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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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   1st Military Intelligence Battalion
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)
APO San Francisco 96307

AVAH-AOFN

14 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion
(Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 31 January
1970 RCS CSFOR65 (R2)(U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. (C) Section 1, Operations-Significant Activities:

   a. The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance
      Support) and its five lettered detachments are organized under
      T&E 30-5D, T&E 30-6D, T&E 30-7D, and MTOE 30-5DF01. The present
      organizational structure of the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion
      (Air Reconnaissance Support) is indicated by Inclosure 1.

   b. The Battalion was engaged in providing combat support to United
      States, Republic of Vietnam and Free World Military Assistance Forces
      for the entire reporting period. Training was conducted on 27 days
      during the reporting period.

   c. On 1 January 1970 this Headquarters was ordered by Headquarters,
      USARV to carry out a 42 man personnel reduction as part of the Phase
      III reduction of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. As a result
      Detachment E, located at Phu Bai, was reduced to zero strength on 27
      January 1970. In preparation for this reduction Detachment B at Da
      Nang assumed the mission of Detachment E on 9 January 1970. The
      problems of transferring missions to Detachment B and zeroing out
      Detachment E were eased by the advance notice of deactivation. This
      allowed sufficient time to conduct liaison with supported units to
      work out problem areas; consolidation of unit property to insure
      availability for turn-in; and study of references applicable to
      deactivation in order to insure all planning and preparation for
      final action was ready and that each key man knew his role. Advance
      notice did cause some problems; because of each individuals natural
      anxiety over his own future until final word was received, morale
      was difficult to maintain. This is best countered by a program of
      keeping all personnel informed of status of deactivation, enlisting
      their help through suggestions and participation in planning, allowing
      individuals the opportunity of submitting requests for their assignment
      on actual deactivation, increased unit recreational activities to

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14 February 1970

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(Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 31 January 1970
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maintain esprit-de-corps and careful monitoring of facilities by
supervisory personnel to insure they are not allowed to deteriorate
through lack of maintenance. Detachment E will be formally deactivated
14 April 1970. (Inclosure 1 reflects the present organizational
structure of this Battalion; however, Detachment E is at zero strength).

d. The following changes in command occurred during the reporting
period:

(1) MAJ Joseph S. Curran, Jr. assumed command of Detachment A on
1 November 1969.

(2) MAJ Donald L. Babin assumed command of Detachment D on 26
November 1969.

(3) MAJ Rodney I. Bowling assumed command of Detachment C on 12
January 1970.

(4) MAJ Alfred A. Arbogast, Jr. assumed command of Detachment A
on 27 January 1970.

e. The following key personnel changes occurred during the report-
ing period:

(1) CPT Gerald A. Sands assumed duties as Battalion 2/3, on 1
November 1969.

(2) MAJ Joseph S. Curran, Jr. assumed duties as Battalion
Executive Officer on 9 January 1970.

(3) MAJ Howard J. Floyd assumed duties as Battalion 32/3, on 24
January 1970.

f. The primary mission of providing tactical interpretation,
reproduction and aerial delivery of imagery and related materials
resulting from tactical air reconnaissance operations within the
Republic of Vietnam was successfully accomplished during the
reporting period. Support has been rendered to Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN), Republic of Korea Forces (ROKF), 1st Australian
Task Force, New Zealand and Royal Thai units as well as to US Army,
Navy, Marine and Air Force elements throughout the four (4) Corps
Tactical Zones. Significant operational statistics and illustrative
examples of the numerous types of regular and special support
provided by the 1st MI Bn (ARS) to requesting units are presented
below:

(1) 1st MI Bn (ARS) Detachments:

(a) Number of targets interpreted: 3,554

(b) Number of frames interpreted: 650,723
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(c) Number of imagery interpretation reports: 3,530
(d) Number of new items or significant changes reported: 2,126
(e) Number of mosaics constructed: 25
(f) Feet of photo paper processed: 565,613
(g) Number of hand-held camera missions flown: 208
(h) Number of hand-held prints made: 25,097
(i) Number of aerial sorties: 1,558
(j) Pounds of cargo hauled on aerial deliveries: 59,289
(k) Pounds of cargo transported on aerial vehicles: 394
(l) Requests for reproduction of photographs filled: 1,771

(2) On 1 December 1969, the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
(TRW) activated the 12th Photo Processing and Interpretation Facility
(PPIF). Five image interpreters from Headquarters and Headquarters
Company (HHC) Imagery Interpretation Section immediately began working
on one shift. In addition to the 12th PPIF, the image interpreters
from HHC continued to work on several shifts of the 45th and 16th PPIF's.
Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports (IPIR's) were produced by these
joint sections on selected imagery resulting from reconnaissance mis-
sions flown by aircraft of the 460th TRW. The types of imagery inter-
pred included photo and infrared. Immediate reports included items
of military activity in response to the requestor's essential elements
of information or items of a significant nature which could have
an immediate effect on friendly operations. Hot Reports of particularly
significant findings were made immediately by telephone to the intelli-
gence officer of the command primarily concerned. The subsequent
Immediate Reports were transmitted via IMMEDIATE precedence teletype
message and routed through the MACV Command Operations Center dedicated
net to the appropriate Field Force or Corps headquarters. The Head-
quarters Imagery Interpretation Section, working in conjunction with
the PPIF's, handled the following amount of imagery during the reporting
period:

(a) Number of targets interpreted: 6,312
(1) Infrared targets interpreted (no SIR's rendered): 2,874
(2) Photo targets interpreted: 3,468
(b) Number of imagery interpretation reports: 4,455
(c) Number of items reported: 980

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g. 1st MI Bn (ARS) personnel continued to provide instruction in hand-held camera and 35mm film processing techniques to aid in familiarization with the aerial reconnaissance system and to accomplish hand-held camera missions. Hand-held photography (35mm) was acquired, processed, and disseminated by 1st MI Bn (ARS) in support of numerous requesting units throughout the four (4) Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) for operational planning, targeting, confirmation/denial of interrogation and agent reports, and other intelligence purposes.

h. Detachment C discontinued its program of providing language qualified imagery interpreters to the IV Corps ARVN II Section. The program was discontinued in November because of the loss of its two language qualified image interpreters who departed Vietnam for reassignment. There was a most beneficial exchange of information and ideas between the ARVN and the American image interpreters. It is felt that the program was well worth the effort involved and greatly improved the imagery interpretation ability of each party involved.

i. In November and December, Detachment D published a Master Cover Trace for distribution to all supported units. Prior to November, a Master Cover Trace was not published because of non-availability of a reproduction (printing) capability. The officers of the detachment, in the conduct of normal liaison activities with supported units, ascertained that a need for a Monthly Cover Trace existed. Through liaison contact with the Air Surveillance and Reconnaissance Officer, III Marine Amphibious Force, and Acquisition Office, Marine Division, it was learned that the 1st Marine Division was an offset press capable of reproducing a Master Cover Trace in the required number of copies. Arrangements were made through III Marine Amphibious Force with the 1st Marine Division to produce the Master Cover Trace on a monthly basis. The trace is in the form of an overlay, scale 1:250,000, depicting plotted missions flown in the detachment's area of responsibility by US Air Force, Marine, and Army reconnaissance assets, for which negatives have been received and stored in the detachment film library. It takes the 1st Marine Division approximately 10-12 days to reproduce the trace. Supported units have indicated that the Master Cover Trace is useful and Detachment D will continue to produce the trace on a monthly basis with the aid of the 1st Marine Division.

j. On the 2nd and 3rd of December 1969, Detachment D held a Fuji Lab Course in Nha Trang, RVN. The course was given in support of the hand-held camera program and was designed to give each unit that utilizes hand-held equipment their own reproduction capability. This would enable the units to have the finished product in a more timely manner, rather than sending the film to Detachment D for reproduction, which requires three to five days before the finished product reaches the requestor. The course was attended by eleven (11) US and two (2) ARVN personnel. The January Fuji Lab Course was combined with the 27-28 January 1970 Hand-Held Aerial Photography Course. All future classes will receive this combined training.

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During the reporting period, Detachment D continued its Hand-held Aerial Photography Course. Three classes were conducted, one each in November, December, and January. A total of eight (8) US Forces personnel and four ARVN were trained in the techniques and applications of hand-held aerial photography.

In December, Detachment B published a Hand-held Camera Guide. This was done due to the fact that the detachment identified an existing need in I Corps for such a booklet through numerous inquiries received on the Hand-held Camera Program. The booklet, written in laymen's terms, describes the mission preparation, techniques of hand-held photography, operation of 35mm camera equipment, types of films utilized, and instructions on how to set up a darkroom facility. The booklet was well received by the supported units and the majority of the units that received original distribution of the booklet requested additional copies.

One problem encountered during the reporting period at Detachment B dealt with the delivery of aerial imagery products to supported units by the attached Delivery Section which maintains two U-6A (Beaver) aircraft. Due to poor weather over extended periods the U-6A aircraft were grounded on several occasions for as long as five to seven days, thereby precluding the normal timely distribution of aerial imagery and associated products to supported units. During these periods of severe weather conditions, arrangements were made to have the imagery and associated products delivered by the S&C (Secret and Confidential) Courier operated by the 1st Marine Air Wing, located at the Danang Air Base. This alternate means of delivery enabled the detachment to deliver the reconnaissance products to supported units on a timely basis. The utilization of this alternate means of delivery was arranged through the Photo Interpretation Center, III Marine Amphibious Force.

On 5 January 1970 Detachment C implemented a Vietnamization program designed to prepare the Vietnamese of IV Corps to eventually take over all II responsibilities in the Delta. The ARVN personnel from the IV Corps ARVN II Section began working in the II Section of Detachment C on a daily basis. With the assistance of the Vietnamese Clerk-Typist employed by the detachment the language barrier was effectively overcome and the two ARVN personnel were incorporated into the daily functions of the Imagery Interpretation Section. In addition, a bilingual chart was drawn up that lists commonly used imagery interpretation words and phrases. The English word or phrase is adjacent to the Vietnamese translation. The image interpreters can communicate and check on each other by pointing to the appropriate word or phrase. The ARVN II's have progressed to the point of being able to readout a complete mission with an absolute minimum of supervision. There is still much work to be done to refine their techniques of rapid readout as opposed to their own standard of a time consuming, detailed readout. Ultimately these two ARVN II's will train other ARVN II's in later phases of the program.

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o. Currently, two ARVN non-commissioned officers from the III Corps Military Intelligence Detachment are undergoing on-the-job training in Detachment A, one each in the detachment's imagery interpretation and reproduction sections. This training program started on 15 January 1970, and is progressing extremely well. Two experienced detachment personnel were assigned to directly supervise and instruct the trainees on the operations of each section. Although no detachment personnel have a Vietnamese language capability, a communication problem did not exist in this case as each trainee can read and write English. It is anticipated that this initial training program will be completed by 15 February 1970 and that the two non-commissioned officer trainees will be sufficiently proficient in the necessary skills to serve as instructors/supervisors for other ARVN personnel who may, in the future, receive training in the detachment's imagery interpretation and reproduction section.

p. After having the EH48B processors in service for almost a year, Detachment A began to notice deterioration of some of the rubber components, primarily the rubber covering on the drive roller. This roller causes the paper to be pulled through the machine, and without the cohesion afforded by the rubber coating the machine will not operate. The necessary parts are unavailable to this date. In order for the machines to remain operational, this rubber covering had to be fabricated. The detachment had several rubber covers (RSN 6740 944 2295) for the older A model, and although not intended to fit the B model, they can be forced on by soaping the roller. During the first attempts to apply this innovation, an entire rubber sleeve was forced on the roller. This proved to be quite difficult, and even stretching this substitute item decreased the serviceability of the rubber sleeve to less than a month. It was then discovered that instead of trying to cover the entire roller it is sufficient and easier to cut the sleeve into two-inch lengths and then slip these onto the roller. Three two-inch sections evenly spaced on the roller will return the machine to an operational status.

q. Physical security was given particular command interest during the reporting period. The annual physical security inspection at Detachment A was conducted between 3-15 December 1969, by the Office of the Provost Marshal, III CTZ, Area I, Long Binh Sector. The corrective action report was forwarded on 30 December 1969. Most discrepancies noted were recurring and beyond organic capabilities to correct. Work orders to correct these discrepancies were initially submitted in October 1968, and resubmitted in December 1969. No action has been taken on these work orders. Continuing attempts to resolve this problem have been unsuccessful.

r. During December 1968, Detachment C was given a physical security survey in accordance with UJARV Reg 190-30. At that time the lack of a security fence around the operations area, which is a restricted area, was listed as a deficiency. During the year since the survey, the detachment has made numerous attempts to obtain the fence from every agency even remotely connected with construction, all to no avail.
During this reporting period, a new physical security survey was performed and the lack of a security fence was listed as a recurring deficiency. Lack of logistical support in areas as critical as physical security presents a continuing problem for Detachment C.

s. During the reporting period, the weaknesses of the logistical system in the IV Corps Tactical Zone caused increased problems for Detachment C. Of particular significance is the problem of obtaining photographic supplies. Elements of the 1st Logistical Command located at Long Binh have been instructed not to ship certain photographic supplies to IV Corps Tactical Zone because of excessive loss of these supply items due to pilferage. At the same time, elements of the 1st Logistical Command serving as this unit's direct support in Can Tho have been instructed not to allow units to hand-carry requisitions to Long Binh. This results in no supplies through normal channels. All photographic supplies obtained during this quarter were obtained by using the detachment's organic aircraft to transport the supplies from Saigon to Can Tho. This process involves numerous man-hours spent away from the unit trying to circumvent the present supply system to obtain mission essential photographic supplies.

t. Effects of personnel support. Support received from the Adjutant General, USARV, was adequate in officer, warrant officer, and enlisted replacements, with the exception of MOS 9309, Photographic Lab Specialist. During the reporting period there was an average shortage of 35 percent of authorized strength in this MOS. All other personnel support has been most adequate.

u. During this quarter, technical supply operations with Detachment B at Da Nang were revised. Due to distance, lack of rapid delivery and unreliable parts delivery, this detachment was authorized to maintain a PLL for its two aircraft. Physical location and clerical support has been provided by the detachment direct support unit. An evaluation of the successfulness of this change is not as yet meaningful, as the switchover having occurred only two weeks prior to the end of the quarter.

v. The Battalion continued its Civic Action Program through donations of food, clothing and toys to two Vietnamese Orphanages. In addition, several members of Headquarters and Headquarters Company have volunteered to teach English to the students and teachers of a nearby Catholic school.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations


(1) Observation: The MOS 9309 qualified officers are more effective as G2's Air than officers with no prior aerial surveillance training or experience.
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(2) Evaluation: It is necessary that the G2 Air be cognizant of
the entire aerial reconnaissance and surveillance system, and the
capabilities and limitations of the equipment and personnel. To
effectively accomplish this assignment, the G2 Air must have a detailed
knowledge of the uses and limitations of aerial imagery. As a 9309
trained officer, he is a trained image interpreter as well as G2 Air.
This gives the officer a better appreciation for what can be obtained
from the various imagery sensors and programs. Many officers are
assigned as a G2 Air without this prior training and thus cannot advise
the commander or other staff officers of what can or cannot be accom-
plished with the assets available. As a result millions of dollars
worth of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets have been,and
will continue to be, improperly utilized, or not fully utilized.
Most often the inexperienced G2 Air who is not a 9309 learns only the
local system and because he has no other experience, training, or
knowledge, he has little basis to evaluate and improve the system or
the procedures in his particular command. In Vietnam the situation
is further aggravated and made unacceptable when an officer with no
experience or training is assigned as a G2 Air advisor. He can
accomplish very little if he is assigned to advise a Vietnamese officer
who has attended an eighteen week course on photo interpretation and
G2 Air operations and procedures.

(3) Recommendation: That all G2 Air and G2 Air advisory positions
be filled by qualified 9309 MOS trained officers.

b. Intelligence: (None)
c. Operations: (None)
d. Organization: (None)
e. Training: (None)
f. Logistics: (None)
g. Communications: (None)
h. Material: AN/TQ-43 Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility
(TIFF).

(1) Observation: The Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility is
not needed nor is it being utilized by 1st MI BN (Arn) detachments,
deployed in the Republic of Vietnam, as it was intended to be utilized.

(2) Evaluation: The AN/TQ-34 consists of a truck mounted van
(M291A2C) with the following components:

(a) Console, Viewer Computer, Imagery Interpretation AR85A.

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(b) Viewer, Stereoscopic, Roll Film, Photographic Interpretation AR91A.

c) Viewer, Stereoscopic, Roll Film, Photographic Interpretation AR90A.

d) Plotting Tables, Photographic Film AR87A (AR88A).

e) Teletypewriter, Reperforator-Transmitter TT76/GGC.

(f) Stereoscopic, Lens-prism Mirror, Aerial Photographic Interpretation AR96A (Zoom 95).

g) Stereoscopic, Lens-prism Mirror, Aerial Photographic Interpretation AR97A (Zoom 70).

The AR85A is capable of detailed mensuration and computation. It is an excellent piece of equipment if used in a controlled environment to do detailed interpretation such as an industrial analysis. Neither the controlled environment nor the opportunity exists in this unit to utilize the AR85A. The M291A2C van is air conditioned, but the air conditioning only operates properly about one-half the time. There are no provisions made for repairing the air conditioners. Thus, the dust, heat and humidity take their toll and the AR85A is usually inoperable. In addition, maintenance support for the AR85A is a formidable problem. This battalion does not have any AR85A maintenance personnel, and our direct support units have been unable to repair them. The type of items reported by this organization include bunkers, foxholes, trench systems, weapons positions and trails. These items can be reported considerably faster and with sufficient accuracy to meet the needs of the requester when not using the AR85A. In the tactical situation that exists in the RVN today the workload and time factor involved absolutely precludes using the AR85A for a second phase interpretation. The result is that this organization NEVER uses the AR85A.

The Viewer, Stereoscopic Roll Film, Photographic Interpretation AR91A is a light table designed to hold two rolls of film for purposes of studying comparative cover. The light table has a vacuum hold down capability. This piece of equipment, together with its associated optical equipment (AR96A) is utilized only as an ordinary light table, a function better served by the AR90A. The type of interpretation accomplished by this organization, together with the tactical situation make it unnecessary to utilize the AR91A.

The Viewer, Stereoscopic, Roll Film, Photographic Interpretation AR90A, together with Stereoscopic, Lens-prism Mirror, Aerial Photographic Interpretation AR97A (Zoom 70) are the pieces of equipment most frequently utilized. The light table is large enough to accommodate imagery from the KA83 camera system (50 inches in length) and the 120 power magnification of the AR97A is more than adequate to meet the needs of the image interpreters.

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The Plotting Tables, Photographic Film AR87A (AR38A) and the Teletypewriter, Reperforator-Transmitter TT76/GGC are used daily. The Teletypewriter, Reperforator-Transmitter TT76/GGC is a reliable communications system. The AR87A's (AR38A) serve very well as plotting tables and are also used as general purpose tables.

3. Recommendation:

(a) That the AN/TSQ 49 (TIIF) now being used by 1st MI Bn (ARS) detachments be turned in and retrograded to CONUS.

(b) That the M292A1 expandable van be issued immediately to replace the AN/TSQ 43 with its M291A2C expandable van.

(c) That the equipment now contained in the AN/TSQ 43 be issued separately to include:

1. AR90A
2. AR87A (AR38A)
3. TT76/GGC
4. AR97A

(d) That one additional AR93A be issued in lieu of the AR91A that will be turned in.

1. Other: (None)

Incl

ALBERT F.P. JONES
LTC, MI
Commanding

CF:
5-ACoFs, J2 USMACV
6-ACoFs, G3 USARV, ATTN: AI/GC-DJT
2-DCSOFS, ATTN: STAG
2-Dir Surveillance and Intelligence, OACSI
2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
2-ACoFs, G2, Eighth US Army
1-CO, 525th MI Gp
2-CO, 460th TRW
2-CO, 2nd MI Bn (ARS)
2-CO, 15th MI Bn (ARS)
2-Commandant, USAINTS
5-Commandant, USAINTS, ATTN: DCVT1 (A3RC)
2-CO, USAIIC
2-CO, USAGDCINTA
2-Commandant, USARPAC
Intel School
1-CO, Each Det, 1st MI Bn (ARS)
2-Hq, USAITR, ATTN: OGC31-PDN (SS)
2-CO, US Army LIA, USAFTARC
AVHGC-DST (14 February 1970) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion
(Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 31 January
1970 RCS CSFOR65-R2 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 07 MAR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 1st
Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference items concerning physical security, page 6, paragraph
1(q&r). The problem of physical security is continuous and must be
constantly upgraded and improved. If discrepancies are beyond organic
capabilities, follow up action must continue after work orders are submitted
rather than simply a work order resubmission prior to an annual inspection.
In reference to paragraph r, the FM security inspection was of the de-
tachment's perimeter. The north and west side of this perimeter at the
time of the inspection did not have protective wire. Protective wire
can be erected using concertina barbed wire or rolled barbed wire and
engineer stakes. These items are non-controlled supply items, available
at all Class IV supply points in Vietnam. Troop labor from the detachment
can erect the protective wire.

b. Reference item concerning Weakness of the Logistical System, page
7, paragraph 19; nonconcur. Present procedures call for film to be
picked up at the depot because of susceptibility to pilferage. There is
also a requirement that hand carried requisitions be limited to priority
01-08 essential items required for an emergency. The correct procedure
for obtaining film, unless it meets the "hand-carry" criteria, is to submit
the requisition through normal channels. After the requisition is processed
and the film is ready for issue from the depot, the requisitioner then must
pick it up at the depot.

c. Reference item concerning Enlisted Replacements in MOS 84G20,
page 7, paragraph 2b(t); concur. Records, this headquarters, confirm
shortage in MOS 84G20. 1st MI Battalion has first priority for fill in
this MOS as personnel become available.

d. Reference item concerning Utilization of MOS 9309 Personnel,
page 7, paragraph 2c(a); concur. The TO&E position calls for MOS 9309
and they are filled with officers with this MOS when available.
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E. Reference item concerning Tactical Imagery Interpretation
Facility, page 8, paragraph 2h(1); concur. The recommendation that the
AN/TSQ-43 be replaced by an expandable van and additional components appears
valid. Upon receipt of complete supporting justification for a MTCE
change, this headquarters will determine the disposition of the AN/TSQ-43
and additional requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cpt fnm:
1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ABS)
GPOP-DT (14 Feb 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 MAR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHOFF
CPT, AGC
2-71 AG
ORGANIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)
OPERATING WITHIN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS CO
SAIGON

DETACHMENT A
BIEN HOA

DETACHMENT B
DA NANG

DETACHMENT C
CAN THO

DETACHMENT D
NHIA TRANG

DETACHMENT E
(ZERO STRENGTH)
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.**

**CO, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion**

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**Sponsoring Military Activity**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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**Security Classification:**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**DD FORM 1473**

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

**Security Classification**