**UNCLASSIFIED**

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**LIMITATION CHANGES**

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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 31 JAN 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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**AUTHORITY**

AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (14 Apr 70)

FOR OT-UT-701036

21 April 1970


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-1- Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

-2- Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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7th Battalion, 13th Artillery
AVGK-AA-C


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1. (C) Section 1. Significant Activities.

a. (C) General

(1) Final implementation of Keystone Cardinal (OPCRD 13-69) took place during this quarter. The 7th Battalion 13th Artillery relieved the 41st Artillery Group and was fully operational on 1 November 1969. The 7th Battalion 13th Artillery (Group) was formed consisting of 7/13th Arty and 7/15th Arty effective 15 November 1969. Upon inactivation of HHB, 41st Artillery Group, the 7/13th Arty En Group came under the direct control of HQ, IFFORCEV Artillery.

(2) During the past quarter the battalion's mission remained the same, that of General Support of US, RVNAF and FMFAF in the 22nd ARVN Division, 4th Infantry Division, Capital RVN Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) areas of operation. On 11 January 1970, 7th Bn 13th Arty assumed the Artillery Warning Control Center responsibilities for the southern half of the Lao Area of Operations. The AWCC was established at Battery C, 7th Bn 13th Arty located at LZ Salem (BR 933805). In conjunction with the implementation of OPLAN 4-69 (Metro Modia) HQ IFFORCEV Arty, Battery A, 7th Bn 13th Arty, moved by combination of land and sea from Khe T'ong to LZ Action (BR 264456) and assumed the mission of General Support of US, RVNAF and FMF with priority of fires to 1st Bn, 69th Armor.

(3) The battalion is in the process of revamping its defensive posture throughout the battalion. Primary consideration is being given to perimeter defense with installation of new perimeter wire, observation towers and fighting bunkers. The battalion also acquired an 81mm mortar for self illumination and was assigned two (2) M-42 "Dusters" for self defense of Camp Fidel. On 27 January 1970, Battery C was assigned an infantry platoon to assist in self defense of LZ Salem.

(4) On 13 December 1969 per General Order 70, Headquarters Department of the Army, dated 13 November 1969, the 7th Battalion 13th Artillery was awarded the Meritorious Unit Citation for service in RVN, for period 9 November 1966 to 31 December 1968.

(5) Throughout this quarter the battalion, through Battery C, continued to provide support for the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). Battery C provided fire support primarily to the 1st and 3d Battalions (Airborne) 503d Infantry.

(6) With the exception of its normal support functions, the primary activities of the battalion were centered around pacification.

(a) In the Associate Battery Program, Battery C of this battalion continued to assist Battery C, 222d ARVN Artillery and Battery B assisted Battery A, 222d ARVN Artillery. Visits to associate batteries totaled 19 and 12 classes were presented. These included boresighting, laying the battery, safety, storage of ammunition, care and maintenance of 105mm howitzer, assembly of firing locks, use of wind cards, computations of high angle fire, daily accuracy checks, aiming post displacement, direct fire and vehicle maintenance. The Battalion Commander 7th Bn 13th Arty made three (3) visits to ARVN Associate Batteries during this reporting period. Included was a command visit to LZ Courage (C Btry, 222d ARVN Arty) with a maintenance team and much needed supplies and materials.

(b) Battery C, located at LZ Salem, constructed a children's recreation area for Duong Lieu Hamlet. The recreation area was christened "Salem Park" and opened for use on 9 January 1970. All materials and man hours were provided by officers and men of Battery C with technical assistance from Service Battery.

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Forward Observers assigned to the battalion during this reporting period were deployed as follows:

(a) Battery A deployed its forward observers in support of the 5th Special Forces until its move from Nha Trang to LZ Action on 11 January 1970. Consequently these forward observers were not available for the battalions utilization during that period.

(b) Two forward observers from Batteries B and C were deployed to support a Mobile Strike Force operation in the Nha Trang area from 26 December 1969 to 31 December 1969.

(2) The battalion liaison section to Binh Dinh Self Defense Area provided targeting for the Binh Dinh and Qui Nhon Self Defense Areas. Interdiction fires were planned daily for Battery B, 7th Bn 13th Arty, in support of ARVN elements in these areas.

(3) The battalion gained operational control of a total of four AN/PPS-5 Radars. Two were OPCON to Battery A during its stay in Nha Trang. Upon relocation of Battery A, the Radars were attached to the 2d Bn 17th Arty. The other two of these radars were deployed in support of Binh Dinh Self Defense Area. The majority of sightings were of three to seven personnel in the open. Although there were no confirmed kills, all missions terminated with rounds on target and dispersion of personnel.
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(4) Overall enemy activity remained at a relatively low level during this reporting period. One high point was experienced during the period 4 January 1970 to 11 January 1970 during which Phu Cat Air Base received 122mm and 140mm rockets and numerous other Landing Zones received mortar attacks. The rocket attack on Phu Cat Air Base marked the first time that 122mm and 140mm rockets had been used by the enemy in the Einh Dinh Area. The Battalion experienced one casualty during the period due to enemy activity. On 15 January 1970, while a passenger in a 2 1/4 ton truck, a member of Battery C was slightly wounded by sniper fire. The enemy maintains the capability of interdicting lines of communications, employing snipers, attacking friendly bases with mortars and rockets, and of launching up to multi-company ground attacks against isolated friendly outposts. The enemy's primary objective remains the disruption of the Pacification Program and the infliction of US casualties.

c. (C) Operations and Training Activities

(1) Operations

(a) The battalion conducted 92 days of continuous operations during the quarter for a cumulative total of 1176 days of combat without major difficulties. On 16 January 1970 at Battery E, 7th Bn 13th Arty the Battalion Commander fired the 750,000th round expended by the battalion in support of combat operations in RVN.

(b) In response to OPLN 4-69 (Metro Medic) IFFORCEV Arty, Battery A departed Nha Trang at 091530H January 1970 enroute to LZ Action to relieve in place and assume the mission of Battery H, 2d Bn 17th Arty. Battery H closed and was ready to fire at 111640H January 1970. Simultaneous with the deployment, Battery A became OPCON to the 52d Arty Group and assumed the mission of General Support to US, RVNLF, and NVA with priority of fires to 1st Bn 69th Arty. On 20 January 1970, Battery A became OPCON to the 7th Bn 15th Arty and continued its present mission.

(c) During the quarter, Battery A accounted for all tactical moves of this battalion. It conducted four displacements, experiencing 18 days of split battery operations, in addition to its redeployment to LZ Action.

(2) Training

(a) Headquarters Battery assumed a major role in the battalion's training program by conducting replacement training for 152 new members of the battalion. Replacement training was previously accomplished by Service Battery.

(b) Batteries B and C received battery evaluations conducted by the IFFORCEV Arty Firing Battery Evaluation Team on 8 and 9 January 1970. No formal scores were given.

(c) Six officers of this battalion attended the Fire Direction Officer Training Course (FDOTC) and six officers and four enlisted personnel attended the Forward Observer Training Course (FOTC).
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(d) The battalion's liaison section at Binh Dinh Solf Defense Area (BDSDA) conducted instruction on aerial observation procedures for 25 personnel of the 203rd R&G Platoon located in Qui Nhon.

c. (U) Logistics

(1) During the quarter Service Battery performed normal support functions through the Battalion Maintenance and S-4 Sections. Towards the latter part of the quarter, priority was placed on obtaining necessary supplies and equipment for the relocation of Battery A from Nho Trang to LZ action. The S-4 section provided regular conveys to LZ action transporting building materials and supplies for construction of personnel bunkers and defensive fortifications.

(2) Emphasis on maintenance continued with all batteries receiving KYI. All batteries received a rating of satisfactory.

d. (U) Civil Affairs

(1) The battalion civil affairs continued in the implementation of the overall pacification program. During this period 2,000 board feet of scrap lumber and 9 culverts were provided for the following:

   (a) House improvements in Duong Lieu Hamlet.
   (b) Repair of Orphanage in Tuy Phuoc District.
   (c) Repair and construction of a section of road in Tuy Phuoc District.

(2) The battalion supplied approximately 6,000 gallons of edible garbage per month to the villages of Phu Ky and Tuy Phuoc Districts.

(3) The battalion distributed over 200 pounds of candy and clothing to the Orphanage in Tuy Phuoc District.

(4) The battalion supplied over 1200 pounds of meat to the villages of Dong Thiou and the Orphanage in Tuy Phuoc District.

(5) To improve the effectiveness of and lend greater emphasis to the battalion civil affairs program, an additional duty, Civil Affairs Officer, was established. The duty of the Civil Affairs Officer is to coordinate the overall civil affairs and pacification efforts of the battalion.

e. (U) Personnel

(1) The personnel status of the 7th Bn 13th Art is as follows:

   (c) Personnel strength as of 31 January 1970:

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31 January 1970


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<th>Enlisted</th>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
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(c) Projected Officer losses by grade as of 31 January 1970:

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(d) Projected enlisted losses:

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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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(e) The assigned strength by battery as of 31 January 1970:

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<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
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31 January 1970

g. (U) Other. During this reporting period eleven dignitaries visited the Battalion (See Incl 2).

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned. Commander’s Observations. Evaluations. and Recommendations.

A. Personnel: NONE

E. Intelligence: NONE

C. Operations:

(1) OBSERVATION: Due to the time consuming (formal) method of conducting destruction missions, many have been terminated because of weather, time and often fuel consumption for aerial observers without actually accomplishing the mission.

EVALUATION: Considering the limitations described above and the tendency of aerial observers to crop within a few meters of a target prior to fire for effect rather than establishing a bracket, the Fire Direction Center, can, by using the all relation formula and the observer sensorings, cause a bracket to be established. Despite range dispersion, the experienced Fire Direction Center can determine a new adjusted quadrant without firing the required rounds to obtain six definite range sensorings. Therefore, a target can be destroyed in less time and with fewer rounds expended.

RECOMMENDATION: That units with similar problems consider the modified destruction mission described above.

(2) OBSERVATION: When fired in conjunction with illumination, the variable time fuze often functions prematurely.

EVALUATION: If high explosive rounds with variable time fuses are fired in the immediate vicinity of illumination ammunition and if the direction of the wind, height of illumination burst and time of flight are not considered, one can expect numerous variable time fuses to detonate prematurely due to the proximity of the illumination.

RECOMMENDATION: When the variable time fuze is utilized and fired simultaneously with illumination careful coordination is necessary to prevent a premature burst that could result in an artillery accident or incident.

D. Organization: NONE

E. Training: NONE

F. Logistics: NONE

G. Communications:

(1) OBSERVATION: Whip and ground plane (RC 292) antenna elements often became impossible to disconnect after assembly because of the accumulation.
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EVALUATION: Rust and corrosion build-up on antenna elements is rapid in RVN because of unfavorable climatic conditions. Frequent preventive maintenance and/or greasing of connection points have been suggested as methods of alleviating this problem. However, the practice of greasing connection points has not proven effective when not followed up with frequent preventive maintenance. Due to operational commitments in RVN, antenna maintenance is not always feasible. This unit uses Silicon Compound non-conducting (5870-221-5903) on the end of the connecting elements to prevent rust and corrosion build up on the antenna.

RECOMMENDATION: Silicon lubricant should be used for protection against rust and corrosion build up on antenna elements, particularly when frequent preventive maintenance is not feasible.

(2) OBSERVATION: Additional life can be obtained from the K-49 keying relay, used to activate the blower motor on the RT 524 receiver-transmitter, if the item is rotated 180 degrees and then reinstalled in the radio.

EVALUATION: On all occasions in which the relay was rotated, the radio functioned effectively. The cause of this irregularity has not been determined, nor how much additional life can be achieved. This practice can make it possible to keep a radio off deadline if a K-49 replacement is not available. Rotating the relay clearly indicates that the part is defective and should therefore be requisitioned.

H. NotaWds: NONE

OBSERVATIONS: Considerations for installing and maintaining an effective defensive perimeter.

EVALUATIONS: Perimeter wire becomes so overgrown with vegetation, that the concertina barrier around a compound is commonly identified and referred to as "Green Line". Concertina which is only slightly overgrown with vegetation offers no obstacle to a US soldier, much less to a well trained sapper. A large percentage of concertina/tanglefoot presently installed in Vietnam only gives a false sense of security. Effectiveness of wire barriers is not only negated by vegetation but also by small ravines, gullies or mounds which afford both cover and concealment when used by the intruder. At best, trip flares offer only a slight increase in effectiveness of barriers. An intruder who spends hours penetrating a perimeter can detect and avoid trip flares.

Perimeter wire, to be effective must be placed on barren soil with no sudden changes in elevation which offer concealment to an intruder. In addition the barrier must be illuminated and observed at all times. Observations must be from towers since heavy concertina provides concealment if observers are at or near ground level.

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Installation of wire barriers requires extensive prior preparation of the ground over which the barrier is to be placed as well as the area between the barriers. Too often the command is not willing to expend the man hours and material to install a secure perimeter until after the fact. A case in point is the recent reported loss of $4.5 million dollars in aircraft which could have been prevented had a fraction of this amount been spent for installing an effective perimeter.

RECOMMENDATION:Outlined below are the minimum procedures required to install an effective perimeter.

1. Using a bulldozer, remove all vegetation and rough grade a defensive belt thirty to fifty meters wide. Follow up rough grade with a road grader to establish a final contour grade.

2. Select exact location for installation of wire barriers. Install desired rows of engineer stakes to secure the wire. Leave a space of at least ten meters between barriers to facilitate cultivation of cleared area.

3. Secure six strands of barbed wire to the engineer stakes spaced 4, 6, 8, 10, 10, 10 inches apart with first strand 4 inches above the ground. Insure that the wire is taut.

4. Install triple or quadruple concertina and secure to barbed wire and engineer stakes. Run one strand of barbed wire through each roll of concertina which touches the ground and pin the wire to the ground with engineer stakes. Insure that this single strand of barbed wire is taut.

5. Spray a heavy concentration of petroleum products (waste oil, diesel, etc.) on soil covered by wire to prevent seed germination and roots from sprouting. Follow up as required to prevent growth. Cultivate between wire barriers. This can be accomplished by pulling a concertina drag behind a tactical vehicle.

This is a lesson learned but not practiced. It has cost not only lives but millions of dollars in material damage. We should practice what we have learned.

3. (U) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information, June

3 Inclosures
1. Firing Battery Tactical Displacements
2. Visit by Dignitaries to 7th Bn. 13th Arty
3. Organizational Chart
Incl 2 and 3 wd HQ, DA

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters 7th Battalion 13th Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1970, ACS, CSFOM-65 (c.2). (c)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-SC-OT, APO 96350

This headquarters has reviewed subject UUL and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

WALTER J. NEHL
Lieutenant Colonel, ADA
Adjutant

cf:
DA, CSFOM (2)
CO, 7th BN, 13th Arty
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ARTY: AVFA-GC-DST, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and forwarding indorsement and concurs.

2. (U) Reference Critical HOS status paragraph 1f (1) (b). Of the three E7, 13E40 slots one is vacant with a diversionary fill-action projected by APO, USARV. Only one E8, 13E50 vacancy exists with fill-action programmed for April 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CP:
1 - CG, IFFORCEV ARTY
1 - CO 7th BN, 13th ARTY
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

I. D. MURRAY
PT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: 7th Bn, 13th ARTY
HQ, I FFV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 31 MAR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Ass' AG
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AVGK-AA-C
31 January 1970

FIRING BATTERY TACTICAL DISPLACEMENTS

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FIRING BATTERY LOCATIONS

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</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery

31 January 1970

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310