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AUTHORITY
30 Apr 1970 DoDD 5200.10; AGO, d/a ltr 29 Apr 1980

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AGDA (H) (26 Mar 70) T-UT-70T285 15 April 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, American Division (4) Ending 31 January 1970 (8)

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Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, HGS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

I. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Command.

1. (C) Background. The Americal Division continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAO) during the reporting period. Enemy contacts varied from light and sporadic during the months of November and December to moderate during the month of January. Rice denial and pacification operations were successfully continued. Moderate to heavy rains during the months of November and December curtailed operations by limiting air, ground, and foot mobility.

2. (U) Command Changes.

a. General Officers. No change.

b. Brigade Commanders.

(1) Colonel J. M. Lee assumed command of the 196th Inf Bde on 10 Nov 69 from Colonel T. H. Tackaberry.

(2) Colonel J. G. Clemons, Jr., assumed command of the 198th Inf Bde on 20 Nov 69 from Colonel J. O. Whittington.

c. Colonels.

(1) Colonel T. H. Tackaberry became the Chief of Staff on replacing Colonel J. G. Clemons, Jr.

d. Battalion Commanders.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) 1st Bn, 20th Inf. LTC A. F. Fischer assumed command from LTC R. R. Wilson on 2 Dec 69.

(2) 4th Bn, 3d Inf. LTC S. V. Wielga assumed command from LTC R. M. Fernandes on 3 Jan 70.

(3) 2d Bn, 1st Inf. LTC F. A. Nerone assumed command from LTC C. P. Campbell on 24 Nov 69.

(4) 4th Bn, 31st Inf. LTC E. E. Sker assumed command from LTC C. M. Henry on 27 Dec 69.

(5) 1st Bn, 46th Inf. LTC F. J. R. Foss assumed command from LTC C. G. Coverdale on 8 Nov 69.

(6) 1st Bn, 6th Inf. LTC H. N. Schwarzkopf assumed command from LTC T. J. Ambrose on 8 Dec 69.

(7) 5th Bn, 46th Inf. LTC M. C. Snyder, Jr., assumed command from LTC J. F. Wagner on 13 Nov 69.

(8) 1st Bn, 14th Arty. LTC B. Pogoloff assumed command from LTC C. J. Phifer on 15 Jan 70.

(9) 3d Bn, 16th Arty. LTC G. A. Dubose assumed command from LTC A. R. Foster on 14 Dec 69.

(10) 1st Bn, 82d Arty. LTC E. J. Garcia assumed command from LTC J. M. Compton on 15 Dec 69.

(11) 3d Bn, 82d Arty. LTC O. L. Faulkner assumed command from LTC H. E. Knight on 23 Nov 69.

(12) 23d S & T Bn. LTC F. E. Wall assumed command from LTC R. N. Raunswinder on 10 Nov 69.

(13) 1st Sqd, 1st Cav. LTC R. G. Graves assumed command from LTC J. H. Dure on 27 Nov 69.

(14) 14th Avn Bn. LTC K. L. Katsler assumed command from LTC J. L. Teague on 30 Dec 69.

(15) 123d Avn Bn. LTC J. P. Brosnan assumed command from LTC R. K. Dietsch on 9 Jan 70.

(16) Americal Combat Center. LTC J. H. Dure assumed command from LTC M. C. Snyder, Jr., on 12 Nov 69.

3. (U) Staff Changes.
AVDF-31L

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

a. LTC R. N. Fernandez became AGofS, 01, on 3 Jan 70 replacing LTC S. V. Wielga.

b. LTC H. E. Knidle became AGofS, 02, on 25 Nov 69 replacing LTC F. A. Herone.

c. LTC E. L. Kennedy became AGofS, 03, on 18 Nov 69 replacing LTC J. C. Davis.

d. LTC R. Black became IG on 3 Jan 70 replacing LTC A. F. Fischer.

e. LTC D. E. Boyle became Div Avn Off on 6 Jan 70 replacing LTC J. F. Broeann.

4. (U) The following distinguished persons visited the Americal Division during the reporting period:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
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<tr>
<td>MR. OLSON</td>
<td>Tech Rep for Sandia Labs</td>
<td>1-2-3 Nov</td>
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<td>MR. GALLO</td>
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<td>COL SHIVLEY</td>
<td>XO, USARV Surgeon</td>
<td>2 Nov</td>
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<td>BO JOHNSON</td>
<td>ADC, 1st MAW</td>
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<td>BO SPANJER</td>
<td>ADC, 1st MAW</td>
<td>3 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>BO TGAN</td>
<td>CG, 2d ARVH Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>BO ROBERTSON</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL WILKINSON</td>
<td>CO, 1st MAR Regt</td>
<td>4 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL WALDROP</td>
<td>AGofS, 03, 1st MAR Div</td>
<td>4 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC LEBER</td>
<td>III MAF Action Off</td>
<td>4 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>MD MILBURN</td>
<td>USARPA Surgeon</td>
<td>5-6 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL PLEMMONS</td>
<td>XO, USARPA Surg Office</td>
<td>5-6 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL SHIVLEY</td>
<td>XO, USARPA Surgeon</td>
<td>5-6 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. HARDIN</td>
<td>Asst for SGM to ASA (R&amp;D)</td>
<td>6 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC GALLOWAY</td>
<td>Asst Stand Systems Manger Offic of CofSA</td>
<td>6 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL PRETT</td>
<td>CO, 67th Med Op</td>
<td>6 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG BWMAN</td>
<td>Dep Cmdr, III MAF</td>
<td>6 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL SILVER</td>
<td>Dep Cmrd for LOG, AVSCOM</td>
<td>10-11 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR LUHMIG</td>
<td>Dir Dist Directorate, AVSCOM</td>
<td>10-11 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>MR HOLLMAN</td>
<td>Ch, Power Plans Div, SNS Engr Directorate, USAF</td>
<td>10-11 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC BRYANT</td>
<td>Dep Dir, TDAS, AVSCOM</td>
<td>10-11 Nov</td>
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<td>LTC TATE</td>
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<td>LTC IA NCE</td>
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<td>MAJ OTTO</td>
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<td>MAJ TIRAR</td>
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<td>BG ALBRIGHT</td>
<td>Dep QM, 1st Sig Bde</td>
<td>10-11 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG MORRIS</td>
<td>CG, 18th Engr Bde</td>
<td>11 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIR ROBERT THOMPSON</td>
<td>Rand Corp</td>
<td>11 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>MR PALMER</td>
<td>Rand Corp</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL TREACY</td>
<td>Ch, OPO, Asg-nurse</td>
<td>11 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL HENLEY</td>
<td>Ch Nurse in MVN</td>
<td>11 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB TARBUX</td>
<td>CG, USAACOM</td>
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<td>LTC MILDREN</td>
<td>DCO, USAV</td>
<td>13 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL EATON</td>
<td>Dep Cmrd, 11th Spec Ops Wing</td>
<td>15-16 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTJ JOHNSON</td>
<td>11th Spec Ops Wing</td>
<td>15-16 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG RICHESON</td>
<td>DCO, 1st Log Comd</td>
<td>18 Nov</td>
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## AVDF-RL

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

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<tr>
<td>COL COWAN</td>
<td>USARV Dental Surgeon</td>
<td>19-20 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL LANCASGTER</td>
<td>CO, 923d Med Det</td>
<td>19-20 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG ROWNEY</td>
<td>Dep Ch HAD (Designate) OCRD</td>
<td>21 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL WAHLE</td>
<td>Dr, Cbt Mat Div, Dev Dir, OCRD, DA</td>
<td>21 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG MURPHY</td>
<td>USAR PAC 03 Dev</td>
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<td>MG BURDETT</td>
<td>USARV Avn Off</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL SMITH</td>
<td>CO, Dug Sup Comd</td>
<td>23-24-25 Nov</td>
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<td>COL TADICH</td>
<td>ACOFTS, 02, USARV</td>
<td>28 Nov</td>
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<td>LTC LITTLE</td>
<td>CO, 313th RR Bn</td>
<td>1 Dec</td>
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<td>COL PAGGEMSTER</td>
<td>SFP 03, III MAF</td>
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<td>LTC STOOTER &amp; PARTY</td>
<td>LMO Team, 25th Engr Div</td>
<td>5-6 Dec</td>
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<td>LTC SWEET</td>
<td>CO, 504th MP Bn</td>
<td>8 Dec</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN O’DONEL (Ret)</td>
<td>Pres. of USO Inc.</td>
<td>9 Dec</td>
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<td>MR. ANDERSON</td>
<td>USO Exec, RVN</td>
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<td>LTC WILLIAMS</td>
<td>CO, 1st Bn, 525th MI Op</td>
<td>10-11 Dec</td>
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<td>LTC CLARKE</td>
<td>Chief of Engrs</td>
<td>10 Dec</td>
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<td>BG DILLARD</td>
<td>CG, USARV Engr Troops</td>
<td>10 Dec</td>
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<td>COL INSKEFF</td>
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<td>10-11 Dec</td>
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<td>MG SIMPSON</td>
<td>CG, 1st MAR DIV</td>
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<td>LTC SHACKLETON</td>
<td>CO, SF Trps in I Corps</td>
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<td>COL REYNOLDS</td>
<td>DCO, Qui Nhon, Sup Comd</td>
<td>13 Dec</td>
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<td>MD WHEELER</td>
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<td>COL OGDON</td>
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<td>COL (P) OLENCROOK</td>
<td>Cdr, USA Ammunition Proc Supply Agency</td>
<td>17 Dec</td>
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<td>COL DZIALO</td>
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<td>COL VAN AUKEN</td>
<td>USARV Arm Off</td>
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<td>BG DOOLEY</td>
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<td>BG YATES</td>
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<td>COL LOGAN</td>
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<td>COL TAY</td>
<td>Co, 45th Engr Gp</td>
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<td>DR. HOFFMAN</td>
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<td>LTC WEEDMOTH</td>
<td>USARV ACTIV</td>
<td>22 Dec</td>
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<td>TERENCE CARDINAL COOK</td>
<td>Mil Vicar of the Mil Ordinariate</td>
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<td>BG THOMAS</td>
<td>Co, 4th Med Bn</td>
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<td>LTC MUHLHERR</td>
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<td>ADM KELLY</td>
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<td>REP MONTGOMERY'Y</td>
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<td>Bob Hope</td>
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<td>Co, XXIV Corps</td>
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<td>LTO PEERS &amp; BARTY</td>
<td>Investigating Team</td>
<td>30-5 Jan</td>
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<td>5 Jan</td>
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<td>LTG YARBOROUGH</td>
<td>Dep, CG, USARPAC</td>
<td>6-7 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG HALPER</td>
<td>Dep CofS, III MAF</td>
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<td>REP MARSH</td>
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<td>MACV Chemical Officer</td>
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<td>BG SINGLAUB</td>
<td>Dep Cdr, Proj Master</td>
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<td>COL RACOULS</td>
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<td>COL PATCH</td>
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<td>BO DOMMER</td>
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<td>REP CORNAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ ZIEGARS</td>
<td>Asst W. Ger. Attach to KVN</td>
<td>26-27 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC WINTERSTEIN</td>
<td>Phoenix Coordinator III MAC</td>
<td>26 Jan</td>
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<td>LTC HUSE</td>
<td>MACV/J2 Rep</td>
<td>27 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG HAIN</td>
<td>Mil Advisor to N.S.C.</td>
<td>28-29 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL VAN ATTIE</td>
<td>Dep USARV IG</td>
<td>28 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL ALBER</td>
<td>Ch Inep Div, USARV IG</td>
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<tr>
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<td>28 Jan</td>
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<td>AMB COLEY</td>
<td>Dep COMUSMACV For Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG THRASH</td>
<td>CG, 1st Mar Air Wing</td>
<td>30 Jan</td>
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<td>BG MULLER</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RG5 CEFFB (U)

10 February 1970
B. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) Surgeon.

a. Animal bites are a growing problem in the American Division. Below are the statistics for the last three months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th># OF BITES</th>
<th># OF MEN TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. In November emphasis was placed on the problem of animal bites, it was learned that a considerable number of unvaccinated and unauthorized animals were present in unit areas. It was also learned that rabies prevention procedures were not uniform and all bites were not being reported properly. Therefore, in December more than twice as many bites were reported and all received appropriate antirabies prophylaxis.

c. This indicates that the problem of animal bites is much greater than was suspected before. Commanders have been advised of the problem so that unauthorized animals can be eliminated and animal bites reported to unit surgeons for proper treatment.

2. (U) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. The MEDEVAC Section is responsible for forwarding personnel records, financial records, and health and dental records, and insuring personal property of individuals medically evacuated is forwarded to the gaining tries of country medical facility within 72 hours of receipt of hospital transfer orders from Headquarters, USARV.

b. MEDEVAC orders are received in message form (1 copy) containing several names on each order. Message orders are received once daily and are sequentially numbered. Immediately upon receipt, the message is reproduced, and sufficient copies furnished each unit for purpose of disposition of personal property which is either mailed (registered) or shipped as baggage.

c. Personnel records and financial data records are collected by personnel of MEDEVAC Section from personnel records branch and finance office. Notification (with suspense date) is then sent to the unit indicating that health and dental records be forwarded to this headquarters for disposition.

3. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

Best Available Copy
a. During the period, Military Justice/Military Affairs continued to comprise the largest activity area. During the quarter Nov 69-Jan 70, this command tried nine general courts-martial, four special courts-martial in which a bad conduct discharge was adjudged, and received 115 special and no summary courts-martial cases for supervisory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 1,265 Article 15, UCMJ proceedings were received for administrative review, correction, statistical reporting and forwarding to USAFSSC, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Military Affairs actions during this quarter include 91 LOD's, 91 Article 15, UCMJ appeal advices, 18 Reports of Survey, 90 Reports of Investigation, 41 elimination proceedings, seven Congressional Inquiries, and three collateral investigations forwarded to DA, TJAG.

Quarterly rates per thousand for general, special (BCD), special, and summary courts-martial during the period were 0.12, 0.05, 1.60, and 0.00, respectively.

b. Legal Assistance Section processed 1,992 cases during the quarter, including, but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powers of attorney, and general counseling and advice.

c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention, with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the Americal Division Combat Center. Instruction is also given on the Military Justice Act, 1968. In addition, unit instruction was provided on an on-call basis to officers and senior NCO's.

d. During the quarter, 69 claims were received for payment for loss or damage of servicemen's property. Foreign claims are monitored at this headquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Office for adjudication.

e. During the period 26-27 November 1969, The Judge Advocate General of the Army, Major General Kenneth J. Hodson, made his annual command staff visit to the Americal Division to observe operations, to inquire into the impact of the Military Justice Act of 1968 upon the office and the command, and to speak to the assembled Judge Advocate officers concerning their careers. General Hodson was accompanied by Colonel William B. Persons, Jr., Staff Judge Advocate, US Army, Vietnam, and Captain Mitchell D. Franks representing the Chief, Career Management Division, OTJAG, DA.
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Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CFOR-65 (R2) (U)

4. (U) Personnel, Administration (Reenlistment)

   a. During the month of December 1969, the Americal Division reenlisted 250 personnel. Of this figure, 204 were RA 1st term and AUS personnel. With this outstanding achievement, the Division was able to win the Quarterly competition within USARV as well as the Semi-Annual USA RV Award. This marked the first time the Division had ever won the semi-annual competition, but it was the second straight quarterly competition won.

   b. For 2d Quarter FY 70, the Americal Division reenlisted 650 men. The previous quarter the Division had reenlisted 545. This total of 1195 reenlistments for the first half FY 70 far exceeded all other divisions in USA RV.

5. (U) Information Office

   a. The announcement by DA of the prosecution of L L Calley in the alleged My Lai massacre of March 1968, drew international interest to the Americal Division during the month of November and December, 1969. As many as 47 correspondents and newsmen were in the Chu Lai area during one day, including representatives from six major TV networks and numerous newspapers and magazines. Most of the news representatives wanted to visit the resettlement village of Son My to interview the "survivors." Special flights were arranged and the correspondents were shuttled to the resettlement village. Some news representatives wanted to visit the village of My Lai to see the actual scene of the alleged incident. This posed several unique problems for the Information Office. The area surrounding the village had to be made secure, the village had to be cleared of mines and booby traps, and coordination for all visits had to be made by the Information Office with these securing forces. Special helicopter transportation providing access to the village had to be arranged by the Information Office. General ground rules for the press visits to the village had to be established. No more than two visits a day were allowed, with an on-the-ground time limit of one hour. Major Pauli, Information Officer, personally escorted each group taken into the area. Movement through the village was restricted to the cleared areas, and correspondents were required to wear helmets and flak jackets. All details of the press visits required extensive coordination with all concerned.

   b. During December the Information Officer was made the Project Officer for the Bob Hope Show in Chu Lai. This required extensive coordination with all aspects of the command, including preparation of the show site, coordination with show officials, and with unit commands to arrange the transport of troops in the field to the show site on the 24th. The result was a crowd of 17,000 troops and hospital patients present to see the Bob Hope Christmas event.

   c. On the morning of 6 January, a fierce two day battle erupted near Tam Ky. It was the largest action of the new year and drew several correspondents to the area. Transportation was arranged and the correspondents and camera teams were flown to Tam Ky, where they were briefed by the Province Chief. The result was a favorable news story of the joint ARVN-US operation which netted 87 North Vietnamese Army regulars killed with one American casualty.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, WDC 25P08-6. (R2) (U)

1. Intelligence:

1. (C) Enemy Situation

a. Quang Tin

(1) During November, enemy forces successfully avoided any significant contact with Americal Forces. The majority of enemy contact with Americal units was squad size or smaller. During this period of resupplying and refitting, NVA units remained almost completely out of contact with any friendly forces. The brunt of the limited offensive activity during November was directed by LF Companies against ARVN/PF/RF units and CAP teams in an attempt to disrupt the GVN pacification program. NVA units were primarily occupied with the gathering and storing of rice and with establishing themselves in secure base areas far removed from the normal AO's of Americal units. Approximately 50,000 lbs of rice was found vic BT1227 and BT1822 by friendly forces during the month and further lends credence to the emphasis placed by the VC/NVA upon the storing of rice for future offensive activities. Major enemy disposition changes for the month were the following: the 3rd Bn. 3rd Regt, 2d NVA Div 8 km SE to vic BT0319 and the 1st Bn, 3rd Regt, 2d NVA Div 12 km SW to vic BT0113 during the period 9 – 15 Nov. The V-15 LF Co moved approximately 17 km NW to vic BT2445 during 16 – 22 Nov. The largest number of moves occurred during the period 23 – 29 Nov with four VC/NVA units moving: the 90th Bn, 1st MP Regt, 2d NVA Div moved SW to vic AT0228; the 409th MP Sapper Bn moved approximately 9 km SW to vic BT3000 and the V-15 LF Co moved approximately 8 km SE to vic BT2838. The 72d LF Bn moved twice during the period 16 – 29 Nov. The first move was SE to vic BT2937. The following week the unit again moved SW to vic BT1919. During the first week of the month there were no major changes of enemy disposition. During 1 – 8 Nov, enemy activity increased as attacks by fire against ARVN/PF/RF units rose sharply. On 1 Nov, Tam Ky City received 4 122mm rockets. During the period 3 – 8 Nov, C/2-1 Inf, operating vic ST1330, received 32 82mm mortar rounds resulting in NCD. On 5 Nov, 164th RF, operating vic BT1554/12, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 10 VC KIA and 2 IJN. On 6 Nov, CAP L-1-5 received 16 60mm mortar rounds and 2 RPG rounds from an UNSEF vic BT301195. Results were 5 VC KIA, 2 IJN, 2 ChiCom H/Grenades and 1 RPG round CIA. Also on the 6th of Nov, elements of the 144th RF Co, received 18 82mm mortar rounds vic BT255197. Fire was returned resulting in 5 VC KIA and 2 IJN. On 7 Nov, 4-4 ARVN received 20 60mm mortar rounds vic BT104317. Throughout the period 2 – 8 Nov, the enemy expended a total of 59 mixed mortar rounds against ARVN/PF/RF units. The only attack by fire against a US installation during the period 2 – 8 Nov occurred on 5 Nov, when LZ Fat City, BT435073, received 12 60mm mortar rounds.

(2) The period 9 – 22 Nov, saw a slight increase in enemy activity directed against ARVN/PF/RF forces but very little against Americal Forces.

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On 12 Nov, PF pltn 115 and PF pltn 165, operating vic BT150332, received 12 mixed mortar rounds. On 21 Nov, 2-5 ARVN and 3-4 ARVN Cav, engaged an UNSEF vic BT210463, resulting in 158 VC KIA, 98 VC, 17 DW, 3 CSW, and a document CIA, in the largest contact in the Province since 12 - 13 Sep 69. During the same period, three attacks by fire were directed against LZ Professional, BT173078, in the only attacks by fire against a US installation. The total number of rounds directed at the LZ were 1 60mm mortar round, 1 82mm mortar round, and 1 RPG round. As opposed to the previous weeks of Nov, the period 23 - 29 Nov showed a slight decrease in enemy activity directed against ARVN/PF/RF units, while the enemy continued to avoid contact with American Forces. The decrease could possibly be a result of casualties suffered by enemy forces during the 21 Nov contact involving the 2-5 ARVN and the 21st ARVN Cav. On 26 and 27 Nov, 21st ARVN Rangers, operating vic BT100233, engaged attacks killed a total of 27 VC. The 21st ARVN Rangers also received 12 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF vic BT103131, on 27 Nov. On 28 Nov, the 37th ARVN Rangers, vic BT035325, received 10 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF with NCO. However, on 30 Nov, D/1-1 Cav engaged an UNSEF and killed 12 VC vic BSO165. During the month of November 69, American Forces accounted for 243 VC/NVA KIA. Enemy units expended approximately 111 mixed mortar rounds against various US NDFs and two US installations.

(3) Enemy activity in the month of December 1969 remained relatively unchanged as rice procurement and general resupply were emphasized throughout Quang Tin (P). The enemy initiated harassing attacks on indiscriminate targets, exacting minor casualties and damage. Allied Forces continued to deny the enemy's resupply attempts as valuable caches of rice and supplies were found. The rice collections of the 2d BN, 3d NVA Regt, which had moved onto the border of Tien Phuoc/Thang Binh Districts, vic BT12326, to protect the Local Force units bringing rice in from the lowlands of Thang Binh and northern Tam Ky Districts, was continually thwarted. On 1 Dec, B/2-1 Inf, vic BT171254, found and evacuated 2,500 lbs of rice. On 4 Dec, Hau Duc RF's, vic AT466066 and AT940266, captured 2 NVA, 2,000 lbs of salt, 2,000 lbs of paper, 50 gallons of fish, and destroyed 2 structures. On 6 Dec, B/1-1 Cav, vic BT197258, found and evacuated 2,000 lbs of rice, and A/2-1 Inf found and evacuated 4,000 lbs of rice vic BT193281. Also on 6 Dec, Hau Duc RF, vic BT018089, found and evacuated 10,000 lbs of rice and 14 DVC. In Ly Tin (D), the 706th LF Co was relocated as a returnee gave its location vic JT3213. The 407th MP Sapper Bn moved to vic BT3805, within its normal area of operation. The 3d NVA Regt HQ moved into the SW portion of Phuoc Chau Valley, Tien Phuoc (D) vic AT79078. In the second week, 7 - 13 Dec, activity increased slightly as the enemy initiated several attacks by fire. On 7 Dec, Tam Ky City, vic BT300230 and BT306226, received 6 122mm rockets from an UNSEP. On 8 Dec, Thang Binh, PF's in two separate attacks by fire vic BT152334, received 4 122mm rockets, 7 75mm B1 rounds, 35 82mm mortar rounds and 20 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEP, resulting in negative casualties. On 9 Dec, vic BT193455 and BT3849452, 1-5 ARVN, found 11 KIA, buried in 2
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graves. On 10 Dec, B/1-46 Inf, vic BT249080, found and destroyed 15 structures with 15 bunkers, 15 tunnels, and miscellaneous military equipment. On 11 Dec, B/2-1 Inf, vic BT197230, found and evacuated 3,400 lbs of rice and received 9 60mm mortar rounds vic BT195236, from an UNSEF, with NCD. On 12 Dec, B/1-46 Inf, received 10 60mm and 3 82mm mortar rounds vic BT251081. On 13 Dec, 1-5 ARVN, vic BT197447, received 10 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. Fire was returned resulting in 5 VC KIA and 1 MDC. On the same day, 4-5 ARVN, vic BT207203, found and evacuated 8,000 lbs of rice. The enemy disposition changed slightly this week as the 3d BN, 3d NVA Rgt, moved from northern Tien Phuoc (D) to the southern portion of Base Area 117, vic BT1602. The V-12 LF Co moved into the Pineapple Forest area, vic BT2421, west of Tam Ky City.

(4) The week of 14 - 20 Dec, saw enemy activity centered in SW Thang Binh (D) where the enemy was engaged in small scale contacts. There were no attacks by fire directed against US NDP’s or installations, and rice denial continued in Thang Binh (D) as A/3-21 Inf, on 14 - 15 Dec, vic BT065305, found approximately 12,400 lbs of rice, F/8 Cav, on 16 Dec, operating vic BT0932, engaged 11 VC resulting in 10 VC KIA. Also on 14 Dec, C/1-46 Inf, found and destroyed a hospital complex on the SW border of Base Area 117, vic BT128013, consisting of the following: 30 structures, 25 beds, and 25 5 gallon cans. On 16 Dec, B/4-31 Inf, vic AT950286, found an enemy base area and evacuated 2 FM, 1 PRC-25 radio, 30 M-16 magazines, 5 82mm mortar rounds, 20 M-79 rounds, 1,106 rounds SA ammo, and miscellaneous clothing. On 19 Dec, 1-5 ARVN, vic BT187463, received 6 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF, resulting in NCD. 3-5 ARVN, on 20 Dec, engaged an estimated VC platoon size force SE of LZ Young, vic BT201156, resulting in 10 VC KIA and 4 MDC. Enemy disposition remained relatively the same, with no major changes occurring.

(5) During 21 - 31 Dec, activity remained unchanged as the enemy continued to avoid significant contact with Americal Forces. There was only one attack by fire and activity in Thang Binh (D) decreased slightly. The 1st BN, 3d NVA Rgt, moved into the southwestern corner of Base Area 117, vic BT1305, placing two BN’s of the 3d Rgt in this area. Caches continued to be found in Thang Binh (D) as D/3-21 Inf, during 21-22 Dec, found approximately 8,200 lbs of rice while operating vic BT085295. A/3-21 Inf, on 22 Dec, found and evacuated 2,000 lbs of rice vic BT092956. On 23 Dec, C/1-46 Inf, vic BT173029, found 11 VC buried in separate graves, all KIA. On 24 Dec, BF Co #962, Thang Linh (D), vic BT245445, received SA fire and 12 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. Later in the week on 27 Dec, B/3-21 Inf, vic BT085325, found and evacuated 1,800 lbs of rice, to bring the total for this week to 12,000 lbs of rice denied to enemy units. On 30 Dec, A/1-46 Inf, vic BT1610, found a total of 12 graves with 1 VC KIA in each, and evacuated 2 M-16 magazines and miscellaneous military equipment. The V-15 LF Co moved into northern Thang Binh (D), vic BT1964, to operate with C-9 LF Co, possible elements of the 70th LF BN, and various guerrilla units. The V-12 LF Co moved to vic BT2315, near
The initial phase of the Winter-Spring Campaign failed to materialize as activity throughout December remained relatively constant. Prisoner of War's and documents had forecast several significant dates as the possible initiating phase of the Offensive. The commemoration of 100 days of mourning for the death of Ho Chi Minh ended on 13 Dec, the 9th Anniversary of the founding of the NLF on 20 Dec, the anniversary of the establishment of the NVA on 22 Dec, and the anniversary of the establishment of the 308th NVA Div on 28 Dec. These special commemorative days for the enemy were considered likely times for attacks. The failure of the December Offensive seemed to hinge on several problem areas. The enemy had been thwarted in their resupply attempts in the district lowlands, infiltration of new personnel was decreasing compared to last year's strengths, NVA units were not as yet in position to pose any threat to the Allied Forces and training which was supposed to end by mid-December, had not terminated. Therefore, it is apparent that the enemy had delayed their plans, using the extended time to finish their preparations. This avoidance of contact is reflected in the total of 162 VC/NVA KIA by American Forces and the 50 mixed mortar rounds expended by the enemy against US NDP's and Installations for the month of December.

The month of January brought a sharp increase in enemy activity as enemy forces finally initiated their Winter-Spring Offensive. NVA units, which had been resting and resupplying, launched a series of attacks centered mainly in the area west of Tam Ky City along the Tam Ky-Tien Phuoc District border. The main unit involved in the attacks was the 3d Regt, 2d NVA Div, which moved from southern Tien Phuoc (D), into the area at the beginning of the month. Offensive action started during the period 1 - 3 Jan 70. On 1 Jan, A/2-1 Inf, vic BT174287, while in an NDP, received 15 82mm mortar rounds, an unknown number of RPG rounds, SA/AW fire and H/Grenades. Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 DNC. Documents taken from the bodies identified the 409th MF Sapper Bn as the unit in contact. The unit was apparently moving to a staging area for the 6 Jan attack on LZ Ross. On 3 Jan, R/1-46 Inf, vic BT188026, found and destroyed a base area complex with 80 bunkers, 30 huts, classroom and latrine, all recently used. The base camp was probably constructed by elements of the 3d Regt as an area to prepare for their offensive actions which began the following week. Enemy attacks by fire and ground attacks made the week of 4 - 10 Jan the most active one since Aug - Sep 1969. The 3d Regt HQ moved inland to vicinity of the Tien Phuoc-Tam Ky border in order to control the Regt's activities. The 1st Bn, 3d Regt, moved approximately 19 km north to northern Tien Phuoc, vic BT0826, in an apparent effort to lure Americal and ARVN forces out of the area west of Tam Ky City, leaving the area vulnerable to attack by the rest of the Regt. The 2d Bn, 3d Regt, moved approximately 7 km NE to vic BT1127, in southern Thang Binh (D), and the 3d Bn, 3d Regt, moved approximately 15 km north to vic BT1417, near
the Tien Phuoc-Tam Ky (D) border. The 70th LF Bn moved to vic BT2144 in northern Thang Binh (D) to form a task force with the C-9 LF Co, and elements of the 72d LF Bn. On 4 Jan, COEDS Camp 2 and 3-4 ARVN Cav compound, Tam Ky City, received 7 unknown type mortar or rocket rounds and SA fire from an UNSF. On 6 Jan, PF's at Phuoc Long, vic BT24343, received 30 mixed 60mm mortar and RPG rounds from an UNSF, with NCD. On the same day, 1-7 Marines on LZ Ross, BT027342, received over 200 82mm mortar rounds, SA/AW fire with a ground attack from an UNSF. The contact resulted in 39 VC KIA, 2 VC CIA, and heavy USM1 casualties. In the largest single contact in the Province since 21 Nov 69, A/1-1 Cav, with 3-4 ARVN Cav, PF's and RF's from Tam Ky (D), vic BT2520, south of the Pineapple Forest area, accounted for a total of 96 VC/NVA KIA, (45 by US Forces, 51 by GVN Forces), 2 VC, 22 IW, and 10 CSW CIA. On 7 Jan, D/3-21 Inf and F/17 Cav, received SA/AW fire and 2 RPG rounds from an UNSF, vic BT13324. Fire was returned resulting in 39 NVA KIA, 5 CSW, and 18 IW CIA. The rest of the week activity consisted of attacks by fire directed at US and ARVN troops and installations. Over 430 mixed mortar and rocket rounds were expended by the enemy at American, USM, and ARVN troops and installations for the week. LZ Hawk Hill, BT31315, received a total of 8 122mm rockets and 3 RPG rounds for the week, resulting in minor damage to the LZ. LZ Young, BT188157, was also attacked during the week. In 7 ABF's, the LZ received 3 unknown type rocket rounds, 1 122mm rocket and 26 82mm mortar rounds.

(8) The period of 11 - 17 Jan started off on the same level of activity as the previous week but began to taper off after the first three days of the week. A/2-1 Inf, vic BT197229, received 5 82mm mortar rounds, 2 satchel charges, and 20 Chicom H/Grenades from an UNSF, with NCD. Also on 11 Jan, B/3-21 Inf, at OP Juliet, vic BT077276, received an unknown number of Chicom H/Grenades, and SA fire from an estimated 30 NVA. Fire was returned resulting in 8 NVA KIA and 1 DMC. LZ Young received 55 82mm mortar, 25 60mm mortar, 10 122mm rocket, and 10 75mm RR rounds during the same day. The attack resulted in moderate ARVN casualties and damage. C/2-1 Inf, operating vic BT209223, received AW/SA fire and 25 60mm mortar rounds from an estimated company size force, resulting in minor US casualties. On 12 Jan, D/3-21 Inf, vic BT085333, received 25 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSF, with NCD. A/1-1 Cav with B/2-1 Inf, and B/1-1 Cav with D/1-46 Inf, vic BT27207, in two separate incidents, received SA/AW fire and an unknown number of RPG rounds from an UNSF. Artillery was processed and SA/AW fire was returned in both incidents, resulting in 39 NVA KIA, 5 CSW, and 6 IW CIA. The next day, A/1-1 Cav found 11 more NVA KIA from that contact. CIDG, Tien Phuoc, in two separate contacts, engaged an estimated 2 NVA platoons vic BT114076, killing 24 NVA and capturing 4 IW. The remainder of the week, NVA and Main Force units successfully avoided contact with US and ARVN Forces. During this period, the 409th MF Sapper Bn moved back to its normal AO, vic BT3406 near the TAM Ky-LY Tin (D) border. During the week of 18 - 24 Jan, NVA and Main Force units continued to avoid significant contact. Apparently the units...
were preparing for the 2d Phase of the Winter-Spring Offensive, as there were only 2 60mm mortar rounds expended for the week. On 21 Jan, 4-6 ARVN, vic BT228173, received SA/AW fire from an estimated 15 NVA. Fire was returned, resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 3 IWC, and minor ARVN casualties. The period of 25 - 31 Jan, showed a slight increase as final preparations for the TET Holiday Offensive were completed. There were 2 changes in enemy disposition for the period. The V-16 LF Sapper Bn moved SE into Base Area 117, vic BT2506, and the 72d LF Bn also moved into Base Area 117, vic BT1812. These units moved to Base Area 117 possibly to prepare for attacks against LZ Professional during TET. Attacks by fire increased as 17 mixed mortar and rocket rounds were expended.

(9) On 25 Jan, CLDC received 8 122mm rockets. Counter-battery from hills 76 and 270, was fired and C/4-6 Inf, engaged the enemy vic BT453022, resulting in 3 VC KIA and 3 IWC. Documents taken from one of the KIA identified the 78th MF Rocket Bn as the unit in contact. Also on 25 Jan the 39th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF vic BT198502 resulting in 43 VC KIA, 2 IWC, and 55 Chicom H/Grenades CIA. B/1-46 Inf, vic BT271021, found and destroyed 15 RPG rounds, 400 Chicom H/Grenades, 700 Chicom H/Grenade charges, 100 feet of fuze, 20 electric blasting caps, 6 RPG propellant sticks and evacuated 1 IWC and 1 US protective mask on 26 Jan. On the 27th, CIDG from Tien Phuoc engaged an estimated platoon believed to be from the 72d LF Bn, vic BT133013, resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 NVA, 2 IWC, 12 82mm mortar rounds, and 2 packs CIA. LZ Young received 8 82mm mortar rounds, with NCO. B/3-21 Inf, vic BT091259, on 29 Jan, engaged an estimated 45 NVA, probably from the 2d Bn, 3d Regt, resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 1 NVA, 1 IWC, 9 packs, and 450 lbs of rice CIA. On 30 Jan, B/1-1 Cav, vic BT219169, received 6 RPG rounds and SA fire from an unidentified UNSEF. Fire was returned resulting in 5 VC KIA and minor US casualties. F/8th Cav and 71st Avn, in support of 4-5 ARVN, vic BT22467, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 18 NVA KIA, 4-5 ARVN, in that contact, accounted for 7 NVA KIA, 2 VC KIA, 3 NVA, 9 VC, 6 IWC, 1 compass and documents CIA and 2 Boi Chanhs. During January, Americal Forces accounted for 444 VC/NVA KIA. Enemy units expended 163 mixed mortar and rocket rounds against US installations and NDP's.

b. Quang Ngai

(1) The relatively low level of activity which prevailed throughout the end of October continued into the beginning of November. On 2 Nov. C/4-3 Inf, vic BS7822/L, found and destroyed an enemy base camp consisting of 25 structures and 30 fighting positions; miscellaneous military equipment was evacuated from the area. On 4 Nov, C/3-1 Inf, vic BS7499, received 5 60mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF. On 3-4 ARVN, vic BS754617, engaged a platoon size force resulting in 7 NVA KIA, 10 VC CIA, and 3 IWC. On 5 Nov, B/3-1 Inf, vic BS539732, recei...
6 75mm RB rounds from an unidentified UNSEF. On 5 Nov, two 140mm rockets were directed against Quang Ngai City; one impacted vic BS94,729 (Quang Ngai MACV Compound) and the other landed vic BS64,5736. This was followed by a small scale sapper attack against the city with negative assessment of enemy casualties. On 6 Nov, B/3-1 Inf, vic BS520724, received a 122mm rocket from an unidentified UNSEF. On 6 Nov, A/4-21 Inf, vic BS86369, received 10 60mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF. On 6 Nov, one aircraft was forced to land due to light SA 30 cal fire, but was later recovered. On 6 Nov, T/2-4 ARVN, vic BS722283, engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 10 VC KIA and 4 WIA. Later on that day, D/1-4 ARVN, vic BS713385, engaged an estimated company size VC force resulting in 14 VC KIA and 1 CSWC. On 7 Nov, CAP 1-1-4-2, vic BS786867, found what appeared to be a stripped Chinese junk, 40-45 foot long. The boat was destroyed after a complete investigation. On 12 Nov, one aircraft received 30 cal AM fire and was forced to land vic BS546955 but was later recovered. On 12 Nov, 174th Avn, vic BS688988, engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 9 VC KIA and 2 WIC. On 13 Nov, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS888989, engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 23 VC KIA, 4 CSWC, 10 unknown type RB rounds, 12 Bangalore torpedos, 100 ChiCom H/Grens and 20 60mm mortars CIA. On 13 Nov, 3-4 ARVN, vic BS665579, engaged an estimated company size VC force, believed to be elements of the 38th LF BN, resulting in 17 VC KIA and 3 WIC. On 14 Nov, 176th Avn, vic BS720800 engaged 1 VC, vic BS733894 engaged 2 VC, vic BS723896 engaged 1 VC, and vic BS725905 engaged 8 VC. These contacts resulted in 12 VC KIA. On 14 Nov, D/4-1 Inf, vic BS510477, found and destroyed 15 structures, 450 gallons of oil and miscellaneous equipment. On 14 Nov, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS899590, engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 7 VC KIA, 2 WIC and 1 CSWC. On 15 Nov, 174th Avn (CC), vic BS473717, received intense 30 cal fire causing the aircraft to crash; the aircraft was not recoverable. On 16 Nov, Minh Long USSF/CIDG Forces, vic BS566065, received 54 cal AM fire and 10 82mm mortar rounds; fire was returned resulting in 10 VC KIA and 3 VC WIA. On 16 Nov, CIDG Forces, vic BS926765, received SA/AM fire and an unknown number of RPG rounds from an unidentified UNSEF. Results of the contact were 40 VC KIA, 3 VC CIA and 13 bunkers destroyed. On 17 Nov, 1-4 ARVN, vic BS877345, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 7 VC KIA, 1 VC CIA, and 3 WIC. On 18 Nov, 174th Avn supported Ha Thanh USSF/CIDG Forces, vic BS324567, resulting in 10 VC KIA and 3 bunkers destroyed. On 19 Nov, D/1-21 Inf, vic BS799438, found and evacuated 15 tons of rice. On the same day, A/4-3 Inf, vic BS585413, received 10 82mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF. On 23 Nov, R/1-52 Inf, vic BS528365, engaged 8 VC resulting in 6 VC KIA and 2 VC CIA evacuated to LZ Raynet. On 25 Nov, C/4-21 Inf, vic BS875295, engaged an estimated NVA platoon size force, resulting in 8 NVA KIA, 1 N, 5 ChiCom H/Gren, 4 M-26 H/Gren medical supplies, 1 wallet, 3 lbs of documents, 30 lbs of rice and miscellaneous military equipment CIA evacuated. On 30 Nov, vic BS5186, D/1-1 Cav, in four separate incidents, accounted for 10 VC/NVA KIA.

(2) From the beginning of November, numerous reports indicated that part or all of the 2d MP Regt would redeploy to Binh Dinh (P). During early November, the 2d MP Regiment operated in eastern Ha To (D) and southern Duc Pho (D). As the month progressed, the 95th BN moved to the Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh (P) border. By the end of the month, the regimental
headquarters and the other two battalions followed suit. 

PV's and documents captured by the 173d Abn Bde in Binh Dinh (P) verified the fact that the 2d Regiment was to operate in Binh Dinh (P). Reports were that the 2d Regiment was to aid Binh Dinh (P) LF units in an anti-pacification campaign. The 22d NVA Regiment HQ remained fairly static in the southern part of Minh Long (D). Two battalions of the 224 Regt operated in old Base Area 123, while one battalion operated in northern Ba To (D). During November, the 21st Regt, 2d NVA Div, operated vic BS680. The 2d NVA Sapper Bn operated west of LZ San Juan Hill and the 107th NVA WpaC Bn remained in the "Horseshoe" area, vic BS4871. LF Bn's and LP Co's remained in their normal AO's during the month.

(3) A total of 178 VC/NVA KIA were accounted for by Americal Forces during the month. November was characterized by a considerable decrease in mortar rounds fired by the enemy. A total of 40 mortar rounds and 3 rockets were directed against US LZ's, NDP's and installations.

(4) During the month of December there was a definite increase in activity in the Americal AO. On 1 Dec, vic BS720820, 4-6 ARVN received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds, RPG rounds, H/Gren and AV/SA fire followed by a ground attack by an unidentified UNSEF. The contact resulted in 4 VC KIA. On the same day, A/4-3 Inf, vic BS718377, found and destroyed 10 bunkers, 2 structures and 47 rolls of paper. On 2 Dec, vic BS4882, B/1-1 Cav accounted for 7 VC/NVA KIA in 4 separate contacts and C/1-20 Inf, vic BS794489, found and destroyed 12 bunkers. Also on 2 Dec, LRRP Team Illinois, vic BS425800, found an old enemy base camp with 10-15 bunkers connected by a tunnel system. On 5 Dec, 3-6 ARVN, vic BS487814, received an unknown number of RPG rounds, 4-79 rounds and SA fire from an unidentified UNSEF. The contact resulted in 9 VC KIA and 1 VC WPA CIA. On 5 Dec, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS692638, engaged an estimated VC squad size force resulting in 5 VC KIA and 3 IWC. Also on 5 Dec, vic BS459689, B/3-1 Inf found and destroyed 10 bunkers. An enemy base camp with 4 structures, 6 bunkers and 6 tunnels was found and destroyed by B/3-1 Inf, vic BS450690, on 6 Dec. In two contacts on 6 Dec, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS738698, accounted for 5 VC KIA, 6 VC, 2 IWC and 1 PRC-25 CIA. On 7 Dec, B/3-1 Inf, vic BS464697, engaged 8 VC resulting in 6 VC KIA. On 8 Dec, B/4-3 Inf, vic BS654463, found and destroyed a base area with 22 bunkers, 8 spider holes, 1 82mm mortar round and 1 RPG round. On 11 Dec, R/1-52 Inf, vic BS432768, engaged 4 NVA resulting in 4 NVA KIA, while C/3-1 Inf, vic BS608568, found and destroyed an enemy base area consisting of 30 sleeping positions and 3 spider holes. The last day of the week, 13 Dec, D/1-1 Cav Blues, vic BS738776, received SA fire from an unidentified UNSEF. Fire was returned and resulted in 35 NVA KIA. C/1-1 Cav reinforced D/1-1 Cav, vic BS733778, to engage an estimated company size force which resulted in 18 NVA KIA and 4 IWC. A/1-20 Inf, vic BS746485, engaged 10 VC in a bunker resulting in 5 VC KIA, 5 VC CIA and 3 IWC. On 19 Dec, 1-4 ARVN, vic BS763573, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 4 VC KIA and 1 IWC. On 20 Dec there were several incidents; the most significant are as follows: C/4-3 Inf, vic BS637440, found 4 graves with 1 VC KIA in each, dead less than 24 hours; C/3-1 Inf, vic BS508728, found and destroyed 7 structures and 3 ChiCom hand grenades. They also found and evacuated 55 ChiCom hand grenades, 200 blasting caps, 75 ft of fuse, 30 lbs of explosives. documents
and a 20 lb homemade bomb, C/5-46 Inf, vic BS77785C, found and destroyed 12 tunnels; C/5-46 Inf, vic BS776930, found and destroyed 12 bunkers, 2 structures and 6 concussion grenades; 4-4 ARVN, vic BS77824, engaged an estimated squad size VC force resulting in 3 VC KIA, 6 WIA, 3 122 mm and 2 155 mm homemade hand grenades CIA. Also on 20 Dec, LUNG Team Illinoia and Oklahoma were inserted vic BS404787. At 1444, vic BS647797, the team observed 4 VC/NVA moving east. At 2014L, the team was inserted vic BS404787 and observed 29 VC/NVA moving west and 11 VC/NVA moving east, 1 with packs and weapons. At 201630, the team was located at 20 43 72 and observed 49 VC/NVA moving east, 18 of whom had packs and weapons. At 201630H, vic BS405809, D/1-1 Cav was inserted in response to the sightings and at 201730H B/1-52 Inf was also inserted vic BS 404787. The LHRF teams and D/1-1 Cav Blues were under operational control of 5/1-52 Inf and engaged an UNSEF resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 4 AK-47's, 1 122 mm pistol (type 54), 10 60mm mortar rounds, 15 ChiCom hand grenades and 2 chocol field phones CIA. On 22 Dec, CAP 1-4-4, vic BS758281, observed 26 VC in 6 boats resulting in 3 VC KIA and 26 VC CIA (3 WIA). On 22 Dec, 3-4-3 Inf, vic BS538411, engaged 2 NVA in a bunker and found 2 NVA in graves, dead less than 24 hours, resulting in 7 NVA KIA. On 28 Dec, vic BS429779, 3-6 ARVN received SA fire from an UNSEF. The contact resulted in 22 NVA KIA, 2 CSW and 1 DCS. The unit in contact was believed to be the 406th LP Sapper Bn. On the same day, 3 Companies 125 and 183, vic BS568531, received 15 82mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF. Also on 28 Dec, vic BS666012, TMP String 82 detected approximately 200 enemy moving NW-SE in the early morning. It was believed that they were elements of the 22d NVA Regt moving to BA124. On 29 Dec, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS740276, engaged an estimated VC squad size force resulting in 5 VC KIA. On the same day, D/4-3 Inf, vic BS453410, engaged 5 NVA resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 1 DCS. D/5-46 Inf, vic BS837070, on 30 Dec, found 6 VC dead over 24 hours and destroyed 6 bunkers. B/3-1 Inf, vic BS449730, on 30 Dec, engaged 4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA, 1 DW, 3 packs, 50 blasting caps, 40 firing devices, 20 priming caps, 1 pair of field glasses, 1 ChiCom H/gren and documents CIA. The 4-6 ARVN, vic BS689299, on 30 Dec, received an unknown number of RPG rounds, mortar rounds and AW fire from an unidentified UNSEF. This contact resulted in 3 VC KIA and 1 DCS. On the last day of the month, 31 Dec, 4-6 ARVN, vic BS701904, found 21 VC KIA, 2 CSW and 1 CSW. (5) Based on agent reports and PW's captured by the 173d Abn Bde during the month of December, the 3d NVA Division HQ and support Bn's were assumed to be generally located in northern Binh Dinh (P). The 2d NVA Regt operated vic BS79410, Binh Dinh (P). As the month progressed, the 2d Regt moved farther south in Binh Dinh (P). In the beginning of December, the 22d NVA Regt operated in western Mo Duc (D) and northern Ba To (I); vic old Base Area 123. By the middle of December, agents reported unidentified battalions in the 2d Regt's old AO. It was thought that the 22d NVA Regt was moving south to take up the AO left vacant by the 2d NVA Regt's move south. This was substantiated by a PW from the 551st Sig Bn.
3d NVA Div, captured on 26 Dec. This Fw placed the 22d NVA Regt HQ vic BS3722 and the 7th Bn vic BS7534. The other two battalions were expected to follow their redeployment. A Fw from the 21st NVA Regt indicated that during the latter part of November and the beginning of December, his unit was moving south. Throughout the month, the 21st NVA Regt operated vic BS4055. The 2d NVA Sapper Bn, MR-5, operated south of LZ San Juan Hill, vic BS 6732, during the month. The 107th NVA Hvy Wns Bn operated in the "Horseshoe" area (vic BS4673) and the northern part of Base Area 121 for the month of December. Local Force battalions and companies operated in their normal AO's throughout the month.

(6) During the month, numerous reports, captured documents and Fw's indicated a VC/NVA attempt to mount an offensive between 19-22 Dec. These dates included two holidays; 20 Dec-the anniversary of the founding of the NLF, and 22 Dec-the anniversary of the establishment of the 308th NVA Div. Promises of "Black Christmas" were frequently reported. However, according to a Fw captured in the beginning of Jan 70, this offensive failed to materialize due to insufficient logistical preparation. The Fw from the 551st Sig Bn, 3d NVA Div, stated that the new dates for the offensive were scheduled for the end of Jan 70, approximately ten days before Tet. During this month, the 2d MF Regt was redesignated an NVA Regiment. The 120th MF Montagnard Bn and the 406th MF Sapper Bn were redesignated LF battalions. During the month, there were 257 KIA's by Americal Forces, and there were 48 60/82mm mortar rounds directed against US installations.

(7) On 2 Jan 70, vic BS3292, forces from the Tra Bong CIDG Camp received 6 RPG rounds and AW fire from an UNSEF. On 3 Jan, B/4-3 Inf, vic BS220285 (Hill 285), received 30 82mm mortar rounds, AW fire, SA fire, H/Grens and a ground attack from an estimated NVA company size force. Based on captured documents, the attacking force was identified as an element of the 2d NVA Sapper Bn, MR-5. The contact resulted in 29 NVA KIA, 1 CSM, 12 IN and miscellaneous military equipment CIA. On 4 Jan, E/5-46 Inf, vic LZ Gator, BS578961, received 20 82mm mortar rounds, an unknown number of RPG rounds, 15-20 satchel charges, H/Grens and SA fire from an unidentified UNSEF. This action resulted in 7 VC KIA, 3 DW and miscellaneous military equipment CIA. On 6 Jan, E/5-46 Inf, vic LZ Minuteman, BS776888, received 10 RPG rounds and 4 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF; one VC was killed in this incident. On the same day, CAP 1-4-2, vic BS777886, and CAP 1-4-3, vic BS767829, were subjected to attacks by fire. CAP 1-4-2 received 5 L22m rockets, 13 60mm mortar rounds, 20-30 82mm mortar rounds, 20-30 M-79 rounds, an unknown number of RR rounds and SA fire from an estimated 2 VC companies. CAP 1-4-3 received 15 60mm mortar rounds, 10 57mm BR rounds, 25 M-79 rounds, an unknown number of RPG rounds and SA fire from an UNSEF. Based on enemy disposition, the 4th LF Bn is thought to have been involved in these contacts. On 7 Jan, 2-6 ARVN, vic BS725900, received 5 RPG rounds, 15 unknown type mortar rounds and SA/AW fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated VC/NVA battalion size force. On 8 Jan, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS675728, 21
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engaged an estimated NVA platoon size force resulting in 8 NVA KIA and 4 IWC. On 10 Jan, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS647526, engaged an estimated NVA platoon size force resulting in 11 NVA KIA, 1 NVA CIA and 15 IWC. On 11 Jan, C/1-52 Inf, vic BS647526, engaged an estimated NVA platoon size force resulting in 25 ChiCom H/Grens from an unidentified UNSEF; fire was returned resulting in 1 NVA KIA. On 11 Jan, 4-4 ARVN, BS647510, engaged an estimated NVA platoon size force resulting in 7 NVA KIA, 2 NVA CIA and 13 packs CIA. On 12 Jan, R/1-52 Inf, vic BS515801, engaged 9 VC resulting in 13 VC KIA and miscellaneous military equipment CIA. On the same day, 3-4 ARVN, BS721586, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 7 VC KIA and miscellaneous military equipment CIA. On 14 Jan, FSB 411, BS539732, received 8 82mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF with NCD. On 15 Jan, D/4-3 Inf, vic BS674380, found and destroyed a base area with 30 bunkers. On 16 Jan, LRRP Team Nevada, operating in the 11th Inf Bde TAOR vic BS540445, engaged 7 NVA with artillery resulting in 5 NVA KIA. Also that day, vic BS705088, R-4 ARVN engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 10 VC KIA, 4 NVA KIA and 3 IWC. On 17 Jan, vic BS585379, 3-4 ARVN engaged an estimated VC squad size force resulting in 8 VC KIA and 2 IWC. On 18 Jan, 3-4 ARVN, vic BS399299, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 10 VC KIA, 1 IWC and documents CIA. On 18 Jan, 1-4 ARVN, vic BS625532, BS625529, BS628529, BS631528 and BS 628530, found and destroyed 17 tons of rice. Two days later, 1-4 ARVN found 92 tons of rice vic BS625525. On 20 Jan, D/1-14th Arty engaged an UNSEF, vic BS498772, detected by IOS sightings, resulting in 19 NVA KIA and 3 IWC. Later that day, D/1-14th Arty engaged an UNSEF, vic BS43879, for CAP 1-3-2 resulting in 10 NVA KIA. On 21 Jan, B/5-46 Inf, in three separate enemy initiated incidents, vic BS728818, BS72892 and BS728939, accounted for 12 VC KIA, 3 IWC, 2 CSW, 3 57mm HR rounds, 7 ChiCom H/Grens and documents CIA. On 21 Jan, 1-4 ARVN, vic BS49526, found and destroyed an enemy training area with 30 structures. On 22 Jan, D/1-52 Inf, vic BS497764, received AW/SA fire, M-79 fire, an unknown number and type of air bursts and 15 60mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF resulting in NCD. On 24 Jan, D/1-20 Inf, vic BS768407, engaged 11 VC which resulted in 3 VC KIA. Also on 24 Jan, D/1-1 Cav, vic BS666950, found and destroyed 7 5-inch rockets and 8 warheads. On 25 Jan, 3-6 ARVN, vic BS727817, engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 6 VC KIA, 1 CSW, 1 IWC and 2 RPG rounds CIA. On 25 Jan, R-4 ARVN, vic BS670575, engaged an estimated VC squad size force resulting in 8 VC KIA and 20 ChiCom H/Grens CIA. Also on 25 Jan, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS69574, engaged an estimated VC platoon size force resulting in 11 VC KIA and 20 ChiCom H/Grens CIA. On 26 Jan, vic BS670876, an OH-6A received moderate 30 cal fire and was forced to land; the aircraft was later recovered. On 28 Jan, A/3-1 Inf, vic BS528657, found and destroyed two base areas with a total of 41 structures. On 29 Jan, 123d Inf, vic BS570264, engaged 10-15 NVA resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 8 packs CIA. On 31 Jan, D/4-21 Inf, with FP platoon 186 and HF Company 186, vic BS323332, received AW/SA fire, an unknown number of satchel charges and 3 RPG rounds from an estimated 2 VC Sapper squads, resulting in 7 VC KIA, 1 CSW,
During the month of January, the 3d NVA Division HQ, its support battalions and the 2d NVA Regt operated in northern Binh Dinh (P). The 3d NVA Div operated on the Quang Ngai/Binh Dinh (P) border. A M2 round and 1 satchel charge C/J. RF and PF results were 2 VC WIA/CIA and 2 IWC.

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for the Chu Lai Rocket Pocket, vic BT4103, and selected fields in the western TAO is presently being established at division headquarters. A new system relay package is being utilized which will provide remote readouts. Line sensor utilization has been consolidated at LZ Stinson, vic BS53824, and 70% of the perimeter is now covered by an electronic barrier. Timely results at LZ Professional, vic BT173078, have been obtained due to the quick reaction of the 1st Bn, 46th Inf, to sensor information. LZ Professional now has the largest single field of sensors in the TAO and operations as a result of sensor activity have resulted in numerous VC/NVA KIA and MIA.

b. The G2 Air section's reconnaissance missions continued to obtain timely information of enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period 148 infra-red missions, 151 SIAR missions, 45 APD missions, 121 photo missions and 754 visual reconnaissance missions were completed. A total of 2,166 targets were acquired as a result of IR and SIAR missions. Of these, 400 were engaged by artillery fire. The 2d ARVN Division G2 Air Section has taken significant steps in assuming a more active role in G2 Air activities. They have selected, planned and requested both IR and photo targets for incorporation into the monthly reconnaissance plan for I Corps and have been requesting these targets on a daily basis for better surveillance of their tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).

3. (C) Military Intelligence Company: Summary of Significant Activities

a. (C) Headquarters

(1) On 26 December 1969, the Americal MI Detachment was reorganized and redesignated the 635th MI Company. This reorganization decreased the overall strength of the unit by 16 personnel. The new MTOM (30-17G) has the following breakdown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

It is not anticipated that the decrease in personnel will hinder the Military Intelligence Company in accomplishing its assigned mission.

b. (C) Counterintelligence Section

(1) During the reporting period, there were no reportable incidents of known sabotage, subversion or espionage.
(2) During the reporting period, there was one reportable incident of possible sabotage. This involved Company D, 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat), at Chu Lai installation. The investigation revealed neither conclusive evidence of sabotage nor outstanding leads. No further investigation is anticipated by this office.

(3) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a marked decrease during this quarter as compared to last quarter. During the reporting period, this office conducted 12 investigations as compared to 13 reported last quarter.

(4) This office provided the following CI services:

- Announced CI Inspections: 24
- Unannounced CI Inspections: 21
- Courtesy CI Inspections: 7
- DANG Assist: 43
- Miscellaneous Investigations: 21
- PSI: 10

(5) During the reporting period, the CI Section case officers conducted 182 source meetings and turned in 499 information reports. This quarter shows a slight increase over the last quarter total of 468 information reports.

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<th>Previous Quarters</th>
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<td>Nov 69-Jan 70</td>
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Month Information Evaluation

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<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>499</td>
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(6) The increase for this quarter is attributable to the NVA's "Fall-Winter Campaign" and "Winter-Spring Campaign". However, there
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were several factors which reduced the number of meetings. First, the source program for the 196th Brigade TAOR at LZ Hawk Hill has not been initiated due to the lack of trained personnel. Secondly, with the presence of the monsoon season, the activities of the sub-sources have been primarily restricted to the area between the foot-hills and the coastal regions.

(7) Volunteer Informant Program

(a) Funds expended for information—approximately 2 to 4%.

(b) Total funds expended this quarter—$4,679.30 or 39.3% of allocated funds for this quarter.

(c) Due to the reduction in the requested FY 70 budget, the overall Volunteer Informant Program was handicapped, and participating units reduced VIP emphasis. However, since the middle of December 1969, when additional funds were allocated, there has been a resurgence in emphasis on VIP and the quantities of items being purchased have begun to increase.

(d) Although emphasis previously had been placed on the purchasing of ordnance, there is an increase in emphasis on the purchase of information under VIP.

c. (C) Imagery Interpretation Section

The Americal II Section is experimenting with methods of improving the resolution and overall quality of 35mm hand-held aerial photography. This experimentation is being conducted with the technical advice and assistance of the US Army Intelligence Material Support Office at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The special film processing procedures used are known as the Henning Reversal and PQD processes. Two types of film may be used: Kodak Panatomic-X (ASA 32) exposed at ASA 2400 and Tri-X (ASA 400) exposed at ASA 3200 and processed by the aforementioned processes produce very fine grain results. The latter process produces practically grainless results when enlarged over 200 times, and gives excellent detail in shadows.

d. (C) Interrogation Section

(1) During the reporting period, the IPW Section interrogated and classified 1,117 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification compared to the previous period illustrates that the significant proportional changes in detainee levels are in the categories of NVA/IPW, Civil Defendants, and Innocent Civilians.
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This significant drop in the number of Innocent Civilians detained compared to the number of other classifications indicates better screening of detainees in the field.

(2) Twenty-four (24) man days were spent in support of cordon and search operations, screening operations and other actions in which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field.

(3) Information from 29 interrogations resulted in response by tactical units. The breakdown of the classification of detainees provided such valuable information is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Nov 69-Jan 70</th>
<th>Aug-Oct 69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA/PW</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/PW</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendant</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilian</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses were made to reports of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, base camps and rocket firing positions.

e. (C) Order of Battle Section

(1) During the last quarter, the OB Section has attempted to streamline the production of all-source intelligence generated by the targeting analysts through the use of data processing. Use of the American Division computer center has been made available to the OB Section. A special project team composed of two analysts has coordinated the overall process which should be operational on 1 February 1970. The processing system is based on the codification for the following broad areas: date of information, location, source of information, i.e., PW’s, agent reports, documents, incidents, type of information and general information on the report. Utilizing data processing will allow a quicker retrieval of large blocks of information enabling the OB Section to render a quicker response to requested area studies and intelligence estimates.

(4) Periodic visits between the Order of Battle Officer, 8th ARVN MID and the OB Section have taken place during the last quarter. LT Anh, the present OB Officer from the 8th ARVN MID, has requested material assistance and suggested periodic informal conferences to discuss the
f. Kit Carson Scouts

(1) The KCS program in the Americal Division has been improving at an ever increasing rate.

(2) Using a former VC school teacher as an instructor has greatly improved the quality and quantity of English training for the new KCS. One KCS has returned from three months of IRO English classes and has an outstanding English language ability. Additional KCS will soon be sent to these classes to aid in the elimination of the ever present language barrier.

(3) The recently distributed bilingual KCS dictionaries are in great demand. A reprint request has been forwarded, and the Americal hopes to have three to four dictionaries in every rifle squad in the near future.

(4) The continuing problem of draft deferments has caused innumerable difficulties for the Americal KCS Program. No single form can be found to present an acceptable certificate of valid draft deferment. Therefore, the Americal KCS continue to carry the original draft deferment. The loss, destruction and possible sale of these deferments continues to complicate the problems of GVN detention. The issuance of a USA RV ID card and draft deferment could simplify this problem.

4. (C) Co G (Ranger), 75th Infantry: Summary of Significant Activities

a. On 201005 Nov 69, Ranger team Oregon was preparing for a FW snatch when they were engaged by 6 NVA. The team returned fire resulting in 4 NVA and 1 US KIA, AK-47's, and several documents and equipment captured.

b. On 151700 Nov 69, Ranger team Oregon engaged 7 to 10 enemy dressed in black pajamas. Two to 3 of the enemy carried weapons. One of the enemy was engaged with the .44 mag. tunnel weapon at 15 feet and fell to the ground. Another was engaged at 40 feet, the weapon was fired twice, the enemy evaded. Claymore mines were detonated killing 2 enemy. The team engaged and killed an additional enemy at close range with the tunnel weapon.

c. On 30140C Nov 69, Ranger team Arkansas observed a total of 60 VC, wearing a mixture of green and khaki uniforms and black pajamas. Thirty of the enemy had packs, 40 had weapons (AK-47's and SKS carbines), and 1 individual had an RPG launcher. The enemy spotted the team and began moving toward their location. The team directed gun ship strikes on key enemy locations killing a total of 12 VC.
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d. From 201445 Dec 69, Ranger teams Illinois and Oklahoma observed a total of 127 enemy. A reaction force from D Troop 1-1 Cavalry deployed against the enemy observed by the Ranger teams. D Troop is an air cavalry troop. B/1-52 Infantry was also deployed to assist in the operation resulting in 14 enemy KIA and 4 AK-47's CIA.

5. (U) Special Intelligence: See SI Annex (published separately).
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D. Operations

1. (C) Operations Summary:

   a. General: Americal Division Forces continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during the period 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970 with contact varying from light and sporadic during the months of November and December to moderate during the month of January. The enemy lull in activity which began last September continued through the first two months of the reporting period. Moderate to heavy rains during the months of November and December limited operations by curtailing the effectiveness of visual reconnaissance missions, causing delay and/or cancellation of tactical close air support missions and limiting ground and foot mobility. Two one-day cease-fires were observed for Christmas and New Years during which time all combat units went into a defensive posture, conducting only local security patrols. The main area of enemy activity was in the Frederick Hill area of operation. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, and Iron Mountain were conducted in conjunction and close coordination with the 2d ARVN Division and continued throughout the period.

   b. Major Engagements: During the three month reporting period, Americal forces were engaged in two large-scale battles with enemy forces. One engagement took place in the Frederick Hill area of operation and was preemptive in nature, while the other engagement occurred in the Nantucket Beach area of operation and was reactive in nature.

   (1) In the Nantucket Beach area of operation, on 13 December 1969, elements of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry reacted to an initial contact with one NVA. An aircraft from D Troop, 1-1st Air Cavalry killed one NVA, brought in air support and inserted their ground unit. Contact was quickly established and a fierce battle began. C Troop, 1-1st Cavalry quickly moved to assist L Troop maintain their offensive. Later that day when the enemy finally broke contact, over 50 NVA had been killed and 10 weapons captured while friendly losses were 3 wounded.

   (2) In the Frederick Hill area of operation, on the 6th and 7th of January 1970, two cavalry troops and two infantry companies combined to organize two separate teams, engaged an unknown size enemy force west of Tam Ky in the vicinity of (center of mass) BT1130 and BT2520. During the two days, ground commanders employed basic maneuver formations with close air and artillery support to successfully rout the enemy from their positions and defeat them. After two days of heavy fighting the enemy avoided contact and, as a result, only sporadic contact could be established with the enemy by the Americal units. The total results of the two days of contact were 110 NVA killed, 20 individual weapons and 5
crew-served weapons captured while American losses were 5 killed and 20 wounded.

c. Operations by AO:

(1) Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in close cooperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued throughout the reporting period, concentrating on combat operations to increase the level of security of the pacification operations near the coastal area. Contact varied from light and sporadic during the first two months to moderate during the last month. The reporting period opened with the 196th Infantry Brigade conducting 2 preemptive operations with the 5th and 6th ARVN Regiments to further secure the population centers of Que Son and Thang Binh. The ARVN forces deployed units into two areas in the vicinity of BT1845 and BT1032 while the American Division supplemented those ARVN forces with one infantry company and one cavalry troop. The operation terminated with only light and sporadic contact reported except for one major contact by the ARVN units. Only a few significant contacts were made during the month of November. At 1525 hours on the 9th of November, C/2-1st Infantry, while on a search and clear mission, engaged and killed 5 VC in a brief skirmish. Several days later a command and control helicopter flying over the 196th, ARVN operation west of Thang Binh, received a heavy volume of small arms fire plus some RPG rounds and crashed, killing 2 and wounding 5 of the 9 occupants. On 22 November, B/3-21st Infantry, engaged an unknown size VC force, killing 6 in a short but fierce battle and suffering 5 killed and 6 wounded. On the last day of the month D Troop, 1-1st Air Cavalry engaged an estimated company of VC in the vicinity of BT1230, killing 12 of the enemy. The only significant contact during the month of December involved F Troop, 8th Air Cavalry, as they engaged and killed 6 VC in a brief skirmish in the vicinity of BT1230. The month of January 1970 began with moderate fighting in the area west of Tam Ky and then dwindled to light and sporadic as the reporting period came to a close. On the 4th of January at 1405 hours in the vicinity of BT097328 B/3-21st Infantry, engaged and killed 6 VC in a brief battle. Two days later a two day battle began in the area west of Tam Ky (reference paragraph b(2)). On the 9th and 10th of January, F Troop, 8th Air Cavalry, engaged an unknown size force west of Tam Ky and killed 12. On 11 January, Recon Platoon, 3-21st Infantry, at 0215 hours ambushed an estimated platoon of NVA in the vicinity of PT077276 killing 8 NVA and capturing one individual weapon. Two American soldiers were killed and two were wounded. At 1020 hours on the same day, C/3-21st Infantry, about 4 kilometers south of their recon platoon, engaged 12 NVA in a brief battle, killing 5 and capturing one individual weapon. On 12 January, at 0945 hours, C/2-1st Infantry, in the vicinity of PT210224, engaged a VC squad and killed 5. At 1000 hours on the same day in the same location as the contact on the 4th...
and 7th of January, two teams of cavalry and infantry engaged an unknown size NVA force in a two hour battle. Thirty-nine NVA were killed and 6 individual and 5 crew-served weapons were captured. Two American soldiers were killed and 11 wounded. The remainder of the month passed with only three other significant contacts. F Troop, 8th Air Cavalry, at 1150 hours on 21 January, engaged and killed 6 VC in the area west of Tam Ky. On 30 January, F Troop, 8th Cavalry and 71st Aviation Company, flying in support of a 5th ARVN Regiment made contact north of Thang Binh, killing 8 and 10 NVA respectively. At 1205 hours on the same day, B Troop, 1-1st Cavalry engaged an UNSEF in a three hour long battle which resulted in 5 VC KIA and 6 US WIA(E). Results of operations during the reporting period for the Frederick Hill area of operation are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FREND</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57 US KIA</td>
<td>497 VC KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315 US WIA(E)</td>
<td>317 NVA KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 US WIA(M)</td>
<td>273 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 FW/VC</td>
<td>32 CH/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 FW/NVA</td>
<td>0 CH/NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145 CIV DEP</td>
<td>83 IN CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164 INM</td>
<td>19 CSWC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reporting period concentrating on the security of major lines of communication and the destruction of enemy forces attempting to attack Quang Ngai City and/or the Chu Lai base complex. 1-6th Infantry searched the Rocket Pocket, around Chu Lai, targeting elements of the 78th Rocket Battalion (VCMF). Saturation patrolling, extensive night ambushes, preplanned air strikes, scheduled artillery fires, and sensor devices severely inhibited enemy attempts to shell the Chu Lai base complex. There was only one indirect fire attack launched against the Chu Lai base complex during the reporting period. Eight 122mm rockets were fired at the base on 23 January causing only minor damage and one casualty. C/1-6th Infantry, having observed the enemy launch site, conducted a combat assault into the area where they engaged several VC. Three VC were killed, three weapons captured, and two US were killed. During the month of November only two significant contacts were made. On 18 November at 0900 hours, 176th Aviation Company, flying in support of the 198th Infantry Brigade, engaged an estimated platoon of VC in the vicinity of B5326667, killing 10. Five days later at 1820 hours, Recon Platoon, 1-52d Infantry in the vicinity of B5524865 engaged an unknown size VC force in a brief battle supported by aviation and artillery. US forces suffered only 2 wounded during the contact, killed 6 VC and captured two more. The month of
December also saw little enemy contact as only two significant incidents were noted. On the 2nd of December, L Troop, 1-1st Cavalry, flying in support of the 198th Infantry Brigade, engaged an estimated squad of VC at 1100 hours and killed 6 in the vicinity of BS486819. At 1730 hours on 20 December in the vicinity of BS410794, B/1-52d Infantry engaged an unknown size NVA force in a two hour battle. Final results were 12 NVA killed, 5 individual weapons captured, and two US wounded. No significant enemy contacts were reported and only scattered resistance was met as the reporting period came to a close. Results for Operation Geneva Park for the reporting period are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 US KIA</td>
<td>125 VC KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 US WIA(E)</td>
<td>68 NVA KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 US WIA(M)</td>
<td>203 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 FN/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 FN/NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 CH/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 CH/NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>115 CIV DEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54 I/CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34 IWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CSWC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Operation Nantucket Beach was conducted within the 198th area of operation by the 5-46th Infantry Battalion and elements of the 6th ARVN Regiment. Constant pacification operations in addition to search and clear operations were continued throughout the reporting period in support of the GVN Pacification Plan. Numerous casualty-producing booby trap and mining incidents were reported during the period. The only significant enemy contact during the month of November occurred at 0830 hours on the 14th, as 176th Aviation Company, flying in support of the 5-46th Infantry Battalion, engaged and killed 8 VC. During the month of December one significant contact was made. L Troop, 1-1st Air Cavalry, engaged an unknown size NVA force in a reactive type operation (reference paragraph b(1)), killing over 50 enemy soldiers. On the morning of the 4th of January, L2 Gator received a ground attack from a small VC force. One US was killed and 5 were wounded before the defending A and E Companies, 5-46th Infantry, repelled the attack, killing 7 VC and capturing 3 individual weapons. B/5-46th Infantry, at 1330 hours on 21 January, engaged an estimated two squads of VC in the second significant contact reported during the month. Results of the contact were 9 VC killed, 3 individual weapons captured, and 3 US wounded. Totals for the reporting period for Operation Nantucket Beach are as follows:
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PRND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. KIA</th>
<th>NVA KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. WIA</th>
<th>NVA WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DEP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DPT</th>
<th>FWT</th>
<th>CH/VC</th>
<th>CH/NVA</th>
<th>CIV DEF</th>
<th>IN CIV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CASUALTY PRODUCING INCIDENTS

Numerous casualty-producing booby trap and mining incidents were reported within the Iron Mountain area of operation. On 13 November in the vicinity of BS688588 the 174th Aviation Company, flying in support of the 11th Infantry Brigade, engaged an unknown size VC force at 1050 hours, killing 9 VC and capturing two individual weapons. Two days later a command and control helicopter from the 3-1st Infantry Battalion received a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire while taking off from a landing zone on a resupply mission and crashed killing 5 US personnel. On 29 November, at 1015 hours C/4-21st Infantry, engaged an estimated NVA platoon in an hour long fight, resulting in eight NVA dead and one individual weapon captured. There were no US casualties. A large weapons cache was found by C/3-1st Infantry at 0930 hours on the 1st of December in the vicinity of BS451747. The cache consisted of 35 individual weapons and one crew-served weapon. A week later, B/3-1st Infantry, engaged an estimated squad size VC force in the vicinity of BS464697 at 1830 hours. It was a brief battle which resulted in 6 VC killed and one individual weapon captured. At 1513 hours on 13 December, A/1-20th Infantry, engaged an unknown size VC force in the vicinity of BS746443, killing 5 VC and capturing 3 individual weapons, while only one US was wounded. B Company, 123d Aviation Battalion, while flying in support of the 11th Infantry Brigade on 26 December, engaged 10 NVA in the vicinity of BS752257, killing 5 NVA soldiers. One NVA and 2 individual weapons were captured. The most significant contact within the Iron Mountain area of operation occurred on the evening of the 3rd of January while B/4-3d Infantry was in a night defensive posture securing Hill 285 (BS820285). B Company received a ground attack from an estimated NVA Company and engaged them for several hours before the attack was

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Successfully repelled. There were 7 US killed and 11 US wounded. Sweeps of the area the following morning yielded 29 dead NVA, 12 individual weapons and one crew-served weapon. On 16 January a long-range reconnaissance patrol engaged 5 NVA at 1630 hours in the vicinity of BS514432 and killed 5. On the last day of the reporting period D/4-21st Infantry, at 0110 hours, while in a night defensive position with GWN forces, received a ground attack from an estimated 3 VC sapper squads. The attack, which lasted an hour, was successfully repelled and 7 VC killed plus 2 individual and 1 crew-served weapon captured. Results of operations in the Iron Mountain area of operation for the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRND</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 US KIA</td>
<td>236 VC KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165 US WIA(E)</td>
<td>196 NVA KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 US WIA(H)</td>
<td>453 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 FW/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 FW/NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 CH/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 CH/NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>277 CIV DEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>106 IN CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>177 IWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 CSWC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (c) Plans

a. The following operation plans and orders were in effect or initiated during this reporting period.

(1) OPORD 3-69 (Realignment of Forces) and OPORD 5-69 (Movement of the 196th Inf Bde) remained in effect. OPORD 7-69 (Golden Fleece - Rice Denial) remained in effect during the reporting period.

(2) OPLAN 3-69 (Defense of Major Cities), OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley - Relief/Reinforcement of CIDG Camps), OPLAN 8-69 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation and Evacuation), OPLAN 9-69 (Natural Disaster Relief), OPLAN 11-69, OPLAN 12-69 (Golden Valley Rehearsal), and OPLAN 13-69 (Rapid Reaction) remained in effect as published contingency plans. OPLAN 14-69 was published on 17 December 1969. OPLAN 183-70, OPLAN 1-70 (Security of VIP's), and OPLAN 3-70 (Defense of Major Cities) are currently being staffed.

(3) Numerous Fragmentary Orders applicable to Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, and Iron Mountain have been published.
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b. Monitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP), formerly known as the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program (ICIPP), continued. Reports were submitted to III MAF as required.

3. (II) Organization

a. Effective 16 October 1969, the Metro Section 2d Battalion (Air-mobile) 11th Artillery attached to the Americal Division was further attached to HHH, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery.

b. Effective 11 December 1969, the 635th Military Intelligence Detachment (Provisional) was reorganized as the 635th Military Intelligence Company (Divisional).

c. Effective 26 December 1969, the 415th Signal Detachment and 570th Transportation Detachment attached to F Troop, 8th Cavalry were inactivated. Personnel and equipment from these detachments have been absorbed by F Troop, 8th Cavalry.

d. Effective 18 January 1970, three forward observer sections were detached from 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery and attached to HHH, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery.

4. (C) Training

a. The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals through the grade of O-3 who are assigned or attached to the division. During the reporting period, 73 courses were completed and 4,721 personnel completed training.

b. 232 junior leaders completed the training conducted in the Americal Combat Center Leadership Course.

c. 96 personnel completed the Unit Reconnaissance Course Training.

d. 123 RF/PF junior officers completed the RF/PF Leadership and Orientation Course.

e. The Americal Division Artillery conducted a Ballistic Meteorological Course for six personnel from the 2d ARVN Division Artillery from 10-28 Nov 69. 22 ARVN students from the 23d ARVN Artillery Battalion were given classes on 105mm Howitzer Section Crew Drill from 8-13 Dec 69. During the period of 16-30 Jan 70, a FADAC Operator Course was conducted for five personnel from 2d ARVN Division Artillery.
The American Division Support Command supports a medical training program conducted by the 23d Medical Battalion for the medical corpsmen, dental technicians and optometry assistants from the 2d ARVN Division Medical Battalion. Six personnel attended a course which began on 22 Sep 69 and ended on 29 Nov 69. Another class is currently in progress for six individuals. This class began on 8 Dec 69 and will end 9 Feb 70. The 723d Maint Bn conducted on-the-job training for six EM in the mechanical maintenance field from the 2d ARVN Division Log Battalion from 15-15 Dec 69. In addition, four EM in the electronics technician field of the 2d ARVN Div Log Bn received OJT from 25 Dec 69 to 15 Jan 70. The 23d S&T Bn conducted training for seven personnel from the 2d ARVN Division Log Bn in the area of stock control and storage from 3-8 Nov 69 and three personnel each from 24 Nov-1 Dec 69 and 8-15 Dec 69.

The 26th Engineer Battalion conducted a four week Engineer Equipment Maintenance Course for four EM and one officer from the 2d ARVN Div Engr Bn. The course began on 1 Dec and ended on 27 Dec 69.

The Division Chemical Section conducted OJT for 13 EM of the 2d ARVN Division on chemical operations from 8-29 Dec 69.

The 16th Aviation Group (Combat) conducted CH-47B Sling Load Operation classes on 17 and 23 Dec 69. A total of 270 personnel from the 2d ARVN Division Artillery attended this training.

Training of American personnel for the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) has been in coordination with the 1st Combined Action Program School. 23 personnel from the American Division have completed the school during the reporting period.

The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry supported a New Equipment Training Team in conducting crew training for the M551 Sheridan. The training began on 17 Nov 69 and ended 13 Jan 70. This training was conducted for: Troop E, 1st Cavalry; Troop F, 17th Cavalry; Troop H, 17th Cavalry; and Troops A, B, and C, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry.

Close Air Support

During the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970, the American Division employed 1,962 Close Air Support (CAS) and Combat Skypat (CSS) missions, using 2,215 aircraft sorties. This was a reduction from 2,226 missions and 2,989 sorties from the previous quarter. This reduction can be attributed to 22½ days and 36 days down for the Chu Lai and An Hoa Air Support Radar Teams (ASRT) respectively and to the monsoon weather which caused mission cancellations throughout the period.
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(1) CSS Missions: Combat Skyports (CSS) totaled 1,333 missions and 943 sorties during the reporting period as compared with 988 missions and 476 sorties during the previous quarter. The USMC flew 1,298 missions with 903 sorties, the USAF flew 14 missions with 14 sorties, and the USN flew 21 missions with 26 sorties.

(2) Forward Air Controlled (FAC) CAS Missions: A total of 629 CAS missions using 1,272 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Americal during the quarter, a sharp decrease from the 1,238 missions and 2,513 sorties for the previous reporting period. The USMC flew 544 missions with 1,101 aircraft sorties, the USAF flew 64 missions with 128 aircraft sorties, and the USN flew 21 missions with 43 aircraft sorties. Air force FAC's improved their armed FAC program with the CV-10A FAC aircraft, adding four (4) M60 machine guns for each aircraft. Additionally, one aircraft has been equipped with an on-board camera to aid the reconnaissance capability. It is anticipated that two (2) additional aircraft will be equipped with cameras, so as to give each Brigade a photo-recon capability.

(3) Ordnance Expended: Total ordnance expended by CAS and CSS missions during the reporting period was 5,214 tons of bombs, 368 tons of napalm, and 3,237 rockets. This represents a 4% increase in bomb tonnage, a 55% decrease in napalm tonnage, and an 18% decrease in number of rockets expended. The increase in bomb tonnage is attributed to the greater percentage of CSS sorties.

b. Arc Light Strikes were placed on four (4) different target boxes using 12 aircraft sorties with a total of 288 tons of bombs dropped. The Arc Light Strikes were employed against enemy base camps, staging areas, and supply/logistical complexes to disrupt command & control, training, and resupply activities. The sharp reduction of targets struck were attributed to light and sporadic enemy activity, available Arc Light sorties, and a lack of lucrative targets.

c. Bomb damage assessment made by forward Air Controllers during the reporting period: 1,031 structures destroyed, 470 structures damaged, 434 bunkers destroyed, 202 bunkers damaged, 120 secondary explosions, 366 sustained fires, 38 enemy killed by air strikes (KFAS), 265 fighting positions and spiderholes destroyed, 15 tunnels destroyed, 17 AA/AW mortar positions destroyed, 4 bridges destroyed, and 6 caves which were sealed. The decrease in damage observed can be attributed to the decrease in FAC controlled missions.

6. (U) Artillery - A separate ORLL for the Americal Division Artillery will be submitted on 15 February 1970.
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7. (U) Aviation - A separate ORIL for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group on 15 February 1970.

8. (C) Chemical: During the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, the Division Chemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities:
   a. 79,920 pounds of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.
   b. 22 E158 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed.
   c. 34 Airborne Personnel Detector missions were flown.
   d. Approximately 1,675 acres were defoliated using 4,325 gallons of defoliant.

9. (C) Engineer
   a. Activities for the period 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970, consisted of organic engineer efforts directed to support of the Americal Division while non-divisional units devoted primary effort to improvement of QLII (LOC) and operational support construction.
   b. QLII continues to receive the priority horizontal effort in the Americal TA0I with two engineer battalions committed primarily to restoration of QLII. One change in engineer troop disposition occurred during the reporting period. The RMR/FRJ Contractors were replaced by CEBU-301, a Seabee Maintenance Unit.
      (1) The 26th Engineer Battalion provided tactical bridge support for the restoration and upgrading of QLII within the TA0I.
      (2) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat), augmented by the 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) and the 137th Engineer Company (Light Equipment), devoted primary effort toward upgrading and paving QLII from Ho Duc (BS740525) to Duc Pho (BS806378), and providing expeditious maintenance from 1/11 Corps border (BS907150) to Duc Pho and from Ho Duc to Binh Son (BS601920).
      (3) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 (MCB 7) performed expeditious maintenance on QLII from Binh Son (BS601920) to the Chu Lai Main Gate (BT520004).
      (4) The 9th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force (FMF), devoted
primary effort toward upgrading and maintenance of QL1 from Chu Lai to BTI4/560.

(5) RMK/FRJ Contractors discontinued operations in Chu Lai on 15 November 1969. RMK/FRJ Contractors supplied mineral products for engineer construction throughout the TAOD.

(6) Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 301 (CPMU 301) replaced RMK/FRJ Contractors and assumed their responsibilities for mineral product production.

c. Engineer operations in TAOD consisted generally of the following:

(1) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat):

(a) In addition to the maintenance and upgrading of QL1, the battalion was committed to minesweeping from Mo Duc to Duc Pho, I/II Corps border to Duc Pho and from Binh Son to Mo Duc. Intermittent rain throughout the reporting period severely hampered the paving effort. The battalion had completed all sub-base work and had completed the base course work except for one kilometer. However, the heavy rains of 24-25 November 1969 and 15-18 December 1969 damaged the base course so that all unpaved portions (5.9 kilometers) needed additional base course work.

(b) The battalion began construction of fifty SEA-huts, three mess halls (2000 sq ft area each) and accompanying utilities for 1-1st Cav cantonment area.

(c) The battalion also exerted a considerable effort toward culvert construction and repair from Binh Son to Quang Ngai.

(d) During the reporting period, the battalion constructed over 1700 ft of revetments for the 27th Surgical Hospital.

(e) The battalion also supported the Americal Division with bunker construction at FSB's West and Center. In addition, they supported the construction of the Mo Duc and FSB Lix access roads.

(f) The battalion also contributed a platoon (9 dozers and 17 dozer operators) to Land Clearing Company (Provisional).

(g) The battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows:
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1. HHC, A(-), D, and 511th Engineer Company (PB): Chu Lai.

2. Company B: FSB Dottie.

3. Company C and 137th Engineer Company (1E): LZ Max


(a) The battalion continued to mine sweep, upgrade, and maintain QL1 between Chu Lai and FSB Baldy (BT1/5460).

(b) The battalion hauled over 45,000 cy of various mineral products for maintenance and upgrade of QL1 and Rt 535 from FSB Baldy to FSB Ross (BT02545). Although Rt 535 is outside the Americal Division's TA0I, it is important because it leads to the strategic Hien Dinh District which is in the Division TA0I. Approximately 25,000 cy were used during December to repair damage from the heavy rains of late November and mid-December.

(c) During the reporting period, one bridging operation was conducted by the battalion. A 90' M-6, single truss bridge, was replaced on Rt 535 at coordinates RT081389 by an 80' timber trestle bridge.

(d) The battalion constructed seven living bunkers, thirty latrines and thirty showers at Hawk Hill. In addition, twenty-nine assorted vertical structures were constructed in support of the Division.

(e) The battalion furnished the command element and one platoon (14 dozers and 28 dozer operators) for the Land Clearing Company (Provisional).

(f) The disposition of the battalion at the end of the period was as follows:


2. Company B: Hill 10 (BT199389).


4. One platoon, HHC: Rock Crusher (BT108428).

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(3) MCB 7 is tasked with the expedient maintenance of QL1 between Chu Lai and Binh Son, base construction at Chu Lai, rehabilitation of airfields at isolated Special Forces Camps, and providing air-mobile equipment in support of the Americal Division.

(4) RMK/PRJ Contractor produced base course aggregate, asphaltic concrete, and ready-mix concrete until they terminated operations on 15 November 1969.

(5) CBMU-301 assumed the responsibility of producing mineral products for engineer units within the TA01 on 16 November 1969.

(6) The Land Clearing Company (Provisional) was formed in August 1969 from assets within the ICTZ and placed in support of the Americal Division by the Third Marine Amphibious Force. The Company consists of one platoon of Army Bulldozers (9 each D7E) and one platoon of Marine bulldozers (14 each Eimco). In the current reporting period, this unit was available to the Americal Division for the months of November and December only. During these two months the company cleared approximately 32 square kilometers, and destroyed 518 bunkers, plus 34,760 meters of trenchline.

(7) 26th Engineer Battalion: Significant Activities

(a) During the quarter, A, B, and C Companies remained in direct support of the 196th Inf Bde, 198th Inf Bde, and 11th Inf Bde, respectively; and D and E Companies remained in general support of the Division.

(b) Mo Duc Road: The battalion was tasked to build a road from QL1 (BS73730) east to the beach on the South China Sea. This road was to be approximately 5 km in length and have two (2) bridges, 70 feet and 120 feet in length. Company C was directed to build the road. Construction started on 26 August 1969. Company C was supported by elements of: HHC, B, D, and E Companies, 26th Engineer Battalion; the 39th Engineer Battalion; the 9th Engineer Battalion FMF; and the 82d ARVN Engineer Battalion. Security was provided by 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st-20th Infantry Battalion and the 110th PP Platoon from Mo Duc. Approximately 36,000 cu vds of fill have been hauled to date. One 2 January 1970, one (1) 5 ton dump truck was destroyed when it hit a mine. The casualties on the project to 31 Jan 70 have been: two US KIA, nine US WIA, two PP KIA, two PP WIA, one VN civilian KIA, and four VN civilians WIA. Although not completed, it is now possible to travel from QL1 to the beach and work is progressing rapidly. This road will greatly facilitate tactical operations by enabling US and ARVN forces to move armor.

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and land clearing equipment into an area which could previously be reached only by sea, and will provide adequate overland access to areas currently being resettled. As a secondary benefit, this artery will stimulate the local economy and will provide a firm base from which to support pacification.

(c) Gaza Strip and Barrier Island Clearing Operations: The battalion was tasked to provide a Combat Engineer Vehicle to both of these operations. One of the battalion's CEV's provided support at the Gaza Strip from 26 October until conclusion of clearing operations on 24 November 1969. On 5 November 1969, the CEV hit a booby trapped 155mm round resulting in one (1) US KIA. On 15 December 1969, a CEV from the battalion was tasked to provide support for the Barrier Island land clearing in northern Quang Tin Province. During the operation, one (1) crewman from the CEV was WIA from enemy NVA fire. The CEV was extracted 2 January at the conclusion of the operation.

(d) FSB Lis Access Road: Company C was tasked to upgrade the road from QL to FSB Lis which is approximately 3 km in length. The project started on 7 October 1969 and was concluded on 9 January 1970, with a total of 16,594 cu yds of fill hauled. Two (2) 5 ton dump trucks were destroyed by road mines on 11 December 1969 resulting in two (2) US WIA for the operation.

(e) Tra Bong Road Land Clearing: In early October 1969, the area from the vicinity of BS52885 west along Tra Bong Road to the vicinity of BS90880 was designated by the 196th Inf Bde for land clearing. Enemy forces were known to be operating along the Tra Bong Road with enemy fortifications and booby trapped munitions being utilized extensively in the area. Company E, with four (4) D7E dozers and one (1) combat engineer vehicle and with security elements from the 1--Inf and 1-2 Cav, moved into the vicinity of BS52886 on 22 October 1969 to begin work. There was a constant problem of dozers getting stuck because the work was in relatively low terrain and much of the area was inundated by the monsoonal rains. On 17 November 1969, two dozers and a combat engineer vehicle were convoved into the land clearing area to replace two deadlined dozers and a deadlined CEV. As the deadlined equipment was being evacuated, a minor contact occurred in which two (2) M79 rounds were fired at the convoy. There were negative casualties and damage. On 18 December 1969, a convoy composed of four (4) 10 ton tractors and lowbed trailers, one (1) front loader, one (1) AVLB, two (2) 5 ton dump trucks, two (2) 4 ton vehicles, and one platoon of APC's extracted the land clearing element. The clearing operation accounted for 2,188,000 sq meters (540.5 acres) cleared, 2,575 meters of fighting trench destroyed, 78 bunkers destroyed, 625 meters of tunnels destroyed, 12 mines and/or booby traps found and destroyed, two (2) AK-47 weapons
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Captured. Two (2) infantrymen and three (3) engineers were WIA.

(f) FSB Ross to Hiep Duc Road Opening (Route 534): The battalion was tasked to upgrade and provide necessary bridging on Route 535 from FSB Ross to its intersection with Route 534 and mine-sweep, upgrade, and provide necessary bridging on Route 534 from the intersection westward to Hiep Duc to enable a GVN resupply convoy to move from Tan Ky to Hiep Duc on 10 November 1969. Company D swept and opened its portion of the route, approximately 17 km, in four and one-half hours. Company D installed one (1) AVLB, two (2) 15-foot M4T6 dry span bridges which were airlifted into place by CH-47 helicopter, and a 23-foot 4-inch M4T6 dry span bridge. The supply convoy closed Hiep Duc at 1630 hours, 10 November 1969, after being on the road for nine hours with no incidents. At 0700 hours, 11 November 1969, the mine-sweep team departed Hiep Duc to sweep eastward along Route 534 to meet a Marine mine-sweep team sweeping westward from FSB Ross. On the return sweep to FSB Ross five (5) mines were found on the road. The Marines had noticed three (3) M-79 HE cartridges placed in a triangle in the road. Suspecting that this was an enemy sign, they began probing mud holes and low spots in the road. This alertness led to the discovery of four (4) mines, all estimated to be 250 pound bombs which had not been detected by the mine detectors. Two of the craters, resulting from destroying the 250 pound mines in place, left the road impassable to the convoy and two (2) 15-foot M4T6 dry span bridges were airlifted to the sites to bridge each crater. The operation concluded when all elements closed LZ Ross at approximately 1700 hours, 11 November 1969, without further incidents.

(g) Tien Phuoc FSB and Airfield: Company D was tasked to provide horizontal construction support. The project consisted of constructing and upgrading the roads, improving the drainage system of the roads, gun pits, and ammo dumps. A portion of the Tien Phuoc airstrip was also repaired. Approximately 1,100 cu yd of earth fill have been hauled to date. Company D was supplied with airlift equipment from HHC and MCB-7. The project was completed on 31 January 1970.

(h) Relocation of the 196th Infantry Brigade: The 196th Brigade relocated from LZ Baldy to LZ Hawk Hill during the last reporting period. Company A has the responsibility of providing the brigade with direct support. To date the following work has been accomplished by Company A, with assistance from 9th Engineer Battalion, MCB-7, B and D Companies:

1. 232 20'x32' living bunkers.
2. 38 8'x8' fighting bunkers.

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2. 4 10'x24' supply bunkers.
3. 6 mess halls.
4. 1 60'x80' brigade TOC.
5. 49 administration SEA-huts.
6. 1 36'x80' FDC bunker.
7. 1 60'x80' hospital bunker.
8. 1 JP-4 distribution point for helicopter refueling.
9. 2 CH-47 hook pads.
10. 1 helicopter gunship runway.

(i) Relocation of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry: Company D continued the horizontal construction started last quarter for the base camp of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. The project consisted of constructing roads, tank trails, and hardstands for troops and maintenance areas.

(ii) ARVN Classes: The battalion instituted an OJT Program for the 2d ARVN Engineer Battalion. The first class started on 13 October with six (6) EM mechanics from the 2d ARVN Engineer Battalion. These classes were on the maintenance and operation of water pumps, generators, bucket loader, 10 ton tractor, D7E dozer, grader, and 20 ton GT crane. On 1 December 1969, the second ARVN OJT Program was instituted for a duration of four (4) weeks for one maintenance officer and four EM equipment operators. The first week of the Heavy Equipment OJT Program was concerned with the operation and maintenance of the 20 ton crane. The second week encompassed the operation and maintenance of the D7E dozer. The last two weeks of the program concerned the operation and maintenance of the Westinghouse 4140 Grader. The ARVN officer worked directly with the battalion maintenance officer and observed the battalion maintenance staff for a four week period. These men were billeted with corresponding members of ROK, 26th Engineer Battalion, and readily adapted to their new environment. The classes appear to have been successful in every respect.

(k) FSB 497: On 21 January 1970, Company A was tasked by the 196th Infantry Brigade to open new FSB F1890/L7. The opening of the FSB required the clearing of 23,000 sq meters of land for fields of fire. During the FSB opening, eight (8) enemy tunnel complexes were destroyed.
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The FSB opening concluded on 23 January 1970 when Company D was airlifted back to LZ Hawk Hill with negative casualties for the operation.

(1) Utilization of Airmobile Equipment: Throughout this reporting period, it was often necessary to airlift airmobile equipment to outlying FSB's and LZ's. These FSB's and LZ's were, as a rule, inaccessible by road or would have required a major road opening to gain access. Through utilization of airmobile equipment, the battalion was able to open and close FSB's and LZ's as well as provide support, such as construction of ammo dumps, opening and closing trash pits, installing drainage and road systems, constructing gun pits, and clearing fields of fire.

d. QIL paving completed at the end of the reporting period is as follows:

(1) I/II Corps boundary (BS909119) north to BS785426.
(2) BS781436 north to BT207377.
(3) There are approximately 11 kilometers of two-lane road that remain to be paved in the Americal TAOG.

e. Enemy LOC interdictions continued to be a problem although there was a marked reduction from the previous quarter.

(1) Casualties/damage by mines and other LOC interdictions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
<th>QIL</th>
<th>529</th>
<th>Mo Duc Rd</th>
<th>Fat City Access Rd</th>
<th>LZ LIs</th>
<th>Access Rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Loss</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minor Damage</td>
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<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>KIA (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA (VN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIA (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIA (VN)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mine Incidents</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Barriers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverts Blown</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges Blown</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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One bridge of some importance, Bridge 399 (RS814358), was badly damaged on 19 November 1969. The north span and abutment were destroyed. The bypass was open to traffic by 730 hours on 19 November 1969. The bridge was repaired by 7 December 1969.
LOGISTICS.

1. (U) General: The current period, 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, has been characterized by a widespread operational construction and repair effort, and the identification and accounting of previously unreported property and equipment.

2. (U) Services Division.

   a. An extensive program was initiated to repair and replace bunkers throughout the TAOR which were damaged by the Monsoon rains. Perimeter defenses were improved and upgraded in preparation for the expected TET offensive. This upgrading consisted of improving perimeter wire and increasing the number of individual culvert fighting positions. Materials for the construction of SFA Huts for the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry and LZ Hawk Hill have been received and construction is 80 percent completed.

   b. Installation property records were established at Chu Lai, LZ Bronso and LZ Hawk Hill by Pacific Architects and Engineers. An inventory of all installation property is being conducted at the above locations. The inventory is expected to be completed within the next 90 days.

3. (U) Supply Division.

   Significant supply activities during the quarter included the identification and accounting for previously unreported equipment and the retrograde of excesses. The quarter was also marked by significant equipment receipts, especially of wheeled vehicles.

   a. A concerted effort was made to have all American units identify and account for all unreported equipment. This resulted in proper accountability being established for 36 vehicles, 72 generators, 80 weapons, 39 radios and numerous other items. The total dollar value of property accounted for through these procedures was over $1,500,000.

   b. Continuing efforts have been made during the quarter in the area of supply economy and the reduction of excesses. The Direct Support Unit identified and retrograded 137 lines with a total dollar value of over $1,900,000.

   c. Significant equipment receipts during the quarter were 392 wheeled vehicles and 60 water trailers. This filled all shortages of water trailers and raised the level of fill of wheeled vehicles to a point where there are no longer any significant shortages. The receipt of 18 refrigeration units also eased the refrigeration problems for the division mess halls.
d. A major equipment change occurred during the quarter with the receipt of 60 M551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance Airborne Assault Vehicles. Nine were issued to each cavalry troop and six were placed in maintenance float. M-43 tanks were turned in for retrograde by the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, and each separate cavalry troop turned in six M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers.

4. (C) Maintenance Division.

a. As of 31 January the M6 exchange program is approximately 99% complete with current on hand figures indicating 22,137 chrome barrel weapons on hand and 81 non-chrome barrels on hand. It is anticipated that the division will complete the exchange program by the middle of February.

b. The Americal Division CMMI Team conducted 6 courtesy and 19 recor inspections (15 receiving satisfactory ratings) during the period 1 November thru 31 January 1970. The 723rd Maintenance Battalion conducted 685 Roadside Spot Check Inspections during the same period.
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F. Civil Affairs/Civic Action/FSYOP

1. (U) Organization:

a. Guidance was furnished by this office in implementing USARV Regulations and directives. USARV Regulation 230-6 and message, CG, USARV, 132004Z Jan 70, requires monthly submittal of Donor Deposit Fund Council Meetings. USARV message 170545Z Dec 69, in conjunction with Ministry of Social Welfare directives, deemphasized the support to orphanages given by FM-AF and GVN agencies. The Community Relations Councils established by each of the brigades for the districts they encompass continue to enhance the civil affairs/civic action programs and provide a focal point for discussion of problems involving relations between FM-AF, GVN agencies, and the local populace throughout the Americal TAOI.

b. This office is currently coordinating with G3 DOT and III MAF to prepare the format for a Personal Response Program to further enhance friendly relations between Americal Division personnel and the indigenous population.

2. (G) Operations:

a. On 23 Jan 70, civil affairs/civic action responsibilities for Ky Chanh (V), Ly Tin (D), Quang Tin (P), were officially transferred from FAG 12 to the 198th Infantry Brigade.

b. Rice Denial: The Americal Division continues to support the program to deny vital resources to the enemy. During the reporting period, 301,917 lbs of rice were captured with 291,244 lbs evacuated and turned over to province and district officials and 10,673 lbs destroyed because of tactical situation. In addition, 16,995 lbs of salt were captured and turned over to district and province officials.

c. Refugees: Refugees still represent an acute problem within the Americal TAOI; however, progress is being made in resettling refugees as territorial security improves. During the reporting period, the 4th, 6th, and 9th AA Platoons from the 29th Civil Affairs Company continued to work in refugee camps in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The refugee population in the Americal TAOI numbers approximately 61,313.
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1.Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) material: This office continued to coordinate the shipment of CORDS material to Quang Ngai Province during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health supplies</td>
<td>3 conexes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td>3 pallets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification:

   a. The Americal Division continues to support the GVN Pacification Program throughout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces.

   b. Phase II of the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign ended 31 December 1969. The 1970 Pacification and Development Program was instituted by the GVN on 1 January 1970.

   c. The goals for the 1970 Pacification and Development Program are:

      (1) Territorial Security:

         (a) 100% of all hamlets in an A, B, or C status according to the Hamlet Evaluation System, and 90% of those in A or B status.

         (b) Reduction of enemy-initiated attacks by 50% in consolidation zones, and by 75% in secure zones.

         (c) Expand the National Police to 122,500 and deploy downward, reduce or eliminate curfews.

      (2) Protection Against Terrorism: Neutralize 1800 VCI monthly. Emphasis will be placed on targeting, prompt release of the innocent, and effective detention and rehabilitation of the guilty.

      (3) Peoples Self Defense Forces: Reach a total strength of 1,500,000 combat effectiveness, in addition to 1,500,000 support personnel. Arm 500,000 and emphasize political mobilization and development tasks.
(4) Improve Local Administration: Have elected councils in every hamlet, village and province. Fully staff all positions and train all officials. Increase village tax revenues and budgetary autonomy.

(5) Greater National Unity: Rally 40,000 Ho Chi Minhs. Strive for lower level ralliers and whole units and emphasize return to normal and useful life.

(6) Brighter life for war victims: Emphasize return to villages. Convert remaining refugee camps into hamlets and improve the lives of war victims.

(7) Peoples Information: Emphasize mass political mobilization by face-to-face techniques. Make local commanders responsible and get all ministries and cadre together.

(8) Prosperity for All: Promote rural prosperity, urban development. Institute land reform and turn 336,000 hectares of land to the tillers.

d. The Americal Division is continuing its increased activity in support of the GVN Pacification and Development Program. The 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, continued the Infantry Company Intensified Pacification Program (ICIPP) during the reporting period. On 8 January 1970, the program was redesignated Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP). 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, continued its support of pacification with one company working in and around seven targeted hamlets. 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, has one company working with ARVN forces in and around their targeted hamlets.

e. Progress in the pacification program in the Americal TAOI during the reporting period:

(1) Security of population (as of 31 Dec 69):

   (a) Quang Tin: 370,581  86.6%  
   (b) Quang Ngai: 644,644  92.6%
(2) VCI neutralized (as of 31 Dec 69): Totals for 1969.

(a) Quang Tin: 430 1,762
(b) Quang Ngai: 186 945

(c) Peoples Self Defense Force (as of 25 Jan 70):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>ORGANIZED</th>
<th>TRAINED</th>
<th>ARMED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Quang Tin</td>
<td>75,495</td>
<td>54,636</td>
<td>13,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Quang Ngai</td>
<td>85,818</td>
<td>63,162</td>
<td>9,922</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Government Status: All villages and hamlets in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces have elected officials. The Village Self Development Fund continues to provide a major source of revenue in upgrading and improving standards of living in villages and hamlets. During 1969, 32,273,900$VN were spent in Quang Tin province and 56,105,000$VN in Quang Ngai province from this fund.

1. The Americal Division is continuing its support of Revolutionary Development through the MEDCAP II program. Through regularly-scheduled visits by MEDCAP personnel, as required through the MEDCAP II program, the quality of treatment continues to increase while training of GVN medical personnel is better affected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDCAPS</th>
<th>PERSONS TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) 11th Bde</td>
<td>103 9,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) 196th Bde</td>
<td>106 12,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) 198th Bde</td>
<td>76 6,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) DIAVAY</td>
<td>16 576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 26th Engr Bn</td>
<td>5 668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) NCOAD</td>
<td>6 58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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4. (c) PSYOP Activities (Nov 69 - Jan 70):

a. Leaflets dropped by aircraft, by campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>7,613,000</td>
<td>10,065,000</td>
<td>19,872,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>763,000</td>
<td>734,000</td>
<td>2,899,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC</td>
<td>609,000</td>
<td>422,000</td>
<td>979,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-NVA</td>
<td>571,000</td>
<td>589,000</td>
<td>682,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total leaflet drop missions flown by the 9th Special Operations Squadron, USAF, in support of the Americal Division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Total Newspapers distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>41,950</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Aerial Loudspeaker Targets during the period:
**AVIA-RL**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report—Lessons Learned, American Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOH-65 (R2) (U)

**10 February 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aerial tape targets</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial tape time</td>
<td>4:45</td>
<td>14:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlyword targets</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlyword time</td>
<td>5:45</td>
<td>22:55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliborne targets</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliborne broadcast time</td>
<td>15:15</td>
<td>7:20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. **Ground Louderspeaker broadcast:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast hours</td>
<td>197:15</td>
<td>181:15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. **Waterborne Loudspeaker broadcast:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast time</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. **Movie Missions conducted during the period:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movie missions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movies shown</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie hours</td>
<td>30:45</td>
<td>20:15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 Jan 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Attenance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>6,080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Hoi Chanhs in the Americal Division TAOC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>545</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) Recent Significant Developments:

a. In an attempt to provide a more widespread coverage via loudspeaker broadcast media, the 198th Brigade PSYOP Section broadcast Chieu Hoi messages from a Coast Guard cutter along the coastline. Broadcasts have been made from Swift Boats before; however, this was the first time the Division has utilized a Coast Guard cutter.

b. New PSYOP Campaigns:

(1) During December 1969 and January 1970 the Americal Division PSYOP Section conducted an Anti-Infiltration Campaign directed at VC and NVA main force units. The campaign objective was to demoralize the enemy by depicting on leaflets the hardships he will encounter within Americal TAOC. The Chieu Hoi Campaign was explained and offered as the only alternative to death at the hands of the GVN and FNMAF. Leaflet drops were made from organic helicopters on all major infiltration routes in the Division TAOC.

(2) A TET PSYOP Campaign was begun in January to support the TET 1970 national program. Objectives of the PSYOP Campaign were to stress family unity, to align the populace with the GVN, and to encourage the VC to rally under the Chieu Hoi Program.

c. Enemy Propaganda: This reporting period, enemy propaganda efforts were more than doubled over the previous quarter. Twelve separate incidents of loudspeaker, leaflet or face-to-face propaganda were directed against Vietnamese nationals and FNMAF. There were also twelve instances of propaganda directed against US forces. A chronological listing of known enemy propaganda is in Paragraph 6.
6. (C) Enemy Propaganda Incidents:

a. 6 Nov 69 - RD Cadre located at BT456076 heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast. The broadcast was in Vietnamese.

b. 071300H Nov 69 - C Company, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, found enemy propaganda leaflets in the vicinity of AT970231. They were written in English and directed at US troops. The theme was anti-American.

c. 122120H Nov 69 - PF unit #216, located at BS785444, heard a VC loudspeaker broadcast in Vietnamese telling the PF's to Chieu Hoi to the VC.

d. 23 Nov 69 - The 39th Engineer Battalion mine sweep team found enemy propaganda leaflets in the vicinity of BS912148. The leaflets were written in English and directed at US troops. The theme was anti-American.

e. 29 Nov 69 - The ARVN's found enemy propaganda leaflets in the vicinity of BT338177. The leaflets were written in English and directed at US troops. The theme was anti-American.

f. 061300H Dec 69 - At FSB Fat City, the 26th Engineer Battalion, heard an enemy propaganda broadcast. The broadcast was in English and directed at US troops. The theme was anti-American.

g. 172020H Dec 69 - Tu My Village received an enemy loudspeaker broadcast. The broadcast was in Vietnamese and directed at the villagers. The broadcast told them to Chieu Hoi to the VC or be killed.

h. 17 Dec 69 - D Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, found an enemy propaganda banner 20 feet long and 3 feet wide. The message on the banner was written in English. It wished the Americans a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year, and urged the troops to demand an end to the war.

i. 25 Dec 69 - C Company, 39th Engineer Battalion, found a Christmas tree in the vicinity of BS754496. The tree was decorated with bags containing fish and propaganda leaflets written in English.

j. 25 Dec 69 - CAP 1-3-3 found enemy propaganda leaflets at Phuoc Hau #1 (BS662978) and Phuoc Hau #2 (BS68391) Hamlets. The leaflets were in English and directed at the NVA soldier, telling him that the black man's and yellow man's causes are the same.
AVDF-HL 10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 Jan 70, RCS CPOR-65 (R2) (U)

k. 061920 and 072145H Jan 70 - The village of Tu My (BS548743) heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast telling the RF's and PF's to Chieu Hoi to the VC or be killed.

l. 07 Jan 70 - The Americal Division received a group of VC propaganda documents. Some of the documents were written in Vietnamese with anti-GVN texts, and some were written in English with anti-American text.

m. 031730 Jan 70 - 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196 Infantry Brigade, found enemy propaganda leaflets tacked to trees in the vicinity of BT190302. There were four types of leaflets. All were written in English and directed at US troops. The themes were anti-American.

n. 101950H Jan 70 - At Tu My Village (BS548743) a VC loudspeaker broadcast was directed at the RF/PP's telling them to Chieu Hoi to the VC or be killed. On 132035H Jan 70 the broadcast was repeated.

o. 112000H Jan 70 - D Company, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry (BT143329), heard a loudspeaker broadcast. The broadcast was in Vietnamese and said, "Join the VC and kill the Americans you are working with."

p. 17 Jan 70 - Enemy propaganda leaflets were found in the vicinity of BS233423. They were written in Vietnamese and denounced the South Vietnamese military and government.

q. 182010H Jan 70 - D Company, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, BT148298, heard a VC loudspeaker broadcast telling the PF's and villagers to come to the VC.

r. 212030H Jan 70 - PF platoon 115, at BS858313, heard a megaphone broadcast telling them to Chieu Hoi to the VC.

s. 230825H Jan 70 - The Assistant Hamlet Chief of Van Truong hamlet found enemy propaganda leaflets in the vicinity of BS781436. The leaflets were written in English and directed at US troops. The themes were anti-American.

t. 230945H Jan 70 - After completing an Earlyphone broadcast, the 11th Brigade S5 received a transmission from an unknown station. The unknown station stated in Vietnamese that the Americans did not mean what they said. They requested the S5 to answer them. The S5 did not answer. The unknown station terminated its transmissions.
u. 231255H Jan 70 - CAP 1-3-12 investigated an explosion in the hamlet of Lien Tri #4 and found enemy propaganda leaflets. They were written in English and directed at US troops. Both themes were anti-American.
II. Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observation, Evaluations, Recommendations (U).

A. Personnel.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Transmission of Financial Data Records Folders

   a. Observation: Finance records are transmitted to U.S. Army Personnel Center, Far East, APO San Francisco 96343, by registered mail on DA Form 200, through the MEDEVAC Section upon receipt of the hospital transfer message.

   b. Evaluation: The current method has the following drawbacks:

      (1) FDRF’s do not accompany the patients.

      (2) Members do not receive regular pay, only partials at hospital in Japan.

      (3) Copies of the part pay vouchers are not filed in the member’s FDRF by the Finance Office, USARJ, but rather are filed in temporary folders, titled Financial Data Records Folder Temporary MEDEVACS Only, Hqs, USARJ Form 8588.

      (4) USARJ Forms 8588 are transmitted to next station separately from the member’s FDRF resulting in late collection of part pays.

      (5) The large volume of requests for FDRF’s which are received here from the member’s next duty station indicates that considerable time passes before a member’s FDRF is dispatched from the Far East record facility. Likewise, when an evacuee returns to Vietnam from hospitalization in Japan, the Personnel Center does not include a transfer order showing the unit of assignment to which the member is returning. This also causes a hardship and takes an excessive amount of time to locate the member’s unit of assignment.

   c. Recommendation: That all FDRF’s of evacuees who are not ambulatory be retained by their respective Finance Office and only a certificate be forwarded to Personnel Center Far East stating that the FDRF’s will be forwarded upon receipt of request from the gaining unit or hospital. This procedure, if used, would possibly serve as better finance service since the member’s records would continually be maintained until the request for FDRF is received.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Mechanization of AMEXCO Bank Listing
AODF-HL

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, American Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, 8CS CSF08-63 (R2) (U)

a. Observation: Money deposited direct to American Express Banking Facility by the Finance Officer for credit to accounts of service members previously required an ADP (Advice of Deposit of Pay) prepared individually. This entailed utilisation of three personnel for a minimum of three days to complete the project. Approximately 30 manhours were expended monthly. In addition, numerous errors were created due to transposing of figures, misspelled names, use of initials only, and illegible handwritten ADP's. Although these ADP's eliminated the necessity for a check list, their use did not eliminate the human error factor.

b. Evaluation: In recognizing the capability for preparation of mechanized listing, the pay division established a means whereby such listing may be prepared on a monthly basis and at the same time procures monthly payroll totals for use in balancing accounts prior to submission of information to banking facility. Additional mechanical listing is furnished the banking facility, showing name, SSN, NOV #, amount paid and account numbers. This listing is sorted in account number sequence, permitting earlier and more accurate posting by bank employees, since account files are maintained also in numerical sequence. The overall use of this mechanical listing saves approximately 60 manhours per month, and at the same time eliminates probability of error by 90%. All information taken from source document is verified and listing is totaled. Totals are compared against 8CS total to insure accurate balance. Errors have been practically at zero since application of this method.

c. Recommendation: Use of such mechanical listings to save time and prevent errors.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Issuance of U.S. Treasury Checks

a. Observation: Treasury checks issued by the Finance Office on behalf of service members are being returned by banks and sales organizations and insurance companies because the account number is not included with the remittance.

b. Evaluation: Treasury checks returned requesting account numbers results in a dual problem:

1. Finance office personnel are required to spend additional time researching the name and unit of the purchaser, contact the purchaser for additional information, and resend the check.

2. The service member incurs delay in receiving credit for the check. Such delay can result in overdraft bank accounts, additional service charges, curtailment of credit, bad credit ratings, and personal embarrassment to the service member.

c. Recommendation: That all treasury check purchase forms (MACV 385) going to third party organizations be required to have account numbers when applicable. Additionally, MACV Form 385 should be amended to provide an additional line in the payee section for account number.
AVDF-IHL
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Berlin
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR—65 (M2) (U)

4. (U) SUBJECT: Forwarding Records and Personal Property of Medically Evacuated Personnel

a. Observation: The normal time lapse between receipt of hospital transfer orders and forwarding of records and personal property has been reduced from 12-15 days to 3-4 days.

b. Evaluation: Improvement in forwarding records and personal property of medically evacuated personnel resulted from the following:

(1) Forwarding advance notification of MEDEVACs taken from Admission and Disposition Sheets prepared by the in-country medical facility rather than waiting for transfer orders (Incl 1). This gives the units a 3-4 day lead time in inventorying and preparing personal property for shipment upon receipt of orders, and immediate forwarding of health and dental records to MEDEVAC Section.

(2) The immediate reproduction of USAMT’s message orders and delivery of units involved on the day of receipt of orders by this headquarters (Incl 3).

(3) The consolidation of MEDEVAC Section with the Casualty Branch under the supervision of the Chief, Casualty Branch. This provided closer coordination of related items and established tighter controls on MEDEVAC records.

c. Recommendation: That commands concerned be reminded of the continuous emphasis required for timely forwarding of records and personal property for medically evacuated personnel in order to provide the best possible services to patient personnel.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Off Limits Violators

a. Observation: Off limit violators are usually involved in other offenses. One of prime concern to military police is AWOL. Control of off limits is a continuing problem, especially in areas where military police support is limited.

b. Evaluation: The majority of potential off limits violators are controlled by gate personnel who effect strict compliance towards proper authorization and spot checking such authorization directly back to the unit. Many such checks of individuals result in the return of AWOL’s to military control. Frequently, such spot checks are made on individuals in need of haircuts, those committing uniform violations, or those with altered or incorrect authorization. In routine patrol areas, similar checks as those described above result in detection and apprehension of AWOL’s.

c. Recommendation: That current off limits policy be strictly enforced.
5. (U) SUBJECT: Chapel Facilities on Fire Bases

a. Observation: Many of the battalion fire bases on the Americal Division Area of Operations have specially constructed chapels. They range from simple sea hut chapels to more sophisticated structures. Construction has resulted in a large expenditure of man hours—chaplain, engineer, and troop labor—and a healthy dollar outlay in materials. The chapels are largely relegated to religious purposes. However, there are some buildings which have been designed as all-purpose morale-type facilities; these are used as day rooms when not employed for religious services. With the Vietnamization of the war and routine relocation of fire bases these constructed buildings become lost facilities. Battalion fire bases rarely have over a company size unit at any one time and attendance at any one chapel service normally is under 40. There is reason to believe that these observations concerning chapels are typical of many battalion fire bases in Vietnam.

b. Evaluation:

(1) The withdrawal of US Forces will leave many fire base chapel facilities in Vietnam. This will result in loss of dollars, manhours, and gold flow (materials are often pruchased from the economy).

(2) It should be pointed out that construction of unit chapels have contributed much to organizational esprit. Men involved identify themselves with the chapel and there are beneficial results to such identification. However, after the individual has rotated, little of this esprit is passed on to his successor. It should be pointed out that many chaplains have spent untold hours in chapel construction programs, hours which could be more appropriately used ministering to their troops. Fire base commanders would also verify that there is never sufficient labor available to maintain the bases to the degree of effectiveness they desire. There is a constant need for rebuilding bunkers, filling sand bags, etc. This labor is used to build fire base chapels.

(3) The impact of paragraphs b1 and b2 would appear to force a reconsideration of past chapel construction procedures on fire bases.

(4) This evaluation is not applicable to chapel facilities at more permanent installations, such as large logistical complexes.

c. Recommendation: That consideration be given to making an all-purpose morale-type facility available to chaplains at battalion size units or remote areas. The facility should feature versatility. It should have an air conditioning-heating system, public address system, day room facilities, motion picture facilities, a self-contained generator, and should seat approximately 40 people. It must be portable and could take the shape of a POD lifted by the CH 54 or one of the inflatable wards of a MUST hospital. Module construction could also be utilized making it possible to link several units together to make a larger facility. It would appear possible to have such a facility
included in the TOE for battalion size units. It is believed that these facilities could be manufactured at a price, which when amortized over the life time of the unit, would make its pragmatic expenditure. Although the unit would be a chaplain facility, it would not be intended as a living or office space and would be moved only when the battalion base relocated. Although this concept is known to have been considered at Department of Army level, there has been no known field input to justify implementation.

B. Intelligence.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Assignment of Ranger Teams

a. Observation: The 198th Infantry Brigade was not receiving immediate intelligence from Ranger Teams in the 198th TAOR.

b. Evaluation: Teams operating in the 198th TAOR were being controlled from the Division TOC. Information was going from the team, through Ranger TOC, to the Division TOC, then being sent to the brigade.

c. Recommendation: There are now 3 Ranger teams OPCON to the 198th Infantry Brigade, and the teams are controlled from the Brigade TOC. The battalion in whose area the team is operating monitors the team's frequency.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Training for ARVN LERP's

a. Observation: ARVN LERP's assigned to the Ranger Company were having a language difficulty.

b. Evaluation: Some of the ARVN LERP's were having considerable difficulty expressing themselves in English. This caused inconvenience and possible danger while on a mission.

c. Recommendation: The company is now conducting English language classes during off duty time.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Increasing Effectiveness of Sensor Strings

a. Observation: Target Mission Force sought a method of increasing the effectiveness of sensor strings.

b. Evaluation: TMF conducted experiments using the D mode with a confirming sensor. Before a signal is emitted from the transmitter, both the confirming sensor and the Minisid must be activated within a period of 20 seconds. As a result, any signal emitted is caused by both a seismic activation and a magnetic or heat activation depending upon which confirming sensor is employed.

c. Recommendation: Utilization of this mode is effective in decreasing false activations and limiting the number of tone codes employed.

4. (C) SUBJECT: Sensors in Field Base Defense
CONFIDENTIAL

AFDP-HL

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (H2) (U)

a. Observation: Sensors can be effectively employed in fire base defense.

b. Evaluation: Line sensors have been used in the following ways:

(1) Close-in perimeter coverage utilizing PPS-5 radars, Xeon search lights and MOD equipment to complement system.

(2) Dead space coverage where no surveillance means other than line sensors are effective.

(3) The combined use of MCID, IID, and BPS systems to gauge sensitivity and activity of area.

c. Recommendation: Using line sensors in this manner improves the security of a fire base.

5. (C) SUBJECT: Air Readout and Air Delivery of Sensors

a. Observation: The Americal Division had no means of air readout or air delivery of sensors.

b. Evaluation: An important capability of sensors was not being realized. Air delivery and readout capability have been developed in the OV-10 aircraft. It sends ADSB/D strings from an altitude of 1500 feet and a speed of 130 knots, and it monitors the strings. The U6A aircraft, outfitted with Portatales and external antennae connections, is also used to monitor. Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) is not present, and selective monitoring is possible by choosing orbit and altitude in mountainous terrain.

c. Recommendation: The U6A and OV-10 aircraft can effectively be used in an air delivery or readout role for unattended ground sensors.

6. (C) SUBJECT: Air support for LRHP Teams

a. Observation: Frequently LRHP teams are deployed in areas beyond the range of organic artillery, during periods when VFR air support is precluded by adverse weather conditions. Unless alternative support is developed, teams deployed in these areas are without tactical air/artillery support.

b. Evaluation: A review of available support assets raised the possibility of deploying Air Force RABPAC Transponder Beacons (PH 5142) in support of LRHP missions planned for areas beyond artillery range. Deploying a beacon would make tactical air support available in all types of weather and would permit deeper, more accurate exploitation of permanent enemy base areas which are out of range of artillery and normal ground controlled activity. An accurate grid plot of the beacon's location is essential to the success of an air strike; therefore the beacon should not be with the maneuver element of the team. The LRHP radio relay team, whose planned position is stationary during the operation, should have the beacon and be responsible for putting it into operation. UHF communications
e. **Recommendations:**

1. That consideration be given to deploying HABFAC Transponder Beacons, where Beacons are available, with LHRP teams when the team’s mission requires that they be located beyond available artillery range during periods of adverse weather.

2. That beacon strikes be requested in advance so that they are on station, if needed, and may be diverted if not required.

3. That the beacon be positioned in an well plotted, stationary location.

7. **SUBJECT:** Organization of Intelligence Data

a. **Observation:** The large volume of intelligence information necessitates some system of organization so that it can be of use to commanders at all levels.

b. **Evaluation:** One useful method has been to divide the battalion area of operations into square areas of four to six squares each. All intelligence information is recorded permanently under the designation of the area involved. This has proved particularly valuable in familiarizing company commanders with areas which they have not operated for extended periods of time.

c. **Recommendation:** That this process be adopted by battalion sized units.

8. **SUBJECT:** Reaction to Sensor Activations

a. **Observation:** Reaction to sensor device activations solely with indirect fire weapons results in negative or, at least, delayed observation. It has been noted that after varying periods of time after emplacement of a sensor string, activations will almost cease and in many cases new trails will be cut to bypass the immediate area of the sitting.

b. **Evaluation:** In order to maximize the value of sensor devices, reaction by friendly elements must not set a pattern. If enemy personnel continue to draw artillery fire in one particular area they soon plan their movement to avoid that area.

c. **Recommendation:** Reaction to sensor activation should be varied to include interception by ground elements, air cavalry, Forward Air Controller Aircraft, or even the battalion command and control aircraft. The best means of avoiding a pattern is to periodically relocate the sensor strings.

**CONFIDENTIAL**
9. (C) SUBJECT: Source Gap of Tactical Units

a. Observation: On many occasions tactical units are not receiving information on a timely basis, which would directly affect their combat operations. Information in many instances is lacking in locating low level VC, guerrillas, and local force unit dispositions in battalion areas of operation.

b. Evaluation: The lack of essential information of this type affects the degree of security the battalion can provide the indigenous population and prevents the timely employment of combat troops in areas where enemy elements could be neutralized. To eliminate this "source gap," battalions were encouraged to work closely with leaders of local populace to gain more reliable information on enemy movements and locations. In addition, battalions were encouraged to recruit agents for development of an information net which would be responsive to the needs of the battalion. This recruitment has been partially successful and, in several instances, such information has led to the neutralization of VC, location of small cache sites, bunkers utilized by enemy elements, and elimination of personnel of local force units. The initial success of this program has created enthusiasm among the units presently using such information sources and has significantly reduced the time required to react to valuable information.

c. Recommendation: Battalions should be encouraged to develop a reliable and responsive information net.

10. (C) SUBJECT: Utilization of Former Members of PRU

a. Observation: Recent instructions from the provincial government of Quang Ngai has caused the strength of Provincial Recon Units (PRU) to be curtailed.

b. Evaluation: The release of personnel who are highly qualified in information gathering and VCI elimination affected the ability of friendly elements to locate and destroy the VC infrastructure. A means of recruitment has been implemented to continue to utilize these personnel in an intelligence gathering role. One former member of PRU, presently attending Kit Carson Scout training in Chu Lai, will be assigned to the 11th Infantry Brigade, while another is currently employed as an agent by an American Counterintelligence team. The value of these personnel is tremendous and their placement in various roles of intelligence gathering is limited only by the imagination of the recruiters.

c. Recommendation: Highly trained and effective personnel released from Provincial Units should be utilized in the gathering of intelligence in areas in which they are trained.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period
Ending 31 January 1970, HCS C35-65 (R2) (U)

11. (C) SUBJECT: PSID Employment

a. Observation: Most units employing the PSID (Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector) in both NDP and ambush sites have reported dissatisfaction with the set due to its apparent hypersensitivity. Several units have totally discarded the set as a reliable means of early warning on the incorrect assumption that because the set generally emits continuous signals, indicating intrusion into the area under surveillance, it was therefore unreliable in its designed role.

b. Evaluation: The PSID, while fairly simple to operate, has not received enough attention from using units concerning selective employment and careful experimentation. Like other seismic detectors, its capabilities vary in proportion to the surrounding terrain. When the soil composition tends to be soft and damp, the gain control must be adjusted to a higher sensitivity setting. Conversely, when the soil composition is hard and rocky, the gain control must be adjusted to a lower sensitivity ("I" is not too low for effective operation) to successfully detect intrusion while simultaneously rejecting false activations. False activations are all activations caused by seismic vibrations emanating from sources other than friendly or enemy personnel. Examples of false activations are helicopters flying overhead, artillery impacting up to 100 meters away, reconnaissance by fire, proximity to running water, swaying bushes, and trees in heavy wind.

c. Recommendation: The PSID is deceptively simple in both appearance and operation. If careful attention is given regarding the set's sensitivity and gain control, its performance should ultimately prove satisfactory to the user. It is recommended that each unit provide training on the set to be used, the type of soil composition likely to be found in the area, proper implantation of the geophone (for reduction of false activations), and user discernment between true and false activations. The PSID is currently being modified at its in-country arrival port to minimize false activations once employed in critical situations.

12. (C) SUBJECT: Treatment of Detainees in the Field

a. Observation: Detainees captured by field units are occasionally harassed or mistreated before reaching the brigade level. These actions against detainees are carried out by capturing personnel or those personnel assigned to transport detainees to the brigade level interrogation point.

b. Evaluation: The mistreated detainee, when interrogated at brigade level, is afraid to reveal information which he suspects will result in his further mistreatment or killed. Therefore, the information received from the detainee is erroneous or of no tactical value. Interrogation has revealed that the local guerrillas and cadresmen have warned the population of being mistreated by US or ARVN personnel if they discover that they have contact with or have been a member of a VC organization. The mistreatment of detainees in the field is the first step in fulfilling that warning.
c. **Recommendation:** Physical contact with the detainee in the field, aside from the required amount necessary for actual detention and search, should be kept to a minimum. This policy will facilitate interrogation and expedites the dissemination of tactically important information to the field.

13. (C) **SUBJECT:** Transfer of Capture Details from the Field to the Interrogation Point

a. **Observation:** Detainees coming in from the field to the brigade interrogation point occasionally arrive with no capture date and, quite frequently, with no circumstances of capture.

b. **Evaluation:** Upon reaching the brigade level interrogation point, the detainee has had ample time to fabricate a false story concerning his capture. The interrogation team has no alternative but to take the detainee's word as being true or contact the capturing unit's rear element, which usually doesn't have any more information than is already known by the interrogators.

c. **Recommendation:** Every detainee that is sent in from the field should be accompanied by as much information concerning capture of that detainee as the tactical situation permits. Information should include: (1) facts concerning any contacts in the area; (2) exactly what the detainee had in his possession at the time of capture; and (3) all information detainee revealed while still in the field.

C. Operations.

1. (C) **SUBJECT:** Booby Traps

a. **Observation:** At 1400 hours on 29 December 1969 a platoon leader from 3-1 Inf Bn triggered a booby trap consisting of an 82 mm mortar round. The resulting explosion severed both his legs and one arm.

b. **Evaluation:** A platoon from the 3-1 Inf Bn was conducting local patrols west of Quang Ngai City in an area five miles due west of FSB 4-11. It was discovered that the area was heavily infested with punji stakes. The platoon leader instructed all members of the platoon to walk cautiously and to avoid the areas in which the punji stakes had been placed. He was by-passing a particularly heavily punji staked area when he detonated the pressure type booby trap.

c. **Recommendation:** Movement through and around areas involving punji stakes must be made with the utmost caution. In this case punji stakes were utilized to canalize the troops into the area of the booby trap.

2. (C) **SUBJECT:** Stay-Behind Ambush

a. **Observation:** At 0930 hours, 21 January 1970, one reinforced squad from Co C/3-1 Inf Bn, sprung an ambush in the unit's night defensive position, killing two NVA and capturing one AK-47.
b. **Evaluation:** The stay-behind ambush has consistently proven to be an effective means of catching the enemy unawares. It is a known fact that a favorite tactic is to track US units to gain information and confiscate any equipment left behind. Co C/3-1 Inf Bn employed a reinforced squad stay-behind ambush in the vicinity of their night defensive position as the remainder of the company began a reconnaissance-in-force. Less than one hour later a three man NVA reconnaissance team walked into the company's vacated position. They immediately went to the old company CP area, indicating that they had been observing the company prior to departure. The ambush was sprung and two of the three NVA were killed.

c. **Recommendation:** Stay-behind patrols and ambushes should be employed in conjunction with movement out of night defensive positions.

3. **(C) SUBJECT:** Closing with the Enemy

a. **Observation:** At times Armored Cavalry troops have been reluctant to close on objectives because of the usually dense tree lines and hedgerows normally characteristic of the enemy's defensive positions. In some instances they have preferred to attack these positions by fire while standing off from the objectives at a distance of 200-300 meters.

b. **Evaluation:** The technique of attacking only by fire has proven unsatisfactory. While the unit sits in a stationary position firing upon the objective two things are happening. First, the enemy is maneuvering his tank-killer teams to firing positions from which they can place effective antitank fire on our vehicles. Second, the enemy is using the trench lines and dikes that normally make up his defensive positions to shift his forces out of the objective area. This results in the friendly units taking a considerable amount of antitank fire and achieving little success when they finally search the objective.

c. **Recommendation:** That all armored cavalry units close on their objectives as rapidly as possible carrying their assaults into the tree lines and hedgerows. Armored Cavalry troops should be reinforced with at least one rifle platoon to assist in securing objectives once the unit has closed on it.

4. **(U) SUBJECT:** Filler Panels for AVLB

a. **Observation:** The AVLB is often impassable to the local Vietnamese vehicles, especially three wheeled vehicles, due to the gap between the tree lines and hedgerows. US vehicles with small wheel base also occasionally have difficulty passing the bridge. Filler panels constructed of salvaged AV-2 airfield m. ting and installed in the gap alleviates the problem.

b. **Evaluation:** The AVLB equipped with filler panels passes the three-wheeled Vietnamese vehicles rapidly and passes US traffic at a much faster. This is particularly useful when the AVLB is employed on a main highway civilian and military traffic alike.

c. **Recommendation:** Filler panels be used on AVLB's when they are to be employed for other than strictly tactical purposes.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, 8CS CSPOR—65 (R2) (U)

5. (C) SUBJECT: Use of Smoke and CS as Early Warning Devices

   a. Observation: VC/NVA frequent attack Day Patrol Bases (DPB) and Night Defensive Positions (NDP) after US use. They are also known to trail units on the move.

   b. Evaluation: When the tactical situation does not permit use of stay behind ambushes and the terrain does not allow direct observation of recently used DPB's and NDP’s or the back trail, smoke and CS grenades have been employed with trip wires in or along such locations. The grid coordinates of the smoke and CS grenades are plotted as well as the color of smoke employed. Observation of the area is maintained and artillery fire immediately placed upon it when the smoke grenade is activated.

   c. Recommendation: That trip wired smoke grenades be employed as early warning devices along back trails and recently used DPB’s and NDP’s. The smoke grenade should be trip wired and the CS grenade surreptitiously wired to the smoke grenade to preclude removal or deactivation of the smoke grenade. Artillery fire should be immediately placed on the area of any activated smoke grenades.

6. (C) SUBJECT: Use of IOS to Calibrate AN/TPQ-10 Radar

   a. Observation: Whenever a part in the computer section of the AN/TPQ-10 radar, which is used to process Combat Skyspot (CSS), is replaced, it is necessary to calibrate the set to insure that it is operating within the maximum acceptable tolerance of 50 meters. In the past, this has been done by an air force FAC observing and reporting the strike of the bombs. Ideal weather conditions must exist so that the FAC can observe the burst of the bombs in relationship to the target. Consequently, inclement weather or periods of limited visibility would preclude calibrating the AN/TPQ-10 radar. To alleviate the problem the IOS was utilized to check its feasibility and compatibility in calibrating the AN/TPQ-10 radar.

   b. Evaluation: On 24 January 1970, the IOS at O.P. 1 was set up to observe a CSS strike at BS475811. It was determined that the IOS could readily determine the exact location of a CSS strike. This evaluation revealed that the target must be visible and on relatively flat terrain and should be within the 10 km operating distance of the IOS.

   c. Recommendation: That it is feasible to utilize the IOS to calibrate the AN/TPQ-10 and that future calibrations be conducted utilizing the IOS.

D. Organization. None.
E. Training.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Small Unit Leadership

a. Observation: Units have been experiencing a continual lack of qualified non-commissioned officers to fill leadership positions such as squad leaders, section leaders, and platoon sergeant. Generally, a PFC or SP/4 would emerge in filling the vacant slots and perform outstandingly. On numerous occasions, a graduate of the non-commissioned officer candidate course would then arrive, and assume the duty heretofore held by a young, non-promotable SP/4. The NCO generally had the technical knowledge needed for the job, but lacked the experience and leadership to run the squad. The entire process creates animosity within the squad. The new NCO then has an extremely difficult time in winning the respect and becoming the "leader" of his squad. In many cases, the SP/4 remains, in reality, in charge, and the NCO becomes a squad member.

b. Evaluation: The main problems encountered are:

(1) Lack of leadership potential in many of the graduates of the non-commissioned officer candidate course.

(2) A lack of experience in the "instant" NCO's leading to an inability to cope with leading a group of men.

c. Recommendation: More stress should be placed on leadership training in the non-commissioned officer candidate course, especially the leadership and supervision of a squad size element.

F. Logistics. None.

G. Communications.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Photo Processing

a. Observation: Ansco film, black and white, rated ASA 500 and ASA 320 respectively does not develop suitably with Kodak chemicals.

b. Evaluation: If processed at the prescribed time and temperature for this type film, the result is a thin, washed-out negative.

c. Recommendation: That Ansco film be re-rated to ASA 320 and ASA 15 respectively. Thus, correct processing is 14 minutes using Kodak Micro-K developer.

H. Material. None.
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10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, ROC CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

I. Other.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Multi-Interest News Events

a. Observation: In November and December, the alleged My Lai incident once again brought international attention to the Americal Division. Like the alleged Alpha Company "mutiny", this story was very unfavorable to the Americal Division and the US Army.

b. Evaluation: Large numbers of civilian correspondents were arriving in Chu Lai and asking to go to the village of My Lai. The newsmen's visits overlapped with those of General Peers and his committee, and the newsmen were not allowed in the village during the times when General Peers and his investigation team were there. This required extensive planning and coordination between project officers.

c. Recommendation: That the Information Officer be notified early in the planning stages of special projects, as was done in this case.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Employment of HB Teams

a. Observation: The ground broadcast team, consisting of one American Sergeant, one ARVN Interpreter, and four Kit Carson Scouts, continues to be a valuable asset to the Brigade and to unit commanders in the field. Recently, emphasis has been put on more person to person contact with the people.

b. Evaluation: The person to person contact method has fostered better relations with the local population and proven to be a more effective way of gaining information. People are more willing to reply when asked a question personally than when asked as a group through loud speakers.

c. Recommendation: That person to person communication be utilized whenever possible.
AVDP-1L

10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

T. H. Tackaberry

Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

1 Inc1

Americal Div Troop List

DISTRIBUTION:
1-ACSFOR-DA (Thru USAFAC)
2-ACSFOR-DA (Thru US/UK)
2-CINCUSARFORCIN
3-CG, USAFR
1-OCHM-DA
2-CO, 11th Inf Bde
2-CO, 196th Inf Bde
2-CO, 198th Inf Bde
2-CO, Americal Div Art'y
8-CO, Americal DISCOM
2-CO, 16th CAG
1-CO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
1-CO, 26th Engr Bn
1-CO, 523d Sig Bn
1-CO, 23d MP Co
1-CO, HHC, Americal Div
1-CO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 21st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf
1-CO, 3d Bn, 21st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 46th Inf
1-CO, 2d Bn, 46th Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 52 Inf
1-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Art'y
1-CO, 1st Bn, 14th Art'y
1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Art'y
1-CO, 3d Bn, 16th Art'y
1-CO, 3d Bn, 18th Art'y
1-CO, 1st Bn, 82d Art'y
1-CO, E Troop, 1st Cav
1-CO, F Troop, 17th Cav

1-00, H Troop, 17th Cav
1-00, 123d Avn Bn
1-00, 14th Avn Bn
1-00, 3d Mil Hist Det
1-ACoSFs, G3
10-ACoSFs, G3
10-ACoSFs, G5
1-ACoSFs, G4
1-Chemical
1-Engineer
1-Signal
1-Aviation
1-Provost Marshall
1-Staff Judge Advocate
1-Information Officer
1-Inspector General
1-Surgeon
1-Chaplain
1-Adjutant General
1-III MAP LNO
2-TACP (ALO), Americal Div
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AVNIGC-DST (10 February 1970) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS COFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-UT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from
Headquarters, Americal Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Americal KCS Program", page 28
paragraph 3f(4). MACV is developing a standarized identification card
for Kit Carson Scouts. The card will be hard to counterfeit, and the color
of the card will be changed every 4 to 6 months and reissued. The cards
will be in serial number sequence. However, this ID card will not replace
GVN national identity cards, nor will it replace or serve in place of
draft deferment certificates. National Police will accept as evidence of
valid draft deferment only the certificate issued.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Transmission of Financial Data
Records Folders (FDRF's)", page 60, paragraph A1; concur. The substitution
of a certificate for the FDRF for those evacuees who are not ambulatory
merits further investigation. Comptroller will contact the US Army
personnel Center, Far East, to obtain their views on the proposal and,
if applicable, coordinate the procedures to be utilized.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Mechanization of ANBICO Bank
Listing", page 60, paragraph A2; concur. This recommendation has been
successfully implemented by the Americal Division and will be publicised
for use by other finance offices.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Issuance of US Treasury Checks",
page 61, paragraph A3; concur. Comptroller will initiate a letter to
COMUSMACV recommending MACV Form 385 be revised accordingly.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Forwarding of Records and Personal
Property of Medically Evacuated Personnel", page 62, paragraph A4; concur.
The evaluation and recommendation rendered on the forwarding of records

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DOWNSIZED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 72 YEARS.
DOB DEC 31 1980.10
and personal property has been a subject of continued emphasis by the USARV AG since formulation of the current medical evacuation procedures on 15 February 1969. The three points presented in paragraph 4, t, (1), (2), & (3) have long been considered the keys to affecting timely and proper shipment of records and property. This procedure is currently employed by the majority of USARV major commands and is emphasized during all briefings and field visits by the Casualty and Medical Evacuation Division, OAG. Continued employment by the Americal Division will help eliminate the problem they cite on page 60, paragraph A1, 31 Jan 70, UNL. Recommend no change in current policy or procedures.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Chapel Facilities on Fire Bases", page 03, paragraph 5A. Nonconcur with recommendation of Americal Division. The cost of such facility to become a part of the battalion TOE would be highly prohibitive. Maintenance upkeep on such a facility would be difficult, if not impossible to provide in a combat situation. Such an elaborate unit would not be in keeping with the other facilities on a fire base. Further, it would pose for the chaplain an additional area of responsibility in the morale field which would consume much of his time, thus deferring him from his basic mission of providing religious coverage for the soldier. No action is required by USARPAC or DA.

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Air Support for LRRP Teams," page 65, paragraph B6; concur. The US Air Force is presently conducting an evaluation of a radar transponder beacon for purposes such as are described. A similar item is being developed for the Army by USAWM.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "Organization of Intelligence Data", page 60 paragraph B7; concur. An expeditious method of retrieval of intelligence information is a must to completely brief commanders on proposed area of operations. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

i. (C) Reference item concerning "Source Gap of Tactical Units", page 67, paragraph B9; concur. Personnel with the expertise required to recruit local informants is available through the Military Intelligence Company of the division. All units should be encouraged to utilize these resources to gather information from casual informants. Battalions are further encouraged to work closely with U.S. counterparts of GVN agencies to affect the widest exchange of intelligence information within a given area. Coordination with DIOS, TILOCS, National Police and MSS are only a few of the agencies available to procure information from. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

i. (C) Reference item concerning "Utilization of Former Members of PHU", page 67, paragraph B10; nonconcur. Employment of PHU personnel as Kit Carson Scouts is prohibited by MACV Dir 525-6 and USARV Reg 525-9, unless individual is a Ho Chi Minh. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

k. (C) Reference item concerning "PSID Employment", page 68, paragraph B11; concur. PSID's have been employed by a substantial number of units in RVN with a high degree of success. False activations are admittedly an inherent weakness in this device. Until such time as this problem can be rectified by the Duffle Bag Facility, CHB, recommend units intensify training of operations to cope with invalid activations. Comments appear valid and will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

l. (C) Reference item concerning "Treatment of Detainees in the Field", page 68, paragraph B12. Item will be extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

m. (C) Reference item concerning "Booby Traps", page 69, paragraph C1. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

n. (C) Reference item concerning "Stay Behind Ambush", page 69-70, paragraph C2; concur. With the enemy experiencing increasing difficulty in resupply, friendly units should be made more aware of the importance of making sure that vacated positions are free of equipment, documents and other material that could be of potential value to the enemy. These stay-behind ambushes may serve to discourage enemy occupation of friendly vacated positions. This observation appears valid and will be included in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

o. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of Smoke and CS as Early Warning Devices", page 71, paragraph C5. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

p. (U) Reference item concerning "Photo Processing", page 72, paragraph C1. Concur with observation and evaluation. These facts have been proven by tests and normal operations conducted by S&FC. Nonconcur with recommendation. Chemicals used in development should be made by the same manufacturer that makes the film. The present supply system has only Kodak developing chemicals. Film supply is from many different manufacturers such as Kodak, Ansco and Dupont. Action is being taken to obtain matching film and developing chemicals.
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AVHUC-DST (10 February 1970) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Employment of HB Teams", page 73, paragraph 2c; concur. The recommendation is in keeping with doctrine contained in FM 33-5.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
Americal Div
GPOP-2; (10 Feb 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Division for Period Ending
31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (M2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 20 MAR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGG
And AG
AMERICAN DIVISION TROOP LIST
(as of 3 January 1970)

1. HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN DIVISION

HQ, American Division

1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)

26th Engr Bn
   160th Engr Det

523d Sig Bn

23d MP Co
   146th MP Plat, 504th MP Bn

3d Mil Hist Det

635th MI Co

328th RR Co

OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

2. AMERICAN DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQ, Div Arty

6th Bn, 11th Arty
   Metro Section, 2d Bn, 11th Arty

1st Bn, 14th Arty

3d Bn, 82d Arty

3d Bn, 16th Arty

3d Bn, 18th Arty

1st Bn, 82d Arty

G Btry, 55th Arty (.50 Cal)

3 Plat, G Btry, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

251st FA Det (Radar)

Inclosure 1

80
252d FA Det (Radar)
271st FA Det (Radar)

3. **AMERICAN DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND**
   - HHC and Band
   - 23d Sht Bn
   - 23d Med Bn
   - 723d Maint Bn (-)
   - 23d Admin Co
   - Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf
   - 63d Inf Flat (CTT)
   - Americal Combat Center (PROV)
   - Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

4. **16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP**
   - HHC, 16th CAG (Obt)
     - 14th Combat Avn Bn
       - 71st Avn Co (Aalt Hel)
       - 174th Avn Co (Aalt Hel)
       - 176th Avn Co (Aalt Hel)
       - 132d Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel)
       - 178th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel)
       - 534th Med Det
       - 756th Med Det
       - 11th Security Flat
       - 123d Avn Bn (Obt) (Inf Div)
         - D Troop, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
         - E Co, 723d Maint Bn
         - F Troop, 8th Cav

5. **11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE**
   - HHC, 11th Inf Bde
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf
1st Bn, 20th Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
E Trp, 1st Cav
59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
90th Chem Det
31st Public Information Det
327th Avn Det
Combat Weather Team 1

6. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
HHC, 196th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 46th Inf
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
F Sq, 17th Cav
48th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
27th Chem Det
10th Public Information Det

7. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
HHC, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf
1st Bn, 52d Inf
4 Trp, 17th Cav
57th Inf Flt (Scout Dog)
87th Chem Det

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

6th CA Flt, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)
  Det 1 (DS of Chu Lai)
  Det 2 (DS of Duc Pho)

Det 3, 7th Payep Bn (DS of Div)

USASSG, ACSI, DA
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, Americal Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 69.

CG, Americal Division

10 February 1970

N/A

701205

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

N/A

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