fly UH-1D/H model helicopters of the Battalion in accordance with USARV Rules, Regulations and Policies applicable to USARV aviators. The Commanding Officer, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat) controlled, monitored and maintained a record of RTAVF aviators. A period of standardization instruction was conducted beginning 30 January 1970. All RTAVF pilots were checked for proper security clearances. The Battalion received the names of nine RTAVF pilots who had accumulated a total of 21,667 hours and had received training in numerous aircraft: Fixed wing, H-53C, KS-4, OH-13, OH-2, and UH-1 helicopters. A request for waiver was submitted and approved for two of the Thai pilots. Neither pilot had received any type of formal instruction in the UH-1D/H helicopter in the USA. At present we have two RTAVF pilots actively participating in combat assault missions with the 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat).

(3) Recovery of CH-54

(a) At 1305 hours, 13 January 1970, the 273rd Aviation Company (Hvy Hel) flight operations received a message from II Field Forces Army Aviation Element (AAE) that CH-54A 67-18429 had declared a "Mayday" and was down at coordinates N8 2505. U.S. Air Force jet fighters and U.S. Army helicopter gunships were scrambled to cover the site. Further information relayed to 273rd Flight Operations from Paddy Control stated that the aircraft was on the ground with no apparent damage to the aircraft and no injuries to the crew. Another message from Paddy stated the aircraft had blown an "O" ring on the transmission oil filter and required a new "O" ring and 10 gallons of SATO 35 transmission oil. At 1420 hours, Major Silva, Commanding Officer, CM Dean, air maintenance technician, and SSG Keller, aircraft
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AVN:CA-EC

SUBJECT:  Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 224th Aviation Battalion
(ckt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R)(U)

February 1970

maintenance supervisor, departed Sanford AAF, Long Binh with the
requested items in a UH-1H and arrived at the downed aircrafts location,
112 nautical miles southwest of Long Binh, at 1600 hours. Inspection of
the aircrafts transmission revealed numerous large steel chips in the
transmission oil filter plus large amounts of finely ground brass in
the transmission oil which was all over the rear deck of the aircraft.
The large amount of metal indicated severe internal damage to the
transmission. A decision was made that the aircraft was unsafe to fly
and would have to be extracted. Coordination was made with Headquarters,
165th Aviation Group (Combat) located at Can Tho and ground security
was provided by an armored cavalry troop from the 164th Aviation Group
(Combat). At 1630 hours, Major Silva, CWO Bean and SSG Keller departed
the aircraft site, along with crewmembers of aircraft 429 to return
to Sanford AAF and start planning for the extraction the following day.

(b) At 1930 hours 13 January 1970 at 273rd flight operations,
a planning conference was held with key members of the unit present.
The aircraft commander, CWO George Kennedy, and pilot, CWO Paul
Eilers, for the recovery aircraft began their mission planning to include
flight time from Sanford AAF to Nora Sai (VCS 1400) where they should
stand-by until needed at the recovery site, route of flight from the
recovery site back to Sanford AAF to ensure that fuel and airfields
were available to make each leg of the flight, and forecast winds for
the next day. At the same time the aircraft maintenance personnel were
deciding on the number of personnel and type skills that would be
required to accomplish the mission of reducing the aircraft weight to
approximately 16,500 pounds, by removing specific parts. The work party
was decided and at the same time a firm list of components to be removed
was made. Based on the components to be removed, a list of special
tools and equipment was drawn up, located, and assembled in the 273rd
hangar. Once the planning had progressed to this point the Operations
Officer made a request for a CH-47 and UH-1H for an 0700 departure
the following morning and began contacting the various airfields along
the route back to Sanford AAF to alert them of the fact that one CH-54
would be stopping there with another CH-54 slung underneath it. He
then coordinated pre-arranged parking locations and rapid refueling
at each airfield. This completed the joint planning meeting and the
remainder of the night was spent assembling the tools and equipment
needed, rechecked weight and balances of each component to be removed,
final flight planning by the crew of the recovery aircraft, and co-
ordination with the various airfields that would be involved in the
flight back.

(c) At 0700 hours, 14 January 1970, the recovery team, with

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special tools and equipment, departed Sanford AAF in a CH-47 for the recovery site. At the same time, Major Silva and LTC Gerald M. Okarski, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cht) Commanding Officer, departed Sanford AAF for Can Tho in a CH-13. The stop at Can Tho was made to brief the S-3 164th Aviation Group (Cht) on the plans made the previous night, arrange for unbiased cover during the extraction and secure a 164th Aviation Group (Cht) SOI to be used if needed while operating in their area. Following this brief stop the two commanders proceeded directly to the recovery site. As soon as the CH-47 landed at the recovery site, the tools and equipment were off loaded and several tasks were started simultaneously. The CH-54 had landed with 8,000 pounds of JP-4 fuel on board so immediately the de-fueling hoses were attached and de-fueling began. At the same time two individuals started removing the tail rotor blades, while two other men started removing the engine air particle separators (EAPS), and a third pair began disconnecting the control rods and wires in preparation for removing the main rotor head with the blades still attached. As soon as the tail rotor blades and EAPS had been removed and secured a safe distance away from the aircraft, work was started to remove the load leveler system. At 0845 hours the recovery aircraft CH-54, 66-18453, departed Sanford AAF for Rac Soi (K21) and arrived on station at 0950 hours. At 1000 hours all components were removed from 429 with exception of the main rotor head and blades, which were rigged for removal. At this time aircraft 453 was called forward from Rac Soi to the recovery site, along with a light fire team to fly cover. Upon arrival 453 came to a high hover over 429, extended 30 feet of cable and was hooked to the main rotor head of 429. Blade socks had been attached to 4 of the 6 main rotor blades with lifting ropes. These were secured by personnel on the ground. 453 then proceeded to lift the rotor head off the mast of 429. A main rotor head stand had been placed 50 yards in front of 429 and was supported by 4 sheets of 1/2" plywood to prevent the stand from sinking into the mud. As the rotor head and blades lifted off the mast of 453 hovered forward over the main rotor head and proceeded to lower the entire assembly onto the head stand while the ground personnel guided the rotor head and blades exactly into place. The entire operation took about 10 minutes and was accomplished with no damage to either the rotor head or any of the main rotor blades. As soon as the rotor head was released 453 departed back to Rac Soi for refueling while the ground crew proceeded to remove the main rotor blades from the rotor head and rig the slings and clevis on 429 for the actual extraction. It should be mentioned here that all ground personnel were issued and wore goggles during the periods when 453 was hovering in the recovery area. Working directly under the 120mph rotor wash in the harvested rice paddy would have been almost impossible without them due to blowing debris. At approximately
CONFIDENTIAL

1045 hours 453 returned to the recovery site and hooked up to 429. After hovering for a few minutes to balance 429 from the mud the pick-up was accomplished and 453 departed for the 28 mile flight to Can Tho. The aircraft weight of 429 was 17,500 at this time. The UH-1D proceeded 453 to Can Tho to alert the airfield while the remainder of the ground crew began loading all the tools and equipment in to the CH-47 and prepared the main rotor head and stand to be slung loaded underneath the CH-47. Upon arrival of 453 and 429 at Can Tho it was decided to remove both engines from 429 to further decrease the weight. This decision was made because of a 20 knot head wind all the way back to Sanford AAF. As soon as 453 and 429 down at Can Tho and shut down the crew members of 453 started to disconnect the engines of 429. A long boom wrecker was borrowed from the 271st Aviation Company (1st Inf Div) in order to remove the engines from 429 and set them down in a protected area. At this time the CH-47 arrived at Can Tho with the ground team, special tools, equipment, and main rotor head and stand. The CH-47 was refueled and dispatched to Sanford AAF, less the ground crew, to unload the items on board plus the main rotor head and stand. It would then pick up two engine stands and return to Can Tho. In the meantime, a second CH-47 was borrowed from the 271st Aviation Company (1st Inf Div) and the ground team returned to the recovery site to pick up the 6 main rotor blades. These were brought to Can Tho. At 1545 hours 453 picked up 429 at Can Tho and departed on a leg of 17 miles to Tan An where 429 refueled. The next leg was 31 miles to Tan An it was 32 miles to Ta in and here once again 453 refueled. At 1800 hours 453 departed Ta in and at 1830 hours lowered 429 down on the "Crane ad" at Sanford AAF, a flight route of 112 nautical miles from the recovery site. On each leg LTC Karaki and Major Silva preceded 453 into the airfield in insure that preparations had been made as scheduled. They also carried the Pathfinder who would climb up on 429 and hook it up to 435 after each refueling. He was then picked up by the CH-47 and rushed ahead to the next refueling point. While 453 was making its way to Sanford AAF the CH-47 had returned to Can Tho with the two engine stands and the ground crew placed the two engines on the stands, loaded them into the CH-47 along with the 6 main rotor blades, 4 tail rotor blades and themselves. They departed Can Tho for Sanford AAF and closed at that location at 1925 hours.

(d) The entire mission took 12.5 hours to accomplish and covered approximately 225 nautical miles round trip. The key to the success of this particular mission was the planning session that took place the night of the 13th. All key personnel must be present initially in order to understand the complete plan from the start to finish. Following this general session, detailed planning by maintenance, operations and flight crews can be done independently. A tendency must be overcome
to take too many people on the ground team. They must be the most experienced personnel in the unit, willing to work hard, and in a small enough group to be controlled easily. Each man must know exactly what he is going to do as soon as he arrives at the recovery site as time is wasted if the briefing is held after arrival. Goggles, drinking water, a radio, smoke grenades, and at least one Pathfinder are items that although not directly related to the preparation of the aircraft for extraction, are invaluable to the overall operation. Sheet plywood is a valuable tool in muddy, swampy areas in order to provide support for parts, maintenance stands, tool boxes and other equipment. The first hand knowledge of the area, ground conditions and condition of the aircraft gained by at least one person visiting the site as soon as possible aids greatly in planning the operation. This operation was completed successfully because of the tremendous effort put forth by all members of this unit that were involved plus the outstanding cooperation received from the 164th Aviation Group (Cbt.), 21st ARVN Division from the 162d and 240th Aviation Companies (Aslt Hel).

2. (c) Section 2 Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations
   a Personnel:
   (i) MOS 71P20

   (a) OBSERVATION: Flight Operations Specialists should have enough training to be able to assume this position after a 30 day familiarization.

   (b) EVALUATION: It has been found that there is a critical shortage of MOS 71P20 as these personnel are not available in the command. All flight operations specialists within this unit have been trained on the job. After five months these personnel have progressed to the point of being capable of doing the job required without constant supervision. At the eight month level they are capable of fulfilling the position efficiently for the remainder of their tour.

   (c) RECOMMENDATIONS: An increase flow of school trained flight operations specialists would greatly enhance the operation of aviation units within ARVN.

   (d) COMMAND ACTION: A continued on-the-job training of personnel for this critical MOS shortage.
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AVP/CA-EC

S0JECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

(2) Administration Officer

(a) OBSERVATION: The heavy administrative workload which this unit carries demands the inclusion of an administrative officer in the TOE.

(b) EVALUATION: This unit has found that the heavy workload of administrative work which the unit is responsible for, the executive officer is required to send an excessive amount of time on administrative problems. It is felt that the inclusion of an administrative officer would be beneficial. It would enable the executive officer to function as the commanding officer’s assistant and also aid him in maintaining proficiency in flying. Because of his workload, he is limited on the amount of time he can fly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the TOE be revised to include the position of administrative officer.

(d) COMM: ACTION: The executive officer is functioning as administration officer and executive officer.

(3) Night Observation Device Operator

(a) OBSERVATION: A trained light operator is needed in units that are involved in Night Hawk operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of the function that the searchlight plays in Night Hawk missions, trained light operators should be assigned or attached to the unit. At this time, this unit is using the crew chief as the light operator. This means that he is not able to man his guns. This unit has tried this system, using its own personnel, and it has worked well. Using presently assigned personnel is not practical because each man assigned to the unit is slotted. Training of these personnel would be no problem, but it would require at least two operators per light system used. It would be imperative that these individuals be rotated nightly, because of the high fatigue factor.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That additional personnel be assigned or attached to units that employ night operations for the purpose of being light operators. They should also be awarded flight pay and put on valid crew-member flight status.

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14
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)(U)

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This unit has, at times, used its own personnel for the purpose of light operators. When this is not possible, the crew chief acts as light operator.

b. Intelligence: None
c. Operations:

(1) Rescue Hoist

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of a rescue hoist has proven to be a great advantage in the extraction of personnel in deep jungle areas.

(b) EVALUATION: In the past, this unit has been using McGuire rigs for the extraction of personnel in dense jungle areas. This is a very critical operation because of the closeness the aircraft must work to the jungle canopy. Also, once the McGuire rig is loaded, the aircraft must come straight up at least 175 feet to clear the trees. This is a minimum safe distance required to keep the McGuire rig from dragging in the jungle canopy. The McGuire has a tendency to catch in trees easily and requires someone to handle the ropes. There is a chance that the ropes from the McGuire rig can become entangled in the tail rotor of the aircraft. When using the McGuire rig, both the crew chief and gunner must leave their guns to assist the pilot in positioning the rig. For these reasons, this unit feels a hoist is much better for this type of operation. The hoist is much faster and easier to operate. It has 250 feet of usable cable, whereas the McGuire rig only has 100 feet of usable rope. The aircraft does not have to operate in such close proximity to the trees and will require less power in pulling the personnel out. The period of time the aircraft must remain in a stationary position is shortened, thus making the operation more safe. The danger of dragging the personnel through the trees does not exist with the hoist.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That all units employing this method of operation be allotted a sufficient number of hoists.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This unit has requisitioned two (2) hoists, which will be mounted as soon as they are available.

d. Organization: None
e. Training: None
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AVUACA-EC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (CBT) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS G3FOR-65 (R2)(U)

f. Logistics:

(1) Fuel

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to this unit's mission, requiring two platoons to operate from remote locations, 70-100 miles from base camp, abnormal POL supply problems/difficulties have been experienced.

(b) EVALUATION: This unit's mission requires two platoons to be operational out of several small, remote locations as far as 100 NM from the parent unit. Due to the remoteness of the locations, and their almost complete lack of facilities, the parent unit is required to constantly arrange for the resupply of POL. This unit does not have a POL resupply capability, which poses a constant problem. Due to the tactical importance and urgency of this particular mission, delays in POL resupply absolutely must be kept to a minimum. Air Force resupply has frequently proven to be inadequate due to the long reaction time required to arrange for the delivery of POL, and once the POL has been delivered, it is used by other units on an unscheduled and emergency basis.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That POL resupply responsibilities be placed on ASD's or other organizations which possess the capability and that the ASD's establish a relatively permanent refueling area at these remote sites, thereby assuring a constant supply of POL.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This unit is presently experimenting with various ways of improving POL resupply, until an organization with a POL resupply capability is directed to assume the responsibility.

g. Communications:

(1) FM and UHF Communication

(a) OBSERVATION: That FM and UHF radio communication between flight operations and mission aircraft break down on an average of four times daily.

(b) EVALUATION: Primary cause of this communication break down is the radios at operations overheat due to a lack of temperature control, to the point of losing their full capability.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACA-BC

13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-46 (R2)(U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Highly recommend that all flight operations facilities be air conditioned.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Air Conditioning has been requested for the flight operations section area, however, there has been negative results. Radios have been placed in the area that circulates the most air around them, and holes have been cut in walls of the building in an attempt to keep them cool. In addition fans are placed in front of the sets to aid circulation. Four spare FM radios are on hand to immediately replace a set that is fading in power.

(2) RT-524 and the KY-86

(a) OBSERVATION: Heat has caused many malfunctions in the operation of the RT-524 radio and the radio voice security device, the KY-86.

(b) EVALUATION: This unit is required to monitor several frequencies in the operations section. It is also required to have the capability of monitoring and talking in the secure mode. Because of the high temperatures, this unit has constant radio failures with the RT-524 and the KY-86. Fans are being utilized to their fullest advantage but the radio problem still exists. According to USARV Regulation 420-54, a radio operations center is authorized to be air conditioned. It is felt that if the communications section was air conditioned, it would eliminate the dust and decrease the temperature twenty or twenty-five degrees, thus, eliminating a great number of radio failures.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That air conditioners be made readily available for communications centers.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This unit submitted a job order request (DA Form 2701) on 15 December 1969, requesting an air conditioner be installed in this unit's communications center. This request was disapproved on 5 February 1970.

h. Material:

(1) Double Visor kits for the SPH-4 Flight Helmet

(a) OBSERVATION: The configuration of the SPH-4 helmet is unacceptable for combat operations. The U.S. Navy currently stocks a double visor kit, FSN 6-RD 8475-792-5706, which fits the SPH-4 flight helmet.

CONFIDENTIAL

17
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AVBACA-EC
13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFDH-65 (R2)(U)

(b) EVALUATION: It is felt by this unit that the single visor kit, currently being installed on all flight helmets issued, could contribute to a loss of sight. Many missions flown in combat zones are launched before dawn and return after sunset. This necessitates the use of a clear visor. During daylight hours of flight, the sunset would require the individual aviator to change to a tinted visor or wear sunglasses under the clear visor. The first recommendations would not be practical, especially during the flight, because the helmet must be removed to change visors, thus causing a safety hazard and a direct violation to Army Regulation 95-5 and 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 385-10. The wearing of sunglasses, while being a more practical solution to the problem, also has many disadvantages. The main one being the gaps between the wearer’s head and the earphone seals caused by the sunglasses. This gap destroys the acoustic ability of the SPH-4 helmet, thereby rendering this helmet design almost totally ineffective. The second factor of consideration is the aviator's comfort. On many individuals the discomfort caused by wearing sunglasses with the SPH-4 helmet is severe. This distracts the aviator and could easily cause a safety hazard. It is felt that if the U.S. Army could fit the SPH-4 helmet with a double visor kit similar to the U.S. Navy kit, FSN to rd 8475-792-5706, the situation would be remedied, thereby possibly saving an aviator’s sight due to exploding plexiglass caused by either enemy action or some unforeseen event. The SPH-4 helmet would be totally effective during day or night operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That USABAAR evaluate the possibilities of the use of a double visor kit for flight helmets and that double visor kits be made available at the earliest opportunity.

GERALD M. OKARSKI
LTC, IN
Commanding

6 Incl
1. Organization
2. Aft Status
3. Operational Statistics
4. Ammo Expenditures
5. Memorandum of Understanding

DISTRIBUTION:
5-CG, 12th Avn Gp (Cbt), ATTN: AVBACA-EC
2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVGHC (DST), APO 96375
2-CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBACC

CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Commander, General, 11 Field Force (Stab), B Company

1. (1) In accordance with Table 21 (4-15), subject report is submitted.

2. (a) Reference paragraph 2a(1). 11th Arm is aware that the following F164 specifications and operations specialist strength for the F164 as of:

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From the above it can be concluded that no shortage of F164 personnel exists in the selected FM.

4. (b) Reference paragraph 2a(4). 2c(4) states: for the inclusion of an administrative officer into the FM should be made in the form of a request for TEC change.

5. (b) Reference paragraph 2g(1) and (2). Heat is a definite factor in the operation of communications equipment, particularly the HC-70-50 (FY-76). Air conditioning plays greatly improve the reliability of the system. An attempt should be made to secure a portable air conditioner for use at a site on 10-day loan. There are expected due-ins on new scales that will allow the F164 to be used in conjunction with the HC-70-50, which is less sensitive to heat. This heat problem is recognized by TEC and the scales involved people, and other corrective steps are being investigated.

John H. Johnson
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
AVFBC-RE-H (13 Feb 70) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS GFOCR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC (DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOR-MT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 January 1970, as indorsed, with the following comment: Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3. The 12th Aviation Group has instructed the 222d Aviation Battalion to submit a request for a TOE change.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. L. BOSHANS
CPT, AGC

20
AVNAD-0 (13 Feb 70) 3 Id Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, A/2 6FRO-(6) (LX) (C)

DN: USARN AVN/AMC 127 AVIATION BRIGADE, APO San Francisco 96344

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVN/RRC, APO 963475
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: G1OP-D2, APO 96548

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as issued.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 1g, pages 7 and 8, addresses the problem of a shortage of communications Chief IDS 31G40 and Field Wireman IDS 36K20. These are critical IDs in the 1st Aviation Brigade. 12th Aviation Group (Combat) is at 60% fill in IDS 31G40 and the Brigade is at 60% fill. In IDS 36K20 both the Brigade and 12th Aviation Group (Combat) are at 67.5% fill. This headquarters has advised United States Army Vietnam of subject IDS shortages and is closely monitoring distribution of IDS 36K20 and IDS 31G40 within the Brigade.

b. Paragraph 2f(1)(c), pages 16, addresses the problem of POL logistics for two platoons that operate 70 - 100 miles from their parent unit. The recommendation that POL resupply responsibility be placed on the ASD is inappropriate. The ASD's are not equipped or staffed to perform POL resupply. This headquarters is advising 12th Aviation Group (Combat) of the 164th Aviation Group (Combat) approach to this recognized problem. Basically, the 164th Aviation Group (Combat) arranged for the supported unit to assist in POL resupply. This headquarters will make a staff visit to the 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat) to assist in resolving this POL logistics problem.

c. Paragraph 2h(1), pages 17 and 18, addresses the need for a dual face visor for the SPH-4 flight helmet. This headquarters will request through USAV that USARVLX evaluates the use of the Navy double visor kit which fits the SPH-4 and that kits be made available as soon as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGC
Vass AG.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHUC-DST (13 Feb 70) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CFPON-lt. (Hc) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96475

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CFPON-lt, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Night Observation Device Operator", page 14, paragraph 2a(3), and paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement: nonconcur. The training of Night Hawk Searchlight/Night Observation Device operators can be accomplished by an OJT program. Units which have been evaluating the Night Hawk system have been utilizing MTOE door gunners, who are already receiving noncrewmember flight pay, to augment the Night Hawk crews. This system appears to be satisfactory in view of the fact that only a limited amount of operator training is required. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning "Rescue Hoist", page 15, paragraph 2c(l): concur. Each assault helicopter company in USARV is authorized two (2) rescue hoists (PSN 1680-179-6047). A unit may obtain these by submitting a requisition to its supporting DSSA. This information was passed to the 222d Aviation Battalion. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

   c. (U) Reference item concerning "Double Visor Kits for the SPH-4 Flight Helmet", page 17, paragraph 2h(l), and paragraph 2c, 3d Indorsement: concur. The Safety Division, USARV Aviation Section will request USABAAR to evaluate the double visor kit for possible Army procurement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
1st Avn Bde
222d Avn Bn

L. D. MURRAY
CP
Assistant Adjutant General

22

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
GPOP-DT (13 Feb 70) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat)
for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R?) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Ass AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACA-EC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

Incl 1 to 222d Avn Bn (Cbt) ORLL dtd 13 February 1970

ORGANIZATION

222d AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
Headquarters Company, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat)
87th Quartermaster Detachment
315th Aviation Detachment (Divisional)
772d Medical Detachment (OA)
117th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel)
195th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel)
92d Medical Detachment (OA)
240th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel)
273d Assault Support Helicopter Company (ASHC) (Hvy)
652d Transportation Detachment (Hvy Hel)

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

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Incl 1  24
222d AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT) AIRCRAFT STATUS
31 January 1970

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** Bn Auth 3 OH-6A by TOE – Special Auth by 1st Avn Bde authorizes 2 UH-1D in lieu of OH-6A’s
*** 2 – Main Floats
*** 3 – Atchd from 478th Avn Co (Hvy Hel)
## OPERATIONAL STATISTICS FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1970

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* = UH-1H  
** = UH-1C  
*** = CH-54
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AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES FOR PERIOD 31 OCTOBER 1969 - 31 JANUARY 1970

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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240th Am Co (Aalt Hdo.)</td>
<td>608,550</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273rd Am Co (Hvy Hdo.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

Commanding General, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces

and

Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, United States Army, Vietnam

1. GENERAL: Pursuant to the authority granted by their respective services, the Commanding General, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces (RTAVF) and the Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, enter into the following Memorandum of Understanding. This document defines the relationship between members of the RTAVF Aviation units and units of the 1st Aviation Brigade, U.S. Army.

2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to permit pilots of the RTAVF to maintain flight proficiency in the UH-1D and H model helicopter and gain experience in U.S. Army Aviation doctrine and techniques. Permission is granted authorizing RTAVF pilots to fly with elements of the 12th Aviation Group (Combat), 1st Aviation Brigade, under agreements outlined in paragraph 3 below. Direct coordination is authorized between the RTAVF and the 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat), 12th Aviation Group (Combat).

3. IT IS AGREED THAT:

   a. Only those RTAVF pilots who have been rated in the UH-1D/H helicopter by the U.S. Army Aviation School qualify in this agreement. Waivers may be considered upon application to the Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, when other agreements contained herein are met.

   b. RTAVF pilots will adhere to rules, regulations and policies applicable to U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARY) Aviators and will have a complete understanding of same.

   c. RTAVF pilots will fly only with USARY Aviators designated as Aircraft Commander and according to the following:

(1) RTAVF pilots must receive proficiency flight checks as prescribed by 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 95-6 prior to flying missions in USARY aircraft. A certificate to that effect will be forwarded to the RTAVF by the unit conducting the flight check.
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AVBACA-EC 13 February 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)(U)

(2) Command of the aircraft will be retained by the USARV aviator.

(3) RTAVF pilots are permitted to fly on all missions flown by units of the 1st Aviation Brigade, in support of RTAVF.

(4) In event of emergency, RTAVF pilots may fly in support of any free world forces.

(5) RTAVF pilots will limit themselves in night flying operations to the support of RTAVF only.

d. RTAVF pilots must be able to speak and understand the English language.

e. Flight physical standards of each agency are acceptable to the other.

f. Individual flight records will be maintained by the respective agencies.

g. Neither force will be held responsible to the other in event of lost life or property as a result of an aircraft accident or hostile fire. Both forces are entitled to the provisions for search and rescue of downed air crews.

4. RECESSION: This Memorandum of Understanding may be rescinded at any time by the incumbent Commanding General of either headquarters represented herein.

SWASDI NAKKAARON ALLENB. BURDETTE, JR.
Major General RTA Major General, USA
Commanding General Commanding General
Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces 1st Aviation Brigade

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29
# Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 222d Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 222d Aviation Battalion

## 1. Report Title

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 222d Aviation Battalion

## 2. Report Date

13 February 1970

## 3. Contract or Grant No.

N/A

## 4. Project No.

N/A

## 5. Other Report No.

701105

## 6. Distribution Statement

N/A

## 7. Sponsoring Military Activity

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

## 8. Abstract

N/A