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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, III Field Force Vietnam

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

HEADQUARTERS II FFORCEN

PERIOD OF 1 NOVEMBER 1969 - 31 JANUARY 1970

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
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1. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.


      (1) During the reporting period there were four major changes in the command group:

         (a) On 3 November 1969, Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell assumed command of II FFORCEV when he returned from leave in CONUS. Acting Commander of II FFORCEV, Major General Walter E. Richardson, returned to command Capital Military Assistance Command.

         (b) On 20 November 1969, Brigadier General L. D. Kinnard replaced Colonel Berkeley S. Gillespie, Jr. as Chief of Staff, II FFORCEV.

         (c) On 20 November 1969, Brigadier General Francis J. Roberts replaced Brigadier General L. D. Kinnard as CG, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

         (d) On 2 January 1970, Major General Hal D. McCown, Deputy CG, II FFORCEV, departed to command Delta Military Assistance Command.

      (2) During the reporting period, there were nine major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV:


         (b) On 16 November 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Fred R. Ball, Jr. became Staff Judge Advocate, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones.

         (c) On 1 December 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Tommie G. Smith became Deputy G3, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Howard Snyder.

         (d) On 1 December 1969, Lieutenant Colonel John R. Hook became Deputy G1, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Hill, Jr.

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(e) On 6 December 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Paluh became Deputy G5, replacing Lieutenant Colonel John E. Mann.

(f) On 11 December 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Newell E. Vinson became Deputy Chief Liaison Officer, SLS-RTAVF, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Griffith.


(3) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORCEV decreased substantially during the quarter as a result of Phase II redeployment and drawdown of units. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 April 1969</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 1969</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1969</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 1970</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Personnel, Morale, Safety, Discipline, and Base Development.

(1) The morale of the command remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>Aug 69 – Oct 69</th>
<th>Nov 69 – Jan 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>1282</td>
<td>2134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>2207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4717</td>
<td>9806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS GSFOR - 65 (R2) (0)

(3) On 20 November 1969, Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry was inactivated and replaced by Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry, which came under Headquarters, II FFORCEV awards authority.


(5) Postal Activities, 44th Army Postal Unit. During the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, the 44th Army Postal Unit sold 10,333 money orders valued at $675,556.15. The postal unit processed 124.0 tons of incoming mail and 45.0 tons of outgoing mail during the same period. The Christmas season of November and December accounted for 94.6 tons of incoming mail and 34.8 tons of outgoing mail.

(6) The military personnel injury rate for 2d quarter, FY 70 is 14.8 percent higher than the 1st quarter rate as shown on the chart below. The Army motor vehicle accident rate remained the same.

II FFORCEV ASSIGNED, ATTACHED, AND OPCON UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>1st Qtr FY 70</th>
<th>2d Qtr FY 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel Injury Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Injuries per one million mandays)</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Motor Vehicle Accident Rate</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Accidents per one million miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Weapons accidents involving small arms, grenades, and/or mines produced 63 injuries and 9 fatalities, accounting for 28.7 percent of the total injuries. Army motor vehicle accidents accounted for 23 military personnel injuries and 5 fatalities. Additionally, 22 Vietnamese were injured and 20 killed in accidents involving Army motor vehicles. Driving too fast for conditions and improper passing were the primary causes of Army motor vehicle accidents, and failure to clear weapons upon entering a secure area was the major factor in weapons accidents.

(8) Quarterly statistics for the 2d quarter FY 70 indicated that offense rates for II FFORCEV assigned, attached, and OPCON units have shown an increase since the 1st quarter, FY 70. The largest increase was in military offenses and this can be attributed to the upsurge in off-limits violations. Narcotics and blackmarketing caused the slight increase in the miscellaneous offense category. Crimes against persons and property
increased in the 2d quarter, and this increase was due primarily to larcenies under $50.00. For the second consecutive quarter, traffic offenses have decreased, reflecting the continued command interest and selective enforcement. Continued unit standdowns and large troop densities in base camps can be viewed as primary causes of the increasing incidents. The last two quarters of FY 69 and the first two quarters of FY 70 comparative rates computed on the basis of 1,000 troops are listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II FFORCEV ASSIGNED, ATTACHED, AND OCP0N FY 70 OFFENSE</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Qtr FY69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes against persons and property</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous offenses</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military offenses</td>
<td>20.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic offenses</td>
<td>16.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Improvement of the II FFORCEV base camp continued satisfactorily.

(10) Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) The daily briefing of selected agent reports was continued by Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing was to inform the G2 of enemy movement, supply, subordination, strength and intentions as well as to better evaluate the intelligence produced by agents and to determine the reliability of the sources. This, in turn, enabled the agency which employed the sources to decide which agents warrant retention and which should be released.

(b) Collection Division was also responsible for insuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) were published.
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for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

and levied on the appropriate collection agencies. In addition, Collection
Division coordinated the collection of intelligence on specific subjects
and informed subordinate units which SICR's were current by publishing a
quarterly II FFORCEV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements Registry.
The Registry indexed all SICR's by number and by collection agencies.
During the past quarter, 20 MACV SICR's were cancelled, while 26 new MACV
and 3 new II FFORCEV SICR's were levied. No new collection plans were
received from MACV for implementation and none were written by II FFORCEV.

(c) During the period 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970, Collection
Division continued analyzing agent reports for more complete exploitation
of all reported information. Specific areas of interest being examined
were: possible psychological vulnerabilities in enemy elements which
could be exploited by the G5, enemy sanctuaries and base areas, movement
of regimental and divisional forces, caches, and intelligence which would
contribute to the identification and selection of targets by the G2 Targets
Division.

(3) Counterintelligence/PHOENIX.

(a) Operations of the Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination
Centers (PIOCC) and District Intelligence and Operations Coordination
Centers (DIOCC) remained at a high level, with gradual improvement. During
this quarter, 22 students from II FFORCEV OPCON units attended the Phoenix
Advisor Course presented by MACCORS - Phoenix. The III CTZ regional
training school completed its first full year of operation on 10 January
1970 with a total attendance of 889 students in 22 classes. The basic
operational knowledge and enthusiasm of personnel involved in the Phung
Hoang program must, in a large measure, be credited to this training
school. Increasing use of psyops in coordination with Phoenix operations
throughout the III CTZ was noted. Notable examples were: In Phuoc Long
Province, three of the December neutralizations were a direct result of
an effective psyops program. In Binh Duong Province, cooperation between
psyops and Phoenix during December included the printing of 1,000 "wanted"
posters on two district level VCI. There was improvement with respect
to cooperation with tactical US and ARVN units with an outstanding example
set by elements of the US 25th Infantry Division in Hau Nghia Province.

(b) Response to the Volunteer Informant Program continued to fall
short of expectations and response varied widely between units. The
variation was due, generally, to the differences in missions and to the
variation in emphasis and priority given to general intelligence funds,
of which VIP funds were a part. With the reduction in intelligence funds

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for FY 70, greater emphasis would have to be given to payment of the volunteer informant in the form of goods and services, rather than monetary rewards. A trend to decreased monetary rewards was noted throughout the III CTZ.

(c) Terrorist incident levels remained relatively constant from October through the end of November; however, these incidents increased significantly in December and remained at a relatively high level throughout January. Analysis of terrorist incidents by geographical location produced inconclusive results. In contradiction to the expressed high level VC policy of cooperation, where possible, with local residents, a slight trend was noted in increased theft of livestock from the local populace. This trend might be anticipated, in light of numerous reports of extreme lack of food in some VC units. Propaganda and tax incidents also increased during the reporting period. This type of incident provides an opportunity to collect funds for Tet activities, and simultaneously to add credence to propaganda regarding enemy ability to launch another offensive, through a "show of strength".

(4) Operations. Company D, 75th Rangers assumed responsibility of Company D, 151st Infantry's AO on 20 November 1969. The AO was later expanded greatly, taking in the northeastern portion of the Catcher's Mitt and western War Zone D. The expansion of the AO was advantageous to the operations of D/75th in that it could place its teams in many possible locations and thus reduce the chance that the enemy would know where to look for an insertion. In its first two months of operation, D/75 exposed several enemy transportation routes and uncovered numerous enemy base camps in War Zone D. Through its aggressive program, utilizing saturation patrolling techniques, much valuable information was gained concerning enemy rear service group activities in War Zone D. A total of 243 teams was inserted resulting in 46 contacts, 50 sightings, and 59 enemy killed. The company was placed OPCON to the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry effective 1200 hours on 1 December.

(5) G2 Air.

(a) Intensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was conducted within the III CTZ throughout the reporting period. Maximum use was made of II FFORCEV air assets; due to the improvement of weather conditions, the number of successful photographic missions increased during the reporting period. In photo reconnaissance, emphasis was placed on surveillance of the III CTZ, the Cambodian border, the inner and outer defensive rings of Saigon, Bien Hoa, lines of communication, suspected base camps,
and infiltration routes. During the reporting period, a total of 2,405 photo missions were flown in III CTZ.

(b) Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) aircraft covered the entire III CTZ on a nightly basis. All missions flown in the III CTZ were flown by the 73d SAC and its attached Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoons. Surveillance patterns placed a heavy emphasis along the Cambodian border, the Fishhook, and the northern and southeastern portions of III CTZ. The daylight SLAR missions were cancelled due to the increased number of friendly movers detected. However, the range setting on the first and last nightly SLAR missions was increased from 25 to 50 kilometers.

(c) Infrared imagery (Red Haze) surveillance was flown to detect enemy activity, base camps, staging areas, and assembly areas within III CTZ. During this period, emphasis was placed on surveillance of the Cambodian border, Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces, and War Zone C and D. Coverage was also provided over the Song Be Corridor, Michelin Plantation, Ho Bo and Bo Loi Woods, Filhol Plantation, the Phuoc Vinh/Funnel area, the Catcher's Mitt, and the Hat Dich Secret Zone. Also, possible rocket launch sites around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area and around Saigon were given high priorities.

(d) Utilization of VR and camouflage detection film, as well as defoliation operations, were directed in the vicinity of Bu Gia Map on 14 January. Initial camouflage detection (CD) photography was flown on 14 January for basic coverage to compare with CD missions to be flown subsequent to later defoliation. A VR mission by chemical corps personnel indicated successful killing of the canopy as dead and dying leaves were detected over most of the target area. However, the CD film indicated living plant life (photosynthesizing leaves) throughout the area. Comparison of the VR and CD results revealed that the initial spray of defoliants was successful in killing the top canopy, but the underlying foliage was basically unaffected, and required reapplication of defoliants after the top canopy had died and fallen off.

(e) III CTZ continued to be the largest single requestor of air force tactical reconnaissance in Vietnam. The seasonal improvement in weather provided the opportunity to obtain unlimited high altitude photography particularly in areas requiring utilization of the KA-1, 36-inch camera system in the RF-101. A basic set of night photoflash cartridge strips was incorporated into the reconnaissance plan. The targets were aligned to topographic features which were discernible on the RF-4C's ground mapping radar scope. This resulted in an improved success rate on fraged
night photography coverage of main infiltration routes, base camp areas, and rocket belts. The final RB-57 equipped with the RS-10 infrared camera system joined Detachment 1, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. This high resolution infrared system employed an immediate readout display in the aircraft which made the system highly suitable for counterinsurgency use.

(6) G2 Targets Division.

(a) The G2 Targets Division's primary function continued to be the development and evaluation of targets for B-52 strikes. During the reporting period the division continued to develop an extensive data base of hard installations, including enemy bunkers, base camps, fighting positions, tunnels, and trench works, which were reproduced on acetate maps. G2 Targets provided this information to friendly units on several occasions where the units had no record of previously constructed hard installations.

(b) During this quarter 152 B-52 strikes were targeted against lucrative base and staging areas within III Corps Tactical Zone. Twenty-one percent of the B-52 assets available within Southeast Asia were allocated to this headquarters by MACV. The most intensive targeting activity of the quarter was against the 9th VC Division located in northern Tay Ninh Province. The 5th VC Division was also heavily bombarded in its base areas northeast of Song Be. These two regions received eighty-one percent of the strikes in III Corps during the quarter. The remainder of the strikes were in Binh Duong (2 percent), Binh Long (4 percent), Long Khanh (10 percent), Phuoc Tuy (1 percent) and Bien Hoa (2 percent) Provinces.

(7) Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remained the supreme political military headquarters controlling all Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) activities in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in III CTZ were subordinate either directly to COSVN or to one of six secondary level headquarters in III CTZ (See inclosure 8). There were no significant changes in the enemy's military - political boundaries during the quarter and the area of III CTZ continued to be divided into 13 major subdivisions. There continued to be a shift in enemy tactics toward decentralisation and small scale actions aimed at sustaining a steady attrition of US and allied forces. Most large NV/NVA maneuver units were in base areas continuing their relative standdown while preparing for possible high points of activity prior to Tet holidays.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFCR - 65 (R2) (U)

(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

(1) A few significant changes in the number and effectiveness of
enemy units were noted in the II FFORCEV TAOI. The table below shows
the combined effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the
beginning and the end of the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 Oct 69</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>31 Jan 70</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>NCE</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>NCE</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Regt</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Regt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Bn</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Bn</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapper Regt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sapper Bn</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCE - Fully Combat Effective (None)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MCE - Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE - Combat Effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NCE - Not Combat Effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) 1st NVA Division redeployment to IV CTZ: Documents captured on
the night of 16 December in Chau Doc (P), IV CTZ, identified the headquarters
element of the Chemical Section, 1st NVA Division and the 101D Regiment.
The documents, which consisted of letters and notebooks, gave details of the
relocation of the 1st NVA Division elements. Two elements moved from the
Glong Bau Area of Cambodia to the Nui Giai area of IV CTZ. One of these
elements was from the 101D Regiment; the other was unidentified. The enemy
had been located in the Nui 0 area along the Cambodian border of IV CTZ in
early December and had been allowed freedom of movement. A handwritten
letter dated 16 December, revealed that the enemy had moved from the Nui 0 to Nui Giai from 11-16 December, but had encountered friendly troops as
they tried to cross the Vinh Te Canal. The documents also stated that the

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cadre of the 101D Regiment were all trained in the terrain of Ghaù Duc (P) and also in the traditions of the Hoa Hao religion. Another letter, from a member of the Headquarters, 1st NVA Division, was addressed to a senior Cpt Luong, Chemical Section, Staff Office, 1st NVA Division and indicated that the chemical section command post was in the Seven Mountains area. It also revealed that the Headquarters, 1st NVA Division was in the Ba Thu area. The information in the document was further substantiated by an agent report received on 31 October which indicated that the elements of the 1st NVA Division were in the Parrot's Beak area during the latter part of October. Following the identification of the 1st NVA Division in IV CTZ, the 1st NVA Division was dropped from II FFORCEV OB holdings.

(3) 88th Regiment redeployment to IV CTZ: Although the 9th VC Division was operating in a split configuration during July and August, it seemed likely, that since the 271st and 272d Regiments had assumed an increased tactical posture in War Zone C, the 88th Regiment would also participate in this increased level of activity regardless of location. However, the 88th Regiment did not join the 271st and 272d Regiments in Binh Long (P). Instead, the 88th followed a pattern similar to that of the 273d Regiment before the regiment relocated to IV CTZ. First, the 88th Regiment dropped out of sight; it was not identified for a three month period. Second, the 88th Regiment, like the 273d Regiment, was last identified in the vicinity of the Straight Edge Woods, a traditional, safe staging area for enemy units. In summary, the proximity of the 95C Regiment to the other 9th VC Division subordinates and the three month inactivity of the 88th Regiment suggested that the 88th Regiment had been redeployed to IV CTZ and the 95C Regiment had become the new subordinate regiment. Later, on 3 December, the 88th Regiment was identified in a contact against Long Khot (H), vicinity of WT920073. This was the first solid indication that the 88th Regiment had relocated in IV CTZ.

(4) 95th Sapper Battalion, a confirmed subordinate to the 9th VC Division: Information obtained from several documents and prisoner of war interrogation reports confirmed the 95th Sapper Battalion as a maneuver element of the 9th VC Division. The T95 Sapper/Recon Battalion was the former T95 Sapper Company subordinate to the 9th VC Division. In November 1968, the T95 Company received a 120-150 man replacement group and was upgraded to battalion level. The T95 Sapper/Reconnaissance Battalion has had very few identifiable contacts that were of any significance in 1969. However, two prisoners captured following the 4 November 1969 attack on FSB Ike, which resulted in 54 enemy killed, identified an element of the enemy force as the T95 Battalion. The T95 Sapper Battalion was operating with a strength of approximately 200 personnel and provided sapper support for the 9th VC Division.
(5) K7 Sapper Battalion, a new subordinate to the 1st NVA Regiment:
Based on an interrogation of a prisoner and several captured documents,
the K7 Sapper Battalion was confirmed as a maneuver element subordinate to
the 1st NVA Regiment. On 12 January at XS599593, four kilometers north-northwest of Binh Phuoc,
elements of the 6-31st Infantry, 9th US Infantry Division, engaged an unknown number of enemy which resulted in 39 enemy
killed and 1 prisoner. The prisoner identified the unit as the K7 Sapper
Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment. The battalion consisted of three sapper
companies and a headquarters company. Two new companies, designated C25B
and C25C, were formed in Ba Thu, Cambodia, with 70 personnel from a 300-man
infiltration group which arrived in June. The other sapper company, newly
designated the C25A Company, is the old C25 Sapper Company which was directly
subordinate to the 1st NVA Regiment. The estimated strength of the new
battalion is 100 men. The C25B Company is located northwest of Binh Phuoc
in the Trang Hoa (V) area. The C25C Company is attached to the K5 Battalion,
1st NVA Regiment in Tan Tru (D) and the C25A Company is located northeast
of Binh Phuoc in the Phu Ngai Tu (V) area. A letter dated 4 January 1969
addressed to the K6 Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment, stated that selected cadre
would be used to form a new combat unit of battalion size which would be
subordinate to the 1st NVA Regiment. It appeared that the increasing
emphasis on small scale operations in the III CTZ has forced the 1st NVA
Regiment to increase its sapper capability.

(6) Reorganization of SR-6 Special Action Elements: On the basis of
the information provided by prisoners Nguyen Ngoc So and Dong Van Hoc, the
N14, N15, and N16 Sapper Battalions and the N18 Artillery Battalion were
dropped as confirmed enemy combat maneuver battalions of III CTZ. The N14
and N15 Battalions were believed to have been decimated during the 1969
Summer - Fall Campaign with remaining members reassigned to SR-2 or MR-3
Main Force units. The N16 and N18 Battalions were probably integrated with
SR-2 Main Force units and may have provided the bulk of the newly discovered
D6B Battalion.

(7) Resubordination of the K3 Battalion, Dong Nai Regiment to SR-5:
On 21 November 1969 at KT877099, the 24th RF Control Group captured one prisoner,
Do Van Luyen, who was a member of the K3 Battalion, Dong Nai Regiment. The
K2 Battalion had replaced the K3 Battalion in the My Son area. The K3
Battalion was practically eliminated due to allied operations. On 26
November, 1st US Infantry Division elements captured documents which identified
the K3 Battalion. One of these documents was a letter from SR-5 Headquarters
which stated the K3 Battalion was to be converted into a City Corridor Unit.
This is the only evidence of a resubordination of the K3 Battalion from the
Dong Nai Regiment to SR-5 Headquarters. However, on 27 December documents
were captured which gave deployment plans of the Dong Nai Regiment. In these documents the K3 Battalion was not mentioned which indicated the statements made by the prisoner, Tuyen, may have been correct.

(c) Recapitulation:

(1) The VC regions, provinces, and special zones in III CTZ controlled 24 local force companies and 30 local force platoons (Note: Local force companies and platoons with a strength of 40 or less are considered platoons).

(2) The battalions and regimental sized units located within III CTZ were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>275th VC Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141st NVA Regiment</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>209th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>271st VC Regiment</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272d VC Regiment</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95C NVA Regiment</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st NVA Regiment</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268th MF Regiment</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st NVA Regiment</td>
<td>SR-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Nai Regiment</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Regiment</td>
<td>MR-7</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>274th VC MF Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>16th Armor Office</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
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<td>66th Base Security Regiment</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
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<td>96th NVA Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>69th VC Artillery Command</td>
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<td>208th NVA Artillery Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>56th VC AA Battalion</td>
<td>69th VC Artillery Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>22d VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
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<td>24th NVA AA Battalion</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d NVA Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th NVA AA Battalion</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th VC AA Battalion</td>
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</tr>
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<td>8th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Artillery Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th VC Heavy Weapons Battalion</td>
<td>SR-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Quyet Thang Battalion</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam

**for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>2d Quyet Thang Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trang Bang LF Battalion</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th VC MF Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>SR-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6B NVA MF Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>SR-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SR-2</td>
</tr>
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<td>2642d NVA Infantry Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>269th VC MF Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>265th VC MF Infantry Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>D1 VC LF Battalion</td>
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<td>D14 VC LF Battalion</td>
<td>Tay Ninh (P)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>D440 VC LF Battalion</td>
<td>Ba Bien (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D445 VC LF Battalion</td>
<td>Ba Bien (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan Song Be</td>
<td>MR-10</td>
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<td>95th Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia Dinh 4 VC MF Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>H5 Water Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-1</td>
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<td>12th VC MF Sapper/Recon Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>K7 NVA Sapper Battalion</td>
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<td>211th NVA Sapper Battalion</td>
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<td>N10 Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-6</td>
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<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N13 Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th VC MF Water Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>SR-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan 10 MF Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>MR-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1 VC LF Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>U-1 (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2 VC LF Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>U-1 (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67th NVA Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>MR-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6 Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>MR-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>525th Engineer/Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>MR-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(d) Summary of Recent Activity.

(1) Enemy level of activity during the quarter remained essentially the same as that noted in the previous quarter. The start of the quarter saw significant enemy initiated activity remaining light to moderate as the enemy appeared to be continuing his standoff of last quarter. The lull was punctuated by an increase in enemy activity noted during the night of 3-4 November. During the first week of November there were 82 enemy initiated attacks in III CTZ compared to only 14 during the previous week. The level of activity remained relatively low from that point until the week of 18 January when enemy activity increased. This increase culminated in a highpoint of activity on the night of 20-21 January. Enemy actions throughout the week and during the highpoint consisted primarily of attacks by fire and standoff attacks. Highpoint activity was focused on allied bases and defensive positions in War Zone C and MR-7, while a sizeable number of incidents were also directed at RF/PP units. Enemy actions continued at a moderate level since the highpoint. The month of January closed with a fairly low level of activity as enemy initiated ground attacks were again minimal in nature and scope, indicating continued adherence to COSVN Resolution 9 and its tactical doctrine.

(2) 1st NVA Division: At the beginning of the quarter, the divisional headquarters was located in the vicinity of Katum while the 101D Regiment was located west of An Loc, and the 95C Regiment was located northeast of Tay Ninh. The regiments of the 1st NVA Division were not identified in contacts during the early part of the quarter as they remained in base areas in northern War Zone C conducting resupply and refitting activities, in preparation for future combat operations. Early in the quarter sufficient evidence was available to support the resubordination of the 95C Regiment from the 1st NVA Division to the 9th VC Division. Midway in the quarter, sufficient collateral was available to confirm the relocation of the division into IV Corps. During the third week of December, documents captured near Chau Doc (P)/Cambodian border identified the 101D Regiment, further confirming the unit's redeployment to IV CTZ.

(3) 5th VC Division: At the beginning of the quarter the divisional headquarters was located in east Phuoc Long (P), the 275th VC Infantry Regiment was positioned northeast of Song Be and the remaining units in north Phuoc Long (P). The division remained out of major contacts until 10 December when a series of contacts north of FSB Judie resulted in 96 enemy killed and 1 prisoner, who identified the 1st Battalion, 275th Regiment. This was the first identification of the regiment since 28 October. The 174th Regiment remained out of contact and was held to be located in eastern Phuoc Long (P),
while the 95th Regiment remained unlocated. On 13 December, southeast of Song Be, the 275th Regiment was located following a battalion size contact. A 1 January contact northeast of Song Be, resulting in 45 enemy killed, identified the 275th Regiment's 2d Battalion. The 5th Division probably had the mission of safeguarding logistic routes in Phuoc Long (P); however, the division was not particularly effective, as documents captured north of FSB Catcher on 17 January revealed that allied actions seriously restricted enemy movement in traditional corridors and in the newly discovered Jolly Road complex. At the end of the quarter, the 275th Regiment was believed to be located in rear areas in northeast Phuoc Long (P) awaiting supplies and reinforcements while the 174th Regiment continued operations in eastern Phuoc Long (P), probably as a security element for infiltration into III CTZ. The 95th Regiment was unlocated and had not been solidly identified in a contact since 15 July. The strength of the division at the close of the period was 4035.

(4) 7th NVA Division: At the beginning of the quarter the 165th Regiment was located southwest of Bu Dop, the 141st Regiment northwest of Song Be, and the 209th west of Loc Ninh. Divisional elements remained within easy striking distance of targets in northern Binh Long and northwestern Phuoc Long Provinces. Throughout November all three regiments were identified in contacts near Loc Ninh, Bo Duc, and Bu Dop. During the first week of December, identification from documents of several artillery units throughout the 7th Division's AO suggested that the division's organic fire support elements had been reinforced with personnel drawn from various units subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command. In the latter part of December the disposition of the 7th NVA Division was somewhat uncertain. The 209th Regiment's 2d Battalion was identified several times in contacts in the vicinity of Bu Dop, suffering in excess of 70 personnel killed. At the same time the 165th Regiment remained out of contact. The 141st Regiment was located in a heavy 27 December contact northwest of Loc Ninh, which resulted in 80 enemy killed. January saw a low level of activity throughout the 7th Division's area of operations. The divisional units had suffered heavy casualties during the Winter Campaign and had withdrawn to more secure areas for refitting and resupplying. No divisional elements were identified until 20-21 January when the 209th Regiment was identified southwest of Bu Dop following a contact which resulted in 27 killed. On 21 January the 141st Regiment suffered 50 killed in a contact northeast of Loc Ninh. The two contacts suggested that elements of the 7th Division had concluded its resupply activities and were preparing to resume offensive activities in the Bu Dop and Loc Ninh areas. At the end of the period the division had an estimated strength of 4325. The 165th Regiment was believed to be southwest of Bu Dop, the 141st Regiment northwest of Loc Ninh, and the 209th Regiment northeast of Loc Ninh.
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(5) 9th VC Division: The period opened with 9th Division headquarters located in the vicinity of the Fishhook, the 271st VC Regiment southwest of Bo Tuc, and 272d VC Regiment southeast of Thiem Ngon and the 88th NVA Regiment north of the Straight Edge Woods. On 2 November, the 3d Battalion, 271st Regiment was identified operating northwest of FSB Vicki by documents taken from an enemy body. The regiment's 2d Battalion was identified by prisoners captured following a 4 November attack on FSB Ike. Two other prisoners captured during the attack identified the 9th Division's 95th Sapper/Reconnaissance Battalion. A document captured northeast of FSB Carolyn on 13 November appeared to be an operation's order outlining an attack on the base. It was to be conducted by the 95C Regiment, supporting the relocation of the 95C Regiment to the 9th Division. The 95C Regiment was again identified through documents captured northeast of Prek Klok on 18 November. Again on 26 November, the 95C Regiment was identified by a prisoner captured following a light contact northwest of FSB Carolyn. This, coupled with additional captured documents, indicated that the 95C Regiment was targeted against the base. During the week of 7 December, the 271st Regiment was identified by documents captured southeast of FSB Vicki. Several contacts northeast of the base, which resulted in a total of 101 enemy killed, were probably with elements of this regiment. The 3d Battalion, 272d Regiment was identified by documents captured northwest of Trai Bi as was the 96th Artillery Regiment's 34th Artillery Battalion. During this period, the 95C and 271st Regiments avoided contact, but remained deployed throughout War Zone C. The 95C Regiment was identified northeast of FSB Ike by documents captured after a 6 January contact where airstrikes and a series of contacts resulted in a total of over 100 enemy killed. At this time the presence of the 9th Division elements in forward areas suggested that the division was preparing to resume actions against allied FSB's and defensive positions in War Zone C similar to those noted during December. The week of 11 January saw a total of 76 enemy killed in an area northwest of FSB Jamie, and attacks by fire against FSB's suggested that the 271st Regiment continued to plan offensive activity against fire support bases. A major portion of the enemy's highpoint activity on 20-21 January consisted of 9th Division operations against allied fire support bases in War Zone C, with the heaviest attacks delivered against ARVN elements of FSB Sandra on 19 January, while documents taken from a total of 21 enemy killed during an engagement east of Trai Bi identified the regimental recoilless rifle company and the unit's 3d Battalion. The 9th Division continued activity in War Zone C. The division, for the most part, avoided major contacts until January, probably in order to retrain and refit. The 271st Regiment, located southeast of Bo Tuc, remained in close proximity to Highway 244 and the Saigon Corridor. The 272d Regiment was located in western War Zone C. The regiment avoided identifiable contacts but might have been responsible
for the 8 January attacks on Nui Ba Den which resulted in 122 enemy killed. The 95C Regiment was located east of Prek Klok, the 272d Regiment southeast of Thien Ngon, and the 271st Regiment southeast of Bo Tu with a total estimated strength of the division being 3985 at the close of the period.

(6) Sub-Region 1: At the beginning of the period the headquarters was positioned in the southern Trapezoid. SR-1 units spent the early part of the quarter engaged in resupply activities while attempting to avoid contacts in preparation for the Winter Campaign. The 268th Regiment was identified on 21 November in two separate incidents involving the K1 and K2 Battalions. During the same period, elements of the 2d Quyet Thang Battalion were also identified in resupply operations north of the unit's normal AO. The 101st Regiment was identified by documents taken from enemy killed in two locations in the Trapezoid on 3 December. This, plus other recent contacts in the area, suggested that the unit had completed its supply and training activities and was returning to its former area of operations.

The second and third weeks of December found the majority of the SR units preoccupied with resupply and receiving replacements. The 2d Quyet Thang Battalion was identified on 28 and 29 December by two prisoners captured in the Citadel. Activity remained light throughout the area and increased only slightly on the night of 20-21 January. Captured documents and prisoners continued to reflect low morale brought about by supply problems and mechanical/manned ambushes by allied forces. The period closed with the 101st Regiment spread out in the vicinity of the Trapezoid and the Michelin. The 268th Regiment was in the Ho Bo/Boi Loi Woods area.

(7) Military Region 7: Military Region 7 Headquarters was located southeast of Gia Ray while the remaining elements of MR-7 remained in their normal base areas. On 21 November, a document captured south of Blackhorse outlined deficiencies of the 274th Regiment, including lack of food and fear of allied attacks. Early December activity remained at a low level except for a concentration of attacks by fire in southwestern Phuoc Tuy (P) on the night of 10-11 December. The remainder of December saw the level of activity increase somewhat in MR-7, particularly in SR-4, as a number of harassing incidents and light attacks by fire were directed at RF/PF and RD elements. MR-7 elements also continued their efforts to reopen the food supply points closed by allied operations. The night of 8-9 January was highlighted by the employment of CS chemical agents against two allied positions in the Binh Son area. This was followed by a low level of activity. Activity increased with a rise in the number of attacks by fire and standoff attacks in the Long Thanh area on 20-21 January. The following week saw the level of activity returning to a relatively low level, as enemy units continued resupply efforts and generally attempted to avoid contact. Military Region 7 units wound up the period positioned in the Gia Ray - Hat Dich - Nhon Trach area.
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(8) VC/NVA Battle Losses.

(a) Overall personnel and materiel losses.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>PW</th>
<th>HC</th>
<th>VCI</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>Rice(tons)</th>
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<td>November</td>
<td>4633</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>1396</td>
<td>173</td>
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<td>768</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1846</td>
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<td>245</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>137</td>
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(b) Losses in Caches: A major factor which continued to lower enemy morale and blunt large scale enemy offensives was the discovery of caches by allied forces.

MATERIEL CAPTURED IN ENEMY CACHES

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Crew served wpns</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (tons)</td>
<td>46.22</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>22.75</td>
<td>100.97</td>
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(9) Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and relative probability of adoption of the end of the quarter.

(a) Capabilities.

1. The enemy is capable of launching sapper attacks throughout the III CTZ and multi-battalion ground attacks in the outlying areas of the Corps Zone. Attacks may be supported by rocket and mortar fire.

2. The enemy is capable of attacks against province and district capitals and FSB’s.

3. The enemy is capable of increasing the intensity and frequency of attacks by rocket, mortar and direct fire by heavy weapons against selected targets throughout the III CTZ and military targets in the CMD.

4. The enemy is capable of conducting small scale ground attacks against periphery of the CMD, utilizing SR battalions and sappers.

5. The enemy is capable of harassing installations and intensifying LOC interdictions and ambushes throughout the III CTZ, for limited periods of time.

6. The enemy is capable of increasing terrorist, sabotage, and assassination activities in the CMD and throughout the III CTZ.

7. The enemy is capable of conducting propaganda, subversion, sabotage, espionage, and political efforts throughout III CTZ.

8. The enemy is capable of avoiding contact for a limited period of time, contingent on the extent of allied efforts and operations.

9. The enemy is capable of withdrawing to out-of-country sanctuaries for the purpose of avoiding allied operations.

10. The enemy is capable of positioning forces in forward base areas throughout III CTZ in order to support his efforts to subvert the population of such areas.

(b) Vulnerabilities.

1. Concentrations of enemy forces are vulnerable to detection by various modes of reconnaissance activity and to destruction by air, artillery, and ground fire.
2. Enemy movement is vulnerable to interdiction by allied ground, artillery, and air attacks.

3. The enemy's supply system, particularly his caches, is vulnerable to discovery by allied operations.

4. The infrastructure is vulnerable to aggressive allied action.

(c) Relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.

1. The enemy is expected to continue attempts to achieve goals set for the Winter Campaign, which were to precipitate a US withdrawal, disrupt the pacification program, and prevent the upgrading of ARVN combat capability. He may resort to occasional attempts at coordinated highpoint-type actions to lend credence to claims of a general offensive, although the majority of his actions will probably consist of attacks by fire, sapper attacks, and standoff actions as he attempts to reduce his losses while awaiting reinforcements through infiltration. He will also probably target RF/FF as part of his effort to disrupt the pacification program, while pressure on ARVN units will probably be increased with possible attempts to defeat selected units in order to erode ARVN confidence. The intensity of his actions may also increase during the later phases of the next quarter as he is expected to test increasing ARVN defenses and the resolve of the allied forces.

2. The enemy's divisional forces are likely to operate from relatively secure base areas from which they can maintain a threat to outlying areas and provide security for logistic corridors. These forces will attempt to maintain pressure on Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces, while they may also provide some support for the development of major logistic corridors from Military Region 10 to Military Regions 7 and 6, as specified in COSVN goals.

3. In the populated areas, subregional forces will conduct attacks by fire and sapper actions, with particular emphasis on supporting local force actions against pacification elements. Activity in the CMD will consist of terrorist and sapper actions probably coordinated with increased activity phases outside the capital. A ground assault on the city is considered unlikely.

(d) Operations, Plans, and Training.

(1) General.
(a) Phase IV of Campaign Toan Thang was initiated effective 0001 hours on 1 November with the same mission and area of operations as Phase III. Operations throughout the III CTZ to locate and destroy enemy forces, to interdict infiltration routes, and to deny base camp areas continued preventing the enemy from achieving any significant tactical success. Generally, operations during the quarter remained at a fairly constant level with the previous quarter. Emphasis was maintained on the upgrading of ARVN/RF/PF and assisting in the pacification effort. The period was characterized by the enemy continuing to avoid major contacts with some exceptions. The enemy's Winter Offensive was initiated in early November with a high point on 4-5 November. Attacks were limited primarily to attacks by fire and were conducted for the most part by subregion forces. During the remainder of November, December, and early January a definite lull in enemy activity occurred. A corps wide high point was initiated by both main force and subregion forces during the latter portion of January. There was a reduction in II FF/CR/65 troop strength with the change in OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to USA/PRV prior to the brigade's redeployment to the United States and the redeployment of other smaller units. As a result of Vietnamization of the Capital Military District, Capital Military Assistance Command began the process of conversion to an advisory element and was scheduled to come under military Assistance Command Vietnam on 1 April 1970. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, remained OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division, and continued to operate in Long An Province conducting combined operations with ARVN/RF/PF, waging primarily a war of attrition against main and local force enemy units in their area of operations. The 25th Infantry Division continued to exert maximum pressure on enemy forces in Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh Provinces, conducting Dong Tien operations with the 25th ARVN Division. The 1st Infantry Division, working closely with regiments of the 5th ARVN Division, continued to grind down SR-1 forces and elements of the Dong Nai Regiment. In January, the 1st Infantry Division deployed its 2d Brigade, consisting of two infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion, into the Hat Dich area to clean out one of the traditional base areas of the 274th VC Regiment. In the northern tier of the corps, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment OPCON, continued to block the main enemy infiltration routes and keep main force Communist units from the more populous central portion of the corps. In December an additional brigade of the ARVN airborne was deployed to Phouc Long Province for operations with the 1st Cavalry Division's 2d Brigade. With two brigades now deployed in the northern tier, the ARVN airborne division collocated its command post with the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at Phouc Vinh. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade continued to be paired with the 18th ARVN Division in Long Khanh Province. During this period the 18th ARVN Division, working closely with the 199th Brigade, displayed considerable improvement. The 3d
Brigade, 82d Airborne Division began the period with the majority of the brigade in a standdown posture in preparation for redeployment. The 1st Australian Task Force continued to operate in Phouc Tuy Province, maintaining increasing pressure on RVN-10 forces. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, operating in south eastern Bien Hoa Province, assumed responsibility for coordination of Friendship II operations. The 3d Mobile Strike Force conducted operations in the Bu Dop area and were deployed in War Zone D at the close of the period. Operations Giant Slingshot and Ready Deck, an effort by US and VN Naval elements to interdict enemy movements on inland waterways, continued denying these routes for infiltration of troops and supplies to the enemy. II FFORCEN combat operations, placing emphasis on small unit operations to search out and grind down enemy forces coupled with quick reaction to intelligence, hurt and hampered the enemy's ability to wage large scale operations. The task organization at the beginning of the period was as follows: 1st Cavalry Division (1st Brigade: 2-5th Cavalry, 2-7th Cavalry, 1-12th Cavalry; 2d Brigade: 5-7th Cavalry, 2-12th Cavalry; 3d Brigade: 1-5th Cavalry, 1-7th Cavalry, 1-8th Cavalry; 1-9th Cavalry; 2-8th Cavalry; Company H (Ranger), 75th Infantry); 1st Infantry Division (1st Brigade: 1-2d Infantry, 2-2d Infantry (M), 2-28th Infantry; 2d Brigade: 1-18th Infantry, 2-18th Infantry; 3d Brigade: 1-16th Infantry (M), 2-16th Infantry, 1-26th Infantry, 1-28th Infantry; 1-4th Cavalry; Company I (Ranger), 75th Infantry; Company B, 34th Armor); 25th Infantry Division (1st Brigade: 3-22d Infantry, 4-23d Infantry (M), 4-9th Infantry, 2-22d Infantry (M), 2-34th Armor (-); 2d Brigade: 2-12th Infantry, 2-14th Infantry, 1-5th Infantry (M), 3-4th Cavalry; 3d Brigade: 1-27th Infantry, 2-27th Infantry; Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry); 9th Infantry Division (3d Brigade: 6-31st Infantry, 2-47th Infantry (M), 2-60th Infantry, 5-60th Infantry; B/3-17th Cavalry; Company E (Ranger), 75th Infantry); 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (1-11th Cavalry, 2-11th Cavalry, 3-11th Cavalry); 199th Infantry Brigade (2-3d Infantry, 3-7th Infantry, 4-12th Infantry, 5-12th Infantry, C/3-17th Cavalry; Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry); D/3-17th Cavalry; Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry; RTAVF (1st Brigade: 1-1st Infantry, 2-1st Infantry, 3-1st Infantry; 2d Brigade: 1-2d Infantry, 2-2d Infantry, 3-2d Infantry; one armored cavalry squadron); 1st Australian Task Force (5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment; 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment/New Zealand (Anzac); 9th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment; B Squadron, 1st Armored Regiment; B Squadron, 3d Cavalry Regiment; 3d Special Air Service Squadron); 82d Airborne Division (3d Brigade: 1-505th Infantry, Company O (Ranger), 75th Infantry).

(b) Results of operations in III CTZ. Significant results of United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF) participation in Campaign Toan Thang, Phase II, during November, December, and January
were 456 US/WMAF killed (415 US, 15 Australians, and 26 Thais); 3,916 wounded (3,627 US, 45 Australians, and 244 Thais); 12,785 eneiw killed; and 863 prisoners. In addition, enemy losses included 1,155 individual weapons; 142 crew served weapons; 533,605 rounds of small arms ammunition; 7,522 rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds; 115 rockets; 998 mines and booby traps; 8,080 grenades; and 116.99 tons of rice either captured or destroyed.

(2) Summary of combat operations.

(a) 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Infantry Division continued Campaign Toan Thong by conducting ground reconnaissance, night patrols, and VC/neutralization operations to deny enemy base area utilization; interdict VC/NVA infiltration to the south, disrupt enemy logistic operations; and to eliminate the VC infrastructure in populated areas. During the period, the 1st Brigade, with three battalions, conducted combined offensive operations with ARVN units in the Trapezoid, Michelin Plantation, Razorback, the Minh Thanh area, and the Long Nguyen Secret Zone. These operations were directed against elements of Sub Region (SR) - 1, the 101st NVA Regiment, Rear Service Group (RSG)-50, RSG-83, C-64, and K-35. The 2d Brigade operated in the Di An - Phu Loi area, the Song Be Corridor, and from the southern Lam Son area to the Catcher's Mitt. The brigade, with two infantry battalions, conducted combined operations with ARVN units against elements of SR-4, RSG-84, Local Force (LF) Company C-41, and possibly elements of the 274th VC Regiment and the D440 LF Battalion. The 3d Brigade, with four battalions, conducted combined operations with ARVN units, against the Dong Nai VC Regiment in the lower Song Be Corridor and against elements of SR-5 in the Catcher's Mitt. During the quarter, the brigade also operated in the Minh Thanh area, Long Nguyen Secret Zone, southeastern Trapezoid, and the Iai Khe rocket belt, and conducted security operations along Highway 13. The division continued its emphasis on psychological operations and on the pacification program. Some of the significant contacts during the quarter, which were characterized by numerous small contacts, follow. On 11 November, at 0625 hours approximately two kilometers south of Xom Mia (XT960383), a contact by the 1-18th Infantry resulted in 19 enemy killed and 6 prisoners. There were no friendly casualties. On 22 November at 0937 hours in the vicinity of Xom Cha Binh (XT556541), a contact by the 2-28th Infantry resulted in 20 enemy killed and 3 individual weapons, 1 crew served weapon, and 13 high explosive rounds captured. Friendly casualties were 3 US wounded. On 30 December at 2135 hours in the vicinity of Xa Dinh Thai (XT568582), contact by Night Hawk resulted in 12 enemy killed.

(b) 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Cavalry Division continued operations to interdict enemy infiltration routes through Tay Ninh, Phuoc Long, Binh
Long, and Binh Duong Provinces, and to neutralize enemy forces operating in the area. Division elements continued to support the pacification program and to conduct Dong Tien operations with RVNAF forces operating within the division's area. The 1st Brigade continued to interdict and neutralize enemy forces operating in the western portion of its assigned TAOR, in the vicinity of Bo Tuc Road and along the Saigon River, to the south of enemy base area 353, and in base area 355. The brigade continued combined operations with the 2d ARVN Airborne Battalion in War Zone C. The 2d Brigade continued combined operations to interdict and neutralize enemy forces operating in central and eastern Phuoc Long Province and to deny enemy access to Song Be. The 3d Brigade continued operations in eastern Binh Long and western Phuoc Long Province and along Serges Jungle Highway. It also conducted combined operations with ARVN units. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued operations in the An Loc and Loc Ninh areas, along the Saigon River, and southwest of Quan Loi. On 3 November at 1730 hours approximately three kilometers southwest of Ap Bu Karr (1) (YU95073), a contact by the 1-9th Cavalry resulted in 41 enemy killed with no friendly casualties. In the early morning hours of 4 November, the enemy ended his seven week lull and launched attacks in the vicinity of Fire Support Bases Ike, Buttons, and Ellen. There attacks were met by the 2-5th Cavalry, the 5-7th Cavalry, and the 1-8th Cavalry, supported by artillery, Shadow, Spooky, Night Hawk, and tactical air. These attacks resulted in 152 enemy killed and 7 prisoners, 21 individual weapons, 14 crew served weapons, 110 high explosive rounds, 223 grenades, 4 rockets, and 1,000 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly casualties were 3 US killed, 51 wounded, and 4 vehicles destroyed. On 10 November approximately three kilometers south of Ap Phuoc Gia A (YU69011), the 5-7th Cavalry located 32 enemy dead. On 29 November, two contacts by elements of the 2d Brigade approximately two kilometers southwest of Bu Glong (YT325970) resulted in 69 enemy killed. There were no friendly casualties. At 1755 hours on 3 December approximately four kilometers southwest of Xa Phuoc Loc (XU925237), a contact by the 1-9th Air Cavalry resulted in 21 enemy killed with no friendly casualties. At 0820 hours on 8 December approximately two kilometers northwest of Bau Tram (XT787568), a contact by the 2-7th Cavalry resulted in 33 enemy killed and 3 crew served weapons destroyed. There were no friendly casualties. At 1030 hours on 11 December in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Judie (YU260170), the 1-9th Air Cavalry contacted an enemy force of unknown size, resulting in 38 enemy killed, with no friendly casualties. On 15 December at 0823 hours approximately three kilometers northeast of Xa Phuoc Loc (XU997265), elements of F/2-11th Cavalry and the 2/1-9th ARVN Battalion, while conducting ground reconnaissance, observed an enemy force of unknown size and engaged it with organic weapons, artillery, aerial rocket artillery, light fire teams, and air strikes. The enemy returned fire with rifle.
automatic weapons, and B-40 fire. The contact was reinforced by elements of B/1-11th Cavalry. Results of the contact were 51 enemy killed and 2 prisoners, 5 individual weapons, 3 rocket launchers, 2 mortars, and 2 machineguns captured. Friendly casualties were 4 US killed and 18 wounded. On 27 December at 0755 hours approximately three kilometers southwest of Don Linh (UX573215), a contact by elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment resulted in 69 enemy killed with no friendly casualties. On 6 January at 0820 hours approximately three kilometers northwest of Ta Yen (XT372781), elements of the 2-5th Cavalry engaged an enemy force of unknown size, supported by artillery and tactical air. A second enemy force was engaged in the same area at 1445 hours. Results of the contacts were 73 enemy killed and 28 individual weapons captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 6 wounded. On 10 January at 1115 hours approximately two kilometers east of Trai Bi (XT461768), D/2-7th Cavalry and a CIDG force engaged an enemy force of unknown size and, supported by artillery and tactical air, killed 41. Friendly casualties were 3 US wounded and 1 CIDG wounded. On 20 January at 1530 hours approximately five kilometers west of Bu Ma Chung (XU920230), a contact by F/G/H/2-11th Cavalry resulted in 27 enemy killed. There was a significant increase in enemy activity on 21 January. The most significant ground actions involved four troops of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The troops killed 35 enemy and captured 6 crew served weapons and 7 individual weapons. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 9 wounded.

(c) 25th Infantry Division. The division continued to promote small unit combined operations with emphasis on upgrading ARVN forces while stressing night operations. Emphasis continued on the upgrading of hamlets and contested villages. The division coordinated night patrols, detection devices, and firepower in its effort to annihilate the enemy. The 1st Brigade continued Campaign Toan Thang with five battalions and operated in Tay Ninh Province with responsibility for the security of Highways 22 and 26. It also conducted combined operations with ARVN units in the vicinity of Tay Ninh City and Nui Ba Den Mountain. The 2d Brigade with three battalions and one cavalry squadron, conducted extensive airborne operations, combat patrols, ground reconnaissance, and combat assaults in the Khiam Hanh, Trang Bang, Cu Chi, and upper Phu Hoa Districts. It conducted security operations along sections of Highways 1, 6A, 7a, 8A, 15, 19, and 26. The brigade emphasized small unit operations to detect and eliminate local guerrillas, support forces, and elements of SR-1 in Boi Loi, the Citadel, Ho Bo, and Filhol areas. It continued to support the upgrading of ARVN forces. The 3d Brigade began the period with two battalions and operated in the southern portion of Hau Gia Province with responsibility for route security along sections of Highway 1, 7A, 8A, 9A,
and 10. Brigade units, along with ARVN and RF/PF forces, intercepted unit or logistic infiltration and destroyed enemy local forces and VCI. During the period, the division continued to emphasize the pacification program. On 2 November at 1100 hours approximately one kilometer southeast of Xam Long (XT362481), a contact by the 4-23d Infantry (M) resulted in 15 enemy killed with 1 US wounded. On 5 November at 0307 hours approximately three kilometers east of X Dong Gong (XT550280), a contact by the 2-12th Infantry resulted in 26 enemy killed and 2 prisoners and 8 individual weapons captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 6 November at 1800 hours in the vicinity of Hung Nahm (XT655257), a contact by the 2-14th Infantry resulted in 14 enemy killed and 2 individual weapons captured. There were 2 US wounded. On 20 November, airstrikes and two contacts by elements of the 2d Brigade resulted in 23 enemy killed, with no friendly casualties. On 25 November at 0945 hours in the vicinity of Nui Cau Mountain (XT276609), a contact by 3-22d Infantry resulted in 25 enemy killed and 4 booby traps destroyed with friendly casualties of 1 US killed, 4 wounded, and 1 helicopter damaged. On 2 December in the vicinity of Xom Suoi Nharn (XT434412), the 2-22d Infantry (M) located 19 enemy dead. On 9 December at 1303 hours in the vicinity of X. Ben Don (XT576295), a contact by elements of the 3-4th Cavalry resulted in 13 enemy killed and 1 crew served weapon captured. Friendly losses were 2 US wounded. On 15 December at 1255 hours approximately two kilometers northeast of Nui Be Dam Mountain (XT293593), a contact by elements of the 2-34th Armored killed 16 enemy. There were no friendly casualties. In scattered actions on 16 December, the 2d Brigade accounted for 24 enemy killed. On 30 December at 1220 hours in the vicinity of Ap An Son (XT437143), a contact by the 2-22d Infantry (M) resulted in 27 enemy killed, and 1 prisoner, 12 individual weapons, 2 crew served weapons, 100 booby traps, and 300 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. On 1 January at 1900 hours approximately two kilometers southeast of Xom Lai Tham (XT292264), a contact by the 4-9th Infantry resulted in 16 enemy killed. There were no friendly casualties. On 6 January at 1600 hours in the vicinity of Ap Bau Mo (XT315175), elements of the 2-27th Infantry, supported by light fire teams, killed 25 enemy. There were no friendly casualties. On 1 January at 1148 hours approximately three kilometers west of Ap Boi Lai (XT499342), a contact by B/3-4th Cavalry resulted in 5 enemy killed and 10 prisoners. There were no friendly casualties. On 8 January at 0750 hours in the vicinity of Nui Cau Mountain (XT2760), A/C/R/3-22d Infantry and A/2-34th Armored engaged an unknown number of enemy resulting in 62 enemy killed. Friendly casualties were 2 US killed and 6 wounded. On 9 January at 0915 hours approximately three kilometers northwest of Xom Duong Long (XT3436), A/B/4-23d Infantry (M), engaged an estimated 100 enemy, killing 32. On 9 January at 1000 hours in the vicinity of Nui Cau Mountain (XT276600), A/C/3-22d Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy, resulting in 47 enemy
killed. On 16 January at 0800 hours in the vicinity of Nui Cau Mountain (XT276600), a contact by A/4-9th Infantry resulted in 13 enemy killed with 4 US wounded.

(d) 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The brigade continued OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division during the reporting period. The brigade began Phase IV of Campaign Toan Thang with four battalions and operated in Long An Province, with responsibility for the security of Highways 4, 18, and 23. It conducted multiple airmobile, reconnaissance, checkerboard, bushmaster, and riverine operations. The brigade conducted operations against enemy local force units and elements of SR-1, SR-2, and the 1st NVN Regiment. The pacification program was also emphasized. In contacts on 12 November, elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division killed 30 enemy. Friendly casualties were 2 US wounded. At 1220 hours on 14 November approximately one kilometer east of Ap Binh Duc (1) (XS648637), a contact by 2-60th Infantry resulted in 12 enemy killed, with no friendly casualties. On 19 November in the vicinity of Tan Kien (XS747830), the 6-31st discovered an enemy cache containing 72 high explosive rounds, 234 grenades, and 5,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. On 30 November at 1850 hours approximately one kilometer north of Ap Phu Tay (XS688582), a contact by the 2-47th Infantry (M) resulted in 20 enemy killed, with no friendly casualties. On 4 December, airstrikes and a sweep during Jitterbug operations in the vicinity of Ap Phuoc Quang (XS647828) by the 5-6th Infantry resulted in 17 enemy killed. There were no friendly casualties. On 12 December at 1745 hours in the vicinity of Ap Vinh Binh (1) (XS598590), a contact by the 6-31st Infantry resulted in 20 enemy killed and 5 individual weapons captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 14 December at 1300 hours in the vicinity of Ap Phuc Chai (XS730640), a contact by the 2-60th Infantry resulted in 18 enemy killed and 6 individual weapons, 1 crew served weapon, 1,300 rounds of small arms ammunition, 5 grenades, and 5 high explosive rounds destroyed. Friendly casualties were 1 US killed and 4 wounded.

(e) 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light). The brigade continued Campaign Toan Thang, conducting combined and coordinated operations during the period. The 2-3d Infantry conducted operations with the 48th ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in southwest Long Khanh Province. Elements of the 2-3d Infantry continued Operation Friendship III, conducting combined operations with elements of the 18th ARVN Division, the 1st Australian Task Force, and RTAVF against the 274th VC Regiment in the Hat Dich area. The 3-7th Infantry conducted combined and coordinated operations with the 52d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in south and east Long Khanh Province. The 4-12th Infantry conducted operations with the 43d ARVN Regiment in western Long Khanh Province. The 5-12th Infantry also conducted operations
with the 43d ARVN regiment in west central Long Khanh Province, with D/17th Cavalry conducting unilateral and combined operations with the brigade and the 18th ARVN Division. The brigade's operations were directed toward the elimination of enemy forces and the VCI, and in support of the pacification program.

(f) 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. The brigade continued Operation Yorktown Victor in the Iron Triangle and southern Phu Hoi District, with the 1-505th assuming overwatch responsibility for the Phu Cuong and Ba Dop bridge on 1 November. The 2-505th continued its standdown at Phu Loi, which it had begun on 15 October, in preparation for redeployment. The brigade had previously been notified of its selection for redeployment on 17 September. On 1 November the 1-508th Infantry moved from southern Phu Hoi District to Phu Loi and began its standdown for redeployment. On 14 November the 1-505th moved to Phu Loi and began its standdown in preparation for redeployment. On 15 November the 3d Brigade was released OPCON II FFORCEV and became OPCON to Headquarters, USARV. The brigade subsequently redeployed to the United States on 12 December 1969.

(g) Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC). BHTAC continued Campaign Toan Thang by conducting extensive search and clear operations in its area of responsibility. Ground radar surveillance and airborne personnel detector operations continued. Hunter-killer teams of A/3-17th Cavalry conducted daylight visual reconnaissance in the BHTAC TAOR. The ready reaction force was provided by D/3-17th Cavalry, which also conducted reconnaissance and ambush operations and provided security for dredge operations along the Dong-Kai River. Effective 1 November, BHTAC was given a new mission by II FFORCEV. The responsibilities assigned BHTAC were as follows: to coordinate US and ARVN efforts for the defense of the Bien Hoa - Long Binh area with the Commanding Officer, Long Binh Special Zone (LSZZ); to insure coordination of the Long Binh Post, Plantation, Camp Frensell-Jones, Bien Hoa Army Base, and Bien Hoa Air Force Base (US) internal defense plans with LSZZ defense plans; to procure and coordinate US and FWMAF units or assets requested by the Commanding Officer, LSZZ for use in defense of the Bien Hoa - Long Binh complex; to act as area coordinator for US Army air assets for the Bien Hoa Sector; to assist the Commanding Officer, LSZZ in the development of tactical operations center (TOC) operations; to assist the Commanding Officer, LSZZ in the development of timely information and intelligence from US intelligence sources; to represent the Commanding General, II FFORCEV in the LSZZ TOC and to be prepared to assist in the occupation of LSZZ TOC alternate (II FFORCEV TOC) by the II FFORCEV main TOC in the event of an emergency requiring such action; to provide assistance to all mobile assistance teams in Bien Hoa Province less Di An and Tan Uyen
Districts; to assist in and facilitate coordination among LBSZ, 1st Infantry Division, RTAVF, and 18th Military Police Brigade on all operations conducted within the LBSZ area; to assist the Commanding Officer, LBSZ in the development of the LBSZ fire support coordination center; to assist the Commanding Officer, LBSZ in the development and training of personnel for a ground surveillance and sensor program (US radar teams would be placed in direct support of the LBSZ); and to assist in coordinating sectors of surveillance and processing of reports of flash bases and countermortar radars within the LBSZ. The instructions tasked II FFORCEV Artillery to provide adequate personnel to the LBSZ fire support coordination element until this function could be performed by ARVN personnel. At this time, plans for the further reduction of BHTAC and its eventual elimination were to be formulated.

(h) 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) began Phase IV of Campaign Toan Thang with the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) completing its deployment to AO Grace (center of mass YS 3082); the 6th Battalion, RAR/New Zealander (NZ) (ANZAC) continuing ambush and reconnaissance operations in AO Linton (center of mass YS6167) and AO Bayswater (center of mass YS6687); and the 9th Battalion, RAR completing its return to the 1st ATF base camp. On 28 November, the 8th Battalion, RAR arrived in Vietnam, replacing the 9th Battalion, which departed the 1st ATF base camp for Australia on the same day. The 8th Battalion began training at the base camp on 29 November. The period was characterized by small and scattered contacts with the battalions operating in various AO's throughout the quarter. The 8th Battalion completed deployment to AO Ashgrove (center of mass YS3885) and began conducting reconnaissance and ambush operations, returning to the base camp on 10 January. It later conducted operations in the Nui Dinh Mountains.

(1) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) conducted combat operations throughout its area of responsibility to interdict infiltration routes through Long Thanh and Nhơn Trạch Districts and to destroy enemy forces within the area. Participation in Operation Friendship III continued. The 1-2d Infantry provided security for Bearcat and the Long Thanh District headquarters during the quarter. The period was characterized by the conduct of reconnaissance and ambush and cordon and search operations resulting in scattered contacts and the discovery of small caches.

(3) Air Operations.

(a) Resources. The following non-divisional resources of the 12th Combat Aviation Group were under the control of II FFORCEV during the reporting period.

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Helicopters.

10 assault helicopter companies
1 aerial weapons company
3 assault support helicopter companies (Med)
1 assault support helicopter company and 1 platoon (Heavy)
1 aviation company (Corps)

1 air cavalry squadron (—). Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry was placed OPCON to the air cavalry squadron on 1 December 1969. One air cavalry troop was placed in support of IV CTZ on 5 January 1970.

Airplanes.

1 utility airplane company
1 surveillance airplane company
2 reconnaissance airplane companies

(b) The ten assault helicopter companies continued to provide 2,700 hours of support time per month. On 15 December 1969, a ninety day test was initiated with two assault helicopter companies and one air cavalry troop to determine the maximum sustained capability of an assault company and an air cavalry troop. Total slick support from the 12th Combat Aviation Group increased during the period by 8 slicks.

2 companies of 12 slicks, 4 gunships each. Special classified missions requiring 24 hour a day support plus general support missions.

1 company of 12 slicks, 4 gunships. General support.

7 companies of 1 C&C, 9 slicks, 4 gunships. Combat assaults plus 2 slicks for general support.

(c) Limitations. Requests for helicopters for airmobile operations and general support continued to exceed assets available. The continuing positive management of these assets and their maintenance support assured maximum utilisation.

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(d) Infant System. The Infant System was introduced into II FFORCEV on 26 November 1969. This system consisted of remote and direct view image intensifier subsystems. Both subsystems have a zoom capability (magnifying about four times) and were used to acquire targets and control fires of the M-21 armament system (7.62mm MG's and 2.75 inch rocket launchers). Optional light assist was provided by two 500 watt searchlights boresighted with the M-134 miniguns. This system was mounted on a UH-1M helicopter. As of 25 December 1969 the Infant System was credited with killing 61 enemy in 129 hours of flying time. In addition, the OH-58 (LOH) was introduced and started operating in III CTZ in November 1969.

(4) Close Air Support. Close air support of II FFORCEV OPCON units during the quarter was fully adequate.

(5) Force Structure. The following changes occurred in force structure:

(a) Gains.
1 Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry on 20 November 1969.
2 8th RAR on 28 November 1969.

(b) The following units were reduced in size in order to meet Phase II redeployment requirements. The units are no longer capable of providing their own administrative and logistic support.
1 HHB, 825th Target Acquisition Battery from 152 to 30 authorized strength.
2 552d Military Police Company from 200 to 53 authorized strength.

(c) Losses:
1 54th Artillery Group on 7 November 1969.
2 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division on 15 November 1969.
3 Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry on 20 November 1969.
5 6th Field Artillery Detachment on 21 November 1969.
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6 79th Field Artillery Detachment on 21 November 1969.
7 9th RAR on 28 November 1969.
8 30th Chaplain Detachment on 1 December 1969.
9 33rd Chaplain Detachment on 1 December 1969.

(d) One unit, the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry was released OPCON to the 12th Combat Aviation Group and placed OPCON to II FFORCEV, effective 1200 hours, 1 December 1969. Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry was placed OPCON to the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, effective 1200 hours, 1 December 1969.

(6) Training.

(a) The II FFORCEV ARVN Battalion Refresher Training Programs for infantry, engineer, and armored cavalry units terminated during the period. The training of the armored cavalry units was hindered by redeployments within the CTZ of both US and ARVN units. As a result only the program for the 10th ACR, 25th Division (ARVN) was completed. The 5th ACR, 18th Division (ARVN) received only Phase I (crew and platoon training) while the 1st ACR, 5th Division (ARVN) program failed to materialize.

(b) ARVN was unable to fully participate in the RMT program due to a shortage of qualified officer and NCO instructors in the ARVN units and a shortage of interpreters in the US units. US units provided training to ARVN counterparts in the following areas: On the job training of RF/PF and ARVN personnel in small unit tactics, patrols, communications equipment and procedures, demolitions, weapons, sensors, sniper techniques, mine detection and employment, engineer equipment and projects, as well as other areas as requested by ARVN and RF/PF commanders. In addition assistance was provided to both the 5th and 18th Division Training Centers to upgrade the methods of instruction of ARVN instructors and to provide additional assistance in range operations, weapons training, and development of junior NCO’s. CMAC instituted a Senior Officer Preventive Maintenance and Tactics Course with eight classes to be conducted prior to the end of February. Upon completion of the last class, it is anticipated that the course will be continued under ARVN auspices with some assistance from CMAC personnel.

(c) The present training assistance programs between US and ARVN units were being reevaluated to determine the requirements and to develop programs which will be beneficial to both. The Dong Tien Program of combined operations proved to be an effective training vehicle to upgrade ARVN capabilities.


e. Logistics.

(1) Programs and projects.

(a) Requisitioning of small size lumber (1x, 2x, and 4x) and plywood for II FFORCEV assigned/attached units and II FFORCEV Artillery units improved. USARV allocated II FFORCEV a monthly pre-established requisitioning ceiling. The II FFORCEV G4 further subdivided the allocation among the assigned/attached units. The establishment of a requisitioning ceiling was another step closer to open requisitioning of small sized lumber.

(b) Command control of sandbags continued in effect. The USARV allocation system continued to provide II FFORCEV sufficient sandbag assets to meet operational requirements.

(c) II FFORCEV assigned/attached and OPCON units during calendar year 1969 captured, turned in, or disposed of 10,866 individual weapons and 1,854 crew served weapons.

(d) The MACV-directed serial number inventory of CONEX containers for II FFORCEV assigned/attached units and II FFORCEV Artillery resulted in reporting to the Joint CONEX Control Agency a total of 12 each Type I containers, 389 each Type II containers, 1 each Type II (CH) containers. Total for II FFORCEV was 402 containers. Units were to be provided a computer printout for verification.

(b) Logistic Readiness Program.

1 The second quarter FY 70 Logistic Readiness meeting for II Field Force Vietnam assigned and attached units was held on 9 January 1970. Topics discussed included: USARV CMMI concept and results, the reporting and accounting for excess property, the proper procedures in retrograding unserviceable components, and an analysis of the Quarterly Materiel Readiness and the Weekly Command Deadline reports.

2 During the quarter, the USARV CMMI Team inspected 10 units, rating two of the units unsatisfactory. The categories receiving low scores were weapons, tactical vehicles, special purpose vehicles, and maintenance management operations. An increase in command interest and emphasis would reduce or eliminate unsatisfactory results in the future.

3 The Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) assignment and maintenance picture was complicated with the receipt of CH-58. The 23d Artillery
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Group was the only affected unit with a mixed fleet of OH-6, OH-23, and OH-58. It was expected that its entire LOH fleet would be OH-58 by the end of 3d Quarter, FY 70. The increase in cyclic overhaul retrograde criteria required all units and staff sections with an aircraft maintenance responsibility to re-evaluate their maintenance posture. The practice of deferring maintenance on non-safety of flight conditions until the major periodic inspection (PMP) corresponding to retrograde time could no longer be tolerated. Further, major inspection workloads would have to be leveled out and programmed in advance along with an additional programming and requisitioning of time before overhaul (TBO) parts and components previously not required.

(2) Ammunition.

(a) Ammunition items in short supply continued to be managed through the use of available supply rate (ASR) allocations to insure equitable distribution of available ammunition to all II Field Force Vietnam units. Expenditures of certain high cost, high tonnage items also continued to be controlled through the available supply rate system.

(b) During the quarter, the number of conventional munitions under available supply rate control were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1969</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1969</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1970</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Transportation.

(a) United States Air Force C123/C130 sorties flown from the Common Service Airlift System in support of II Field Force Vietnam are summarized in Inclosure 7.

(b) The MACV allocation of C-7A aircraft dedicated to II FFORCEV remained at 14 aircraft during the reporting period. During the last month of the reporting period the level of combat essential air lifts was significantly lower. This was credited to better management of Priority 01 airlift requests on the part of the units.

(4) Engineer support.

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(a) General. With the end of the Southwest Monsoon, or rainy season, heavy emphasis was placed on road building throughout the III Corps area by divisional and non-divisional engineers.

(b) LOC Program. The 20th Engineer Brigade, ARVN Engineers, and RMK/BRJ, a civilian contractor, were engaged in restoring principal roads in III Corps Tactical Zone. The brigade had units working on QL-20 from Gia Kiem to the II/III Corps boundary, QL-1 from the junction with QL-20 to Gia Ray, QL-13 from Lai Khe to An Loc, and TL 2A/LTL 1A from the junction with QL-13 to Phuoc Vinh. The ARVN 30th Engineer Group constructed bridges on QL-1 between Gia Ray and the II/III Corps boundary and on II/II-1A south of Phuoc Vinh. The civilian contractor continued construction on QL-1 between Cu Chi and Saigon and on QL-15 between Bearcat and Vung Tau.

(c) Tactical Road Program. Work was started on the II FFORCEV Tactical Road Program, a project designed to open secondary roads in the six most heavily populated provinces in III Corps. A total of 595 kilometers of secondary roads were scheduled for opening in Long An, Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa Provinces. At the close of the quarter 226 kilometers of road were completed. This represents 38 percent of the program. US divisional and non-divisional engineers, Navy Seabees, and ARVN engineer troops were engaged in the program.

(d) Land Clearing Program.

1 Production in the land clearing program increased as the rains slacked off. A total of 30,719 acres was cleared during the period by the land clearing battalion. Significant cutting operations were conducted in the Hat Dich, Gang Toi, Nhon Trach, War Zone C, Bu Dop, Duc Phong, and Trapesoid areas.

2 A significant accomplishment during the period was the activation of the 318th ARVN Land Clearing Company which was being trained by the 62d Engineer Battalion. The formal classroom instruction for one platoon of operators was completed in January, and the operators were participating in their first 45 day cut cycle with the 501st Land Clearing Company (LCC) in War Zone C. Mechanics were being trained in Company A, 62d Engineer Battalion. The 318th LCC, a part of the 30th Engineer Group, was expected to be fully trained and operational by 1 June 1970.

3 Secondary Growth Equipment. During January 1970 four items of special equipment to cut secondary vegetation growth were received in the theater. These items, consisting of 2 Marden brush cutters and 2 Rome disc harrows, were procured under the Vietnamese Laboratory Assistance Program.
Army (VIAPA). USARV issued them to the 20th Engineer Brigade for test and evaluation in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The 20th Engineer Brigade, in conjunction with II FFORCEV headquarters, was developing a two fold program which would merge tactical considerations with the requirements to test the equipment under varying soil and vegetation conditions.

(e) Bridge Security Program.

1. The responsibility for maintaining the security lighting systems on bridges throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone was transferred during the quarter to the Capital Military Region and the provinces.

2. The pier protection system on the Binh Loi Bridge was completed during the quarter. Also completed were repair projects on the pier protection systems on the Tan Thuan, Chu Y and Phu Xuan Bridges, and the anti-sapper boom at Ben Luc Bridge. Work started on repairing the system on the Dong Nai Bridge. Remaining bridge security projects assigned to the 20th Engineer Brigade were the pier protection systems on the Cau Ganh and Phu Long bridges, and the construction of anti-sapper booms at the Phu Cuong and Ben Loi bridges. ARVN Engineers were prepared to start construction of a pier protection system for the new Song Be Bridge.

3. Security lighting systems were complete except for the Song Be Bridge. The 20th Engineer Brigade was to furnish materials to the ARVN 30th Engineer Group to construct a temporary lighting system. The permanent system was to be constructed following release of funds by GVN. Commercial power was requested for the Phu Long Bridge security lighting system.

(f) 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain). Under the operational control of the II FFORCEV Engineer, the 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) continued its support of HQ, II FFORCEV and OPCON units by producing military geographic data and disseminating it to the field. The most important documents produced were an updated minefield listing and a map booklet showing locations of known minefields. The map booklet was a new format that provided a graphic portrayal of minefields in the III CTZ and IV CTZ in a convenient 8 x 11 inch size. The information presented referred to the location only and was classified Confidential. This permitted distribution to the lowest level having a need for the data. Other major projects completed during the quarter were a series of overprinted maps showing updated land clearing operations, geologic structures, and location of natural resources. Members of the 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) continued aerial and ground reconnaissance of natural construction materials, roads, bridges, and airfields in the III CTZ and contiguous areas. This was a recurring program to enable immediate
response to queries from OPCON units concerning the location, condition, and capacity of LOC within the II FFORCEV area of interest.

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations. During the reporting period, II FFORCEV psychological operations were conducted in support of tactical operations, pacification, redeployment, and special campaigns. The period was highlighted by:

(a) Increased emphasis on analysis of intelligence for rapid exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities. Specific actions included expansion of intelligence evaluation activities of G5, II FFORCEV; establishment of a combined US/ARVN target audience analysis section for III CTZ as part of the Combined Psychological Operation Coordination Center; incorporation of G5/S5 elements into OPCON unit TOC’s at division and brigade level. The improved coordination with intelligence agencies increased the number of quick reaction missions (from 6,492 to 11,212 since the last reporting period) and significantly reduced reaction time for loudspeaker and leaflet exploitation.

(b) Operation Family Tree was expanded to increase friction and mistrust within the enemy chain of command. By establishing a central intelligence collection and control system, G5, II FFORCEV was able to maintain a record of combat actions, to include personnel and equipment losses, tactical failures, and lack of leadership for all major enemy headquarters in III CTZ. This file system also included an analysis of enemy failures during his 1969 Spring/Summer/Fall Campaigns and a summary of enemy claims, weaknesses, and future objectives as outlined in COSVN Resolution 9. Based on these data, special leaflets addressed to each major enemy unit were on standby for distribution by OPCON units of II FFORCEV during enemy contacts (high points). Special leaflets were continuously updated to reflect the latest personnel and equipment losses. Whenever possible, adjacent major units (enemy regiments) were also targeted to insure complete enemy awareness of their failures.

(c) Psychological operations against local forces were fully implemented during this period, supporting II FFORCEV/III Corps tactical operations. Emphasis was placed on personalized appeals to both local force companies and the adjacent population areas, and on the use of small quantities of leaflets on carefully selected targets. A total of 44 different leaflets was developed against local companies during the reporting period.

(d) Preparations for further redeployment of US forces was an important part of psychological operations during this period. General type redeployment
media were developed and stocked by OPCON units to be used as necessary, to preclude the delays in the use of psyop, experienced by previously redeploying units. In addition, more emphasis was placed on countering the enemy propaganda directed at redeployment by extensively quoting President Nixon's speeches of 3 November and 16 December which outlined specific conditions affecting the US rate of redeployment.

(e) The more detailed intelligence analysis begun during this reporting period has revealed increasing examples of the effectiveness of US/FWMAF psyop. In particular, the enemy has experienced increasing concern with the success of the Chieu Hoi Program, the loss of food and equipment caches revealed by Ho Chi, and the impact of MEDCAP's on the civilian population.

(2) Civil Affairs.

(a) During this quarter, emphasis continued on fostering a closer working relationship with CORDS representatives at all echelons, GVN officials, and RVNAF personnel. The province oriented civil affairs platoons continued to be deployed throughout III CTZ in direct support of the III CTZ advisory staff. They proved highly effective in serving as the coordination link between the US/FWMAF and the local GVN officials.

(b) The number and extent of civic action projects undertaken by US units remained relatively constant during the quarter. Most of these were of the short-term, high-impact type. This assisted in reducing the impact caused by the redeployment of US units.

(c) Efforts were made during the last two quarters to insure that civic action projects undertaken were helpful and contributed to the success of the Village Self-Development Program.

(d) The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division redeployed to the United States during the reporting period. Prior to departure, the unit insured that civic action projects not completed were turned over to a responsible unit or III CTZ advisory team.

g. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

(1) Rural Development (RD).

(a) General. Pacification continued to show progress during this period, although December and January were marked by some enemy interference which caused an apparent leveling-off. January HES figures indicated that an estimated 3,270,000 people in the III CTZ area (98.2 percent of the population...
less Saigon) were living under GVN security (security rating of C or better), an increase of 41,000 people or 1.0 percent over October. More impressive, however, was a look at security changes wrought in the past twelve months. Now only a minuscule percentage (0.5) of the population remained under VC control. Roads which were either closed or extremely dangerous were now teeming with civilian traffic. Curfew hours were eased, and areas which lay fallow were back under cultivation. Good progress was made in most areas of pacification. The past twelve months was a period of impressive achievements.

(b) Cadre. Pacification continued to show progress during this period, with RD cadre contributing significantly to the effort. The most notable RD cadre contributions were their support of the Village Self Development and People's Self Defense Force programs. Nevertheless, there was concern that the mission of the RD cadre was no longer valid in really secure, well governed areas. Redeployment priorities for RD cadre as outlined in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan were completed with the exception of Long An, which had approval from the Ministry of Rural Development to direct efforts to upgrading the remaining "D" hamlets during early 1970. In addition, a study was being conducted for deploying RD cadre in more efficient and smaller operational teams based on the number of hamlets and size of population within a village without regard to HES category. Findings and recommendations of the study were to be forwarded to the Ministry of Rural Development. Son Tron cadre are undergoing reorganization from 70-man groups to 30-man groups, similar to that of the present RD cadre group organization. Reorganization of Son Tron cadre groups was completed in three of the four provinces with such cadre.

(c) People's Self Defense Forces. During the period, PSDF continued to show improvement. To provide further improvement, it was proposed to organize highly trained and effective "inter-teams" in the PSDF. The training program for PSDF leaders would be equivalent to that established for basic military leadership training of RF/PF at the National Training Center. Graduates would be better qualified to organize and train members of the PSDF. Also, Mobile Training Teams were set up with Regional Forces and Popular Forces members at sectors and subsectors. PSDF members also would receive instruction in weapons maintenance. At the subsector level, one ARVN non-commissioned officer was appointed to advise, assist, and monitor the PSDF program. Statistically, the PSDF appeared to be on the way. Yet there was the negative side. PSDF was obligatory for selected age groups, which did not endure the program to many thoughtful Vietnamese especially when the program was designed to bind the people to the side of the government. There was a danger in demanding too much, such as required attendance at a training center for
several weeks while family funds dwindled. Further, there was concern over attempts to enlarge the security role of the PSDF. On the other hand, the great strength of the PSDF was a commitment signified by taking up arms for the GVN. Moreover, despite their lack of military expertise, they played a substantial role in hamlet security. While no one would seriously contend that PSDF formed a ring of steel around any hamlet in III CTZ, they create a zone of uncertainty.

(2) Territorial Security. During the reporting period, the Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF) showed an increased ability to provide territorial security in III CTZ. Despite a reduction of 101 contacts compared to the previous quarter, the RF/PF inflicted heavier personnel and equipment losses on the enemy during this period. This increase can be attributed to increases in manpower, training, and communications of the RF/PF. Also, a significant increase was seen in the ability to react quickly to enemy contacts and to fresh intelligence. In sum, the RF/PF had a major impact on pacification successes. This was expected to continue through 1970. Nevertheless, leadership continued to be the most critical problems, especially at the company commander and platoon leader levels. There were insufficient replacements for the inept. Also, there was concern over attempts to organize the RF/PF into bigger, more sophisticated units. Excessive RF/PF personnel already were committed to special activities not pointed toward the primary mission of these forces.

(3) Refugees. During the fourth quarter of 1969, 25,539 refugees received final payments from the Ministry of Social Welfare and were removed from the active rolls. Goals for the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign were exceeded by six percent. In addition, 29,139 out-of-camp refugees were registered, paid, and dropped from the active rolls. The return-to-village program resulted in 5,154 former refugees returning to their ancestral homes. The year 1969 saw 99,559 refugees resettled in III CTZ. There were 8,099 active refugees in III CTZ—6,376 in Hau Nghia Province alone.

(4) Chieu Hoi.

(a) During the period there were 1,978 ralliers registered in III CTZ. This was a decrease of over 33 percent compared with the 2,964 returnees registered during the previous period. The returnees were categorized as 1,069 (54 percent) military, 569 (29 percent) political, and 340 (17 percent) other. There were thirty NVA and four re-groupees among the military ralliers. The monthly breakdown of the 1,978 returnees was: November—737; December—768; and January—473. The provinces of Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, and Long An accounted for over 71 percent of the ralliers.

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(b) During the period, 730 Armed Propaganda Teams were trained in basic psychological warfare operations and techniques at the Vung Tau National Training Center.

(5) Development.

(a) On 23 October 1969, the GVN announced the imposition of a new austerity tax on about 1,500 import items, effective 24 October. The measure was intended to reduce the budget imbalance and to control the growing inflationary pressures which resulted from increased GVN expenditures. The initial impact of the austerity tax was stronger in the provinces than in Saigon. It considerably retarded the intensified pacification effort aimed at promoting popular cooperation with the GVN. The psychological impact of the tax increases and the concern it evoked in US and Vietnamese government circles were due not so much to the measure itself as to the manner in which it was announced and implemented. At the time of its promulgation, the extent of the tax, the specific items subject to it and, most importantly, the reason for the measure itself were not adequately explained to the people. The result was confusion, speculative withholdings, hoarding, price increases for items not affected by the tax, and a widespread loss of confidence in the GVN. Prices soared in the wake of a new austerity tax. The upward movement continued in November, but at a somewhat reduced rate. A levelling off of prices was apparent in December. However, prices at the end of December and in January were affected by the rise in demand which commonly precedes Tet, and the real and lasting impact of the tax on price levels can not be accurately gauged until after Tet.

(l) Forest activities in Don Luan District, Phuoc Long Province, increased, making this area the foremost producer of logs in III CTZ. Only a fraction of the logs were locally processed. The bulk was exported in the form of logs. Phuoc Long's forests supplies logs not only to Saigon and the Delta, but also to the former leading log-producing provinces in III CTZ such as Tay Ninh. The concessionaires who owned the right of forest exploitation in Don Luan District brought to Dong Xoai some 250 to 300 forest workers with their families from areas outside the province. Housing for these workers was constructed rapidly. Food was imported from Saigon and from neighboring Binh Duong. The influx of some 1,500 persons engaged in productive work formed an excellent base for the expansion of local production of food. Sufficient suitable and secure land areas for local food production existed in and around Dong Xoai. Therefore, a joint Vietnamese/American effort was underway to clear some 50 hectares of land for the planting of vegetables and rice.
(c) In November 1969, II FFORCEV began an extensive secondary road upgrading program in Long An, Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Gia Dinh, and Bien Hoa Provinces. It was contemplated that the vast majority of the 595.2 kilometers of roadway programmed would be completed at the end of the dry season (28.1 percent was completed after only two months of operation). The objective of this program was to increase and improve accessibility between populated areas of economic significance and to provide access to Viet Cong base areas. The work force was predominantly US Army engineer battalions, plus some ARVN engineers and FWMAF engineer elements. Construction priorities were set by each province through coordination with II Field Force Vietnam.

(d) During this period, the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) approved a public works roads and bridges budget of $330,341,000 for 1970 which represents approximately 200 kilometers of roadway. The 1969 program was 81 percent accomplished as of 31 December 1969, with most of the uncompleted portion reprogrammed into 1970. The 1969 CPDC program was deemed successful, considering the late start (May 1969) and the rainy season working conditions.

(e) The Philippine Civic Action Group Vietnam (PHILCAGV) returned to the Philippines. The majority of its construction equipment was returned to the US Army and retrograded out of country. The ten major items of equipment that were not retrograded have been placed in USARV stock to fill TO&E shortages. The majority of the roadway upgrading programmed, but unaccomplished by the PHILCAGV will be undertaken by US or ARVN engineers, Public Works Departments, or FWMAF elements.

h. Communications. Significant changes in communication in support of II Field Force Vietnam operations during the reporting period are outlined below.

(1) Radio.

(a) On 15 November 1969 the HYL-3/TSEC secure automatic radio retransmission device arrived in country for a 30 day test by II FFORCEV/OPCON units for the purpose of evaluating its operation under actual combat conditions, at the end of the test the units were allowed to keep the sets for operational use. Release of additional HYL-3's and maintenance support is scheduled for April 1970.

(b) On 4 December 1969 an AN/TRC-24 VHF system from Plantation to Phu Loi for the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division was discontinued. The brigade
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became OPCON to USARV in its final preparation for redeployment to CONUS, and multi-channel communications to it were no longer required.

(c) On 7 December 1969 USN CTG 194.6 was given permission to enter the II FFORCEV CG Command Net (Secure) on an "as required" basis to pass contact reports on its operations.

(d) At 1700 hours on 7 December 1969 the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry entered the II FFORCEV CG Command Net (Secure).

(e) An AN/TRC-24 VHF system was installed from Plantation to Di An by the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) on 9 December 1969 to provide direct communications from II FFORCEV to its newly acquired OPCON unit, the 3-17th Air Cavalry Squadron.

(f) On 9 December 1969 the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division deactivated its station in II FFORCEV RATT Net.

(g) On 15 December 1969, the Special Liaison Section (US) to the RTAVF at Bear Cat entered II FFORCEV CG Command Net. Equipment was provided by the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps).

(h) Nui Chau Chan (Hill 837) under the signal operational control of II FFORCEV Signal Section was used extensively by II FFORCEV OPCON units and the 5th Special Forces Group as a FM retransmission site during the reporting period.

(2) Commenter/Comm Security.

(a) Command emphasis was placed on FM radio secure equipment (NESTOR). A NESTOR Task Force was formed to study problems in the NESTOR program and determine courses of action required to resolve these problem areas. The first meeting of the Task Force was held on 3 December 1969. Representatives from Headquarters, II FFORCEV and all II FFORCEV OPCON units as well as representatives from USARV attended this meeting. As a result of the discussions and recommendations during this meeting, the II Field Force Signal Section drafted a Signal OPLAN on NESTOR Implementation. Draft copies of the plan were sent to the Department of the Army, United States Army Vietnam, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, and all units OPCON to II FFORCEV. Concurrence, suggestions, and recommended changes were requested from all organizations.

(b) A teletype circuit from the II FFORCEV Main CommCenter to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division was deactivated on 4 December 1969.

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deactivation was due to redeployment of the 3d Brigade.

(c) On 6 December 1969 a teletype circuit was installed from the II FFORCEV Main CommCenter to the 3-17th Air Cavalry Squadron.

(3) Wire Communication.

(a) On 10 November 1969 the class "A" dial subscribers at Bearcat were afforded direct access into the tandem switch. This was the result of a request received from the RTAVF CG and indorsed by this headquarters to USARV. Access to the tandem eliminated the requirement for the Bearcat subscribers to obtain operator assistance from the Long Binh telephone exchange in order to dial anywhere in the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand.

(b) An emergency action console (EAC) telephone was installed on 11 December 1969 for the Chief of Staff, II FFORCEV to provide him with access to the rapid response system.

(c) On 17 December 1969 a complete review of all CACS circuits supporting Headquarters, II FFORCEV was forwarded to USARV. As a result of the review and rejustification, approximately 20 percent of the circuits was deactivated, thereby freeing communications assets for upgrading in areas where required.

(d) The installation of a 50 pair cable on Plantation from II FFORCEV Hurricane Patch frame to II FFORCEV Artillery Havoc frame on 24 December 1969 considerably improved communications to the II FFORCEV Artillery area. The cable was installed to replace two 26 pair tactical cables provided by the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps). The new fixed plant, low loss cable will provide better quality circuits.

i. Information.

(1) During the reporting period "The Hurricane" continued to feature stories on Vietnam, its culture, its people and its armed forces. In the November, December, and January issues, there were 25 feature articles; 11 emphasized Vietnamese subjects to include pacification and a major story on the city of Saigon. Nine articles featured Free World Forces and American Forces in III Corps Tactical Zone while the remaining five were on miscellaneous subjects. In the annual DA Print and Broadcast Journalism Award contest, "The Hurricane" won the best magazine award. It was also selected the best magazine in USARV.
(2) The Radio and TV section continued to produce the weekly program, "Dateline III Corps" for AFVN and initiated a new program, "III Corps Roundup" which is broadcast three times weekly. There were 1,056 hometown radio tapes, 66 feature tapes for AFVN, 11 spots for AFVN, and 5 hometown TV releases. The submission of TV hometown releases is the first attempted by this office.

(3) In public information there were 117 press releases and 176 hometown news releases.

(4) Relations with the civilian news media continue to be excellent. Eighty-nine correspondents attended the six press up-date briefings conducted during the period. During the same period 33 correspondents interviewed the CG and one was briefed by the G2.

j. Inspector General. During the reporting period the Inspector General completed one inspection and conducted two investigations/inquiries.

k. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period, personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate section continued to make visits to the subordinate units in the field to provide legal assistance and guidance in the handling of military justice matters. The section continued to experience an increase in the workload of military justice matters due to the implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968; however, no additional officers were assigned.

(2) Three general courts-martial trials were conducted during the reporting period.

(3) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp, and station functions.

(4) Claims processing remained at a high level during the quarter.

(5) On 15 November 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Fred R. Ball assumed the position of Staff Judge Advocate; Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones rotated to Germany.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.
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(1) Establishment of redeployment criteria.

(a) OBSERVATION: Early establishment of redeployment criteria is essential to proper planning and execution of redeployment moves.

(b) DISCUSSION:

1 Early establishment of redeployment criteria enables early identification of personnel returning to the United States. This permits timely requests for and receipt of assignment instructions for both personnel returning to the United States as individual replacement and those being reassigned within the Republic of Vietnam, all wing these personnel to be moved as soon as manpower requirements allow.

2 Insufficient lead time in this matter often causes personnel decisions to be made in reaction to crisis deadlines, and as a result, morale can be adversely affected.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A complete and final set of criteria concerning disposition of personnel should be provided as early as possible to a redeploying unit.

(2) Employment of Vietnamese nationals.

(a) OBSERVATION: Job placement of Vietnamese nationals must be considered in any redeployment planning.

(b) EVALUATION:

1 The withdrawal of an American unit from a base camp creates a job placement problem for those Vietnamese who are authorized on the unit's Table of Distribution (TD).

2 Efforts to find another US unit at the same base camp with the TD authorization and having vacancies prove difficult, especially base camps that are not primarily American.

3 Job security is as vital as any pacification project to local Vietnamese.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That maximum effort be placed in this area in calming the fears of employees and in confirming their new employers early in the redeployment operation.
(3) **Maintenance Technician Instructors.**

(a) **OBSESSION:** Progress in the implementation of the Province Maintenance Shop (PMS) program in Region III has been rated as the most advanced in country by USAID-Saigon evaluations. However, progress made in this program will diminish during 1970 if US advisory and technical assistance capabilities are not strengthened and maintained. Satisfactory development of the US/GVN sponsored National Maintenance System (NMS) is contingent upon adequate development of the PMS network, the foremost segment of the NMS. The Central Repair Parts Supply Depot, another segment of the NMS, has progressed to a high degree of self-sufficiency. The final segment of the NMS must necessarily be a central material reclamation facility which has not been planned and programmed to date. Unless the PMS program proves successful, the funds and effort expended thus far in the development of the NMS will not have produced satisfactory results and the program will be unnecessarily delayed if not abandoned altogether. The level of development of the PMS facilities in the III CTZ obviated the need for the construction, tooling, and staffing of provincial facilities for the maintenance of Province Advisory Team organic vehicles, as programmed in MACV Directive 1-68. Province Team organic vehicles in the III CTZ are being serviced in PMS facilities with the concurrence of the province chiefs. This cooperation results in substantial savings to the US Government.

(b) **EVALUATION:** AID budgetary limitations and directed staffing reductions preclude reestablishment of the Province Logistical Advisor and Province Maintenance Advisor positions. In view of the province team vehicle servicing being provided by the PMS facilities, and the fact that on-the-spot US advisory and assistance support cannot be provided by AID, the most logical and practical solution to this problem would be assignment of a US Army vehicle maintenance technician NCO to each of the 12 PMS facilities in the III CTZ. NCO's assigned should carry a grade of not less than E-7 and possess an MOS of 63Z50.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That a well qualified US Army vehicle maintenance technician NCO be assigned to the staff of each Province Team to serve as Province Maintenance Advisor.

b. **Intelligence.** None.

c. **Operations.**

(1) **Sniff and Snipe Hunt.**

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(a) OBSERVATION: The neutralization of enemy bases of operation in inundated areas, such as the Rung Sat, can be accomplished by the skillful integration and coordination of available weapons and proven tactics.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. Areas most suitable for the employment of Sniff and Snipe Hunt operations are characterized by numerous waterways, a high water table with a limited amount of high ground, and by thick but penetrable overhead cover, such as found in jungle areas with double and triple canopy.

2. These type areas necessitate the enemy use of sampans for the movement of supplies and personnel, an activity which can be easily detected by airborne observers. Once the enemy is detected, his ability to depart the area is virtually impossible.

3. The high water table precludes the enemy construction of underground fortifications and makes him extremely vulnerable to all types of fire, particularly artillery.

4. The numerous canals and rivers provide excellent reference points for accurate location of targets identified by Sniffer equipment and the accurate adjustment of fires. Further, they provide excellent routes for amphibious forces to enter, isolate, and exploit identifiable targets.

5. The thick but penetrable jungle facilitates more sensitive readings by Sniffer while affording sufficient protection from ground attack during low level flights.

6. Concept of Operation.

a. Select an area for the operation based on current intelligence, restricting friendly operations in this area for a minimum of twenty-four hours prior to the initiation of the Sniffer operation. This facilitates the identification of enemy targets, allows for the designation of a specified strike zone, permits the Sniffer to engage targets of opportunity, and eases coordination across boundaries.

b. Initiate Sniffer teams at first light to develop targets; this permits maximum utilization of daylight for follow-up operations.

c. As Sniffer completes the mission, he should be replaced by an airborne forward observer or forward air controller who immediately engages sensed targets in order of priority.
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d Hunter killer teams should be used to evaluate engaged targets and continue low level observations of the target area until the arrival of ground forces.

e Amphibious forces should be preassembled close to the target area to pile on, isolate, and otherwise exploit the target. They should then reassemble and move to subsequent targets, where c and d, above, are continuing.

f Infant and ambushes should be employed during hours of darkness to prevent enemy withdrawal.

g This should be repeated on the second day or as the situation dictates.

h A combined command post should be established to provide unity of command and a combined fire support coordination center established if artillery fires are to be massed effectively.

i A target analysis team should be employed to correct sniffer readings for drift, establish target priorities, select suitable fires, and plan the conduct of a ground sweep.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the use of these type operations be considered for employment in inundated areas.

(2) Ambush Sites.

(a) OBSERVATION: Ambush sites are not being varied and perimeter security personnel are not alert.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy is inflicting casualties on friendly units on ambush because the ambush sites are not being varied and perimeter security personnel are not alert. Review of mission books of RF companies and PF platoons show that ambush sites are within fifty meters of the sites previously used. Ambushes are established and alternated every night in a monthly pattern. This practice has allowed the VC to bypass the ambush sites and enter outposts, villages, and hamlets. On 28 December 1969, the VC attacked an RF platoon in Long Thanh District, Bien Hoa Province, overrunning it. The RF losses were five killed, two wounded, and three captured (two later escaped). RD cadre at the outpost lost three killed and one wounded. Weapons lost included one 60mm mortar, one M79 grenade launcher, three 45 caliber pistols, and two PRC-25 radios. Inspection of the outpost after the attack disclosed that the concertina wire was overgrown with grass
and the firing ports of the bunkers were obscured by grass. The night ambush sites were located within 50 meters of each other and only two sites had been used during the entire month. The ambush patrols were not remaining in ambush past 2300 hours, and guards at the outpost were not alert. In the case cited above, the first indication of the attack occurred after the VC had penetrated the perimeter.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis be placed on proper methods of conducting ambush patrols and maintaining perimeter security.

Quick Reaction to Contact and Fresh Intelligence.

(a) OBSERVATION: Quick reaction and airmobile operations are increasing in effectiveness; RF companies in joint operations with US companies are developing quick reaction to contacts and the exploitation of fresh intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION: Examples of the above observation occurred in late January when RF companies inflicted significant casualties on the enemy and captured prisoners and equipment while experiencing minimal friendly losses. In one action, one company made initial contact and another company linked up for completion of the sweep, discovering and overrunning freshly built bunkers. Results were 14 enemy killed. Seven AK-47's and one B40 rocket launcher with two rockets were captured. Friendly losses consisted of one RF killed. The second action was a success due to the quick reaction to fresh intelligence. Upon receipt of the intelligence, the 486th RF Company of Long An Province immediately swept a suspected VC district headquarters area, resulting in one enemy killed and nine enemy captured. There were no friendly casualties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis on quick reaction to contacts and intelligence be stressed as a principal factor in successful operations.

Security Measures for Road Convoys.

(a) OBSERVATION: Proper security measures are not practiced for military convoys.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy's capability of inflicting damage to friendly forces is enhanced due to improper clearing of roads for military convoys and poor communications security. On 9 January, a military convoy was scheduled in Binh Tuy Province. Security forces for the convoy were composed of three
RF companies, one ARVN company, and one ARVN mechanized platoon. Prior to the convoy's departure, the security forces reported clearing the road and adjacent areas. Times and route of march were transmitted in the clear between friendly units over insecure communications. Midway along the route of march, the convoy was ambushed by an estimated enemy reinforced squad using B40 rockets and small arms fire. The enemy was positioned in individual bunkers which had overhead cover and were 20 feet from the road. Friendly losses were four killed and 13 wounded. Enemy losses were unknown.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Unit commanders should insure that the route of march is cleared of mines and obstacles and that possible ambush sites are identified. Emphasis should be placed on the proper use of the SOI to insure secure communications.

d. Organisation. None.

e. Training. None.

f. Logistics.

(i) Property turnover.

(a) OBSERVATION: Security must be provided for property being turned over by American units during redeployment.

(b) EVALUATION: Property being turned over by redeploying units must be safeguarded during the period of turnover. This is especially important in the turnover of vacated buildings; sufficient security must be provided to preclude these buildings being stripped. This will become more important as more units redeploy. Careful planning results in minimal problems in this area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all redeployment planning consider this area of property security.

(2) Province Public Works Services Equipment Potential.

(a) OBSERVATION: The equipment and manpower potential of the Province Public Works Services continues to represent a low level capability for constructing roads.

(b) EVALUATION: The deadline rate for all public works equipment remains at a constant 25-30 percent. This, added to the fact that the overall
equipment inventory is inadequate to begin with, creates a very low potential for accomplishing substantial roadwork.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the GVN Ministry of Public Works eliminate competitive bidding on equipment needs and restrict its purchases to single manufacturer for each type of equipment. Require each manufacturer to set up a major spare parts depot and a maintenance center to perform 4th and 5th echelon repairs. While the elimination of competitive bidding might be more costly on the surface, the reduction of GVN administration structure, the improvement of equipment maintenance, and other less apparent benefits would result in cost reductions. Considering the future withdrawal of military forces from Vietnam, a transfer of US engineer equipment to Director General of Highways (DGOF) would fill many gaps in the inventory of Public Works equipment, particularly the equipment that would not normally be retrograded or would be disposed of for salvage. Further, since this equipment is of US manufacture, spare parts could be acquired on the international market.

g. Communications. Redeployment Communications Requirements.

(a) OBSERVATION: Dedicated voice and secure teletype circuits between a deploying unit's standdown base and its OPCON and support headquarters are essential. Determination must be made early as to the disposition of installed communications assets.

(b) EVALUATION: The provision of the necessary signal support required at any major redeployment site normally entails organic US signal units as well as Army Area Signal units. To prevent unnecessary confusion which could result, one signal coordinator should be designated for the site/ installation. The signal coordinator should be included in the planning at an early stage along with higher headquarters to resolve problems which cannot be resolved at a lower level. Communications requirements usually increase during standdown operations and preparation for redeployment. This makes it necessary for the organic signal personnel and equipment to remain operational until late in the redeployment. Communications planning should include RVNAF, as soon as security constraint on redeployment authorizes access, so that RVNAF can analyze requirements and formulate and staff their planned communications support of transferred facilities. When a major unit redeploys, the units remaining in the area will require signal support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That only the spaces representing those which supported the specific redeploying units be withdrawn from a signal unit rather than redeploying the entire signal unit. This would insure uninterrupted signal support to the remaining, non-redeploying units.

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h. Material. None.

i. Other.

(1) Use of "U" pickets for assault trackway.

(a) OBSERVATION: The passage of vehicles over trackway becomes difficult when trackway is not visible.

(b) EVALUATION: Assault trackway employed in muddy terrain for the purpose of facilitating the movement of vehicles often becomes immersed in mud and covered with water, causing vehicle drivers to lose sight of the trackway. The use of engineer "U" pickets on either side of the trackway aids in keeping the vehicle driver on the mat. Thus, even though the trackway is immersed in mud and covered by water, a driver can successfully navigate.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That "U" pickets be used to pinpoint the exact location of covered assault trackway.

(2) Road upgrade during monsoon season.

(a) OBSERVATION: Road upgrade during the monsoon season is difficult along sections of the road which are inundated due to heavy rains and nonexistent drainage.

(b) EVALUATION: Using demolitions for ditching in muddy terrain achieves quick and adequate results. The objective is to establish a drainage ditch approximately five feet wide and five feet deep. The procedure used is as follows: Because of the soft and muddy ground conditions, experimental test shots were made to determine the proper depth, spacing, and size of charges to achieve the desired results. The test shots determined that optimum results are obtained using a charge of 2½ pounds of C-4, spaced two feet apart, and at a depth of two feet. Narrow holes for the charges are easily made with a post hole digger. The charges are primed with detonating cord and attached to a line main. The procedure results in simultaneous detonation in the entire ditch line, with little material falling back into the ditch.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That in areas too wet to use conventional ditching techniques, drainage be accomplished using demolitions.

(3) Engineering problems during monsoon season.
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(a) OBSERVATION: The construction of fire support bases at the beginning of the monsoon season encounters significant wet weather construction problems.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. Priority of construction is normally given to defensive berms, tactical operations centers, bunkers, wire barriers, and finally improvement of access and other roads.

2. Roads quickly become quagmires during the monsoon season and drainage problems develop within the fire support bases. In some cases, roads become impassable and logistic resupply becomes totally dependent on helicopters.

3. Attempted solutions often prove futile.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: The following be considered in the construction and maintenance of roads of fire support bases:

1. Install culverts during the initial construction efforts.

2. Access roads should enjoy a high priority in the initial construction efforts.

3. Roads built in any season should be built with a high crown to assure drainage and, where needed, intercept ditches should be developed.

4. When the monsoons come:

a. Initiate road repairs with rocks or an appropriately tough material insoluble in water.

b. Other fill should be high in gravel content and compactible.

c. Maintain convoy control and regulate vehicle access to dirt roads; tracked vehicles, with their neutral steering, are especially damaging to roads.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. E. Macdonald

-Assi AG

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9 Incl
1. II FFORCEV Order of Battle — wd HQ, DA
2. II FFORCEV Troop List
3. II FFORCEV Area of Operations
4. Close Air Support
5. B-52 Strikes
6. Aviation Statistics
7. C130/C123 Sorties
8. Enemy Organization in the III CTZ — wd HQ, DA
9. Disposition of Enemy Forces — wd HQ, DA

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Cmnd Hist, MACV - 2
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ACofS, G2 II FFV - 1
ACofS, G3 II FFV - 5
ACofS, G4 II FFV - 1
ACofS, G5 II FFV - 1
DEPCORDS - 1
CDC LNO - 1
7th Mil Hist Det - 5
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AVHC-DST (23 Feb 70) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "The Light Observation Helicopters" paragraph 1a(e)2, page 35; concur. It is presently expected that the distribution of OH-58 aircraft to the 23rd Artillery Group will be completed within 3rd Quarter, FY 70. No further action by higher headquarters is recommended.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Establishment of redeployment criteria" paragraph 2a(1), page 48; concur. Redeployment criteria is developed separately for each redeployment phase. The primary influence upon the established criteria is the determination of the ultimate disposition of the unit i.e. whether the units will remain in the force structure or will be inactivated. Additional influences affecting the criteria are the size of the reduction and the projected strength posture at the completion of the reduction phase. Inasmuch as each factor is variable it is impossible to publish a criteria that would remain valid in all situations. In cases where changes to the redeployment criteria have been required, it has been essential to insure that established ceilings were reached on the date specified.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Employment of Vietnamese Nationals" paragraph 2a(2), page 48; concur. In accordance with USAV policy and specifically developed OPLANS, the Civilian Personnel Director assigns an action officer to provide on-site assistance to the unit commanders/installation coordinators. Immediate action is taken to identify the positions affected, determine the employees to be released, issue release notices, and provide placement assistance. No further action is recommended.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Communications, Redeployment Communications Requirements" paragraph 2g, page 54; noneconcur. The reference to the signal "spaces representing those

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DR 5200.10
which supported the specific redeploying units" is ambiguous. Should the statement be referring to the signal unit organic to the redeploying unit, then it is not valid, for then it is in contradiction to paragraphs 3a(1) and 3a(2) of Annex G (Communications-Electronics) to USARV OPLAN 183-69. Should the statement be referring to signal spaces associated with the 1st Signal Bde's area support units, then it may be valid; however, planning for the redeployment of 1st Signal Bde spaces/units considers a host of other factors in addition to direct C-E support of units scheduled for redeployment. The subject of redeployment communications requirements is well covered in Annex G (Communications-Electronics) to USARV OPLAN 183-69.

When a unit redeploy, the organic signal unit must also redeploy, not merely lose signal spaces. Internal planning should take communications requirements into consideration in determining the sequence of units standing down, i.e. the signal unit should be one of the last units to stand down. It may be assumed that non-redeploying units remaining in the area are not organic to the major unit which is redeploying. The latter unit's organic signal unit should not be expected to provide communications support for these non-redeploying units. Support for such units should come from either organic resources or from the Area Communications System.

FOR THE COMMANDER

[CPT. L.D. MURRAY]
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn
II FFV

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 MAR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
# II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM TROOP LIST

1 Nov 69 – 31 Jan 70

## OPCON UNITS

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Incl 2

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**STATISTICAL SUMMARY**

**III CTZ - CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U)**

1 November 1969 – 31 January 1970

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<table>
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<th>6. (C) Results</th>
<th><strong>KBA (SC)</strong></th>
<th><strong>KBA (EST)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Structures (Destroyed)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Structures (Damaged)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sampans (destroyed)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sampans (Damaged)</strong></th>
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Incl 4
## B-52 Strikes in III CTZ

**November 1969 - January 1970**

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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>25th Inf Div</th>
<th>1st Cav Div</th>
<th>1st Inf Div</th>
<th>25th Inf Div</th>
<th>199th LIB</th>
<th>RTAVF</th>
<th>1st ATF</th>
<th>III Corps</th>
<th>9th AIR</th>
<th>MACV</th>
<th>II FFV</th>
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Incl 5
# Quarterly Summary

## Aviation Statistics

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<th></th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rotary Wing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>37,838</td>
<td>40,350</td>
<td>40,166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops Lifted</td>
<td>205,428</td>
<td>223,353</td>
<td>221,307</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tons of Cargo</td>
<td>27,812</td>
<td>31,179</td>
<td>27,693</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Wing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>7,786</td>
<td>7,832</td>
<td>7,145</td>
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<td>Troops Lifted</td>
<td>3,122</td>
<td>2,996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tons of Cargo</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>147</td>
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<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
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<td>Crewmembers WIA</td>
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<td>VC KBA</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>234</td>
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</table>

**Rotary Wing Totals**

- Hours: 118,354
- Troops Lifted: 650,088
- Tons of Cargo: 86,684

**Fixed Wing Totals**

- Hours: 22,763
- Troops Lifted: 8,966
- Tons of Cargo: 415

Incl 6
## STATISTICAL SUMMARY

**USAF C130/C123 SORTIES**

1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70

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<thead>
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>EMERGENCY REQUEST</th>
<th>CONFLICT ESSENTIAL</th>
<th>PRIORITY I</th>
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<td><strong>455</strong></td>
<td><strong>2958</strong></td>
<td><strong>3421</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL SHORT TONS:** 32,237

**TOTAL PASSENGERS:** 25,274

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Incl 7

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

HQ, II Field Force Vietnam

14 February 1970 70

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310