<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO: UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FROM:                   |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb DoDD 5200.10; Ago ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DDD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

THIS DOCUMENT IS:
CLASSIFIED BY______________________________

Subject to General Declassification Schedule of
Executive Order 11652-Automatically Downgraded at
2 Years Intervals- DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31,_____.

BY
Defense Documentation Center
Defense Supply Agency
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps (M)

Period Ending 31 January 1970

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

INCL

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Combat Surveillance School
US Army Electronic Warfare School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Director, Defense Research & Engineering
Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commanding Generals
US Army Electronics Command
US Army Weapons Command
III Corps, ATTN: Project MASSTER
XXIV Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Development & Education Command
USAF Air Ground Operations School
The Air University Library
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Defense Documentation Center
USAF Project RAND
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
AVII-OCT 17 February 1970

Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities
   a. (U) Command and Organizations
      (1) (U) Command
         (a) On 18 November 1969, COL Charles J. Bailey, Jr. (USMC) departed XXIV Corps on PCS for assignment to Chief of Staff position, HQ I MEF.
         (b) On 19 November 1969, BG Allan G. Pixton departed XXIV Corps on PCS for assignment to ARADCOM, Colorado Springs, Colo.
         (c) On 19 November 1969, COL (P) Robert C. Hixon arrived at XXIV Corps to assume duties as the incoming Commanding Officer, XXIV Corps Artillery. He arrived XXIV Corps from Department of the Army (GFC of the Secy Def).
         (d) On 3 December 1969, COL Milton M. Cook, Jr. (USMC) arrived XXIV Corps from position of DCS (Plans), III MAF. At XXIV Corps he assumed duties as DCS.
         (e) On 12 December 1969, MG Edwin B. Wheeler (USMC) departed XXIV Corps for assignment as CG, 1st Mar Div. The Deputy Commanding General's slot was not subsequently filled during the quarter.

      (2) (U) Organization
         (a) During the reporting period the 3d Marine Division (-) departed XXIV Corps on the occasion of their redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam.
         (b) On Nov 69, C Btry, 6th Bn, 33rd Arty was reduced to zero strength as part of Phase II redeployment.
         (c) On 19 Nov 69, the 1st Bn, 40th Arty redeployed as part of Phase II redeployment.
         (d) On 1 December 69, the 31st CS Chaplain Detachment assigned to XXIV Corps was deactivated.

b. (C) Intelligence and Counterintelligence
CONFIDENTIAL

(a) General. During the period 1 Nov 69 through 31 Jan 70, major enemy units in XXIV Corps AO generally avoided decisive contact with Allied forces. Enemy initiated activity was characterized as light to moderate with scattered attacks-by-rocket/mortar/RPG fire, mining of LOCs, small unit ground attacks, and propaganda, military/political proselytizing, terrorism and other politically related activity. Enemy activity concentrated on undermining the pacification program, discrediting the GVN military/political structure, and influencing the rapid withdrawal of all US forces from SVN. Emphasis was placed upon strengthening the VC Local Forces/VC Infrastructure to proportions equivalent to its effectiveness during the period of TET 1968. Throughout the XXIV Corps AO, rice collection was the focal point of activity by NVA/VC forces in the lowlands. 7th Front, 4th, 5th and 6th Regiment elements depended on rice and other foodstuff supplies being delivered to them in the Piedmont by lowland forces. A significant number of friendly initiated contacts resulted from efforts by local forces to move supplies to NVA/VC forces operating in the Piedmont area. PWs, ralliers, and captured documents attest to the fact that a food shortage was experienced by enemy forces in the Piedmont due to the effectiveness of US/ARVN/GVN Territorial Force ambushes and operations. The most active enemy initiated combat resulted from attacks by NVA forces operating out of the DMZ. Of note was the contact between elements of the 2d Bn/27th NVA Regt and US/ARVN forces from 11-16 Nov 69. A PW stated that elements of the 2d Bn entered SVN on 10 Nov 69, and that companies of the 2d Bn/27th Regt would rotate into SVN every 10 days. During these sharp contacts approximately 300 enemy personnel were killed which indicates that a possible reinforced battalion participated in contacts during the four day period. Significant activity by enemy forces during the latter stages of this reporting period was the establishment of large bases along the Vietnamese/Lao border. The bases were located in northwestern QUANG TRI (P) and the adjacent Laoavian region, the Salients, eastern Base Area 611, and the A SHAU Valley/A Loui area. Large quantities of supplies were detected being moved from NVN down routes that feed into these areas. The 248, 52d, 812th, 803d, and 29th Regts were again recognized during the reporting period as operating in and adjacent to these areas in SVN. In late December and January, enemy forces increased their tactical posture throughout the Corps AO and appeared to be approaching readiness for an offensive around TET.

(b) QUANG TRI (P)

1 In QUANG TRI (P), November was characterized by low level attacks-by-fire and ground contacts with the exception of the 11 to 14 Nov engagements with elements of the 27th Regt. Northwestern QUANG TRI (P) saw the 52d Regt/320th Div move into SVN from NVN as part of a major effort to locate forward logistical bases for use during the Winter-Spring Campaign. The 31st Regt continued its propaganda, preselytizing, and harassment in GIO LING and CAM LO Districts. Mining activity in the CUA VIET River took a slight upsurge and was conducted by elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regt. Activity in the QUANG TRI (P) lowlands was at a very low level. NVA forces operating out of the DMZ let their presence be known through light attacks-by-fire and small-size ground contacts.

2 In early December, visual reconnaissance sightings detected bunker/hut

Incl
CONFIDENTIAL

construction, rice caches, trail activity, and numerous small groups of enemy personnel in the Vietnamese Salient and Northern Laoistan Salient indicating a significant sign of preparations for the Winter-Spring Offensive. Elements operating out of the DMZ began deploying south of the eastern and central DMZ to conduct reconnaissance, harass friendly units, establish staging areas, and position supplies. Small ammo and medical caches were discovered throughout the area. Heavy logistical activity continued in western QUANG TRI (P) in the area northwest of KHE SANH. Moderately active foot trails and Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) recordings along Rte 9, east of KHE SANH indicated NVA elements moving into the KHE SANH area. Activity in the lowlands was limited to mining of QL1 and the movement of the 7th Front elements toward the lowlands. The 1st BN/7th Front was identified in a company size contact, vicinity TD 333385, indicating the apparent eastward shift of some 7th Front units.

In December vehicular activity was noted along Rte 616 and the XE PON River in the Vietnamese Salient as the 812th NVA Regt continued to extend its LOC into the interior of SVN. Ground reconnaissance patrols also reported sightings and contacts in the DA KHE NAM Valley, vicinity TD 048235.

3 In January, the enemy continued to harass Allied forces in the eastern DMZ area with mortar and rocket attacks-by-fire and mining incidents. Elements of the 2d BN/27th Regt were again contacted in the central DMZ area on 4, 5, and 6 Jan 70. Contacts up to platoon size occurred in the MAI LOC-CAM LO area, probably with elements of the 31st Regt. LOCs along Rte 616 across the Salient, as well as Rte 1032, up to the HOUAY NAM XE River remained active with vehicular traffic. In the Piedmont, 7th Front units were probably responsible for numerous small contacts with friendly forces. Otherwise, enemy initiated activity was at a low level in January up to the close of the reporting period.

(c) THUA THIEN (P).

1 In November, captured documents and a PW indicated that the 11A Recon Bn, Military Region Tri Thien Hue (MRTTH) was active in reconnoitering prospective base camps and cache site areas along Rte 547 probably in anticipation of regimental size forces moving back into the THUA THIEN (P) interior. Visual reconnaissance sighted new .50 cal positions, bunkers, mortar pits and trail activity in the A SHAU Valley to further support the imminent infiltration of troops into the province. It was speculated that the 29th and 90th Regts supported by BINH TRAM 42 would move back into the A SHAU Valley from their positions in BASE AREA 611. Activity elsewhere in THUA THIEN (P) was at a low ebb. Rice collection and proselyting activity were the primary endeavors of other enemy forces. The 6th Regt continued to refit and reorganize in the western base of BAN AVAHO, LAOS (TD 0308). However, elements of the 6th Regt were engaged in close and continuous coordination with the VC Local Forces of PHONG DIEN and QUANG DIEN (D) (C113 and C114), possibly in preparation for upcoming offensive activity.

2 December was a month of few contacts with enemy units. Food collection and light harassment in the lowlands constituted the bulk of enemy activity in THUA THIEN (P). Poor weather throughout XXIV Corps AO in early December prevented surveillance of enemy activities in the western areas. However, evidence did indicate that a large build-up of supplies was taking

3 CONFIDENTIAL
place in Base Area 611 and was spilling into the A SHAU Valley area. On 14 Dec.
two members of 02X12 Dr/6th Regt were captured, vicinity YD 3232, confirming
agent reports that elements of the 6th Regt were operating in the northern Pied-
mont area of Thua Thien (P). Intelligence sources, in late December, confirmed
heavy activity in eastern Base Area 611 and the A SHAU Valley. 3d Force Recon-
naissance Teams, operating northwest of A Loan Airfield, spotted 120 bunkers, 25
huts, 20 "A" frame structures and approximately 140 enemy personnel confirming
the eastward movement of enemy forces out of sanctuaries in Laos. Activity in
the 4th and 5th Regt AO's continued to be light; however, agent reports and captured
documents continued to indicate preparations for a general offensive to take
place in early 1970.

Evidence collected in the month of January continued to confirm the pres-
ence of elements of the 6th Regt operating in the Piedmont of northern THUA
THIEN (P). FWs and captured documents revealed that close coordination between
6th Regt units and local forces was taking place. This would indicate that en-
emy offensive activities are probably scheduled in the near future. Captured
documents also gave reference to two regiments operating in the mountain areas
of THUA THIEN (P) (probably referring to the 803d and 29th Regts). On 8 Janu-
ary a reconnaissance team operating in the A SHAU Valley discovered a battalion
size base camp (vicinity YC 3793) with "BE" inscribed on a support to a flag in
the center of the area. "BE" is confirmed AKA for the 29th Regt. Other sight-
ings of large base camps and heavy eastward movement of enemy forces and con-
tacts by recon teams in the A Shau continued. This heavy trail activity and
sightings of several trucks in the A Shau area indicate possibly a transporta-
tion unit (BT42) is supporting movement into the Valley area. A Jan 70 raller
revealed evidence of an increased tactical status of the C3 K10 Bn/5th Regt.
He stated that the C3 Company had deployed to the eastern slope of Hill 226
(vic YD 628145) on 30 December, after returning from the "western area". During
January, a slight upsurge in enemy activities in the lowlands became apparent.
Propaganda and terrorist activities increased. At the close of this reporting
period enemy activity in Thua Thien (P) was on the upsurge. The movement of
major elements into the province to forward base areas coupled with increased
local force activity provided indicators that MRTTH had begun advanced prep-
arrations for major offensive activity.

(2) (C) Intelligence Collection:

(a) General: The Collection Division continued to perform its mission by
providing the G2 with information in a timely, accurate, coordinated manner.
The Division monitored 41 MACV Special Intelligence Collection Requirements
(SICR), 12 special collection programs and coordinated the activities of its
four (4) branches: IPF, Ground Reconnaissance, Ground Surveillance and Tech-
nical Intelligence. Liaison with the intelligence community of the 1st Infan-
try Division (ARV) was made on a continuing basis which promoted the free
exchange of ideas. The general subject's of discussion during the period were
the Winter-Spring Campaign and an assessment of the VC/NVA capabilities.

(b) Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch:

The number of human sources exploited during the reporting period re-
mained relatively unchanged from the previous quarter. During the quarter
there were 116 human sources exploited, 31 HOI CHANHs and 85 FW's. It is

CONFIDENTIAL
significant to note that the return of ralliers and capture of FW's was spread equally through the reporting period with one exception. On 13 Dec 69, 16 FW's were captured as a result of several contacts in the lowlands of THIEU PHONG (D). The capture of FW's was also evenly spread geographically through the lowlands of the Corps AO.

2 Close coordination among all interrogation elements within the Corps AO increased the timeliness of tactical information used for immediate exploitation in the field as well as the accuracy of the information being obtained from human sources. Emphasis was placed on translation of ABFW interrogation reports and dissemination by local US elements to all intelligence units having an interest. Continued liaison with interrogation elements and Order of Battle sections at all levels in the Corps provided the interrogators with sound intelligence backgrounds which enabled them to fully exploit each human source.

3 Close liaison with 1st Infantry Division (ABFW) G2 provided access to documents captured by ABFW elements. Readouts were disseminated throughout the US intelligence community. Daily liaison was conducted with all interrogation elements, both US and ABFW, within the Corps AO. Both benefited by more complete exploitation. At the close of this quarter a training program was initiated for interrogators and interpreters in order to increase the quality of interrogation performed by this section.

(c) Technical Intelligence: During the reporting period the Technical Intelligence Branch monitored combat operations and passed significant items to the Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEC). The CMEC Field Team attached to this Headquarters continued to provide invaluable assistance to units in the field. The branch registered 96 rifles and 42 pistols as individual war trophies. Although most items of technical intelligence have been previously reported, the following significant items were reported during the period.

1 On 21 Nov 69, 3 North Vietnamese manufactured miniature directional mines (MOB-5) were discovered in southeastern QUANG TRI Province. The mines were similar in size to miniature directional mines produced in VC jungle workshops. The factory-produced mines are constructed with more sophistication and precision. Because of their small size they are easy to conceal on the body, making them a very effective terrorist device. The capabilities of the mine were presented in an oral brief by the LIV Corps CMHC contact team.

2 On 14 Nov 69, in PHU LOC District, THUA THIEN (P), a young Vietnamese boy reported a VC emplaced railroad mine and was rewarded through the ABFW VIP program. ROB personnel disarmed the mine by tracing the detonator cord to the detonator and charge. The charge was approximately 12 to 15 lbs of C4 in a sandbag. The detonator contact was placed approximately 25-30 feet in front of the charge to insure that the engine received the blast rather than the 2 flatcars being pushed ahead of the engine. The detonator was made of split bamboo, with one detonator wire attached to each piece of bamboo. The detonator was then placed in a joint in the track so the weight of the train would force the bamboo joint and detonator wire together, thus setting off the charge.
CONFIDENTIAL

(d) Ground Reconnaissance Branch: Long Range Reconnaissance in the XXIV Corps AO continued to provide information collected by 270 patrols during the reporting period. These patrols engaged in 42 contacts, resulting in 62 enemy KIA and 1 FW. There were 120 sightings, totaling 600 enemy, without making contact. There were numerous bunker complexes and base camps reported that were targeted by artillery and air strikes. The information provided was invaluable in the assessment of enemy routes of movement, staging areas, and enemy course of action for the Winter/Spring Campaign.

In addition to the assigned LRRPs, the 3d Force Recon Company operated in the Corps AO during Dec 1969 and Jan 1970. Their teams provided considerable information on enemy activity in the A SHAU Valley, to include the sighting of 6 vehicles, 224 enemy, 365 bunkers, and 5 base camps.

(e) Ground Surveillance Branch: During the reporting period the Ground Surveillance Branch continued its assigned Duel Blade and Duffel Bag missions. The onset of bad weather hampered the Air Force implanting of sensor strings in the western border region of XXIV Corps. To supplement the restricted Air Force support, XXIV Corps used OV-10s from the 1st MAW and O-1s from the 220th RAC to air implant ADSIDS. To assist definition of type targets detected in the KHE SANH area, O-1s were used to drop single acoustic buoys on previously implanted ADSID strings. The light aircraft proved to be extremely responsive and effective because they could fly "under" the poor weather in order to make successful implants. In all cases the drop aircraft maintained radio contact with the airborne readout station, in order to confirm each successful implant.

1 On 30 Dec 69, the Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP) reverted to the control of III MAF. SCAMP did an excellent job of providing an orderly transition of the Duel Blade program from the 3d Marine Division to the 101st Abn Division (AM) and the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (N).

2 The Tight Jaw program continued to expand and was very successful. ARVN opened two new readout sites, one west of HUE (FSB LION) and the other overlooking the BA LONG Valley (FSB SARGE). The six ARVN readout sites were equipped with the portable readout devices. All ARVN regiments in XXIV Corps AO have been issued the Patrol Seismic Intrusion Device (PSID). Field reports indicated that ARVN was well satisfied with this sensor.

3 (c) Counterintelligence.

(a) PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM: Included in the Security Division's mission was the coordinating with and monitoring of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program in its attack against the Viet-Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Phung Hoang is the GVN Program established to eliminate the VC shadow government. The Security Division continued its liaison to all PIOCC's and DI OCC's which are the cutting edge of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program. During the reporting period a briefing was presented by the I Corps Phoenix Staff to the 101st Abn Div (AM), 1/5 Inf Div (N) and XXIV Corps to familiarise the units with the mission, function, and organisation of the program. This briefing was very useful, timely and discounted the recent unfavorable publicity the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program has received.
CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Security: G2 Security Division had the overall responsibility for counterintelligence and security procedures of Headquarters XXIV Corps and attached units. During the reporting period a Counterintelligence technical survey was conducted by the 525th Military Intelligence Group of all areas within the XXIV Corps Headquarters buildings where sensitive information was routinely discussed. A counterintelligence inspection was conducted by the Security Division of all sections of Headquarters XXIV Corps to determine security awareness. The Security Division had the responsibility for staff supervision of Communication Security (COMSEC) and had representation on the Operation Security (OPSEC) Committee of which COMSEC was a part. Monthly COMSEC briefings were presented for new arrivals in XXIV Corps and in January, a MACV briefing team presented a special OPSEC briefing on enemy communication intercept capabilities to all major units in the Corps AO.

(c) Early Warning Net and Base Informant Program: The Early Warning Net (EWN) continued as one of the major efforts of the Security Division. The EWN constantly provided intelligence of enemy movement near Phu Bai Combat Base. The EWN continued to expand, with the addition of informants, the main source of intelligence gained through the EWN.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) (C) The XXIV Corps Area of Operation was extended temporarily south into the 1st Marine Division TAOR on 10 January 1969. This temporary AO extension included the area bounded by ZC N-S Grid Line 08 in the west, ZC E-W Grid Line 89 in the south and ZC N-S Grid Line 80 in the east. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) used this area to conduct ground operations. In addition to this temporary AO extension, a major internal boundary modification between the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in Quang Tri Province provided a larger area of operation to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN).

(2) (C) The following operations terminated during the reporting period:

(a) Operation NORTON FALLS: Elements of the 101st Abn Div (AM) conducted extensive operations in an AO west and northwest of VANDEGRIFT CB to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and base areas and to screen the redeployment of the 4th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division. This operation commenced 2 October 1969 and terminated 8 November 1969 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWAG</td>
<td>NWAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>MIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RET</td>
<td>RET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/SW</td>
<td>C/SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>521</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE: This 101st Abn Div (AM) operation was designed to find, fix and destroy enemy forces within the 101st Abn Div (AM) AO. Elements of the division conducted detailed search, LOC patrols, and ambushes to neutralize local VC/VCI forces and to deny rice resources to the enemy. In PHU LOC District, operations were conducted in conjunction with Regional and Popular Forces along Route 1 to interdict enemy efforts to
CONFIDENTIAL

infiltrate and harass the civilian population. In PHONG DIEN District, the Piedmont area south of HUE, and an area in the vicinity of LZ SALLY, operations were targeted to deny the enemy access to the populated areas. Throughout Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE, the 101st Abn Div (AM) actively participated in support of the accelerated pacification program in THUA THIEN Province. This operation commenced 29 September 1969 and terminated 6 December 1969 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVC</td>
<td>RET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Operation FULTON SQUARE: The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) conducted search and clear, reconnaissance in force and ambush operations within their assigned AO. The operation was highlighted by heavy contact with the enemy in an area vicinity of LZ SPARROW from 11-17 Nov 69. Elements of the brigade engaged a battalion of the 27th NVA Regiment. Reinforcements were deployed in the area to include the 5th Battalion, 2d Regiment, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 2d Battalion, 501st Inf, 101st Abn Div (AM). The action initially was characterized by frequent mortar and heavy ground attacks. This activity soon changed to infrequent attacks by fire and sporadic ground action until it subsided on 17 Nov 69. Operation Fulton Square commenced on 22 Oct 69 and terminated on 18 January 1970 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVC</td>
<td>RET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN: This operation is designed to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, caches, and base camps within the 101st Airborne Division (AM) AO, and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. The 101st Airborne Div (AM) continues its active participation in support of the accelerated pacification program in THUA THIEN Province. Operations are conducted in close coordination with Sector Forces to include RF, PF, NPFF, and PRU to deny the enemy access to their sources of supply. The operation commenced on 7 Dec 69.

(b) Operation GREENE RIVER: This is the operational nickname given to current search and clear, reconnaissance in force and ambush operations by the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) within their assigned AO. The operation commenced on 19 January 1970.

(c) Statistical data of current operations:

CONFIDENTIAL
(a) Task Force Clearwater patrol units detected 26,525 vessels on the inland waterways of NIGTZ during the reporting period. They boarded and searched 6,069 and inspected 18,977 without boarding. 28,037 persons were checked for proper identification, and 232 were detained. Twenty enemy were killed by TF Clearwater Forces during this period.

(b) The enemy continued to threaten the Cua Viet LOG security. Mining attempts occurred throughout the period, with most activity during the periods of lower lunar illumination. On 12 Nov, a suspected NVA pressure influence mine was detonated by sweep boats and the following morning another pressure mine was recovered intact by the sweep boats. Also, on the morning of 13 Nov, YOG-76, a small navy gasoline tanker, was holed by 2 swimmer-placed Limpet mines and sank in the Cua Viet harbor. A pressure mine was detonated by a UK scare charge sweep on 14 Nov. PBR-17 was destroyed and sank when it detonated a pressure mine on 16 Nov, costing the life of one sailor. On 2 Dec, a complete NVA pressure mine was recovered by a fisherman fishing in the Cua Viet river and another was tangled in the sweep on 3 Dec. The skimmer detonated one mine on 16 Dec, 2 on 17 Dec, and 4 on 18 Dec, using UK scare charges. One new pressure mine was recovered following an engagement with a sapper element on 31 Dec just north of the Cua Viet river. Two mines were detonated by scare charges on 8 Jan, one was tangled and destroyed by bottom sweep on 11 Jan and one was detonated by scare charge on 12 Jan. On 21 Jan, a 3 pound TNT charge, employed as a swimmer deterrent in the Cua Viet harbor, produced a secondary explosion of an unknown type ordinance, estimated at 15 pounds HE. This represents 18 known or suspected mining attempts during the quarter. There were no known attempts to interdict the Perfume LOC. In the same period, patrol units engaged the enemy 28 times, and provided continuous insert/extract, cover fire and illumination support to U.S. Army and Marine Corps units operating on the river banks.

(c) One captured mine was rendered safe and used to determine the effectiveness of mine sweeping techniques being used. All types of craft that normally operate on the river were operated over the "test mine" to determine adequate safety precautions when operating in mined waters. As a result of these tests, mine sweeping procedures were updated and new operating
(c) The minehunting sonar system, SHADOWGRAPH, was evaluated on the Qua Viet river and found to be an effective system for locating submerged objects. The evaluation proved that the system was not adversely affected by the heavy silt in the muddy Vietnamese rivers. The sensing elements were towed behind the tending craft, in this case an MSM, and consequently forced the towing craft to pass over or nearly over the mine before it was detected. This prohibited using the Shadowgraph as a live mine hunter in the Qua Viet River, where the MSM is very vulnerable to the NVA pressure mine. The entire system is now being retrograded to CONUS where results of tests and evaluation can be analyzed and a new employment considered.

(e) On 5 November, the staff group and 8 of the 10 PBRs of RIVER DIVISION 543 shifted to CTG 115.1 and reported to Da Nang. The other 2 PBRs were attached to River Division 521, which established a detachment at Qua Viet of 6 PBRs. This shift of boats and personnel left the Clearwater river security groups each operating with 4 fewer PBRs.

(f) The MK40, MOD-1, 3 pound hand held anti-personnel depth charge was being evaluated in the Qua Viet harbor as a swimmer deterrent. This charge normally detonates at a depth of 15 to 30 ft and has a stun radius of 55 ft and a kill radius of 30 ft.

(g) Continued emphasis was placed on civic action programs with MEDCAPS conducted regularly throughout the Clearwater AO. Patrol units conducted a total of 66 MEDCAPS in villages along the inland waterways of NICTZ this quarter. Broadcasts of distributed PS70PS tapes and music tapes were made regularly during daylight hours at villages along the patrol routes.

(5) (c) Phase II Redeployment

(a) During the reporting period the last two of four USMC embarkation units redeployed. Embarkation Unit Three, consisting of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, elements of the 3d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment plus other support elements of the 3d Marine Division, stood down 22 to 27 October and embarked for Okinawa 4 to 10 November. Embarkation Unit Four, consisting of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment and various 3d Marine Division support elements stood down 5 to 10 November and embarked for Okinawa 19 to 29 November. This completed the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division. A total of 15,000 USMC personnel were redeployed.

(b) In early November 1969, B Btry, 6/33 Arty was reduced by 147 spaces to zero strength. On 19 November 1/40 Arty redeployed with 505 spaces. This terminated the redeployment of Army personnel in the XII Corps AO.

d. LOGISTICS.

(1) (U) General. During this reporting period, the plans and procedures for logistical support in the XII Corps area of operation (AO) underwent extensive change due to the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division and its combat support and combat service support units. Details of this change are discussed in the following paragraphs.
(2) (C) Operations.

(a) Redeployments.

During the period, the 3d Marine Division completed redeployment from NICTZ to Okinawa. A total of 18,306 personnel and 24,047 S/T of cargo were redeployed. The entire redeployment was accomplished by use of 49 vessels and 39 air sorties between 20 October 1969 and 25 November 1969.

(b) IFB (Instrument Flight Rule) Radar Air Drop Test Program.

Due to several unsuccessful air drops of food and ammunition from helicopters during December 1969, the CG, 101st Abn Div (AM) requested a study group and test program be conducted to test and perfect a system of airdropping supplies from Air Force C-130 aircraft and Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters during actual instrument conditions.

2 A Study Group composed of knowledgeable personnel from the 834 Air Division, "Milky" Radar Site, and 101st Airborne Division met at the 101st DISCOM on 29 December 1969 to discuss and set up the test program. A three phase test program was devised using: standard dummy loads, in Phase I, in the low lands; dummy loads, in Phase II, in semi mountain/canopy area; and actual CDS containers with food and ammunition in a PEB in actual weather conditions during Phase III. 1,000 and 2,000 lbs loads, 22 and 28 feet chutes (reefed and unreefed), and use of 30 second cutters were to be tested during these phases.

3 Phase I testing was at "DZ Jeanne", consisting of drops from both the C-130 and Chinook on 5 January and 13 January. C-130 CEA (circular error average) on 16 actual drops was 178 yards; the CH-47 helicopter dropped 8 loads with a 387 yard CEA.

Phase II testing was conducted at "DZ Jack", on 20 January 1970. Results were not acceptable due to high winds and numerous malfunctions. A C-130 dropped 3 loads with a 441 yard CEA and the Chinook dropped 4 loads with a 475 yard CEA. A repetition of Phase II will be conducted at a later date.

(c) Move of the 101st Abn Division Rear from Bien Hoa to NICTZ. On 21 Dec 69, the 101st Abn Division (AM) completed the move begun 23 Oct 69 of the Division Rear from Bien Hoa to NICTZ. Transportation utilized was: 36 C-130 and 4 C-124 sorties; 76 Sea/Land Van; and 6 LST shipments. Major units moved were the 101st Admin Co and the 101st Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS). Special problems of the move involved shipment of 12,000 pieces of personal baggage from the Division baggage facility and the Division personnel and finance records, without interruption of operations.

(3) (C) Supply.

(a) Class I.

Complete responsibility for Class I support in the NICTZ was assumed by the Army on 15 Nov 69. Operation of the Quang Tri/Dong Ha Class I points was transferred from FLSS-B to the 26th Gen Spt GP. On 28 Dec 69, the Class I point at Dong Ha was closed and the operation was transferred to the Quang Tri Class I point.

CONFIDENTIAL
1. With the redeployment of the 3rd Marine Division during the month of November 1969, FLSO-B terminated POL operations on 15 November 1969, at the Qua Viet holding area/transfer point and at the Dong Ha Ramp. Responsibility for this mission was taken over by the USASUPCOM (26th GS Gp). This transfer of responsibility resulted in significant changes in the distribution of bulk POL products in the northern portion of NICTZ. That is, only MOGAS and Diesel Fuel (DF) are now received through the port at Qua Viet, JP 4 is piped from Tan My to Quang Tri for further distribution and AVGAS is line hauled from Tan My, by 5,000 gallon tankers, to all distribution points in NICTZ.

2. On 17 November 1969, the USASUPCOM (26th GS Gp) established a refueling point in the Dong Ha area for the 108th Artillery group. This refueling point has a storage capacity of 30,000 gallons MOGAS and 30,000 gallons DF and is available to all US units in the area requiring fuel (MOGAS and DF) in capacities of 1,200 gallons or less.

3. On 5 December 1969 the residual detachment of MAG-39 which was operating the tactical airfield fuel dispensing system (TAFDS) at the Quang Tri airfield was redeployed. To insure continuity of POL operations at the airfield it was necessary to task the OQ, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) with the operation of this POL facility.

(c) AMMO.

1. The redeployment of the 3rd Marine Division in November 1969 resulted in large quantities of excess Class V stocks at the Quang Tri ASP. Through an agreement between Force Logistical Command (FLC) and USASUPCOM a joint inventory of Marine stocks was conducted and a portion turned over to the Army. On 16 November 1969 the Marine portion of the Quang Tri ASP was turned over to the USASUPCOM Da Nang. As a result of the termination of the Marine ASP, the USASUPCOM assumed the Class V support mission for residual Marine units in NICTZ for common non-allocated Class V items. All Marine peculiar and Army allocated Class V items required for Marine operations were provided to them by FLC which maintained representatives at the Phu Bai and Quang Tri ASP's.

4. (C) Maintenance.

(a) During this period, due to the redeployment of Marine maintenance units, common item maintenance support for residual Marine units was assumed by the Army. Marine peculiar maintenance was performed by Force Logistical Command (FLC) Da Nang.

(b) The first shipment of 10 M551's (AR/AAV) was received on 18 January 1970. After application of a breach block MWC, the vehicles were issued to the 3/5 Cav on 20 January 1970.

(c) The first XXIV Corps CMMI inspection was conducted on 8 January 1970.

5. (C) Transportation.

(a) Closure of Cornfield Ramp (HUE). For the period 27 Oct to 30 Nov 69 the Cornfield Ramp at Hue was closed for a trial period which resulted in its
permanent closure by the Navy. As a result of lower cargo handling require-
ments experienced after Phase II Redeployment, the Naval Support Activity, DNG
was able to consolidate Hua/Phu Bai operations at the Tan My Ramp and thereby
affect economies in personnel and equipment.

(b) Trailer Transfer Operation. In December USASUPCOM, DNG initiated a
trailer transfer system to improve long haul operations between Dong Ha and
Da Nang. Assets and men were drawn from SUPCOM transportation units, which
were utilised to operate points in NICIZ at Quang Tri and Phu Bai.

(c) Rail Spurs Completed. The Bridge Ramp Spur in Da Nang was completed
on 2 October, and the Camp Haskins spur was completed 25 October; however,
neither spur was operational because of problems in clearing the right of way.
On 25 November a 1500 ft spur was completed at Phu Bai Combat Base which should
be in operation next quarter when the cargo handling area is completed. Plans
for military spurs at Quang Tri and Dong Ha have been cancelled.

e. Personnel Administration.

(1) Civilian Personnel Management. Due to a directed reduction in the lo-
cal national work force; the command was only authorized 47 local national direct
hire spaces. This represented a reduction of 9 spaces. Daily hire (AIK) funds
were sufficient to meet the needs of the command.

(2) Maintenance of unit strengths: Unit strength remained at an accept-
able level throughout the reporting period.

(3) Medical:

(a) Excellent medical support continued in the Corps AO throughout the
period.

(b) Following the realignment of forces as a result of the departure of
the 3d Marine Division, the 18th Surgical Hospital opened and operated the
Quang Tri Medical center.

f. (U) Inspector General

NONE

g. (U) Information

(1) Coverage was furnished the following major events:

(a) Redeployment of the Third Marine Division (completed).

(b) Arrival and distribution to farmers of a large shipment of Kubota
tractors in Thua Thien Province.

(c) Realignment of U.S. forces in Corps AO following departure of Third
Marine Division and other organizations.

(2) Eight interviews were arranged with the CG and staff sections for mem-
ers of the press.

CONFIDENTIAL

13
483 news releases were made on Corps activities.

Coverage of news events by civilian media was arranged and coordinated for 214 correspondents. Of these, 125 remained overnight.

Command HISTORY. During the reporting period the 31st Military History Detachment initiated a historical study of US military operations within the XXIV Corps Area of Operations for the year 1969.

Army Aviation.

Signal

AUTOSEVOCOM.

(a) During the period 3-6 November 1969 all USMC subscriber terminals served off of SECORD 80 at Dong Ha were deactivated due to the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division.

(b) On 14 November 1969, the Wideband AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal at 108th Arty Gp at Dong Ha, served off of SECORD 80, was replaced with a Narrowband AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal at the same location but served off of SECORD 35 in Phu Bai. Simultaneously, Secure Switchboard SECORD 80 at Dong Ha was deactivated.

(c) On 4 December 1969, the Narrowband AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal at the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) was relocated from Camp Red Devil to the new Tactical Operations Center at Quang Tri Army.

(d) On 10 December 1969, the Wideband AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal at MAG 36 in Phu Bai, served off of SECORD 35, was transferred in place to MAG 16. Authorization to reactivate the terminal was not received until 3 January 1970 and some delay was realized due to the unavailability of keying material.

Relocation of the Red Devil Switchboard. On 26 November 1969, the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) Tactical Operations Center Switchboard (Red Devil), AN/MTC-1, was relocated from Camp Red Devil to the new TOC location at Quang Tri Army.

(3) XXIV Corps Communications Center Rehabilitation.

(a) On 1 December 1969, the XXIV Corps TOC Communications Center was relocated into AN/MSC-29 teletypewriter vans.

(b) On 4 December 1969, Seabees and personnel of the 1st Signal Brigade began rehabilitation/expansion of the TOC Communications Center Facility.

The rehabilitation project was completed on 5 Jan and during the period 6-8 January 1970, the TOC Communications Center was relocated to the rehabilitated facility.

Improvement of Camp Eagle Telephone Service.
During this reporting period extensive rehabilitation effort was expended on the Camp Eagle and Gia Le Cable Distribution Systems in preparation for installation of the AN/TTC-28 Dial Telephone Exchange at Camp Eagle. Although the rehabilitation was primarily intended to improve the cable distribution systems for dial service, subscribers gained immediate benefits through improved quality and reduced outages. Construction of the AN/TTC-28 site began in mid-December. The equipment was installed at the newly constructed site in early January and wiring of the facility was started immediately. The tentative activation date of the Dial Telephone Exchange was designated as 15 February 1970, at which time all telephone subscribers at Camp Eagle and Gia Le will be provided dial telephone service.

(5) (C) XXIV Corps FM Secure Command Net. On 20 November 1969, a HYL-3 Regenerative Repeater was installed at Camp Evans as an automatic secure re-transmission station for the XXIV Corps FM Secure Command Net. This equipment was acquired for a 30 day test and evaluation period. It proved to be a valuable asset in that all stations in the net were able to contact the XXIV Corps Headquarters station directly in the secure mode. Previously, a number of the outlying stations were required to relay through a manual relay station at Camp Evans. Installation of the HYL-3 eliminated the manual relay requirement and not only improved the transmission security of the net but also eliminated possible operator error at the manual relay. Upon completion of the test and evaluation period, approval was obtained to retain the HYL-3 for an indefinite period of time.

(6) (C) Multi-Channel Communications. During this reporting period, the activation, deactivation, reroute, and/or retermination of numerous circuits/systems was necessitated by the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division and the subsequent reconfiguration within NICTZ.

(a) A total of 144 circuits were deactivated, 47 circuits were rerouted and/or reterminated and 157 circuits were activated.

(b) Five Corps Area Communications Systems were deactivated:
1 12 channel system from Phu Bai to Camp Eagle.
2 12 channel system from Phu Bai to Camp Eagle.
3 12 channel system from Mai Loc to Quang Tri Army.
4 12 channel system from Hue MACV to Hue Citadel.
5 45 channel system from Dong Ha to Quang Tri Army.

(c) Four Corps Area Communications Systems were activated:
1 45 channel system from Phu Bai to Camp Eagle.
2 12 channel system from Quang Tri City to Dong Ha East.
3 12 channel system from Dong Ha East to Dong Ha West.
4 45 channel system from Dong Ha West to Quang Tri Army.
(d) One 120 channel Defense Communications System between Quang Tri City and Dong Ha was deactivated.

(e) One 48 channel Defense Communications System between Dong Ha and Da Nang was deactivated, relocated, and reactivated between Quang Tri Army and Da Nang.

(7) Communications Support at Dong Ha West. During this reporting period, the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division necessitated the assumption of telephone and communications center service responsibility by elements of the 1st Signal Brigade. An AN/MTC-1 manual switchboard was activated at Dong Ha West in early November thereby permitting the deactivation and removal of the USMC AN/TTC-28 Dial Telephone Exchange. An AN/MSG-29, mobile communications center, was activated at Dong Ha West thereby permitting deactivation of the USMC AN/TGC-37 interim communications center facility.

(8) Improvement of Message Handling. The XXIV Corps Message Review Board met three times during the quarter to review message preparation and processing procedures of XXIV Corps Staff Sections and COPChem units. Introduction of a new message form on 1 November 1969 resulted initially in several minor format and internal instruction errors. Subsequent review periods however, indicated a marked decline in message discrepancies.

(9) Improvement of Telephone Service to Quang Tri Army. On 23 January 1970, four dial telephone trunks were activated between the Phu Bai Dial Telephone Exchange and the Quang Tri Army Switchboard. This added capability afforded the Class "A" telephone subscribers at Phu Bai direct dial access to the Quang Tri Army Switchboard.

(10) NICTZ Communications Co-ordination Committee. Three meetings were held during the reporting period and projects discussed which are still in progress are:

(a) Installation and activation of an AN/TTC-28 Dial Telephone Exchange at Camp Eagle to provide dial telephone service to Camp Eagle and Gia Le subscribers.

(b) Provision of four dial telephone trunks between the Phu Bai Dial Telephone Exchange and the Dong Ha West Switchboard.

(c) Upgrade of the integrated Communications System between Phu Bai and Da Nang from 120 to 240 channels.

(d) Phu Bai Army Communications Center assuming message traffic handling responsibility for DASG-V thereby releasing 1972d Comm Sqdn assets.

(e) Preparation of a NICTZ Telephone Directory.

(f) Continued emphasis on elimination of communications circuit/systems not required.

(g) Continued emphasis on communications security and full implementation of the NESTOR program.
CONFIDENTIAL

k. Engineers

(1) (U) Command and Staff relationships. Two of the three engineer combat battalions of the 45th Engineer Group were stationed in the XXIV Corps AO; the Group was tasked by III MAF, and these two battalions were effectively employed in general support of XXIV Corps. Upon the redeployment of Naval Mobile Construction battalions, the 32d Naval Construction Regiment moved from the vicinity of XXIV Corps Headquarters to Da Nang and controlled all Seabee units in I Corps, rather than those only in NICTZ. Upon request of III MAF, these units were tasked by COMNAVFORV through 3d Naval Construction Brigade. CG, XXIV Corps had no direct tasking authority over these supporting Army and Navy engineer units in the Corps AO, but all units responded effectively to requests from this headquarters and organic engineer units for back-up support on combat support and operational support missions. The Engineer, XXIV Corps exercised direct tasking authority over the 2d Plt, 3d Bridge Company (PMF) which was OPCON III MAF in direct support of XXIV Corps.

(2) (C) Phase II and Phase III Redeployment of Forces. During the reporting period, four of the five Seabee battalions (less one company with horizontal construction capability only) departed the Corps AO under Phase II Redeployment; two battalions returned to CONUS, two were restated in-country. The remaining battalion (MCR-133) was replaced late in the reporting period by MCR-10 on normal rotation of units. The 2d Platoon, 3d Bridge Company was scheduled for redeployment to CONUS under Phase III in the next reporting period.

(3) Engineer projects completed during the reporting period:

(a) Dong Ha bridge (165 meter span over the Mieu Giang River), 75% complete at the end of the previous quarter, was completed and opened to traffic on 16 Nov 69.

(b) Song Bo railroad bridge (YD 614278), reported as 80% complete at the end of last quarter, was actually completed on 31 Oct 69.

(c) The railroad spur at Phu Bai was completed on 16 Nov 69.

(d) Seabees completed repair of storm damage to the Pho Trach highway bridge (YD 519349) and repair of fire damage at Bridge 1-34 (YD 838176).

(4) (U) Continuing engineer projects.

(a) Land Clearing. The land clearing projects in Phu Thu District (in support of Operation SATURATE) and west and south of FSB Jack (YD 495287) were completed except for some minor "pockets" which will be done at a later date; this land clearing during the quarter totaled approximately 4,400 acres. Land clearing operations were shifted to the Leatherneck Square area in northern Quang Tri Province; over 5,000 acres were cleared in this area during this reporting period. An additional 500 acres were cleared in conjunction with construction of the tactical road to FSB Barbara.
(b) Primary Lines of Communication (QL-1 and QL-9). Seabees completed second lift paving on all remaining portions of QL-1 between Lang Co Bridge (AT 885995) and Dong Ha, except for a 3/4 mile section south of Dong Ha. Second lift paving of QL-9 was completed from Dong Ha to the entrance road to Camp Carroll (ID 033561). First lift paving from this point to Elliott Combat Base had previously been completed; an additional 3.2 km of first lift paving was added during the quarter to the 5.4 km section between Elliott Combat Base and Vandegrift Combat Base.

(c) Railroad construction. YNRS continued restoration of the railway north of Hue. At the end of the reporting period, restoration had progressed through Camp Sally. Organic engineers of 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile) (Company "C" 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion) assisted by restoring portions of the roadbed which had been cut by defensive structures.

(d) Throughout the reporting period, US engineer forces supported ARVN engineers in construction of living/fighting bunkers (multiple arch culvert type) in the Dual Blade Area. ARVN was allocated 191 of these bunkers; US engineers were supporting construction of 112:

- 35 at A-2 (complete)
- 56 at C-1 (49 complete)
- 20 at A-1 (not started)
- 1 at Dong Ha (complete)

(e) Tactical Roads. Army engineers have continued construction on three of the access roads to key fire support bases started during the last reporting period, and initiated construction of the tactical road in Phu Thu District which will connect to the site of the Thuy Tu Estuary Ferry to Vinh Loc Island. The ferry itself was constructed by Naval Support Activity; construction of the terminal facilities will be initiated by Seabees in the next reporting period. At the end of this reporting period, these roads were at the following state of completion:

- Access road from Camp Sally to FSB T-Bone and connecting road to FSB Geronimo: 44%
- Access road from LZ Nancy to FSB Barbara: 68%
- Access road from Camp Evans to FSB Rakkasan: 67%
- Phu Thu - Thuy Tu Estuary road: 56%

1. Civic Action Activities.

(a) During the reporting period, military civic action projects continued to be emphasized and carried out in order to take maximum advantage of existing favorable security conditions and to solidify the pro-GVN sentiment of the people. All projects were approved by province officials and
supported the 1969 Pacification and Development objectives. XXIV Corps elements completed 141 projects out of a total 291 projects undertaken with 74% being of the self-help variety. Adverse weather conditions severely hampered civic action projects throughout the reporting period. The decrease in numbers of projects completed were the result of:

1. Redeployment of the 3d Marine Division.
2. CA/PSMAR AID Fund reductions.
3. Adverse weather.

(b) Major projects undertaken by XXIV Corps elements.

1. 101st Abn Div (AM).

a. Pacification. The division tactical forces displaced from the A Shau Valley to the periphery of the population centers in the coastal lowlands in the fall. This provided, for the first time, the opportunity for the brigades to become directly involved in military civic action projects as well as assisting in RVNAF training. During the period 121 civic action projects were completed and 126 projects are currently underway representing a significant increase over the previous reporting period.

b. Project Dedication. Four significant dedication ceremonies were held by local officials. The Commanding General, 101st Abn, attended ceremonies in which 850 books were donated to the Quoc Hoc Library in Hue and the dedication of the major addition to the Huong Thuy High School. Ceremonies were held on 19 Nov commemorating the construction of the Tay Loc Orphanage. The 501st Signal Battalion sponsored the project with much of the materials furnished by the division. During a ceremony on 7 Dec, 232 Kubota tiller tractors were presented to hamlet chiefs by province officials. Personnel from the division assisted in assembling the tractors. Major projects completed during the period included 56 schools, 3 dispensaries, 4 orphanages, 2 village headquarters, 43 wells, 1 market and 6 bridge and road repair projects. Current projects underway include 39 schools, 8 dispensaries, 2 village headquarters, 41 wells and a Boy Scout center.

g. MEDCAP Support. During the period, 21,810 medical and dental patients were treated by divisional medical personnel. 4,656 immunizations were administered and 31 Vietnamese from local hamlets were evacuated to hospitals for medical care. The division surgeon continued to provide outstanding support for the MEDCAP program throughout the reporting period. Division medical units provided MEDCAP assistance at 42 district medical facilities, and at 12 Hue city medical facilities. The surgeon formalized the division MEDCAP program in a division circular which prescribed policies and procedures under which MEDCAP support was provided.

d. Territorial Security. During the period, the division emphasized the conduct by subordinate units of combined operations and training programs for the RP/PF/PSDF. Mobile Training Teams (MTT) were organized, provided specialized training and committed to increase the combat effectiveness of the RP/PF/PSDF. MTT training was directed toward ambush and patrolling techniques, land navigation, battle drill, first aid, radio procedures,
marksmanship, care and cleaning of weapons, employment of individual and crew served weapons, artillery fire adjustment, and airmobile operations. US and RF/PF forces combined to conduct joint local patrols, night ambushes, helicopter assaults and cordon operations. During the period, 20 RF companies and 13 PF platoons received instruction from maneuver units and mobile training teams of the battalions of the division. The employment of the 3d Bn of the 157th Inf in a dedicated role to Phong Dien District contributed significantly to the overall pacification and state of RF/PF training in that area.

2 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)

a Pacification, Upgrade Territorial Security: RVNAF and PWMAF continued to provide an adequate shield for RF/PF activities in the populated areas. Thirty of the 31 RF companies and 162 of the 169 PF platoons authorized were in the province. One RF company received training at Dong Da and 21 PF platoons were at Lien Trin for training. A sector initiated Command Inspection Program emphasized the personal welfare of the troops. A school for all company and platoon leaders of the territorial security forces was started on the 15th of Dec 69 by the Brigade. The school is emphasizing leadership, ambush techniques, direction of fire support and allied subjects. The attempt of this program and the continuing CAP, MAT and joint operations program was to close the wide performance gap between the units of the territorial forces created by the uneven leadership talent available.

b Projects, Support for major projects underway consisted of providing and transporting building materials purchased through A1K funds. Labor was provided on a self-help basis. A completion date of 1 Feb 70 was set for the Hai Tong High School Library for which 541,720$VN was allocated. A school and dispensary were being constructed in Quang Tri City for the 1st ARVN Div and sector (RF/PF) dependents with 500,000$VN being allocated to purchase materials. Repair efforts were underway to restore the warehouse in Ha Thanh Hamlet by providing materials and assistance in transporting excess bricks from the installation. Final coordination was underway with province officials concerning "Plowing for Peace" projects. This request was made in order to further refugee resettlement and increase local food production with emphasis on vegetables.

c Community relations.

1 On 7 December 1969, a group of EM from Hq. XXIV Corps presented a program of modern music at the Hue University Auditorium. The group, "The Unknown Expedition", presented a two hour program with over 300 Vietnamese attending.

2 A 30 member Vietnamese Childrens Choir from Hue presented a program of Christmas music during services conducted at Phu Bai Chapel

2 XXIV Corps Chaplains presented gifts to over 700 ARVN soldiers confined in the 1st ARVN Div hospital and the Dong Ba hospital. The gifts were presented by US soldiers and high school students from Hue.

4 The NGO Wives Club of Tripler Army Hospital donated clothes and gifts to 103 lepers in the Thua Thien Province Hospital. The items were distributed by XXIV Corps Chaplains.
CONFIDENTIAL

5 On 29 Dec 69, the 25 member Saigon Culture and Drama Team presented a variety program for personnel at Phu Bai Combat Base. The program was made possible by MG Truong, CG, 1st ARVN Div.

6 Assistance was rendered the 1st ARVN Div in celebrating their 15th anniversary. Congratulatory messages to 1st ARVN Div members in the Citadel and six fire support bases were disseminated via aerial PSYOP broadcast. The accomplishments and achievements of the division were outlined in aerial broadcasts and leaflets to the people residing in the urban population centers of Hue, Quang Tri City and Dong Ha City.

(d) Miscellaneous activities.

1 The CA/PSYWAR AIK Fund was reduced by 50% from the previous quarter which represented a significant reduction in assets available to support military civic action.

2 05 Conferences were conducted monthly during the reporting period. The conferences were attended by representatives from subordinate XXIV Corps units, tenant units in the AO, Province MACV/CORDS Advisors, and 1st ARVN Division.

3 Civic Action activities continued to complement the GVN Pacification and Development Plan and contributed to 98.4% of the population residing under GVN control. Economic activities were the primary concern of the people who were enjoying a high degree of security. The implementation of new taxes upon luxury items caused prices to rise on basic commodities and were a source of concern to the population. This concern could have been lessened if prior planning and preparation of the people had been accomplished prior to implementation of the law.

(2) Psychological Operations.

(a) XXIV Corps, 05 PSYOP Division continued to monitor and supervise PSYOP programs/campaigns being conducted by units OPCON to XXIV Corps, and to coordinate activities with the 1st ARVN Division and both provinces.

(b) Major PSYOP campaigns.

1 The High Price of Rice (Rice Denial)

a This campaign (1 Oct - 31 Dec) began as an off-shoot of the regular fall rice denial program. The campaign emerged when friendly forces had significant success intercepting enemy rice collection missions. The high price of rice was equated to the price the enemy was paying in suffering, hardship and loss of life. The tactical operations formed the basis for psychological exploitation. A broad base of participation was established by employing both US and Vietnamese PSYOP resources to conduct the campaign. A special effort was made to influence all audiences with the High Price of Rice concept.

b The public news media was used to keep the local citizens informed on the campaign progress, and to keep them conscious of their role in denying the enemy food. When significant actions occurred, news articles were prepared for radio, TV, and newspapers and submitted to the Vietnamese Information Service and US Information Officers. Special leaflets and broadcast
tapes were developed and used throughout the AO. Over 15 million leaflets and 100 hours of aerial and ground broadcast were employed during the campaign. A weekly summary of events contributing to the high price of rice was published and distributed in tactical and advisory channels. Province agencies translated the summary and disseminated it to district level.

Intelligence reports reviewed from FW interrogations, ralliers and agents indicated that food collection had become increasingly difficult. This campaign represented an effort to use a central theme that was relevant to military and civilian audiences while at the same time being psychologically damaging to the enemy.

The TET campaign currently in progress is a joint campaign encompassing all Vietnamese and US PSYOP resources located in the Corps AO. The campaign was planned jointly with the 1st ARVN Division and province PSYOP representatives. The planning was accomplished with emphasis on singleness of purpose and objectives. The objectives are:

a To convince the VC/VCI that the TET period is the most appropriate time to return to family and the GVN.

b To convince the NVA and NVN leadership to seek peace, thus returning their fighting troops home.

c To demoralize the NVA and VC during the TET holiday period.

d To convince local Vietnamese citizens that substantial progress is being made toward peace and prosperity under the GVN.

During the period there were approximately 4,910 requests for leaflets and 3,594 requests for aerial loudspeaker missions processed. In response to these requests approximately 104,219,000 leaflets were disseminated, and 67 hours were broadcast over aerial and ground loudspeakers.

Thirty-nine Hoi Chanhs rallied during the period. The Chieu Hoi program maintained its quantitative momentum, but decreased contacts with enemy units reduced the element of tactical pressure which strongly influences rallying.

Pacification.

During the reporting period, statistics indicated the pacification progress as follows.

1 The percentage of population within the Corps AO, living in ABC secure areas rose from 96.7% to 98.4%. The percentage of population living in contested areas dropped from 3.3% to 1.6%.

2 The number of hamlets that were in secure areas increased from 815 to 845, while the number of contested hamlets dropped from 49 to 20.

Effectiveness of the pacification effort.

1 The elimination of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) through the
CONFIDENTIAL

Phoenix program resulted in 177 reportable VCI during the period through 20 Jan 70.

During this period hamlet elections were conducted, raising the percentage of hamlet elections from 96% to 98.6%. Twelve hamlets were still without elected officials. All villages have elected officials.

At the close of the period covered there were over 190,000 PSDF recruited, which was about 85,000 over the programmed goal for 1969. US military forces in both provinces have initiated training programs in an effort to raise the proficiency of the combat PSDF by directly training the RF/PF who in turn will train PSDF.

Through active tactical and psychological operations, XXIV Corps units directly aided in the return of 36 ralliers between 1 Nov 69 and 18 Jan 70.

Major areas of economical development were farming and fishing.

The 8th Lunar rice harvest was completed with over 19,000 metric tons of rice produced. Even with this harvest there were reports of a rice shortage in Quang Tri province. It was felt that this shortage was self-imposed to limit the amount of rice available to the VC or NVA.

The "Plowing for Peace" program received a shot in the arm when the 232 power tillers were distributed in Thua Thien province. These tillers have been put to use throughout the province. The people were pleased with the operation of this equipment. They were saying "Water buffalo number ten, Kubota number one".

The fishing industry improved with the lifting of certain fishing restrictions along the coast and inland waterways.

Quang Tri received the 7.6 million $VN for the purchase of boats and motors for the fishermen of Gia Dang fishing village. When this equipment is put into use, the fishing industry will receive a much needed push.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel.

NONE

b. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Items: Sensor Analog Relay System (SARS)

(a) Observation: The 101st Abn Div consecutively erected the SARS at three fire support bases (FSB) within XXIV Corps. In each case high winds, combined with shock waves from nearby heavy artillery, caused the relay tower to collapse. The latest collapse resulted in major damage to the equipment which had to be evacuated to CAM RANK Bay for repair.

(b) Evaluation: The relay was too fragile to withstand both the wind and
artillery shock waves that occurred at the fire support bases. A UER has been submitted on this item.

(c) Recommendations: That the relay be reinforced to withstand the high winds and violent shock waves associated with artillery firing.

(2) Item: Battle Area Surveillance System (BASS)

(a) Observation: The BASS was installed in the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (MECH) TAOR during December. The eight channel relay is located at FSB FULLER and the readout site is located in the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) TOC at Quang Tri Combat Base. Currently 22 strings (approximately 80 sensors) are receiving automatic readout by the BASS and recorded on the X-T plotter.

(b) Evaluation: This excellent item of equipment has enabled the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) to consolidate all five of their previous readout sites at a single location. The X-T plotter has eliminated the tedious job of manually recording each detection. This enables the readout operator to devote more time to analyzing each detection sequence, and has resulted in a more accurate definition of valid targets.

(c) Recommendation: That additional BASS equipment be deployed to other units that have a requirement to readout a large number of sensors from a central location.

(3) Item: MINISID 1-D

(a) Observation: The MINISID 1-D is a modified MINISID 1-C which has a new type arming switch and 2 eleven position combination recovery switches.

(b) Evaluation: Both the new arming switch and combination recovery switch are desirable modifications. However, their present construction requires improvement in design. The 3-position arming switch is too weak and tends to break or fall off when going from the "test" to "arm" position. The 3 different positions are not positive or definitive, and it is too easy to accidentally turn it to the "ON" position. Neither the arming switch nor the knobs on the combination recovery switches have protective caps over them. When the MINISID is buried, the well around these knobs fills with dirt and water and the knobs become difficult to operate. This has resulted in some MINISID's self-destructing while being recovered. As a field expedient, units cover the knobs with burlap prior to burying the MINISID.

(c) Recommendation: That the arming switch be modified so that it is more durable and has 3 positive detent positions. Protective caps should be provided for both the arming switch and recovery switch. It would be preferable if these were screw on caps. A UER has been submitted on this item.

c. (U) Operation: NONE
d. (U) Organization: NONE
e. (U) Training: NONE
f. (U) Logistics: NONE

CONFIDENTIAL
(1) Item: Psychological operations.

(a) Observations: The psychological impact on the civilian population in areas affected by redeployment of the 3d Mar Division was minimal.

(b) Evaluation: The overall impact of redeployment was reduced through a vigorous PSYOP campaign in support of redeployment. Tapes for aerial and ground broadcast were prepared and used on a regular basis six weeks prior to redeployment. Leaflets were dropped throughout the area of operation. A list of questions and answers most commonly asked by Vietnamese people was distributed to the HE and HB teams.

(c) Recommendations: Utilize all available resources to reduce the detrimental effects of redeployment on the population. If possible, ARVN units replacing the US Force should be seen throughout the AO prior to redeployment of forces.

(2) Item: Civic Action Projects.

(a) Observations: All major civic action projects that could be completed by the 3d Mar Div prior to redeployment were completed. Other projects were turned over to the Civic Action Area Coordinator (CAAC) along with a complete set of records on civil-military operations.

(b) Evaluation: An accelerated effort was made by the redeploying unit to complete all on-going action projects prior to movement. Supplies and materials not required for redeployment were channeled into priority projects that could be completed, and sufficient materials were left to finish those projects not completed. Files on all projects, to include those receiving continuing assistance, provided guidance to new units taking over projects. Large quantities of supplies, material and foodstuff were distributed throughout the AO by the redeploying unit which should have been turned over to the new CAAC for use in carrying on civil-military operations.

(c) Recommendations: Large quantities of supplies and material should not be distributed to the project sites. Material should be turned over to the unit assuming support of the project(s) to insure timely completion. A system for collecting excess supplies and materials should be established between the redeploying unit and the unit assuming civil-military operations responsibility.

(3) Item: Dustoff Helicopter Role in Air - Crash Rescue

(a) Observation: During air - crash search/rescue operations it has been noted that the capabilities of the Dustoff helicopters have not routinely been used to the fullest extent.
(b) Evaluation: Air-crash search/rescue teams should be equipped to effect rescue as expeditiously as possible regardless of the location of the crash site. Dustoff helicopters have two distinct features which would enhance air crash rescue operations. Specifically, the Dustoff helicopter is equipped for hoist/jungle penetrator operations and in-flight medical care.

(c) Recommendations: That future air-crash search/rescue teams incorporate Dustoff helicopters to the maximum extent possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2 Incl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Roster of Key Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Troop List of XXIV Corps Units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 1 wd HQ, DA

R. D. PECCO
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

ATT: CINCPAC (1 Mar 70) 1st Ind

SUBJ: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,

Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSF94-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,

APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the

Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned

for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, XXIV

Corps.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Sensor Analogue Relay System (SARS)",

   page 23, paragraph 2b(1); concur. The relay tower should be reinforced to

   allow operation in areas of high winds and shock waves. Recommendations for

   the best method of reinforcement should be solicited from the USARV Duffel

   Bag Facility at Cam Ranh Bay. Recommend that DA task DCFG to investigate

   stability of other SARS Antennae, in order to eliminate any similar problems.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Battle Area Surveillance System

   (BASS)", page 24, paragraph 2b(2); concur; however, there are no plans for

   additional BASS in RVN. This is an excellent example of successful employ-

   ment of the system and will be included in the next issue of USARV Combat

   Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USAHPAC is recommended.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "KINISID 1-D", page 24, paragraph

   2b(3); concur. Action has been initiated to correct this shortcoming.

   This problem should not be experienced in future models although the 1-D

   will continue to be in the same configuration. Recommend DA advise DCFG

   to investigate the feasibility of modifying the arming switch as discussed

   in this item.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning "Psychological Operations", page 25,

   paragraph 21(1); concur. It is recognized that redeployment of units will

   affect the local population economically as well as provide the enemy with

   opportunities for propaganda campaigns. Guidance on ways to reduce the

   impact of redeployment is contained in USARV's Redeployment Guide and

   Annex Q (Civil Military Operations) to USARV OPLAN 183-69. These actions

   should be accomplished by the redeploying units and their supporting

   headquarters.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

BOD NR 5200.10
CONFIDENTIAL

AWDRC-DST (1 Mar 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

e. (C) Reference Item: "Civic Action Projects", page 25, paragraph 21(2); concur. Guidelines and policies on turning over civic action projects and materials from a redeploying unit to a unit assuming the civil-military operations is contained in FM 41-10. Application and coordination of this recommendation should be accomplished by the local commander.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
XXIV CORPS

Cy fum:
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS GPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 20 MAR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Short
CPT, AG
Assist AG
CONFIDENTIAL

TROOP LIST AS OF 31 JANUARY 1970

**XXIV CORPS**

HHC, XXIV CORPS

MI Det (Prov)

204th MI Det

24th PI Det

108th Trans Co (Car)

2d Plat, Co A, 504th MP Bn (OPCON)

31st Mil Hist Det

62d Avn Co (OPCON, XXIV Corps)

220th Recon Acft Co (OPCON, XXIV Corps)

325th Avn Det

**XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY**

HHB, XXIV Corps Arty

1st Bn, 83d Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

1st Bn, 39th Arty (155mm) (SP)

108th Arty Gp

HHB, 108th Arty Gp

8th Bn, 4th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

6th Bn, 33d Arty (105mm) (-)

1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40's)

Btry G, 65th Arty (.50 cal Mg)

Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

Btry F, 26th Arty (Tgt Acq)

Inclosure 2
CONFIDENTIAL

235th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
238th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
239th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
240th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
245th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
250th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
274th FA Det (AN/TPS-25) (Attached to 108th Arty Gp)
5th 175 Gun Battery (175mm gun - 8" How) (FMF Pacific - OPCON 108th Arty Gp)

101st Airborne Division (AM)
HHC, 101st Abn Div

1st Brigade
HHC, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
1st Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 502d Inf

2d Brigade
HHC, 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div
1st Bn, 501st Inf
2d Bn, 501st Inf
1st Bn, 502d Inf

3d Brigade
HHC, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div
3d Bn, 187th Inf
1st Bn, 506th Inf
2d Bn, 506th Inf

Division Artillery
HHB, 101st Abn Div Arty
CONFIDENTIAL

2d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm) (T)
2d Bn, 320th Arty (105mm) (T)
1st Bn, 321st Arty (105mm) (T)
2d Bn, 11th Arty (105mm) (T)
Btry A, (AVN) 377th Arty
4th Bn, 77th Arty (ARA)
268th, 331st, 388th, 650th Trans Det
266th FA Det

101st Avn Gp
HHC, 101st Avn Gp
101st Aslt Hel Bn
499th, 510th, 516th, 527th Trans Det
158th Aslt Hel Bn
159th, 168th, 169th, 273d Trans Det
159th Aslt Spt Hel Bn
327th, 625th, 649th Trans Det
163d Avn Co (GS)
530th Trans Det
478th Avn Co (-) (Atch from 1st Cav Div)
382d Trans Det

Division Troops
3d Bn, 506th Inf (OPCON I FORCEV)
2d Sqdn, 17th Cav
332d, 333rd, 507th Trans Det
L Co (Ranger) 75th Inf
326th Engr Bn
501st Sig Bn

CONFIDENTIAL
101st MP Co
265th RRC
42d Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
47th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
58th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
577th Inf Plt (Combat Trackers)
10th Cal Plt
20th Cal Det
Det 4, 7th PSTOP Bn (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)
7th AA Plt, 29th CA Co (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)
22d Mil Hist Det
25th PI Det
34th PI Det
101st MI Det (Prov)
TASS 20 (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)
359th Avn SP Det (Evans Air Ops)

Division Support Command
HHC & Band
5th Trans Bn
326th Med Bn
426th S&S Bn
801st Maint Bn
101st Admin
3rd Force Recon Co (FMF Pacific)
3rd Bridge Co (-)
1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
HHC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div
1st Bn, 11th Inf
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armor (Tank)
5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (SP)
Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav
Co F, (Ranger) 75th Inf
Co A, 7th Engr Bn
Co G, 2d Bn, 34th Armor (Attached from 25th Div to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div)
3d Sqdn, 5th Arm Cav (- D Troop) (Attached from 9th Div)
43d Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
75th GS Spt Bn
48th PI Det
86th Cal Det
298th Sig Co
517th MI Det
407th RR Det
77th Omct Tracker Det
321st Avn Det

**Task Force Clearwater**

HUE RIVSECGRP
Dong Ha RIVSECGRP
588th Sig Co Det
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, XXIV Corps

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CG, XXIV Corps

17 February 1970

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310