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AGDA (M) (18 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694230 15 April 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, AFC CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Introduction.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division, during the reporting period, continued in the performance of its general missions:

(a) In conjunction with GVN (Government of Vietnam) forces, the identification and destruction of local Communist forces and the Communist infrastructure (VCI) in order to provide a secure environment to further GVN authority over the area and people.

(b) Destruction of main force NVA (North Vietnamese Army) units, equipment and base camps.

(c) Assistance in the training and improvement of GVN forces.

(d) Overwatch of the Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI).

(e) Area preparation (construction and destruction).

(2) Within the overall framework of these general missions, the principal missions for the reporting period have been to:

(a) Target against Base Areas 355 and 356 in the Trapezoid and Michelin areas, and Base Area 359 in the Catcher's Mitt and War Zone D.

(b) Detect and destroy enemy forces approaching Saigon through the Iron Triangle - Phu Cuong - Mi An - Tan Uyen Zone.

(c) Within the TAOI, coordinate the security of key bridges and

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1 December 1969

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installations, and respond to Communist/NVA attacks against Allied installations, camps and headquarters.

(d) Support the Government of Vietnam Revolutionary Development Program by conducting military operations within the TAOI in coordination with and in support of the 5th ARVN Division, Capital Military District and respective provinces.

(e) Maintain security of major lines of communications within the TAOI (Rt 13 - Tho Iron; Hwy 314 and 16 - Tho Load; Hwy 7B, 2A and 1A - Tho Zinc; and the Saigon Bypass).

(c) In coordination with the 25th Infantry Division, and the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions, conduct attrition operations against Communist Sub-Region 1 (SR-1).

(g) Continue implementation of "Vietnamization" through operations with the 5th ARVN Division and other GVN military forces in the TAOI under the Dong Tien or "Progress Together" Program.

(3) Based on command guidance, experience factors and the changing tactical environment, the following operational trends were prevalent during the reporting period.

(a) Increased emphasis on night operations.

(b) Maintaining contact.

(c) Small unit operations.

(d) "Pile-on" tactics.

(e) Village/hamlet seal and search operations.

(f) Rallier/PW interrogation and exploitation.

(g) Increased centralization of divisional assets.

(h) Joint US/AFRN/RF operations at battalion, company and platoon level.

b. Personnel and administration

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(1) Personnel strength:

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<th>NAG</th>
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<td>192</td>
<td>16022</td>
<td>17296</td>
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<td>Authorized 31 Oct 69</td>
<td>1077</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>16008</td>
<td>17277</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned 1 Aug 69</td>
<td>1146</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>16829</td>
<td>18161</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned 31 Oct 69</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>16097</td>
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(2) Enlisted gains, qualification and status:

(a) Replacements received: 3811


(c) Credits: None

(d) Qualifications: None

(3) Officer gains, qualifications and status:

(a) Replacements received: 489

(b) Outstanding requisitions: 0

(c) Credits: Ample replacements were received for losses; however, a shortage of captains still exists in combat arms, particularly Infantry.

(d) Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fill is being received for requested captain requirements in combat arms.

(4) Enlisted losses: Administrative losses during the period include reassignment within RNW, rotation and EIS, and board actions:

(a) Reassignments within RNW: 458
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(b) Rotation and ETS: 3598

(5) Officers and Warrant officers losses: There were 417 losses during the quarter due to reassignments within Vietnam, rotations and ETS.

(6) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

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<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
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(7) Maintenance of Morale: Awards and decorations

- Medal of Honor: 0
- Distinguished Service Cross: 1
- Distinguished Service Medal: 1
- Silver Star: 179
- Soldier's Medal: 22
- Bronze Star Medal - Valor: 921
- Bronze Star Medal - Merit: 2521
- Army Commendation Medal - Valor: 506
- Army Commendation Medal - Merit: 3327
- Legion of Merit: 7
- Distinguished Flying Cross - Valor: 65
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Distinguished Flying Cross - Achievement 20
Air Medal - Valor 130
Purple Heart 805
Air Medal - Achievement 198
Certificate of Achievement 30

(b) Personnel management:

(a) Infusion: During the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69, the 1st Infantry
Division was not involved in any infusion program.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the reduction of troop strength in RMQ,
replacements in the last quarter were mostly those holding 11 series
MOSs. This has greatly reduced the input of EM in support RMQ. Util-
ization and cross training in conjunction with AR 611-201 and AP 600-200
should be accomplished to alleviate the anticipated shortages in support
MOS.

c. Operations.

(1) General:

(a) The 1st Infantry Division continued its participation in Opera-
tion Toan Thang ("Complete Victory"), Phase III, which began on 17 Feb
69 and ended at the close of this reporting period. All organic units
and those under the operational control (OPCON) of the division were
involved. General objectives were to maintain the offensive-oriented
protective "umbrella" in the northern and eastern portions of the Division
TAO1, conduct a vigorous pacification and security campaign in the cen-
tral and southern TAO1, and implement programs to upgrade local ARVN
and GVN military units.

(b) Specific objectives include denying enemy base area utiliza-
tion, interdicting Communist/AVA infiltration activities, disrupting
enemy logistical operations, exposing 5th ARVN Division units to exten-
sive field operations, and winning support for the GVN from the local
population. Battlefield operations have consisted of both unilateral
and joint (US-ARMY-RP) ground reconnaissance, night ambush, route securi-
ty, PSYOP (psychological operations) and search and seal operations.
In addition, extensive operations in conjunction with riverine forces
have been conducted along the Saigon, Thai Tinh and Song Be Rivers to
interdict enemy traffic along and over these natural highways. Finally,
in the pacification campaign, strong civic action (CIVAC) and PSYOP
programs have been combined with increased efforts to provide military
security for the civilian population.
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(2) Force disposition:

(a) During the reporting period, four significant boundary changes
resulted in major adjustments in division force disposition. On 8 Aug
69, GVN forces assumed responsibility for northern Gia Dinh Province
(Thu Duc District) in the southern portion of the TA01, and the 1st Infantry
Division took over the Phu Hoa area. In October, the 3d Brigade, 82d
Airborne Division, temporarily assumed control of the Phu Hoa - Iron
Triangle - Phu Loi area, also in the southern portion of the TA01. These
changes, coupled with the increasing combat activity of the 7th Regiment,
5th ARVN Division, enabled the 1st Infantry Division to slowly increase
its force density in the north.

(b) From 12 Aug to 22 Sep 69, the 1st Infantry Division assumed
temporary responsibility for convoy security along Route 13, 17 km north
of its old AO. Finally, on 7 Sep 69, the division's AO was expanded
to the north and northwest of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Thus, by
the end of the reporting period, the division had taken advantage of the
reduced enemy activity in the southern and central TA01 to increase the
amount of key territory under direct GVN control. At the same time, it
had moved its forces north and broadened its umbrella over the populated
areas of Binh Duong Province.

(c) Until 12 Aug 69, the 1st Brigade supplied one mechanized bat-
talion in the Michelin Plantation and one infantry battalion in the
northern Trapezoid. On 12 Aug 69, the brigade expanded its AO south to
permit the 3d Brigade to move its center of activity north along Route
13. In conjunction with this AO reorganization, the 1st Brigade reli-
quished its mechanized battalion to the 3d Brigade, but picked up two
US and two ARVN (Dong Tien) infantry battalions operating in the Trape-
zoid. When the 3d Brigade's additional northern responsibilities were
terminated, the mechanized battalion was returned to the 1st Brigade.
In turn, one US and one ARVN infantry battalion were turned back to the
3d Brigade. Thus, during the latter half of the reporting period, the
1st Brigade employed one infantry battalion in the Michelin Plantation,
and one mechanized battalion, and one US and one ARVN infantry battalion
in the Trapezoid. As in the previous period, the 1st Brigade conducted
offensive operations in these areas to detect and destroy Communist/
NVA forces and caches, extensive ambush operations to interdict enemy
infiltration and logistical operations, and combined Dong Tien operations
with the 8th ARVN Regiment.

(d) Initially, the 2d Brigade was operating in the populated, south-
ern portion of the TA01 with four battalions (three infantry and one
mechanized). In August and September two of these battalions (one
infantry and one mechanized) were transferred north. Currently, the

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2d Brigade secures the southern portion of the TAOI with two infantry
battalions whose operations are closely coordinated with the 3d Brigade, 82d
Airborne, and the 7th Arm Regiment. In addition, the Brigade maintains
a forward attack base in the Catcher's Mitt (FMB "Florida") to keep the
enemy off balance. In general, the objectives of the 2d Brigade have
been support of the intensified pacification program through population
and resources control operations in coordination with local ARVN/GVN
forces, the interdiction of enemy infiltration and logistical operations,
and the neutralization of local VC.

(e) In early August, the 3d Brigade employed six battalions (three
US and 2 ARVN Dong Tien infantry battalions and one armored cavalry
squadron) in the vicinity of Route 13 (north and south of Lai Khe),
An Dien and Chanh Luu, and in the Trapezoid. Then, from 12 Aug to 22
Sep 69, the brigade employed three battalions (one infantry and one
mechanized battalion, and one armored cavalry squadron) along Highway
13 from Lai Khe to approximately 16 km north of Choi Than. Following
this operation, the 3d Brigade's center of activity returned to Lai
Khe. For the remainder of the reporting period, the brigade employed
three infantry battalions (two US and one ARVN Dong Tien battalion)
northwest of Lai Khe, and one infantry and one mechanized battalion in
the Song Be Corridor against the Dong Nai Regt. During these opera-
tions the missions of the brigade have been to detect and destroy
Communist/NVA forces and caches, interdict enemy infiltration and logistical
operations, conduct combined "Dong Tien" operations with the 8th
ARMN Regt and secure convoys along Route 13.

(f) From 7 Aug to 20 Sep 69, one mechanized infantry battalion, one
mechanized cavalry troop and one artillery battery were OPCON to the 1st
Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) and operated around the Quan Loi - An
Loc area.

(g) From 7 Sep to 10 Oct 69, two troops from the 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment (E/2-11 and F/2-11) were OPCON to the 2d Brigade,
1st Infantry Division. These units remained at Phu "Cafe" Camp while
being equipped with the new Sheridan tank, and participated only in
local security operations.

(h) One battalion (1-51) of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division,
was OPCON to the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, from 10 Sep to 1
Oct 69. The battalion conducted ground reconnaissance, night ambush,
and search and seal operations during that period. By the end of
September, the rest of the airborne brigade had arrived and assumed
responsibility for the Phu Hoa - Iron Triangle - Phu Loi area, in con-
junction with one battalion of the 7th ARVN Regt. The brigade is
scheduled to leave Vietnam sometime in November 1969.

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(i) On 21 Sep 69, the division armored cavalry squadron (1st Squadron,
4th Cavalry Regiment) was placed under direct divisional control
and given its own AO west of Ben Cat.

(j) During the reporting period the division was assisted by the
531st, 571st and 593d US Navy River Divisions (Patrol Boat Riverine)
and the 24th South Vietnamese River Assault Group (RAG). These naval
forces have worked extensively with 1st Infantry Division elements to
interdict enemy traffic on the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers.

(k) Inclosure 3 provides a detailed description of force disposition
by battalion-size units.

(3) Operation Toan Thang, Phase III.

(a) The concentration of divisional air and artillery assets in
support of extensive small unit operations along historical enemy infil-
tration routes and base areas has prevented the enemy from making any
significant penetration into the populated southern portions of the
TAOIs. Faced by more effective ARVN and GVN military forces, and con-
tinuous pressure from the 1st Infantry Division, enemy units have remained
in remote areas and have continued to operate in increasingly smaller
groups to avoid detection. The division has maintained its network of
interlocking fire support bases (FSB) and further centralized its other
support assets in order to employ them more effectively and efficiently.
At the same time, small unit ground reconnaissance and night ambushes
have continued to be emphasized. Units of the 5th ARVN Division and
local regional and popular forces (RF/FF) have been successfully encour-
aged to participate in these small scale operations resulting in an even
stronger Allied force density in critical areas.

(b) Under this protective cover, the pacification campaign has
proceeded rapidly in the populated regions of the central and southern
TAOIs. Increased security has meant an increase in both economic growth
and respect for the government of South Vietnam. At the same time,
the 1st Infantry Division, 5th ARVN Division and Binh Duong Province
forces have increased their efforts against the dwindling VCI network
and Communist local force units through systematic seal and search oper-
ations, centralization and coordination of intelligence data, rapid
PW and raillery exploitation, and the extensive use of Mobile Resource Con-
trol Teams.

(c) Known enemy units within the Division TAOIs have desperately
tried to avoid contact and have often devoted their entire efforts to
food, equipment and personnel resupply. Resupply has become their
major mission. In order to conserve existing force levels, the enemy
has abstained from large-scale attacks against Allied installations. Combat operations have generally been limited to small unit sapper attacks and stand-off attacks by mortar and rocket fire.

(d) The one enemy high-point occurred the 11-14 Aug 69. This took the form of numerous attacks by fire against Allied bases and attempts to interdict the line of communications between Lai Khe and An Loc. The high-point was followed by a period of increased enemy contacts marking the NVA autumn offensive. Due to the enemy's limited ability to sustain extended operations and his desire to avoid severe losses, these attacks gradually dwindled. Since that time, the discovery of numerous arms caches by 1st Infantry and 5th ARVN Division units, plus the continuous interruption of enemy resupply and replacement activities has made it increasingly difficult for the enemy to conduct even normal non-combat operations.

(e) At this time, intelligence reports indicate that another Communist high point may occur in November 1969. However, due to logistical problems, it is doubtful that the enemy can launch any significant attacks in the 1st Infantry Division's TACM for some time.

(f) In June 69, the 1st Infantry Division established a "floating boundary" system along its Saigon River boundary with the 25th Infantry Division. The boundary was divided into segments approximately 1,000 meters on either side of the river. With sufficient advance notice, each side could request permission to operate in these segments. The system has allowed units from one division to operate extensively on both sides of the river when units of the other division are elsewhere. Because of the system's success, CG, II Field Force Vietnam ordered the 1st Infantry Division to establish similar floating boundaries with the adjacent 1st Cavalry Division (AVN), and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. This was completed by 1 Sep 69.

4) Operation "Strangle."

(a) Operation Strangle began on 21 Jul 69 in western Binh Dinh Province with the objective of neutralizing enemy forces of Sub-Region 1 (SR-1) operating in the Iron Triangle and the Trapezoid. Participating units included the 2-28, 1-28, and 2-16 Infantry Battalions, the 2-2 Mechanized Infantry Battalion, 1-4 Cavalry, B/2-34 Armor (the division tank company), elements of the 8th ARVN Regt, and US and Vietnamese naval forces. Their main missions were interdicting replacement and resupply routes, and destroying enemy base camps. Aided by extensiveROME ploBO operations in the Trapezoid and divisional air assets, the attrition of enemy units has proceeded successfully. Intelligence reports now indicate that for the first time the enemy has been forced to import food and military supplies across the Saigon River from the west and southwest. When the operation ended on 21 Sep 69, 414 enemy had been eliminated (365 KIA, 35 WN and 14 ralifers).
(b) SR-1 itself is a larger area which also extends deeply into the AO of the adjacent 25th Inf Div. Thus since early August, the 1st Infantry Division and II Field Force Vietnam have sponsored a series of SR-1 conferences designed to facilitate the exchange of intelligence information between concerned FWMAF (Free World Military Assistance Forces) and GVN forces. To date, eight such conferences have been held and attended by representatives of II Field Force Vietnam, the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions, and US-AVN Saigon River naval forces. Thus, though Operation Strangle has officially ended, its concept and objectives have now been expanded and applied to the entire enemy sub-region.

(5) Operation "Danger Forward": Phase I.

(a) Operation Danger Forward (Phase I) began on 21 Sep 69 with all 1st Infantry Division elements and OPCON units of 1-505th Airborne Infantry Battalion. This operation will continue during the autumn and winter of 1969 with the three-fold mission of conducting offensive operations to neutralize Communist forces in the division's TACR, upgrading and encouraging more efficient employment of ARVN/GVN forces, and maintaining overwatch of the pacification program throughout the area concerned. The 1st and 3d Brigades with the 8th ARVN Regiment will operate against SR-1 in northern Binh Duong Province and against the Dong Nai Regiment, east of Route 13. The 2d Brigade, together with the 7th ARVN Regiment, will operate against the K-1 Battalion, Dong Nai Regiment, and the 2d Quyet Thang Battalion.

(b) Concept and techniques: The overall mission of Operation Danger Forward is to target and to destroy specific enemy units. Forces and patterns of operation will be tailored to inflict maximum damage on enemy forces. Division forces will not be uniformly dispersed throughout the TACR; force density will be varied to focus on the main enemy concentrations. Through continuous intelligence analyses of activities and dispositions, the 1st Infantry Division will responsively adjust its operations to exploit enemy vulnerabilities at various levels of activity. Danger Forward consists of five types of operations: Strike Danger, Dominate Danger, Destroy Danger, Sky Sweep, and Hawk Hunter. The techniques of these types differ in terms of mission, size of maneuver elements, and use of airlift.

(c) Strike Danger: In areas of enemy troop concentrations, division forces conduct Strike Danger operations to destroy these forces. The mission is to destroy main force units, not to control a specific geographical area. These operations are characterized by company-size maneuver forces operating within the 105mm fire fan of a mobile artillery position. Three companies conduct ground reconnaissance and ambush operations from this position, which is secured by the fourth company which may conduct local ground reconnaissance and ambushes. Each company operates for approximately three days in the field and secures the artillery position for one day.
Strike Danger provides a high offensive and mobile reconnaissance capability while affording maximum security for the infantry elements. The Dong Tien program during Strike Danger aims at upgrading the offensive capability of ARVN battalions and companies. Through combined operations, ARVN units gain experience in combating main force units and in employing fire support. Although these operations do not include pacification as a primary mission, Strike Danger compliments pacification by denying enemy access to populated areas.

(d) Dominate Danger: Once main force units are destroyed or dispersed, the division then conducts Dominate Danger operations to eliminate enemy remnants. The mission in this type of operation is to exercise control over a specific geographical area and deny its use to the enemy. A company or companies operate from a mobile artillery position. The company conducts platoon-size patrols in the vicinity of the artillery position. The other companies of the battalion operate from patrol bases each within the 105mm fire fan of the artillery position. The positions of these patrol bases will be changed often. The companies operate approximately on a 21 day cycle; for example, 18 days in ground reconnaissance operations and three days on stand-down at a base camp. This technique provides the greatest amount of area domination with a given force and requires a high proportion of forces committed to terrain control missions. The Dong Tien program for this phase includes combined ops with RF/PF as well as ARVN units. Upgrading RF/PF assumes importance in increasing the security capability of these forces with respect to the populated areas around which Dominate Danger operations are being conducted. Together with low cost-high impact pacification projects, these efforts are designed to prevent Communist/AVA elements from acquiring support from local hamlets and villages.

(e) Destroy Danger: As RF/PF begin to assume responsibility for securing the populated areas, the division conducts Destroy Danger operations. The mission of forces involved in this phase is to find, through aggressive mobile patrolling, and eliminate the remnants of enemy that may remain or infiltrate after Dominate Danger operations. This technique is characterized by numerous platoon and squad-size patrols operating without any fixed bases but within a 155mm fan. These forces may be airlifted into position and operate on approximately a 12 day cycle; for example, 10 days of patrolling and two days stand-down at a base camp. These operations should be employed in situations where the enemy lacks a significant offensive capability. The Dong Tien program capitalizes upon the ARVN/RF-PF ability to discover enemy cache sites and to eliminate the enemy infrastructure. Pacification focuses on upgrading hamlets and preventing scattered Communist elements from disrupting hamlet security.

(f) Sky Sweep: When RF/PF assume the major responsibility for securing populated areas, the division conducts Sky Sweep operations. Although the enemy retains the capability of engaging in limited attacks and acts of terrorism, ARVN/RF-PF have the resources and the popular support to insure
overall security of the area. The mission of these operations is to provide additional assets on an "as needed" basis in order to bolster ARVN/GVN confidence in their own capabilities. The division provides airlift and all troop units to assist ARVN/RF-VF in their efforts. In these operations, platoon-size elements may operate with one-half lift companies. One platoon is moved by helicopter while the other checks out target locations and makes a show of force in the area. Responsibility for pacification is transferred to ARVN/GVN authorities, with US forces assuming an overwatch role.

(g) Hawk Hunter: When RF/VF assume responsibility for security of an area, relieving ARVN for employment in less stabilized areas, the division conducts Hawk Hunter operations. The mission is to show continued US interest in an area with economy of force operations. In these operations, squad-size elements conduct multiple insertions with short term reconnaissance missions in coordination with RF/VF. Dong Tien is conducted through the provision of airlift and MPT to increase RF/VF capabilities.

(h) All five of the above operations may be in action simultaneously in different locations of the TAOI. Furthermore, it is envisioned that, as the enemy moves out of 1st Infantry Division TAOI, the division will expand its area of operation to the north to maintain contact with enemy units. During this "roll up" to the north, responsibility for the stabilized areas will be transferred to ARVN/GVN forces.

(i) Division cavalry squadron: In all of the techniques of Danger Forward, the cavalry squadron plays a major role. It is the division's ground mobile strike force. Because of its mobility, firepower and shock action, the squadron can conduct offensive operations against main force units, reinforce the contacts of other maneuver elements of the division, and conduct economy of force operations. The cavalry squadron will normally operate under division control throughout the division TAOI.

(j) As of 31 Oct 69, the cumulative results of US/ARVN Danger Forward operations were 598 enemy KIA, 47 PWS and 41 ralliers.

(6) Operation "Thunder Run";

(a) Due to an increase in enemy activity in northern Binh Long Province, Operation Thunder Run was initiated on 12 Aug 69. While the 1st Cavalry Division countered a northern enemy threat, the 1st Infantry Division assumed an additional 17 km section of Route 13 named AO "Red Ball". The temporary AO encompassed an area approximately 10 km east and west of Route 13, the main supply route (MSR) to 1st Cav Div elements based at Quan Loi, An Loc and Loc Ninh.

(b) Immediately, elements of the 2-2 Inf (Mech) and the 1-4 Cavalry provided route and convoy security from Lai Khe to a point approximately 38 km...
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north. The main actions occurred above Chon Thanh (XT765615) and FSB Thunder III (XT772656) in AO Red Ball. Here units of the 2-2 Mech outposted the road while daily convoys rolled back and forth escorted by elements of the 1-4 Cavalry. For over one month these units guarded the road and destroyed repeated battalion-size ambushes of the NVA 101st Regiment.

(c) On 121530 Aug 69, the K-8 Battalion, 101st Regiment, attempted to ambush the Devil Run convoy at XT766745. Thunder III was mortared, road culverts at both ends of the ambush were blown, and a section of the convoy was taken under fire by rocket propelled grenades (RPG) as well as automatic and small arms fire. C/2-2 Mech outposted along the road ploca cuts which extend 200-300 meters on either side of the road piled on the ambush force before any damage to the convoy could be done. While C/2-2 and convoy escort forces from the 1-4 Cav and 11th ACR poured direct fire on the enemy, artillery and air strikes were employed. A subsequent sweep of the area revealed 54 enemy dead; in addition, two M/7, several AK-47, RPG and RPG rounds, and a quantity of ammunition and documents were captured. There were two US KIA and eight WIA (two KIA and two WIA were from the 11th ACR).

(d) From 12 to 16 Aug 69, lst Infantry Division elements constructed FSB Hartman (XT763738) approximately eight km north of Thunder III along Route 13. Occupied by C/2-2 Mech, B/1-28 Inf and B/1-5 Arty (105), FSB Hartman was the division's northern highway outpost for the following critical weeks.

(e) Two days later, the K9 Battalion, 101st Regt, initiated a similar convoy ambush at 1130, vic XT766678, 1.5 km north of Thunder III. Initially the convoy was stopped and several vehicles damaged by RPG and M/5A fire. However, once elements of B/2-2 Mech and 1-4 Cav arrived, fire superiority was gained, and air strikes, artillery and helicopter gunships were directed on the ambush site. Successive sweeps of the area by C/B/Recn/2-2 Mech and B/1-28 Inf produced one Chieu Hoi, one SRS rifle, four AK-47, and several grenades, RPG rounds and AK-47 magazines. The enemy left 20 dead, while US convoy forces suffered one KIA and three WIA.

(f) On 20 Aug 69, a reinforced enemy platoon attempted a third ambush against a Highway 13 convoy vic XT765729. Elements of C/2-2 Mech, together with a quick reaction force composed of the Recn Platoon/2-2 Mech and B/2-34 Armor (-) rapidly "piled-on" the ambush site. Artillery and USAF Fighter-bombers (TAC Air) were immediately directed against the enemy force. There were two US WIA, seven enemy KIA, and two M/7 (WIA); three AK-47s, 15 AK-47 magazines, two RPG launchers and five RPG rounds, one light machinegun, two CHICOM handgrenades, five sets of web gear, miscellaneous SA ammunition, and two documents were captured. The convoy was untouched.

(g) On 6 Sep 69, elements of the K-9 battalion launched the 101st Regiment's final ambush attempt against a "Thunder Road" convoy. About 150-200 enemy soldiers participated in the attack; the ambush was positioned
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vic XW763680, the same location of the previous K-9 ambush on 14 Aug 69. At 1055 the Devil Convoy received mortar fire followed by a ground attack at 1100 from the western side of the road. The security element, B/1-4 Cav returned fire and was immediately supported by artillery, helicopter gunships, and TAC Air. As the convoy moved safely out of the contact area at 1115, A/3-1-2 and C/2-2 Mech, moved into the ambush site. Though sporadic contact continued until 1730, it was the initial quick U.S. reaction that trapped the enemy before he could withdraw. U.S. losses were one KIA and seven WIA; enemy losses included 55 KIA, four WIA, three Chieu Hois, three light machine guns, eight AK-47s and three AK-47 magazines, 1,000 5A rounds, 11 840 rounds and nine 840 rocket boosters, 45 grenades, four anti-tank grenades, 18 canteens, 10 sets of web gear, 10 helmets, 10 ponchos, 10 lbs rice and four flashlights.

(b) At 221200 Sep 69, AO Red Ball was terminated, the area was returned to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM and the 2-2 Inf Mech) returned to the 1st Bde at Dau Tieng. For approximately 41 days the task force based at Thunder III and FSM Hartman had secured the daily Convoy to and from Quan Loi and kept a vital supply route open despite the best efforts of at least one full NVA regiment. (i) At the same time that Operation Thunder Ram ended, the 1-16 Inf Mech, A/1-4 Cav, and C/2-33 Arty returned to 1st Infantry Division control. The enemy autumn offensive had ended. (j) Enemy initiated activity: During the reporting period, the enemy has launched several stand-off attacks by mortar and rocket fire and two unsuccessful sapper attacks. These limited operations, while causing little physical damage, had two purposes. First, they gave the Communist forces a slight psychological boost and secondly they tended to divert Allied support assets from other enemy objectives. But any advantages accrued from these operations was fleeting. After these attacks have only warned the 1st Infantry Division of possible enemy movement and attempted small-scale operations in the TDZ. The most significant attacks are listed below.

(a) On 12120 Aug 69, as the kick-off to the enemy autumn offensive, Lai Khe Basecamp received 15 rounds of 107mm rocket fire. Nine US were wounded, and six helicopters and three trucks were lightly damaged. Unfortunately, five civilians in Lai Khe village were killed and 11 more wounded. (b) On the evening following the death of Ho Chi Minh on 4 Sep 69, the Communists launched a brief series of attacks throughout the division TDZ. At 2028, Lai Khe Basecamp received twenty 107mm rockets resulting in four US WIA. After midnight, at approximately 0100, attacks were launched against Dau Tieng Basecamp, FSB Thunder III and Chon Than. Twenty 82mm mortar shells and two 107mm rockets hit Dau Tieng, damaging 10 helicopters but causing no casualties. The SF compound at Chon Than received mortar, SA/AM, and 50 cal. fire, followed by a small ground probe. At the same time, Thunder III,
four km north, was attacked by sappers supported by RPG and SA fire. Then at about 0145, two RF compounds (XN942204 and XN769138) near Phu Lai, received 14-79 and RPG fire. At about the same time, FSB Gala (XN803418) was struck by twenty 82mm mortar shells. Finally, at 0200, NDF Mons XII (XN635436) took eight 60mm mortar shells and 20 minutes later, five 82mm mortar shells struck Ben Cat. Although the attacks were widespread and coordinated, the only serious effort was against FSB Thunder III. Here elements of A/2-2 Mech and B/2-34 Armor decisively repelled the enemy assaults, the Communists were thrown back leaving 23 dead and one FM. In the morning, a sweep located 49 RPG rounds, 200 grenades, and several AK47, Bangalore torpedoes and RPG launchers.

On 9 Sep 69, 0130, a small-scale sapper attack was launched against FSB Jim (XN882392) defended by elements of the Recon Platoon and B/2-2 Mech. A fierce battle ensued for about 30 minutes. Although several sappers actually penetrated the perimeter, the surprise attack was repulsed. There were six US WIA.

The night of 10-11 Sep 69 marked the end of an NVA proclaimed "truce" and small enemy stand-off attacks were automatically expected in the division AO. As anticipated, rocket and mortar attacks were directed against Lai Khe, Dau Tieng and Phu Lai Base Camps. Dau Tieng was hit the hardest with 10 107 and 10 122 rockets, and 35 82mm mortar shells. But the attacks, mounted with great effort, only resulted in 11 US WIA, one ARVN and one civilian WIA, and four vehicles damaged.

On 22 Oct 69. At 2125, Dau Tieng received 30-40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Only eight rounds fall inside the base perimeter resulting in four US WIA and one helicopter slightly damaged.

(b) The Trapezoid.

The Trapezoid is a vast jungle area lying between the Michelin Plantation on the north and the once formidable Iron Triangle on the south. The area, over 100 square km, is bordered on the west and east by the Salavan and Thi Thanh Rivers. Once a lively enemy stronghold, the Trapezoid is now anything but a haven for Communist and NVA soldiers. Constant US/ARVN patrolling and extensive Rome plow operations have continued to reduce the level of enemy activity there during the reporting period.

The only large scale contact in the Trapezoid occurred on the morning of 24 Aug 69, when B/2-2 Mech stirred up a hornet's nest during a Rome plow security operation at XT570365. The mechanized force engaged an estimated enemy company defending a bunker complex. While artillery, helicopter gunships and TAC Air supported the contact, two platoons of
D/2-28 were inserted into the area. At 1556 vic Xr575365, 1/2-28 Inf (-) moved in from the east and regained contact. Again supported by artillery, gunsights and TAC Air, the firefight lasted until 1735. There were six US KIA, and one armored personnel carrier (APC) and two Roni plows damaged. A search of the area located 28 enemy dead and indicated 11 more possible killed.

(c) For the remainder of the period, operations in the Trapezoid have been characterized by small scale contacts. On the morning of 26 Aug 69, at 1045 vic Xr593375, B/2-2 Mech spotted and engaged one enemy soldier. A closer search of the area revealed an RVN battalion medical detachment which quickly surrendered. Total results were one enemy KIA, nine POW, four ARVN, four SKS rifles and one 9mm pistol. US units have also been bolstered by ARVN forces operating in the Trapezoid. The ARVN have proved particularly adept at locating enemy caches and base camps, while increasing the overall Allied force density in the area. They are also becoming more proficient at combat operations, especially night ambushes. For example, on 012000 Sep 69, the Reconnaissance Company, 1-8 ARVN Regt, engaged an estimated enemy platoon, vic Xr533334. After a short, one-sided fight, a search of the area located 18 enemy KIA, one POW and several weapons. On the night of 24 Oct 69, an 1/2-28 Inf ambush was positioned near a trail network in a small rubber grove, vic Xr544397. On the following morning, at 0700, they sighted eight enemy moving south down the trail. The ambushers detonated their claymore mines and followed up with Saigon fire. The Communists returned fire but were too late to be effective. The ambush resulted in one US WIA, six enemy KIA and two POW (MIA), and several weapons captured. Contacts like these are continuous, while seemingly minor, such actions have gradually squeezed the enemy out of his former jungle haven.

(9) The seal and search of Phu Hoa Dong.

(a) The 2d Brigade conducted the village seal of Phu Hoa Dong (XT715190) on 15-26 Sep 69, using forces from the brigade, the 7th ARVN Regt, and GMN forces of Phu Hoa District and Binh Duong Province. The 2d Brigade devised an imaginative deception plan to mask the real objective and to trap VC elements within the target village. The seal was the largest such operation conducted in the history of pacification in the 1st Infantry Division TDY. On the night of 15 Sep 69, ten US/ARVN companies converged rapidly on the village by PAG/PBR boats, foot marches, and trucks. The seal was completed at 160053 Sep and maintained for eleven days. One ARVN and three US battalions maintained the cordon, conducted night ambushes inside and outside the village, and performed ground reconnaissance and area searches outside the seal area. Under the supervision of the Phu Hoa District Chief, the village was thoroughly and methodically searched.
searched by five RF companies, national policemen, an armed propaganda team, and US troops. PSYOP were conducted daily throughout the operation employing aerial broadcasts, leaflet drops, ground speaker teams, and face-to-face communications. Band, movies, MEDCAP, DEV-CAP, raffles, and food were used to preclude the villagers from adopting an antagonistic attitude during the screening and searching. The seal was terminated on 260700 Sep as a complete success. Final results were 23 Communists KIA, two Communist KIA possible, 17 PV, 16 ralliers, 32 individual weapons, six crew-served weapons, 1785 small arms rounds, 72 arty/mortar rounds, 1121 kilos rice, and various military supplies and equipment. The seal operation rendered the Communist units in the area ineffective, improved the security status of the village, and gave respect and valuable training to the participating CMN units.

(b) The Phu Hoa Dong seal and search was only one of many US/ARMY/RF combined operations in support of the pacification campaign. Using the combined firepower, intelligence-gathering capabilities, and supporting forces of three Allied elements, the efforts to neutralize VC/ and provide better local security in the populated areas of the Ist Infantry Division TARO have continued to grow more efficient and more productive.

(10) Riverine operations: Continued domination of the Saigon River has been critical in limiting enemy activity and preventing him from massing men, material and equipment of any significant size in the division TARO. From August to October 1969, there were three types of riverine forces operating on the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. First was the Vietnamese River Assault Group (VRG), which transported Allied troops along the river. Second were the US Navy Riverine Divisions. Operating speedy, well-armed patrol ships, they patrol and ambush the river by night and conduct reconnaissance of the river's banks and estuaries by day. Often responding to radar sightings and contacts by Ist Infantry Division units, they have severely restricted enemy movement on the river by night. From 1 Aug to 31 Oct 69, PBR have accounted for 152 enemy KIA. Last are the "Ski Boats" of the 1st Engineer Battalion. Since September these low-draft, fiber glass boats have constantly participated in river searches, sweeps and ambushes with the 2-18 Inf and 2-2 Rabt. Their transport capability has contributed much to the success of these units in locating and eliminating small enemy units. With riverine assets, the Ist Infantry Division has developed the "Squid" operation, a new technique which may be described as waterborne Eagle-Flighting. The main principles involved are listed below:

(a) Normally, a minimum of two PBR or four ski boats are utilized, depending on the load, the average speed is 15 to 20 knots for PBR and 18-25 knots for ski boats.
(b) Normally, the river craft move in a trail formation when inserting troops; the line turns towards the shore simultaneously to allow maximum firepower to be employed if necessary. This also allows the maximum number of troops to get ashore in a minimum amount of time.

(c) The number of troops per boat depends on the number and type of boats. Usually one rifle platoon is employed in this type of operation. If PBR are utilized and the unit only receives two to work with, 10-12 men are placed on each; with four boats, five to six personnel are employed per boat. With ski boats, never more than six men per boat can be used. Thus, at least four ski boats are necessary to transport one platoon.

(d) Procedures are basically the same. The major differences are in the firepower and draft of the two types of boats. The draft of the PBR is approximately three feet; this limits its use in some of the shallow streams. The ski boats, on the other hand, have a draft of 12 to 18 inches and are capable of navigating many of the small streams and canals. Once the troops are inserted, the boats stay close to shore, ready to support by fire if necessary. In areas that have extensive undergrowth along the river and stream line, a light fire team or a hunter killer team is requested to support the "Squid" operation. At a minimum, a helicopter LOR is utilized to provide the air cover and observation, especially ahead of the fleet when moving on narrow canals. Artillery fires are planned in the area of operation. The selection of the area is based on intelligence reports and previous sightings. The planned artillery consists of at least one concentration which the platoon leader or platoon sergeant is able to shift. At times, an LOR is utilized to spot insertion areas from the air, smoke is used to mark the area and the boats move to the designated spot. Extractions are similar to air extractions where personnel move to a pre designated pick-up point. If only two PBR are available, one boat will provide security while the other loads; the loaded boat then covers the other element as it is loaded. For ski boats, or if four PBR are utilized, two boats are loaded at a time while the other two provide security. If necessary, air assets are requested to cover the extraction. However, this is not always needed and a large number of "Squid" operations have been conducted without the benefit of air support.

(e) The amount of time a unit spends in one area depends on the intelligence and terrain. However, generally platoons do not operate in an area over two hours. Normally, the distance from the stream or river bank to the AO does not exceed 1000 meters. Usually the distance varies from 10 to 500 meters.

(11) Operation "Night Danger": Night Danger, actually an operational concept, was conceived and implemented in October 1969. The objective of
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The program is to increase the pressure on enemy night-time operations, especially resupply and infiltration activities. To do this, the division has centralized its target acquisition and target destruction assets so that the Division Commander is able to make a more efficient and discriminating use of his resources. The result has been a greater ability to analyze and correlate intelligence information and follow through with a quicker, measured response.

(a) One key element to the program has been the 1st Infantry Division's Target Destruction Section (TDS). Located in the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC), the TDS is a newly organized section drawn from the resources of the Div Artillery, the Division Fire Support Element (FSE), the Military Intelligence Detachment and the Sensor Platoon. The section receives all intelligence reports coming into the DTOC and maintains communications with division radar teams and all sensor monitoring stations servicing the division TACI. In addition, the TDS has communications with all artillery units in and adjacent to the TACI through the facilities of the FSE. In operation, the TDS receives and analyzes intelligence, determines possible targets, and assists the G3 operations officer in recommending appropriate responses. This has meant both a quicker response to fleeting targets and a more efficient use of division assets. As of the end of the reporting period, the TDS had assisted in approximately 115 enemy kills.

(b) To date, the most effective division night asset - and the one recommended most frequently by the TDS - is Nighthawk. The 1st Infantry Division Nighthawk program began on 2 Aug 69. The Nighthawk force consists of three Nighthawk helicopters (UH-1H, each equipped with two TVS-4 starlight scopes, two Sheridan searchlights, and two mini-guns), two AH-1G/UH-1H gunships and one UH-1H slick. The Nighthawk team works with one Nighthawk aircraft and one gunship or slick as a chase ship. Each Nighthawk team is designed and missioned to search out and destroy enemy forces in the TACI during the hours of darkness. From 2 Aug to 31 Oct 69 there were 58 engagements by Nighthawk teams resulting in 132 Communist/NVA KIA (SC) (for more information on Nighthawk, see Incl 13, 1st Inf Div Cir 525-8, "Utilization of Nighthawk Aircraft"). Night Danger contacts are quick and abrupt. With Nighthawk, the VR (visual reconnaissance or damage assessment) of the contact is immediate.

(c) In the early morning hours of 22 Sep 69, the 571st PBR were patrolling the banks of the Saigon River below Ben Chua. At approximately 0015 vic XTS99350, they observed and engaged 25-30 enemy crossing the river. There was no return fire and the action was over in minutes. A search of the water located 25 enemy dead, 14 backpacks and one AK47. The following night, the event was repeated about two km up the river. The PBR and one platoon, D/2-28 Inf engaged 15-20 enemy. There was no return fire and 17 more enemy dead, 11 backpacks and one AK47 were located.

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(d) On 13 Oct 69, the LRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol)
Team #1 reported heavy enemy movement in the northern Ben Cat
area. Immediately, TOT salvos from three artillery batteries hit the target area
followed by five TAC Air strikes. A subsequent search located 18 enemy
dead.

(a) On the night of 16-17 Oct 69, strong readouts were noted from a
new sensor field placed on the Razorback. The information was relayed
from the monitoring station on Nui Ba Den (the Black Virgin Mountain) in the
25th Infantry Division AO to the 1st Infantry Division TDS. As the
sensor readings changed intensity, a pattern of movement was established
and Night hawk aircraft were quickly directed onto the target areas (vic
XX571595, XX535575, and XX480575). The results were 21 enemy
KIA over a three-hour period.

(f) On 17 Oct 69, radar located an estimated 20 enemy soldiers
in stationary positions just east of Dau Tieng Base Camp (XX508468). A
Night hawk team, quickly dispatched to the area engaged the enemy before
they could move. Thirteen enemy dead were counted.

(g) A series of sensor activations and radar sightings along the Saigon
River on the night of 23 Oct 69 were followed up by River Patrol Boats
(RPB) and Night hawk. This combination of four assets resulted in a total
of 10 enemy KIA in three different locations (XX634320, XX591351 and
XX590351).

(12) Caches: From August to October the 1st Infantry Division, ably
assisted by the 7th and 8th ARVN Regiments, proved itself particularly
adept at scouring the division AO for hidden enemy supplies. The enemy's
inactivity was partially due to the success of these hunts. It should be
pointed out that only one significant rice cache was discovered (at XX523412,
C/2-28 led by Kit Carson Scout unearthed four tons of rice). Most of the
other finds involved small amounts of food, military equipment or documents.
Most notable were the large number of sizeable arms and munitions caches
found. The most significant are listed below:

(a) On 29 Aug 69, B/2-28 Inf vic XX563735 located the following
items in the Trapezoid: 75 1/4 lb TNT blocks; four bicycles; 210 lbs
salt; two ChiCom grenades; six anti-tank mines; twenty 15 lb ChiCom clay-
mores; 14 Bangalore torpedoes; 23 82mm mortars rounds; five rifle grenades; nine cases of 81mm rounds; 7,400 rounds
of SA ammunition; six RPG rounds with boosters; six RPG rockets; and 70 lbs
of rice.

(b) On 24 Sep, 1-16 Inf Mech began extensive operations in the lower
Song Be Corridor. Although there were no significant enemy contacts, the
mechanized battalion was able to locate numerous caches believed to belong
to the Dong Nai Regt. Most important was the series of finds made by

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A/1-16 aided by a cooperative raider.

(c) On 21 Sep 69, vic XT571463, A/1-16 was led by the raider to an arms cache containing the following items: two 82mm mortars, 24 light machine guns; one 100-round LG drum; twenty-six 57mm rounds; seven 62mm rounds; sixteen 60mm rounds; eight lbs TNT; eight RPG rounds; three gas masks; forty rounds AK47 ammunition; seven ChiCom claymores; and 128 75mm NR rounds.

(d) On 7 Oct 69, the raider led A/1-16 to another hidden munitions dump vic XT804492 containing: 661 lbs TNT; 140 lbs C-4; 24 cans with press-type detonators; and five cans of time fuses.

(e) The following day the company was led to another cache vic XT804492 consisting of 512 lbs TNT; seven RPG rounds; five RPG boosters; and two 82mm mortar shells.

(f) On 25-26 Sep 69, the 7th Company, 2-8 ARVN, discovered two large arms caches in the Trapezoid (vic XT648335 and XT645339). The first one contained two 12.7 heavy machine guns, three S&S rifles, one light machine gun, 1,000 rounds AK47 ammunition, fifteen 60mm mortar rounds and 15 rifle grenades; the second cache revealed three RPG, 109 RPG rounds, thirty-three 82mm mortar rounds, fifteen 30 lb HE mines, 8,000 rounds, 50 caliber ammunition, 60 RPG fuses, 4,000 rounds 7.62 ammunition and 15 ChiCom claymores.

(g) On 13-14 Oct 69, F/1-2 Inf located a large bunker complex believed to be an NVA hospital in the northeastern corer of the Michelin Plantation vic XT592566. A thorough search of the area yielded 3,000 penicillin bottles, six large penicillin bottles, 40 bottles of glucose, four bottles of vitamins, one roll of medical tape, one bottle of iodine, 30 bottles of sterile water, and 10 operating tables.

(h) On 25 Oct 69, C/2-28 Inf unearthed a cache in the Trapezoid (vic XT994941) containing 10 light machine guns, 300 hand grenades, one heavy machine gun (with mount and extra barrel), 22 S&S rifles, one ChiCom radio, one hundred 1/4 lb blocks of TNT, seven carbines and five AK47.

(i) The largest arms depot was found on 26 Oct 69 vic XT548379. The responsible unit was again A/1-16 Inf which was now operating in the Trapezoid. The cache contained six 7.62mm Soviet rifles (model #189 N 30), seven Thompson machine guns, 97 S&S rifles, five sub-machine guns, one 7.62mm heavy machine gun (with extra barrel), two Soviet 7.62mm light machine guns Model OPM (with three spare barrels), three US M-1 carbines, one M-1 rifle, 25 Soviet 7.62mm carbines (model LD44), one 7.62 mm rockin gun mount, one ground mount for a 51 cal. machine gun with wheels, 114 R-
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rounds, five electric detonators, 1000 ft of time fuse, 20 gal can half-filled with Chicom grenade pouches, one 7.62mm machine gun shield, nine 70mm Chicom artillery rounds, two 75mm FR rounds, two mortar sights, two loaded 7.62mm drum-type magazines, nine tray-type 7.62mm machine gun magazines, one hundred seventy-five 57mm FR rounds, 30 machine gun magazines, 1955 rounds 51 cal. ammunition, twelve 60mm mortar fuses, two mortar charges, two wire cutters, four cleaning rods for 7.62mm weapons, and one 82mm mortar bore brush.

(13) 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment.

(a) The division armored cavalry squadron, the L-4 Cav, had normally been OPCON to one or more of the division's three infantry brigades. But on 21 Sep 69, the L-4 Cav was placed under divisional control and was sent to the central and southern portions of the division AO. Utilizing the road network south of Lai Khe, it has acted as a quick reaction force able to reinforce US, ARVN, or RF/PF infantry contacts, or initiate rapidly executed operations against elusive Communist units through its own mobility and firepower. During October, it has gradually expanded its area of operations and continually devoted its efforts to the neutralization of all Communist elements in the division's southern AO. Coordination with the 2d US Bde, the 7th ARVN Regt, the 5th ARVN Div and Binh Dinh Province has been continuous.

(b) On 1 Oct 69, the L-4 Cav, in cooperation with the 749th RF Company, mounted a highly successful operation against the Communist C65 Local Force Company. Hiding in a base area north of Binh Hoa Village (VP120), the enemy unit had been detected by the RF Company commander several weeks prior. Aided by the L-4 Cav, he was more than willing to conduct a surprise attack against their suspected base camp (vic XN29215). In the ensuing operation, the RF Company and one cavalry troop pushed through the base area while another troop cut off the enemy retreat. The actions were supported by a D Troop, L-4 Cav, Hunter-Killer Team and the "Lighthorse" helicopter group. The final results were six enemy dead, nine RF, and five AK47, one 60mm mortar, fifteen 82mm mortar rounds, and eight RPG rounds captured (all enemy were identified as members of the C65). There were three US wounded slightly by RPG and booby trap fragments. No casualties were suffered by the RF troops and no vehicles were damaged in the action.

(14) USAF Support: There were 1,253 sorties of TAC Air in support of 1st Infantry Division operations during the reporting period. In addition, 16 A-52 strikes were called in support of operations; eight were targeted in the Trapezoid, four in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, two in the Razorback, one in the Song Be Corridor and one in the Iron Triangle.
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(15) The total cumulative results for Operation Toan Thang, Phase
III, which began on 17 Feb 69 and ended on 31 Oct 69, for 1st Infantry
Division assigned and OPCON units are:

(a) US: 386 KIA, 2320 WIA, 2041 MIA (evac); 67 MCV/APC, seven
generators, three 2 1/2-ton tankers, two Zippo's (APC with flamethrower),
72 helicopters, one O-16 Bird Dog, 46 Rome plows, 76 tanks, twelve 2 1/2-
ton trucks, two "Dusters" (40mm SP), five 3/4-ton trucks, five 1/4-ton
trucks, two 10-ton trucks, two 5-ton trucks, one 4.2" mortar, one NVL (armored
bridge layer), one VTR (M-98 tank recovery vehicle), five bulldozers, and four M-548
"Camels" (tracked cargo carriers) damaged; one Zippo, ten tanks, one 5-ton truck, 48
MCV/APC, six Rome plows, 21 helicopters, four 1 1/4-ton trucks, one 1-ton truck, two bucket loaders, one
"Low Boy" (low bed trailer), and one 155mm howitzer destroyed.

(b) Enemy: 3213 KIA (BC), 403 KIA (posse), 293 captured, 87 ralliers,
and 2216 detainees; 1756 individual weapons, 347 crew-served weapons,
371,911 SA rounds, 313 Anti-Tank mines, 15,017 anti-personnel mines, 4742
grenades, 2340 RPG rounds, two 105mm rounds, 1834 mortar rounds, 7653
bunkers, 80,4 tons of rice, 78 rockets, 4216 lbs of explosives, 371 RR
rounds, one 1000 lb bomb, two radios, one pair of binoculars, and nine
70mm rounds captured or destroyed.

(16) Statistical Summary:

(a) Monthly totals*

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<th>US KIA</th>
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<td>8</td>
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*Does not include 1st Infantry Division units while OPCON to another
controlling HQ.

(b) Monthly ratios:

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<thead>
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<th></th>
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<th>Elimination Ratio</th>
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</thead>
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<td>18.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(17) Land clearing operations:

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(a) The division Rome plows began the quarter at NDP Wilderness I, vic X798285, and cut 625 acres from 7 to 17 Aug 69. On 18 Aug the plows moved to Wilderness II, vic X703324, where they cut 265 acres in five days. Moving to X804233, they cut 380 acres before returning to Lai Khe on 31 Aug. A week's standdown was followed on 8 Sep with 115 acres cut at X780313. On 11 Sep at X900440, 60 acres were cut. From 13 to 19 Sep, the plows cut 425 acres vic X756300. Following a standdown, the plows cut 310 acres at X699458 from 2 to 8 Oct. From 11 to 13 Oct, 185 acres were cut at X847275. From 14 to 18 Oct the plows operated near FSB Son (X681486).

(b) The four M49A3 tanks that were providing security for the Rome plows have been turned in.

(c) The 984th Land Clearing Company began land clearing operations in the RVZ on 17 Aug, at NDP Mons VIII, vic X5646, and cut 2890 acres between 1 and 12 Aug 69. On 13 Aug the plows moved to a new NDP, Mons IX, at X571405 and cut 221 acres. On 30 Aug the plows moved to X635345 and cut 3258 acres between 31 Aug and 14 Sep. At this time the 984th LOC moved out of the 1st Infantry Division AO and remained out until 28 Oct. The plows then returned to Mons XIII (X574396) and cut 525 acres. By the end of this reporting period a total of 8884 acres were cleared.

(18) Convoy operations: A Combined Transportation Coordination Center was established on 19 Sep 69 for convoy coordination. All ARVN, 1st Cav Div (AM), 25th Inf Div, 1st Logistical Command (Highway Traffic Control), and 1st Infantry Division elements who were involved in overland resupply operations through the area of the 1st Infantry and 5th ARVN Divisions, coordinated with the Center. This procedure has enhanced the security as well as reduced delays in convoy operations.

(19) Operation Dong Tien: Since the end of July 1969, the Dong Tien ("Progress Together") program has continued to grow and expand in the 1st Infantry Division. The major goals have remained the same: to increase the quantity and quality of combined and coordinated joint operations; to materially advance the division's three major missions (support of pacification, improvement of ARVN/GVN military units, and intensification of small scale combat operations); and to significantly increase the efficiency of critical combat and combat support elements, particularly Army aviation assets. The overall purpose of Dong Tien is to further the "Vietnamization" of the war by improving the effectiveness of all South Vietnamese military units. The division program must prepare ARVN and US units to assume, at some future date, the responsibilities currently held by the 1st Infantry Division. The program is also designed to increase the ability of ARVN units to use US Army aviation support effectively by having them continuously use these assets in the field. At the same time, more intensive combined operations continue to reduce the number of enemy in the TAMI.

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making the task of changing territorial responsibilities somewhat easier.
The objectives of Dong Tien have been generally embodied in the "Danger
Forward" and "Night Danger" programs of the 1st Infantry Division. Division
assets, especially Army aviation assets, are now more centralized and sup-
port both US, ARVN and SVN forces in the TACO. The Danger Forward concept
has envisioned a steady "drive to the north" where the gradual improvement
of PSDF and ARVN forces enables ARVN units to conduct more extensive field
operations in the northern and northeastern TACO. Then, as ARVN forces
become more combat proficient, 1st Infantry Division units will move north
leaving their former AO to the 5th ARVN Division. The Dong Tien program
has been implemented in many ways. There have been constant liaison and
coordination visits among the 1st Infantry Division, 5th ARVN Division,
and Binh Duong Province. For example, the 1st Infantry Division GC/5 has
visited his 5th ARVN Division counterpart several times to discuss
problems common to their jobs. In addition, maneuver units of the division
now operate much more closely with ARVN units. Their intelligence gather-
ing capabilities have made such small scale combined operations significant
and have given these units added confidence and experience. But, however
valuable these efforts, the heart of the 1st Infantry Division's Dong Tien
program is the association of designated US infantry battalions with design-
nated ARVN infantry battalions. The programs undertaken and some of the
methods involved are described below:

(a) In the 1st and 3d Brigades the Dong Tien program has taken the form
of physically colocating one 8th ARVN Regiment battalion with one US infan-
try battalion at the same fire support base. These operations were briefly
covered in the preceding report (see para 1c(4)(h) 2 - 4, 1st Infantry
Division OPL, 1 May - 31 Jul 69). During the current Reporting period,
the 1-28 Inf has continued to work with the 4/8 ARVN infantry battalion
at FSB Gela. Then, on 2 Sep 69, the 4/8 was replaced by the 2/8 ARVN Inf.
Dong Tien combined operations were continued between the 1-28 and 2/8
at FSB Gala, FSB Son (XT581486), and, as of 31 Oct 69, FSB Apollo (XT637507).
The 2-28 Inf continued similar operations with the 1/8 at FSB Mahone II
(XT521429) (renamed FSB Kien) until 14 Sep 69. At that date the 1/8 was
replaced by the 3/8 ARVN. All sponsored units were from the 8th ARVN Rgt,
5th ARVN Division.

(b) The most striking problem in each ARVN battalion proved to be the
inexperience of small unit leaders, and the dependence of the staff and
subordinate commanders on the battalion commander for leadership. Without
the support, resupply and communications assets available to US units, the
ARVN forces were accustomed to conducting only battalion-size field oper-
ations. Now, with the cooperation of the ARVN battalion commanders,
decentralized operation in the Trapezoid and the jungles northeast of Lai
Khe were begun. Operating from either joint or colocated tactical operations
centers (TOC), the US and ARVN battalion commanders planned daily operations
in a joint AO. For the first time, sufficient assets were available to
support ARVN company and platoon-size operations. To assist the ARVN units,
either the dual company or the cross-attached platoon concept was utilized,
In the former, one US company and one ARVN company would share a joint AO, have identical missions, and operate from a joint company CP. In the latter, the ARVN company would exchange one of its platoons for a US platoon. US communications were thus always available. In this way, the ARVN units have been exposed to US methods of operation and have improved the quality of their small unit leadership through practical experience. In addition, they have become familiar with an operational area which they may have to assume full responsibility for in the future.

(c) From August to October 1969, the 2d Brigade has conducted extensive Dong Tien operations with the 7th ARVN Regt in the central and southern portions of the TAoL. From July to September, the 1-18 and 4/7 infantry battalions conducted a continuous series of combined operations using the dual company concept. The two battalion TOC were never combined, and the real work was done at the company level. Normally, the company commanders had a joint CP and decisions were made together. For night ambushes, squads were cross-attached to form section patrols of one US and one ARVN squad. These operations served to familiarize the 4/7 with the area north-east of Phu Lai and develop ARVN small unit leaders. Currently the ARVN 4/7 is conducting rice denial and ambush operations from NDP Venable Heights (X902176) in conjunction with the US 2-18.

(d) In the southwestern portion of the TAoL, the 2-18 Inf attempted to implement the colocated battalion concept at FSB Mortain (X703145) with the 3/7 ARVN battalion in August and September 1969. Unfortunately, the 3/7 was OCPON to the Phu Hoa District Chief at the time and was required to maintain two of its companies at Phu Hoa Dong village. As a result, the ARVN battalion commander spent only two or three nights at FSB Mortain. There was an exchange of liaison teams between Mortain and Phu Hoa Dong and several joint operations were completed with the one ARVN company that did stay at Mortain. Both units participated in the seal and search of Phu Hoa Dong (15-26 Sep 69) after which the 1st Infantry Division turned over the Phu Hoa AO to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and the 3/7 was moved out of Binh Duong Province.

(e) The 2/7 ARVN battalion operated extensively with the 1-26 US infantry battalion from 12 to 23 Sep 69 and with the 1-18 Inf from 24 Sep 69 to the present. In September, the 2/7 and 1-26 were colocated at FSB Normandy III (X904318). Daily field operations were conducted from Normandy III and FSB Jim (X982392) which was secured by one 2/7 ARVN company, one mechanized company from the 2-2 Inf, and one US artillery battery. The dual company concept was implemented with joint company CP. The main objective was to prepare the 2/7 to assume responsibility for FSB Jim and the surrounding AO. This was accomplished by 1 Oct 69. During October 1969, the 2/7, supported by US artillery at Jim and Normandy III,
and in coordination with the 1-18 also at Firebase III, has conducted extensive small unit operations in its own AO. This was the first ARVN unit to occupy and take complete responsibility of a FSB in a critical section of the 1st Infantry Division TAD.

(f) Under the auspices of the 2d Brigade and the 7th ARVN Regiment, a Combined Strike Force (CSF) was organized at Phu Van Base Comp (ZCB44146) in August 1969. Here, a joint US/ARVN staff trained one US and one ARVN company in advanced field techniques. After about one week of training, the CSF acted as a 60-minute quick reaction force ready to move anywhere in the division TAD. Although the concept worked well with the 7th ARVN Reconnaissance Company, inherent logistical problems were complicated by the inexperience of successive ARVN units. Thus it was decided to terminate the CSF on 14 Sep 69. The experiment pointed out that such advanced tactics worked best only with experienced ARVN units.

(g) Artillery Dong Tien operations commenced on 8 Jul 69 between the 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery, and elements of the 51st Artillery, 5th ARVN Division. After a two-week training program at Lai Khe which stressed airlift and airmobile operations, radar registration, crew drill, and US artillery direct support procedures, A Battery, 51st Artillery, was moved by rotary wing aircraft to FSB Mahone II (Kien). Since then, it has continually supported the combined operations of the 2-28 and 8th Regiment Dong Tien infantry battalions. In addition to enhancing the indirect fire support coverage in the Trapezoid, the artillery Dong Tien program has developed an integrated fire coordination system for use as additional ARVN combat support units are brought into areas previously secured by US forces.

(h) In July and August 1969, a short but significant series of Dong Tien operations was conducted between the 2-18 US infantry battalion and the 34th ARVN Ranger Battalion in the Thu Duc District (in the southeastern portion of the TAD). From 15 Jul to 7 Aug 69, the ARVN unit operated jointly with the 2-18 in order to learn the successful tactics and operational techniques employed in that area. On 7 Aug 69, the Thu Duc AO was completely taken over by the 34th Rangers, permitting the 2-18 to move north.

(i) Since the start of the Dong Tien program, the performance of involved ARVN units has steadily risen. To date, the increased performance has been accompanied by increased results. From 1 Jul 69 to the present, 392 enemy have been eliminated by the 7th and 8th ARVN Regiments. This is but one measure of the program's success and shows that the strong efforts put into Dong Tien by 1st Infantry Division units have been extremely productive.
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d. Training.

(1) Replacement training.

(a) There were 9,081 replacements trained by the division school during the reporting period.

(b) Since the school opened on 15 February 1969, there have been 14,636 replacements trained.

(2) Sniper training.

(a) During the reporting period, the following 18-day sniper classes were conducted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class No.</th>
<th>Start/End Date</th>
<th>No. Snipers Graduated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>16 Aug - 3 Sep</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>9 Sep - 27 Sep</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>29 Oct - 16 Nov</td>
<td>(20 in class)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) 1st Infantry Division snipers eliminated 27 Communist/NVA during the three month period.

(c) Total body count to date: 57 KIA.

(d) As of 31 Oct 69, the 1st Infantry Division had 48 snipers deployed in the field.

(3) Division Mobile Training Team (MIT).

(a) The following training was conducted by the MIT during this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Hours of Instruction</th>
<th>Man Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>4571</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>11,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>5657</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>17,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>6216</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>23,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) A mobile training team composed of two NCO and one ex-sapper raider/Kit Carson Scout demonstrated the capabilities of and defense against sapper attacks. The team presented this instruction at all 1st Infantry Division base camps, fire support bases, and bridge installations.

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(4) Kit Carson Scout training. There were 32 Scouts trained by the Division Training Command during the reporting period.

(5) TNI Schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MACV Recondo</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AARCS</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A IP/SIP</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEST</td>
<td>Republic of Philippines</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLL</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio-Visual</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator Ting</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR 500</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Intelligence: The 1st Infantry Division's area of operations starts approximately 10 km north of Saigon. The division TAOI includes the major portion of Binh Duong, southern Binh Long, western Long Khanh, northern Gia Dinh and northern Bien Hoa Provinces. This area, approximately 70 km east to west and 55 km north to south, includes the major Communist infiltration routes to Saigon. The Saigon River on the west and the Dong Nai River on the east provide natural highways for both friendly and enemy forces. Except for the large Michelin Rubber Plantation in the northwest, the northern section of the division's TAOI is mostly jungle terrain with scattered settlements along waterways and major roads. Most of the population lives in the central and southern portions of the TAOI. The isolation of the enemy from this vulnerable zone is considered critical to the overall war effort. The following section is an outline of the Enemy Order of Battle.

(1) The strengths of enemy forces operating in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI are estimated as follows:

- Main Force Military Personnel 2945
- Local Force and Guerrilla Personnel 1043
- Total Estimated Combat Strength 3988
- Logistical Support Personnel 900
- Total Strength (estimated) 4888

(2) The known rate of infiltration appears to have been inadequate to maintain enemy strength in the division TAOI. Known infiltration into the area decreased during August, September and October 1969. Exact current figures for infiltration into the 1st Infantry Division TAOI are not known.
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(3) Specific reinforcements available from outside the division TAOI are from the 1st, 5th, 7th and 9th Divisions. All units within the division TAOI can be expected to have artillery units in support.

(4) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the division TAOI and along its periphery are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Combat Strength</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Current Probable Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101 Regt</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Trapezoid/Michelin area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258 Regt</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Ho Bo/Boi Lai area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quyet Thang I &amp; II Bns</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Pilhol/Phu Hoa area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Arty</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Ho Bo Woods/Southern Trapezoid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Arty Bn</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Southern Trapezoid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Nai Regt</td>
<td>800-900</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Song Be Corridor/ Catcher's Mitt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 Arty Comd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 Arty Regt</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>N of Phuoc Vinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K33 Arty Bn</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>N of Tay Ninh City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K34 Arty Bn</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Long Nguyen/ Michelin area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K35 Arty Bn</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Dispersed in Catcher's Mitt, southern War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 Arty Regt</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Zone D, Bien Hoa Province area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Force Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C61 Ben Cat Co</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Dispersed along Thi Tinh River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C62 Chau Thanh Co</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>SE of Chanh Lu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C63 Lai Thieu Co</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>An Son/Lai Thieu area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C64 Dau Tieng Co</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Michelin/Northern Trapezoid area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C65 Phu Cuong City Flat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>M/C/E</td>
<td>An. Son area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Current Probable Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C301 Tan Uyen Co</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>SW Catcher's Mitt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C10 Cu Chi Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Non-C/E</td>
<td>Phi Hoa area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C25 Cu Chi Co</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Phi Hoa area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Rear Service Gp</td>
<td>100-200</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>War Zone C, large portion of SR-5, U-1 and Ba, Bien Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83d Rear Service Gp</td>
<td>500-700</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Michelin, Trapezoid, Saigon River Corridor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units considered available as reinforcements are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Current Probable Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st NVA Division</td>
<td>3250</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>XT5280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95C Regt</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>V15 Base area, War Zone C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10D Regt</td>
<td>500-800</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Northern Phuoc Long Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Communist Division</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>NW of Duc Phuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95A Regt</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>NE of Song Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174 Regt</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>XU6511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275 Regt</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>XU9016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>XU6608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 Regt</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Fishhook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165 Regt</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>War Zone C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209 Regt</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>C/E</td>
<td>Western Tay Hanh Province</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Dong Nai Regiment: The Dong Nai Regiment (DNR) has been identified several times during the last three months.

(a) On 2 Aug 69, at XT863168, a rallier from C1/K4 Battalion, reported that he was a bodyguard for Ut Thanh, the political officer of the K4 Battalion. The rallier also reported that, at the end of June, the C1 Company, K4 Battalion, left Ba Tao (vic XT8450) and moved to Suoi Loi (vic XT8030) with the mission of operating near the Cach Hau area. On 5 Aug documents taken from a KIA at vic XT38488 identified the K2 Battalion, DNR. The document revealed that as of 30 Jul 69, the K2 Battalion had 109 men divided into a battalion headquarters, a signal platoon, a recon platoon, and four companies (designated C5, C6, C7 and C8). The mission of the K2 Battalion was to conduct concentrated attacks in coordination with K1.
K3 and K4 Battalions, enemy positions believed to be in the Binh Duong Provincial Capital Area. On 19 Aug, the Phu Chanh RF Company received a raider via XT861230 who identified the C22 Recon Company, DNR, and reported that the C3/K3 Battalion, DNR, would conduct operations in the Lai Thieu area. He also reported that the DNR would move south into the Lai Thieu area, and locate the K1 Battalion, DNR, in the Tan Uyen area, the K2 Battalion and two companies of the K3 Battalion in the Lai Thieu area, and the K4 Battalion in the Chanh Lau-Hoa Lo area. At XT919334, on 26 Aug, a PW, identified as a member of C1 Company, K1 Battalion, DNR, claimed that he was on a rice-gathering mission when captured. He identified a base camp located at YT152344 for the last 1 1/2 years, reported the strength of C1 at 70 men, and explained that the K1 Battalion goes to Binh My to procure rice. On 31 Aug, a PW captured via XT914434 identified the C6/K2 Battalion, DNR. The PW reported the strength of the K2 Battalion at 120 men, its location via XT895415, and that the K2 obtained rice from Phuoc Hoa.

(b) On 3 Sep at XT893136, a raider identified himself as a member of the Recon Co/DNR. His mission was to recon a route from the Phu Chanh area to Thu Duc in order to allow the K2 Battalion, DNR, to move south safely. On 7 Sep, via XT875305, a LOI received SA ground fire and went down. A contact ensued with a total of five enemy KIA and five PW found in a bunker. These PW identified the K4 Battalion, DNR, and reported that their mission was to set up a forward CP for the K4 Battalion.

(c) A PW captured on 10 Oct at XT816395, was identified as the XO of H2 Company, K4 Battalion, DNR. He reported that the K4 Battalion has a strength of 230 men and was dispersed east of Highway 13 and north of Highway 301. On 14 Oct Chon Thanh district received a raider who was identified as a member of C4 Recon Company/DNR. The raider reported a base camp located at An Linh (XT874533). He also reported that the unit's mission was to recon all targets of the DNR and that the support companies were to build base camps via XT8555 - XT8557. On 27 Oct at XT868826, elements of the 4/7 ARVN Infantry Battalion led by a raider engaged an unknown number of NVA in a platoon-size base camp with SA fire. The NVA returned fire with SAM/G, then withdrew to the north and northeast. The results of the contact were six NVA KIA and documents captured which identified the recon platoon of the K1 Battalion, DNR.

(7) 101 Regiment: From August to October 1969, the 101 Regiment was identified in numerous friendly initiated contacts, but the regiment was not involved in any large scale offensives.

(a) In August a major re-location of the 101 Regiment took place. The K1 Battalion and Regimental HQ relocated to the Kung Nguyen Secret Zone; the K2 Battalion relocated to the Boi Loi Woods; and the K3 Battalion to the Trapperoid. Regimental strength of the 101 was approximately 700 men.
Significant activity on 5 Aug resulted in 35 KIA and four PW who were later identified as members of the 101 Regiment. On 6 Aug, a PW captured after a contact resulting in 10 KIA, identified elements of the 101 Regiment.

(b) In September, various elements of the 101 Regiment again changed their locations. The K1 Battalion was located east of the Michelin, the K2 Battalion in the Boi Loi Woods and the K3 Battalion with the Regimental HQ in the Trapezoid. Though the 101 Regt continued to avoid contact during September, it was identified in several friendly initiated contacts. On 1 Sep, the 8th ARVN Regt killed 18 enemy and captured one PW, who identified the K1 Battalion, 101 Regiment, and reported that his unit was on a food resupply mission. On 22 Sep, PBR killed 25 enemy swimming in the Saigon River, who were later identified as members of the 101 Regiment. Documents taken off a KIA stated that the K3 Battalion, 101 Regiment, was to conduct combat operations while the rest of the regiment would be engaged in transporting 10 metric tons of supplies.

(c) In October, the regiment again changed its locations. The K1 Battalion, which was believed to be involved in transporting munitions relocated to an area northeast and east of the Michelin. The K2 Battalion, believed to be acting as a security force for SR-1 HQ, relocated to the Trapezoid area. The K3 Battalion relocated to the area east of the Michelin and is the only battalion believed to have a combat mission. On 13 Oct, 18 enemy were killed and documents identified elements of the 101 Regiment.

(8) C10 Cu Chi Local Force Company. Although C10 was contacted only once in the months of August, September, and October 1969, it was identified by PW and ralliers taken in the Phu Hoa Dong Village Seal 16-25 Sep. As a result of the seal, the unit is held with a strength of less than five men, possibly armed with 1 B40. There has been no contact with the unit since the seal, but indications point to the possibility that the remainder of C10 has combined with the C25 Cu Chi Local Force Co. The unit is held in the Phu Hoa area near Phu My Village (vic XT711183). As an independent element, the unit is considered noncombat effective at the present time.

(9) C25 Cu Chi Local Force Company. C25 was contacted in the Phu Hoa Dong Village Seal 16-25 Sep. Two PW taken in the seal stated that C25 was divided into two elements: C25A and C25B; each element has a strength of 10 men. The unit is held in the vicinity of Phu My (V) near Phu Hoa Dong (vic XT711183). In a contact on 20 Oct 69, vic XT694178, the 3-82 Abn Bde captured documents from six KIA which identified the C25A and C25B units. These documents were dated from March to October 1969, and gave a list of personalities in C25A and C25B. There are recent indications that C25 may be planning future attacks on towns in the Phu Hoa area and Phu Hoa Dong Village.

(10) C61 Ben Cat Local Force Unit. (a) From August through October 1969, C61 and related Ben Cat elements yield 20 ralliers and two PW. This
represents about one out of every 6-7 enemy that normally operate in the AO of the Ben Cat District Committee. Such a large percentage of ralliers may be explained by effective Allied operations in the area, and by severe hardships due to the lack of food and supplies. The C61 and related units yielded three ralliers during August. On 18 Aug, a female rallier from the Finance Section of the Ben Cat District Committee said the C61, C5, and the Finance Section were located at XT683366. She led Allied elements to a location where a large amount of material was captured and 57 bunkers were destroyed. The ralliers said C61 and other communist elements were building new base camps vic XT648393. On 25 Aug, a rallier, an assistant squad leader, reported a large weapons cache at XT647393. On 30 Aug, another rallier from the C5 reported that his unit was located near XT715-367, but might move to XT648393. The C4 mortar platoon conducted several mortar attacks against Ben Cat during the month.

(b) In September, there were five ralliers from Ben Cat units. On 22 Sep, one rallier from the C3 Chot Lai Khe reported that his base camp was located vic XT716337. Three members of Ben Cat units who rallied on 24 and 25 Sep near Than An Village were on rice resupply missions. They reported that the C61 base camp had been overrun by Allied forces and that the unit was dispersed throughout its AO in 3-4 km calls. Several documents captured during September indicated the Ben Cat units would increase their mining activities.

(c) During October, there were 11 ralliers and two PW from various Ben Cat units. The most important of these was a PW captured on 10 Oct, who was a member of the Ben Cat District Committee. He reported the location of C61, C5 and the Ben Cat District Committee at XT695360, XT686374 and XT695383. The other PW and ralliers generally reported a similar picture of the status of the C61 and related elements. In this period before the rice harvest, most of the Communists are near starvation and have resorted to eating roots and leaves in order to survive. Morale is extremely low, as the large number of ralliers indicates. Allied sweeps throughout the C61 AO have forced some elements north, to vic XT6742, and west to Thi Thanh vic XT6439. The strength of most units has been reduced. The C61, for example, now has only about 40 men, half of whom are believed to be incapacitated from disease or starvation. As a result of Allied exploitation of ralliers, several substantial caches were discovered in the area, and several base camps were overrun.

(11) C62 Local Force Company. The C62 has been identified only once during the last three months. On 21 Sep 69, two ralliers at XT860230 reported that C62 was located vic XT846317. The strength of C62 is between 40-50 men who are working in coordination with two companies of the K4 Battalion, Dong Nai Regiment, in the Chanh Luu - Hoa Loi area.

(12) C63 Local Force Company. The C63 has not been contacted since August. On 10 Aug, at Lai Thieu District (XT86055), five ralliers were
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received: one female commo-liaison soldier, one assistant platoon leader, one platoon leader and two soldiers. On 11 Aug, at the Lai Thieu District, a raider identified himself as a squad leader of C63. He surrendered one 82mm mortar, one 60mm mortar, two B40s, two 2K54s, one .38 cal pistol, two .45 cal pistols, one PRC-25 and a quantity of documents. On 13 Aug, at Lai Thieu District, a PW identified as a platoon leader of C63 stated that C63 lost contact with Lai Thieu District HQ two months earlier. Since then, C63 has remained out of contact. He stated that the K2 and K3 Bns, Dong Nai Regiment, withdrew from Lai Thieu District approximately two months ago. While in Lai Thieu District, K2 Battalion suffered 20-30 KIA and K3 Battalion lost 60-70 men. Both the K2 Battalion and K3 Battalion are having difficulties with food supplies.

(13) The C64 Dau Tieng District Unit. The C64 Local Force Company, with the exception of a very knowledgeable raider, avoided identifiable contact during August 1969. The unit is believed to have conducted mortar attacks on the Lai Tieng area, but no definite identification of the C64 doing so was made. On 7 Aug, a raider who was an administrative chief of the Dau Tieng District Committee, reported that the District HQ section and several subordinate units were located vic XT438596; the C1 Mobile Platoon vic XT546446; the C2 Platoon vic XT506523; the B5 Heavy Weapons Platoon vic XT505524; and the B4 Female Mortar Platoon vic XT506424. In September, the C64 avoided all identifiable contact. Several agent reports located the unit south of its normal AO in the Thanh An Village area. In October, there were three raiders from the unit. On 7 Oct, a female raider from the B4 Female mortar platoon indicated that the B4 had just received 10 new members. On 11 Oct, a raider, who claimed to be a former CO of C64, reported that there were 80 members of the unit near XT600490. A 15 Oct female raider from the B4 unit reported that her unit had recently acquired 10 new members, but some were soon to be sent to Cambodia for an unspecified type of training while the rest waited vic XT488517.

(14) C65 Local Force Company: The C65 has been identified several times in the last three months. On 2 Sep 69, at XT314204, a raider claiming to be a medic, reported that SR-5 had assigned 12 NVA soldiers to the C65. This was only a temporary move, since they would return to SR-5 as soon as C65 could recruit local personnel. On 4 Oct, the 1-4 Cav and the 794 NF Co conducted an operation against a C65 base camp. Results were: six enemy KIA and nine PW, of the C65 Local Force Company. On 7 Oct at Phu Cuong, a raider reported that he was a squad leader in C65, and that in May the unit had received 12 NVA replacements. On 8 Oct at Chau Thanh District, a raider reported that there were only eight men left in C65. He also led district forces to a weapon cache vic XT82222.

(15) C301 Tan Uyen Local Force Company. The C301 was identified by a raider to the Bien Hoa Sub-Sector on 3 Oct 69. The raider reported that the Tan Uyen Local Force Company was operating with guerrillas in Binh My.

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Binh Co, Tan Uyen and Khanh Van Villages, with a total strength of 100 men. On 17 Oct, vic XT964235, the 464 RF Co ambushed 15 Communists resulting in five enemy KIA and one WIA. The PW reported that he was from C301 Local Force Company, which had a strength of 150 men and a mission of transporting ammunition across the Song Be River. It is possible that the C302 and C303 Tan Uyen Local Force Companies, which haven’t been identified since December 1968, may have combined with C301 and are operating in the Tan Uyen area.

(16) Rear Service Group 83:

(a) August 1969: Rear Service Group (RSG) 83 continued supply operations during August, with the heaviest activity centered along the Saigon River near Ben Chua Hamlet (vic XT5536). On 6 Aug, a rallier identified himself as a forced laborer for RSG 83. The source rallied at XT551365 during a seal of Ben Chua. Two detainees picked up at XT554363 on 24 Aug, also identified themselves as forced laborers working for RSG 83. A PW captured on 25 Aug at XT585371, identified his unit as B3 Platoon, RSG 83. The last location of the unit known to the source was vic XT575364, on 24 Aug. Documents identifying RSG 83 or its subordinate elements were found as follows: On 1 Aug at XT564463; on 14 Aug at XT584943 and XT594333; on 15 Aug at XT592432; on 24 Aug at XT636387; and on 25 Aug at XT585371.

(b) September 1969: RSG 83 continued operations during September along the Saigon River Corridor with the primary mission of supplying enemy units in SR-1, particularly in the Trapesead and Boi Loi Woods areas. Activity was heaviest along the river near Ben Chua Hamlet (vic XT5536). A PW captured on 21 Sep, identified himself as a platoon leader of the C125 Transportation Company, RSG 83. The PW had been wounded on 19 Sep by a gunship and was picked up at XT587387 during a sweep. The source reported that his unit base camp was located vic XT5739 in the Rau Nho Rubber Plantation area. He was on route to Ben Chua to fetch rice when wounded, and subsequently was captured. A rallier on 27 Sep, Ben Chua Hamlet, reported that he was a member of B3 Platoon, C1 Company, RSG 83, and had helped transport rice from XT545351 to XT545364. His last rice mission was on 30 Aug. On or about 1 Sep, his unit’s base camp was overrun by Allied forces, and he remained with the Thanh An Village Guerrillas (vic XT546384) until he decided to rally. Documents identifying elements of RSG 83 were found as follows: On 6 Sep, at XT545350; on 11 Sep at XT542377; on 13 Sep at XT545350; on 14 Sep at XT543343; on 15 Sep at XT542377; in a base camp at XT593393; on 29 Sep in a base camp at XT587373.

(c) October 1969: RSG 83 continued supply operations during October, trying to find new food sources and supply routes to help alleviate the critical food shortage being suffered by enemy units in SR-1. On 21 Oct, a rallier identified his unit as the 3d Platoon, C122 Transportation Company, RSG 83. The source rallied to PF at Suoi Can outpost and reported that the TD of his unit was in the Boi Loi area vic XT5234. (Ref: 1st Cav Div DMU #299). A PW captured on 23 Oct by 2-14/25th US Infantry Division at XT643301, identified his unit as C2, RSG 83. He stated that his unit was
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Located southwest of Bung Cong vic XT655315 (ref: 25th Inf Div INTSUM #297). Documents identifying elements of RSG 83 were found as follows: on 8 Oct at XT57443; on 12 Oct at XT601499; on 16 Oct at XT651484; on 16 Oct at XT610320; on 20 Oct at XT562355; on 21 Oct at XT581356; on 27 Oct at XT655-313; on 28 Oct at XT621330; and on 30 Oct at XT635354.

(d) Other RSG identified during the month: RSG 01, 02 and 05 - documents found 8 Oct at XT57443; RSG 01 - documents found 8 Oct at XT50357; RSG 02 - documents found 20 Oct at XT562355; RSG 02 - documents found 24 Oct at XT534320; and RSG 50 - documents found 26 Oct at XT574355.

(17) 96th Artillery Regiment: The strength of the 96th Arty Regt is approximately 300 men and it continues to operate in War Zone C. Each of its three bns has a strength of approximately 200 men. The regiment is expected to continue to rocket Tay Ninh, Lai Khe, Dau Tieng and Phuoc Vinh.

(c) During the reporting period, the 96th Arty Regiment relocated its K34 Battalion in July or August to the Tay Ninh area. The K34's mission, which had been to rocket Lai Khe, was assumed by the K35 Battalion. This left the K35 Battalion with the dual mission of rocketing both Dau Tieng and Lai Khe.

(b) The K33 Battalion, which is believed to be located north of Phuoc Vinh, continues to have the mission of rocketing that US base camp.

(c) Presently, K34 Battalion may be giving artillery support to units in Tay Ninh Province, and the K35 Bn may be giving artillery support to SR-1.

(18) 8th Artillery Battalion:

(a) Since August 1969, there have been indications that the 8th Arty Bn may have split into two units, 8A and 8B. On 26 Aug, captured documents suggested that SR-1 may have formed an artillery regiment, consisting of the D8, D9 and D10 battalions. On 27 Aug, contact resulted in 15 enemy KIA. Captured documents identified the 8th Arty Battalion.

(b) On 4 Sep, there was an indication that the 8th Arty Battalion may have been divided. A FW stated that the 8A and 8B units had been formed, that 8B would operate in the Ben Cat and Dau Tieng Districts, and that 8A would operate in the Ho Bo/Citadel area.

(c) On 4 and 22 Oct, there were indications from a FW and documents that a 10th Arty Battalion had been activated. It is believed that the 10th Arty Battalion is a possible NVA for the 8B Artillery unit which will operate in the southern Truc Van District. It is also believed that the 8A unit will operate in the Ho Bo/Citadel area.

(19) 9th Artillery Battalion: The 9th Arty Bn remained relatively quiet from August to September 1969, but was identified several times during the month of October. Documents captured after a contact resulting

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in 14 enemy KIA on 28 Oct, identified the C7, C8 and C9 companies, 9th Arty Battalion. It is believed that the 9th Arty Battalion, with a strength of 130 men, will remain in the lower Trapezoid area and continue its mission of rocketing Cu Chi and providing artillery support for SR-1 forces. The 9th Arty Battalion may be low on ammunition, forcing it to remain relatively inactive until it receives supplies and replacements.

f. Logistics:

(1) On 1 September 1969, additional emphasis was placed on property accountability and acquiring authorization for property on-hand in excess quantities. Major subordinate commanders were directed to perform quarterly supply inspections of all their assigned and attached units. Reports of these inspections were forwarded to the ACOs, G3, for review. In addition, the Supply Logistics Assistance Team (SLAT) began performing semiannual inspections of all property books in the division. Deficiencies found in these inspections require a reply indicating actions taken to correct these errors. The SLAT has continued to conduct inspections as a part of the Annual General Inspections.

(2) For several weeks during October, the 1st Infantry Division tested an excess material turn-in plan. The 1-26 Infantry was allowed to turn in excess material on a "no-question-asked" basis to the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion yard in Di An. This was successful and on 31 Oct 69, it became a policy throughout the 1st Infantry Division to accept excess material turned in on this basis each Thursday to 1st S&F yards at Lai Khe, Di An or Dau Tieng. No property book credit is given. Accompanying technical inspections, and log book documents are desired, but not required. Units use organic transportation to deliver the items.

(3) Delivery of water by helicopter is under study. By 31 Oct 69, each infantry battalion had been issued one hundred, 3-gallon bags with which water can be safely dropped to the ground. D/1-4 Cav was issued 30 water bags.

(4) Exploding mines have been a constant danger to armored personnel carriers. In order to protect crews from exploding mines under the surface of APC, belly armor kits are being installed on M113 armored personnel carriers. As of 31 Oct 69, eight kits had been installed. New M113s are being issued with kits installed and additional kits are being installed on low mileage vehicles first.

(5) In order to keep the maintenance of combat vehicles at a high level, the 1-16 INF (Mar) has begun studying the possibility of having their quarterly preventive maintenance services done while they are in a field location, instead of bringing their vehicles back to a base camp. So far the unit has accomplished the task satisfactorily on two vehicles.
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(6) A purchase account has been opened to obtain supplies for the health and welfare of male and female PN.

g. Organization: Several organizational changes took place within the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(1) The High Gear (Ground Sensor) Platoon, 1st Military Intelligence Detachment, was attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, effective 15 Aug 69, as directed by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 9793, 29 Aug 69.

(2) On 6 Oct 69, the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, was detached from the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, as provided for in 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 12022, 7 Oct 69. 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 12023, 7 Oct 69, directed the attachment of the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

(3) The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, was detached from the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 12024, dated 7 Oct 69, and attached to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 12025, 7 Oct 69.

(4) As directed by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 12024, dated 7 Oct 69, the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry was detached from the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and attached to the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 12025, 7 Oct 69.

(5) Co B, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, was detached from the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Mech and attached to the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Mech, 20 Oct 69 by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 13861 and 13862, respectively.

(6) As of 12 Oct 69, action on all requested MTOE changes was suspended by USARV.

h. Pacification campaign:

(1) Pacification objectives: During the reporting period significant gains were made toward the attainment of the pacification objectives in the 1st Infantry Division TAOR. The goals of the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), Phase II, were to have at least 90% of the population living in A, B and C hamlets and 50% living in A and B hamlets by 31 Oct 69 (as determined by the Hamlet Evaluation System or HES Rating). At the beginning of August, 96% lived in A, B and C hamlets and 40% lived in A and B hamlets. These percentages continued to improve during September and by 31 October 69, 98% of the population was living in A, B and C hamlets and 75% in A and B hamlets.
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(2) Disposition of Units: During the reporting period, the battalions of the 2d Brigade have been repositioned to the north, leaving the security of the villages and hamlets in Di An, Lat Thieu and Chau Vinh to local forces. Southern Phu Hoa District, formerly in the 2d Brigade AO, was taken over by the 3-82d Airborne Brigade on 1 Oct 69.

(3) Territorial Security:

(a) Enemy activity during the past three months has been limited to harassing actions, and terrorist and propaganda activities. Sixteen persons were assassinated. One of the prime targets of the enemy attacks has been the People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF); six of those people killed were PSDF members.

(b) The general decrease in enemy activity has resulted in a general improvement of territorial security. Although several hamlets suffered a security regression due to isolated mining, bombing, or terrorist incidents, the overall HES security status continued to improve despite these regressions.

(c) The HES rating is composed of a security portion and a development portion; the combination of the two gives the overall HES rating for the hamlet. It is possible for a hamlet to have an overall "C" rating and still be rated "D" in security. For example, all four hamlets in the village of Phu Hoa Dong were rated "C" in August 1969. In September, a successful seal operation was conducted, during which 56 enemy were either killed, captured, or induced to rally. But, because of this increased activity, the security rating of two Phu Hoa Dong hamlets dropped to a "D". However, in October the HES security ratings of these hamlets rose and now reflects their improved security status. The HES ratings will continue to fluctuate in relation to enemy activity in the area.

(4) Status of RF/DF and PSDF:

(a) There are 29 RF companies and 118 PF platoons operating in the 1st Infantry Division AO. Currently all of these forces are armed with the M16 rifle. These forces have the mission of providing local security to the populace. Because the local security of hamlets and villages is critical to the pacification effort, the effectiveness of each RF/DF unit is also critical. Personal visits have been made to each District to determine the true status each RF company and PF platoon. These visits have determined that most RF companies are rated marginal or adequate by the district senior advisors. Each district has one RF company which is rated good or excellent and this company is usually the Ready Reaction Force for the district. But even this company is still tied to its compound at night. Because junior leaders are often weak and ineffective, each company's performance is dependent on the ability and aggressiveness of the company commander. This lack of depth seriously limits the effectiveness
of these units. There are one or two companies rated inadequate, and this rating was based primarily on the poor performance of the company commander.

(b) Many PF platoons are considered to be equal to the best RF units. Currently, there are 10 PF platoons in training and, by the end of December, they will have been assigned to various districts. Plans for the future also include the use of one RF company in each district as a quick-reaction mobile force, capable of operating away from its base for several days.

(c) In an effort to train and upgrade RF/PF units, the 1st Infantry Division has conducted a series of combined US - RF/PF operations. During October alone there were 19 combined operations. They enable ten RF companies and nine PF platoons to operate away from their compounds giving them valuable field experience and increased confidence in their military abilities.

(d) The Peoples Self-Defense Force (PSDF) continued to grow. At the close of October, there were approximately 32,000 people organized into units; 20,000 were trained and 5,600 were armed. Although 60% of the PSDF have been trained, they have received only limited instruction in military and political subjects. Weapons training has consisted of only short instruction periods followed by firing 20-30 rounds on the range for familiarization. During the reporting period there have been several PSDF rallies held for the purpose of instilling more vitality into the PSDF program. Although the PSDF are rudimentary militia used strictly for hamlet self-defense, if employed properly as a supplement to RF/PF units, they can make valuable contributions to the security of the local population.

(5) Future problem areas: During October a proposal was made by the Binh Duong Province Chief to move the hamlet of Ben Chu (Thanh An Village) in Tri Tam District to the north near Ben Trah Hamlet. Once in a more secure area, it would then be possible to improve Ben Chu's low HES rating. But this violates the GVN policy of "taking the government to the people." Opposition has already been voiced by the III Corps Corps Refugee Committee; such an operation would add more than 1,500 people to the relief rolls. Also, some progress has been made in upgrading the four hamlets in Thanh An Village over the past three months. Moreover, the effort involved in such a movement would be great and the move itself would be an admission to the people that the government cannot protect them.

(6) Statistical summary: The following is a statistical summary of the pacification of hamlets within the TAK during the reporting period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>A-B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D-E</th>
<th>VC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lai Thieu</td>
<td>29,071</td>
<td>8,081</td>
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<td>37,152</td>
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<td>Chu Thi</td>
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<td>1,382</td>
<td>3,441</td>
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Population in A, B and C = 98.3%.
Population in A and B = 60.3%.

(b) As of 30 Sep 69:

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<th>District</th>
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<th>D-E</th>
<th>VC</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</table>

Population in A, B and C = 98.6%.
Population in A and B = 64.1%.

(c) As of 31 Oct 69:

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<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>A-B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D-E</th>
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<td>1,023</td>
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<td>37,627</td>
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<td>101,850</td>
<td>12,056</td>
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<td>113,916</td>
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<td>15,019</td>
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<td>1,418</td>
<td>2,652</td>
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<td>64,688</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td>280,946</td>
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AVM-1T-MD

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Population in A, B and C = 98.5%. Population in A and B = 75.4%.

1. Psychological operations (PSYOP).

(1) Psychological operations during the reporting period were aimed at five main target groups:

(a) Civilians

(b) Families of local Communists (VC).

(c) Communist (VC) guerrillas and VC.

(d) Local armed units.

(e) NVA.

(2) From August to October 1969, a total of 14,875,180 leaflets were disseminated and 889:42 hours of loudspeaker broadcast were employed in support of the division. The following is a breakdown, by unit, of support operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Leaflets</th>
<th>Broadcast Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>3,366,400</td>
<td>200:00 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>5,735,380</td>
<td>427:32 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>5,773,400</td>
<td>262:10 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,875,180</td>
<td>889:42 hrs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(3) During the reporting period total monthly missions increased from 729 in August, 2153 in September to 2711 in October. The number of aerial broadcast hours was also increased from 32 in August, 68 in September to 164 in October. During this same period, the percent of ralliers who heard broadcasts and saw leaflets increased from 52% in August, 60% in September to 91% in October.

(4) The recent reorganization of the PSYOP section in the division has resulted in a more accurate development of propaganda material targeted against specific enemy units. Working in close coordination with G2 and G3 personnel, enemy vulnerability has been more accurately determined and more responsive PSYOP support for tactical operations has been possible. Airborne and ground loudspeaker broadcast systems have been used daily, incorporating such themes as "Chieu Hoi," "Family Appeal" and "Fear of Allied Power." In the field, ralliers are encouraged to make personal appeals to their former comrades to surrender. As Allied forces continue to increase their pressure on the enemy and his logistical

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System, Communist morale will continue to fall and individual enemy soldiers will become increasingly vulnerable to such appeals.

j. Civic action/civil affairs:

(1) During the past three months, 2,168 man days (10 hours per day) were devoted to civil affairs/civic action activities. Surplus or salvaged military supplies donated for civic action projects were valued at $1 million. Voluntary contributions totaled 531,000 $VN, and 1,500,000 $VN were used from the ALK Civic Action/TSYOP Fund for civic action projects. Generally, resources and monetary support were used on educational and social welfare projects while the remaining funds and resources were used on economic development and transportation improvements.

(2) Thirty-six schools, 18 hospitals (dispensaries), and 14 orphanages were assisted during the reporting period.

(3) Completed construction projects included nine dwellings rebuilt, 20 kilometers of roads upgraded, three pagodas repaired, six dispensaries built or repaired, 10 schools built, four bridges constructed and 10 fences erected.

(4) There were 60 English classes attended by 3,600 students, 60 RF/DF medics completed a 6-week first-aid training program, and 3,000 school children were taken on trips to the Saigon Zoo. There were 225 MEDCNP conducted, during which 30,123 patients were treated.

(5) Commodities distributed for self-help construction projects included 48,000 lbs of cement, 900 sheets of tin, 24,000 bd ft of lumber, 75 gallons of paint, 20,000 school kits, 75,000 lbs of food and 17,600 lbs of clothing.

(6) A typical civic action operation was the program to support the seal of Phu Hoa Dong Village (16-26 Sep 69). For 11 days the villagers were generally confined to one of the four hamlets. During that period, the 2d Brigade C5 supervised the serving of 2,200 noon meals per day for three days, 1,550 kilos of rice for three noon meals, and 500 gallons of water per day. Items distributed included 72 gallons of cooking oil, 16 bags of flour, four bags of meal, 475 school kits, 3,200 bars of soap, 2,152 dental kits, and 50 occupational kits. Entertainment for the villagers included 15 hours of films, 16 hours of band music, two hours of magician shows, three trips to the Saigon Zoo (for 136 children), and a lottery in which nine pigs were given away. Building materials given to the Phu Hoa District Chief to repair homes damaged in the fighting included 351 sheets of tin, 101 sheets of plywood, 93 pieces of...
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lumber, and nine sheets of plastic roofing. These activities contributed greatly to the favorable attitude of the villagers during the seal.
2. (C) LESSON LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.


(1) OBSERVATION: Promotions among the lower enlisted personnel have improved considerably, but are still limited.

(2) EVALUATION: The required overstrength of personnel in grades E-3 and E-4 precludes continual position vacancies ("cumulative vacancies") required for promotion allocations.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Personnel required as overstrength to perform unit missions should not be considered when determining cumulative vacancies.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Intelligence in search and seal operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Thorough intelligence operation planning prior to the establishment of a village seal is essential to the rapid gathering, dissemination and exploitation of intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION: The fact that village seal operations normally are joint efforts consisting of US, ARVN, RE/PF and National Police (NP) elements, emphasizes the need for close cooperation to insure timeliness and minimize duplication of effort. The desirability of deploying a very large, combined interrogation effort at the beginning of a village seal should not be minimized since the greatest number of personnel are usually detained at the beginning of a seal. Lack of adequate resources causes confusion, compromises the value of shock effect, reduces the timeliness of information and unnecessarily inconveniences and alienates those innocent civilians detained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Because of the large number of personnel detained during a village seal, pooling of interrogation resources and locating them in the vicinity of the command and control element is desirable. Care must also be taken that information is distributed concurrently to all participating elements. A joint intelligence center should be organized to maintain a log of all individuals detained in the form of an alphabetical card file, conduct rapid initial interrogation to gain information of immediate tactical value and categorize detainees as PW, raider, civilian defendant or innocent civilian, and to conduct in-depth or follow-up interrogation. A CT/PA screening against blacklists is necessary during this step.
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(2) Use of IPW (interrogation prisoner of war) teams during village
seals.

(a) OBSERVATION: PW and ralliers have knowledge that must be exploited
immediately in order to be useful.

(b) EVALUATION: ARVN and US IPW teams should operate together and
work with the search units from centralized locations. The establishment
of one clearing office can greatly facilitate the collection and dissemi-
nation of captured data.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: US/ARVN IPW teams should operate a central
interrogation facility and be ready to send out mobile IPW teams to units
involved in the seal.

(3) IPW teams at FSB.

(a) OBSERVATION: Ralliers and PW are interrogated as quickly and
completely as possible.

(b) EVALUATION: Intelligence concerning enemy units is acted upon
before the enemy unit has a chance to move. The presence of an IPW
team at the FSB will speed up the interrogation process.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: IPW teams should be kept at FSB whenever pos-
sible to speed up the exploitation of certain types of tactical intelli-
gencc.

(4) Exploitation of ralliers.

(a) OBSERVATION: Rallier exploitation in the form of interrogation
followed by detailed, systematic search of areas pointed out by ralliers
has enabled 1st Infantry Division units to uncover many large caches.

(b) EVALUATION: The key to successful exploitation of ralliers is
detailed interrogation conducted prior to any attempt to move with the
rallier into the area of his reported caches. Other information is
available from ralliers in addition to the location of forces and supply
caches. Information as to future plans of the unit as well as strength
and disposition of forces can be effectively exploited after being sub-
stantiated. Ralliers are often disoriented initially upon arrival at
a unit's location. An aerial VR, conducted with an interpreter and
interrogator have proved effective in orienting the rallier on the ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units should insure that sufficient time is

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spent interrogating and orienting the rallier before attempting to exploit his information. The additional time spent will reduce the possibility of the rallier becoming disoriented and lost.

(5) Employment of ralliers.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy is often familiar only with the terrain in the immediate vicinity of base camps, caches, or routes of ingress and egress.

(b) EVALUATION: Ralliers employed as guides to lead US personnel to base camps or caches often become completely disoriented in heavy jungle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should try to orient ralliers in relation to a main trail, stream or other terrain feature.

(6) Sensor fields.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period the 1st Infantry Division continued monitoring sensors. Areas of greatest interest were known enemy supply and infiltration routes.

(b) EVALUATION: The sensors have provided valuable information in detecting enemy movements as well as enhancing base camp security. Also, they have provided a better and more profitable artillery coverage of specific areas within the TNOI.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the division utilize more sensors in the future. Their employment gives good coverage of specific areas of the AO and assists commanders when economy of force is critical. Also, sensor fields used in conjunction with radar devices provide mutual support as well as a confirmation of enemy movements. Radar sightings yield a direction of movement which is important in detecting established trends and for destroying the enemy.

(7) Army aviation intelligence reporting procedures.

(a) OBSERVATION: The results of Nighthawk and Lighthorse operations are reported to the supported unit as contacts of possible intelligence value occur. These reports are then relayed to ACoS, G2.

(b) EVALUATION: Results of Nighthawk and Lighthorse operations reported by the pilots while they are still flying and immediately after the contact are often sketchy and lacking in essential detail. Facts and figures tend to be inaccurate until the pilots have had a chance to digest
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and reconstruct exactly what occurred.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The battalion S2 should debrief the pilots
and crew after they have landed. The results of these briefings will
then be forwarded to G2 Air for update of the inflight spot reports.

C. Operations.

(1) Squid operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: An innovation in operational techniques was developed
during the reporting period. The Squid, a waterborne Eagle Flight, was
employed to provide reconnaissance and limited area search of river and
stream banks.

(b) EVALUATION: In August 1969, the 2-18 Inf acquired four 18' ski
boats with 25 HP outboard motors capable of safely transporting six to eight
fully equipped men. These were employed to transport a platoon on the
waterways in Phu Hoa District, allowing them frequent and limited searches
and recons of areas otherwise inaccessible except by air. The technique
proved very successful in that it permitted the unit to cover a large area
in a short span of time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to the future use
of ski boats on Squid operations in suitable operational areas.

(2) Periods of enemy movement.

(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy movement in the lst Infantry Division TQR
is no longer limited to those hours of darkness normally associated with
ambush operations. It has been found that small groups of enemy move most
frequently between 0630 - 0830 and 1700 - 2000. Engagerunts with such small
groups have occurred as early as 1600.

(b) EVALUATION: This new pattern of enemy movement has occurred
for two reasons. US/GVN forces have habitually conducted ambushes dur-
ing periods of darkness only, and withdraw such ambushes at first
light. Also, lack of food has caused the enemy to become less cautious
in his efforts to resupply his forces.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: US ambush forces must adjust to the new pattern
of movement. Ambush patrols should depart well before darkness. In over-
watch position with observation of the ambush site may be occupied during
daylight hours. After dark, the ambush patrol then occupies the ambush
site. The ambush patrol remains in position until 0830. If contacts and
sightings diminish noticeably after using this technique over a period of
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time, ambush patrols can again adjust their timing.

(3) Enemy attacks during aerial resupply.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy harass or mortar an element receiving aerial resupply, generally when the aircraft is coming in for the second sortie.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy observes the route used by the first sortie in and out of the resupply LZ and knows that US personnel may bunch up in the process of distributing supplies from the first sortie. He can fire on the troops and aircraft more effectively after the aircraft completes the first sortie.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: If possible, platoons should be resupplied separately to prevent bunching up and to shorten the time at the resupply LZ. The commander of the element being resupplied should have the resupply aircraft use a different route in and out of the resupply LZ for each sortie.

(4) Enemy base camp utilization.

(a) OBSERVATION: Equipment, documents and other evidence of recollection have been found in enemy base camps recently destroyed by US/GVN forces. Information from a raider indicates that he was instructed by his commander to leave the base camp during the time US/GVN forces operated in the area, and then return and rebuild it upon the departure of US forces.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy has learned from experience that once an area has been searched and friendly forces depart that area (base camps, etc.), US/GVN forces seldom return to the site. To take advantage of this tactic, stay-behind ambushes in base camps have proved effective. Concentrations of artillery are also used on destroyed base camps. The same tactic has proved successful in IaD sites recently vacated by US units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to leaving a base camp area after the first search, remaining away for several days, and then returning to the base camps unexpectedly for another search.

(5) Locating enemy caches.

(a) OBSERVATION: American infantry units frequently miss valuable opportunities to cut into the enemy's supply system simply because they do not recognize the signs and locations of these hidden storage areas.
(b) EVALUATION: There has been a continuing dependency on ralliers to uncover their former cache sites and bunker complexes. If the American infantrymen will take their time and make a more thorough search, being careful to read all signs, he will turn up more significant finds. All old and destroyed bunkers must be checked since the enemy uses these as storage areas. Use of bamboo probes and mine sweepers has revealed several hidden caches in the walls of otherwise empty emplacements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: US patrolling elements should carry devices such as bamboo poles to check for hidden bunkers, tunnel passages and caches. The employment of mine detectors should also be considered by the commander.

(6) Employment of Nighthawk gunships.

(a) OBSERVATION: With the capability of observing and engaging night targets, Nighthawk has proved itself to be extremely effective. Although flown at critical altitudes and airspeeds, the relative safety of the operation is enhanced by flying and detecting targets while completely blacked out. This contrasts greatly with Firefly, which depends on white-light searchlights to spot targets for the Light Fire Team.

(b) EVALUATION: The Firefly has two major disadvantages which have been eliminated in the Nighthawk operation. First, the Firefly has limited target engagement capability, and second, during the search phase of the operation, white light must be used which gives away the Firefly's location.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Nighthawk aircraft should continue to be utilized in place of the Firefly for night VR and combat operations (see also Incl 13, 1st Inf Div Cir 525-8, "Utilization of Nighthawk").

(7) "Lighthorse" helicopter team.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Lighthorse helicopter team has been operating since the first part of September 1969 (see Incl 13, 1st Inf Div Cir 525-7, "Utilization of Lighthorse").

(b) EVALUATION: Lighthorse has proved itself to be an effective small scale air cavalry operation. By placing Lighthorse aviation assets OCPON to a brigade, the ground commander is able to provide a certain degree of mobility to his organic ground elements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The Lighthorse concept should be continued on a regular basis. Such a division-allocated task force is extremely effective in supporting small unit operations.
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(8) Command and control aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: The ideal situation is to have a UH1D C&C helicopter containing the battalion commander, the S3 and the artillery INO over a contact area. In many instances these assets are not available. The same task, however, can be accomplished by the battalion commander aboard a LOH.

(b) EVALUATION: Artillery, TAC Air, Army aviation, ground units, resupply and medical evacuation must be coordinated. The battalion commander's assets include a LOH equipped with one FM and one UHF radio. Communications are controlled as follows: TAC Air and Army aviation are controlled using a common UHF frequency. Artillery is coordinated (but not adjusted) using the battalion command net. The artillery INO in the TCC then provides guidance to his forward observers accordingly. The TCC immediately puts a radio on the frequency of the company in contact. This permits the battalion to monitor both resupply and medical evacuation requirements. By having an S 4 representative in the TCC, these requirements can be quickly fulfilled. The company in contact simply submits its request for dispatch of needed support over the battalion command net. Once dispatched, the ships are controlled on the battalion adin/log net. Reports are rendered and additional assets are requested from the TCC. The TCC does not transmit on the company frequency. This system reduces traffic on the battalion command net, permits full and closely coordinated use of all assets, and allows the battalion commander to control his ground elements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: One LOH equipped with FM and UHF should be provided and the above system employed when a UH1D C&C aircraft is not available.

(9) Use of PSYOP aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period a 500 watt speaker system for LOH aircraft has been developed and given to each battalion for use in support of brigade operations.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that to the lack of sufficient aircraft, division G 5 PSYOP support is not always sufficient to meet the required quick reaction needs. The brigade LOH speaker system which has this capability can be utilized to fulfill these requirements. The system can also be used in support of planned PSYOP missions on a regular basis. Giving each brigade control of their own speaker assets greatly expands the flexibility of the PSYOP effort.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Brigades should adopt and whenever possible use the OH-6A speaker system to fulfill quick reaction PSYOP missions.

(10) Light observation helicopter tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the past sixty days three OH-6A scout aircraft have been shot down.

(b) EVALUATION: Slow airspeed is the primary cause of concentrated enemy fire on scout aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: OH-6A scout pilots recognize the fact that as airspeed is decreased, their aircraft are more vulnerable to ground fire. This necessitates a varying pattern of search and a fluctuation of airspeed to meet mission requirements. Suggested minimum airspeed is fifty-five knots.

(11) Radar guided anti-aircraft weapons.

(a) OBSERVATION: On numerous occasions during the period, pilots have heard a buzzing sound over their FM radios that might have been enemy radar guided anti-aircraft weapons tracking their location.

(b) EVALUATION: While divisional aircraft have experienced no actual hits in conjunction with these phenomena, the possibility of radar guided air defense weapons cannot be discounted.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Pilots should be instructed on reporting procedures and evasive tactics used when they encounter this situation. Initial orientation for all flight personnel must include these instructions.

(12) Trip flares in the defense.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been found that when trip flares are employed well beyond the defensive wire (100-150 meters), the reconnaissance unit of the enemy force often trips a flare, providing several hours warning of an impending attack. This in itself often confuses the enemy and forces him to change his attack plans. The emplacement of trip flares and the fire support plan (NEPTARS) in particular should be closely coordinated.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: Trip flares used in the defense by fire support bases and night defensive positions should be emplaced beyond the outer wire.

(13) Dooby trapped areas.
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(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy quite often emplaces his booby traps in areas of heavy vegetation where they are extremely hard to detect.

(b) EVALUATION: US personnel, when moving through a heavily vegetated area that is booby trapped, quite often take casualties from booby traps they fail to detect.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Claymores, Bangalore torpedoes, and artillery fire can be used to clear paths through an area which the commander suspects of being booby trapped. In the 1-4 Cav, cannon rounds from tank cannon have also proved extremely effective.

14) Deception plans for seal operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: A careful plan of deception insures the success of the seal by keeping the enemy off balance.

(b) EVALUATION: Although the enemy may be aware of the intensive GM-ARM-US planning efforts and any significant changes in Allied force density, an imaginative deception plan may prevent the enemy from taking protective measures or fleeing from the target area. Such deception plans are limited only by the imagination of the commander and his staff; in any case, deception measures should make use of existing patterns of activity to make the plan credible to the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders planning a seal operation should employ a comprehensive deception plan. This may include fake orders or transmissions, temporary troop concentrations in areas away from the projected seal and making coordination with local village agencies as late as possible.

15) Conduct of village seals at night.

(a) OBSERVATION: Special methods are necessary to keep the seal effective at night when visibility is limited.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to increase the effectiveness of the seal, night illumination and night viewing devices are needed to detect enemy movement. Perimeter troops must be vigilant at night and be prepared to defend both sides of the perimeter.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continuous night illumination from flare ships and artillery units should be planned for and used. Radar and infrared devices are more effective when used on towers and in conjunction with trained snipers. Commanders should have sufficient forces to conduct daylight reconnaissances, to allow a portion of the force to rest during the day, and to conduct night ambushes outside of the perimeter. Carefully
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Spaced 3-4 man positions should be ready to defend both sides of the perimeter. It should be noted that intense night illumination often interferes with night scanning devices.

(16) Mine sweeping.

(a) OBSERVATION: Mines are generally located on the same section of road time after time.

(b) EVALUATION: Most mines are not being located with mine detectors, but are found visually. Even when found visually, detectors frequently fail to show a reading over the mine.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Since most mines are found visually, the same personnel should be used on the same road section each day to increase familiarity with the area and enhance the detection of any change. In addition, the sweep team should carefully remove all foreign matter from the road. Old pieces of board, bamboo, straw, etc., are used both as mine markers and to conceal slapstick detonators.

(17) Ski boat loading.

(a) OBSERVATION: Ski boat loading should be kept to a minimum.

(b) EVALUATION: Ski boats (Kenner Ski Barges) are constructed with a very shallow side board and bow section. The more personnel and equipment loaded into these boats, the lower they sit in the water, making it easier for water to come over the side boards. With a large percentage of the weight in the front, the bow tends to plow into waves and take on water instead of riding over the waves.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Not more than nine men, preferably eight, and their equipment should be put in these boats at any one time. All personnel and equipment should stay as far to the rear as possible.

(18) Cutting landing zones.

(a) OBSERVATION: LZ cutting operations require special preparation.

(b) EVALUATION: In the 1st Infantry Division it was often necessary for the LZ team to be inserted by means of a ladder from a hovering Chinook. To efficiently cut 5-ship LZ it often required more than one day. The effectiveness of Bangalore torpedoes in brush clearing to expose the larger trees to the chain saws or demolition should be emphasized.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: All engineer platoons should be trained on
the assault ladder. A minimum of 12 chain saws are required per team
because of the high demand rate. Troops should be given added training
on the proper use of chain saws. Two Chinooks are required for initial
insertion; one to carry personnel, the second for the LZ kit. Sufficient
quantity and variety of demolitions should be available so a resupply
can be effected after the leader of the LZ team analyzes the LZ and tailors
his demo supply request to fit the situation. A Chinook should be available
to fly the demo resupply two hours after the request is received.
Close coordination is essential between the security and the LZ teams for
maximum efficiency and safety. A chain saw mechanic is absolutely neces-
sary.

(19) Offensive Rome plow operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Rome plows have proved to be very effective offensive
weapons. In addition to their effectiveness in uncovering and
destroying enemy base camps, the Rome plows are capable of isolating
enemy forces encountered during land clearing operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Rome plows can be used effectively for clearing
large areas in order to deny the enemy the concealment vital to his free
movement and maintenance of his base camp areas. Large numbers of Rome
plows such as those used for land clearing operations, are not required
to accomplish the task of cutting high speed approaches for mechanized
forces to contact areas, exposing and destroying base camps and fortified
positions or isolating enemy forces encountered. As few as six Rome
plows with a mechanized force are sufficient. Upon encountering an
enemy force during cutting operations, the Rome plows begin cutting a
swath around the force with the accompanying security force outposting the
area cleared until the entire area of contact is isolated by an open cut.
Additional cuts are made, either sectioning off the uncut area or reducing
the size of the uncut area by widening the initial cut around the isolated
area. As the isolated area is reduced in size enemy forces have the choice
of attempting to break through the forces outposting the perimeter of the
cut or remaining in the area to be destroyed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Rome plows should be used in conjunction with
a mechanized force. Such forces provide a more effective reaction force
and take best advantage of high speed approaches cleared by Rome plows.
Infantry forces can provide security by having personnel accompanying each
Rome plow, but a mobile force is required to react to contacts made during
cutting operations.

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d. Organization.

(1) Medical "Go Teams."

(a) OBSERVATION: There exists a definite need for a fast, competent, sustained and mobile medical treatment unit in combat divisions.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1st Medical Battalion has developed a "Go Team." This team consists of one medical corps officer and four enlisted medical personnel. This team has pre-packed medical equipment and can be dispatched to any point within the 1st Infantry Division AO with 10 minutes notice. The team can supplement or completely take over a battalion aid station, thus providing the highly mobile, competent medical care required to meet any emergency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This concept of "Go Teams" should be considered for use throughout Vietnam.

(2) Mobile dental teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: Unlike medical care which is available at all division fire support bases, dental care is only available at division base camps.

(b) EVALUATION: The 257th Medical Detachment (Dental) in conjunction with the 1st Medical Battalion has formed a Mobile Dental Team. This team, consisting of one dental corps officer and one enlisted dental technician, travels from one division fire support base to another. This team has pre-packed equipment airlifted by medical evacuation helicopters. This concept is in accordance with the 1st Medical Battalion principle of bringing treatment to the patient instead of the patient to the treatment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This concept of a Mobile Dental Team should be considered for use throughout Vietnam.

(3) Military police strength.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 178 enlisted personnel authorized by MTOE 19-27G is not sufficient to provide effective police service when a division is operating from more than one base camp.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1st Infantry Division MP Company is currently 48 men overstrength, a level that has been maintained or exceeded since its arrival in RVN in order to meet operational commitments.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Future TOE actions should include an optional provision for one additional military police platoon when the division military police company is required to operate in widely dispersed base camps for extended periods of time. Additionally, provisions should be included for a proportionate increase in personnel necessary for logistical and administrative support.

e. Training.

(1) XM-706 (V-100) armored car.

(a) OBSERVATION: Upon issuance of the XM-706 armored car, training requirements have increased considerably. In the 1st MP Company, 1st Infantry Division, the MP company commander (an armor officer) has given his men a considerable amount of on-the-job instruction.

(b) EVALUATION: When the armored cars were initially issued to the 1st Military Police Company, personnel were not adequately trained in the operation and maintenance of the vehicle. Furthermore, the main armament, twin mounted M-73 machineguns, were novel weapons to military policemen. Lack of knowledge concerning the functional capabilities of both the weapons system and the vehicle itself has resulted in clutch burnout, transmission damage, uninitiated discharge of the weapons due to solenoid arc, solenoid burnout due to oil on the electrical connectors and control box malfunction due to a faulty electrical harness built into the vehicle itself. It has been extremely difficult to resolve these problems due to a lack of repair parts, knowledge and applicable technical manuals.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An adequate training program should be established on Army level for both operation and maintenance instruction for all users of this vehicle and any other type equipment similarly placed into the logistics bank.

(2) Ski boat operators.

(a) OBSERVATION: Ski boats are designed to carry a 2000 pound load at high speeds. Without speed, maneuverability is poor and control is difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: During river patrol missions, it is necessary to carry heavy loads at relatively slow speeds. As a result, the boats are difficult to handle and this difficulty is amplified in rough water. During a 180° turn where a boat runs back on its own wake, an inexperienced operator can easily cause the loss of a boat. Difficulties have also been encountered when meeting or being passed by other boats. The
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wakes from these boats in a narrow river are enough to swamp a slow
moving heavily loaded Ski boat.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All operators should receive thorough training
in Ski boats and their operation before they operate in a hostile environ-
ment. The necessity of operating at low speeds with heavy loads should
be foreseen and integrated into training programs.

f. Logistics.

(1) Logistical support for forward attack bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: The move to FAB presents some problems in resupply
since all elements, the companies in the field as well as the artillery
battery and the battalion CP, have to be resupplied by air.

(b) EVALUATION: This problem was solved by establishing a forward
logistics base at the closest existing FSB, consisting of a field mess
and elements of the support platoon. Supplies were trucked to the FSB
and then airlifted to the field elements on the first and fourth days
of each company operational cycle. One hot meal per day was prepared
at the FSB and flown to the FAB for the battalion CP and artillery bat-
tery. Virtually no problems were encountered with this system, and it is
felt that maximum use of limited air assets was obtained through the sched-
uling system used.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Small forward logistic operations centers have
proved effective and their use is recommended where the situation permits.

(2) Logistical support for village seal operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Village seals present special logistics problems.

(b) EVALUATION: Potential problems must be recognized and detailed
planning accomplished before the seal operation begins.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Road networks should be used whenever possible
and air resupply kept to a minimum. Participating Vietnamese units
should be encouraged to solve logistical problems with their own assets.
Local district forces not used at night by the seal forces should be
encouraged to return to their normal operational compounds for resupply;
this also enables them to fulfill their regular role of local security.
When possible, participating Vietnamese units should be encouraged to
supplement their rations through purchases at local markets.

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(3) Upgrading main supply routes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Highway upgrading and maintenance is a continuous
problem.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of 5" minus rock to fill the pot holes and
washouts on highways has proved satisfactory. Extensive utilization of
road graders to continually shape the road surface is the key to keeping
the road passable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Adequate rock supplies are a primary concern.
Patching and grading should be accomplished with at least two graders
working in an echelon formation. The graders should limit work within a
500 meter strip and move to the next successive section upon completion.
After upgrade has been accomplished, daily road patrolling is necessary
to prevent the road from deteriorating.

(4) Maintenance of FSB.

(a) OBSERVATION: Upgrading the more permanent FSB should be completed
before the monsoon season begins.

(b) EVALUATION: Engineer effort, after the monsoon season has begun,
is greatly handicapped by the elements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The more permanent FSB should be upgraded (cul-
verts, ditches and roads) prior to the monsoon season on a programmed
basis. Much engineer effort can be saved by constructing drainage struc-
tures and interior roads prior to the monsoon and then allocating suffi-
cient engineer resources to maintain them.

(5) Destruction of perimeter vegetation at FSB.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is necessary to clear vegetation from perimeter
wire for maximum security.

(b) EVALUATION: During the rainy season, growth of grass and bushes
between and in concertina and tanglefoot is rapid. Open areas between belts
can be backbladed with a dozer and areas in tanglefoot can be cut. Growth
inside concertina must be burned or the wire removed prior to cutting.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Backblading with a bull dozer is relatively
quick and effective for a month. Cutting is good for about two months as
a rule. Removal of concertina is wasteful and time consuming in relation
to the permanence of the grass-cutting operation. An effective expedient
measure is the application of diesel fuel with hand pump, water-type fire
extinguishers, soaking the area thoroughly and then setting it afame. Whatever vegetation remains is killed in a few days and the operation is repeated to remove any unburned portions. This is also the most effective method of retarding new growth. A more lasting solution is the application of a high potency, long residual vegetation killer followed by a burning of the dead grass and brush.

(6) Backfilling double culverts.

(a) OBSERVATION: When backfilling around double culverts, the culverts are often pushed out of alignment.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: Drive U-shaped pickets along the sides of the culverts at an angle so that pressure is put on the lips of the culvert. Wiring across the culvert from picket to picket will hold the culvert in place.

(7) Stabilizing backfill.

(a) OBSERVATION: Backfill over culverts during the rainy season is frequently impossible to stabilize and the road becomes deeply rutted and impassable.

(b) EVALUATION: The soil is saturated, adequate compaction cannot be achieved and the bearing capacity of the soil is easily exceeded.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Two methods have been used to solve this problem. MSR matting laid crosswise to the roadway can be used to distribute the weight enough for the soil to carry the load. The second method is to mix cement in the soil to increase the soil’s bearing strength.

(8) Management of flying time.

(a) OBSERVATION: A program for managing and allocating flying hours was found necessary to eliminate problems encountered with regard to aircraft maintenance and pilot flying hours.

(b) EVALUATION: The flying hour program, established on 15 Sep 69, has held to a minimum instances of aircraft stacking up for repair and pilot overflying their 140-hour maximum for a consecutive 30-day period.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A similar flying hour program be used in other combat units.

g. Communications: Long radio transmissions.
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FURTHER: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period
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(1) OBSERVATION: When using communications security equipment
T/SEC KY-8, long transmissions on the radio set RT-524 often result in
a loss of the latter portion of the message and rushing noise only is
heard by the receiving station.

(2) EVALUATION: On long transmissions, the security equipment at
the transmitting and receiving station do not remain in synchronization.
Therefore, the latter portion of the transmission is not received.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: When making long transmissions using the
RT-524 with a KY-8, key the transmitter approximately every minute to
re-synchronize the security equipment.

h. Material.

(1) Use of assault trackway.

(a) OBSERVATION: Roadways weakened by monsoon rains fail quickly
under heavy traffic.

(b) EVALUATION: Sections of failed roadways that became impassable
and new roads that required immediate opening were covered with assault
trackway, FSN 5680-926-1388. Vehicles that crossed the trackway, did so
unassisted, and completed their mission. The trackway, although bulky
to move around and difficult to retrieve, served its intended purpose.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Contrary to the ACTIV evaluation of trackway
being not suitable for use in Vietnam, trackway continues to perform
its intended purpose and should remain in the Army system.

(2) XM-706 (V-100) armored car.

(a) OBSERVATION: The XM-706 armored car was issued with a very
limited MIL-STD.

(b) EVALUATION: At present, repair parts for the V-100 armored
car are limited to a minimal MIL and parts that are related to other
vehicles presently used in Vietnam. The usefulness of the vehicle is
highly depreciated in view of the inadequacy of the repair parts system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Certain prerequisites should be established in-
cluding an adequate repair parts system prior to acceptance of any new
equipment. Among other requirements, there should also be both trained
user personnel and trained repair specialists available before acceptance.

(3) Power boat repair.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period
        Ending 31 October 1969, ACS CSFN-65 (R2) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: Patching holes in power boats with patches and
    rivets is unsatisfactory.

(b) EVALUATION: Instead of attaching the whole patch to the boat
    with rivets, a fuel cell repair kit is used. This kit consists of a
    fiberglass sheet and plastic epoxy. Two coats of this material and
    one coat of paint will effectively seal the hole.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The above method should be adopted as a regular
    repair procedure.

(4) PPS-5 radar sets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some PPS-5 radar sets are showing excessive wear
    on the antenna drive gear trains.

(b) EVALUATION: One cause is that some units are lifting the RT unit
    into the radar towers by means of a rope tied to the antenna drive.
    This applies an excessive torque to the antenna drive causing strain
    on the gear trains.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The holds on the front of the RT unit must be
    used for all lifting.

(5) P-153 mine detectors.

(a) OBSERVATION: Repair parts for the P-135 mine detector, especi-
    ally the short handles and the receiver-transmitter wiring harness,
    are in short supply.

(b) EVALUATION: There are generally 10 to 20 detectors deadlined
    and waiting these parts at any given time. These items must be made
    available in order to keep enough detectors in operation to enable
    the division to fulfill its mine sweep commitments.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All measures should be taken, including
    Red Ball and MER requests, to obtain these parts.

(6) Hard mounts for helicopter gunships.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the past year there have been numerous
    incidents where crew chiefs and gunners have accidently fired their
    weapons during sudden maneuvers on contact missions.
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(b) EVALUATION: Bungee Cords supporting the .50 do not offer
    the stability required for the weight of the weapon and flight maneuver
    used in firing passes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Hard mounts should be installed in all UH-1C
    gunships in order to provide a firm firing platform and to restrict
    traverse, elevation and deflection of the machine gun to meet safety
    requirements (hard mounts have been installed on all 1st Inf Div UH-1
    aircraft).

(7) Water in helicopter static systems.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the nonsoon season, excessive amounts of
    water become trapped in the pilot static tube system resulting in erroneous
    readings of the altimeter, vertical speed and airspeed indicators.

(b) EVALUATION: The pilot tube has a cover which prevents water
    from entering, but the static ports are open. High winds and excessive
    rainfall causes water to be forced into the static ports.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Masking tape should be used on the static ports
    to protect the system from water entry. This tape is removed as part of
    the pre-flight inspection.

(8) Oxygen and acetylene equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: When a welder is finished with his oxygen and
    acetylene equipment, he should shut the pressure off at the bottle instead
    of at the gauges. If the latter is done, the gauge seals often rupture,
    creating a safety hazard from escaping gases.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: Section leaders should make frequent checks to
    insure that the pressure is shut off at the bottle and that all gauges are
    removed and properly stored at the end of the working day.

(9) M109 SP howitzer.

(a) OBSERVATION. It is difficult to line up the threads and remove
    a tube on the M109.

(b) EVALUATION: While attempting to remove the tube from a M109 SP,
    a great deal of difficulty was encountered in getting the threads to
    line up so the tube would slide out of its mount. An attempt was made
    to turn the tube by means of a sling. This was unsuccessful, and the
    following procedure was then used which allowed the tube to be removed
A five-ton wrecker held the tube at the center of balance with a sling. A truck was chained to the muzzle brake and an eight-foot long 4x4 board was passed through the muzzle brake. The board was used as a wrench and the tube rotated a few degrees. The truck was then backed up slowly in an attempt to remove the tube. If the tube did not move, the truck moved forward to loosen the chain and the tube was rotated a few more degrees. This process continued until the threads lined up and tube was removed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a method similar to that described above be adopted and publicized as a field expedient.

(10) Elevating and traversing handwheels on the M102 howitzers.

(a) OBSERVATION: The elevating and traversing handwheels on early model M102 howitzers are made of magnesium alloy and are easily broken.

(b) EVALUATION: A more durable handwheel is now in the system. Each unit should have the new handwheel on order.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Until new handwheels are received, any service and evaluation section can repair a broken handwheel by use of a thin metal strap and small metal screws.

(11) Level vials and micrometer scales.

(a) OBSERVATION: Level vials and micrometer scales on howitzers require frequent replacement when personnel use solvent to clean the fire control sight mounts.

(b) EVALUATION: Solvent removes the paint and is an unauthorized cleaning agent.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A simple cleaning by a dry cloth is entirely sufficient and would insure that level vials remain legible.

(12) Water truck pumps.

(a) OBSERVATION: Water truck pumps have fiberboard vanes that wear out within one month.

(b) EVALUATION: Replacing the fiberboard vanes with aluminum vanes solves the problem. The aluminum vanes last approximately six months.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Aluminum vanes should be standardized on water
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truck pumps.

(13) Rebuilt generators.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some rebuilt generators are being received in an unserviceable condition.

(b) EVALUATION: Four 5kw generators were received with faulty magneto's, several 5kw and 10kw generators had pressure safety lines hooked up backwards, and two 5kw engines had bad rods.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Rebuild agencies should place more emphasis on quality control.

(14) Standard lightweight avionics equipment (SLAE).

(a) OBSERVATION: SLAE installed in the CH6A continue their high failure rate.

(b) EVALUATION: The problem has been brought to the attention of avionics personnel at all echelons. The 1st Infantry Division presently has no repair capability for SLAE equipment and must evacuate it to Avionics Electronic's (AVEL) Central.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continue emphasis by appropriate agencies should be maintained until this failure rate is reduced.

(15) Minebooms.

(a) OBSERVATION: Chain-type minebooms used to protect key bridges are not durable.

(b) EVALUATION: Some minebooms are composed of many timbers held together by individual lengths of steel cable. When one timber or cable link breaks the complete boom is useless. If a cable is extended across the complete river gap and each timber joined to it independently, the failure of one timber would not cause a complete boom failure. The individual timber can be repaired easily.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The continuous cable system used at the Phu Qong Bridge to support the mineboom should be adopted for all minebooms in Vietnam.

(16) Mineboom maintenance.
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(a) OBSERVATION: When minebooms have a chain link fence attached, the river debris which collects on the fence causes additional stress. As a result, the timbers often break away from their cable connectors.

(b) EVALUATION: A chain link fence is attached to the mineboom at Phu Quong Bridge for the purpose of stopping submerged mines from floating under the boom. These chain link fences function well, but tend to trap all trash floating downstream. If this debris is allowed to collect on the chain link fence, the force of the water would eventually break the boom.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Mineboom personnel should check minebooms with chain link fences attached and clean them as debris collects.

1. Doctrine:
(1) Airborne Personnel Detector.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a requirement for the establishment of doctrinal concepts concerning the use of the Airborne Personnel Detector.

(b) EVALUATION: These concepts must address the limited resources that are available to a commander. In addition, more definitive guidance is required concerning the interpretation of detector readings and the meaning as it relates to the type of action a commander should take. The battlefield environment has a profound effect upon the detector's capabilities. Therefore more definitive guidance is required concerning these effects. Because the number of variables that affect the operation of this instrument are so numerous and because the interpretation by different individuals of the effects of these variables are equally numerous, the commanders can have nothing but doubt concerning its capabilities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Both long and short term studies should be initiated to provide further guidance concerning the use of the Airborne Personnel Detector.

(2) Herbicides.

(a) OBSERVATION: A greater variety of herbicides and appropriate delivery systems are needed.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to give a commander the flexibility to use herbicides in support of his tactical operations, he must have the ability to select the type of effect desired and control the specific areas of application. Neither the herbicides available to him nor the disseminating devices will allow these options without causing undue risk to the
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friendly populace. It is generally accepted that defoliation of heavily vegetated areas will improve observation from the air. However, little is accomplished towards improving fields of fire or improving observation for the soldier on the ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The purpose and use of herbicides need to be re-evaluated; such a study would point out additional objectives as targets for future research.

(3) Ski boat SOP.

(a) OBSERVATION: To operate Ski boats successfully, precise formations and operational patterns must be established and followed.

(b) EVALUATION: Ski boats operate in groups of four at distances where voice control is often impossible; control of these boats is by radio and hand signals. The boats have various patterns for patrolling the river and searching the banks. There are maneuver patterns established for enemy contact and emergency situations. Infantrymen are assigned fields of fire and observation, and are instructed on actions to perform in hazardous situations. It is the boat operator's responsibility to brief all personnel on their duties and actions in emergency situations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All boats should have written SOP dealing with their operations and maneuvers posted in them; all personnel should be briefed on this information prior to the start of a mission.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, ENC CLRD-65 (P2) (U)

3. (U) Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information:
None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C.T. Selby

13 Incl
1-Organizational Structure
2-List of Key Commanders
3-Force Disposition
4-1st Bde Operational Report
   Lessons Learned
5-2d Bde Operational Report
   Lessons Learned
6-3d Bde Operational Report
   Lessons Learned
7-Support General Operational
   Report-Lessons Learned
8-Division Chemical Section Oper-   
   ational Report-Lessons Learned
9-1st Avn Bn Operational Report
   Lessons Learned
10-1st Engr Bn Operational
    Report-Lessons Learned
11-121st Sig Bn Operational
    Report-Lessons Learned
12-1st MP Co Operational Report
    Lessons Learned
13-1st Inf Div Circulars
Incl 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 wd HQ, DA

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AVPB-RB-H (1 Dec 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCENW, APO San Francisco 962661 2 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for the period ending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B.G. MACDONALD
ILT. AGC
Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division and comments of endorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "Officer gains, qualifications and status", page 3, paragraph 1b(3)(c); concur. A shortage of infantry captains does exist USARV wide. DA requisition fill projections for 3d quarter FY 70 indicate the problem will become even more acute in the months ahead. The shortfall in this area will continue to be met with branch and grade substitutions, i.e., with armor captains and infantry lieutenants. Other combat arms captains have been available in sufficient quantity to keep the Division at or above TOE authorizations.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning "Personnel: Position Vacancies for Promotion", page 46, paragraph 2a; concur. Authority to promote personnel to grade E4 and E5 without regard to position vacancy has been granted by Department of the Army. For the past six months USARV has been authorized to promote 25% of its promotion allocations to grade E4 and E5 without regard to position vacancy criterion as indicated:

      | E4 | E5 |
      |----|----|
      | Jul 69 | Yes | No |
      | Aug 69 | Yes | No |
      | Sep 69 | Yes | Yes|
      | Oct 69 | No  | No |
      | Nov 69 | Yes | Yes|
      | Dec 69 | Yes | No |

   c. (C) Reference items concerning "Intelligence in search and seal operations", page 46, paragraph 2b(1) and "Use of IPW teams during village seals", page 47, paragraph 2b(2); concur. The joint seal operation not only provides adequate personnel for a timely operation, it is also a means of implementing the Improvement and Modernization program for RVNAF. These articles are being considered for inclusion in the Jan 70 edition of the Combat Intelligence Lessons.
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AVHOC-567 (1 Dec 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

d. (C) Reference items concerning "IFW Teams at FSE", page 47, paragraph 2b(3); "Exploitation of ralliers", page 47, paragraph 2b(4); and "Employment of ralliers", page 48, paragraph 2b(5); concur. To maximize the exploitation of tactical intelligence, speed is of the essence. Locating IFW teams at FSEs, when possible, allows for quick and complete interrogation of ralliers and PWs. A thorough interrogation provides information on enemy unit strengths, locations and plans as well as allowing for the physical orientation of the PW or rallier.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Sensor Fields", page 48, paragraph 2b(6); concur. Upon request by the using unit, ground sensor assets for use in RVN are allocated by COMUSMACV based on mission priority and availability of equipment.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Squid operations", page 49, paragraph 2c(1); concur. At this time a study is being conducted to determine if the Ski Boat should be classified as Standard A equipment.

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Enemy base camp utilization", page 50, paragraph 2c(4); concur. Consideration should also be given to the employment of stay behind forces after completion of search operations.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of PSYOP Aircraft", page 52, paragraph 2c(9); concur. This recommendation is in keeping with the doctrine contained in FM 33-5.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Light Observation Helicopter Tactics", page 53, paragraph 2c(10); concur. With the exception of the minimum airspeed, the evaluation and recommendation are valid. The airspeed utilized is dependent on the mission requirements, the enemy situation, and the terrain.

j. (C) Reference item concerning "Radar Guided Anti-aircraft Weapons", page 53, paragraph 2c(11); concur. The phenomenon is currently under investigation by MACV J2. USA RV has not published guidance on evasive action since the threat has not been defined. Pilots should be instructed to report occurrences of this phenomenon through intelligence channels.

k. (U) Reference item concerning "Cutting landing zones", page 55, paragraph 2c(18); concur. No action is required by higher headquarters.

l. (U) Reference item concerning Medical "Go Teams", page 57, paragraph 2d(1); concur. However, this concept is not new. Appendix 3, FM 61-100 provides guidance for the establishment of rapid reaction medical teams.

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AVHGC-DCT (1 Dec 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGCS CSFR-65 (R2) (U)

m. (U) Reference item concerning "Mobile Dental Teams", page 57, paragraph 2d(2); concur. The concept of a Mobile Dental Team has been implemented by all medical detachments (dental service).

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Military Police Strength", page 57, paragraph 2d(3). Nonconcur with recommendation that future TOE actions include an optional provision for one additional military police platoon. Any increase in authorization, either by individual or cellular unit, is accomplished by a MTCE action rather than a TOE action. Due to the current moratorium on submission of MTCE changes and the severe limitation on additional manpower spaces, it appears that provisional overstrength of the MP Company from divisional assets is the best means available to meet increased operational commitments which are of uncertain duration.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "XM-706 (V-100) Armored Car", page 58, paragraph 2e(1); concur. CDC and AMC have recognized the repair parts and design problems and are taking action in these areas. The only TM's published for the XM-706 are the 20P and 34F manuals. The manufacturer has an operator's manual which is currently in short supply. Action is being taken to notify units of address where operator's manuals may be obtained.

p; (U) Reference item concerning "Logistical support for forward attack bases", page 59, paragraph 2f(1); concur. The success of the small forward logistics operations center in solving resupply problems without undue stress deems it worthy of being considered in future operations faced with similar circumstances.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Maintenance of FSB", page 60, paragraph 2f(4); concur. Considerable assistance in this effort can be provided through self-help programs.

r. (U) Reference item concerning "Stabilizing Backfill", page 61, paragraph 2f(7); Concur. However, use of the soil cement procedure is the preferred method.

s. (U) Reference item concerning "Management of Flying Time", page 61, paragraph 2f(8); concur. The management of aircraft and aviator flying time and scheduled maintenance is the responsibility of the unit commander.

t. (U) Reference item concerning "Communications: Long Radio Transmissions", page 61, paragraph 2g; nonconcur. Keying the transmitter every minute to re-synchronize the security equipment is not normal operating procedure when using the KY-8/RT-524 combination. Loss of synchronization could be caused by any number of reasons such as, equipment failures at
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AVHGC-DST (1 Dec 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSF09-65 (R2) (U)

either end, excessive heat buildup, an interrupted radio path or atmospheric disturbances. It should be remembered that the "or - - equipment is designed to operate at a receive-transmit ratio of 9:1.

u. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of Assault Trackway", page 62, paragraph 2h(1); sufficient data is not provided to allow evaluation. The 1st Infantry Division should submit a more detailed statement of exception to the ACTIV evaluation if reconsideration is desired.

v. (U) Reference item concerning "XM-706 (V-100) Armored Car", page 62, paragraph 2h(2); concur. Action is currently being taken by USARV, 1st Log Comd and TAC to alleviate the shortage of repair parts and mechanics for the XM-706 Armored Car.

w. (U) Reference item concerning "Power boat repair", page 62, paragraph 2h(3); Concur with use of the fuel cell repair kit as a field fix for patching holes in metal skin boats. The unit will be notified to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) to USAMC/COM for technical evaluation.

x. (U) Reference item concerning "Hard Mounts for Helicopter Gunships", page 63, paragraph 2h(6); concur. Sagadi Mounts for UH-1C helicopters are available in sufficient quantities to meet requirements. Units having a need for these mounts should identify requirements to USARV Aviation, AVH&V-LOG.

y. (U) Reference item concerning "Water in Helicopter Static System", page 64, paragraph 2h(7); concur. Extreme care must be taken during pre-flight to insure that the tape is removed.

z. (C) Reference item concerning "Material", page 64, paragraph 2h(9); nonconcur. To remove the tube of the M109 SP Howitzer by connecting a truck to the muzzle brake can damage the tube. That type and amount of force is not required to separate the tube from the breach mechanism. A wrecker can be used to support the tube during the separation. A 4x4 inch wooden plank can be placed in the muzzle brake and/or a chain wrench placed around the tube to apply necessary force to rotate the tube. That method of applying force will not cause damage to the tube. 3-40 degree/1 turn of the tube will align the threads of the tube and breach mechanism for separation.

aa. (U) Reference item concerning "Rebuilt Generators", page 66, paragraph 2h(13); concur. When rebuilt generators are received in an unserviceable condition, 1st Log Comd contacts the responsible rebuild agency to inform them of the quality control failure.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

ab. (U) Reference item concerning "Water truck pumps", page 65, paragraph 2h(12); concur. An Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) should be submitted IAW para 3-74, TM 38-750.

ac. (U) Reference item concerning "Airborne Personnel Detectors", page 67, paragraph 2i(1); concur. The final draft of USARV Pam 525-2(R), Utilization and Employment of Personnel Detectors, was distributed to the field in limited quantities on 29 Nov 69. The pamphlet is now being published in Japan and is expected to be released to the field in Feb 70.

ad. (U) Reference item concerning "Herbicides", page 67, paragraph 2i(2): MACV is presently conducting a study concerning new herbicides and improved delivery systems; therefore, this item will be forwarded to MACV J3-09 for consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY

CPT.

MACV J3-09
1st INF DIV
II FFV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C L. SHORT
CPT, ACC
Asst AG

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Assigned Units

HHC, 1st Inf Div
701st Maint BN
1st S&T BN
121st Sig BN
1st Engr BN
1st Avn BN
1st Med BN
1st MI Det
HHC and Band, Spt Cmd
1st Admin Co
266th Cal Flat
242d Cal Det
43d FI Det
44th FI Det
17th Mil Hist Det
Co I (Ranger), 75th Inf
1st Sqdn, 4th Cav
HHC, 1st Bde
1st Bn, 2d Inf
2d Bn (Mech), 2d Inf
2d Bn, 28th Inf
35th Inf Flat (Scout Dog)
HHC, 2d Bde
1st BN, 18th Inf
2d BN, 18th Inf
HHC, 3d Bde
1st BN (Mech), 16th Inf
1st BN, 28th Inf
1st BN, 26th Inf
2d BN, 16th Inf
41st Inf Flat (Scout Dog)
61st Inf Flat (Combat Tracker)
HBB, Div Arty
1st BN, 5th Arty
1st BN, 7th Arty
2d BN, 33d Arty
8th BN, 6th Arty
1st MP Co
269th FA Det Radar

Attached Units

Co B, 2d BN, 34th Armor
314th Avn Det
317th Avn Det
340th Avn Det

OPCON Units

A Btry, 5th BN, 2d Arty (-)
1st Flat, I Btry, 29th Arty (6 Sect)

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**FOURTH DISPOSITION**
August 1969

**CONFIDENTIAL**
# FORCE DISPOSITION
## September 1969

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## Force Disposition
October 69

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| 1-16  | Ground Reconnaissance and Night Patrol Operations in Southern Song Be Corridor  
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       | FSB Dominate  
       | and Phu Loi |
| 2-18  | Ground Reconnaissance, Night Patrol and VCI Neutralization Operations Vic Tan Uten  
       | and FSB K甸e IV (Western Catcher's Mitt)  
       | and FSB Boa |
| 1-28  | Ground Reconnaissance and Night Patrol Operations in Song Be Corridor |
| 1-28  | Ground Reconnaissance and Night Patrol Operations Vic Long Buoi  
       | Secret Zone (FSB APOLO)  
       | and FSB Saigon  
       | FSB 5010  
       |  
       | Ground Reconnaissance and Night Patrol Operations in Western Trapezoid |
| 1-4   | Ground Reconnaissance, Night Patrol, and Convoy Security Operations from Ben Cat to Song Be Bridge |
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
Office of the Chemical Officer
APO 96345

5 November 1969

SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Division Period
Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. GENERAL: (1) During the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969, the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Section continued to exercise operational control over assigned chemical units, and perform missions in support of combat operations.

   (2) The 242d Chemical Detachment (CBRC) augmented the Division Chemical Section with personnel necessary to sustain chemical operations. During the period 1 August 1969 to 20 October 1969, 1 Lt Ralph L. Johnson was detachment commander. CPT William J. Patten assumed command on 21 October 1969.

   (3) The 266th Chemical Platoon provided chemical support to the 1st Infantry Division. CPT William R. Dias commanded the platoon during this reporting period.

   b. OPERATIONS: (1) Personnel Detection Missions (Bloodhound):

      (a) Missions continued to be flown for the Division G-2 on a daily basis until 5 September 1969. Fifty large area surveillance missions were flown. The average size of targeted areas was 60 square kilometers.

      (b) An Airborne Personnel Detector crew was assigned to the division air cavalry troop on a permanent basis during the report period. The personnel detector is used to search out specific areas of interest and to locate enemy activity which can be exploited by the assets of the air cavalry troop. After a bloodhound mission is completed, a hunter killer team searches the area in which hotspots are detected to confirm and identify the activity in that location. A total of 102 missions were flown during the reporting period.
(c) On 6 September 1969 large area surveillance missions were discontinued. The personnel detector and crew were assigned as part of an aviation battalion lighthorse team (composed of Aviation Battalion assets, similar to an Air Cav Troop) which is further attached to battalion size units for operations. The personnel detector is used to locate hotspots which are immediately searched by a hunter killer team. Significant findings are exploited immediately by ground forces, eagle flights, artillery fire or light fire teams. A total of 62 personnel detector missions were flown as part of this team.

(2) Riot Control Agent CS: (a) Non-persistent CS: Three missions employing a total of 79 B-158 CS clusters were flown in UH-1 aircraft targeted against enemy positions. One mission expending 19 B-158 clusters was targeted against an enemy base camp in a heavy jungle area. The other two missions were flown prior to artillery preparation for ground forces exploitation. The use of CS munitions under this concept cannot be evaluated because there was no observable evidence that the use of CS aided in making the enemy more vulnerable to friendly fires. The failure rate of munitions functioning properly was minimal. Most of these failures can be attributed to human error as opposed to mechanical problems.

(b) Persistent CS: A total of 215 drums (17,200 pounds), were dropped on two missions during the reporting period. Impact bursters were used to detonate the 55 gallon drums. These missions were conducted on post B-52 strikes to restrict enemy use of terrain or hardened positions remaining in the area after the air strikes and to harrass known enemy in the area. The use of persistent CS in the division TAOR was not used more extensively because of our inability to control downwind drift and the uncertainty concerning the persistency of the agent. In addition the only means available for its delivery are helicopters which are normally used on higher priority tasks.
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AVDB-CM
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report lst Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(3) Defoliation: (a) A total of 41 C-123 aerial defoliation sorties were flown in the divisions TAOI during the months of August and September. A total of 4,720 hectares were defoliated by C-123 spray.

(b) The burning of vegetation by the use of diesel fuel continued throughout the reporting period. Approximately 122,000 gallons of diesel fuel was dispensed by ground spray equipment on the perimeters of three base camps, two fire support bases and along the sides of highway 13 north of LAI KHE base camp.

(4) Flame Operation: (a) One hundred and seventeen, 55 gallon fougasses were emplaced at fire support bases during the month of October.

(b) The mechanized flamethrower, M132, is used in support of tactical operations. It is generally used to assist in clearing antipersonnel minefields in heavily vegetated areas. In this role it is used to merely burn off the minefield. It is also used in a perimeter defense role around FSPB's and NDP's. On one occasion it was used by the 2d Battalion 2d Infantry to break up an attack by NVA forces against a friendly position. The division chemical section personnel assisted the 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry with the training of personnel in the servicing and firing of the mechanized flamethrower. At the present, the only means of qualifying personnel to operate this equipment is by an on the job training program. It should be noted that even a majority of Chemical Staff Specialists in the 54 MOS lack the qualification to operate or service the mechanized flamethrower.

(c) During September an attempt was made to develop a flame system to set a river on fire. The logistics involved was to enormous to achieve success. The resupply routes of the VC/NVA crosses the SAIGON River. The area in which they cross the river is from 30 to 60 meters wide. The exact crossing sites are unknown until they are detected by radar or visual sightings. The concept envisioned, engulfing the VC/NVA in the water with flame as they attempted to cross the river. Various methods were tested. These included the floating of 5 gallon cans of napalm down the river to dumping fuel on the water and prepositioning drums of napalm with high explosive charges along the banks of the river. The Navy PBR boats were used to conduct this test. The logistical burden precluded testing other expedients or conducting the actual operation. The desired munition would have been a chemical substance deliverable by helicopter that would ignite upon contact with water and create a mass of flame.
(5) Vector control apparatus: In an attempt to assist the Preventive Medicine personnel with the control of mosquitoes and other small insects, an expedient fogging device which uses the exhaust system of motor vehicles was installed on a 3/4 ton truck at each of the Fire Support Bases and Night Defensive Positions within the division. The fogging solution consisted of a 6% by volume mixture of malathion in diesel fuel. This device is used to augment other insecticide dispersing equipment.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

   a. There is a requirement for the establishment of doctrinal concepts concerning the use of the Airborne Personnel Detector. These concepts must address the limited resources that are available to a commander. In addition, more definitive guidance is required concerning the interpretation of detector readings and the meaning as it relates to the type of action a commander should take. The battlefield environment has a profound effect on the detector's capabilities. Therefore, more definitive guidance is required concerning these effects. Because the number of variables that affect the operation of this instrument is so numerous and because the interpretation by different individuals of the effects of these variables are just as numerous, the commanders can have nothing but doubt concerning its capabilities.

   b. In order to give a commander the flexibility to use herbicides in support of his tactical operations, he must have the ability to select the type of effect desired and to control the specific areas of application. Neither the herbicides available to him nor the dissiminating devices will allow these options without causing undue risk to the friendly populace. It is generally accepted that defoliation of heavily vegetated areas will improve observation from the air. However, little is accomplished towards improving fields of fire or improving observation for the soldier on the ground.

   [Signature]
   HERBERT J.A.
   LTC, G-3
   Division Chemical Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345

AVDB-AVN
5 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 October 1969, RCS (SFOR) (RI) (U)

Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-AVN (MID)
APO 96345

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. In addition to the general aviation support provided to the 1st Infantry Division during past reporting periods, 1st Aviation Battalion implemented two new programs. The first was the employment of Night Hawk, and second, the fielding of a "Lighthorse" force. The aircraft assets of Company B and D Troop, 1/4 Cav remained the same as they were for the last reporting period. Company A acquired an additional UH-1D from Company B, 701st Maintenance Battalion.

(1) The Night Hawk concept, as described in the last reporting period, was implemented as a full scale operation starting 27 July 1969. It was noted during the first Night Hawk operations that for security and radio relay for the low flying Night Hawk, a chase ship would be necessary. The Night Hawk and chase ship flew as a team until the end of August when the second Night Hawk team was assembled. In order to maintain the same number of day assets in support of the Division, D Troop, 1/4 Cav was given the mission of providing the second chase ship. That mission also provided D Troop with an opportunity to provide night flying experience for the UH-1D pilots, as well as provide for a "spacer" aircraft for scheduling maintenance flow in the remainder of the UH-1 fleet. On 18 September 1969 a third Night Hawk team was assembled. Instead of employing three Night Hawks and three chase ships each night, only two flew each night with two chase ships. The third system stayed down in a reserve status. Each ship had one night down and two nights flying every three days, and only two chase ships flying every night were required. On 30 August the decision was made to fly all three Night Hawks whenever possible. Again, in order to conserve day assets, one G model gunship was converted into a C&C aircraft for the "Lighthorse" mission and a procedure was established that allowed two chase ships to cover three Night Hawks. Due to maintenance problems and...
operational requirements, 1 Troop, 1/4 Cav was forced to discontinue providing a chase ship late in October. This left the Night Hawks with only one chase ship to cover three Night Hawk ships at one time. Two gunships from Company B were committed as two of the three chase ships required. If a Night Hawk went down the chase/gunship would call the "slick" chase ship to pick up the crew. Also, the gunship could cover the downed Night Hawk with fire until pick up was accomplished. This chase system has worked quite well although allocated "blade time" has consistently been exceeded. Since Night Hawk accomplished night surveillance missions and was able to effectively neutralize targets that it found by itself, fire fly missions were no longer necessary and were thus eliminated. Results of Night Hawk for the period were in excess of 125 KBA and 10 sampans destroyed.

(2) In the early part of September, the Lighthorse force was established. Lighthorse consisted of one C&G aircraft, one Bloodhound/Param aircraft, three troop carrying slicks, and a Hunter Killer team. The Lighthorse team is employed under the OBCOM of a Division for a specified time period, in addition to use under Division control for LRRP insertions and extractions. The most successful part of Lighthorse has been the employment of the Hunter Killer team on VR's to locate the enemy and collect intelligence. As a result, the Hunter Killer capability of Lighthorse was expanded in mid October to two teams operating at the same time. On many occasions Lighthorse has successfully exploited sensor readings from its Bloodhound and VR's by its Hunter Killer teams to get KBA's, followed by insertion of ground troops using the three troop carriers. Lighthorse missions include VR's of specific areas and point targets such as bunkers, suspected enemy base camps, and frequent first light VR's of known and suspected enemy trails.

(3) To increase maintenance efficiency, and to stabilize the hours flown by Company A to a workable level, a flying hour program was adopted on 15 September. 3000 hours per month and 92 hours per day flown by 19 aircraft was the main proposal of the program. Close records are kept to insure that excess blade time on any one day will be compensated for in the following days. This program has proven itself to be a valuable management tool for the battalion in the short time it has been in operation. Over a long period of time it should provide the Division the maximum amount of aircraft hours with the greatest efficiency being gained per aircraft hour.

(4) Testing of the Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS) indicates this system should be employed primarily for sensor drops and not as a substitute for artillery. MADS proved effective on sensor drops because the WP marking round, dropped with the sensor, impacts within 20 meters of the sensor increasing accuracy in plotting sensor locations.

(5) The 1st Aviation Battalion conducted Staff Assistance Visits to the three Brigade Aviation Sections and the Division Artillery Aviation Section. These visits were conducted to assist the sections in solving
problems in the areas of operations, flight records, safety and maintenance. These visits served a two-fold purpose in that they were used by the sections to improve and increase the efficiency level of their operations and by the 1st Aviation Battalion to learn of any problem areas of the sections, check on aircraft utilization and to help maintain the same aviation standards throughout the Division.

b. Battalion Command Structure at the end of the reporting period:

Inclusion #1.

c. The Aviation Battalion provided the Division with daily aviation support throughout the AO for the reporting period. Training of newly assigned pilots in the LOH continued in Company B. Additionally, LOH transition training was conducted by qualified instructor pilots in several of the Brigade Aviation Sections. Command information was conducted weekly by unit commanders and Character Guidance was conducted monthly by a guest chaplain.

d. The Aviation Battalion did not conduct any tactical or administrative move during the reporting period.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) Night Hawk:

(a) Observations: The Night Hawk, with a capability for engaging observed targets, has proven itself to be an extremely effective night observation operation. Although flown at critical altitudes and airspeeds, the relative safety of the operation is enhanced by flying and detecting targets while completely blacked out.

(b) Evaluation: The Firefly had two major disadvantages which have been eliminated in the Night Hawk operation. First, the Firefly has limited target engagement capability, and second, during the search phase of the operation to locate targets, the white light must be used thus giving away the Firefly's location.

(c) Recommendation: That Night Hawk operations continue to be utilized in place of the Firefly for night VR's and combat operations.

(2) MADS:

(a) Observation: The MADS (Mortar Aerial Delivery System)
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has been used as a 6.2 in. mortar round delivery system for both "bombing" of an enemy positions with HE rounds and marking sensor locations when a sensor and a WP round are dropped together from an aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: Dropping of HE 4.2 in. mortar rounds on enemy positions is better accomplished using artillery fires. Dropping WP rounds and sensors together for the purpose of accurately plotting their location has proven to be very efficient.

(c) Recommendation: That the MADS be used primarily on sensor drop missions and be discontinued for use as a substitute for artillery fires.

(3) Lighthorse:

(a) Observation: Lighthorse has been operating since the first part of September.

(b) Evaluation: Lighthorse has proven itself to be an effective small scale air cav operation. By placing Lighthorse aviation assets OCON to a brigade, the ground commander is provided the resources to search for and engage hostile elements using his organic ground elements.

(c) Recommendation: The Lighthorse concept be continued as a regular operation.

(4) Flying Hour Management:

(a) Observation: A program for maintaining and allocating flying hours was found necessary to eliminate problems encountered by Company A with regard to aircraft maintenance and pilot flying hours.

(b) Evaluation: The flying hour program which was established on 15 September has held to a minimum instances of aircraft stacking up for "E's" and pilot's overflying their 140 hour maximum for a consecutive 30 day period.

(c) Recommendation: The flying hour program be continued.

(5) LOH:

(a) Observation: During the past sixty days three OH-6A scout aircraft have been shot down.

(b) Evaluation: Slow airspeed is the primary cause of concentrated enemy fire on scout aircraft.
(c) Recommendation: LOH scout pilots recognize the fact that as airspeed is decreased, their aircraft is more vulnerable to ground fire. This necessitates a varying pattern of search and a fluctuation of airspeed to meet mission requirements. Suggested minimum airspeed is fifty-five knots.

c. Training:

(1) Flight Records:

(a) Observation: Flight records are continually received with numerous errors in the addition of flight time, aircraft qualifications, instrument ratings and various other areas.

(b) Evaluation: The new record forms are not clearly understood by the aviators signing them. In most cases he has never been told the meanings of various sections of DA Form 759 Part I, and 759-1 Part II.

(c) Recommendation: Aviators should be presented a one or two hour block of instruction on flight records so they may have a better understanding of the system.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Radar Guided Anti-Aircraft Weapons:

(a) Observation: Pilots have, on numerous occasions during the period, heard a buzzing sound over their FM radios that could have been enemy radar guided anti-aircraft weapons tracking their location.

(b) Evaluation: While divisional aircraft have experienced no actual hits in conjunction with this phenomena, the possibility of radar guided air defense weapons cannot be discounted.

(c) Recommendation: Pilots should be instructed on reporting procedures and evasive tactics used when they encounter this situation. Initial orientation for all flight personnel must include these procedures.

(2) Reporting:

(a) Observation: The results of Night Hawk and Lighthorse operations are reported to the supported unit as contacts of possible intelligence value occur. These reports are then relayed to Division G-2.

(b) Evaluation: Results of Night Hawk and Lighthorse operations reported by the pilots while they are still flying and immediately after the contact are often sketchy and lacking in essential detail.
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Facts and figures tend to be inaccurate until the pilots have had a chance to digest and reconstruct exactly what occurred.

(c) Recommendation: The Battalion S-2 continue to debrief the pilots and crew after they have landed. The results of these debriefings will then be forwarded to S-2 Air for update of the inflight spot reports.

(3) AO Maps:

(a) Observation: Pilots have had problems exactly identifying the ground AO in which they are working.

(b) Evaluation: Pilots need a large scale map with the various AO's outlined and frequencies and call signs compiled in.

(c) Recommendation: Large scale marked maps supplied by S-2, be carried in each aircraft.

e. Logistics:

(1) Weaon Hard Mounts:

(a) Observation: During the past year there have been numerous incidents where crew chiefs and gunners have accidentally fired their weapons during sudden maneuvers on contact missions.

(b) Evaluation: The use of Bungee Cords for support of the M-60's does not offer the stability required for the weight of the weapon and flight maneuver used in firing masses.

(c) Recommendation: Hard mounts should be installed in all UH-1C gunships in order to provide a firm firing platform and to restrict traverse, elevation, and deflection of the machine gun to meet safety requirements. (Hard mounts have been installed on all organic UH-1 aircraft).

(2) Water in Pitot Static Systems:

(a) Observation: During the monsoon season an excessive amount of water becomes trapped in the pitot static tube system resulting in erroneous readings of the altimeter, vertical speed, and airspeed indicators.

(b) Evaluation: The pitot tube has a cover which prevents water from entering, but the static ports are open. High winds and excessive rain fall causes water to be forced into the static ports.

(c) Recommendation: Masking tape should be used on the static ports to protect the system from water entry. This tape is removed as part of the pre-flight inspection.

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f. Organization: None

g. Other: Statistical data for the quarter,

(1) Hours flown: 18,862

(2) Sorties flown: 33,888

(3) Passengers moved: 32,390

(4) Cargo moved (tons): 958

Incl

JAMES R. ALLAN
LTC, FA
Commanding
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Inclosure 1 to Operational Report of 1st Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 October 1969, RSC (SFOR) (RI).

Battalion command structure at the end of the reporting period:

LTC James R. Allan  Commanding
MAJ John F. Byrnsd  Executive Officer
CPT Neil Stribling  CO, HHC
MAJ Robert L. Phillips  CO, A Co
MAJ Peter B. Torres  CO, B Co
MAJ John N. Smith  S-3

Incl 1 to Incl 9
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 1st Engineer Battalion
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-CR-0 4 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Engineer Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1969, PCR CSFOR-65 (R1)

Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T-(MHD)

1. Section 1: Operations: Significant Activities:

a. Organization:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company provided command and staff supervision for combat engineer support to the 1st Infantry Division. Engineer equipment support is provided by the heavy equipment platoon and consists of: a 20 ton rough terrain crane; graders; five ton dump trucks; sheepfoot, grid, and steel wheel rollers; 10 ton tractors; and scoop loaders. This equipment is attached to the line companies on a mission basis to provide additional support. The company's equipment was utilized at numerous Fire Support Bases for new construction and general upgrade. The graders were kept in constant use to maintain Routes 240, QL-13, and LTL-14 during the rainy season.

The AVLB (Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge) Section, attached to Headquarters Company, consists of four (4) AVLB launchers and six (6) bridges. The AVLB section has been deployed on several missions in the vicinity of Thunder I, II, and III; Bau Tiang, the Michelin rubber plantation, and the Trapezoid.

The Rome Plow section is organic to Headquarters Company and consists of six (6) Rome Plows, an Armored Personnel Carrier, and a complete maintenance section. The Rome Plow section is placed in direct support of 1st Infantry Division
units to accomplish area land clearance in the TACR. During the report period, they have cleared approximately 2,565 acres.

The Rome Plows began the quarter at NDF Wilderness I and cut 625 acres from 7 to 17 August. On 18 August, the plows moved to Wilderness II where they cut 265 acres in 5 days. Moving to XT804283, they cut 360 acres before returning to Lai Khe on 31 August. A one week maintenance standdown was followed on 8 September with a 115 acre cut at XT780312. On 11 September at XT900440, 60 acres were cut. From 13 to 19 September, the plows cut 425 acres in the vicinity of XT756300. Following a maintenance standdown, the plows cut 310 acres at XT699458, October 2-8. From 11 to 13 October, 185 acres were cut at XT847275. From 14 October to 18 October, the plows have been operating near FSB Sun. The four M1243 tanks that have been providing security for the plows have been turned in. Four Combat Engineer Vehicles were obtained at the beginning of October to replace the tanks. However, the CEVs will not be used as Rome Plow security due to lack of a gauge round, thereby placing the total requirement for security on the unit that is being supported.

The water point section provided over 1.2 million gallons of potable water to units in the field. Water point units are presently located at Thunder II (XT785558), FSB Kien (XT519418), FSB Tennessee (XT583333), FSB Apollo (XT597507), and FSB Florida (XT083329).

(2) A Company provided direct combat engineer support to the 1st Brigade in Dau Tieng. Much of the first part of the quarter was devoted to the upgrade of the base camp at Dau Tieng. Improvements were made on the defense perimeter, interior roads, drainage, personnel bunkers, and sanitary and mess facilities for 1st Brigade units.

A daily mine sweep was conducted from Dau Tieng to FSB Kien (XT519418).

On 30 August, a platoon from A Company was air inserted at XT603392. The
mission was to emplace a 38'4" M476 dry span bridge on LTL-14 so that the 984th Land Clearing Company could move into a new cut area. The bridge was air inserted from Di An and the following day returned by airlift. The platoon from A Company secured the bridge the night of 30 August, disassembled the bridge the following morning and was airlifted back to Dau Tieng.

Throughout the quarter, FSB Kien, FSB Tennessee, and FSB Gala were supported with drainage improvement, minor construction, and facilities upgrade. FSB Gala was closed out in September.

On 1 October, A Co began a deliberate upgrade of LTL-14 from Dau Tieng to FSB Tennessee. The opening of the access road to FSB Tennessee was the first task. With the use of 1700 feet of assault trackway plus extensive dozer and grader work the access road was opened to traffic on 15 October. Upgrade of the rest of the road continues.

(3) B Company provided direct combat engineer support to the 2nd Brigade which is headquartered at Di An.

During the period ending October 1969, B Company was engaged in numerous significant projects.

An effort was made to continue the upgrade of NDP's in the 2nd Brigade AO. Such upgrading has included the hauling of laterite, drainage improvement, and the construction of bunkers, mess halls, and latrines. FSB's and NDP's receiving such assistance include FSB Jim, FSB Mortain, FSB Venable Heights, FSB All-American II, Cheyenne NDP, and Pagoda Inn NDP. A new FSB Normandy III, was also constructed in July of this period and is maintained on a continuous basis. The construction of this new NDP during the rainy season required considerable engineer effort and determination.

Numerous mine sweeps were also supplied to assure the safe and unrestricted use of vital roads and MSR's in the Area of Operations. Company B supplied
four daily sweeps positioned at FSB Jim and one sweep daily from FSB Normandy III to cover Routes Zino and Lead from the Song Be Bridge to Tan Uyen and Ben Cat to Route L21-16.

Some work continued on the Division Training Command School and ranges. Progress continues to be slow due to the lack of materials, sporadic and heavy rainfall and the commitment of higher priority projects.

Construction began on the Division Stand-down Center in Di An. This project has included the construction of sidewalks, an outdoor movie theater, interior drainage and a swimming pool complex consisting of a concrete pad and building for the filter, two showers, a sun deck and a chain link fence around the pool. Also included are a roadway to the pool and a privacy fence. All projects are proceeding satisfactorily with work remaining to be done on the theater, drainage, roadway, and privacy fence.

(4) C Company provided direct combat engineer support to the 3rd Brigade, headquartered in Lai Khe. During the period 1 August to 31 October, mine sweep operations were predominant among the tasks accomplished by C Company. Sweep parties worked out of FSB's Mahone (Kien), Hans VIII, Lorraine, Son, Thunder I, II, III, Hartman, Wilderness I and II, and Ben Cat. In August the 1st Platoon based at FSB Mahone replaced a blown culvert on L21-14 vicinity Ben Chua in support of a village seal. During this time a squad size demo team supported 1/4th Cavalry operations in the Iron Triangle and along Route 240. The August Monsoons created washouts and rendered QL-13 almost impassable. C Company, forming an engineer task force, supported with additional equipment from Battalion, upgraded and restored 13 kilometers along this important Northern MSR. The 554th Engineer Battalion assumed the remaining work and C Company began upgrade operations at Thunder I, II, III, and FSB Hartman. September brought about the need for LZ cutting teams and, after familiarization training with CH-47's for aerial ladder insertion,
C Company cut 6 LZ's west of Thunder III in support of the 2/2nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion and in the vicinity of FSB Lorraine in support of the 2/16th Infantry Battalion. An LZ team was also utilized to open FSB Son. October brought about a road project along Route 240. In a move to reestablish overland resupply to FSB Lorraine and FSB Son, Route 240 was upgraded from Ben Cat to FSB Lorraine. During this operation, assault trackway was utilized as an entrance road between Route 240 and FSB Lorraine. In a project which still continues at Thunder II, two artillery pads for "self-propelled Howitzers are being constructed and cement and soil stabilization is being used to establish a working platform.

(3) D Company provided general support to the 1st Infantry Division. D Company retained responsibility for QL-13 from Lai Khe to Thunder III until August 15. Minesweep teams have been located at each fire support base.

Major base camp construction was accomplished by the 2nd and 3rd Platoons in support of the Division Hqs area. One 16'x30' prefabricated metal building was dismantled, moved, and re-erected on a new pad. Four large dead trees were removed from the DTCC area, all in close proximity to critical power lines and existing buildings which necessitated their removal on a limb by limb basis, each one being rigged and lowered to the ground. A 12'x400' service road to the rear of Division Hqs building was completed and five unserviceable personnel bunkers were removed. A chain link fence was completed around the DTCC area with two service gates and a network of sidewalks poured connecting the DTCC and all the staff sections. This brings the sidewalks poured by D Company in the Division area to over 5000 feet. A new personnel bunker was built in the DTCC area to replace one previously removed. During this same period, the 3rd Platoon built a half-scale DANGER FORWARD SIGN of reinforced concrete which was installed in front of Division Hqs. A 14'x20'x8' septic tank was constructed of concrete block with a reinforced concrete floor and precast reinforced concrete sectional covers. A 16'x25'
shower-latrine facility with concrete floor and louvered sides was completed. The facility consists of five commodes, five urinals, five sinks, and five showers. A twenty foot water tower was erected to service the latrine. In addition, an overhead cover and standoff was constructed over the Commanding General's trailer.

On 15 August 1969, Company D assumed responsibility for the 1st Engineer Battalion's section of the base perimeter and all other guard commitments, thus reducing engineer effort by the unit to a platoon minus size element. In so doing, it has increased the efficiency of the guard and perimeter defense and permitted a more effective use of men and equipment. All guard is performed as a primary duty on a daily basis.

When D Company assumed responsibility for the perimeter, much improvement of the area was required. Elimination of grass which had grown up between the wire and completely obstructed vision was the first objective. The area was cut, where possible, and other areas soaked with diesel fuel, burned, and then resprayed and burned when the vegetation was dead. Much tactical wire required replacing and nearly all trip flares had to be remounted. The majority of the flares had been improperly mounted on the final wire, leaving the primary and secondary belts unprotected. Five triple concertina belts were added in a major drainage ditch. Twenty five 55 gallon drum fougasse and bunker positions are being improved. All such work has been done by personnel assigned as perimeter guards.

One provisional platoon, varying in strength from 15 to 20 men, has continued effort in the Division Headquarters area. They have prepared the site and moved four house trailers assigned to the General Staff. A four inch trunk sewer line with feeders from each trailer was installed and connected to the previously constructed septic tank. An additional hundred feet of sidewalk was poured in the area. Due to increased weight from heavy monsoon rains in the earth fill over the DTCC, the beams began to fail and required installation of 260 feet of 6\(^2\) H
beams and posts as intermediate supports to prevent failure.

On 27 September 1969, a landing zone mission was assigned to 3rd Platoon which required an air insertion. Initial concept called for a 100m x 200m landing zone. Subsequent changes called for a clearing 800m in diameter. The project required a full platoon for 3 days and one squad for an additional 5 days.

(6) E Company (bridge) provided general support to the 1st Infantry Division. The company continued its bridging operations with one significant bridge built during the quarter. Riverine missions in support of various infantry battalions were also continued, but changes in the type equipment used, the unit supported, and the areas of operation have occurred.

1st Platoon, which constructed the foundation for the destroyed Ben Cat Panel Bridge at XT763328, constructed the replacement bridge on 2 Aug 69. Two days were devoted to assembling, launching, and decking the new triple double bridge, and on 4 Aug 69, the bridge was complete and opened for traffic.

In September and October, the 2nd Platoon became involved in four M476 fixed span operations. All of these fixed spans were placed over critical points in key routes and used for passing convoys into areas of tactical operations. The first fixed span was a 38 foot 4 inch fixed span airlifted from Di An to the vicinity of XT662341 and installed by A Company. The second bridge, a thirty foot M476 fixed span, was hauled from Di An to Lai Khe, airlifted from Lai Khe to the vicinity of XT862409, and installed by E Company. On 19 October, 2nd Platoon moved overland to the vicinity of XT705440 and installed a thirty-eight foot 4 inch fixed span, and on 20 October, installed a forty-five foot fixed span in the same general location.

E Company's assault trackway outfit was used extensively during this quarter. Several rolls of trackway were laid in base camps, fire support bases, and secondary roads. The assault trackway proved to be useful in the rainy season in
that it gives a poor road the support needed to cross military traffic.

In September, the 1st Inf Div took over responsibility for the security of the Phu Cucang Bridge located at X7607135. E Company sent a 5 man team with one bridge erection boat and 1 Boston Whaler to this location. The team's mission was to maintain, and if necessary, repair the mine boom that protected the bridge from water borne mines. These men continued to maintain the mine boom until the end of September when 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne assumed responsibility for the bridge.

In previous quarters, E Company has supported various Infantry Battalions in riverine operations. The boats used on these operations, LTR Half Pontons, have been adequate, but have many shortcomings. In September, E Company received ten new 21 foot Kenner Ski Barges to improve its riverine capability. These new boats are constructed of fiberglass, have dual 40 hp outboard engines for propulsion, and a center control with steering wheel, throttle control, gear control, and electric starter. In September, these boats, along with 10 men, were ordered to move to the Phu Cucang Bridge and begin support of the 2/28th Inf Bn in river operations. The boats remained with the 2/28th Inf Bn and participated in river searches, river sweeps, and night ambushes until the end of September.

E Company was assigned a new river mission in support of the 2/28th Inf Bn in mid-September. Four Ski boats and 10 men departed the Phu Cucang Bridge site and moved up the Saigon River to Dau Tieng. The mission at this location was to patrol the Saigon River fronting the 2/28th Inf area of operation during daylight hours, and at night to set up ambushes along likely river crossing points. On 3 October 69, when the mission supporting the 2/18th Inf Bn was completed at Phu Cucang, the four remaining Ski barges were sent north to work in support of the 2/2nd (Nacht) Inf Bn. These missions have proved to be successful and will probably continue for some time.
h. Intelligence and Counter Intelligence:

(1) Daily Intelligence reports from 1st Inf Div Hqs and Hqs, 3rd Bde are processed by the Bn S-2, and further disseminated to subordinate units within this command. In addition, local base camp commanders provide intelligence data for elements of the battalion at base camps supported from the Battalion Headquarters. These reports, along with intelligence documents from II Field Force and higher headquarters, are utilized for planning local security requirements for engineer operations.

(2) During the period 20 Jul 69 thru 20 Oct 69, the 1st Engineer Battalion Tunnel Rats participated in numerous search and tunnel exploration operations within the 1st Inf Div MAOR. Working with the 984th Land Clearing Company, the Tunnel Rats investigated 15 bunkers and tunnels. The Tunnel Rats then conducted a joint operation with the 1st Engineer Battalion Rome Plows during which they provided timely, on-the-spot bunker and tunnel search capabilities. The Tunnel Rats then teamed with elements of the 2/16th Inf to search and destroy four (4) Viet Cong base camp areas. This was followed by several operations in support of 2/28th Inf which resulted in the exploration of several tunnel and bunker complexes. Finally the Tunnel Rats have recently been in support of 2/2nd Mech.

These operations resulted in the exploration and destruction of several base camp areas, two (2) major tunnel complexes and the investigation of two (2) wells thought to be entrances. In addition, during this quarter, the Tunnel Rats either destroyed or evacuated: 7 lbs of documents, 1 ea 81mm mortar and baseplate, 7 ea 81mm mortar rounds, 19 ea 60mm mortar rounds, 1 ea RPG launcher, 3 ea RPG rounds, 2 ea Chicom grenades, 1 ea M-6 hand grenade, 8 ea sticks of Chicom C-4, 3 ea SKS rifles, 2 ea AK47 rifles, 400 rounds of AK ammunition, 1 ea Chicom claymore mine, 4 ea US claymore mines, 250 lbs of rice, a number of tools, cooking utensils, medical supplies, clothing and webgear.
o. Administration:

1. As of 20 Oct 69, the Battalion Staff was:

   Commanding Officer: LTC Rodney E. Cox
   Executive Officer: MAJ Lawrence E. Mullins
   Assistant Division Engineer: MAJ Dennis J. York
   S-1: CPT John W. Nelson, III
   S-2: CPT Carl Collins
   S-3: MAJ Albert R. Goan
   S-4: CPT James C. Patrick
   CO, HHC: CPT Robert J. Hanus
   CO, A Co: CPT Jackie E. Bippes
   CO, B Co: CPT Robert M. Amrino
   CO, C Co: CPT Barry J. Cantor
   CO, D Co: CPT Anson F. Torpey
   CO, E Co: CPT James H. Glock
   Command Sergeant Major: CSM Herbert E. Naumon

2. The overall Battalion enlisted strength has been above 100% TOE authorized level throughout this period. All excess personnel have been properly utilized.

3. Personnel changes within this period were 275 departees processed out and 207 replacements processed in. There is a continuing shortage of Engineer Squad Leaders, MOS: 12B40; Cooks, 94B20; and Medics, 91B20.

   d. Pacification: Although no projects were undertaken during the quarter as direct pacification projects, daily mine sweeps and upgrade of road nets within the 1st Div 40 has increased civilian commerce and traffic contributing significantly to the pacification effort.

   e. Civic Action: Contributing to the 1st Inf Div intensive civic action effort, the Battalion participated in a number of projects although none were of
a large scale. The Battalion Surgeon has continued to conduct Medcape in Xom Xoai and Lai Khe Villages. Two parties have been given for the children of Xom Xoai during the past three months. Equipment has been dispatched to Lai Khe Village from time to time to improve drainage within the village. Two culverts were emplaced in Lai Khe Village and 150 meters of roadway rebuilt.

Two bridges were constructed by E Co. A fifteen foot fixed span was installed in Di An Village and a twenty foot trestle bridge was constructed in Ben Tri. The timber trestle bridge was E Company's contribution to the civic action program in that it was built to make a road in the village passable for local farm traffic.

In addition, B Company during the last month of the quarter embarked in civic action projects in the Di An District. The most important work involved upgrading road nets, cutting drainage ditches, and hauling rock and laterite to low places on the road. Planned for Oct 69 is the construction of an 18'x60' building to be used as a theater. The building will be located in the market place of Di An Village.

f. Training: During this quarter, training within the Battalion was primarily presented at Company level. Range Firing was conducted twice monthly with all TOE weapons. Familiarization training with CH-47's for aerial insertion of L2 teams was conducted for elements of D and C Companies. Most personnel were inexperienced with the ladder insertion technique. Familiarization training for aerial ladder insertion continues to insure that each line company within the Battalion has experienced personnel for future L2 missions.

In early October, four Combat Engineer Vehicles were obtained. A training and familiarization program was conducted by Hqs Company for all CEV crews. Instruction included operation, maintenance, and firing of the CEV's. Range firing was conducted after instruction.
During the quarter, the Battalion sent 12 personnel to Long Binh to participate in two day classes on generator operation and maintenance. Two allocations for PLL School were obtained and 1st Engineer Battalion personnel attended.

A training team from 1st Engineer Battalion is presently training the 18th ARVN Engineer Battalion at Xuan Loc. The team departed Lai Khe for Xuan Loc on 30 September 1969 and began instruction on 2 October 1969. The team consists of 3 Officers and 3 senior NCO's. Classes are being given in demolitions, rigging, concrete, culvert construction, weapons training with M-16's and boat operations with LTR Half Pontons. Six weeks will be required to present the instruction to all units of the 18th ARVN Engineer Battalion.

Instruction has been well received. The unit has been most cooperative in assisting the instructors with training aids. Attendance has been good. The students appear interested, ask questions, and seem to grasp the more difficult subjects. The only problem stems from the fact that classes take twice the normal time due to the necessary translations.


a. Personnel:

(1) Observation: The effectiveness, productivity, and morale of the Battalion Headquarters, Staff Sections, and the elements of the Headquarters Company, has been greatly increased by assigning guard as a principal duty to two platoons of one line company.

Evaluation: The increase in working efficiency by personnel assigned to this unit, plus the stability of working hours has directly affected the quality and the amount of work accomplished by the respective sections. This is evidenced by the improved maintenance posture of the Battalion.

Recommendation: That the Lai Khe guard commitment continue to be satisfied by the currently used method.
(1) **Observation:** Engineer operations are adversely affected by the lack of aircraft support for command and control and repair parts re-supply.

**Evaluation:** Current aircraft allotment to the 1st Engineer Battalion has been on an inconsistent stand-by basis. 1st Engineer Battalion elements are located at a majority of the fire support bases in the 1st Inf Div TAOR (14 out of 17 at present) and the line companies are at three separate locations. Many of these locations are inaccessible except by air. It requires two full days of aircraft time to visit all the job sites. The desirable situation would be for the Battalion Commander, his staff and the line company commanders to visit the engineer work sites daily. In addition, an aircraft is required to fly Romo Flow repair parts to that section's field location.

**Recommendation:** That the 1st Engineer Battalion be allocated a UH-1D helicopter for a minimum of eight (8) hours station time and four (4) hours blank time on a daily basis.

(2) **Observation:** Backfill over culverts during the rainy season is frequently impossible to stabilize, become deeply rutted and impassable.

**Evaluation:** The soil is saturated, adequate compaction cannot be achieved and the bearing capacity of the soil is easily exceeded.

**Recommendation:** Two methods have been used to solve this problem. ML11 matting laid crosswise to the roadway can be used to distribute the weight enough for the soil to carry the load. The second method is to mix cement in the soil to increase the soil's bearing strength.

(3) **Observation:** When backfilling around double culverts, the culverts get pushed around out of alignment.

**Evaluation:** The backfill even though placed slowly is knocking the culverts out of alignment.
Recommendation: Drive U-shaped pickets along the sides of the culverts at an angle so that pressure is put on the lips of the culvert. Wiring across the culvert from picket to picket will hold the culvert in place.

(4) Observation: The upgrade of QL-13 was not begun until the condition of road approached being impassable.

Evaluation: The use of 5" minus rock to fill the pot holes and washouts in the highway proved most satisfactory. Extensive utilization of road graders to continually shape the road surface was the key to keeping the road passable.

Recommendation: In similar situations, especially during the monsoon season, adequate rock supplies should be of primary concern. Ditching and grading should be accomplished with at least two (2) graders working in an echelon formation. The graders should limit work within a 500 meter strip and move to next successive section upon completion. After upgrade has been accomplished, daily road patrolling is a must to prevent the road condition from deteriorating.

(5) Observation: Upgrade of the more permanent FSB's was delayed until their conditions wore desperate.

Evaluation: Engineer effort after the monsoon season has begun is greatly handicapped by the elements.

Recommendation: The more permanent FSB's should be upgraded (culverts, ditches, and roads) prior to the monsoon season on a programmed basis. Much engineer effort can be saved by constructing drainage structures and interior roads prior to the monsoon and then allocating sufficient engineer resources to maintain them.

(6) Observation: C Company conducted (5) LZ missions during the month of September.

Evaluation: During several of these missions it was necessary for the LZ team to be inserted by means of a ladder from a hovering Chinook. It was also
seen that to efficiently cut 5-ship LZ's it often requires more than one day. The effectiveness of Bangalore torpedoes in brush clearing to expose the larger trees to the chain saws or demolition should be emphasised.

**Recommendation:** All engineer platoons be trained on the assault ladder. A minimum of 12 chain saws required per team because of the high deadline rate. Troops should be given added training on the proper use of chain saws. Two Chinooks are required for initial insertion, one to carry personnel, the second for the LZ kit. Sufficient quantity and variety of demolitions should be available so a resupply can be effected after the loader of the LZ team analyzes the LZ and tailors his demo supply request to fit the situation. A Chinook should be available to fly the demo resupply 2 hours after the request is received. Close coordination is essential between the security and the LZ team for maximum efficiency and safety. A chain saw mechanic is a must.

(7) **Observation:** Mines are generally located on the same section of road time after time.

**Evaluation:** Most mines are not being located with mine detectors. Even when found visually detectors frequently fail to show a reading when checked over the mine. Most mines are found visually.

**Recommendation:** Since most mines are found visually, the same personnel should be used on the same road section each day to increase familiarity with the area and enhance the detection of any change. In addition, the sweep should remove from the road all foreign matter. Old pieces of board, bamboo, straw, etc., are used both as mine markers and to conceal slaptick detonators.

(8) **Observation:** It is necessary to clear vegetation from perimeter wire for maximum security.

**Evaluation:** During the rainy season, growth of grass and bushes between and in concertina and tanglefoot is rapid. Open areas between belts can be
backbladed with a dozer and areas in tanglefoot can be cut. Growth inside concertina must be burned or the wire removed prior to cutting.

Recommendation: Backblading with a bull dozer is relatively quick and effective for a month. Cutting is good for about two months as a rule. Removal of concertina is wasteful and time consuming in relation to the performance of the grass cutting operation. An effective expedient measure is the application of diesel fuel with hand pump water type fire extinguishers, soaking the area thoroughly and then setting it afame. Whatever vegetation remains is killed and in a few days and the operation is repeated removing the portion initially unburned. This is also the most effective method of retarding new growth. A more lasting solution is the application of a high potency, long residual vegetation killer followed by a burning of the dead grass and brush.

(9) Observation: Chain type minebooms are not durable.

Evaluation: The mine boom at the Phu Cuong Bridge is composed of many timbers held together by individual lengths of steel cable. When one timber or cable link breaks the complete boom is useless. If a cable is extended across the complete river gap and each timber joined to it independently, the failure of one timber would not cause a complete boom failure. The individual timber can be repaired easily.

Recommendation: Continuous cables should be used to support all mine booms.

(10) Observation: When mine booms have chain link fences attached to them the river debris which collects on it causes additional stress which often causes the timbers to break away from their cable connectors.

Evaluation: The mine boom at Phu Cuong is connected with chain link fences attached to the mine boom for the purpose of stopping submerged mines from
floating under the boom. These chain link fences function well, but they tend to stop all trash floating down stream. If this debris is allowed to collect on the chain link fence, the force of the water pushing on it eventually breaks the boom.

**Recommendation:** Mine boom personnel should check mine booms with chain link fence attached and clean it as debris collects.

(11) **Observation:** Ski boat loading should be kept to a minimum.

**Evaluation:** Ski boats are constructed with a very shallow side board and bow section. The more personnel and equipment loaded into these boats, the lower they sit in the water, making it easier for water to come over the side boards. With a large percentage of the weight in the front, the bow tends to plow into waves and take on water instead of riding over the waves.

**Recommendation:** Not more than 9 men, preferably 8, and their equipment should be put in these boats at any one time. All personnel and equipment should stay as far to the rear as possible.

(12) **Observation:** The operation of Ski boats are designed to carry a 2000 pound load at high speeds. Without speed, maneuverability is poor and control is difficult. During river patrol missions, it is necessary to carry heavy loads at relatively slow speeds. As a result, the boats are difficult to handle and this difficulty is amplified in rough water. During a 180 degree turn where a boat runs back on its own wake, an inexperienced operator can easily cause the loss of a boat. Difficulty has also been encountered when meeting or being passed by other boats. The wakes from these boats in a narrow river is enough to swamp a slow moving heavily loaded ski boat.

**Recommendation:** All operators should receive thorough training in Ski boats and their operation before they operate in a hostile environment.

(13) **Observation:** To operate Ski boats successfully, precise formations and operational patterns must be established and followed.
Evaluation: Boats operate in groups of four at distances where voice control is often impossible; therefore, control of these boats is by radio and hand signals. The boats have various patterns for patrolling the river and searching the banks. There were also maneuver patterns set up for enemy contact and emergency situations. Infantrymen are assigned fields of fire and observation, and are instructed on actions to perform in hazardous situations. It is the boat operators' responsibility to brief all personnel on their duties and actions in emergency situations.

Recommendation: All boats should have written SOP's dealing with their operations and maneuvers posted in them. All personnel should be briefed on this information prior to the start of a mission.

(14) Observation: During this reporting period, the Tunnel Rats have been called out on a number of false alarms or bogus missions when, in actuality, there was no need for them.

Evaluation: These "false alarms" are most likely the result of commanders anticipating a need for the Tunnel Rats prior to locating a tunnel. Several futile missions have resulted from the ground commanders inability to distinguish authentic tunnel entrances from natural terrain features, faults, or miscellaneous holes in the ground.

Recommendation: It is recommended that in the future supported units make positive identification and location of tunnels prior to requesting the Tunnel Rats.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Observation: Lack of aircraft support has prohibited the S-2 from making a VR of the Division's MSR's daily in the early morning hours.

Evaluation: It is necessary that timely information be gathered daily on the condition of MSR's as they are vital to the Division's operations.
Frequently reports of interdiction or washouts, usually through one of the mine sweep parties, are not received until late in the morning resulting in a loss of time that could be used in the preparation of equipment and materials to repair the interdiction. Convoys have backed up at interdiction points because convoy commanders did not know that they existed.

Recommendation: It is recommended that an aircraft be made available for ½ hours for a daily first light reconnaissance of all the MSR's within the Division AO.

e. Logistics:

(1) Observation: Repair parts for the P-153 mine detector, notably the short handles and the receiver-transmitters wiring harness, are in short supply. There are generally 10 to 20 detectors deadlined and waiting those parts at any given time.

Evaluation: These items be made available in order to keep enough detectors in operation to enable the Battalion to fulfill its mine sweep commitments.

Recommendation: All measures be taken to include "Red Ball" and MER requests to obtain these parts.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Johan W. Nelson, III
CPT, MFC
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 121st Signal Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

(C) SECTION 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. The 121st Signal Battalion continued to support the 1st Infantry Division in Operation Toan Thang, Phase III, 17 February 1969 to present.

b. The Forward Area Signal Center Platoons continued to support brigade forward and base camp command posts.

c. Component Unit Dispositions and Commanding Officers:

- 121st Signal Battalion
  - HHD
  - Company A
  - Company B
  - 1st Platoon
  - 2d Platoon
  - 3d Platoon
  - Company C

- LTC John C. Lain, Lai Khe
- CPT Winfield T. Perry, Lai Khe
- CPT Robert W. Male, Lai Khe
- CPT Stephen A. Oliva, Phu Loc
- SFC James M. Cobb, Dau Tieng
- 1LT John Ball, Di An
- 1LT Lloyd D. Mahlum, Lai Khe
- CPT Donald L. Thiroyseu, Di An

d. The following multi-channel communication systems were established or discontinued during the reporting period:

1) 12 Aug - System 63A83V established between 3rd Brigade Headquarters in Lai Khe and the forward command post at Chen Thanh.

2) 19 Aug - System 63A73V discontinued between Lai Khe and Ben Cat.

3) 19 Aug - System 61A73V established between 1st Brigade Headquarters in Dau Tieng and the forward command post at Ben Cat.

4) 25 Aug - System 63A83V discontinued.

5) 13 Sep - System 62A72V established between 2d Brigade Headquarters at Di An and the forward command post at Phu Hoa Dong.

Incl 11 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

6) 23 Sep - System 62A72V discontinued to Phu Ho Long and re-established from Di An to Fire Support Base formerly III.

7) 23 Sep - System 61A73V discontinued.

8) 23 Sep - System 63A73V established between 3rd Brigade Headquarters at Lai Khe and the forward command post at Ben Cat.

9) 13 Oct - System 61A71V established from 1st Brigade Headquarters at Dan Tien to the forward command post at Fire Support Base Tennessee.

SECTION 2: Lessons Learned, Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

a. Personal:

1) Observations: The manning of MARS stations with qualified operators from the Signal Battalion draws from limited resources of soldiers trained in critical communications MOS's.

2) Evaluation: Usually, individuals within the Signal Battalion who possess the necessary skills, education, and motivation to learn MARS operations have already been trained for critical communications jobs. Since their MOS training can not be effectively duplicated by unit on the job training, their assignment as MARS operators leaves unfilled vacancies in their unit. On the other hand, there are occasionally individuals possessing non-critical MOS's within the Division who are experienced amateur radio operators and are anxious to become MARS operators. Some will even extend their overseas tours in order to obtain the job.

3) Recommendations: To locate qualified operators for MARS status, advertise throughout the Division to locate interested individuals who have experience as amateur radio operators.

b. Operational:

1) Observations: Long transmissions on the radio set RT-524 using communications security equipment T/SEC NY-8 often result in a loss of the latter portion of the message - rushing noise only is heard by the receiving station.

2) Evaluation: On long transmissions, the security equipment at the transmitting and receiving station do not remain in synchronisation. Therefore, the latter portion of the transmission is not received.

3) Recommendation: When making long transmissions using the RT-524 with a KY-3, key the transmitter approximately every minute to re-synchronize the security equipment.

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c. Training: None

d. Intelligence: None

e.Logistics: None

f. Organization: None

g. Other: None

JOHN C. LAIN
LTC, SC
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1st Military Police Company
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Military Police Company for the Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR (R1)

Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T (M41)
APO SF 96345

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities:

a. General: During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the 1st Military Police Company continued in its mission of providing general military police support for the 1st Infantry Division and all tenant units. The 1st Military Police Company operates from basecamps located in Di An, Lai Khe, and Dau Tieng. During the reporting period, increased emphasis was placed on resources control operations and on upgrading PW Collecting Points. Resources control operations were considerably strengthened by the assignment of ten XM 706, Armored Cars, more commonly known as V-100, Armored Cars, and the allocation of air support which provided the resource control team certain air-mobile capabilities. The addition of the Armored Cars has provided improved security for military police personnel and increased the Company's capability in the performance of convoy escort and security missions.

b. Administration: As of 31 October 1969, the administrative structure of the 1st Military Police Company is as follows: LTC Charles F. Gallagher, Provost Marshal; MAJ John R. Jolley, Assistant Provost Marshal; CPT James N. Lietzau, Acting Company Commander; I/LT Frederick A. Gertz, Escort Guard Officer; and I/Sgt Sterling J. Carroll, First Sergeant.
The Platoon Leaders are:

1st Platoon: ILT Daniel L. Jackson
2nd Platoon: CPT Edward B. Elmore
3rd Platoon: CPT James F. Keefe Jr.
4th Platoon: SFC Richard F. Lewis
Security Platoon: ILT Frederick A. Gertz

C. Operations: The 1st Military Police Company is deployed in direct support of Division Headquarters, each Brigade, and Division Support Command. The 1st Military Police Platoon, located in Dau Tieng, supports both base camp and tactical operations within the 1st Brigade's area of operation. The 2nd and 4th MP Platoons operate within the confines of Di An basecamp and in support of the 2nd Brigade in its area of operation. The 3rd Military Police Platoon provides military police support for the 3rd Brigade and Lai Khe basecamp. The 5th Military Police Platoon, the Security Platoon, provides security for Division Headquarters and the Tactical Operations Center located in Lai Khe basecamp. In the area of resource control operations, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Military Police Platoons checked over 250,000 individuals and in excess of 60,000 vehicles moving within the 1st Infantry Division TAOR. These operations resulted in the detention of 30 individuals, the confiscation of contraband on at least 50 occasions, and the return of a Vietnamese National who rallied to support the GVN. In one instance, a resource control team confiscated a 40 pound bag of marihuana that was undoubtedly destined for sale to U.S. Forces personnel. With the rice harvest scheduled between November and early January, it is anticipated that military police personnel will participate in a program to deny diversion of the crop to the enemy.

D. Personnel: On 1 August 1969, the 1st Military Police Company had 7 commissioned officers, 2 warrant officers, and 202 enlisted personnel. On 31 October 1969 the company had 7 commissioned officers, 2 warrant officers, and 222 enlisted personnel. However, there has been a slight turnover of personnel, with 67 gains and 43 losses, resulting in a net gain of 24 personnel. Officer personnel losses: LTC Christopher R. Haydon, ILT Jeremiah E. Dorsey, ILT Timothy D. O'Toole, ILT Joseph G. Monroe, and ILT Mark A. Gray. Officer personnel gains: LTC Charles P. Gallagher, CPT James N. Lieteau, CPT James F. Keefe, and ILT Frederick A. Gertz. There were 0 KIA and 1 WIA during the reporting period. The Company was supported by 7 ARVN Military Policemen and 6 National Policemen. There were 40 out of country R&R's and 4 in country R&R's granted during the reporting period.
AVDB-MP-D

1 November 1969


e. Awards and Decorations: During the reporting period 10 Bronze Star Medals, three for Valor, 56 Army Commendation Medals, 3 Air Medals, and 1 Purple Heart were awarded to members of this unit.

f. Logistics: The issue of 10 XM 706, Armored Cars to the 1st Military Police Company has directly affected both operational and logistical requirements. While the Armored Car has upgraded the Company's capability for providing security for tactical movements and personal defense, it also has imposed new burdens in terms of logistical support. The vehicle is still characterized as an experimental model and resultedly was phased into the system without an adequate PLL in certain instances, without the applicable Technical Manuals, and in two cases, missing starters, which are critical items and not readily available in Vietnam. Continuation of a temporary loan on mission essential items has assisted the logistical operation. Equipment such as M151A1C's, gun-jeeps, were augmented into the TO&E. Also, night sighting devices were allocated to the Company on a loan basis. Utilization of all equipment has remained heavy. Self-help engineer projects have increased. During this period, five new bunkers have been constructed; four inadequate bunkers have been removed; a vehicle washing facility has been constructed; and logistical administrative procedures have been revised to improve property accountability and serviceability factors for all equipment.

2. (O) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

Observation: Promotions among the lower enlisted personnel has improved considerably, but are still limited.

Evaluation: The required overstrength of personnel in grades E-3 and E-4 precludes continual position vacancies ("cumulative vacancies") required for promotion allocations.

Recommendation: That personnel required as overstrength to perform unit mission not be considered when determining cumulative vacancies.

b. Operations: None

c. Training:

Observation: Upon issuance of the XM 706, Armored Car, training
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Military Police Company for the Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR (R1)

requirements have increased considerably.

Evaluation: When the Armored Cars were initially issued to the 1st Military Police Company, personnel, then in the Company, and also personnel subsequently joining the Company, were not adequately trained in the operation, and maintenance of the vehicle. Furthermore, the main armament, twin mounted M-73 machineguns, were novel weapons to military policemen. Lack of knowledge concerning the functional capabilities of both the weapons system and the vehicle, itself, has resulted in clutch burnout, transmission damage, uninitiated discharge of the weapons due to solenoid arc, solenoid burnout due to oil on the electrical connectors, control box malfunction due to a faulty electrical harness built into the vehicle itself, and finally, culmination of the problem in an inability to resolve these problems by maintenance personnel due to lack of repair parts, knowledge, and applicable Technical Manuals.

Recommendation: That an adequate training program be established on Army level for both operation and maintenance instruction for all users of this vehicle and any other type equipment similarly placed into the logistic bank.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics:

Observation: The XM-706, Armored Car, was issued with a very limited PLL/ASL.

Evaluation: At present, repair parts for the V-100, Armored Car, are limited to a minimal PLL and parts that are related to other vehicles presently used in Vietnam. The usefulness of the vehicle is highly depreciated in view of the inadequacy of the repair parts system.

Recommendation: Certain prerequisites should be established to include an adequate repair parts system prior to acceptance of any equipment innovation. Among other requirements, there should also be both trained user personnel and trained repair specialists available before acceptance of new type equipment.

f. Organization:

Observation: The 178 enlisted personnel authorized by MTOL 19-27G is not sufficient to provide effective police service when the Division operates from more than one base camp.
AVDB-MP-D


Evaluation: The company is currently 48 men overstrength, a level that has been maintained or exceeded since its arrival in SVN in order to meet operational commitments.

Recommendation: Future TO&E actions should include an optional provision for one additional Military Police Platoon when the Division Military Police Company is required to operate in widely dispersed base-camps for extended periods of time. Additionally, provision should be included for a proportionate increase in personnel necessary for logistical and administrative support.

James P. Latapie
CPT, MFC
Acting Commander
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Utilization of Light Horse

1. PURPOSE: This circular prescribes procedures to insure proper utilization of Light Horse.

2. ORGANIZATION:
   a. Light Horse will be organized as follows:
      (1) One C4C ship/Blood Hound (serves dual capacity).
      (2) Two hunter-killer teams.
      (3) Three lift ships.
   b. There will be no organic infantry elements in Light Horse.

3. GENERAL:
   a. Light Horse will be employed under the OPCON of a brigade for a specified number of hours.
   b. Commanders of brigades will forward proposals for the use of Light Horse daily to reach this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-70, NLT 1400 on the day prior to use. These proposals will be briefed to the Commanding General who will allocate Light Horse for the following day.
   c. Light Horse will be employed much as Dark Horse is employed. It is capable of performing a variety of missions and exploiting any situation which may develop. It is best suited to conduct reconnaissance of a specific area and to identify targets.
   d. Light Horse will not be used to cover the movement of ground forces into an area, to accomplish logistical tasks, or for administrative missions.
   e. Light Horse will not be used to conduct Eagle Flights. Non-divisional helicopters will be used for this purpose.
   f. Commanders of brigades having OPCON of Light Horse will establish a rifle company as a ready reaction force (RRF). One platoon will be on 15 minute alert; the remainder of the company will be on 30 minute alert.
4. COMMITMENT OF THE RRF: When Light Horse hunter-killer teams or Blood Hound locate a target for ground engagement, the brigade commander or his designated representative may decide to insert the RRF platoon. Command and control will be exercised by a tactical commander designated by the brigade commander.

(AVDB-TD)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

A.G. HUME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

C
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Utilization of Night Hawk Aircraft

1. PURPOSE: This circular prescribes procedures to insure the proper utilization of Night Hawk aircraft.

2. ORGANIZATION:
   a. The Night Hawk force consists of the following assets:
      (1) Three UH-1H aircraft; each equipped with two mini-guns, two searchlights, and two starlight scopes.
      (2) One UH-1H control/chase aircraft.
      (3) Two AH-1G/UH-1C chase aircraft.
   b. Control of all Night Hawk assets will be the responsibility of the Night Hawk force commander (Vulture 6) who will be present in the control aircraft.

3. GENERAL:
   a. Night Hawk teams are designed and missioned to search out and destroy enemy forces in the Division TAOR during the hours of darkness. Normally each Night Hawk team (one Night Hawk ship and one chase ship) will be employed in a battalion AO for a specified number of hours. Night Hawk missions will be forwarded by the DIVCEN to the 1st Aviation Battalion operations center.
   b. Commanders of brigades will forward proposals, including time and justification for use of Night Hawk, to reach this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-TO, NLT 1200 the day of use. Recommended missions will be briefed to the Commanding General for approval. Requests for diversion of preplanned Night Hawk missions will be submitted to the ACofS, G3. Night Hawk will not be used for any mission not approved by the Commanding General.
   c. Information provided by surveillance devices, such as radars and sensors will be used to target Night Hawk in areas of known night movement.
   d. In the event weather conditions exist that preclude the use of the TVS 4 (starlight scope), or that significantly increase the hazard of low altitude night flying, the Night Hawk team leader will so inform the control ship. The
Night Hawk force commander will verify the weather conditions and notify DTOC for possible employment in another area.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. The ACofS, G3 will:
   (1) Consolidate mission requests from the brigades.
   (2) Present recommendations to the Commanding General for approval.
   (3) Notify the brigades of approved missions in the brigade's area of operations.

   b. Commanders of brigades will:
      (1) Notify the using unit of approved missions.
      (2) Insure that coordination has been effected to allow the Night Hawk team to be employed immediately after receiving their in-flight or ground briefing.
      (3) Insure recovery of aircraft downed in their area of responsibility.

   d. The battalion commander, with whom the Night Hawk team is working, will keep the DTOC informed of Night Hawk activities through the brigade commander.

e. Each Night Hawk team leader is responsible to report, by radio, to the ACofS, G3 en route to each mission and on completion of each mission. Additionally, he will report all intelligence information to the battalion operations center which controls the AO in which his team is operating.

(AVDB-TU)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

C.T. SELBY
LTC, AG
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A.G. HUME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

/23
1st Inf Div Cir 525-9

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

CIRCULAR
NUMBER 525-9

29 October 1969

(Expires 1 October 1970)

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Flame Fougasse

1. PURPOSE: This circular provides detailed instructions for the preparation and use of the flame fougasse.

2. APPLICABILITY: This circular applies to units having perimeter defense responsibilities.

3. GENERAL: The fougasse is a flame field expedient used to cover relatively large areas with flame. It is used to produce casualties among enemy personnel and/or to provide temporary illumination of the battle area. The fougasse is semidirectional and will project flame generally along the long axis of the drum in the direction that the exposed end faces.

4. CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT: a. Fougasses may be employed at the commander's discretion to cover likely avenues of approach, such as gullies, ravines, and river beds which are masked from the fires of organic weapons. Fougasses must be integrated into the detailed defense plan. Fougasses, employed for the above purposes, should be placed as indicated in Appendix A.

   b. Fougasses may be employed as part of the commander's final protective fires against massed attacking forces. To obtain the best perimeter coverage, they should be placed with the drums aligned at a 45° angle to the perimeter, from 2 to 3 meters forward of the inner line of concertina wire (see Appendix B). Fougasses, constructed of 55 gallon drums, should be placed approximately 40-50 meters apart across the area of concern. If all the drums are detonated simultaneously, this will create a solid wall of flame.

5. CONSTRUCTION: a. Prepare a hole for a 55 gallon drum inclined 30° from the horizontal oriented in the desired direction of fire. The top of the drum should protrude above the ground as shown in Appendix C.

   b. Place three blocks of TNT or three blocks of C-4 at the bottom center of the hole. The electrical blasting cap will be seated in the explosive with the wires leading to the rear of the position. A WP grenade will be placed on top of the TNT or C-4, and secured with three wraps of detonating cord. A 15 pound shaped charge or two claymores may be used with equal effectiveness. Do not wrap the claymores or shaped charges with detonating cord. Cap the detonating cord separately if claymores or shaped charges are used.
c. Fill the 55 gallon drum with 40 gallons of six per cent thickened fuel mixture. The thickened fuel is prepared by adding seven and one-half pounds of Ni or 15 pounds of Ni thickener to 40 gallons of Mogas. After the drum is filled, the bungs should be replaced to keep out moisture and debris.

d. After the drum and propelling charge have been set, the drum should be tamped with three feet of earth or at least three layers of sandbags. Tamping is essential to provide directional control of the explosive and to reduce dangerous back blast.

e. The claymore firing device is an ideal electrical source for firing the fougasse with less than 100 feet of lead wire. A stronger electrical source is required if the lead wire is longer than 100 feet or if there is more than one blasting cap.

6. MAINTENANCE: After placement, the fougasse should remain stable for 60–90 days. After this period, the fougasse should be detonated as intended and replaced.

7. SAFETY: a. All fougasses are command detonated using electrical firing devices. Firing leads should remain shunted to prevent static electricity, lightning or high frequency radio waves from prematurely detonating the fougasse. Electrical sources should never be connected when working around the fougasse.

   b. Adequate safety considerations must be given to the hazards imposed by the explosive charge used to detonate the fougasse. When fougasses are in close proximity to friendly personnel, additional tamping is recommended. As a rule, fougasses should not be positioned closer than 50 feet from the fighting positions.


   b. FM 7-11, Rifle Company, Infantry, Airborne and Mechanized.

   c. FM 20–33, Combat Flame Operations.

(AVDB-CM)
FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

A. C. HUME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

C.T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

3 Appendices
A - Fougasse on Avenue of Approach
B - Fougasse as Final Protective Fires
C - Replaced Fougasse

DISTRIBUTION:
A plus
25- AVDB- CM
Friendly Position

Command bunker

Erecting Cap

300

Wounding Grenade Position

Detonating Cord

3 Pounds C-4 or
3 Pounds T.N.T.
wrapped with
detonating cord

NOT TO SCALE

Appendix C to Incl 13
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CG, 1st Infantry Division

1 December 1969

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310