### UNCLASSIFIED

#### AD NUMBER

| AD508165 |

#### CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

**TO:** unclassified  
**FROM:** confidential

#### LIMITATION CHANGES

**TO:**  
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**FROM:**  
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; NOV 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.

#### AUTHORITY

30 Nov 1981, DoDD 5200.10; AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1982

---

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
AGDA (M) (12 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694208

19 March 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

SPE DISTRIBUTION

1 Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2 Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Combat Surveillance School
US Army Electronic Warfare School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
US Army Signal School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96228

AVBK-AC 20 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the Period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969 (U)

SEZ DISTRIBUTION

The enclosed Operational Report-Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with II FORCENV Reg 525-21 and USARV Reg 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SAMY L. OWENS
MAJOR, INFANTRY
Adjutant

Incl

AS

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - CINCUSARPAC (ATTN: GROF-DT, APO 96558)
3 - CG, USARV (ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375)
5 - CG, II FORCENV, LONG BINH, RVN (ATTN: AVFBC-RE)
6 - CG, CHAR, SAIGON, RVN (ATTN: G-3)
2 - EA STAFF SECTION THIS HQ
2 - CO, 1-505 ABN INF
2 - CO, 2-505 ABN INF
2 - CO, 1-508 ABN INF
2 - CO, 2-321 ARTY
2 - CO, 82D SPT BN
2 - CO, B/1-17 CAV
2 - CO, C/307 ENGR
10 - S-3, 3D BDE, 82D ABN DIV

CONFIDENTIAL

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
AVSK-AC

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities

   A. (U) Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMAND POSITION</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General</td>
<td>Diokherson, George W</td>
<td>BG</td>
<td>17 Dec 68</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy CO</td>
<td>Smith, Albert C Jr</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>14 Feb 69</td>
<td>4 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy CO</td>
<td>Gillert, Gustav J Jr</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>5 Aug 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Foss, Peter J</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>15 Jun 69</td>
<td>9 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Long, Charles H</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Oct 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>Owens, Sammy L</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>14 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>Gorder, Charles</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>25 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>Lawrence, Paul S</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>16 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>Brassell, Joseph W</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>7 Feb 69</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>Dyer, Glen</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>30 Oct 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-5</td>
<td>Pianka, Joseph</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>30 Oct 66</td>
<td>29 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-5</td>
<td>Brow, Reginald</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>30 Oct 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 1-505</td>
<td>Zamparelli, Alfred A</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>14 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 1-505</td>
<td>Keenan, Arthur P</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>16 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 1-508</td>
<td>Lunsford, Paul R</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>24 Apr 69</td>
<td>26 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 1-508</td>
<td>Foss, Peter J</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>27 Sep 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 2-505</td>
<td>Martin, John R</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>22 Aug 69</td>
<td>7 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 2-321</td>
<td>Cunningham, Martin J</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>8 Aug 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 2-321</td>
<td>Wallis, Charles H</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>25 Jul 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, C/307 2ng</td>
<td>Allan, Jon A</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>6 Mar 69</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, C/307 Eng</td>
<td>Robboke, Ervin D</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, 518 H/ID</td>
<td>Kilday, John D</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>28 Sep 68</td>
<td>26 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, 518 H/ID</td>
<td>Haynes, Howard R</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>29 Aug 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, B/1-17 Cav</td>
<td>May, Stephen A</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>29 May 69</td>
<td>11 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, B/1-17 Cav</td>
<td>Cushion, John R</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>29 Aug 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, 56th Sig Co</td>
<td>Shimotori, Gene N</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>20 Jun 69</td>
<td>6 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, 58th Sig Co</td>
<td>Manning, Robert F</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>10 Aug 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, Co O 75th Inf (Rngr)</td>
<td>Peter, Donald A</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1 Mar 69</td>
<td>21 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, Co O 75th Inf (Rngr)</td>
<td>Downing, Patrick H</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>21 Jul 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DTE 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBKI-44C

B. (C) Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety and Discipline

1. (C) Strength as of 31 October 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>PRESENT FOR DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-505</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-505</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-508</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-321</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82d Spt Bn</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 3d Bde</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1-17 Cav</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C, 307th Eng</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th Sig</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Mid</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th PTO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th Scout Dog</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co 75th Ranger</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>3915</td>
<td>3723</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (U) R&R Utilization for the three month period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>INITIAL ALLOCATIONS</th>
<th>STANDBY AND CANCELLATIONS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF NO SHOWS</th>
<th>ALLOCATIONS USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RECEIVED</td>
<td>REALLOCATIONS</td>
<td>TURNOVERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAV-AIT</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2h</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGKOK</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYDNEY</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONG KONG</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANILA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>8h</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOKYO</td>
<td>7h</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIPEI</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) Postal Activities for three month period:

a. Total amount of mail received: 7474
b. Total amount of mail dispatched: 2688
c. Total money orders purchased: $584,583.00
d. Total money orders cashed: $3,051.83

Stamp requisition to Postmaster, San Francisco, amounted to: $9,772.00

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operation Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for (rev)
1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

4. (C) Total awards processed and approved for period:

- Purple Heart: 150
- Army Commendation: 1067
- Air Medal: 498
- Bronze Star: 891
- Silver Star: 5
- Soldiers Medal: 6
- Legion of Merit: 3

TOTAL: 2620

5. (C) Casualties suffered by the Brigade during the period:

- KHA: 8
- WHA: 138
- Non Battle Deaths: 6
- Non Battle Injuries: 100

TOTAL: 252

6. (U) Chaplain's activities for the period:

- Services: 553
- Attendance: 14,198
- Hospital Visits: 167
- Counselling: 939

7. (U) Red Cross services during the period: Records indicate the following types of request for the reporting period:

- Emergency Leaves: 120
- Discharge and Government Benefits: 1
- Reporting other than 1 or 2 above*: 357
- Personal Problems: 80
- Family Problems: 25

* This category being requests from families with regard to the delivery of birth messages, H\&W reports, and casualty reporting.

8. (C) Medical: Medical services provided the Brigade and units are outlined below:

a. Statistical data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>PATIENTS EXAMINED</th>
<th>PATIENTS IN HOLDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>3282</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

b. Significant Diseases Treated (Cases Treated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>FUM</th>
<th>MALARIA</th>
<th>INTESTINAL</th>
<th>VD</th>
<th>DIARRHEA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>FGCT</th>
<th>PPH</th>
<th>¥G</th>
<th>UR</th>
<th>SKIL</th>
<th>DX</th>
<th>HEPATITUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>1386</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Dental Patients:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>PATIENTS EXAMINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Brigade Health Status: The general health of the Brigade is excellent. There have been no major changes in the rates of any of the significant diseases and they all remain at a relatively low rate.

Unit commanders can best prevent any significant loss of man hours by encouraging individual effort toward personal care and hygiene.

C. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence

1. Operation TOAN THANG Phase II continued through October with the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div shifting its area of operations from the Saigon area to the Iron Triangle/Phu Hoa District area of the III Corps Tactical Zone. During the period, contact with up to company sized enemy units was initiated. As is typical of most of III Corps, contacts with three to five enemy were most common. During the reporting period contacts with enemy forces resulted in 167 VC KIA; 2 NVA KIA; 5 VC PW; 9 NVA PW; and 3 Hoi Chanh.

2. During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969 enemy activity was again characterized by low level incidents. While the Brigade remained in the Saigon area no rockets were fired into or from our AOs. Within Tan Jianh and Phu Kon District enemy activity dropped to its lowest level since the Brigade assumed control of the area in October 1968. In the Pineapple Plantation west of Saigon the 6th Bn SR2 returned to its old AO from Cambodia in late August. Before departing the Pineapple on 15 October Brigade elements accounted for well over 50 KIA from that VC unit. Assassinations, terrorism and propaganda remained low in the old area of operations. In the new AO the VC are a little more active. Propaganda, terrorism and tax collection incidents are more frequent but remain at a relatively low level. Bodytrap incidents decreased slightly with the departure of the last battalion from the Pineapple area. The bodytrap rate was fairly high in the new AO until the last ten days of the reporting period when it dropped sharply. It appears that sustained combat and surveillance operations have severely limited the enemy's ability to produce and
CONFIDENTIAL

AVK-AC

emplace boobytraps in the new Brigade AO. Enemy reconnaissance activity has continued at a moderate level during the period. No large-scale recon activity such as would precede an offensive has been noted in either the old or new area of operations.

3. With the assumptions of a more active area of operations, brigade units have engaged up to company-sized enemy elements. In some cases, larger contacts, however, are still the exception. Sustained small-arms operations have forced the enemy in and near our AO to disperse and attempt to avoid contact. Within the AO continuous pressure has been maintained on the enemy through the use of ground and air reconnaissance, detailed searches, "Popper" missions, extensive night ambush and joint cordon-and-search operations. Extensive exploitation of PW and NLF Chanh information yielded good results. Enemy units within the AO include the following:

SR 1
Quyet Thang II Battalion
C25 Local Force Company
Xia Dinh L Sapper Battalion
210 Local Force Company

Enemy units within the Brigade area of operations include the following:

SR 1

268 Regiment
Quyet Thang II Battalion
Naiv Kator Sapper Battalion

Dong Nai Regiment
C61 Local Force Company
C65 Special Service Company

9th VC/NVA Division

SIAR, Red Haze, Night Hawk, and "Real Round Missions" were employed whenever available to the Brigade. As an aid in determining enemy movement patterns and in target acquisition they have been very helpful. Ground radar was shifted to meet the requirements in the new area of operations. Target acquisition in the new AO increased initially, but dropped off considerably as ground units began to dominate the routes used by VC. With the announcement of redeployment of the Brigade, the expansion of the brigade sensor program ceased. All fields were allowed to die and by 27 October the program ceased. Ground surveillance by Co D (Ranger), 75th Infantry continued during the reporting period in both the old and new AO's with good results.
SUBJECT: Operation Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

5. During the reporting period 5 caches of significance were discovered by US troops. One large cache consisting of 95 individual weapons, 22 light machine guns, 22,000 small arms ammunition and 228 mortar rounds was unearthed in the Iron Triangle area. In addition 3 caches of rice totalling 5 3/4 tons were also captured in the area. A hastily abandoned sapper unit base camp cache of demolitions, rocket tools and assorted small arms and crew served weapons was captured just west of the Tan Son Nhut Rocket belt. Documents identified the unit as part of the D12 Sapper Battalion, SR2.

6. In summary enemy units continued to attempt to avoid contact with friendly units during the reporting period. Through the area he attempted to maintain his strength and resupply his units. In this endeavor he has been largely unsuccessful. Food shortages have become common in the VC units. The VC have continued to lose both influence and personnel to GVN and US Forces in the area.

7. Recapitulation of Enemy Losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>Rockets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA 167/2</td>
<td>840 rounds 32,658</td>
<td>Individual 183</td>
<td>BkO/Bk1 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA Ph 5/9</td>
<td>C/S rounds 2,351</td>
<td>Crew Served 28</td>
<td>122/107 O/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoi Chanh 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miscellaneous

- Radios: 1 NVA
  - 2 Chicom
  - 2 VC

D. (C) Operations, Plans and Training

1. (C) General:

   a. During the reporting period two operation plans and one operation order were published.

   (1) OPAN 69-69 (T Day Plan). A plan for the redeployment of US Forces from Vietnam following cessation of hostilities.

   (2) OPAN 2-69 (Redeployment). A plan for the redeployment of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to the United States during Phase II of USARV redeployment schedule.

   (3) OPORD 1-69 (Operation Yorktown Victor). The order for the redeployment of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to its new AO in southern Phu Hoa District and the Iron Triangle.

   b. Training: During the reporting period the Brigade conducted training in accordance with USARV Regulation 350-1. Thirteen personnel from the Brigade attended special schools conducted by the United States Army.

Training facility at Long Binh. Seven men from Company O, 75th Infantry, graduated from the MAGV Recce school. Special training was conducted by mobile training teams from the Replacement Company in marksmanship and counter-boobytrap techniques.

c. Operations: The period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969 was a very critical interval in the life of the Golden Brigade. The Brigade continued to work very closely with Vietnamese forces within the AO. Numerous operations were conducted to familiarize the Vietnamese with the terrain and special techniques which had proven successful for US troopers. All combat operations were planned and executed following Brigadier General Dickerson's guidance for combined operations:

(1) Deal directly with the Vietnamese chain of command.

(2) Vietnamese commanders accompany US commanders on all command control flights.

(3) Establish combined tactical operations centers.

(4) Vietnamese make all searches of villages and hamlets.

Operation YORKTOWN VICTOR began on 10 September 1969 and continues to 15 November.

1. MISSION: 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division redeployes to new AO to conduct combined operations against local and main force units within its AO, assist in the pacification and coordinates Dong Tien operations in new AO.

2. Location: Binh Duong Province

3. Commander: Brigadier General Dickerson

4. Concept of Operation: On 10 September 1969, the 1-505 Infantry turned over their old area of operations northwest of Saigon to ARVN forces and moved north into the Iron Triangle under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. On 30 September 1969, ARVN units took over the 1-505 Infantry's AO. The changeover was completed on 15 October with Vietnamese units taking over for the 2-505 Infantry.

With the movement completed the Brigade began the two fold task of combined operations in the new AO and preparing for redeployment to the United States. Plans were made based on guidance from higher headquarters. The 2-505 Infantry was placed under the operational control of the Capital Military Assistance Company to operate in the Pineapple region from 1-15 October. On 15 October the 2-505 reverted to Brigade control, moved to Phu Loi, and stood down to prepare for redeployment on 1 November 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operation Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

The Brigade resumed operational control of the 1-505 Infantry on 11 October 1969. On that same date the 1-508 Infantry moved northward. The Brigade operation in the Iron Triangle and southern Phu Hoa District was given the historically appropriate title of OPERATION YORKTOWN VICTOR.

OPERATION YORKTOWN VICTOR
The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division's Final Campaign For the Independence of the Vietnamese People

Two years ago, prior to a major sweep of the area by elements of three allied divisions and a massive land clearing operation by Rome Plows, the Iron Triangle was a Viet Cong base area of considerable proportion and tactical significance. Following this major operation, allied forces moved to other redoubt areas further north and west of the cleared forest in search of Main Force units.

The forest is gone. In its place has grown a more densely covered and more formidable obstacle, elephant grass eight feet tall and as thick as bamboo saplings. The 3d Bde returned to occupy the area. The ground is now honeycombed with tunnels and underground tunnel complexes. The residents of this complex are the elusive and dedicated members of the 83d Rear Service Force—an almost legendary VC logistical unit.

OPERATION YORKTOWN VICTOR was initiated by the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division on 10 September 1969 when the 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry air assaulted into the "Iron Triangle" formed by the confluence of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers, approximately 25 kilometers northeast of Saigon and Phu Hoa District lying just to its south. The operation was designed to seek out and neutralize the logistic complex believed to exist "somewhere in the triangle". The 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division was motivated by another and more personal objective: While operating during the past year in the outlying areas of Saigon, the Brigade was in continuous, indirect contact with elements of the "suspected" 83d Rear Service Force. Supplies for the local and VC guerrilla forces in Bien Hoa, Bao Loc and Go Vap districts appeared to have been provided by this almost mythical rear service group. Although the Brigade captured substantial weapons and sufficient documents attributed to the 83d Rear Service Group, the location of this group had never been fixed, nor could intelligence accurately determine their method of operation. The Brigade did recognize that an effective VC logistics capability enabled them to reconstitute their offensive units on a recurring basis despite heavy losses. Eliminating the guerrilla was not enough. The Brigade had to cut off the logistics lifeline. OPERATION YORKTOWN VICTOR set out to fix this elusive force and close out the final chapter of the 3d Brigade's defense of the capital city of South Vietnam. The Golden Brigade impatiently moved after the phantoms of the forest.
The Brigade based its tactics on an area domination concept that had proven successful in their recent operations along the outer periphery of the western sector of Saigon. In these operations, the main purpose of Brigade operations was to dominate the entire area with military and civic action programs for a period sufficient to disrupt enemy operations and to neutralize the enemy political and military infrastructure. Such domination of the area, encompassing the entire western half of Saigon and its environs, provided the GVN a safe haven behind which to provide security and regain control of their people. It also provided the opportunity to develop professional police forces and to train and deploy local self defense forces for the protection of the hamlets and outskirts of the capital city.

In the population free Iron Triangle, domination involved physical proselytizing and methodical searches, coupled with saturation patrolling and extensive night ambushing. Bushmaster operations—wherein the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division troopers outguerrilla the VC guerrillas—became the tactic of the day. The troopers of the 1st Battalion (Abn), 505 Infantry led the way when they moved in to the Iron Triangle on 10 September. They have hunted the enemy twenty-four hours a day employing night ambush patrols, daylight stakeout operations, bushmaster operations and frequent "stay behind" ambush patrols. The battalion has been highly successful in finding enemy caches of equipment and food hidden in the vast tunnel networks of the area.

The success of the 1-505 Infantry was closely paralleled by that enjoyed by the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry when they moved into the southern Phu Hoa District, just below the Iron Triangle, on 1 October 1969. Great emphasis had been placed on Dong Tien. An average of one combined operation daily was significant in bringing increased stability in the area. Combined block and search operations with helicopters, US Navy PBR's, ARVN RAG boats, and US and Vietnamese organic vehicles used for insertion of troops have enabled the allies to find the enemy and his caches. Operations such as these point up the combined/joint character of OPERATION YORKTOWN VICTOR.

The results of numerous enemy contacts made by the 1-508 Infantry have considerably reduced the Viet Cong influence in southern Phu Hoa District. The discovery and destruction of caches and fortifications has further reduced the relentless pressure on the enemy. At the same time the ability and will of the Vietnamese forces has been considerably enhanced through close cooperation with elements of the 1-508 Infantry.

OPERATION YORKTOWN VICTOR has proven to be highly successful for the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division both in terms of enemy personnel and equipment rendered ineffective and territory brought under the control of the GVN. The enemy's logistics lifeline has been cut and the forest phantoms brought to earth by the Golden Brigade.

On 1 November the 1-508 Infantry moved from its area of operations to standby at Phu Loi prior to redeployment on 15 November. The 1-505 Infantry continues OPERATION YORKTOWN VICTOR until 15 November when it will assume standoff posture to prepare for redeployment on 1 December 1969.

Details of operations conducted by elements of the Brigade are as follows:
SUBJECT: Operation Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

2. (C) 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry
   a. (C) Operation Toan Thang Phase III:
   (1) 1 Aug 69 - 13 Aug 69

   (2) The mission of the battalion was to initiate combat operations west of Saigon in order to locate, capture or destroy enemy personnel or equipment with particular emphasis on areas that might be used to launch rocket/mortar attacks against Saigon from within the CHAC AO. The mission also included preventing enemy infiltration, interdicting enemy movement, and identifying and eliminating VC infrastructure.

   (3) Location: 1 Aug - 13 Aug, Gia Dinh Province, Map Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheet 6330 IV.


   (5) Forces Involved:
      (a) US Forces:
         1. 1-505 Inf
         2. One OPCON pl, B/1-17 Cav
         3. One OPCON LGM, 1099th Boat Co
         4. Aero Rifle pl, 3/17 Cav (11 Aug 69)
         5. Three Scout Dog Teams, 37th IPSD
      (b) Other Forces
         1. RP/PF forces in each district
         2. 11th ARVN Abn Bn, 5th Ranger Gp (4, 5, 6, 13 Aug 69)
         3. 30th ARVN Ranger Bn, 5th Ranger Gp (7, 8 Aug 69)
SUBJECT: Operation Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(6) Concept of Operations:

(a) On 1 Aug 69 the battalion moved from Fire Base Chris (XT535760) and AO’s Swordfish and Eagle to Fire Base All American (XT745005) and AO Denver, AO extensions Chute and Snoopy (Overlay attached). The move was made utilizing 3 CH-47 Chinooks and was completed in less than four hours. Company A moved to and conducted operations in AO Snoopy with one plat B/1-7 Cav (OPCON). One plat Company A secured the Hoc Eon Bridge (XT713071). Company B operated in the eastern AO with their CP at East Bridge. Company C conducted operations in AO Chute. Company D was at Fire Base All American securing the fire base and conducting operations in the southern portion of the AO. Company E secured the East Bridge (XT653071) and conducted waterway and trail denial operations. The companies rotated areas of operations every five days.

(b) Primary emphasis was placed on continuous operations in the "rocket belt", which circled the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut area. Maximum effort was placed on night ambushes in order to "take the night away from Charlie".

(c) Increased efforts in the area of combined operations produced several joint/combined operations with ARVN, RF and PF forces.

(d) On 8 Aug, the battalion relinquished AO extensions Chute to 2/18th Inf and shifted the southern boundary further south.

(7) Tactics and Techniques:

(a) Upon arrival in the new AO, the battalion reestablished its presence by conducting platoon sized cachefinder operations, canal denial operations, and trail overwatch operations. The tactics were altered somewhat on 9 Aug when no contact had been gained. All units began squad sized area recon operations methodically checking one grid square at a time. This concept of saturation patrolling is conceived to "find the enemy and his caches".

(b) With little contact in the AO prior to 22 Aug, the tactics remained that of small unit searches saturating a wide area. On the eve of 22 Aug a new technique of ambushing was instituted. Instead of ambushing on likely avenues of approach into AO Snoopy, five of the six ambushes were placed around one hamlet. That night, contact was gained in an almost epic stability operation that is related in this after action report, contact 22-25 August in AO Snoopy.
A V B K - A C

1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

1. The following after action report is submitted in order to illustrate
the unique cooperative efforts of 1-505 Inf and Cu Chi District forces in AO
Snoopy, and to relate this successful operation as a lesson learned.

2. PRELUDE: Intelligence information from Brigade indicated that there
was a probable effort on the part of the VC to move to the Hoc Mon, Quang Trung
Training Center area by routes from the north of our AO, skirting Cu Chi to the
east, then southward either along the Hau Nghia, Binh Doung Province boundary
or southwest through the village of Tan Phu Trung (c/m XT6810) to Cu Chi, Duc
Hoa District boundary and then on to their objectives.

3. THE CONTACT: To counter this threat 1-505 Inf placed ambushes
astride the probable avenues of approach. On the night of 22 August, five
ambushes of Company B were concentrated around the village of Tan Phu Trung
hamlet #1 (c/m 701087). (Sketch). At 2228 hours B4 ambush patrol (AP) reported
observing 3 VC 250 meters southeast of their position (XT697093). They
appeared to be stationary, perhaps digging. The company was told to keep the
enemy under observation and be prepared to fire M79's if the enemy moved away
from them. No artillery could be fired due to the proximity of the village,
about 200 meters southeast of the enemy positions. No illumination was
requested as it would have scared off the enemy. The enemy were observed
until approximately 2345 hours. At 2345 hours the enemy started moving
toward the village away from the ambush. The ambush opened fire with M79
rounds. The enemy initially returned fire with AK-47's. The ambush patrol
then started receiving fire from a light machine gun and B40's. During the
engagement, four ACAV's were moved from Company B's command post to reinforce
the patrol and a Firefly team was requested. 81mm mortars fired illumination
while the ambush patrol engaged what they estimated to be 10-15 enemy.
Contact was broken at 0117. The Firefly team arrived on station at 230030
hours. They searched the area but found nothing and departed at 0118 hours.
B4 ambush patrol and the ACAV's conducted a sweep of the contact area at
0100 hours while the Firefly team was still on station. They reconnoitered
by fire in the area but received no fire in return. The sweep produced negative
results. Company B was directed to keep all ambush patrols in the same
position except B4 which was resupplied and moved 200 meters to the west.
During the contact and search, radio contact was made with Cu Chi District,
elements. They were kept informed of the situation and requested to assist
in a first light search. The PF troops were to search the houses in hamlets
1 and 2 while US troops were to beat the bush of the perimeter of the village.
This plan was confirmed by Cu Chi District Senior Advisor at 0145 hours after
checking with the District Chief. There were no other contacts during the
night.

4. THE SEARCH: At first light Company B and the OPCON Cav platoon
from 8/1-17 Cav again searched the area of contact. They found a fresh
fighting hole, a spider hole cover, 2 PRD magazine drums in good condition
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of 3d Able, 32d Abn Div for period
1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

with ammunition, one chicom grenade, and a gas mask. The search continued
throughout the morning with the PF's checking hamlet #1. It appeared at
that time that the VC may have escaped. At approximately 1030 hrs. the PF
unit moving to hamlet #2 along the road via XT695093 observed and captured
8 NVA hiding in a ditch alongside of the road. The US company was not 200
meters away and apparently the VC were afraid to fight it out. They were
armed with 6 AK-47's, and 2 RPG's. The search efforts intensified with this
find out no further results were achieved on the 27th of August. The PF's
interrogated at the village headquarters by Cu Chi District and 3/82 HNID
revealed that they were NVA from 1st Company, 1st Battalion, Quyet Thanh
Regiment and their mission was one of reconnaissance and to prepare sighting
holes for a future attack on the PF compound in Tan Phu Trung. No date
was known. Two of the NVA's were platoon leaders, one was a squad leader.
They said their company commander and his bodyguard were still at large
somewhere in the area. They further stated that their battalion was located
to the north above the 18 eastwest grid line and that their recon element
had used the route indicated by Brigade intelligence to move to Tan Phu
Trung. A map was later found by the PF's revealing the area and routes
used by the NVA's. That afternoon a Hunter/Killer team checked out the
area. There were no significant sightings.

FOLLOW UP: The 1-505 placed two ambushes in the same general
area on the night of 23 August in hopes of catching the two remaining NVA.
The company CP at XT692107 had a sighting of 3 VC at 0145 on 23 August.
Artillery was fired in the area and a FAC made a visual reconnaissance under
illumination while elements of the company reaction force searched the area
with no results. A tracker team was requested and arrived at 0305. The
first light search yielded negative results, but the tracker team indicated the
enemy went back into the village (hamlet #2). Company B then moved to
the northern area depicted on the map while Cu Chi District forces researched
the village. At 0900, the PF platoon, acting on information received from
one of the captured NVA platoon leaders, found four additional PF's, 2 AK-47's
and 1 K-54 pistol at XT699087 (hamlet #1). Of these PF's one was VC5, the
other three were local guerrillas. They said that two other local guerrillas
had escorted the NVA company commander out of the area during the night.
Quite possibly this was the 3 VC observed by Company B's CP during the night.
Company B's efforts were intensified during the conduct of their search
operations of the northern area. Observation aircraft assisted in the
search which netted several sighting holes and one tunnel approximately
60 meters long. In addition one of the PF's, a lieutenant, agreed to broad-
cast via the "Earlyword" system to the NVA company commander Nguyen Van
Phan in an effort to persuade him to surrender. Another broadcast was made
over the general area of the NVA battalion as indicated by the PF's telling
them of the fate of the recon party and to surrender or die. Company B
placed 6 ambushes around the second hamlet on the night of 23 August in re-
action to the information provided by the tracker team. Quite possibly the
NVA had been forced back into the village. On 24 August at 2330 hours B2
ambush made contact with 4 VC 75 meters to their north at grid XT687101.
The AP engaged the enemy (most likely the NVA company commander and his guides) with small arms fire. The enemy fled to the northwest. Blocking fires were called in to the northwest and ACAV's swept the area. A Firefly again came on station at 2200 and searched the area. Two enemy were observed on the berm of the village and engaged; however heavy rains came over the area forcing the Firefly out of the area and obliterating all tracks. Again a coordinated operation was planned at first light with the US searching the area outside the village and the PF's searching the village. An armed propaganda team made broadcasts in the area, but no further results were forthcoming in the search for Nguyen Van Phan.

6 OBSERVATIONS:

a. The tenacity with which Company B and the Cu Chi District PF forces (22, 26, 28th platoons) maintained their control over an area of an enemy contact paid off handsomely with the results previously mentioned.

b. The fact that eight VC were captured outside the village is an indication of definite progress toward pacification of Tan Phu Trung which the continual presence of a US company in the area has no doubt influenced. The NVA were unable to link up with their contact initially and were afraid to go into the village. They were subsequently found in the ditch along the road outside the village. The elimination of the 4 man cell on the 24th of August by the PF's furthered the progress of allied forces in eliminating the VC infrastructure in this village.

c. The PF forces netted all the PW's and weapons. This greatly enhanced their prestige and faith in themselves.

d. During the interrogation of the PW's, the question was asked: "What do you do with all the dirt from your bunkers"? The NVA/VC SOP is to take the extra dirt and dump it into rice paddies or old wells. Earlier it had been noted by farmers of Tan Phu Trung that certain paddies were unexplainably sandy. With this information, the PF's were able to locate a 3 bunker/tunnel complex: a lesson learned.

e. This minor victory resulting in 12 VC/NVA PW's, 8 AK-47's, 2 B-40 rocket launchers, and 1 R-54 pistol captured with no friendly casualties, is the high point thus far in the joint ARVN/US operations conducted by the 1-505th Inf since returning to this AO 1 August 1969. The numerous previous combined operations with Tan Phu Trung PF's gained a good rapport and mutual respect. For more important, the channels were open to midnight coordination of first light operations with the Tan Phu Trung PF's. This is considered significant and perhaps even unique. The Cu Chi District Chief, Major Sanh, and his senior advisor, Major Curboe, responded rapidly and effectively to this information and request for assistance showing extreme versatility, flexibility, and competence.
Every lead was followed up and every asset available employed during the conduct of this operation. The axiom: "the whole is equal to the sum of its parts", has indeed proven true; the profits from this success will eventually be reaped by the villagers of Tan Phu Trung.

(c) Dummy Ambush Patrols: On 8 August Company D conducted a dummy ambush patrol designed to lure the enemy into a killing zone and then to destroy him by fire. The site chosen for the operation was the location of a previous ambush site where four US soldiers from the 2-505 had been killed (X0770067). Several innovations were used to make the patrol appear to be a 4th and relatively easy "push-over". The patrol would be dressed sloppily, transistor radios would be playing, and the unit would be arranged in such a manner as to appear undisciplined. In addition they would take an obvious route to the site. Plans for the actions at the site included a rushing mass coming from a squad radio, clothing stuffed to look like soldiers wrapped in poncho liners, helmets were used as heads. A transistor radio played softly in order not to overset the stage, while the patrol was in the area until after dusk they would move around, smoke, and prepare for a stealthy departure after dusk to the radar tower on NC Island (X0770067). Once in the radar tower the squad leader would monitor the sensor device, observe the site with PIS 5 Radar and a M.D. If there was any activity in the area the claymores would be blown, and a preplanned artillery concentration would be called in on the area. V2I fires would continue throughout the night to prevent any enemy movement and the area would be swept at first light. Prior training for the operation included instruction in the emplacement, operation, and monitoring of small portable sensors that were to be emplaced around the dummy ambush patrol. Classes were also given along with practical application in the use of a remote control device to detonate claymore mines from a distance of one mile. 20 claymore mines were to be emplaced around the site. Four rehearsals were held by the ambush patrol the day before the operation. The patrol consisting of seven men departed prior to dusk and the operation went smoothly as planned except for the radar set which had mechanical troubles. There was no enemy activity during the night and the site was policed at first light to prevent detection of ruse. The battalion has conducted three such ambushes in the AO, two were less sophisticated but effectively deceptive in nature. Other dummy ambushes are planned on a periodic basis.

(d) Popper missions: Air assets were allotted to the battalion on four occasions during the reporting period.

1. On 8 August the battalion was allocated the airmobile company (AIC) with 7 lift ships, 3 gunships, and 1 C&C ship for one-half day. Six popper missions were conducted, four in AO Chute by Company D and two in AO Snoopy by Company B.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVN-K-AC
SUBJ: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

2 On 10 Aug the battalion received the heavy half of the AMC from 17h30 - 1900 hours. The battalion inserted one platoon from Company I into AO Chute. After searching the area the platoon left a stay behind patrol and was extracted.

3 On 11 Aug, the Aero Rifle platoon (ARP) 3-17th Cav was placed OCPON to the battalion for three hours from 0700 - 1000. Two popper missions were conducted, one along the Hau Nghia/Binh Duong Province boundary and the other in northern AO Denver in response to a sighting from a visual recon.

4 The light half of the AMC was placed OCPON to the battalion from 1300 - 1600 on 13 Aug. Combined popper missions with one platoon 11th ARVN Airborne and one platoon Company G were conducted in northern AO Denver.

5 On 17 Aug Companies B and D made six insertions into the Tu Duc area vicinity XS9899 to implant sensor devices for CIAC 0-2.

6 On 19 Aug the Aero Rifle platoon 3-17th Cav OCPON to 1-505 made two popper missions vicinity XT7511 and 778112 with negative results.

7 On 21 Aug elements from 3-17th Cav and 2-18th Inf OCPON 1-505 Inf conducted two blocking force insertions in reaction to an agent report. One carbine and several tunnels were found vicinity XT7212.

8 On 25 Aug Company D inserted a blocking force in reaction to a LOH pilot being shot in the leg. Negative results.

9 On 26 Aug Company C using two slicks from the Aero Rifle platoon inserted one platoon vicinity XT737093 at 1600 hours. An hour later half of the platoon was picked up, the other half acted as a stay behind ambush patrol. They later gained a visual sighting of three VC, but lost them in hot pursuit. At 1705 another popper mission was conducted by Company C vicinity XT67095 with negative results. Company A then made an insertion at XT80178 at 1730 hours and later made a false extraction. There was no contact.

(a) Combined operations:

4 Aug: One company 11th ARVN Airborne Battalion and Company B conducted joint sweep of the area east of Hoc Mon (XT7805). The two respective battalion commanders controlled their units together from a C&C ship.

5 Aug: One platoon 11th ARVN Airborne Battalion and one platoon Company B conducted a search vicinity XT7801 with one platoon Company G blocking to the north. Again, both commanders controlled the operation from a C&C ship.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBN-AC

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 22d Inf Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

6 Aug: One company 11th ARVN Airborne Battalion and Company D conducted a combined reconnaissance-in-force vicinity XT8003. The operation was observed from the air.

7 Aug: The entire 30th Ranger Battalion conducted a combined operation with Company D acting as a blocking force. The Rangers conducted a combat landing using VN river assault boats on three beaches on the Saigon River sweeping west into the blocking forces. The area of operations XT770058, 813078, 808100 and 770090. Joint ambushes were established overnight, and the units conducted searches out of the area the following day.

11 Aug: Company D conducted a joint operation with the Can Chu Trung FF platoon vicinity XT6612. Joint ambushes were established overnight.

12 Aug: Company D conducted a combined sweep operation with a Cu Chi District platoon.

13 Aug: Company C conducted a combined platoon sized "point mission" with the 112 Company, 11th ARVN Airborne Battalion.

Contacts from 14 - 27 August 1969

1 At 151929 hours vicinity XS653939 a Firefly received 40 rounds of automatic weapons fire. They returned fire resulting in one bunker being destroyed.

2 At 152200 hours vicinity XS640942 Firefly received small arms fire from unknown number of VC. They returned fire with unknown results.

3 At 161200 hours vicinity XT69120 one VC was captured.

4 At 161935 hours vicinity XT660150 VC rockets were fired into Cu Chi. There were negative casualties and no damage.

5 At 174625 hours vicinity XT660150 Cu Chi three VC rockets hit inside the perimeter at Cu Chi. There were negative casualties and no damage.

6 At 182111 hours vicinity XT723099 Company B spotted 3 VC 600 meters east of their position. Artillery was used and it landed right on the VC. Results: 1 VC KIA was credited to B Battery 2-521 Artillery.

7 At 224625 hours vicinity XT697095 Company B engaged 4 VC. VC returned fire. There were no US casualties. Company B conducted a search of the contact area with negative results.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

8 At 231030 hours vicinity XT691097 Cu Chi ARVN captured 8 VC POW, 6 AK-47's, 2 B40 rocket launchers, 5 B40 rockets, and numerous AK rounds. POW's were members of NVA 1st Battalion of the Quyet Thanh Regiment.

9 At 240135 hours vicinity XT692104 Company B, 1-505 engaged 4 VC with negative results.

10 At 240955 hours vicinity XT691097 Cu Chi RF & FF forces captured 4 VC POW, 2 AK-47's and 1 K-54 pistol. Two VC and one VC commander escaped.

11 At 242008 hours vicinity XT798080 Company D, 1-505 Inf engaged 7-8 VC. Results were 2 VC KIA.

12 At 242120 hours vicinity XT686099 Company B, 1-505 Inf engaged 4 VC with negative results.

13 At 250721 hours vicinity XT790075 a Hunter/Killer team received ground fire. Pilot was shot in the leg.

14 At 251803 hours vicinity XT771050 Company B, 1-505 Inf while in a boat, received fire from an estimated 3-4 VC. There were no casualties.

15 At 260250 hours vicinity XT648115 Cu Chi 23rd FF unit received a ground attack from an estimated two VC squads. There were negative FF casualties and enemy results were unknown.

16 At 261620 hours vicinity XT732104 Company C, 1-505 Inf spotted three individuals running from bush to bush and hiding from aircraft. They ran to the west and were seen last in the vicinity of XT720100. There was visual contact only.

b. (c) Operation Toan Thang Phase III:

(1) 10 Sep - 30 Sep 69

(2) The mission of the battalion was to destroy VC/FRN in AO; conduct ground reconnaissance of area; conduct riverine operations with the 28th RAG (Vietnamese) and the 593/571 US Naval PMI groups; support the pacification program; construct and secure Fire Base All American II, and be prepared to reinforce RF/FR units in the battalion AO.

(3) Location: Binh Duong Province, Map Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheet 6331 III, Ben Cat.

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(5) Forces involved:

(a) US Forces:
1. 1-505 Inf (OPCON 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div 10 - 30 Sep)
2. Ranger elements Company O, 75th Inf
3. Scout Dog Teams, 37th IPSD

(b) Other Forces: None

(6) Concept of Operations: On 10 Sep 69, Co A conducted a combat assault into vicinity XT751303 to secure the area for construction of Fire Base All American II. The Battalion CP and headquarters elements closed the same day and construction began. On 11 Sep, Companies B, C, and D were to have combat assaulted into the Iron Triangle to conduct ground reconnaissance operations. The air assets however were not available. On 13 Sep, Company B conducted a combat assault into XT720285. Company B secured the area as Company D moved by CH-47 to the LZ and then moved overland to the southern Iron Triangle area. Company C moved by truck to XT730321 and then overland to the western AO. On 15 Sep, TF Strukel was formed to assist in the cordon and search of Phu Hoa Dong XT719197. The TF consisted of Companies A and B. The recon platoon also participated in the cordon and search. Company D remained in the Iron Triangle while Company C moved to and secured the fire base. On 26 Sep, the cordon and search of Phu Hoa Dong was terminated and the recon platoon returned to battalion control, but Companies A and D were passed OPCON to 2-18 Inf until 230600 Sep when they were released. On 28 Sep, Companies B and D conducted combat assaults into the Triangle in 8 separate LZ's. Emphasis was placed on ambush operations during the rest of the month.

(7) Tactics and Techniques:

(a) Ground reconnaissance determined that the enemy was moving along the roads and trails in the area in small groups. Subsequent tactics were planned to take advantage of the enemy's obvious pattern. The "stay behind" ambush and clandestine day/night ambushes ("bushmaster" operations) made repeated contact with the enemy.

(b) PSYOPS: A particular Psyops mission was devised to "play with the minds" of the VC. Several contacts (11) had been made in a 1,000 meter radius in seven days. On 22 Sep a Psyops plane broadcasted Chieu Hoi warning to the VC. On 23 Sep, the target area was hit with 8" Howitzer, 155mm, 105mm, TAC Air strikes, and 200 rounds of CS gas from 4.2"
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

mortars. Ground troops then swept the area and a Psyops team broadcasted from the ground using a Chieu Hoi theme. Contacts continued in the area, but there were no Chieu Hoi's.

(c) Airmobile operations: In multi-company airmobile operations and eagle flights, the use of common points of origin are essential. The importance of security versus operational flexibility is overbalanced in these cases on the side of points of origin.

(d) Fire discipline: Since moving to the Iron Triangle, units have had to be retrained to adjust to the new terrain and the different enemy. The most difficult problem in the dense terrain is fire discipline. All too often the first man to see a VC without in turn being seen, fired his weapon at the enemy and the enemy disappeared while the rest of the squad or platoon deployed. This tactic worked quite frequently in the open rice paddy terrain around Saigon but not in this new locale. 50 meters or closer has been determined to be optimum kill range. No kills so far have been reported to have been beyond that range. Command emphasis on battle drill, silent deployment of the squad, fire discipline and control has helped eliminate the tendency but has not yet overcome it.

(e) Analysis of VC actions in the Iron Triangle during reporting period.

There has been no identification of a main force VC unit in the Iron Triangle during the reporting period. It is believed that the VC living in the Iron Triangle proper are small, 5-10 man units belonging to the 83rd Gear Service Group. These small groups appear to be lightly armed and have the mission of transporting rice and supplies thru the area to main force units in the southern portion of SR-1. The VC tend to move at twilight or in the late afternoon as the great majority of contacts has been made between 1700 and 2100 hours. In some cases, the VC traveling in groups of 3-4 have not even been armed with anything but grenades.

Tunnels and bunkers are numerous throughout the Iron Triangle but appear most frequently in the southern portion of the Triangle paralleling Highway 1h and the secondary road to the south of it in the southern portion of the AO. From this maze of tunnels and bunkers, trails and paths lead to the south to the Saigon River and known crossing points.

Mines and boobytraps are numerous in the Iron Triangle and cover almost the entire spectrum of explosives and firing devices. Local VC made grenades, I-26 frag grenades, 60mm mortar rounds, 82mm mortar rounds, 105mm shells and 155mm shells have all been found boobytrapped. Boobytraps have been found in the entrances of tunnels and bunkers, across trails with trip wires, in trails with pressure firing devices, daisy chained in recently Rome Plowed areas and in the jungle and grass areas. In two instances grenades have been found on the ground surface with boobytrapped artillery shells buried beneath them.
Main force elements thought to be using the Iron Triangle include the Quyet Thanh Regiment and the 4th 31a Dinh Sapper Battalion. Although no contact has been made with these units NVA equipment has been found in addition to uniforms similar to those worn by the Quyet Thanh and red inner tubes not generally found with local forces. Sapper equipment has been found to include numerous blasting caps and watches altered to be used as timing devices for delayed detonation of explosive charges.

The enemy will probably continue to use the Iron Triangle as a communications and supply route. He will probably increase his use of boobytraps to inflict casualties, to provide early warning of friendly troops, and to protect his cache and base areas. VC main forces can be expected to use the Triangle as an infiltration route and as a base and cache area.

c. (c) Operation Toan Thang Phase IX:

(1) 1 - 31 October 1969

(2) The mission of the 1-505 Inf was:

(a) Location and elimination of VC/NVA forces in the Iron Triangle.

(b) Interdiction, disorganization, and eventual elimination of enemy supply, communication, and infiltration routes through the battalion AO.

(c) Conduct ground reconnaissance of the AO.

(d) In conjunction with the 28th RAG (VN) and the 593/71 US Naval PBR Groups, conduct riverine operations along the Saigon and Thi Tinh rivers.

(e) Improve and secure Firebase All American II.

(f) Maintain capability for reinforcement of adjacent RF/PF units on order.

(3) Location: Binh Duong Province, Hap Vietnam, l:50,000, Sheet 6331.III, Ben Cat.

(4) Commander: LTC Alfred A. Zamparelli, 1 Jun - 31 Oct 69.

($) Forces Involved:

(a) US Forces:

1 1-505 Infantry

2 Element of Company O, 75th Infantry

3 Scout Dog Teams, 37th IPSP
4 Troop B, 1-17 Cav
5 593/571 US Naval PFR Groups
(b) Other Forces: 28th RAG (VN)

(6) Concept of Operations: The 1-505 Inf concentrated on small unit saturation operations, with its active southern portion of the Iron Triangle receiving primary physical occupation. Harassing and interdictory fires, popper missions, and quick short duration tactical operations were employed to harass and confuse enemy forces in the northern portion of the AO.

(7) Tactics and Techniques: Numerous techniques were used to locate and eliminate the enemy. Stalker operations, bushmaster operations, and stay-behind ambush patrols were used in addition to night saturation ambush patrols to interdict enemy movement. Detailed search operations, and tunnel exploitation operations were used to seek out and destroy enemy supply caches and hidden staging areas.

(8) Training: All required training was conducted in addition to the institution of marksmanship training on the Hoc Mon rifle range. Additional training on ambush patrolling was also held. Company D had a class on the flamethrower and Company B conducted classes on airmobile operations. Companies B and D received training on safety considerations and employment of fougassee, trip flares, and claymore anti-personnel mines.

3. 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry

a. General: During the period 1 August to 31 October 1969 the 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry continued its mission of interdicting enemy infiltration routes into the Saigon area, and denial of suspect and known rocket launching sites, assembly areas and caches. During the months of August and October the battalion operated in the Pineapple Plantation (COM XS66385) approximately 12 kilometers west of Saigon in Long An, Gia Dinh and Hau Nghia Province. During September, the 2-505 conducted operations in its "traditional" area of operation consisting primarily of Hoc Mon District, located in Gia Dinh Province, along National Route One. Combat operations in both areas were typified by daylight reconnaissance missions, cachefinder operations, air cavalry economy of force missions, and waterborne patrols. Defensive missions for the reporting period were limited to security of Hoc Mon Bridge (XT12072), the Surveillance Operations Center (XT54070) Radar Site Four (XT774067), Fire Base Copperhead (XT805025), and occasionally Fire Base All American (XT740068). Security missions during August and October include Fire Base Claudette (XS63927), Fire Base Kathy (XS624867), Fire Base Barbara (XS560656), and Fire Base Chris (XS637564).
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

b. Detail Area Searches, Cachefinder Operations, and Daylight Reconnaissance Missions:

(1) 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969

(2) Conduct detail searches to locate and capture or destroy enemy caches and laager areas.

(3) AO's Denver, Swordfish, Eagle and extensions, located in Gia Dinh, Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces.

(4) LTC Keenan

(5) Forces Involved:

(a) US Forces: Companies A, B, C, D and E 2-505 Inf

(b) Attached US Forces: Platoons from B/1-17 Cavalry

(5) Other Forces: August - 31, 32 and 34 Companies, 3rd Airborne Battalion, 1st Vietnamese Airborne Division, Squad size patrols from the 1st and 6th Battalion, 50th ARVN Regiment, 25th ARVN Division, September - 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion, 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion, Hoc Mon Popular and Regional Forces, October - 3rd Ranger Group, 1st Battalion, 50th ARVN.

(6) Concept of Operation: All infantry elements of the battalion and attached units conducted searches and reconnaissance missions on a daily basis. Generally, each rifle company conducted two platoon size operations daily. The specific areas searched were systematically selected to insure that the entire battalion area of operations was covered. All available intelligence data was considered prior to targeting an area for search or reconnaissance. Special emphasis was placed on thorough searching of canals and streams.

c. Night Ambushes:

(1) 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969

(2) Conduct extensive night ambushes throughout AO to interdict routes of enemy movement and cover known and suspected rocket launching sites.

(3) AO's Denver, Swordfish, Eagle and extensions, located in Gia Dinh, Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces.

(4) LTC Keenan

(5) Forces Involved

(a) US Forces: Companies A, B, C, D and E 2-505 Inf

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(b) Attached US Forces: Platoons from B/1-17 Cav, US Naval River Patrol Boats and patrols from Company O, 75th Inf (Rngr)

(c) Other Forces: August - All rifle companies from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Brigade, Vietnamese Airborne Division. September - Popular Forces squads from platoons located at Hoc Mon Bridge and other outposts in Hoc Mon District participated nightly in combined ambushes. Additionally, extensive combined ambushes were conducted with the 6th and 8th Airborne Battalions, Vietnamese Airborne Division. October - limited participation was received from the 1st Battalion 50th ARVN Regiment located at Fire Base Barbara.

(6) Concept of Operation. Every rifle company normally dispatched six to eight ambush patrols per night. Each patrol consisted of eight to twelve men. Several techniques of combining the US and VN forces on ambushes were tried. During early August elements of Company C were fragmented with the companies of the 3rd Vietnamese Airborne Battalion and participated with fireteam size elements, in VN ambushes. Later in the month, "pure" US ambushes were dispatched and controlled by the VN rifle company commander. During September, the Hoc Mon District Popular Force soldiers participated as individual riflemen in US ambush patrols. In all cases specific ambush missions and locations were recommended by the company commander. Coverage of known and suspected routes of movement, both land and waterway, rocket launch sites, and cache sites, was insured. All available intelligence was considered when selecting ambush locations. Standard patrolling and ambush techniques were employed. Emphasis was placed on alternate means of communication, use of night observation devices and employment of snipers. Frequently, in the Pineapple area, infantry ambushes were closely coordinated with riverine ambushes and patrols.

d. Airmobile Operations: Throughout the reporting period the battalion made extensive use of all airmobile assets.

(1) Reference FRAGO 12-69 (ELECTRA), Map, Saigon, 1:50,000, Sheet 6330 IV.

(2) Execute airmobile assault with two rifle companies into An Son (CON XT815095). Conduct coordinated reconnaissance-in-force south to Song Ba Lia, destroying all bunkers, tunnels and boobytraps.

(3) Binh Duong Province

(4) LTC Keenan

(5) Forces Involved:

(a) US Forces: Companies A and D 2-505 Inf. Weapons Platoon E/2-505.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(b) Attached US Forces: 3rd Platoon B/1-17 Cav.

(c) Other Forces: 794, 163, 179 Regional Force companies, Binh Duong Province, Regional Boat Force, Binh Duong Province.

(6) Concept of Operation: Companies A and D were air assaulted into adjacent landing zones in northern sector of AO. Cavalry platoon and three RF companies sealed objective area on south and east. RF boats blockaded Saigon River on the west. Artillery and Tac Air preparation preceded landing of troops.

(II)

(1) Reference PIANSUM 10 Aug 69, Map, Duc Hoa, 1:50,000, Sheet 6230 II.

(2) Execute combined airmobile assault with two companies into "Twin Island" area (COM X8530815). Conduct coordinated reconnaissance-in-force east to Vam Co Dong River.

(3) Hau Nghia Province

(4) LTC Keenan

(5) Forces involved:

(a) US Forces: Company B, 2-505 Infantry

(b) Attached US Forces: River Division 212, Ben Luc Naval Support Activity.

(c) Other Forces: 31st Company, 3rd Airborne Battalion, Vietnamese Airborne Division.

(6) Concept of Operation: Company B and 31st Company execute airmobile assault into separate landing zones and conduct detailed reconnaissance east toward Vam Co Dong River. PBG boats block eastern flank of AO. All units utilize probes and metal detectors to locate caches in zone. Artillery and TAC Air preparation prior to insertion of troops.

(e) Airmobile "Popper" Missions. During the period 1 August to 31 October 1969 the battalion conducted frequent popper missions. One or more platoons from a US or VN Airborne company or the battalion reconnaissance platoon combined with National Police and one-half of an airmobile company (AMC) for such missions. The limited availability of the AMC somewhat restricted the frequency of these missions. To offset this limitation and as an economy of force measures, the battalion frequently made use of the Aero rifle platoon from B/3-47 Cavalry.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(1) 1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969

(2) Conduct "quick reaction" airmobile operations to find and destroy the enemy and supplies.


(4) LTC Keenan

(5) Forces Involved:

(a) US Forces: All combat platoons of the battalion.

(b) US Forces attached/supporting: Aero Rifle platoon B/347 Cav.

(c) Other Forces: Vietnamese Airborne companies of the 3rd, 6th and 8th Battalions, Vietnamese Airborne Division.

(6) Concept of Operation: In most cases popper operations were conducted against known or suspected enemy locations, cache sites and infiltration routes. All available intelligence was screened prior to starting the operation. Agent reports, SIAR and RED HAZE readouts, URS reports, and radar readings were frequently checked out with the airmobile assets. The basic concept involved the surveillance of a target by the light fire team (LFT) or by the Hunter-Killer team (HKT), a short preparation employing gunships and or artillery followed by a rapid insertion of troops on the target. Frequently, more than one landing zone would be used to position the infantry favorably, especially when operating near streams or inundated areas. In the event of significant contact, additional troops were "piled on" using the troop helicopters.

(7) During the reporting period, popper operations were conducted on the following dates:

- August: 6, 11, 14, 16, 21
- September: 1, 11, 16, 29
- October: 9, 11, 14

f. Waterborne Operations. Because of the many rivers and canals within the two major operational areas, the battalion made extensive use of watercraft and available Vietnamese (RAG, RAID and RF) boats and the US Navy PER elements. The watercraft were used to conduct waterway reconnaissance missions along the Rach Tra Canal (COM XT75065), the Ben Luc River (COM XS620790) and the Saigon and Vam Go Dong Rivers. Boats were used to transport
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

Patrols, establish blocking positions, screen rivers for adjacent land operations, waterborne RCP's and as amphibious ambuses. The principal type craft used were RAG, RAID, PER, ILM, airboats, skibarges and engineer boats.

g. Major Attachments/Detachments during the reporting period.

Attachments: 11 Aug - 15 Aug 34th company 3rd Bn, 1st VN Abn Bde
15 Aug - 31 Aug 31st company 3rd Bn, 1st VN Abn Bde
1 Sep - 30 Sep 1 platoon B/1-17 Cav

Detachments: 3 Aug - 30 Aug two rifle companies 2-505 conducted closely coordinated operations with 3rd Bn, 1st Abn Bde.
1 Sep - 30 Sep one platoon 2-505 OPCON to 2-321 Arty for security at Fire Base Copperhead.
1 Sep - 1 Sep Company C OPCON 1-508 in AO Swordfish.

h. Training. All training in the battalion was conducted according to a master training program. Emphasis was placed on fulfilling mandatory training requirements, weapons training, night firing, familiarization with night observation devices, first aid, water safety, personnel hygiene and physical fitness. Maintenance training was also conducted on a regular basis. Subjects included in the training program were:

- Physical Conditioning
- Command Information
- Civil Affairs
- Character Guidance
- Prevention of Heat Injury
- Sentry Duty
- Counter Ambush Drill
- Code of Conduct
- Supply Economy
- Weapons Zero
- Field Sanitation
- Internal Defense
- Military Justice
- Weapons, water and vehicle safety
- SAEDA
- Wet Weather Operations
- Geneva Convention
- Survival, Escape and Evasion

a. During the month of August the battalion repeated its program of ambush training conducted the previous May. A battalion level Mobile Training Team (MTT) presented classes on ambush techniques to all rifle platoons in the unit. Subjects given special emphasis include: selection and reconnaissance of sites, moving from intermediate to final sites, establishing local security and early warning procedures, placement of claymore mines and trip flares, basic formations, radio and pyrotechnic signals and employment of snipers and starlight scopes.

b. Additional specialized training was given to selected soldiers in the battalions and soldiers from the 6th Vietnamese Airborne Battalion on the operation and maintenance of the airboats employed on the Cau Sang Canal (COM XT683020).
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period
1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

1. Standdown

On 15 October 1969 the 2-505 Infantry ceased combat operations and executed a tactical road movement from AO Swordfish to Phu Loi. The battalion closed on Phu Loi by 151500 October 1969 and was housed in the former stand-down area and the area formerly used by the 82d Replacement Detachment. On 16 October personnel began processing for redeployment within the RVN and return to CONUS. Personnel for RVN reassignment were scheduled for movement between 20 and 21 October. Personnel for CONUS assignments were scheduled for movement between 1 and 3 November. A battalion "Honor Guard" was designated to remain in RVN until 12 December in order to accompany the Brigade colors back to Ft Bragg, North Carolina.

2. 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry

a. Summary of the concept and execution of operations during the reporting period - See paragraph 1a(6).

b. Map References:

(1) AO Detroit (1 August - 31 August): Operation "Homeward Bound". Maps: 1:50,000, Sheets 6230 I, Duc Hoa, 6230 II, Tan An, 6330 IV, Saigon, 6330 III, Cam Giuoc.


c. Attached as Tabs to this report are overlays showing AO's for the reporting period:

AO Detroit (1 August - 31 August)
AO Swordfish (31 August - 31 October)
AO North Carolina (1 October - 31 October)

d. Format for combat operations section.

(1) Reporting period: 1 August - 31 October 1969

(a) Date operation started and ended:

1 1 August - 31 August 1969 - AO Detroit (Operation "Homeward Bound")

2 31 August - 1 October 1969 - AO Swordfish (Operation "Wet Devil II")
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(b) Mission for the 1-508 Inf during the operations:

1. Continue pacification, conduct denial searches and extensive night ambushes in AO Detroit.

2. Conduct denial searches and extensive night ambushes in AO Swordfish.

3. Conduct combat operations against local and main force enemy units in AO North Carolina. Combined operations with ARVN and RF units, and denial searches and ambushes used extensively.

(c) Location - Province (See Tabs A, B, and C)

1. Gia Dinh - AO Detroit

2. Hau Nghia, Long An, Gia Dinh - AO Swordfish

3. Binh Duong - AO North Carolina

(d) LTC Paul R. Lunsford - 1 August - 27 September 1969
LTC Peter J. Foss - 27 September - 31 October 1969

(e) Forces Involved:

1. US Forces

a. Operation "Homeward Bound" - 1-508 Inf Bn CP, 4 rifle companies from 1-508, HHC and E Company 1-508 Inf.

b. Operation "Wet Devil II" - 1-508 Inf Bn CP, 4 rifle companies from 1-508, 1 company OPCON from 2-505 Inf (until 4 Sep 69), HHC and Company E 1-508 Inf.

c. Operation "Strac" - 1-508 Bn CP, 4 rifle companies from 1-508, HHC and Company E 1-508 Inf.

2. Other Forces:

a. Operation "Homeward Bound" - 53rd RF Bn

b. Operation "Wet Devil II" - 50th ARVN, 55th RF Bn

c. Operation "Strac" - 1st Bn, 7th ARVN Regt, 41st RF Inter-Company Group, Phu Hoa District Forces
AVBK-AC
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period
1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(f) Concept of operations: On 1 August 1969 the 1-508 Inf was located in AO Detroit and remained there until 31 August 1969. The concept of operation for the 1-508 in that AO consisted of detailed searches for possible rocket launcher and cache sites, extensive night ambushes and combined operations with the 53rd RF Battalion. The Battalion also had the mission of continuing pacification operations in AO Detroit. The Battalion CP was located at FB Hardcore I.

On 31 August 1969 the 1-508 was released from responsibility from AO Detroit and assumed responsibility for AO Swordfish. The Battalion moved to the new AO by convoy and CH-47 and commenced denial operations there, leaving one company OPCON to the 5th ARVN Ranger Group until 1 Sep 69 and with one company from the 2-505 Inf OPCON to the 1-508 Inf until 1 Sep 69. Operations in AO Swordfish were characterized by small unit detailed searches, combined operations with ARVN's and Regional Forces, airmobile operations, "popper" missions, extensive night ambushes and stay-behind ambushes, use of "Firefly" for checking out radar sightings and other targets, canal patrols using organic boats and extensive use of artillery H&L during both day and night, in addition to firing on radar sightings. The Battalion CP was located at FSB Claudette.

On 1 October 1969 the responsibility of AO Swordfish was relinquished by the 1-508 Inf and turned over to the 2-505 Inf. The 1-508 moved by convoy, AMC and by CH-47 to AO North Carolina to conduct operations against local and main force enemy units in the area of operations. Operations in AO North Carolina by the 1-508 were characterized by small unit detail searches of various terrain features, combined operations with Regional Forces and ARVN units, bridge security operations, airmobile operations, waterborne insertions by Navy PBR boats of ambush and search units, use of Rangers for reconnaissance and surveillance missions, employment of stay-behind forces, extensive night ambushes, conduct of Resource Control Points (RCP's) in conjunction with National Police, and pacification operations. Combined operations were conducted with the 1st LV, 7th ARVN units and the 1st Inter-Company Group (RF). The Battalion CP was located at FSB Hardcore II.

e. Tactics and Techniques:

(1) Tactics and techniques used in operation "Homeward Bound" in AO Detroit.

(a) Extensive use was made of movement on foot in AO Detroit to search areas and ambush sites. Particular attention was given to movement along dikes and trails due to likelihood of boobytraps in these areas.

(b) Large numbers of frag grenades (both US and Chicom type) with trip wire were common in this area.

(c) Boats, when used, are extremely vulnerable to enemy ambushes along canals and small streams. Light Fire Teams should be used as security whenever possible.
AVB-AC

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Aba Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(d) Extensive night ambushes consisting of four to six ambushes per rifle company, and where possible, moving ambushes were employed to deny the enemy a larger portion of the terrain.

(e) Detailed searches of possible rocket launching sites and uncultivated areas were accomplished on a daily basis.

(f) Maximum use of Starlight Scopes and other sensing devices.

(g) Use of probing rods.

(h) Navigating canals and swamps with air boats.

(i) Combined operations with Regional Forces.

(j) Coordination with Regional and Popular Forces of night ambushes.

2 Tactics and Techniques used in AO Swordfish "Operation Wet Devil II".

(a) Insertion and extractions with River Patrol Boats (PR's), Ski Barges and sampans of search and ambush units.

(b) Maximum use of airmobile companies (AMC) for insertions during operations, popper missions, and Air Rifle platoons. Other air assets such as CH-47 and UH-1D logistic aircraft were used for resupply and rotation of companies.

(c) Due to inundated nature of the terrain, movement overland was a maximum of 2000 meters a day.

(d) Troops were in water most of the time. Units were rotated every three to four days to dry out the troops.

(e) All resupply was lifted from FSE at FSB Claudette to save blade and flight time of resupply ships.

(f) Extra ropes and snap links were issued due to numerous stream and canal crossings necessary while moving within the AO.

(g) Banks and beds of canals and streams should be checked. The VC use them for hiding caches. Floating bunkers were also found in the canals of the AO.

(h) Extensive night ambushes of four to six per rifle company.

(i) Use of Kit Carson Scouts to act as point men for the companies.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(3) Tactics and Techniques used in AO North Carolina "Operation Strac".

(a) Extensive use was made of Recon platoon combined with Province Reconnaissance Intelligence Teams to check out Intelligence Reports and to gather intelligence.

(b) Maximum use of Starlight Scopes and other sensing devices.

(c) Insertions and extractions by River Patrol Boats (PER's) and Ski Barges were used for small units in placing them in their ambush and search locations.

(d) Extensive night ambushes of six to nine per rifle company.

(e) Combined sweep and block operations were conducted as often as possible.

(f) Proper coordination with adjacent, higher and local RF and ARVN units on night and day locations, operations and ambushes.

(g) Extensive use of engineer demolitions equipment and bulldozers for destruction of tunnels, bunkers, fighting positions and boobytraps.

(h) Maximum use was made of stay behind ambushes.

(i) A/T platoon was used extensively for convoy security, road clearing operations, and as a mobile reaction force for operations as needed.

(j) Rangers with Tracker Teams were used for surveillance and reconnaissance missions and stay behind ambushes.

f. Training (Note * Indicates mandatory training)

(1) Brigade or higher headquarters training conducted during the reporting period:

(a) Marksmanship Training (2 companies 25 Sep 69)
   (1 company 26 Sep 69)

(b) Boobytrap Instruction (2 companies 25 Sep 69)
   (1 company 26 Sep 69)

(2) Company and Battalion taught subjects during the period 1 Aug to 31 Aug 69:

*(a) Command Information (subjects):

1. Geneva Conventions
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

1 Prisoners of War
2 Once a Veteran
3 Drugs and You
4 Your Personal Affairs
5 Military Justice Act of 1968
6 Rescue Component Demobilization
7 Marriage to Foreign Nationals
8 Your Reserve Obligation
9 Me, an Ambassador?
10 Malaria
11 Minority Groups in Vietnam
12 Tour Extensions
13 Mail
14 Mines and Boobytraps
15 Educational Opportunities
16 *(b) Character Guidance
17 Marks of greatness
18 Marriage
19 *(c) Weapons firing (zero and familiarization)(range estimation)
20 *(d) Military Justice
21 *(e) Sentry Duty and Patrolling
22 *(f) Material Readiness and Buddy System
23 *(g) Geneva Conventions

(1) Company and Battalion conducted the following training during the period 1 Sep 69 to 30 Sep 69:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

*(a) Command Information (subjects)

1. Clear Your Weapon
2. Chambered Rounds and Bouncing Trucks Don't Mix
3. Watch Your Step
4. Warrant Officer Program
5. Returning to CONUS
6. Military Air Travel
7. Communism
8. PW's and You
9. History of South Vietnam
10. Free World Assists - Vietnam
11. Your Reserve Obligation
12. Weapons Control in Safe Areas
13. Weapons Safety

*(b) Character Guidance

1. Common Sense
2. Common Sense (make-up)

*(c) SAEDA

*(d) Armed Forces Censorship

*(e) Geneva Convention

*(f) Code of Conduct

*(g) Weapons Firing (zero, familiarization and safety)

*(h) Gas Mask Fitting and Testing

*(i) First Aid and Safety

*(j) Civil Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

36
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

*(k) CIR refresher.

*(l) Psychological warefare

(h) Company and Battalion Taught Training during the period of 1 Oct to 31 Oct 69:

*(a) Command Information subjects:
1 Returning to CONUS
2 Customs Laws and you
3 Protect your health
4 Marijuana marks you
5 Water safety
6 Enemy
7 Mines and booby traps
8 Road to "Soc Mow"
9 Army heritage
10 Prisoners of war
11 How to get war trophies home

*(b) Character Guidance
1 Marriage

*(c) SAEDA

*(d) Weapons Firing (zero, familiarisation and safety)

(e) Code of Conduct

(f) Survival, Escape and Evasion

(g) Physical Training

(h) Bi-weekly Rifle Training

(i) First Aid
CONFDIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

5. 2-321 Artillery

a. Operations:

(1) Operation Toan Thang Phase III continued throughout this period.

(2) The battalion mission remained as direct support to the Brigade and Battery C, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery remained in general support to the Brigade until 1 October, at which time it was given the mission of GS, II Field Force.

(3) Units located at Fire Support Bases Copperhead, Harrison, Hardcore I, and All American I were all in Gia Dinh Province. Units occupying Fire Support Base Barbara were in Long An Province. Units occupying Fire Support Bases All American II and Hardcore II are in Binh Duong Province.

(b) LTC Martin J. Cunningham II assumed command of the Battalion from LTC John R. Martin on 18 August 1969.

(5) Concept of Operations: No change

(6) Location of Units:

HNB 2-321 - FSB Copperhead (XT806027)

A Btry 2-321 - FSB Barbara (X57785h) 1 Aug to 15 Aug; FSB All American I (XT750505) 15 Aug to 10 Sep; FSB All American II (XT75050h) 10 Sep to present.

B Btry 2-321 - FSB Harrison (XT736055) 1 Aug - 28 Sep; FSB Barbara (X57785h) 28 Sep to 15 Oct; FSB Copperhead 15 Oct to 29 Oct for standdown. Unit deployed to CONUS on 29 Oct 69.

C Btry 2-321 - FSB Hardcore I (XT752937) 1 Aug to 15 Aug; FSB Barbara (X57785h) 15 Aug to 28 Sep; FSB Harrison (XT736055) 28 Sep to 1 Oct; FSB Hardcore II (XT70213h) 1 Oct to present. Unit will commence standdown on 1 November 1969.

C Btry 2-12 - FSB Copperhead (XT806027)

b. (C) Tactics and Techniques: The Battalion continued the basic tactics and techniques as outlined in the previous report of 1 August with minor modifications. Greater emphasis has been placed on obtaining maximum utilization of air assets for observing artillery fires. When available, forward observers with companies in static defense positions were placed in USAF FAC aircraft to attack targets of opportunity and conduct reconnaissance by fire in suspected enemy locations and possible cache sites. Also, intelligence targets obtained by Brigade S-2 and airborne personnel detectors
AVBK-4C

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(Sniffers), were appropriately attacked. Another technique that proved to be valuable was the periodic firing on friendly base camps and night ambush sights within 3 to 4 hours after they were vacated. VC were thought to be coming in to these positions to search for food and other items which might have been left by the US units. Battery 2 rounds, VT was the method of fire and on 2 occasions confirmed kills were reported.

c. (U) Training:

(1) Driver's Training: The battalion driver's training school terminated on 22 August 1969. The course was a series of two day training periods during which personnel were trained in vehicle operation, maintenance, records, safety and road signs. Upon termination, a total of 171 personnel had attended the course of which 145 successfully completed it and were awarded operator's permits. The training is considered to have been a success in that this organization showed a marked decrease in traffic accidents and maintenance problems.

(2) Officer's Refresher Training: Officers' refresher training was terminated 5 October 1969. This training covered a wide range of subjects pertaining to artillery and associated subjects and proved invaluable in maintaining professionalism in the officer personnel of this organization.

(3) Extensive training was conducted in the areas of artillery forward observers, fire direction center and liaison section procedures and techniques. Emphasis was placed on areas which are not frequently used but in which proficiency must be maintained and in procedures gleaned from "lessons learned" material.

d. (C) Organization: 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery is organized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHB 2-321</td>
<td>DS 3/82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-321</td>
<td>Priority of fires - 1-505 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-321</td>
<td>Priority of fires - 2-505 Inf until 15 Oct (standdown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/2-321</td>
<td>Priority of fires - 1-508 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/2-12</td>
<td>GS 3/82 to 1 Oct, then GS II Field Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVBK-9AC

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

e. (C) Expenditures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Mission</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>Misc. Longs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Contact, known enemy locations</td>
<td>7,232</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Intelligence targets, radar, defensive fires</td>
<td>22,662</td>
<td>1,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Counter mortar/counter rocket</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Preparations &amp; recons by fire &amp; Marking rounds</td>
<td>13,833</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) H &amp; I</td>
<td>16,895</td>
<td>5,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Illumination, registrations</td>
<td>5,561</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. (C) Enemy killed by artillery during this period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery</th>
<th>Number KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. B Troop, 1-17 Cavalry

a. Organization:

Troop B/1-17th Cavalry was organized under the 17-57G MTO&E. Three line platoons consisting of seven ACAV's, one 106mm track and one 81mm mortar track each, and the CP group composed of 3 ACAV's have been the principal combat elements of the group.

b. During this reporting period, B Troop has performed a variety of missions to include mounted and dismounted searches, tunnel clearing operations, engineer security, convoy escorts, fire base security, reaction missions in support of the infantry battalions, bridge security, cordon and searches and as a blocking force for other elements including infantry, navy and other tracks. The troop has been responsible for three different AO's within the Iron Triangle while OPCON to the 1-505th Infantry from 1 Oct to 27 Oct.

40

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(1) The largest portions of the combat operations have been in support of the infantry battalions where one platoon was OPCON to the battalion. During the month of October the whole troop was OPCON to the 1-505, where it operated both, as a troop and supported the infantry company by placing elements OPCON to them as well. A brief summary of significant actions follows:

(a) 3rd platoon acted as a reaction force to ambush during contact of Company B, 1-505 at XT700093 on 23 Aug 69. At 1010 hours, FF's found 8 VC, 5 AK-47's, 1 B-40 launcher, and 1 B-40 rocket while in US/ARVN sweep of the area.

(b) B Troop took one Chieu Hoi at XT723317,020720 Oct while occupying night defensive position. Later found 1 AK-47, 100 rounds AK ammo, and 1 grenade.

(c) 1st platoon while reacting to company D, 1-505 engaged 1 VC in the open at XT745227 on 3 Oct at 1000 hours.

(d) 3rd platoon while reacting to Company D, 1-505, had one track hit a mine at XT680290 at 031105 Oct. Results: 1 ACAV destroyed, 2 US WHA.

(e) 062315 Oct infantry element attached from 1-505 had a accident while on ambush at XT733240. Results: 1 US Killed.

(f) 071200 Oct 3rd platoon had one track hit a mine (107mm rocket) at XT745230. Results: 2 US WHA, extensive damage to ACAV.

(g) 101220 Oct 2d platoon while on a search operation found a tunnel complex with 1 VC in it at XT700210. Results: 1 VC KIA, 3 82mm boobytraps, 1 60mm compression detonator, 1 Chicom grenade, 1 55 anti-personnel, 3 CBU's boobytrapped, 1 M26 grenade, 1 claymore mine, 1 rifle grenade, blasting caps, 1 AK-47 magazine and 23 rounds AK-47 ammo.

(h) 131200 Oct 1st platoon found a bunker complex big enough for a company at XT680273. Results: 1 .50 caliber ammo can full of medical supplies, 100 rounds AK-47 ammo, VC clothes, VC cooking area with a large grinding wheel, 1 Chicom grenade boobytrap.

(i) 2d platoon while OPCON to Company D 1-505 had a track hit a lo pound Chicom mine. Results: 1 US WHA, 1 ACAV and equipment destroyed.

(j) Numerous tunnels, boobytraps and amounts of ammunition have been found during the reporting period while the Cavalry platoons were OPCON to different infantry companies in the Iron Triangle and in the area around Saigon.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(2) Total significant enemy results for the reporting period has been:

- 2 VC KIA
- 3 82mm mortar rounds
- 1 VC Hoi Chanh
- 1 60mm mortar rounds
- 1 AK-47
- Numerous Chicom grenades
- 300 rounds AK-47 ammo

7. 52d Chemical Detachment
   a. (C) Operations, Plans and Training are as follows:

   The 52d Chemical Detachment continued its mission of providing special chemical operations support to the Brigade. On 15 Oct 69, the Detachment stoodown for deactivation and on 25 Oct 69, the 52d Chemical Detachment was officially deactivated.

   (1) Defoliation operations were conducted to reduce enemy ambush sites and avenues of approach, increase fields of fire and improve radar effectiveness. A summary of the defoliation missions conducted is as follows:

   (a) Aerial Defoliation (UH-1D aircraft with Agavenco aerial spray apparatus).

   1. 2 August - Canal banks between FB Kathy (XS623887) to FB Barbara (XS576857); 6 barrels (295 gal) Agent Blue.
   2. 8 August - Canal banks between FB Kathy (XS623887) and FB Claudette (XS660928); 6 barrels (320 gal) Agent Orange.

   (b) Ground Defoliation (Power-Driven Decontaminating Apparatus).

   1. 4 August - FB Hardcore (XS752937)
   2. 5 August - FB Copperhead (XS608028); 400 gal diesel mixed with 20 gal Agent Orange.
   3. 8 August - Phu Loi Post (XT857164); 400 gal diesel mixed with 20 gal Agent Orange.
   4. 25 August - Phu Loi Post (XT857164); 200 gal diesel mixed with 10 gal Agent Orange.
   5. 26 August - Phu Loi Post (XT857164); 600 gal diesel mixed with 30 gal Agent Orange.

   (2) Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer) missions were conducted to provide information on enemy troop locations and activities for the S-2 collection plan. A total of 27 missions were flown for a total of 45 flight hours.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(1) Riot Control Agents were employed in conjunction with Sniffer missions, and a total of 92 non-persistent CS munitions (E158) were employed on 4 sorties.

(2) Miscellaneous. The Detachment continued technical inspection of the chemical equipment for turn-in, including K17, K17A1 and XM28 Protective Masks, mask carriers, a contamination apparatus and chemical agent detector kits. The Detachment also provided materials and assistance to the 1-505 Inf Bn in the emplacement of flame fougasses around the perimeter of FB All American II (KT9530X).

(3) CBR Training conducted during the period included the following:

(a) On 6 September the personnel of the Detachment underwent refresher training on the operation and operator maintenance of the XM3 Airborne Personnel Detector.

(b) On 14 September the personnel of the Detachment underwent refresher training on the construction and employment of flame field expedients. A practical demonstration of a 55 gal flame fougasse was conducted on the Phu Loi Post perimeter.

E. Logistics, Transportation and Engineer Operations

1. Logistics. During the period the 82d Support Battalion continued its mission of providing supplies, direct support maintenance, medical services and miscellaneous services to all assigned and attached elements of the Brigade. Toward the latter portion of the period, preparation and work upon the Brigade's retrograde activities assumed important significance.

(a) In order to best cope with the wide dispersion of the Brigade areas of tactical and administrative operations, the Support Battalion had been divided into two support elements. The forward support element (FSE) at Tan Son Nhut continued to provide spot maintenance support, supplies, and services to the Brigade's three maneuver battalions, the artillery battalion and other forward elements, while the major portion of the Support Battalion continued operations at Phu Loi. The element at Phu Loi provided support to the Brigade rear elements and back up support to the FSE in all areas except Class I, III, medical and postal services. The FSE, under the command of Major Perry C. Reynolds, handled all classes of supply except Class V and VI, provided direct support maintenance and technical supply and support for automotive, track, engineer and miscellaneous equipment, provided medical services through use of the FSE's medical holding area, laboratory and dental clinic, and provided the Brigade with postal services.

(b) With the standdown of the 2-505 Inf, change in the tactical areas of operation, and the impending departure of the Brigade, the FSE was closed down on 24 Oct 69 and Support Battalion personnel and material were consolidated into one element operating at Phu Loi.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Learned of 3rd Bde, 82d Abn Div for period
1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

2. Organization for Support:
   a. The 82d Support Battalion was organized with a battalion headquarters, a
      headquarters and headquarters element, Company A (Administration), Company
      B (Medical) and Company C (Supply and Maintenance). Attached for administration
      and logistics were Company O, 75th Infantry (Ranger) and the 37th Infantry Platoon
      (Scout Dog). The staff was a normal S staff, with the exception of the S-2
      who was also the communications officer.
   b. The FSE was organized for support with an administration and
      special services section, APC services section, medical support and services
      section, supply support section and maintenance supply section. These sections
      performed their specific functions utilizing personnel and equipment from the
      companies of the support battalion.

3. Material Services
   a. Supply:
      (1) Class I:
         (a) The FSE supported all the Brigade's forward elements with Class I
             supplies at the start of this period. When the 1-505 and 1-508 moved their area
             of operation to the Iron Triangle, however, they drew their Class I supplies from
             the 20th Maintenance Battalion. When 2-505 began standdown, Class I supply to
             the FSE decreased to the point that only the FSE and Red Ball were being supplied
             through FSE. On 25 October, with the close down of the FSE, Class I supply for
             2-505 Red Ball through the Brigade ceased.
         (b) The following quantities were issued to supported customers during
             this period:

             | MONTH | "A RAT" | "B RAT" | "C RAT" | RP | SUEDRY PACK |
             |-------|---------|---------|---------|----|-------------|
             | AUG   | 351,168 | 351,168 | 26, 5   | 5,232 | 1,094       |
             | SEP   | 268,742 | 268,742 | 23,243  | 0   | 929         |
             | OCT   | 63,190  | 63,190  | 29,500  | 0   | 170         |
             | Total | 683,100 | 683,100 | 27,243  | 5,132| 2,193       |

         (2) Most Class II supply items (clothing, individual equipment,
             ammunition, tools, etc.) were received, stored and issued by the BSO in
             Phu Loi, with ISE stocking fast moving expendable items (mess hall expendable
             supplies, batteries, etc) for distribution to Brigade units in Tan Son Nhut
             area. On 8 Oct 69 the Class II and IV warehouse, operated by the BSO and
             Company C Supply Platoon, was closed down. The building was required to
             house retrograded operations for the Brigade under the direction of Saigon
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

Support Command. One half of the BSO's Class II Yard was also turned over to the Saigon Support Command on 12 October.

(a) Fatigues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>COATS</th>
<th>TROUSERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td>4,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>2,671</td>
<td>4,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,840</td>
<td>10,182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Mess Ware, Paper and Plastic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>PLATES</th>
<th>CUPS</th>
<th>KNIVES</th>
<th>FORKS</th>
<th>SPOONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>1057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>2430</td>
<td>1795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,989</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>3,554</td>
<td>5,382</td>
<td>4,395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Batteries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>BA 30</th>
<th>BA 42</th>
<th>BA 58</th>
<th>BA 200</th>
<th>BA 386</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>6832</td>
<td>1306</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>5412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>6142</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>2788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>4174</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17158</td>
<td>2091</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>9341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Class III:

(a) POL products were received from Depot, stored at the FSE and issued to using units in bulk, in package products, through vehicle refuel stations and through mobile refuel (2½ ton tankers) for delivery on site. When the 1/505 and 1/508 areas of operation moved to the Iron Triangle the quantity of Class III drawn from the FSE decreased significantly, and when the 2/505 began standdown at Phu Loi, supply of Class III from the FSE ceased.

(b) Mogas and Diesel:

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBK-AC
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>MOGAS (Gals)</th>
<th>DIESEL (Gals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>33,800</td>
<td>37,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>25,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>8,915</td>
<td>71,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>60,220</td>
<td>71,415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Class IV:

(a) The BSO continued normal operations in the supply of construction and fortification materials until late September. At that time, the Class IV yard was cleared of material in accordance with USARV directives and was turned over to Saigon Support Command on 3 Oct 69 for their use during the Brigade retrograde operations.

(b) Fortification Items Issued During the Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>U/I</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbed Wire</td>
<td>R1</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr Stakes (8')</td>
<td>Ea</td>
<td>821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr Stakes (5')</td>
<td>Ea</td>
<td>1304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr Stakes (3')</td>
<td>Ea</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina Wire</td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>Hd</td>
<td>3123 (3,123,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Class V: The Brigade ammunition office has processed the following number of issues and turn-ins during this period:

Number of Issues: 254
Number of Turn-Ins:
Serviceable: 19
Unserviceable: 22
Salvage: 5

(6) Class VII:

(a) As the Brigade began retrograde operations, the quantity of TOE major end items received decreased substantially.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) The Commander's Critical Items List was an effective tool in the receipt of mission essential items. The last CCIL was submitted on 6 Oct 69. Although the receipt of TOE major items diminished, necessary items continued to be procured.

(7) Class VIII:

(a) Medical supplies received directly from the depot were issued directly to the FSE hospital and battalion medical Platoons. Approximately 85% of the items requested were stocked in sufficient quantity for immediate issue. With the closing down of the FSE and standdown of the 2/505, the quantity of Class VIII items issued decreased substantially.

(b) Quantities of faster moving items issued during this period are cited below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SURGICAL SPONGE (4x4)</th>
<th>FOOT POWDER (Cans)</th>
<th>TETRACYCLINE (Bottles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>5,760</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Class IX: Direct exchange repair parts continued to be provided the battalion maintenance sections by the FSE technical supply section until the close down of the FSE. At that time, all direct exchange repair parts were supplied by the consolidated technical supply section of the Support Battalion at Phu Loi.

B. Services:

1. Laundry: This service was provided the Brigade on Contact through the Saigon Support Command and through individual hire of laundry maids.

2. Bath: During this period two bath units were operated by the Brigade. They operated at two separate fire bases, one with the 1/505 and the other with the 2/505. In late August the unit with the 1/505 stopped operations and returned to Phu Loi and in mid-October the unit with the 2/505 also ceased operations as the 2/505 began standdown.

3. Water Supply: Approximately 10 to 12 thousand gallons were provided the FSE and other Brigade elements daily. This was in addition to the water supplied the battalions by organic water tankers. Beginning 15 October 69 an additional 3,000 gallons was supplied daily to the newly opened "All American Swimming Pool".

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period
1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969.

4. Graves Registration: Due to the close proximity of the Tan Son Nhut Mortuary Depot only personnel effects were processed by the Brigade. During this period 14 cases of personal effects were processed, 5 in August, 6 in September and 6 in October.

5. Miscellaneous Services:

(a) Map Supply: Forty-nine map lines were stocked at the BSO, with thirty-five of these map lines being stocked at the FSE. 1,426 maps were issued to the Brigade during this period.

(b) Captured Enemy Equipment: Captured items of equipment were turned in to CMAC. Explosive items were released to USAF EOD personnel immediately.

(c) Transportation: Transportation requirements were mainly for hauling equipment from depot to BSO, FSE, and Battalion forward areas. The provisional truck platoon was administered by "C" Company, 82d Spt Bn and was provided backup support by the 48th Transportation Group.

Total Mileage: 38,750 miles
Total Tonnage: 1,614 tons
Approximate personnel hauled: 350

4. MAINTENANCE:

a. Every battalion in the Brigade maintained its own motor pool, with an automotive warrant officer as O.I.C., which provided organizational maintenance for the battalion. Direct support maintenance was provided to the Brigade by Company C, 82d Spt Bn. Backup maintenance in automotive, armament and electrical generators was provided by the 610 Maintenance Battalion. Backup support for instruments, electronics and office machines was provided by the 147th Light Equipment Maintenance Company.

b. JOBS RECEIVED REPAIRED OPEN

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal &amp; Inst</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Technical Supply: The Technical Supply activity supported 67 addressees. Pertinent data for this period is cited below.
## CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Average Lines stocked</td>
<td>5977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Average Lines at zero balance</td>
<td>2971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Average lines at zero balance with due outs</td>
<td>1115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Average fringe items on hand</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Total requests received</td>
<td>8929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. ASL requests received</td>
<td>7715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Fringe requests received</td>
<td>1214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Red Ball requests received</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Priority group I (01-03) Requests received</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Priority group II (04-08) Requests received</td>
<td>3886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. Priority group III (09-15)</td>
<td>3808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Total Requests Filled</td>
<td>5626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Total ASL requests filled</td>
<td>4692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Fringe requests filled</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Red Ball requests filled</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Priority Group I requests filled</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Priority Group II requests filled</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. Priority Group III requests filled</td>
<td>1619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Engineer.

   a. Organization: During the reported period, each infantry battalion was supported by a minimum of one OPCON engineer squad. This support was increased to a maximum of one OPCON engineer platoon as required. All other Brigade units were supported on a mission basis.

   b. Support Rendered:

      (1) Combat engineer support to the infantry

          (a) Mine detector teams

          (b) Demolition teams

      (2) Fire base/patrol base support

        CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Construction of perimeter defense at West Bridge
(b) Construction of perimeter defense at Middle Bridge
(c) Bunker salvage at Box Bridge
(d) Tactical bunker construction
(e) Delivery sandbag fill
(f) General earthwork and drainage
(g) Construction of perimeter defense at FSB Barbara
(h) Road construction and repair
(i) Water purification units at FSB's Claudette, Chris, Barbara, Harrison and Phu Cuong Bridge.

(3) Phu Loi support:
(a) Construction of standdown area
(b) APO relocation
(c) B Med construction
(d) Bunker line construction
(e) Pad for General's trailer
(f) Fence and blast wall construction for General's trailer
(g) Remodeling at Officer's club

F. (C) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

1. During the reporting period Psychological Operations were conducted using leaflet drops, ground and aerial loudspeaker missions, leaflet distribution, face to face discussions, and the displaying of posters. These operations were conducted primarily by the HE Team (audio and visual) and the HB Team (audio). The HE Team also provided publicity for the Brigade Medcap/Dentcap program, helped control the civilian population during cordon and search operations, provided information to villagers concerning local operations, and provided quick reaction Chieu Hoi appeals during enemy contact. These two teams are attached to the Brigade from the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion. In addition, extensive use was made of the Armed Propaganda Team, attached from Gia Dinh Province Chieu Hoi Center. The APT was employed on Medcaps and Dentcaps to spread information concerning the Third Party Inducement, Voluntary Informant, and Chieu Hoi programs. The team also gathered considerable information concerning the VC and VCI in certain areas.

   a. Themes most often used.
      (1) Third Party Inducement.
      (2) Voluntary Informant Program.
      (3) Chieu Hoi Program.
      (4) Rewards Program.
      (5) Support the GVN.
      (6) Atrocities of the VC.
      (7) Allied forces are your friends.
      (8) News and Music (during Medcaps and Dentcaps)

   b. Psyops accomplishments.
      (1) Air Leaflet missions - 25 Leaflets dropped - 1,429,518
      (2) Ground Leaflet missions - 84 Leaflets dispersed - 27,812
      (3) Air loudspeaker missions - 37 Hours - 53
AVBK-AC  
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

(4) Ground Loudspeaker missions - 56 Hours - 74
(5) Audio Visual missions - 30 Hours - 25
(6) Newspaper distributed - 9,010
(7) Magazines distributed - 17,610
(8) Posters distributed - 5,400

2. Psychological operations during the reporting period can be viewed as being conducted during three phases. During the first phase, 1 August to 15 September, the Brigade continued operations in the Gia Dinh Province area. The second phase, from 15 September to 15 October, the Brigade gradually phased out of Gia Dinh and simultaneously began operations in the Ben Cat/Phu Hoa Districts of Binh Duong Province. Finally, from 16 October to 31 October the Brigade continued operations in Binh Duong and made preparations for redeployment to CONUS. For security reasons the program to explain the movement out of Gia Dinh was not initiated until the battalions had left their respective area of operation. At that time an extensive program was employed explaining that the Brigade was leaving the area only because the GVN was now capable of taking over. The program involved the use of leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, posters, and newspapers and was conducted primarily by Capital Military District as it was felt that it would be in poor taste for the Brigade to discuss the capabilities of the GVN with the Vietnamese people. Psychological Operations in the Binh Duong were necessarily limited in nature because of the brief time the Brigade would be operating there prior to redeployment. These operations consisted mostly of leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts, especially over areas of enemy contact. The redeployment of the Brigade was not exploited during psychological operations in Binh Duong since it was assumed that the Brigade would be replaced by another U.S. troops in that area.

3. In support of the Brigade psychological operations program, the U.S. Air Force flew "Gabby" and "Earlybird" missions utilizing C-47 and U-10 aircraft. Leaflets, tapes and movies were provided by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office and 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

G. (6) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development support.

1. During the reporting period the Brigade continued civil operations in the Gia Dinh Province area. Between 10 September and 15 October the Brigade phased out of Gia Dinh and phased into the Ben Cat/Phu Hoa Districts of Binh Duong Province. The Brigade continued to support the GVN in the form of aid to the villages (medicaps, dentcaps, improvement of sanitary facilities, road improvements, distribution of building materials, etc.). By 15 October all the projects in the old area of operations in Binh Duong Province were of a limited nature both because of the brief duration before redeployment and because of the sparsity of people within the Ben
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969

Cat District Area of Operations. Throughout the reporting period the Brigade continued to conduct Medcaps using Brigade medical personnel. Dentcaps were also conducted by the U.S. Air Force. Finally the Brigade continued to conduct Saturday morning trips for school children to see the Saigon Zoo, the Presidential Palace, the American Embassy, and the Saigon docks.

2. Civil affairs accomplishments during the period.

   a. Medcaps - 76 People treated - 9,116
   b. Dentcaps - 12 People treated - 598
   c. Materials & Commodities distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>89 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin sheets</td>
<td>414 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>7,000 Bd Ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricks</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>400 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand</td>
<td>16 cubic meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverts</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand bags</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer stakes</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecticide sprayer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VN Flags</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health kits</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing kits</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing kits</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matches</td>
<td>2,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candy</td>
<td>635 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assorted food</td>
<td>2,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>372 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. (c) Communications.

1. During the reporting period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969, the 58th Signal Company and communications elements of subordinate battalions were tasked with relocating communications equipment and in turn re-engineering the various means of communications for the Brigade. This was due to the relocation of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division from the Saigon area under CMAC operational control to the Phu Loi area under II Field Force operational control. The following is the Brigade operational and administrative communications system as of 31 October 1969:

   a. VHF Radio Relay Systems:

       (1) 12 channel radio relay system provides common user telephone trunks for administrative traffic between the Brigade Main Command Post at Phu Loi Post

and the Brigade Rear Base Camp at Camp Red Ball.

(2) 4 channel radio relay systems provide TOC to TOC hotlines, artillery coordination hotlines, and common user telephone trunks between the Brigade Main CP and the fire support bases of the subordinate infantry battalions and artillery battalion.

b. FM Radio Nets: The Brigade operates a Brigade Command Net, a Brigade Secure Net, and a Brigade Surveillance Net, primarily for tactical operational traffic, and enters the II Field Force Command and Secure Nets.

c. Radio teletypewriter Net: The Brigade maintains an AM/SSB RTT Net including all its subordinate battalions though normally passing only limited intelligence traffic, the net has proved invaluable for maintaining administrative and casualty reporting traffic with battalions operating temporarily under a different headquarters at extended ranges from Brigade.

2. Additional communications support provided from outside the Brigade are as follows:

a. At Phu Loi Post, Company B/44, 36th Signal Battalion, provides post signal functions including a manual telephone exchange with access to the Corps area network and over-the-counter communications center service with access into the world wide communications center network. During the relocation of Brigade Main to Phu Loi Post, Company B/44, 36th Signal Battalion supported the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division in an outstanding manner by doubling the Brigade Class A phones to the various battalion standdown areas at Phu Loi Post.

b. 55d Signal Battalion, II Field Force, provided a radioteletypewriter set AN/GRC-122 at Phu Loi for entry into the II Field Force RTT Net.

c. 53d Signal Battalion, II Field Force, provides 12 channel radio relay system for sole user telephone "hotlines" for TOC operational traffic, dedicated teletypewriter circuit for command and control traffic, and common user telephone trunks for administrative traffic between II Field Force and the Brigade Main Command Post at Phu Loi Post.

d. The 69th Signal Battalion and the 40th Signal Battalion provides telephone pole installation support to the Brigade as required. The 40th Signal Battalion assisted the 58th Signal Company in the installation of telephone poles at the standdown area and VHF at Phu Loi Post.

e. At Camp Red Ball the 69th Signal Battalion provides dial lines into the MAOV Dial Telephone Exchange and 3 trunks from the Brigade Chippewa Rear Switchboard to MAOV, providing access to the area system.

3. The Brigade MARS Station operated by the 58th Signal Company completed the following number of MARS calls during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALLS COMPLETED</th>
<th>RED CROSS PRIORITY CALLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. (U) Information: During the reporting period the Public Information Office accomplished the following activities:

1. Hometown news released........................................ 825
2. Photographs with caption released......................... 100
3. Features/news stories....................................... 60
4. Processed film................................................. 259
5. Photographs processed/distributed.......................... 3713
6. Radio broadcasts............................................... 6
7. Number of National news media representatives escorted... 21

J. (C) Inspector General Activities.

1. The IG office coordinated the Command Readiness Inspection of nine subordinate units. Inspections were discontinued following notification of redeployment.
2. One investigation was conducted.
3. Five requests for assistance were received and processed.
4. A total of 41 complaints were received, of which 13 had some justification. Of the 13, 12 were resolved locally, and one is pending action by the Finance Center, U.S. Army.

K. (C) Staff Judge Advocate activities for the period:

1. Total persons punished: 341
   (a) E4 or below 323
   (b) E5 or above 18
   (c) Commissioned 0
2. Personnel who were offered and refused to accept nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 UCMJ: 2
3. Actions favorable to persons, i.e., vacation of suspense: 15
AVBK-AC  CONFIDENTIAL

4. Actions unfavorable to persons, i.e. vacation of suspense: 14
5. Total number of appeals: 12
6. Summary Courts: 9
7. Special Courts: 10
8. Legal Assistance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>CORRESPONDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption and change of name</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship, Immigration &amp; Passports</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Relations and Paternity</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of Attorney</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notarizations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Finances, Debts, Insurance etc</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Property</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wills and Estates</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. (c) Section 2

A. Personnel: None

B. Operations.

(1) Proper use of stay behind forces upon enemy recon by fire actions.

(a) OBSERVATION: During recent operations more and more use has been made of stay behind forces when an element is moved from an area of operations. It has been noted in almost every case that enemy forces have reconnoitered by fire the area near where the stay behind force was positioned. In some cases, the stay behind forces almost immediately returned the fire giving their position away.

(b) EVALUATION: Unit commanders should caution any personnel who are being used as a stay behind force, that the enemy is in the practice of reconning by fire. Personnel should be reminded that unless there is sufficient fire to indicate an enemy attack, fire should be held to keep friendly positions hidden from the enemy and to deceive him into believing that there are no stay behind forces left in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all unit commanders who are planning to use extensive stay behind forces be encouraged to thoroughly indoctrinate personnel to be used on the importance of maintaining secrecy of their positions. Since recon by fire is being used more and more by enemy local and main force units, it is important that all personnel are made aware of the fact that they should hold their fire until told by their leaders to open fire.

(2) Detection of enemy digging.

(a) OBSERVATION: Captured NVA disclosed that fresh dirt from digging tunnels, bunkers, is dumped into a rice paddy (still under water) or an old well.

(b) EVALUATION: This dirt will turn a part of the rice paddy into a muddy color which contrasts with the rest of the paddy and can be detected by alert observers from the air.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all airborne observers be alert for rice paddies with a muddy color which contrasts with the rest of the rice paddy, as a possible indication of enemy digging in the area.

(3) Testing of Radar Equipment and Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Numerous radar sightings of moving and stationary targets were engaged by artillery during this period with negative results.
CONFIDENTIAL


(b) EVALUATION: The Battalion S-2 conducted 4 tests on 24 Aug 69 using stationary and moving personnel at designated locations to determine the validity of the radar sightings. The tests showed that only 50% of the readings were accurate.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All infantry battalion intelligence sections should make periodic checks of radar equipment to ensure a high standard of performance of equipment and personnel.

(4) Battalion Observer in Firefly Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Numerous Firefly operations were flown by observers from 1-508 (ABN) DIF during this period with unsatisfactory results.

(b) EVALUATION: Firefly observers report that navigation is virtually impossible when flying at low levels in the "light ship". The observer's ability to clear targets is thus extremely limited. At present the observer must rely upon the pilot of the Command and Control aircraft to determine the location of targets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The Bn Observer should ride in the Command and Control aircraft. At present the Command and Control aircraft is a UH-1B model and weight limitations prohibit the observer from flying in this aircraft. It is therefore recommended that a UH-1D model be used as the Command and Control aircraft.

(5) Use of Panel Markers on 17's and 17's.

(a) OBSERVATION: Identification of ground units by munitions and the Command and Control aircraft on numerous Popper missions has been difficult. Identification is not difficult on the P7 or 17; it is difficult once the ground units have deployed and begun their search.

(b) EVALUATION: Smoke has been used excessively to mark friendly locations for aircraft. The use of smoke alerts the enemy to friendly locations and the approach of aircraft. Panel markers can be easily identified by aircraft but are extremely difficult for the enemy to identify.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Increased reliance upon the use of panel markers to mark friendly locations with a decreased use of smoke.

(6) Placement of ambush patrols.

(a) OBSERVATION: Ambushes along avenues of approach to one battalion were not resulting in many contacts.
AV3K-AC

(b) EVALUATION: The NVA apparently were not entering the AO along these avenues. Numerous radar sightings indicated there were some enemy personnel moving within the AO. On the eve of 22 Aug, rather than ambushing along likely avenues of approach into one part of the AO, one company placed five of six ambushes around one hamlet. That night contact was gained and later 8 NVA were captured.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The enemy has been known to frequently use villages to hide out during the day. By ambushing around villages and hamlets, the enemy can be engaged as he attempts to enter or leave.

(7) Combined Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period all subordinate units conducted extensive combined operations with ARVN units within and surrounding particular US areas of operations.

(b) EVALUATION: To better prepare ARVN units to take over that portion of the Saigon defense perimeter occupied by the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, additional emphasis was placed on combined operations. Each battalion was instructed by Brigade to establish liaison with adjacent ARVN units for the conduct of combined squad, platoon, and company size day and night operations. These operations included night ambushes, road searches and recon missions, cordon and search operations, sweep and blocking forces, airmobile power missions, and waterborne patrols. All operations were conducted under combined US-ARVN command and control even though some elements consisted of pure US, pure Vietnamese, or integrated US-ARVN forces.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The combined operations proved very successful for both the ARVN units involved and the 3d. Several enemy caches were uncovered. The ARVN units were able to familiarize themselves with the battalion area thus making them better prepared to assume the mission of defending Saigon against infiltration and rocket attacks. It was determined that better coordination could be established if operations were planned directly between US and ARVN battalion headquarters and in many cases, directly between the US and Vietnamese company commanders involved.

(8) Operations in inundated terrain

(a) OBSERVATION: The inundated nature of the terrain in the pineapple area requires maximum use of airmobile and waterborne assets in order to take a natural advantage away from the enemy and facilitate tactical and administrative troop movements which would otherwise be extremely difficult or impossible if done by foot or vehicle.
CONIFIDENIAL


(b) EVALUATION: The difficulty of movement in the pineapple region makes complete area coverage extremely difficult. Ideally companies should remain in the field a minimum of three days up to a maximum of nine days in order to gain familiarity with enemy tactics, activity, and possible contact areas. The use of helicopters and watercraft enables elements to cover the entire battalion area rapidly and make tactical and administrative troop movements without unnecessary wear and tear on the individual soldier.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: With advance planning and coordination, air and waterborne assets can be used to cover the entire battalion area rapidly and make tactical and administrative troop movements without unnecessary wear and tear on the individual soldier.

9) Weapons Platoon

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the nature of tactical operations, terrain, and shortage of trained personnel, it was determined that the 81mm mortar platoon within each maneuver company was both impractical and inefficient for the purpose of indirect fire support when compared to artillery and the battalion heavy mortar platoon.

(b) EVALUATION: To improve efficiency, the line company mortar squads were disbanded, and selected personnel and equipment were used to form a weapons platoon for general and direct support of battalion line companies. This platoon consists of four mortar sections, 2 81mm, and one officer platoon leader. A great deal of flexibility is gained by an organization of this type. In the event a line company is in a location where indirect fire support is not available, one or more 81mm mortar sections and accompanying POC can be deployed to their location for an indefinite period under the operational control of the company commander. When sections are not needed to provide direct support to companies, platoon integrity can be maintained to be used to compliment the heavy mortar platoon in its mission of providing indirect fire support to the infantry battalion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Formation of the weapons platoon has been efficient and effective for several reasons. Selected individuals can be trained for the platoon thus eliminating a drain on infantry troops that had occurred when each line company had its own weapons platoon. Resupply is facilitated by eliminating duplication. Indirect fire support control and coordination is more efficient and a higher level of operational proficiency can be maintained.

(1) Use of Riot Control Agent 33

(a) OBSERVATION: Riot Control munitions should be used more extensively, where possible, to exploit tactically the ability to temporarily disable unprotected enemy troops or "flush" them from concealed or fortified positions. Emphasis should be placed on the use of CS as a stimulant for the enemy to "Chieu Hoi" or surrender, rather than merely as a method for providing incapacitated targets for gunships or ground troops.

(b) EVALUATION: All Brigade tactical units are currently equipped with XM28 lightweight riot control agent mask. When non-persistent riot control munitions are used, such as the E158 (aerial) or E8 (ground) the CS concentration usually dissipates within 10 minutes after employment. Riot control agent CS may temporarily disable unprotected hostile troops, suppress their fire, "flush" them out of concealed positions, and reduce their ability to maneuver. Riot control munitions are especially useful when the exact location of the enemy troops is unknown, in dense vegetation, or in conjunction with sensor readings, as one munition (E158) will initially cover an area approximately 6500 square meters. An attempt was made to employ E158 munitions in reaction to high Sniffer readings, but approval was denied by the ground commander because "friendly troops were in the area." If the friendly troops had their XM28 masks, the munitions could have been employed, possibly with results. The munitions, however, should not be employed in close proximity to densely populated areas, as the civilians may experience extreme discomfort. As a guideline, on a warm day (lapse condition) riot control munitions should not be employed within 2 kilometers of friendly villages (downwind of target area); on cool, overcast days (neutral conditions) the minimum distance should be at least 4 kilometers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Riot Control munitions should be used more extensively, weather and terrain permitting, to reduce enemy observation, fire and movement, or "flush" from concealed positions, especially in support of sensor readings or when enemy location is uncertain. Commanders should insure that their troops carry their XM28 masks on operations, and that the masks and carriers are in serviceable condition.

(11) Use of herbicide agents in firebase/perimeter defoliation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Defoliants (chemicals used to kill vegetation or inhibit vegetation growth) in RVN are in extremely short supply and insufficient quantities are on hand for defoliation of all the areas that are in need of defoliation, including all firebases and base camps.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBK-AC


(b) EVALUATION: Defoliants should be used on the vegetation in areas inaccessible for removal by methods such as cutting or burning. These may be areas within barbed wire, or areas containing uncharted minefields such as those found in Phu Loi Post. In areas readily accessible, where cutting or burning may not be used for removal of vegetation, a mixture of JP-4 and diesel fuel (1 to 1 ratio) is almost as effective as the defoliants. Hand pumps, such as a 2-gallon hand fire extinguisher, should be used. Do not use any type of power driven machinery to disperse the JP-4/diesel mixture, as it is extremely flammable and any sparks may cause the mixture to ignite violently.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Defoliants should be used for vegetation removal primarily where access to the area is restricted by barbed wire entanglements, minefields, etc. In areas which are accessible, vegetation may be removed by cutting, burning, or application of a JP-4/diesel mixture using a hand pump sprayer.

(12) Land Clearing Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: After land clearing more than 700 acres in various types of terrain with D-7E Dozers, it was found that a systematic pattern of box dozing produced the most efficient results. See diagram next page.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: That the shown pattern be used in land clearing operations. Also when land clearing a heavily vegetated area, an angle type blade should be used rather than a straight type blade. This is due to the fact that vegetation and earth are quickly accumulated in front of the straight blade, whereas this vegetation and earth would slide off to the side using an angle blade. This causes less strain on the tractor and also results in a more efficient operation. A ground guide should be used when bulldozing in a heavily vegetated terrain. This is to preclude the possibility of the dozer becoming immobilized by walls and gullies or other hazards not readily visible to the operator. It is recommended that a maximum of two to three inch deep cuts be used when clearing. This will uncover any tunnel entrances present without completely destroying the tunnel itself. Also this will prevent exposing softer earth at greater depths which is always a hazard to heavy equipment.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVAK-AG
SUBJECT: Operation report of 21 Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969.

(13) Skin disorders common to soldiers in an inundated area.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several soldiers in this Battalion have had skin disorders of their lower ankles and feet.

(b) EVALUATION: In a very wet area such as the Pineapple area southwest of Saigon, it is very difficult for soldiers in line companies to keep their feet dry. High, dry ground is at a premium, and seasonal rains tend to complicate the problem. Though these men practice proper foot care such as changing socks, airing their feet, using foot powder, etc., skin disorders still have arisen.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The maximum length of time that a soldier should remain in the Pineapple area is four days. At the end of this time he should rotate to a firebase (in this case Claudette, Barbara, or Kathy) for a period of about four days before returning to the inundated area. At the firebase, skin disorders are permitted to heal before they become so serious that he must be declared a casualty.

(14) Joint staff operations between 1-508th Inf and Phu Hoa District.

(a) OBSERVATION: Frequent exchange of battalion level staff procedures with district representatives has had a favorable effect upon the district's staff.

(b) EVALUATION: Vietnamese representatives at District level (for example, the Phu Hoa District Chief) are eager to improve their staff procedures. District advisors (US) report that, during the period 1-15 October, there has been a marked improvement in Vietnamese staff procedures at District level. This improvement is attributed to the fact that Vietnamese staff members were invited to observe and participate in our battalion's staff planning, particularly in operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Increased effort should be made to have the Vietnamese participate in the planning of combined operations with a decreased role being given to their US advisors. The result should be improved Vietnamese staff procedures and increased coordination during combined operations.

(15) Tunnel Complexes

(a) OBSERVATION: Many tunnel complexes in the Iron Triangle were found to be multilevel with trap doors between tunnels. Often, smoke or CS will not penetrate the various levels.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: All tunnels must be thoroughly explored by tunnel rats if all levels are to be cleared of enemy troops and all caches discovered.

c. Other

1. (U) Item: Idle Line Termination, AN/GRC-163.

   (a) OBSERVATION: During the installation of AN/GRC-163 Systems, extremely high noise levels on the AN/TCC-70 resulted in an inability to "lock" onto the 1-KC sync signal. When all four voice channels were terminated in non-idle equipment, however, the noise level was reduced sufficiently to allow proper operation.

   (b) EVALUATION: The AN/TCC-70 has an extremely high channel gain. When unterminated, sufficient noise is reflected through the channel hybrid to literally turn off the system. This is due to the fact that the AN/TCC-70 will sync only when the Signal (1-KC) to noise ratio is above a certain level.

   Most tactical equipment provides no idle line termination, and hence terminating the channels in this equipment does little to resolve the problem outlined above. However strapping 600 ohm resistors across the channel terminals resolves this problem for the idle condition. With the terminating equipment in use the hybrid is out of balance, seeing 300 ohms rather than 600. However, this does not degrade service beyond an acceptable level.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: The manufacturer should reduce the channel gain on the AN/TCC-70 to preclude idle channel problems.

2. (U) Item: Ringing Problems, AN/GRC-163.

   (a) OBSERVATION: The Z-4 ringer module has a relatively high failure rate. The TA-182 can be substituted to provide a ringing capability for each channel.

   (b) EVALUATION: None.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: None.


   (a) OBSERVATION: Occasional interference has been encountered between the AN/TPS-25 Radar Set and the AN/VRC-12 - AN/PRC-25 series of FM radios. Interference has been of sufficient magnitude at times to preclude communications.

   (b) EVALUATION: Improper grounding in the Magnetron of the TPS-25 is a possible source of spurious radiation. Interference has been noticed up to distances of 100 to 150 meters and across the entire 30.00 to 75.95 band.

   In addition, Radar Set alignment can be quite critical.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: The Electronics Command should investigate Frequency Interference problems associated with the AN/TPS-25.
CONFIDENTIAL

BATTALION AO's
1 AUG-30 SEPT 69
REF: SPECIAL USE
SE ASIA 1:100,000
SHEETS 6230, 6330

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1st BN, 505th INF A/D
1 Oct 69-31 Oct 69
REF: SPECIAL USE
SE ASIA MAP
1:100,000
SHEETS 6330-46331

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H (20 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the Period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969 RCS CSPQR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORGEV, APO San Francisco 96266 5 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the period ending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (20 Nov 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the Period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 28 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Detection of enemy digging", page 57, paragraph 2B(2); concur. Aerial observers must be alert for all sightings which are contrast to the surrounding area. An Aerial Scout Observer Course was opened at Fort Knox, July 1969. Personnel completing this course are programmed for assignments to Air Cav units.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Testing of Radar Equipment and Personnel", page 57, paragraph 2B(3); concur. Radar equipment should be checked for accuracy as frequently as possible, using both stationary and moving targets. The requirement for making periodic checks of this equipment should be included in the Unit Field SOP.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of Panel Markers on LZ's and PZ's", page 58, paragraph 2B(5); concur. In addition to comments made in the evaluation, smoke is an expensive item to use excessively when a more suitable and less expensive item (panel marker) is available for marking and identification.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Placement of ambush patrols", page 58, paragraph 2B(6); concur. Relocating of friendly ambush sites is necessary when contact is not being made with known enemy forces operating in the AO. The enemy frequently change their route of movement to avoid being ambushed. Additionally, the enemy intelligence source give him information as to the location of ambush sites.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of Riot Control Agent, CS", page 60, paragraph 2B(10); concur. The minimum safe distance discussed in the evaluation should be adequate to prevent casualties to unprotected personnel. However, when using riot control munitions, special attention must be given to wind speed and direction, weather conditions, and proximity of unprotected friendly troops and local villagers.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of herbicide agents in fire-base/perimeter defoliation", page 61, paragraph 2B(11); concur. When using defoliants, consideration must be given to the damage of crops/cultivated areas. The continuous use of diesel fuel as a defoliant on an area will eventually sterilize the soil. Hand pumps may be used when

CONFLICTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
CONFIDENTIAL
AVHGC-DST (20 Nov 69) /d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the Period Ending 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969 (U)

spraying over small areas; however, this method of dispersal is not as effective as the aerial or power driven method.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Skin disorders common to soldiers in an inundated area", page 64, paragraph 2B(13). Concur, however, a stand down period after 48 hours is ideal when troops are operating in inundated areas. This item was presented at the last USARV Surgeons' Conference and published in USARV Training Newsletter No. 6-69, dated 19 November 1969.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Idle Line Termination, AN/GRC-163", page 65, paragraph 2C(1); concur. This problem is presently under evaluation by an ECOM representative working with the Americal Division.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Radar—Radio Interference", page 65, paragraph 2C(3); concur. ECOM representatives are currently in the field investigating the sources of this interference.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
L.D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
3d/82d ABN BDE
II FPV

Cy furn:
3d/82d ABN BDE
II FPV

72
CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (20 Nov 69) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Assl AG
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, HQ, 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CG, 3D Brigade, 82D Airborne Division

REPORT TITLE

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, HQ, 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.