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18 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR 0T UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lesson Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, AGS CSPOR - 65 (R2)(U)

1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
a. General,
   (1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation DAN QUY4N - HINUS.
   (2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation HINUS, 1 August - 31 October 1969, is set forth at Inclosure 1.
   (3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.
   (4) Locations, coordinates for villages, LZ's and FSB's are listed at Inclosure 6.
   (5) Mission. The Division's general mission during this reporting period was to conduct operations in support of GVN pacification programs; provide reaction forces to counter enemy attacks against key installations and populated centers; conduct operations to screen the CAMBODIAN Border and to interdict enemy infiltration routes; secure lines of communication in the Division area of operations; maintain coordination and liaison with GVN forces and agencies; conduct offensive operations to destroy NVA and main force enemy units and be prepared to deploy one brigade with three battalions to conduct operations anywhere in VIETNAM,
   (6) Concept of Operation. The Division accomplished its multiple missions by deploying units to areas of operation where several tasks could be performed simultaneously. Tasks which exceeded brigade control capabilities or which required assets not available to brigades were assigned missions under Division control.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (HQ) (U)

(a) Pacification: The 1st Brigade was responsible for that portion of Bình Định Province that lies in the Division area. One battalion was assigned responsibility for An To记者了解, while Bình Sơn District received a smaller effort because of its size. The 2d Brigade, with no fixed AO, conducted civic action projects in each of its areas of operation. The 3d Brigade was assigned responsibility in each of the three districts.

(b) Screen the Western approaches into the Division Area of Operations. The Division cavalry squadron under Division control accomplished this mission. It was assigned an area of operation along the Cambodian border from the southern Pleiku Trap Valley in the north to the Ia Drang Valley in the south to include the Chu Pà Mountains.

(c) Interdiction of Infiltration Routes: The infiltration route that starts in the Chu Pà Mountain area and runs east in Lệ Thungan District crossing Highway 14 midway between Pleiku and Kontum Cities were assigned to the battalion stationed in Lệ Thungan District. The cavalry squadron was assigned the western origin of the infiltration route that originates in the IA Drang Valley and runs east, crossing Highway 14S, 20-30 kilometers south of Pleiku City. The remainder of this route was assigned to the battalions with the mission of pacification in the Thanh An and Phú Núơn Districts where the route passes through their areas of operation.

(d) Highway Security: Highway 19A was secured by the tank battalion, reinforced, under Division control. The remaining routes were secured by the battalion with pacification responsibility in the district through which the route passes.

(e) Reaction Forces: The Division was prepared to counter enemy attacks against key installations and population centers within its area of operation. The concept was to relieve GVN forces in security missions to permit them to effect direct reinforcement. If this was not possible, the Division was prepared to employ forces first to cut off enemy withdrawal routes; second, to attack the enemy forces directly; and third, to reinforce the defenders. Primary responsibility rested with the brigade or separate battalion/squadron within whose area of operation the attack took place.

(f) Liaison with GVN: The Division maintained continuous liaison with Headquarters, II Corps. The brigades maintained continuous liaison with the provinces in which they are located. Battalions assigned a pacification mission maintained continuous liaison with
SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, HHC CSFOR-65 (R2) (C)

The district to which they were assigned.

(g) Deter and Defeat Major Ground Attacks against PLÉIKU and BINH BINH Provinces: The Division was deployed to cover all avenues of approach either by maneuver units or surveillance by a variety of means. The approach of major enemy units would be blocked by screening forces employing multiple means of fire support.

(h) Swing Brigade: The Division concept of operation calls for one brigade of three battalions with no fixed area of operation. This brigade was to be available for employment anywhere within or outside of the Division area of operations. Due to directed missions in the AN LAO Valley and increased enemy activity in PLÉIKU, this concept has not been fully implemented so far.

b. Intelligence.

(l) General: Enemy activity throughout the Division area of operation during August remained light. All three NVA Regiments which had participated in the Sommer Offensive withdrew into CAMBODIAN sanctuaries during July and were inactive during August. In KONTUM Province, the 304th Local Force Battalion attempted to fill the void created when the 28th and 66th NVA Regiments withdrew to CAMBODIA, and conducted frequent standoff attacks in the TANH CANH - DINH BINH area.

In PLÉIKU Province, local force units intensified their harassing activity and stepped up village attacks, propaganda lectures, and civilian proselytizing while the 24th Regiment continued to resupply

Elsewhere, the 95B Regiment, operating along the PLÉIKU - BINH BINH border, was the only NVA regiment to remain active in the Division area of operation. The K-2 Battalion, 95B Regiment continued their interdiction of Highway 19 and harassed convoys and fixed installations along the highway between LZ ACTION and the MANG YANG Pass.

Increases in enemy activity in WUANG DUC and DARLAC Provinces required the deployment of a task force of one rifle company, an air cavalry troop and a ground cavalry troop to BAN MA THUOT on 1 September. This task force secured the ASP and airfield at BAN MA THUOT East and conducted surveillance operations along the CAMBODIAN Border in southern II Corps in support of the 23d ARVN Division.
During September, enemy activity decreased throughout the division area of operation. Local force units continued to be responsible for most of the enemy activity as they increased their village harassment. Activity was strongest in Binh Dinh Province where elements of the 9th Brigade concluded operations against the 18th NVA Regiment and elements of the 95th Regiment and commenced an operation against the GTA LAI Provincial Committee to the northwest of An Khe. In addition, the 2d Brigade deployed to Binh Dinh Province and commenced a combined operation with ROKA forces in Bane Area 226 targeted against the 13th NVA Regiment.

Increased enemy reconnaissance and activities in early October indicated that the enemy forces were preparing to launch an Autumn Offensive in Phuoc Long and Kontum Provinces. In Phuoc Long Province, friendly forces began to make increasing contact with NVA elements moving east and northeast out of the Chu Pah. It was believed that the 29th NVA Regiment and its 6th Battalion had infiltrated back into the Chu Pah and were preparing for a highpoint. A LiP screen deployed west of Plei Nin confirmed this movement and the 2d Battalion, 8th Mechanized Infantry was deployed and became engaged in a sustained series of contacts that were still in progress at the close of the reporting period. To the south, ARVN forces captured an individual from the 91st Composite Battalion west of Plei Khi near the ROCKET BOX. Contacts intensified daily and culminated on 25 October, when enemy forces launched a highpoint in their Autumn Offensive. Although Camp Enari, LZ OASIS, and US installations in Plei Khi received rocket attacks, RP/FP elements and rural villages and hamlets were the prime enemy targets. Villages to the southeast of Camp Enari, such as Plei Do Linh and Plei Pham KeAh, received mortar attacks during this period.

In Kontum Province, enemy activity increased daily throughout the month of October until it also reached a highpoint of 25 October. Allied installations received mortar and rocket attacks. Villages and the District Headquarters at Old Pah TQ received frequent standoff attacks and light ground probes. Since that time, ARVN forces have repeatedly made contact with enemy units operating in Kontum Province.

In Quang Duc Province, reliable intelligence still indicated heavy enemy deployment in the II Corps - III Corps border area. By late October, the enemy had shifted their forces to the northwest and posed a threat to 2U PRANG and DUC LAP. During the last week of October, DUC LAP, 2U PRANG and firebases in the 2U PRANG area received heavy recoilless rifle and mortar fire but no major ground attacks.

A possible change in enemy tactics was noted in October with the capture of COVNP Resolution #9. This document plus other documents
captured throughout South Vietnam indicated that enemy inventories were to distant NVA units and assign the cadre to local force units giving the appearance that the NVA units have left the country.

(a) KONTUM: During the months of August, main force NVA units, such as the 28th and 66th Regiments, and elements of the 50th NVA Artillery Regiment continued to conduct re-supply and resupply activities in their CAMP Vinh sanctuaries in the Tri-Border area following their Summer Offensive in the DAK TO - Bien Hac area. To fill the hold left by the NVA forces, the 21st Main Force Battalion increased its activities during August and initiated standoff attacks against KON LONG, KON KONG, THAN CAI, THUAN BANG, and DAK TO. The KONTUM City area was the prime source of the month's most significant activity. On 25 August, KONTUM City received a rocket and mortar attack from an element of the 15th Artillery Battalion, and a bridge on Highway 14 north of the city was destroyed by an unknown size force. Elsewhere in the Province, KON KLEANG Village received a battalion size attack from the 5th Battalion, 21st NVA Regiment. Documents and prisoners of war attested to the fact that the 5th Battalion has been redesignated the 94th Group and had the responsibility of protecting the northern sanctuaries and resupply route running from the MAI TIAI Border area to the 1st NVA Division located in southern I Corps. The 94th Group was also given the responsibility of conducting harassing attacks in the MAI DAO area.

Enemy activity decreased throughout KONTUM in September and consisted of the mining of Highway 14 between KONTUM City and DAK TO and sporadic village engagements. The most significant attack occurred on 25 September, when the village of MY KAI received three separate standoff attacks and light ground probes from estimated company size forces. Activity remained light until the first week of October, when increased enemy activity was noted in the DAK TO area.

During the first week of October, Special Forces elements made frequent contact with enemy units. In addition to the activity in the DAK TO area, frequent enemy reconnaissance activity was noted in the DAK TO - Bien Hac area. A battalion of NVA moved 22nd Main Force Battalion into the Tri-Border area. On 4 October, the 102nd Scout Company (ARVN) made contact with a squad size enemy element north of KONTUM City resulting in two NVA captured. Examination of the POW's revealed that their unit was the 206th Sapper Battalion. This was the first identification of the 206th Sapper Battalion in over a year.
Documents captured late in the month once again identified elements of the 40th Sapper Battalion.

Enemy activity increased throughout the month and reached a high point on 25 October when the enemy launched their current offensive. ARVN installations received heavy mortar attacks and ARVN ground and cavalry elements made numerous contacts with enemy forces. Activity was moderate for the remainder of the month.

(b) PLEIKU: Following the termination of the enemy’s Summer Offensive in July, both NVA and VC main force units withdrew into their base areas to refit and resupply. During the month of August, enemy activity in PLEIKU Province was limited to harassing attacks by local guerilla forces against villages and hamlets located in rural areas. Enemy forces appeared to be content with limited disruption of the GVN Pacification effort. These harassing activities increased in intensity until the highpoint was reached in September. Elements of the 31st Composite Battalion, operating out of the southern CHU PA, staged infrequent standoff attacks on friendly installations following in the PLEIKU - Camp Varnu area during August and September. Although there was a noted decrease in attacks on villages and friendly installations following the mid-September highpoint, increasing reconnaissance activity by elements of the 4th Battalion, 24th Regiment in the PLEIKU area and the 631st Composite Battalion in the PLEIKU area, indicated that enemy forces were once again preparing for a new offensive.

Contacts and LRP sightings to the west and northwest of PLEIKU during the first week of October, confirmed enemy movement out of the CHU PA. It was also believed that the 6th Battalion and the remainder of the 24th NVA Regiment would shortly move back into the CHU PA from their CAMBODIAN sanctuary. Increased contacts with enemy forces around PLEIKU in mid-October indicated that the 24th Regiment had completed resupply and staging operations and was prepared to initiate attacks on villages and friendly installations in the PLEIKU area and also commence interdiction of Highway 14 between PLEIKU and KONTUM. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mechanized) began to encounter platoons and company size NVA forces on a daily basis. Documents captured during these contacts identified elements of both the 4th and 6th Battalions, 24th Regiment. Elsewhere in PLEIKU, the 631st Composite Battalion re-established their offensive and subjected LZ OASIS to their first recent and mortar attack in more than five months. The 631st Composite Battalion continued their participation in the enemy offensive and rocketed allied installations in PLEIKU and finally Camp Varnu during the last week of October.
In August, the 1st Brigade continued their operation targeted against the 13th NVA Regiment in their extensive base area to the northeast of AN KHE. Elements of the 13th NVA Regiment had been evading to the north since mid-July in an effort to avoid decisive contact with the 1st Brigade forces. One battalion from the 1st Brigade was lifted to an area north of the regiment's location in an attempt to drive the enemy back into friendly elements sweeping from the south. Following sporadic contact in the northern area, the 13th NVA Regiment fled northeast across the SONG CON River into Base Area 226, leaving behind rear security elements to slow down friendly forces in pursuit. Sporadic contact with the small size units occurred throughout the month of August. The numerous bunker complexes found, contacts with enemy forces, heavy ground-to-air fire encountered, the uncovering of a hospital complex, and the discovery of weapons and rice caches attested to the regiment's extensive use of the area as a base area. When the 1st Brigade terminated their operation against the 13th NVA Regiment, they had accounted for over 300 NVA/VC killed and 5,000 pounds of rice captured.

Elsewhere in Southern BIH DIIN, the K-2 Battalion, 95B Regiment increased their interdiction of Highway 19 between the MANG YANG Pass and LZ ACTION during August. In late August, a large number of APD readings, mortar activations, and visual reconnaissance sightings indicated that elements of the K-2 Battalion located north of the Highway 19 were moving south on their way to VC Valley for resupply. At this time, the 1st Brigade commenced a multi battalion operation in VC Valley targeted against the K-2 Battalion, 95B Regiment.

In mid-September, 1st Brigade forces terminated their successful operation targeted against the 95B Regiment. The Regiment was forced to break down into squad size elements in an attempt to evade the sweeping forces, but not before they lost 94 KIA, 5 tons of rice, and miscellaneous small arms and munitions. In addition, more than 7,246,850 plaster were removed from the bodies of two dead NVA officers. Prior to the termination of the VC Valley operation, 1st Brigade initiated an operation against the GIA LAI Provincial Committee in their base area to the northwest of AN KHE. Only sporadic contact was encountered with squad size security elements from the Provincial Unit. Following this operation, Division attention was directed once again to the 13th NVA Regiment which had relocated into its old base area in Base Area 226. After the operation had commenced, the 2d Brigade elements were joined by ROKA forces to conduct a combined operation against the 13th NVA Regiment and what were believed to be elements of the BIH DIIN Provincial Unit. Although only sporadic contact could be made, over 28 tons of material were captured and over 120 enemy killed by combined forces.
Enemy activity remained light until late October when enemy forces increase their highway interdiction to the east and west of AN KHE. Forty NVA were killed to the northeast of AN KHE during the last week of October following an attempted convoy attack.

(d) DARLAC and QUANG DUC: Enemy activity in DARLAC Province remained constant with previous months. As in the past, BAN ME THUOT City continued to provide the most lucrative target. In August, BAN ME THUOT was subjected to two standoff attacks from elements of the K 394th Composite Battalion. Elsewhere, enemy activity was limited to sporadic ground probes in an area south of the city.

During September, enemy elements concentrated on harassing outposts and villages to the north and northeast of BAN ME THUOT City, while attacks on BAN ME THUOT itself ceased. It was later learned from prisoners that the K 394th had moved into Base Area 740 to conduct training. However, one prisoner captured from the battalion stated that the K 394th had left behind an element to harass the city. Activity increased in October, as enemy elements stepped up their harassment to the north and northeast of BAN ME THUOT. In addition to this, local force elements intensified interdiction of Highway 21 east of the city. In mid-October, documents were captured north of the city identifying elements of the 301st Local Force Battalion. Although the 301st Local Force Battalion was believed to have left its old area of operations in HAPPY VALLEY south of Highway 21, this was the first indication that the 301st was responsible for the increased activity in the BUON HD area.

In the II Corps - III Corps Border area during October, B Troop of the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry obtained their first indication of movement in the BU PRANG area. Contact was limited to ground-to-air incidents and sporadic observation of one to two individuals. In late October, reliable intelligence indicated enemy movement northeast toward BU PRANG. Following this, the Special Forces Camp at BU PRANG, fire support bases in the area, and DUC LAP Special Forces Camp began to receive heavy recoilless rifle and mortar attacks. Enemy activity was limited to attacks by fire with no ground attacks occurring.

(2) Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength as of 31 October 1969.
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division

Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (C)

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<td>250th Transportation Group</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>DARLAC</td>
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<td>40th Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
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<td>TOTAL ENEMY FORCES</td>
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(3) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques:

(a) A Division Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRP), during the month of September, encountered a VC squad utilizing a scout dog with the point man. When the dog observed the LRP team, he commenced to bark and pointed in the direction of the LRP team thus alerting the VC element to the presence of the LRP. This was the first encounter in
the Division area of operations of enemy forces utilizing dugs as an early warning system.

(b) A significant tactic recently noted by the 4th Infantry Division forces is the enemy’s use of short fuzed RPG 7 rounds to obtain an air burst. On several occasions recently, RPG-7 rounds fired at friendly forces have detonated prior to striking a solid object. All RPG-7 rounds are armed with a self-destruct mechanism to explode after traveling approximately 800 meters. Indications are that enemy forces are taking advantage of this limitation in an effort to inflict maximum casualties.

(c) A recent operation conducted in Base Area 226 in BINH DINH Province uncovered a munitions cache belonging to the 18th NVA Regiment containing 56 rounds of mixed 107-mm and 122-mm rockets. Until this discovery, the regiment was not credited with having a rocket capability. Also, documents and a POW captured from the 95B Regiment indicated that the regiment has a cache of 122-mm rockets. Although both regiments have rocket caches, it is not believed that they have qualified artillery personnel assigned. It is possible that enemy units have stockpiled rockets in their base areas with the intention of moving in trained artillery personnel when a lucrative target presents itself.

(d) A returnee from the K-4 Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment revealed that he observed a new type of 122-mm rocket which is termed a DKB or A-12 rocket. The returnee also stated that the DKB used a shell 80 centimeters long, with a warhead 25 centimeters long. He also indicated that the tubes could be assembled together for mass firing or could be fired singly.

(e) A returnee from the 24th Regiment revealed the following security and signaling methods employed by the 24th Regiment during missions: A piece of painted luminous wood is tied to the back of the head for recognition during hours of darkness; units may identify themselves by a prearranged number of taps on a rifle butt or a particular vocal clicking sound; units may identify themselves by a white cloth or band on the arm or some predesignated place of the body such as just below the left elbow.

(f) Recent POW testimony indicated that enemy units have captured dufflebag equipment and have sent the devices to North VIETNAM for analysis. The POW also stated that the NVA have sensor teams operating in South VIETNAM with the mission of finding and
destroying or booby trapping our devices. Recently, sensor fields in the DUC CO area were found marked indicating general locations of the string and warnings to avoid the area.

(4) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses:

(a) Personnel:
   - KIA (3C) 969
   - NVA CIA 4
   - VC/VMC CIA 8
   - Total 981

(b) Weapons:
   - S/A 173
   - C/S 17
   - Total 190

(c) Ammunition:
   - S/A rounds 100,269
   - C/S rounds 1,403
   - Grenades 499
   - Mines 133

(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items:
   - Explosives 206 lbs
   - Documents 534 inches
   - Rice 39,945 lbs
   - Salt 2,082 lbs

(e) Enemy Facilities
   - Destroyed Structures 1,316
   - Fortifications 5,904

(5) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Capabilities

1. The 40th Artillery Regiment, with its artillery battalions, is capable of conducting standoff attacks utilizing recoilless rifles, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, 107-mm, 122-mm, and 140-mm rockets, 85-mm guns and 105-mm howitzers throughout KONTUM, PLEIKU, and DARLAC Provinces.

2. The K-16 Tank Battalion (PT-76) has the capability of conducting armor attacks in KONTUM and PLEIKU along the CAMBODIAN Border.
The 16th NVA Regiment has the capability of conducting multi-battalion size attacks against allied installations, isolated camps, and populated areas in central BINH DINH Province. They can also interdict Highway 19 and the pipeline from BINH KHA to AN KHA.

The 24th NVA Regiment is capable of conducting battalion size attacks against isolated installations and villages and hamlets located in the PLEI MIENG area and interdict Highway 14 from PLEIKU north to KONTUM City.

The 95B Regiment is capable of conducting up to battalion size attacks against fire support bases, isolated camps, and populated areas in the PLEIKU - BINH DINH border area. They can also interdict Highway 19 by ambush and mining, attack pump stations and bridges, and destroy sections of the pipeline from AN KHA to PLEIKU.

The 631 Composite Battalion is capable of conducting up to battalion size ground attacks supported by mortar and rocket fire in the PLEIKU - Camp Enari - LZ Oasis area.

The K-25A and K-25B Battalions are capable of building trail networks, fortifications, and artillery positions. They can also conduct up to company size attacks on allied installations and rural areas.

The K-20 and K-28 Sapper Battalions can conduct limited attacks on allied installations and isolated villages and hamlets.

The 408th Sapper Battalion can conduct company size sapper attacks supported by mortar and possibly rocket fire against allied installations and populated areas in central and eastern PLEIKU.

The 304th Local Force Battalion can conduct company size attacks in the TAN CANH - BINH area and interdict Highway 14 from KONTUM City north to DAK TO.

The 94th Group is capable of conducting ground and mortar attacks in up to battalion strength in northeastern KONTUM.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities

1. Enemy units are vulnerable to airstrikes and artillery fire when in bivouac or massing for an attack.

2. Enemy weapons, munitions, and food caches are vulnerable to
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Allied search and clear operations.

3 Enemy lines of communication are sufficiently extended to make them vulnerable to interdiction by allied operations.

4 Enemy units are vulnerable to psychological operations due to low morale, heavy personnel losses, and shortages of food and medical supplies.

5 Enemy movement is vulnerable to detection by airborne personnel detection and sensor devices.

6 Enemy forces have limited logistical support and cannot conduct extended offensive operations unless they are near existing base areas.

(c) Probable Courses of Action

1 Throughout the Division area of operations, enemy forces are expected to continue their present offensive for a short period of time and will probably conduct one more offensive before the end of the year.

2 In Kontum Province, elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment are expected to conduct mortar and rocket attacks against Ben Hau, Dak To, Tahn Canh, Dien Bien, Poulet Klung, and Kontum City. These attacks can be accompanied by up to battalion size ground attacks.

3 The 304th Local Force Battalion is expected to continue harassing activity in the Tahn Canh - Dien Bien area and interdict Highway 14 from Kontum City north to Dak To.

4 Other local force units will probably conduct platoon to company strength harassing attacks in the Dak Seang, Dak Fak, Plateau Gi, and Mang Buk areas.

5 In Pleiku Province, the 24th Regiment is expected to conduct up to company size attacks on SF/FV installations and villages and hamlets in the vicinity of Plei Krong and interdict Highway 14 between Pleiku and Kontum City.

6 The 631st Composite Battalion is expected to conduct attacks by fire on the Pleiku - Camp Enari - LZ Oasis area.

7 The 408th Sapper Battalion is expected to increase harassing attacks in central and eastern Pleiku Province. The battalion can also be expected to conduct sapper training for enemy units in Pleiku Province.
Local force units are expected to harass lines of communication and conduct terrorism and assassination activities, and small scale attacks on hamlets and villages in an attempt to disrupt the GVN pacification effort.

9. The 9th Regiment is expected to conduct limited squad to company size attacks against bridge security elements, strong points, jump stations, and convoys along Highway 19 in eastern Quang Tri and western BINH DINH. In addition, they will also conduct mining of Highway 19 and interdict the pipeline.

10. In BINH DINH Province, elements of the 18th NVA Regiment are expected to attempt disruption of the GVN pacification effort in VINH THANH Valley and conduct limited interdiction of Highway 19 east of AN KHAC.

11. In DUNG DAC Province, enemy forces are expected to conduct attacks by fire and light ground probes against BAN ME THUOT, LAC THIEN, BUON HO, and surrounding areas.

12. In QUANG DUC Province, installations in the BU PHANG - DUR LAP area could possibly receive multibattalion size attacks supported by mortar and rocket fire.

(a) General: During the past quarter, the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) provided Counterintelligence (CI), Interpretation (II), and Interrogation Prisoners of War (IPW) support to the Division. Several innovations were made during the reporting period to enhance the final product provided to the Division. In addition, special emphasis was placed on the internal security of Camp Ekari and the denial of classified or sensitive information to low level or potential low level enemy agents.

(b) Counterintelligence: The activities of the CI section during the reporting period continued to include preplanned operations against small local force units and individuals with the majority of the CI effort being devoted to increasing the number of agent sources within the Tactical Area of Responsibility. A combined operation was conducted during the quarter to screen all indigenous employees working at Camp Ekari. The highly successful operation resulted in the identification and neutralization of 31 VC and VCS. The emphasis placed on internal security and security of classified material continued, with repeated unannounced CI inspections plus inspections of unit burn areas used to destroy classified material.

(c) Interrogation of Prisoners of War: Prisoner interrogation
methods were enhanced during the last quarter with the utilization of a tape recorder during interrogation sessions. The utilization of a tape recorder allowed the interpreters to obtain a comprehensive interrogation from particularly intelligent or knowledgeable detainees. IPW also provided direct support to the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) during their operation in the eastern CHU PA. A HOI CHANH from the 24th NVA Regiment and a representative from IPW accompanied the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) during a sweep operation and provided the battalion with an intimate knowledge of enemy techniques and probable enemy locations.

(d) Imagery Interpretation Section: During the past quarter, the II Section coordinated with the OB Section on several occasions. A concerted effort by II, OB, and IPW during the period resulted in a comprehensive study of the PLAK TRAP Valley. MOHAWK and BIRDDOG missions have been flown recently to keep the study current. The II Section also provided overlays of hard targets, trails, and cultivated areas for operations in the CHU PA and Base Area 226. In addition, II coordinated with Dufflebag for the emplacement of ground sensors in the PLAK TRAP Valley.

(7) Communications Security (COMSEC): During the past quarter, use of unauthorized codes continued to be the most common security violation. Additionally, there was an increase of transmissions of classified information in the clear. This was partially caused by the large influx of new personnel into the Division but was remedied by firm disciplinary action by commanders and by continued COMSEC instruction by the 374th HHC. During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the 374th HHC reported a total of 33 COMSEC violations in the Division.


(1) Operations.

(a) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period.

(b) Enemy activity in the Division area of operations remained at a low level during the months of August and September. Intelligence indicated the continued presence of elements of the 24th NVA Regiment in the CHU PA Mountains area and to the northwest of PLAK Xleanor; 953 Regiment units south of Highway 195; and a major portion of the 25th NVA Regiment units northeast of AN KHU. Enemy forces in the RNW H&t - DAK TO - TAN CHAN area during June withdrew in July and did not appear again until October. However, there were numerous small contacts in the POLAK Xleanor area during September.
that indicated VC/NVA forces remained in the area. Highway 19 and the adjacent pipeline continued to be targets for VC/NVA, in the BINH DINH area. During September, the Division continued operations with CVN forces, whenever possible. Activity against local VC/VCI continued in cooperation/coordination with provincial and local government offices.

The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was sent under the operational control of the 1/3d airborne Brigade for operations in the AN LÃO Valley on 20 September. Because of the increased enemy activity in QUANG BINH and PHÄI NAM Provinces, Task Force FIGHTER was formed at the end of September at BAD AVG (Hii) in support of the 23d ARVN Division. The Division committed A Company, 2-35th Infantry and A and D Troops of the 7-17th Cavalry to this Task Force. The 3d ARVN Cavalry resumed responsibility for Highway 14 from the 2-8th Infantry (Mech). The 1-10th Cavalry completed a phased standdown at Camp Addle in preparation to assume a screening mission in the west along the CAMBODIAN Border. The three days of non-aggressiveness during the VC/NVA standdown significantly lowered the number of combat operations conducted in September. The enemy continued to rebuild and resupply his forces until October.

Enemy activity increased throughout the Division area of operations during October. Heavy enemy reconnaissance activity was noted both in KONTUM and PHÄI NAM Provinces during the first week of October. Increased activity in the PHÄI KHOI area indicated the elements of the 24th NVA Regiment were preparing to launch a new highpoint. Enemy activity culminated on 25 October, when the enemy launched the first phase of their current offensive and conducted numerous attacks by fire and light ground probes. The 631st Composite Battalion became active and conducted attacks by fire in the PHÄI NAM-Camp Shari-CÂ M BÀ area. Villages to the east of Camp Shari were also subjected to harassing attacks. The 2d Brigade was joined in late October by FOK forces for combined operations against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment. Enemy activity was light in the area until late October when enemy forces increased interdiction of Highway 19 to the east and west of AN KHÂ."
Cavalry (-) from the 1st Brigade and returned to 2d Brigade control, Company A, 3-12th Infantry, supported by a PS artillery platoon, provided the vital support for the GVN pacification operation south of Highway 19B in LE THUNG District by conducting monitoring, ambush and search and clear operations. On 15 August it was determined that local GVN efforts had developed to the point of being able to both pacify the area and at the same time secure themselves. As a result, US support was released and returned to their parent units. Of particular significance was the 1st Brigade’s penetration of NVA safe areas north of AN KKB against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment during Operation GAFFY BLUE (5-25 Aug) and south of Highway 19B near the DAK PAYOU Valley against the 95B Regiment. Operation GAFFY BLUE involved the 3-8th Infantry and elements of the 1-8th Infantry and 1-69th Armor. The number of contacts, birdings, results, and defense of the area, plus the proximity of the area to Base Area 226, made it evident that the boundaries of Base Area 226 were subject to change. The movement of significant IR’s from the 18th Regiment’s base area to Base Area 226 added credence to this thesis. Results of the twenty day operation were: 100 NVA KIA (a total of 300 KIA for the entire operation of two months), 3 POAs, 4,800 lbs of rice captured, and 352 structures and fortifications destroyed. Three US were KIA and thirteen WIA. Nine helicopters were damaged or destroyed during the operation as a result of heavy ground-to-air fire. South of Highway 19B, in the vicinity of the SONG BA River and DAK PAYOU Valley, the 3-12th Infantry and 1-69th Armor initiated operations against local VC and the withdrawing 95B Regiment. This operation was to serve to neutralize Base Area 202. There was a coordinated increase in VC initiated activity during the night of 11/12 August which included a sapper attack on Camp Radcliffe; seven vehicles and two buildings were destroyed, and one vehicle and seven buildings damaged. There were no friendly casualties. August 12th was most productive with regard to enemy battle losses. In eight separate incidents there were 35 NVA KIA and 2 US WIA. Operations in support of GVN pacification efforts in LE THUNG and AN TUG had the full cooperation of all agencies and continued into September.

Operation WAYNE JAVAILIN continued into September. The 3-12th Infantry, with supporting 105mm and 155mm artillery, pursued elements of 95B Regiment after their abortive attempt to interdict Highway 19. As the enemy broke up into small units and withdrew south of Base Area 202, the 3-12th Infantry and an air cavalry troop from the 7-17th Cavalry, reacting to intelligence reports, carried out running contacts more than 30 kilometers south of Highway 19 into PHU BON Province. This rapid penetration deep into and thru
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Base Area 202 proved to completely disorganize the enemy, deny him
use of a safe haven and negate his offensive capability for an ex-
tended period. In conjunction with two Regional Force Companies from
PKM KOM District, this operation also countered the enemy's threat
to the supply base in the north of CHEO REO. During one of the num-
berous contacts with the 1-17th Cavalry, the aero-rifle platoon was in-
serted on 6 September after gunships expanded an estimated 20-25
NVA. From as a result of the sweep were two 9-mm pistols, and the
bodies of two NVA officers with packs containing 704,850 plasters.
At the month's end, the 1-17th Infantry returned to the AIN KHR area
to assist in pacification and highway security with the 1-16th Cavi-
alry. Operation WAYNE BOULDER was initiated 10 September, by the
1-8th Infantry targeted against GIA LAL VC forces north of AIN KHR.
This operation was preceded by diversionary air cavalry missions,
air strikes, and LRP insertions. The finding of a switchboard, field
telephones and documents indicated the VC political headquarters in
the area had displaced in disarray. A significant action during the
operation was the sighting of an enemy company size force on 11
September by A Troop, 7-17th Cavalry. Gunships and air strikes
were employed followed by the insertion of the aero-rifle platoon and
Company, 1-8th Infantry. Twenty-five bodies were found along with
weapons and rucksacks.

Operation WAYNE JAVELIN terminated on 18 October. The relatively
small number and low intensity of enemy contacts attested to the
success of this operation during the preceding month. All enemy ac-
tivity appeared primarily directed toward incidents of ground-to-air
fire and minor interceptions of the highway and pipeline. Operation
WAYNE BOULDER terminated 11 October. The most significant action
occurred on 5 October at 0100 hours at FS LARRY. The CP of the 1-8th
Infantry received a coordinated attack from the south and east by an
estimated reinforced platoon. Although three individuals breached
the wire, quick employment of a squad reaction force drove them off,
and the combination of artillery, SPOOKE and ground fire forced the
NVA to break contact at 0200. Operation WAYNE BOULDER netted 93 enemy
KIA, 1 HOI CHAND, 8,300 lbs of rice, 5 AS-47s, 650 lbs of salt and
2,750 lbs of corn. Operation WAYNE BREAKER commenced on 18 October
with 1-8th Infantry in a security and pacification mission in the
SONG BA River Valley. Results to date included 7 NVA KIA, 1 LAV,
2 automatic weapons, and 5 small arms with no US losses. On 14
October, the 1-17th Cavalry released the mission of security for High-
way 19E to the 1-69th Armor. Both units were placed directly under
Division control. The armor battalion was initially reinforced with
one infantry company to provide security for the Home flow operation.
and one infantry company as a reaction force and tank security ele-
ment. The highway was free of major action until 18 October, when
Incidents began occurring with increasing frequency. On 20 October the pipeline was interdicted with small arms fire, B Company, 1-69th Armor; while escorting a convoy received small arms and B-40 fire, and a convoy from the 8th Transportation Company received small arms and B-40 fire from an estimated fifteen VC. A reaction force engaged the enemy and killed ten. On 24 October, a large culvert was blown on the highway, fifty meters of pipeline were destroyed and a 2-1/2 ton truck damaged by a mine. On 27 October, Bridge #33 was blown and on 28 October, a large crater was blown in the road east of An Khe. On 23 October, an additional infantry company was placed under the operational control of the 1-69th Armor. The addition of the infantry company will now give the armored force more flexibility in providing road security.

(4) 2d Brigade: Operation PUTNAM TIGER continued during August, with screening, road security, and both US and combined search and clear/pacification operations. A liaison team was established with KONTUM PIOCC and MOCC. The 2d Infantry (Mech) returned from 1st Brigade control and assumed the security mission for Highway 14. KONTUM pacification support in the vicinity of PhD OF/PLII 0, and at the end of August, also assumed security responsibility for Highway 198 from PHAIU to Bridge #30. The 1-22d Infantry moved from its screening mission north and west of POL-II KING and initiated search and clear operations on what is referred to as the PHAIU Pocket Box (ZA 1453). This move released an ARVN Ranger Battalion from a security role to allow its deployment to BAN MA THI웃 for search and destroy operations. Keeping a unit in the area northwest of PHAIU significantly reduces the threat of 122mm rockets being fired against this major population center and its associated military facilities. The 1-12th Infantry continued operations against stay behind elements of the K-4 Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment in the PHAIU MRONG area with CIDG forces from that camp. A battalion size combined operation was conducted with CIDG forces in the mountains west of PHAIU MRONG. Intelligence indicated the presence of a company size NVA force and a resupply route in the area. No contact was made; the enemy successfully avoided detection. On 23 August, LRP 2C engaged an NVA squad. Gunships and artillery were employed in support resulting in 9 NVA killed and no friendly casualties.

Operation PUTNAM TIGER was brought to a successful close on 22 September, climaxing an operation which began on 22 April as the NVA "Summer Offensive" was initiated with the 24th NVA Regiment moving east out of the CHU PA Mountains toward Highway 14 in conjunction with the 26th and 66th NVA Regiments' move toward DAK TO. The five month operation, designed to keep Highway 14 open to military and civilian traffic, destroy the elements of the 24th NVA Regiment.
operating in the area, protect the population and assist in KONTUM Province pacification efforts southeast of KONTUM resulted in 562 NVA KIA, 2 POW, 261 CHANG, 147 rounds of mortar and rocket munitions and 13,928 rounds of small arms captured. Use of Home Flow and dozers against the numerous bunker complexes found in the jungle resulted in the destruction of 4,979 fortifications, denying the enemy safe access to Highway 14 and providing the local inhabitants many acres of open area for cultivation. Friendly losses were 81 killed and 245 wounded. Since the 24th NVA Regiment had only two battalions, it was considered combat ineffective as a result of continued contact with the 2d Brigade in May and withdrew to its sanctuaries, leaving behind only a token force. During September, the 2d Brigade relocated to Camp Hadcliff with a TAG CP at LZ H:ARK TIMES. The 1-12th Infantry, which had been astride the traditional NVA routes to Highway 14, was placed under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade and moved to LZ ENGLISH for subsequent operations in the An Lao Valley. On 21 September, the brigade began an assault on Base Area 226 with the combat assault of A and C Companies, 1-22d Infantry. The operation, PUTNAM TIGER, involved the 5-6th Infantry, 1-22d Infantry and B Company, 1-69th Armor (RN). The operation was designed to disarm and scatter the 16th NVA Regimental elements in the Base Area, thus, relieving any threat to that portion of Highway 19 between An Khao and Qui Nhon and the rich rice coastal area south of Phu My. Two major combined operations were conducted involving 2d Brigade units with two GSF companies from PL3 HRONG in the Chu PA Mountains and with the 2d Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment around Base Area 229. These were highly successful and continued the ever increasing cooperation/coordination between the 4th Infantry Division and II Corps.

During October, Operation PUTNAM COUGAR continued the assault on Base Area 226 and terminated on 28 October. The coordinated operations of US/GVN forces effectively disorganized the elements of the 18th NVA Regiment and forced them to scatter into other areas. Combined operations with the GRID from 2 October until 19 October were extremely successful in that caches of equipment were uncovered. These included 90 Mauser carbines and SKS rifles, 20 AT mines, 30 AP mines, six 75mm RA rounds, 97,460 small arms rounds, 2432-36 rifles, one 9mm machinegun, six M14-47 rifles, one P-38 pistol, two 82mm mortars, 400 32mm mortar rounds and 402 81mm mortar rounds, 5 light machineguns, 1 RPG-2 rocket launcher, 23 RPG-2 rounds, twenty-six 120mm mortar rounds, 1 CHICOM machinegun, 760 12.7mm rounds and 5,590 lbs of rice. US losses were 4 KIA and 14 WIA, while the enemy suffered 9 KIA and one prisoner. The discovery and location of the caches indicated that the enemy units had been planning significant...
offensive operations in the areas of Highway 19 to the south and the heavily populated coastal region of BINH DINH Province. The equipment discoveries have very likely preempted and restricted enemy incursions into populated areas and have had a favorable effect on the population and the pacification program.

(e) 3d Brigade: The brigade terminated Operation GREEN GALLOP resulting in 8 NVA KIA, 14 detained and 1,420 lbs of rice and 3,232 rounds of small arms ammunition captured or destroyed. The 1-10th Cavalry moved to the 1st Brigade. The 1-14th Infantry terminated Operation GREEN ORANGE III on 5 August resulting in 83 NVA KIA, 6 POW's, 53 detained and 21 weapons, 733 lbs of rice and 156 structures and fortifications captured or destroyed. The 1-35th Infantry terminated Operation GREEN AX on 5 August resulting in 12 NVA KIA, 11 POW's and 11 detained; 5 weapons, five 122-mm rocket boosters, sixteen 60-mm mortar rounds and 308 structures and fortifications were captured or destroyed. With the termination of these operations, Operation GREEN ACE was initiated involving all elements of the 3d Brigade. Emphasis was placed on combined operations. Two major combined operations of battalion size were conducted involving the 1-42d ARVN Battalion, RF/PF and CIDG. On 14 August, as a combined CJF/and Company B, 1-14th Infantry force terminated a PLA/KU sector controlled operation and were moving out of the area of operations, an ammunition cache was found consisting of 112 32-mm and 30 60-mm mortar rounds and 14,000 rounds of small arms. Pacification in PHU NHON and THANH AN Districts were supported on a continuous basis by elements of the 1-14th and 1-35th Infantry.

Operation GREEN ACE continued during September with the enlargement of the brigade area of operations to include the area previously occupied by the 2d Brigade. This change came about during the latter part of September when two major adjustments of the Division area of operation took place. First, the 24th STZ resumed Highway 14N security from the 2d Brigade with the 3d ARVN Cavalry, and second, the 2d Brigade penetrated Base Area 226 and subsequently moved its entire headquarters into the BINH DINH area. The 2-38th Infantry (Mech) came under the operational control of the 3d Brigade upon departure of the 2d Brigade and was employed along Highway 19, security force for MARY LOU while it was being closed out, and as a maneuver force west of PLAIKU. There were numerous platoon and company size combined operations leading to a continued increase in RF/PF and CSF combat effectiveness. The 1-14th Infantry and the 1-35th Infantry continued RF/PF training programs in PHU NHON and AN THUC Districts. The M-16 transition training was one of the most important portions.
of this program. An attack by fire was conducted against the CP of the 1-35th Infantry at FB GYPSY on 16 September. Thirty rounds of mixed 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar rounds were received. Three US were wounds in the shelling. Three secondary explosions were observed as a result of counter mortar fire. On 29 September, west of the CP PA, B Company, 2-35th Infantry minus and a FSJ D/JRNIG CP company made contact with an estimated NVA company. The Reconnaissance Platoons and C Company reinforced the six hour contact. Results were 2 US KIA and 8 WIA; 25 NVA were KIA. To assist in the security of 60 PRANG and BAi Ng ThOUD area, A Company, 2-35th Infantry was placed under the operational control of Division Task Force FIGHTCJH along with P and D Troops, 7-7th Cavalry.

Operation GROUNDS ACK terminated on 16 October and relinquished a large part of the western sector of their area of operation to the 1-10th Cavalry which, under Division control, initiated a screening operation, KRAMAR WHIT, designed to preclude infiltration of units from CAMBODIA into the Division secured areas. The search and clear/pacification operations of the 3d Brigade were redesignated GROUNDS BEAR. In the PLEI KONG area on 19 October at 0835, C Company, 2-8th Infantry (Mech) received small arms and B-40 fire from a well dug in enemy force. The one hour and twenty minute contact resulted in 2 US KIA, 3 WIA and 2 enemy KIA; 1 AK-47 and 1 B-40 captured. At 1207 A Company, while attempting to reinforce C Company, received small arms and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force. Contact was maintained until 1322 and resulted in 4 US KIA, 16 WIA and 24 NVA KIA. Strong enemy action continued in the PLEI KONG area resulting in the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) being placed under the operational control of the Division on 20 October and initiating Operation HODGES BLACK. Sporadic contact continued in the area. On 22 October at 1705, B Company, 2-8th Infantry (Mech), while attempting to recover an armored personnel carrier, received small arms, automatic weapon and B-40 fire from an unknown size enemy force. Gunships, tactical aircraft and artillery supported the infantry as they closed with the enemy. When the enemy broke contact at 1745, 24 NVA bodies were counted and friendly losses were 1 KIA and 1 WIA. On 23 October, A Company found 40 large fortifications in a small area all connected with communications wire. This is believed to have been a regimental or battalion CP complex controlling the engaged forces. In the bunker 13 NVA bodies were counted. Contact continued until the end of October and resulted in 4 US KIA, 17 WIA, and 70 enemy KIA. The engagement of this unit in the PLEI KONG area has seriously disrupted plans for interdiction of Highway 14 and coordinated attacks on PL6KIU.
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KONTUM and US installations in the area. The continued use of some plows
in destroying the numerous bunker and fortification complexes in the
area will deny the enemy free access to Highway 14 and provide local
inhabitants additional cultivation areas. The lack of contact permitted
a greater effort to be directed toward pacification programs,
civic action and training of ARVN elements in the CHU PA area of
operations. This training has enhanced the combat effectiveness of
the VIETNAMESE units involved, and the other programs have engendered
additional confidence from the people in the governmental programs.

On 20 October, the 3d Brigade and the 42d ARVN Regiment initiated
Operation GUINT THANG 35/GREANE BULLET in the CHU PA area with the
1-35th and 3-12th Infantry, and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 42d Regiment.
This operation, designed to intrude into a known enemy sanctuary, was
preceded by a one week artillery preparation of more than 9,000 rounds,
141 tactical air sorties, and 34 B-52 sorties. There was little enemy
activity until 29 October at 1550 when a platoon of B Company,
3-12th Infantry was engaged by an estimated two platoons of NVA in
bunkers. They were reinforced by B Company. Support was provided
by artillery, gunships and tactical air. Contact broke at 1600. Re-
sults were 2 US KIA, 12 WIA and 8 NVA KIA. On 30 and 31 October,
contact continued in the CHU PA sector in the 3-12th Infantry area.
On the morning of 30 October, the CP location received small arms and
32mm mortar fire. Eighteen US were wounded by the mortars. On 31
October, A Company received small arms and B 40 fire and C Company
made contact with an estimated enemy platoon size element. The in-
creased enemy action indicated that a major base area had been pen-
etrated and continued disruption of this area may preempt enemy offen-
sive operations in November to the east by the 631st NVA Composite
Battalion.

(2) The following OPLANS were published during the reporting
periods:

(a) OPLAN 69-69, dated 5 August 1969, classified SECRET, will not
be discussed in this report.

(b) OPLAN 24-69 (SPRING WHITE), dated 12 August 1969, classified
SECRET and will not be discussed in this report.

(c) OPLAN 25-69 (STEEL CABLE CHARLIE), dated 19 August 1969,
classified SECRET and will not be discussed in this report.

(d) OPLAN 26-69 (STEEL CABLE ALPHA), dated 30 August 1969, clas-
sified SECRET and will not be discussed in this report.

(e) OPLAN 183-69, dated 10 October 1969, classified SECRET, will
not be discussed in this report.
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(f) OPLAN 27 69, dated 7 September 1969, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan outlines actions required of the Division Support Command in the event of damage resulting from enemy attack and/or damage caused by natural disasters to Camp Chari.

(g) OPLAN 23 69 (BLAZ), dated 29 September 1969, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan requires the Division to organize and prepare to deploy a 400 man temporary reaction force composed of rear detachment personnel.

(h) OPLAN 30 69, dated 4 October 1969, classified CONFIDENTIAL. The Division would prepare to reinforce artillery positions/FSB's in the SUPRANG/DUC LAP area on order.

(i) OPLAN 29 69 (CHANG), dated 26 October 1969, classified CONFIDENTIAL. The Division reinforces combined defensive forces in the PLUKU defense complex.

(j) Air Support:

(a) The following close air support missions were flown in support of Operation DAI QUAN - NWU, 1 August - 31 October 1969:

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<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOONSHINE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHADOW</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C130</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3488</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>2368</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>630</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Bomb Damage Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>EST</th>
<th>BAV</th>
<th>BXBS</th>
<th>FLP</th>
<th>SIG</th>
<th>EXD</th>
<th>PSN</th>
<th>SPK</th>
<th>BPD</th>
<th>CTP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAC PP</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC PHM</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS3 PP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS3 PHM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B-52 Strike: B-52's struck known base areas, infiltration routes, strong points, and major NVA headquarters. Both Primary and Secondary strikes were delivered in support of Operation DAN QUYEN - MINES. The following figures show the number of strikes carried out during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>HSMS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRIMARY</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECONDARY</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training: The 4th Infantry Training Detachment trained a total of 4,222 US enlisted men, 356 US officers and 156 VIETNAMESE enlisted men during the reporting period.

(a) The Non-commissioned Officer Combat Leadership course graduated 98 students.

(b) The replacement committee trained 3,875 enlisted men and 586 officers.

(c) The Pre-Rcando School graduated 135 students. Of these, 19 attended the MACV Rcando School.

(d) The Special Training Section trained 39 snipers.

(e) Two special classes on patrolling were conducted for base camp personnel resulting in 33 enlisted graduates.

(f) The Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received the twelve day reconnaissance course.

(g) The RF/FP and Kit Carson Scout programs continued. RF/FP graduated 112 students and 44 Kit Carson Scouts graduated.

(h) Replacement training will be increased from 3 to 4 days during the next quarter. Additional marksmanship, patrolling, NVA tactics and base camp defense courses will be included.

(5) Chemical.

(a) The Division Chemical Section performed as a staff section and as an operating section. The Chemical Section and 43d Chemical Detachment operated extensively in the employment of Riot Control Agents.
(RCAs) supervision and conduct of herbicide operations, and the operation and maintenance of Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) equipment. In addition, training was conducted in CER readiness and use of standard and field expedient flame weapons. The chemical ASP operated in support of Division missions and also supported Divisional units as required.

(1) TRAILDUST defoliation missions increased over the previous reporting period, while helicopter defoliation missions decreased. The increase in TRAILDUST missions is attributed to improved weather conditions over the area of operations. The majority of TRAILDUST missions were flown in Binh Dinh Province, where the monsoon season varies somewhat in occurrence with that of the remainder of the area of operations. The decrease in helicopter defoliation missions is attributed to the lack of herbicides and political clearance. See Inclosure 5 for a summary of defoliation operations.

(2) Generally speaking, herbicides were not sufficiently available through ARVN supply channels in quantities to support extensive helicopter employment.

(3) Beginning 1 July 1969, political clearance for the employment of herbicides was difficult to obtain. At that time, the approved areas in Kontum, Pleiku, and Binh Dinh Provinces were drastically reduced in size. The Division Chemical Section has prepared a study requesting more extensive areas for employment of herbicides. Partial approval has been obtained, and complete approval is expected.

(4) Riot Control Agent (RCA) munitions were extensively employed in direct support of combat operations and significantly increased the effectiveness of fire support. RCA targets were located by special intelligence activities; necessary clearances were processed by Division Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCB), and missions were conducted by the Division Chemical Section. See Inclosure 5 for a summary of RCA operations.

(5) The amount of persistent CS employed nearly tripled over that of the preceding report period. The Chemical Section employed 1,126 drums against targets in Plei TRAP Valley, in the vicinity of Chu Prong Mountain, and VC Valley. Drums were employed by air drop from CH-47 helicopters against infiltration routes, way stations, bunkers, tunnels, and assembly and all living areas to deny their use to the enemy. Intelligence sources indicated major enemy movement away from locations in which bulk CS had been employed.
(2) Nonpersistent CS was employed in the form of XKL-5 (LJXKL), CS Canister Clusters. Deployment of CS enhanced the effectiveness of ground operations, artillery, tactical airstrikes, and B-52 raids. The Chemical Section employed 974 XKL-5 clusters during the period.

(d) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) operations continue to be centrally controlled from the division base camp. To enhance flexibility, however, one APD and operator have been detailed to Headquarters, 1st Brigade to support operations in DitTH DitTH Province. Another APD and operator have been detailed to the advisory element of Headquarters, 24th Special Tactical Zone to support operations throughout the 24th STZ. The Division's APD team (SCONTO) continues to operate as a four ship hunter-killer team composed of 2 AH-1 gunships and 2 OH-6 light observation helicopters. APD missions during the reporting period were 172 in August, 106 in September, and 179 in October.

(e) The Division became the first unit in RVN to receive the XM91 Multishot Portable Flame Weapon. The system is a four shot, rocket propelled, shoulder fired weapon. It is capable of firing four incendiary rockets at the rate of one per second and being reloaded with new rocket clips. In October, a New Equipment Training Team, assisted by the Division Chemical Section conducted training in the operation and maintenance of the weapon system. The weapon has been distributed to field units and is presently under evaluation.

(6) Research and Development. Items of equipment evaluated during the reporting period were:

(a) Marginal Terrain Assault Bridge (EUGUE 34). This item was tested by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry for a period of 60 days with the following comments: The MTA3L was found to be effective for a variety of mechanized missions during the dry season; however, during the wet season the MTA3L was found to be limited in employment due to the additional weight of the vehicle, and the bridge tended to shift under loads on wet ground. The maintenance on the vehicle was effectively accomplished at battalion level, and the final report was a recommendation to accept the MTA3L.

(b) Mine Roller MIA. This item was evaluated for a period of 60 days by the 4th Engineer Battalion with the following comments: The ground clearance was not adequate to negotiate the terrain in this area of operation. The torsion drums are not flexible enough to allow travel over AVLB or Bailey type bridges; the structure frame and support arms were filled with improper structural material that caused structural failure. The bearings of the individual road wheels showed
excessive wear, even with repeated lubrication, and the two C&V's that had the mine roller on them showed excessive track and sprocket wear. The recommendation was that the mine roller be engineered to overcome the noted deficiencies and be attached to C&V instead of tanks.

(c) ANT30C Sighting System XM-76 (ENSURE 224) It was tested for a 60-day period by the 4th Infantry Division Artillery and the following comments are offered: There were no significant maintenance problems during the testing period. The only deficiency was that the sighting system had a tendency to fog up during abrupt temperature changes and would on occasion be unsuitable for use for one and one-half hours. When operational, the system provided excellent sighting from aircraft due to the vibration compensating gyro. Recommend that the system have the fogging tendencies corrected and be accepted for general use.

(d) The following Items are presently under evaluation or are programmed for evaluations:


5. Fragmashord XM-37 (NOT ENSURE). No equipment.


10. Footgear for Inundated Areas (ENSURE 267.1). No equipment.

11. XM-33 Armament Subsystem (ENSURE 223). No equipment.

(e) Logistics

(1) Logistical Operations, DAN QUYNH - MINES.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned - 4th Infantry Division
Period ending 31 October 1969, BCS GSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Emphasis continued on utilization of land lines of communications (LLC) throughout the Division's area of operations for movement of all classes of supply. With the lessening of the monsoon rains in late September and early October, road conditions improved in the forward areas which greatly enhanced resupply operations. A change in tactical posture and improved flying conditions contributed to the increased utilization of air assets (Air Lines of Communication, ALOC).

(b) Elements of the 45th General Support Group and logistical support activities (LSA) of the 593d General Support Group, QUI NHON Support Command, continued to provide logistical support to the 4th Infantry Division in Operation KHE SANH. Additionally, support was received from logistical support activities of CAM RANH BAY Support Command at BAN MH THUOT, when a Division task force was deployed to the BAN MH THUOT area in late August.

(c) Forward Support Element OASIS continued to support units operating in western Pleiku Province with Class I, bulk and packaged Class III, Class IIIVA, barrier and construction material and Graves Registration during a major portion of the period. 45th General Support Group provided bath and laundry service at this location. In late October, the OASIS was reduced from a brigade to a battalion firebase as the 3d Brigade Headquarters returned to Camp Enari. The FSE was withdrawn concurrent with the 3d Brigade relocation and bath and laundry facilities were returned to 45th Group. A DF2 refuel point was established at LZ XAENGDI to support the 1st Bn, 10th Cavalry, which was conducting screening operations along the CAMBODIAN Border.

(d) FSE MARY LOU continued to support the Division's 2d Brigade with Class I, bulk and packaged POL issues, Class III, barrier and construction materials and Graves Registration, for a major portion of the period. QUI NHON Support Command operated an ammunition supply point (ASP) at MARY LOU and the 45th General Support Group continued to provide bath and laundry service. In late September, a phase out of Firebase MARY LOU was initiated. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, was deployed to LZ ENGLISH which became OPCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the remainder of the 2d Brigade deployed to the AN KHE area for operations in Base Area 226, northeast of AN KHE. Laundry and bath facilities returned to 45th General Support Group control and the MARY LOU ASP continued to function until late October.

(e) At Camp Radcliff (AN KHE), support was provided by LSA of QUI NHON Support Command and a forward support element (FSE) operated by the 4th S & T Battalion. Continuous support was provided to the 1st Brigade during the period from these activities and temporary support to the 2d Brigade during its operations in Base Area 226.
The LSA provided supply Classes I, III, IIIA, IV, V, Graves Registration and laundry service. Class II & IV supplies and bath services were provided by the FSE.

(f) In late October, the 2d Brigade with two infantry battalions began operations in the AN Lao Valley adjacent to the 173d Airborne Brigade area of operations along the coast. LZ ENGLISH became the logistical support base of the brigade again, with combination LSA/FSE type support. The LSA augmented by 4th S & T Battalion personnel provided Class I, III, IIIA and IV supplies with the FSE providing Class II & V support and bath service. Graves Registration and laundry service provided by the FSE.

(g) A DF2 refuel point was opened at Firebase BLACKHAWK on QL 19 in mid-October. This point provided fuel re-supply to the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor in support of this unit's highway security mission.

(h) Direct support maintenance and medical companies have habitually been employed in direct support of brigade task forces.

(i) Supply and Services:

1. Division Supply Office (DSupO).
   a. Requisitions received: 11,986
   b. Requisitions passed: 2,578
   c. Requisitions filled: 6,050
   d. Total due out releases: 3,105

2. Class I.
   a. Rations Issued (three meals per ration):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>A RATIONS</th>
<th>G RATIONS</th>
<th>LRP RATIONS</th>
<th>SUNDARY PACKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Enari</td>
<td>801,668</td>
<td>81,701</td>
<td>7,008</td>
<td>1,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN KHE</td>
<td>423,359</td>
<td>80,063</td>
<td>6,096</td>
<td>1,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE MARY LOU</td>
<td>369,688</td>
<td>29,605</td>
<td>32,256</td>
<td>1,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE Oasis</td>
<td>236,851</td>
<td>27,140</td>
<td>12,672</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,831,566</td>
<td>218,504</td>
<td>138,032</td>
<td>5,028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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4 DEC 1969

S U B J E C T: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period ending 31 October 1969, HQS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

b. Headcount and number of A Rations. Breaks, 31 October 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>A RATION HEADCOUNT</th>
<th>TOTAL RATION HEADCOUNT</th>
<th>UNIT BREAKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Shari</td>
<td>801,668</td>
<td>390,377</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN KHE</td>
<td>423,359</td>
<td>509,713</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE MARY LOU</td>
<td>369,668</td>
<td>431,549</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE Oasis</td>
<td>236,642</td>
<td>277,661</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,831,331</td>
<td>2,018,102</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Class III,

a. Bulk POL Issues in Gallons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>AVGAS</th>
<th>MOGAS</th>
<th>DPF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Shari</td>
<td>2,224,500</td>
<td>57,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN KHE</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE MARY LOU</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE Oasis</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>185,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,754,500</td>
<td>60,700</td>
<td>3,498,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Package POL Issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>OE-10*</th>
<th>OE-30*</th>
<th>OE-50**</th>
<th>GAA**</th>
<th>GO-90*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Shari</td>
<td>4560</td>
<td>17,527</td>
<td>8,696</td>
<td>14,505</td>
<td>3,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN KHE</td>
<td>4,820</td>
<td>13,160</td>
<td>8,260</td>
<td>21,420</td>
<td>1,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE MARY LOU</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE Oasis</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>5,395</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11,150</td>
<td>39,272</td>
<td>19,641</td>
<td>37,080</td>
<td>5,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Gallons
** In Pounds
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned by 4th Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GusFOR-65 (U)

Class IV Issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>BARBED WIRE</th>
<th>CONCERTINA</th>
<th>SANDBAGS</th>
<th>2' &amp; 3'</th>
<th>4' &amp; 5'</th>
<th>6' &amp; 7'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Truân</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>331,400</td>
<td>14,874</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN acrd</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>1,539,800</td>
<td>9,835</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB MARY LOU</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB Oasis</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>222,400</td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,976</td>
<td>9,786</td>
<td>2,222,500</td>
<td>29,038</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Baths: 42,570
6. Graves Registration

The US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and V in support of operations:

Class III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>B-52's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,478,463,5 gals</td>
<td>7,569,076,9 gals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Class V

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance</th>
<th>Qty (each)</th>
<th>Weight (s/t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>11,482</td>
<td>3,359.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>124.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igtntm</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>418.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rockets</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Delivered by fighters and AC-47 (Spooky):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance</th>
<th>Qty (each)</th>
<th>Weight (s/t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-mm</td>
<td>345,600</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62-mm</td>
<td>904,000</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (62) (U)

Delivered by B-52's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinance</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Weight (t/l)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>3,112.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation Services:

During the reporting period, there were 186 convoys with a total of 4,918 vehicles. Company B, 4th Supply and Transport Battalion hauled supplies to FSB's from the company's base at Camp Enari. Company B also augmented Divisional units with vehicles for unit moves, as required.

Aircraft Support:

a. Total cargo tonnage moved by dedicated airs: 37.4
b. Total passengers moved by dedicated airs: 2,096
c. Total cargo tonnage moved by special mission airs: 217.2
d. Total passengers moved by special mission airs: 537
e. Total cargo moved by opportune airs: 0
f. Total passengers moved by opportune airs: 0

Medical Services: The 4th Medical Battalion, with Companies B, C and D supporting the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades respectively, and Company A supporting Camp Enari, provided the following medical services during the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PATIENTS SEEN</th>
<th>ADMITTED</th>
<th>RETURNED TO DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; A</td>
<td>9,787</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>6,209</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Co</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Co</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>20,013</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Material Readiness.

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During the reporting period the operational readiness rating of the Division declined. This was caused by a decrease in enemy activity and a resultant increase in the attention focused on the maintenance of equipment. The Weekly Deadline Report (DA Form 206) proved an effective means of monitoring maintenance management at the unit level. The operational readiness rate for communication equipment improved as modules became available. The Division has not yet received sufficient modules to consider the problem alleviated.

One of the key factors in improving maintenance awareness in the Division has been the formation of a permanent Division CMMI Team under the supervision of the ACMoS, G-4. Highly skilled, qualified personnel were chosen from Divisional units to form the team. The team has conducted approximately 40 inspections since its formation and only seven units received satisfactory ratings on their initial inspection. The primary reason of the unsatisfactory ratings is failing scores in the area of maintenance management. TAFES records, publications, and PLL require more emphasis at unit level and the CMMI Team is bringing this to the attention of the commanders. Coupled with the formation of the CMMI Team, a complete Division Material Readiness SOP was written. The intention of the SOP was to provide the unit commanders with a concise and complete publication, which, with a minimum of supplementary publications, allow him to effectively maintain and manage the equipment within his command. It can be expected that the CMMI Team and the new Material Readiness SOP will contribute to a significant increase in the operational readiness of the Division during the next quarter.

The failure of combat vehicle engines was reduced somewhat during this reporting period. The importance of operator level maintenance was stressed and improvement should continue.

A standdown was completed for the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry during the reporting period. The standdown was accomplished one troop at a time over a five and one-half week period. The unit was experiencing a very low operational rate prior to its standdown. The operational rate was increased during the standdown, and the effect of the standdown has resulted in the initiation of a Division policy that each mechanized unit will have a platoon element undergoing a standdown at any given time.

Maintenance Support.

(1) Headquarters and Company A (Main Support), 704th Maintenance Battalion continued its role of providing direct support maintenance for Camp Ebadi units, backup direct support for the battalions forward.
support companies, supply of Class IX (repair parts), and retrograde of material. 704th Maintenance forward support companies continued to support the 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades. Company K (Transportation Aircraft Maintenance), located at Camp Khark, continued its aircraft direct support maintenance mission.

2 Emphasis is placed on repair by forward maintenance companies with supplementary contact teams provided by Headquarters and Company A, 704th Maintenance Battalion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job orders completed by Divisional maintenance:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC's</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTR's</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheel Vehicles</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Engineer Equipment</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>3,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal-Repaired</td>
<td>2,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal-Evacuated</td>
<td>1,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Components</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Repair parts requisitions processed and level statistics:

| Total Requests Received                      | 76,001 |
| Total ASL Requests Received                  | 53,382 |
| Total ASL Issues                            | 26,944 |
Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period ending in October 1969, HCS CSFOR-6C (22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Receipts</td>
<td>17,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Due Out Releases</td>
<td>14,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Passing Actions</td>
<td>28,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Replenishment Requests</td>
<td>12,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Warehouse Requisitions</td>
<td>1,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transactions Posted</td>
<td>93,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Lines on ASL</td>
<td>13,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Zero Balance %</td>
<td>7.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Balance %</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Accommodation</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Satisfaction</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Administration

Administration action was completed on 101 Reports of Survey with 23 currently pending final action. Thirty-five Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 266 Combat Loss Reports were processed.

e. Civil Affairs

(i) Civic Action

(a) TAOR: The Civic Action teams and villages in which they reside have continued to be attacked, probed and targeted for kidnappings and assassination attempts. Significant activities included the kidnapping of twenty-two civilians from PLEI BRUNG, including eighteen PSDF; and attempts to murder the village chief of PLEI LE AH resulting in two PSDF KIA, the C4 UTC of PLEI HO BY and one of the US KIA during an ambush near the village; four enemy KIA, one friendly civilian KIA during an attack on PLEI PHAM G1; and a series of probes in the area of PLEI PHUNG HONG, PLEI KUNG BACH and PLEI BREL DOR resulting in one friendly and one enemy KIA.

(b) The IR-6/3 experimental rice project enjoyed excellent results during its initial phase. With twenty percent (20%) subtracted from the gross weight of the rice harvested to allow for moisture content, the yields varied from a low of 2,500 kilos/hectare to a high of 12,000 kilos/hectare. This is very favorable, of course, when compared...
SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period ending 31 October 1969, RCS C3FOR 65 (R2) (U)

with the national average of 2,100 kilos/hectare. Present plans
call for putting in from thirty to forty hectares of IR5/8 during
December to determine the feasibility of a winter rice crop in this
area.

2 The four FF platoons recruited from the TAOR area have com-
pleted their training, two of which, the PLEI DO and PLEI HO BY
platoons, are now back in their villages. The PLEI NHOA YUT platoon
is processing at LE TRUNG District and should be back in its village
within one week; there is a possibility of the PLEI PHAM GI platoon
being held at District Headquarters to help secure an artillery po-
sition and this headquarters is attempting to have District return
this platoon to its village in line with the promises made the vil-
lage when the platoon was recruited.

3 Through both the Ethnic Minorities Office and Agricultural
Service Office in PLEIKU some seven thousand (7,000) additional fruit
trees and 7,000 fingerlings for the village fish ponds have been ob-
tained and distributed.

4 The ARVN CA NCO program has continued to grow and function
smoothly. The total trained at the II Corps Civic Action course now
stands at thirty-six (36). Two NCO's have been lost to the program;
one through the lack of motivation, and the other due to a routine
assignment to JCS in SAIGON. Of the remainder, twenty-eight are
working in civic action posts. The other six are working as inter-
preters back in the battalions of the 4th Infantry Division from which
they were drawn. Within two months realignments will be made to
put these six into Civic Action Posts. At the present there are only
twenty-eight positions that can make effective use of ARVN CA NCO's
and to incorporate all the CA trained NCO's immediately into the
program after formal training would deprive units of badly needed
interpreters. Also, on the last day of October an ARVN ILT was at-
tached to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, to under-
study the 4th Infantry Division CA program.

5 The education program in the TAOR showed the greatest gains
during the reporting period. Through the efforts of the Ethnic Minor-
ities Chief, PLEIKU, trained and certified MONTAGNARD teachers were
assigned to the schools in the TAOR. This resulted in the GVN begin-
ning to pay teachers while improving the overall quality of instruction.
It also greatly increases the probability of a vehicle educational
program continuing in this area once the 4th Infantry Division leaves.
Also, through the efforts of Company B, 8th PSYOPS Battalion, 5,000
JARAI language texts were reproduced and distributed to the schools
in the TAOR along with the teacher's manual for the same. (Students
population is now approximately 2500).

6. MONTAGNARD medic training is being greatly increased. PLEIKU hospital has agreed to conduct a two month course which will result in the GVN certification and eventual employment of those who successfully complete the course. The requirement of VIETNAMISH literacy has presented the greatest difficulty to date in finding recruits; however, thirty recruits have been located and will be given OJT in the village dispensaries from 1 November to early January when the formal course will begin at the PLEIKU hospital.

7. Recent programs and guidance from both IOG and G3 stepped up the training and patrolling activities by the TAOR PF elements and PSDF. The current policy is to get these elements outside the village defensive perimeters on patrols and ambushes. The principal training burden has fallen on the resident CA team and activity has greatly increased recently in this area. The long range results should be extremely fruitful.

8. In late October two windmills were obtained through CORDS, IFFORCEV. These are presently being erected and should they prove successful, an additional eighteen have been promised. These windmills offer tremendous potential in regard to raising the level of sanitation and personal hygiene as well as an economical, simple and effective means of irrigation.

(b) KONTUM: With the movement of the 2d Brigade, Civic Action by the 4th Infantry Division ceased in this area. No major projects were in the building stage and thereby left unfinished and the II Corps G5 advisor was informed as to what continuing programs had been supported by the Division and the status of each. Also, the G5, II Corps sent an officer with a US advisor to KQUNTUM to coordinate the transfer to 24th STZ of civic action formerly handled by the 4th Infantry Division.

(c) PLEIKU (Outside TAOR): Civic Action outside the TAOR in PLEIKU has been concentrated in those hamlets along the principal LOC’s: Highway 14 South in PHU NHON, Highway 19 West in THANH AN and Highway 19 East in LÊ TRUNG. Support has been mainly in the form of MEDCAPS and some limited school support. The 3d Brigade handled PHU NHON and THANH AN with 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry servicing LÊ TRUNG. The effectiveness of the l-10th’s efforts was evidenced by some excellent intelligence on pending enemy attacks given to the CA team by people in the hamlets where they worked and the recent killing of
one and capture of four VC cadre by the P3DF in another hamlet. The 1-10th CA team is now engaged in re-opening a school in this area and recruiting and training NONVAWAD medics. A new dispensary sponsored by the 3d Brigade has been opened in PAV NHH. Although not specifically a civic action program, the PP and P3DF have received considerable training and have been engaged in combined operations with 3d Brigade units, thus improving the effectiveness of these territorial security elements, and advancing GVN’s pacification program in the area.

(d) BINH DINH: Civic Action has remained active in the An TUC-BINH DINH area with prime emphasis on HMONCARS and commodity distribution. Additionally, a highly successful PSYOPS face-to-face campaign was conducted along Highway 19 using both Civic Action and PSYOPS assets. With the shifting of 2d Brigade Headquarters into BINH DINH, 4th Infantry Division Civic Action will undoubtedly increase in intensity and area serviced.

(e) Other: The program to inoculate the TAOR population has proven highly successful with over 7,900 of a population of 21,000 already inoculated. In addition to the direct benefit of countering any possibility of plague epidemics, this program served as a vehicle to introduce relatively sophisticated preventive medicine on a mass scale. It also exercised GVN medical supply channels since it was the province hospital staff that supplied the serum and gave the majority of the actual inoculations, and by so doing, it brought the hospital staff into contact with large numbers of people of which they were charged with providing medical treatment. It also demonstrated GVN’s concern for the people by the presence of the province health workers out in relatively remote hamlets and villages.

(f) Statistical Summary of Civic Action

(1) Construction projects during the reporting period. Joint projects are marked with a J next to the number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECTS</th>
<th>BUILT</th>
<th>REPAIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dwellings</td>
<td>6J-27</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads (kilometers)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11.5J-47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, HC3 CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>4J-14</th>
<th>4J-20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dispersaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Places</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>5J-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrines</td>
<td>4J-21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>5J-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>62J-43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fence (kilometers)</td>
<td>4J-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spillways</td>
<td>1J-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archways</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MADCAP Huts</td>
<td>4J-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle Pens</td>
<td>6J-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig Pens</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Perimeter (meters)</td>
<td>4,495J-3605</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag Poles</td>
<td>5J-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play Grounds</td>
<td>5J-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volley Ball Courts</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Ponds</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gates</td>
<td>8J-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardens</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulletin Board</td>
<td>5J-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Health:

- MEDCAP 3: 380,835
- Youth Health: 99,394
- Health Items (cap, etc): 9,010

Services:

- Cement: 13,029 bags
- Tin Sheets: 1,226 each
- Lumber: 67,463 board feet
- Paint: 201 gallons
- Rope: 620 feet
- Nails: 573 pounds
- Barbed Wire: 434 coils
- Sand Bags: 23,050 each
- Engineer Stakes: 4,200 each
- Concertina Wire: 820 coils
- Food: 28,050 pounds
- Clothing: 6,040 pounds

(2) ARVN Dependent Housing,

(a) Significant Activities. During the reporting period little progress has been made in the ARVN Self-Help Dependent Housing Program. The major problem has been the non-availability of ARVN soldiers to work on the construction, since they have been heavily committed to tactical operations. During the period covered by this report, construction was completed on twenty (20) family units and twenty (20) new units.
were started. At the AVN Dependent Housing Council held at 11 Corps Headquarters on 16 September 1969, the lack of progress reported by all units made it clear that the program goals could not be achieved in a reasonable time. As a result of the meeting, DCG, IFFOMCAV, sent out a letter on 29 September 1969, that revised the goals both in the current phase and for the future. The revised IFFOMCAV goal for Phase I will consist of the total of family units under construction and completed. The 4th Infantry Division revised goal for Phase I is 63 family units with 43 family units already completed and 20 family units under construction. Future goals will be based on available material rather than estimates of its future availability.

(b) Statistics.

(1) The following materials were provided during the period covered by this report:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CEMENT</th>
<th>TIN SHEETS</th>
<th>LUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42d Regiment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Ranger Group</td>
<td>120 bags</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>700 (BF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Armored Cavalry</td>
<td>230 bags</td>
<td></td>
<td>500 (BF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Aug-Sep-Oct)</td>
<td>340 bags</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>1,200 (BF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The following is a total of materials that have been provided to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CEMENT</th>
<th>TIN SHEETS</th>
<th>LUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,940 bags</td>
<td>1,624</td>
<td>18,260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGCSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Significant Activities

1. During the reporting period the 4th Infantry Division conducted two intensive face-to-face psychological operations campaigns in coordination with GVN PSYOP assets. The first operation was conducted along Highway 19E from La Trung District Headquarters to An Khe from 21 August to 1 September 1969, and the second operation was conducted on Highway 14 north from Pleiku to Kontum from 9-12 September 1969. The objective was to gain the support and confidence of the people. The operations proved to be very effective and assisted in the reduction of enemy mining incidents along both routes. Additionally, the number of villagers who voluntarily reported the locations of enemy mines increased during the period. Also, resistance by the people against VC demands was evidenced by the villagers from Kon Chara. On 12 September 1969, a group of Montagnard villagers from Kon Chara were approached by five Viet Cong tax collectors who demanded 60,000$VN in taxes. The villagers attacked the VC and killed their leader, with the other four VC rallying to the GVN. The villagers were rewarded for their actions in a special ceremony when they received gifts from the Pleiku Province Chief, and the 4th Infantry Division.

2. During the reporting period, the Division PSYOP section experienced difficulties in obtaining sufficient air support for leaflets and tape missions, due to the relocation of the Air Force PSYOP support unit from Pleiku to Tuy Hoa. However, these initial difficulties were overcome as the new procedures for requesting leaflet missions were formalized with the assistance of the Division Air Liaison Officer and Air Force personnel at Tuy Hoa. In addition, the PSYOP section now receives air support from a VNAF unit in Pleiku, and this increased the number of leaflet missions flown by organic helicopter air assets. Of particular significance is the leaflet drops that are made in conjunction with chemical missions over the area. The section has developed a special leaflet to accompany the chemical drops.

3. The Division PSYOP section has selected four Ki Carson Scouts to be trained in the conduct of psychological operations. Two of these individuals receive experience in propaganda warfare while working with the Viet Cong.

4. The Division PSYOP section continued membership in the Pleiku PSYOP Coordinating Committee, which coordinates all PSYOP activities in the Province. It is at these meetings that Provincial and Division representatives exchange ideas for improving PSYOP programs, and explain particular problem areas that have been encountered. The Chief of the VIETNAMSC Information Service,
Chairman of the Committee has now assumed the responsibility of arranging for and disseminating all PSYOP printed material to the districts and the Division. This function was formerly accomplished by the Assistant Province Advisor for PSYOPS. The change over has not reduced the amount of publications available for distribution and the Division continues to provide the local populace with magazines, newspapers, posters and movie films.

### Statistical Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Aug-Oct 69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaflets</td>
<td>137,390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker hrs. (air)</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker hrs. (ground)</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio Visual hrs.</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>39,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;D Performance hrs.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Propaganda Team – days</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIETNAMSE Information Service Visits</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Personnel

1. **Strength**

   a. **Beginning of Period (1 August 1969)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized – organic units</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>16,485</td>
<td>17,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized – attached units</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>17,536</td>
<td>18,802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. **Assigned – organic units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>17,148</td>
<td>18,547</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assigned – attached units</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>1,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>18,077</td>
<td>19,558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOH-65 (R2) (u)

(b) End of Period (31 October 1969).

| Authorized - organic units | 1,119 | 195 | 16,485 | 17,799 |
| Authorized - attached units | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 1,119 | 195 | 16,485 | 17,799 |
| Assigned - organic units | 1,201 | 199 | 16,237 | 17,637 |
| Assigned - attached units | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 1,201 | 199 | 16,237 | 17,637 |

(2) Replacements: The Division received a total of 576 officer and 5,149 enlisted replacements. During the same period, 634 officers and 6,764 enlisted men rotated out of the Division.

(3) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HOSTILE Wounded</th>
<th>HOSTILE Dead</th>
<th>HOSTILE Missing</th>
<th>NON-HOSTILE Wounded</th>
<th>NON-HOSTILE Dead</th>
<th>NON-HOSTILE Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVAHTY</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10th Cav</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-69th Armor</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Eng</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Avn</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124th Sig</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th MP Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division

Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOS-65 (R2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scout Dogs</th>
<th>K-75 Inf</th>
<th>XI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Morale and Personnel Services: Awards and Decorations during the period were presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECORATIONS AWARDED</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Medal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Valor)</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Service)</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation (Valor)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation (Service)</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Service)</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>1,308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BADGES**

| Combat Infantry Badge | 1,192 | 1,136 | 1,102 |
| Combat Medical Badge  | 82    | 36    | 31    |
SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
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Aircraft Crewman Badge

|       | d | 18 | 11 |

Miscellaneous Badges

|       | 20 | 8  | 91 |

TOTAL

|       | 1,302 | 1,193 | 1,235 |

(5) Promotions: A total of 5,974 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

(6) Reenlistment: There were a total of 270 reenlistments during the reporting period. The breakdown was as follows: First Term RA Reenlistment: 185; AUS Enlistments: 85.

(7) Postal:

(a) Money Order sales: $2,664,174.01.

(b) Parcel Post and Postal Fees: $57,445.10.

(c) Incoming Mail: Air Mail 1,776 sacks

| First Class | 349 sacks |
|            | 422 sacks |
| Direct     | 9,953 sacks |
| Breakdown  | 9,769 sacks |
| OSP        | 12,175 sacks |

(d) Outgoing Mail: Air Mail & First Class 1,662 sacks

| Sacks   | 4,207 |
|         | 2,232 |

(e) Number of mail days: 92

(8) Special Services Activities:

(a) The Division was visited by the following 11 USO shows:

Jug of Punch
George Gobel
South Market Street Band
Miss America
Chanin Hale
Roy Acuff
Bob Weymouth
George Jessel
Free Lancers
Gary Vinson
Melba Joyce
The Division was visited by four touring soldier shows.

R & R quotas received were 4,255 out-of-country, and 795 in-country.

A total of seventy-five 16-mm films circulated within the Division.

A total of 4,500 personnel checked out 1,200 books from the Special Services Library.

Chaplains Activities: The following services were conducted during the period with the following attendance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SERVICES</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>22,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>25,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Services</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2,504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) General Courts Martial: 10
(b) Special Courts Martial: 103
(c) Summary Courts Martial: 5

Health:

(a) In recent months, skin disease has caused man-day losses. Prevention programs are being initiated and this problem is being monitored closely. Priority is being given to water and clothing resupply. Clean uniforms are being issued about every four days and clean socks every one to two days. Medics have been instructed to inspect the skin of each of their men to reduce this disease wherever possible. Prompt treatment will prevent more serious illness.

(b) In the last several months, a number of animal bites have occurred within the Division. In the month of September, sixty men were treated for animal bites. Animals must be registered and tethered, and a campaign to enforce this has been initiated by the
Military Police. Continuing emphasis is being placed on rodent control. Personnel are being encouraged to use bed nets as a protective measure against rodents.

g. Engineer

(1) General. During this quarter, the majority of the engineer effort was in direct support of combat operations. All operations of rifle company size or larger included engineer support. Three line companies remained in direct support of the three brigades. One company was in support of the Task Force Commander at Camp Radcliff, while the bridge company supported the Division with tactical bridging, combat engineer vehicles, and assistance with base camp projects.

(2) Operations,

(a) Company A continued in direct support of the 3d Brigade and all attached units at LZ OASIS. Major tasks were road maintenance, drainage, upgrading a Landing Zone (LZ), firebase construction, mine-sweeps and direct combat support. During August and September, a total of 2,447 kilometers of roads was mine-swept. The company constructed two LZ's and upgraded four.

(b) Company B remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade operating out of Camp Radcliff. Major effort was expended in direct support missions to infantry battalions involving development of fire support bases and LZ's, bunker destruction and road maintenance. In addition, with one land clearing team from HHC, 10 kilometers of road were cleared from Highway 19 north on Highway 503.

(c) Company C remained in support of the 2d Brigade throughout the reporting period. The company operated out of FSB AARY LOU, until 21 September 1969. The company then moved to LZ HANUMAN. On 28 October 1969, the company moved to LZ ENGLISH in the vicinity of BONG SON. Considerable effort was expended by the company in upgrading LZ's and maintaining roads to battalions and LZ's. The 2d platoon worked in the vicinity of LZ FLANNY with one HHC land clearing team to finish a bunker destruction mission. At the conclusion of the mission, over 7,000 bunkers had been destroyed. The majority of operations by the platoons with infantry battalions consisted of bunker destruction, constructing LZ's and upgrading FSB's.

(d) Company D, during the period 1 August through 20 October 1969, was involved both in a direct and general support role.
2d platoon was in DS of 1-22d Infantry and later 3-12th Infantry until 23 September. The other platoons were in GS of Camp Radcliff.

Typical tasks at Camp Radcliff included construction of mine booms, repairing roads and 84 yards. On 24 September, the 2d platoon was assigned the task of rebuilding and repairing bridge security structures on Highway 19.

Company E gave general engineer support to the Division with tactical bridging, mine sweep, base camp construction, convoy security, resupply hauling and transportation. Company E's bridging support consisted of a 38 ft dry span located west of Kontum on the route to Po lei Khong and various AVLB missions within the Division AO. The CEV with the mine roller attachment was employed in minesweeps along routes from LZ Oasis to FSB's in the 3d Brigade area of operation. One platoon was responsible for fifteen construction projects in support of Camp Enari in addition the disassembly of one brigade FSB at Mary Lou in the vicinity of Kontum. Bridge trucks from the company were used to haul supplies and personnel in support of engineer and tactical units. In addition, ten dump trucks assigned to Company E were used to haul rock and sand from Pleiku and Kontum respectively, to fire support bases in the Division area of operations.

b. Army Aviation Operations

(1) Operational totals of the 4th Aviation Battalion were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AVG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours flown</td>
<td>3,241</td>
<td>3,029</td>
<td>2,926</td>
<td>9,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>11,044</td>
<td>9,443</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>28,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops lifted</td>
<td>15,986</td>
<td>12,955</td>
<td>10,852</td>
<td>39,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons of cargo</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft damaged</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft destroyed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The average number of aircraft per day used in support of the 4th Infantry Division was:

28 UH-1H, 12 UH-1C/AB-1G, 3 OH-6A, 4 CH-47, 1 CH-54.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1969, AGS CSMD-R-65 (M2) (U)

1. Inspector General

   (1) Fourth Division Annual General Inspections of two divisional units were conducted. Courtesy inspections in preparation for the USARV AGI were conducted in fifteen (15) units, and fourteen (14) reinspections were made. The 4th Infantry Division received its Annual General Inspection by HQ's, USARV.

   (2) No complaints were received by this office during the reporting period. Three hundred and twenty-seven requests for assistance were received during this period.

J. Signal

   (1) General: Operational activities continued to focus upon providing multichannel communications in support of the Division and its elements.

   (2) Operations:

      (a) On 22 September 1969, elements of Company B were deployed in support of a 2d Brigade TAC CP at LZ HARDTIMES. Operations ended on 23 October 1969.

      (b) On 18 October 1969, the headquarters of Company B deployed to Camp Radcliff at AN KHE.

      (c) On 26 October 1969, elements of Company B were deployed to LZ ENGLISH in support of the 2d Brigade move to that area. Elements of HHC and Company A were deployed on 27 October 1969, to assist in wiring in the 2d Brigade Headquarters.

      (d) On 23 October 1969, the 3d Brigade moved from LZ Oasis to Camp Zhari. One VHF system was discontinued. Elements of Company B were moved to Camp Zhari.

      (e) On 30 October 1969, multichannel communications to LZ MARY LOU were terminated. Elements of Company B supporting this operation returned to AN KHE.

K. Information Activities

   (1) During the period 1 August - 31 October 1969, a total of 18 news correspondents visited the Division AO, covering a variety of subjects ranging from pure hometown and human interest material to the Division's active combat and pacification operations. Included in the
news media personnel were representatives from Overseas Weekly, Time Life Publications, AP, UPI, Telenews International, New York Times, Newsweek, and NSA (Scripps-Howard). Military correspondents from Stars & Stripes, MACV, USAHV, IPFV, and a DOD Pictorial Team also visited the area. There was one free-lance writer in the area during the period.

(2) During the quarter, the Radio/TV Section broadcast 2,700 minutes on AFVN-(AM-FM)-Pleiku as news broadcasts. An additional 1,350 minutes of news were aired over the AM facilities of AFVN, QUI Nhon. An additional 1,520 minutes were utilized for a disc jockey show and chaplain’s messages over AFVN Pleiku. Television was used quite extensively during the period with 2,430 minutes of broadcast time used for Division news and special events. A total of 383 hard news radio releases were received, prepared, and cleared by the section during the period.

(3) This Division continues to be a leader in the number of hometown news release submissions. During the period August through October, 6,859 DA forms 1,526 were logged and forwarded. This is somewhat of a drop from previous quarters and reflects a decrease in incoming personnel and the general lull in ground action. Action has been taken to increase significantly the number of releases submitted.

(4) The photo release program which began in July continues to progress in a satisfactory manner. During the reporting quarter, 711 pictures were forwarded for release as opposed to 491 the previous quarter.

(5) A total of 553 hometown interview releases and audio tapes were processed by the Home Town News Center for use by local radio stations in CONUS. Special emphasis is being given this program for the Thanksgiving/Christmas holiday period.

(6) Improvements continue to be noted in the distribution of command information publications. 11 newspapers are now broken down for distribution at the battalion level rather than the brigade level. This modification has appreciably reduced the time required to get the papers to the man in the field.

(a) There were four fact sheets prepared and distributed during the period 1 August through 31 October 1969.

(1) Changes Regarding Courts-Martial

(2) Care and Prevention of Field Diseases
SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period ending 31 October 1969, AGS GSPOR-69 (R2) (U),

(3) VIETNAM entertainment contest

(4) VUNG TAU IN COUNTRY 25th

(b) There were 13 issues of the Division's weekly newspaper
The Steadfast & Loyal, published during the quarter, including a special
issue commemorating the Division's third combat anniversary and award of
the RVN Callantry Cross with Palm. A series of articles was run on the
R&R sites available. Increased emphasis was given to command information
topics during the period. A special orientation issue was also prepared.

(c) The first issue of the new Division yearbook, Esprit, was
prepared and distributed during the quarter. The second issue was also
prepared with distribution scheduled for 15 December 1969. This pub-
lication, in magazine format, couples feature material concerning Divi-
sion activities with command information materials.

(7) During the period, the Photo Section produced 9,038 prints
and processed 67 rolls of colored film. Emphasis continues on photo
journalism; however, support required for the Home Town News Program
has hampered this somewhat. The receipt of additional equipment should
alleviate this problem in the near future.

(8) The Public Information Section released a total of 2,501 hard
news stories and 1,394 photos during the quarter. This is a relatively
new program, begun in July, which has significantly aided in informing
the public of the actions of the 4th Division. Feedback is most infor-
mal but all indications are an increasing awareness of the Division's
operations through CONUS media.

(9) Increased coverage has been noted on 4th Division events in
the three major command publications in VIETNAM: Stars & Stripes,
USARV Reporter and MACV Observer. The following coverage was received
during the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Stories</th>
<th>Photos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporter</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stars &amp; Stripes</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) During the period 1 August - 31 October, 2,206 new members were
enrolled in the 4th Division Association, bringing the total membership
to 11,513. Seventeen per cent of those presently assigned to the 4th
Division are members of the Association. Scholarship Fund contributions
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During the period totaled $23,720.76, raising the total collections to date to $277,825.18.

(a) On 31 August, PFC Paul Greathouse became the 10,000th member of the Camp Enari Chapter of the 4th Division Association. PFC Greathouse was presented with his membership card by the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division.

(b) In September, the custodian of the 4th Division Association visited the Division Liaison NCO's at the 67th Evacuation Hospital and 26th Casualty Staging Flight to insure that a workable distribution system was in operation for gifts to the sick and wounded of the Division purchased by the 4th Division Association.

(c) During the month of October, a total of $275,000 of Division Scholarship funds was transferred to the Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C., from the agreement between the Scholarship Fund Board of Trustees and the Riggs National Bank in increments of $25,000.

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Personnel

(1) R&R Standby Lists

(a) Observation: During this period units were receiving numerous reports of R&R "no shows".

(b) Evaluation: Frequently, personnel had requested an R&R for a specific date, but upon receipt of the allocation had declined the R&R at the last minute. This resulted in an R&R "no show" charged to the unit.

(c) Recommendation: That a "standby" R&R roster be maintained. This roster should consist of the names of personnel next in standing who desire R&R to the specific location. When R&R permisive travel orders are submitted to a headquarters, a roster of standby personnel will accompany the orders. Units then verify the selected individual's intentions to accept the R&R not less than 36 hours prior to scheduled departure and not more than 48 hours. In the event an individual scheduled to depart on R&R cannot accept the R&R, permisive travel orders can be prepared for the first individual on the standby list and hand carried through channels to Special Services.
Aircraft Crew Chiefs

(a) Observation: Many enlisted personnel serving in the capacity of crew chief are G7ALF door gunners.

(b) Evaluation: Ideally, only school trained crew chiefs G7N should be allowed to crew an aircraft.

(c) Recommendation: Due to the shortage of qualified G7N crew chiefs, recruiting and selection of personnel for G7N slots should be closely monitored. A training program in the service platoon where highly motivated personnel receive 60 to 90 days training as mechanic's helpers before they are allowed to crew aircraft can result in a tremendous increase in average aircraft availability rate.

b. Intelligence

(1) Tape Recorders and Interrogation

(a) Observation: The interrogation of particularly intelligent and knowledgeable detainees has sometimes produced a great amount of complex material in a very short time. Interpreters have been unable to keep pace with the detainee and consequently, valuable information has been lost.

(b) Evaluation: The technique of utilizing a tape recorder allows a verbatim translation of the detainee's comments and has resulted in a more comprehensive interpretation being obtained from the interrogation of knowledgeable detainees. In addition, interpreters are afforded more time subsequent to the actual interrogation to translate the detainee's comments.

(c) Recommendation: The IPW Section should be authorized two tape recorders to insure that all interrogations are exploited for their full intelligence value.

(2) Multiple Enemy Mines

(a) Observation: Several enemy mines have been detected in one location and the enemy often utilizes culverts to camouflage his mines.
(b) Evaluation: Unnecessary additional damage and casualties result when individuals and vehicles move through an area before a thorough search upon the initial location of one mine. Mine detectors fail to pick up mines in culverts.

(c) Recommendation: Upon discovery or detonation of a mine, a thorough visual and mechanical search should be made 200 meters in all directions around the location of the first mine. Careful visual search around all culverts should be included as part of mine sweep operations.

(3) Enemy Cache Sites

(a) Observation: Enemy units continually use the same areas for way stations and resupply/cache sites.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy is forced to frequent the same areas due to his lack of navigational equipment, i.e., compasses, maps. Therefore, the enemy must use natural terrain to locate his caches and way stations.

(c) Recommendation: Units should periodically check areas of known cache and strong points from past experience. Natural terrain features such as caves, thick underbrush and draws should be searched in detail.

(4) Area Searches

(a) Observation: When a major contact is made with the enemy, invariably, the enemy will have a cache close by.

(b) Evaluation: Supplies are very precious to the enemy and therefore a fairly strong security force is employed to guard the supplies. The units will fight to evacuate or defend the supplies.

(c) Recommendation: When a unit is engaged, a detailed search of the contact area should be made for caches once the enemy breaks contact or is overpowered.

c. Operations.

(1) Marking of Enemy Base Camps
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Period Ending 31 October 1969, HCS USFOR-65 (H2) (U)

(a) Observation: A battalion discovered a large base camp complex of bunkers and caves.

(b) Evaluation: The tactical situation precluded a thorough search of the complex and the battalion moved to another location. When the tactical situation permitted, the battalion returned to the general area of the enemy base camp but was unable to find the exact location due to the dense jungle.

(c) Recommendation: When an enemy base camp or fortification is found and a thorough search cannot be made, the area should be marked to insure friendly location of the site when a thorough search can be made. Marking material preferably should be visible from the air and relatively permanent in nature, such as International Orange Paint.

(2) Sapper Attacks

(a) Observation: During this period enemy operations stressed sapper attacks and the sapper attacks are expected to continue.

(b) Evaluation: Sapper attacks are preceded by detailed reconnaissance to include identifying anti-intrusion devices and determining the extent of protective wire. This may take place 3 to 7 days prior to the attack and is followed by attack rehearsals. The night before a sapper attack, the enemy will neutralize obstacles by tying down trip flares, mines, etc., and will approach within a few hundred meters of the position. After dark they will slowly work their way through the wire using the least likely avenues of approach along low ground. Sapper attacks usually take place between 2400 and 0200 hours. They may be preceded by mortar fire to get US troops to move inside bunkers. The sapper attack will be quick with one or two squads heading for predetermined targets such as ammo storage, artillery positions, or CP's. Half of the sappers will be armed with 7 to 14 CHIGOM grenades and up to 20 kilograms of TNT. The other sappers will have AK-47's.

(c) Recommendation: That all personnel familiarize themselves with current sapper tactics and techniques.

(3) ROKA Search Techniques

(a) Observation: ROKA forces have been extremely successful in searching out enemy forces and materiel.
(b) Evaluation: Good intelligence is the basis for the formulation, execution, and excellent results of ROKA search operations. Intelligence includes prior knowledge of the enemy, his disposition and strength, a terrain analysis, and long range/continuous weather forecasts. A typical ROKA area of operations during a search normally consists of a 2000 meter radius circle cordonizing the bulk of the enemy force within the AO. A maximum amount of troops use thorough search techniques, slowly tightening the cordon by moving 50 to 100 meters a day. As the cordon tightens, ROKA troops, forced to leave the cordon due to the shrinking circle, form a second cordon concentrating on suspect areas, ridges, possible exfiltration routes (blue lines), and likely avenues of approach of an enemy counterattack. A third cordon is often provided by a reserve force. The techniques of patience and meticulous search of every meter of the objective area saves lives and insures complete clearance. The ROKA soldier often moves along on his haunches in a half duck waddle with the M16 at the ready under his right arm while he searches above, below, right and left with his left hand, always observing. This is slow and it tries the patience of the individual and the commanders of each level who must refrain from pressing speed. Its casualty saving quality and thoroughness are the pay off. ROKA troops carry light combat loads during search operations. Small arms, LAW’s, and 60-mm mortars are followed by heavier weaponry; flamethrowers, 106-mm recoiless rifles, 81-mm mortars, 55 gallon drums of napalm (with connecting pipe to pump the napalm into caves and tunnel complexes and ignited with flamethrowers or fire), and quad .50 caliber machineguns. One day’s spare rations necessitate daily resupply. Following a ROKA search, operation a “stay behind” task force conducts mop up operations. Sweeps are conducted to pick up enemy stragglers, enemy cache areas are re-searched, marked, and fortifications are destroyed. Critiques are conducted down to the squad level following ROKA search missions stressing new and old lessons learned. The success of ROKA search operations using the above techniques is accentuated by continued successful operations against the enemy.

(c) Recommendation: All commanders, when feasible, should emulate the successful example of the ROKA forces.

(4) Close Artillery Support

(a) Observation: Ground forces have a tendency to rely on air-ground fire (especially helicopter gunships) to support units in
contact rather than close artillery support.

(b) Evaluation: Each enemy contact presents a challenge to the leader on the ground level to evaluate and apply proper combat resources. Informal queries indicate that the general consensus of opinion leading to the call for gunships is related to clearance times, safety restrictions and what appears to be a "carte blanche" authority for anyone in the area to checkfire the artillery.

(c) Recommendation: That use of artillery as the most responsive means of fire support be emphasized and that small unit leaders receive continuous training calling for and adjusting artillery. That this training emphasize the use of continuing adjustment as the unit moves so that fires can very quickly be adjusted to the contact area, this eliminates some of the safety restrictions. That schemes of maneuver and gun-target lines be considered in advance and that "checkfire" authority be limited to senior ground commanders in the area and air routes and corridors be formally established and adhered to.

(5) Enemy Detection

(a) Observation: The enemy seems to retain the ability to engage friendly company and battalion bases.

(b) Evaluation: On numerous occasions during the reporting period, friendly bases were attacked at ranges from 35 to 50 meters and on one occasion a FSB was penetrated.

(c) Conclusion: That small unit leaders be constantly reminded that active, aggressive use of a combination of SRP's, LP's, and local patrolling are the best defense against base camp probes and attacks.

(6) Engaging the Enemy

(a) Observation: On too many occasions, contact with the enemy follows a format of:

1. Contact established.
2. Artillery and/or gunships called.
3. Areas swept with negative results.

(b) Evaluation: While the decision of the best way to engage the enemy must be left to the commander on the ground, when contact is the result of a meeting engagement and the enemy is not dug in aggressive fire and maneuver to close with and kill or capture the enemy.
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Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

by fire and maneuver would produce more meaningful results and battle-
field intelligence.

(a) **Recommendation:** That small unit leaders be constantly
reminded that aggressive offensive tactics using organic firepower
usually produce the best results and are likely to reduce rather than
increase friendly casualties.

(c) **Recommendation:** Commanders give consideration to em-
ploying short duration FSB's against targets of opportunity outside
their supporting artillery fans.

(8) **Land Navigation**

(a) **Observation:** Platoon and squad leaders tend to rely on
the company commander for land navigation.

(b) **Evaluation:** Leaders who are not constantly aware of
their positions on the ground are losing valuable experience in ter-
rain analysis and more importantly are not prepared to take control of
their element should something happen to the element leader.

(c) **Conclusion:** Commanders should continually quiz subor-
dinates about locations while the unit moves to insure that all leaders
are aware of their ground location.

(9) **Carrying Ammunition**

(a) **Observation:** Soldiers frequently carry machine gun
ammunition Pancho Villa style over their shoulders and pack.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, MSG CPD OR-65 (H2) (1)

(b) Evaluation: During stream crossings this method of carrying ammunition creates a definite safety hazard because the ammunition will keep the pack attached to the body of the man even if he succeeds in dropping his pack.

(c) Recommendation: Unit leaders should insure that M-60 ammunition is carried in such a way that it cannot impede the soldier when he drops his pack.

(10) Stay Behind Ambush Squad

(a) Observation: VC and NVA will frequently trail moving US forces.

(b) Evaluation: When the enemy is following US forces he usually will stay 200 to 300 meters behind the rear security.

(c) Recommendation: Before an element moves to a new location they should have pre-planned an ambush squad. This squad should be dropped off at likely ambush sites while the company continues to move. This practice also gives a bulk of the element knowledge of their location in case they have to be reinforced.

(11) Aerial Observation for Armor

(a) Observation: Often while moving through dense jungle terrain, tanks have difficulty selecting a route which will minimize obstacles.

(b) Evaluation: Aerial observation has assisted greatly in directing the lead element to avoid obstacles and impossible terrain. This can overcome the navigational problems experienced when observation is restricted on the ground to a distance of 10 to 20 meters.

(c) Recommendation: Aerial support should be made available to armor units conducting operations in jungle and other restricted terrain.

(12) Tank Recovery

(a) Observation: When tanks become stuck or damaged by mines great distances from normal lines of communication, a major recovery problem is developed.

(b) Evaluation: In areas where the water table is close to the surface combat vehicles become mired because they have broken through
the thin, hard earth layer. Junior leaders often do not realize the magnitude of their problem and attempt to recover the vehicle using conventional techniques which assume that hardstand is nearby. In most cases these recovery efforts are a waste of time and energy and do not free the vehicle from without outside assistance.

(b) Conclusion: In addition to intensified training of vehicle commanders to recognize and avoid such areas, emphasis must be placed on early request for assistance. The junior leader should make his best attempt at recovering the vehicle but should that fail he should immediately request the assistance of a senior recovery specialist and provide a list of materials that he feels necessary for successful recovery. These items should be assembled while the specialist is enroute. Upon arrival at the scene, the specialist makes his analysis and calls for the waiting material and submits his request for security forces, engine 1 and other requirements to complete the entire operation. This action immediately focuses command attention on the problem and greatly reduces the amount of wasted time and effort that results when assistance is piecemealed to the operation.

(13) Tanks in the Indirect Fire Role

(a) Observations: Use of M60A3 Tank in indirect fire role.

(b) Evaluations: There are many problems encountered in emphasizing M60A3 tanks in an indirect fire role. These problems include accuracy of fire, extensive wear on the 90-mm gun tube and reducing the mobile aspect of armor. The problem of accuracy of fire stems from the fact that the projectile fired has a fixed charge and the weapon itself has a relatively flat trajectory. Compensation for range is made only by adjusting the elevation of the gun. Since the weapon has a flat trajectory - intermediate hill rises between gun and target cannot be overcome as it can when firing artillery where the elevation and charge accounts for range. The second problem of extensive wear is important; the tube life of the 90-mm gun is relatively low compared to indirect fire weapons. Approximately 1,400 rounds of HE will wear out a 90-mm gun whereas the tube life of most artillery pieces is 5,000 to 6,000 rounds. The third problem is a violent reduction of combat power. Tanks were designed to maneuver, employing them in an indirect fire role, the tank is in an immobile position. Notwithstanding, however, the tank in an indirect fire role provides a valuable supplement to other indirect weapons for area type coverage with a large volume of fire.

(c) Recommendations: If tanks must be employed in the
indirect fire role, FO's should be used to adjust the fire. Due to the ballistic characteristics of the gun and ammunition, it must be realized that the use of tanks firing indirect is very limited.

(14) Reaction to Fire

(a) Observation: During the initial volley of incoming fire, most everyone took cover in bunkers and fighting positions.

(b) Evaluation: During any type of attack, massive volumes of fire must be returned immediately with whatever weapons are available. In order to control, direct, or shift these fires, leaders and key personnel must be out evaluating the situation firsthand. At the inception of the attack on GYPSY, about 50% of the fighting strength were outside their bunkers. After initial incoming individuals were firing, communicating, and assisting in evacuation of the wounded. Although soldiers outside bunkers increased the probability of casualties, the activity was absolutely necessary for gun crews to deliver accurate fires and for medical personnel to render aid to the wounded.

(c) Recommendation: The number of personnel outside bunkers should be kept to a minimum, consistent with what must be accomplished. Leaders must be out directing efforts and evaluating the situation.

(15) Direct Artillery Fire

(a) Observation: A battery employed direct fire against muzzle flashes during an attack on a fire support base.

(b) Evaluation: The Battery CO spotted the flash of the third round fired by the enemy. The line of sight from the gun to target was obstructed in some areas by latrines, equipment racks, and engineer stakes. Observers were posted near the gun pits and directed fire within three minutes after receiving the first incoming round.

(c) Recommendation: Structures within the 105-mm howitzer direct fire sectors should be constructed below gun pit wall level or moved to allow unobstructed direct fires. Latrines and showers should be fabricated to be toppled easily. When definable, enemy targets present themselves during an attack, controlled suppressive fires must be immediately employed. Suppressive fires must continuously be delivered on observed enemy targets.
Fighting Positions for Support Personnel

(a) Observation: Fighting positions built on firebases are intended to accommodate only infantry elements. During the attack on a firebase, support personnel reported to their sleeping bunkers or were used to evacuate the wounded.

(b) Recommendation: If supplementary fighting positions are constructed, they can be used to strengthen overall defense.

(c) Recommendation: Supplementary fighting positions for use by support personnel should be constructed to block enemy advances if the perimeter is breached.

d. Organization - None

e. Training

(1) Critiques

(a) Observation: While conducting combat operations, a maneuver company has little time for formal or semi-formal training.

(b) Evaluation: Leaders and all commanders can carefully observe their personnel while on operations, and they conduct a thorough, detailed critique of all observed actions, both good and bad.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders and leaders maximize the use of the technique of critiquing to counter the lack of organized training while on operations.

(2) Quick Kill

(a) Observation: A hasty spray of automatic weapons fire is often used to initially engage enemy soldiers.

(b) Evaluation: A hasty "18 round spray" is usually not effective when engaging the enemy. It expends one magazine and leaves little or no ammunition for sustained fire. Magazine changes cause lulls permitting the enemy to gain fire superiority.

(c) Conclusion: Therefore, commanders should employ the
"quick kill" technique, and emphasize that even a few rounds hastily aimed are more effective than 10 that are sprayed.

(3) SHP Training

(a) Observation: Due to constant turnover of personnel, unit commanders are forced to rely on relatively untrained and inexperienced soldiers to lead SHP's.

(b) Evaluation: Inexperienced leaders operating independently put a much greater burden on unit leaders and require detailed instructions before being sent out on a mission.

(c) Conclusion: Unit leaders should insure that SHP's are issued detailed but simple orders. Patrol leaders should be quizzed thoroughly on routes of march so that unit commanders can be sure that patrols get to the right position. Classes should be conducted at every available opportunity on pertinent subjects, so that leaders are trained as rapidly as possible.

(4) Tank Modification for ARVN Driver Training

(a) Observation: Certain modifications are necessary before the average ARVN soldier can crew the M43A3 tank.

(b) Evaluation: The biggest problem is the weight factor, including both material and men. At the present, the ARVN personnel are unable to stop the tank within the normal stopping distance. It takes approximately 1000 lbs. of pressure by gauge to stop when traveling at speeds above 10 miles an hour. The VIETNAM soldier can get about 200 lbs. Additionally, the ARVN soldiers are unable to lock the brakes even when the tank is at a complete halt without using both feet. The type seat and backrest in the M43A3 is not suitable to smaller VIETNAM soldier's use. The seat does not adjust forward enough to provide back support nor go high enough to provide forward and side vision over both fenders.

(c) Recommendation: A modification kit should be developed which will provide at least a 6" extension of the brake pedal. The seat should be modified to provide a locked non-leaning backrest and a 10" increase in height for proper visibility.

f. Logistics

(1) Monsoon Supply Preparation
(a) Observation: Land supply routes were found to be unreliable and unnegotiable during periods of heavy rain.

(b) Evaluation: During the middle of July, fire support bases located along land supply routes required overland resupply by convoy due to weather. After initial attempts with organizational vehicles failed, special purpose vehicles, i.e., M578 full tracked cargo carriers and wheeled GOSH vehicles, were employed with only limited success. Increased use of land mines to interdict roads was encountered as the use of roads was increased.

(c) Recommendation: Prior to the onset of monsoon rains, a thorough engineer reconnaissance of all intended overland supply routes should be made. These routes should be upgraded where necessary during dry work periods. During monsoons, maximum use of good weather must be made and stocks of Class I, III, IV and V built up on fire support bases to minimize the requirements for overland supply. When overland supply is required, it must consist of quantities of necessary items consistent with the difficulty of resupply. Excess use of roads during bad weather will make roads impassable. When using special purpose vehicles not organic to the unit, the recovery capability of these vehicles, in case of mechanical failure or mishap, is vital to the planning of the resupply convoy.

(2) Resupply of Forward Units

(a) Observation: During a three day period of July, some units became low on stocks of food and supplies because of inclement weather on days of intended resupply.

(b) Evaluation: Often during the monsoon season when units allowed food supplies to be used according to predetermined consumption rates, planning to be resupplied on schedule, periods of rationing were experienced. The weight of meals carried is the critical factor in determining the number of meals an element can carry. Stores of food on fire support bases were used to resupply elements when they could only receive resupply by walking to the resupply point.

(c) Recommendation: During the monsoon period the basic load of meals carried should be increased to twelve, of which six should be Long Range Ration Packets. This will increase the available meals without increasing weight. When possible, units should rotate through fire bases regularly to keep nutrition up while Long Range Ration Packets are being used more extensively. Resupply of units must be a part of operational planning and accomplished enough in advance of the necessary time to provide a reserve against resupply difficulties.
FIELD SHOWER UNITS

(a) Observation: During the quarter, there were a large number of requests for use of S&T Battalion's field shower units at forward firebases. Most units desired truck mounted units which are in short supply.

(b) Evaluation: The S&T Battalion is authorized nine field shower units by present MTOE. Of these nine, only three are operated as truck mounted units. (Truck mounted units have a water tank, the water pump, and the hot water heater mounted on a 2 1/2 ton truck. This permits the shower tent and spray units to be set up at a battalion firebase, normally on a hilltop, and allows the truck to travel back and forth to the nearest stream for water). The remaining six units are not truck mounted. They are designed to be set up beside streams or lakes and to pump water out of the stream or lake. However, few Division firebases are established by water sources since the firebases are established on high ground. A truck mounted water tank is imperative for operation of shower units in an unconventional warfare situation. Under the present MTOE, the S&T Battalion does not have sufficient 2 1/2 ton trucks or water tanks to operate nine truck mounted units.

(c) Recommendations: That all shower units assigned to S&T Battalions in Vietnam be of the truck mounted design.

INSECT CONTROL

(a) Observation: The optimum time of the day to employ insecticide against mosquitos is between dusk and dawn. However, the use of aircraft limits aerial spraying to daylight hours. The use of an aircraft for insecticide spraying is a drain on already limited aircraft assets. Spraying on a regularly scheduled basis is difficult because if the one AGRAVIRCO sprayer in the Division can not be used on a scheduled day due to weather or tactical aircraft requirements, it may be several days before the sprayer is available to the user again.

(b) Evaluation: To overcome the problems encountered in aircraft spraying, a program of ground spraying using the M106 RCA Dispenser (Mity Mite) was established. The Mity Mite is placed in a 1 1/2 ton truck (or other vehicle) which drives around the FSB at dusk. For larger FSB's such as LZ OASIS, a rack to hold the Mity Mite and a 55 gallon drum of insecticide was fabricated for a 1 1/2 ton trailer. This permits spraying the entire FSB without replenishing insecticide. Although it is too soon to observe the effects of this procedure on the malaria rate, there has been a noticeable decrease in the number of
flies at FSB's where this procedure is being used.

(e) Conclusions: That ground spraying with the Mity Mite be used in lieu of aerial spraying whenever possible.

g. Communications

(1) Power Sources

(a) Observation: A requirement exists to have FM voice communications from the Battalion Command Bunker during alerts. For maximum effectiveness VRC-12 series radios are used instead of the AN/PRC-25. However, a 24 volt battery was being used as the sole source of power for these radios and there were no provisions for recharging the battery during the course of an alert. Consequently, even if the alert lasted only for a few hours, the battery would lose some of its power and communications difficulties were encountered.

(b) Evaluation: Within the Battalion Communications Section a 1.5 DC generator was on hand but was being kept in Administrative Storage. Keeping this generator readily available near the Command Bunker and in a state of readiness for operations enables a quick change to generator DC power in the event battery power fades.

(c) Recommendation: Units should not rely solely on battery sources for emergency communications unless a system is available which allows the battery to be recharged during operation. Lacking this a DC generator should be available and ready to provide power for communications during alerts or attacks.

(2) Antenna Orientation

(a) Observation: When faced with a high loss obstacle in a VHF radio relay system, it is sometimes possible to improve system quality by a slight misorientation of antennas to the side of the obstacle.

(b) Evaluation: While it is generally desirable to have VHF antennas at opposite ends of a system oriented directly at one another, the mutual misorientation of antennas to an aiming point slightly (less than 10 degrees) off the normal orientation, and away from the obstacle provides a better transmission path.

(c) Recommendation: That the misorientation technique be tried on all VHF systems suffering from high loss obstacles.

(3) Obstacles to FM Radio
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, AGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: Many operations are carried on in terrain areas not conducive to good line of sight transmission.

(b) Evaluation: The predominant means of communication for the battalion is the FM radio. The expected and required transmission distance varies from 10 to 20 kilometers. However, unless the terrain is relatively flat the communications within the line of sight limitation of radios will be difficult, unpredictable, or impossible.

(c) Conclusion: When working in mountainous terrain, good communications require planned relay stations and directional antennas. Elements also carry RT/GRC-292's and communication materials for field expedient omni and unidirectional antennas. Personnel should be aware of problems encountered due to obstacles to line of sight, improper placement of antennas, and overshooting. RTG's and commanders must be thoroughly trained and supplied to fully utilize all available transmission aids. Equipment and personnel are available for relay missions to achieve constant communications.

h. Material

(1) Steering Knuckle Failure

(a) Observation: A high rate of steering knuckle failure was noted when vehicles operated in deep mud or water.

(b) Evaluation: The cause of the failures was determined to be ripped or missing steering knuckle boots.

(c) Recommendation: When operating in an area where there is deep mud and/or water, frequent inspections of the steering knuckle boot be made to insure it is not leaking.

(2) Observation: The M66A3 OVM does not include the fuel tank purge pump as a standard item of issue.

(b) Evaluation: This pump is a must when operating in wet weather to remove the water from the fuel tanks. The adoption of the M117 bilge pump to blivet hoses and fittings has saved many man hours replacing fuel filters and injector pumps.

(c) Recommendation: The M66A3 OVM authorization be modified to include the fuel tank purge pump as a standard item.

(3) Tank Commander Override Modification
Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969; RUS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: The Tank Commander override is mounted too low for a short Tank Commander.

(b) Evaluation: The M6A3 tank is designed to fire and traverse buttoned up.

(c) Recommendation: That the controls, and operating rods be extended six inches up and to the rear to provide complete control and vision at all times. This can be accomplished, if authorized, in about two hours work with organic tools and ingenuity.

(4) SOP for Engine Removal

(a) Observation: Access to hose coupling is difficult when disconnecting the engine from the transmission on the M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier and the M58 Cargo Carrier.

(b) Evaluation: The left exhaust manifold of the M113A1 engine and the right manifold of the M58 engine is the impediment to reaching the hose couplings, and is difficult to maneuver around in order to release the coupling.

(c) Recommendation: That the removal of the appropriate exhaust manifold be made a part of the standard procedure of disconnecting engines from the transmission.

(5) Changing Multifuel engines

(a) Observation: The changing of engines in multifuel wheeled vehicles is cumbersome.

(b) Evaluation: The front cross member of the vehicle makes it difficult to easily remove and reinstall engines.

(c) Recommendation: That the removal of front cross member be made a part of the standard procedure of removal and emplacement of engines on multifuel wheeled vehicles.

(6) Filler Plug Removal

(a) Observation: Filler Plugs on the front of M101A1 105 Howitzers are being stripped of threads.

(b) Evaluation: This is caused by units not having the proper wrench to remove the filler plug, thus causing the plug threads to be stripped.
(a) **Observation:** A high percentage (50 - 75%) of all M60 machine guns being submitted to support maintenance have loose rivets on the receiver. The rivets work loose causing the head space and bullet ramp angle to change causing the weapon to jam and double feed.

(b) **Evaluation:** Rivets cannot be tightened or replaced at this level and the weapons are turned in as unserviceable and replacement weapons requisitioned.

(c) **Recommendation:** The machine gun can be welded on each side where the rear half of the receiver slides into the front half. The receiver should also be welded at the bottom. Welds should be electric and no more than ½ to 3/4 of an inch in length.

1. Other: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD L. PHILLAMAN
LTC, GS
Acting Chief of Staff
DISTRIBUTION:
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2 - CC, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav
2 - CC, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
1 - CC, 1st Bn, 3d Inf
1 - CC, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
1 - CC, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
1 - CC, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
1 - CC, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
1 - CC, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
1 - CC, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
1 - CC, 3d Bn, 16th Arty
1 - CC, 6th Bn, 29th Arty
1 - CC, 4th Bn, 42d Arty
1 - CC, 2d Bn, 9th Arty
2 - CC, 4th Sgr Bn
2 - CC, 124th Sig Bn
1 - CC, 4th SAT Bn
1 - CC, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
1 - CC, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
1 - CC, 4th Med Bn
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject ORL and concurs, except as indicated below.

2. (U) Reference para 1e(1)(a): HQ, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam is currently evaluating the performance of the pilot project windmills. If they prove effective, steps will be taken to determine whether or not windmills can be provided through the Commodity Import Program. This would mean that the windmills would be available for individual Vietnamese to purchase, but that none would be provided free as US Civic Action Programs.

3. (U) Reference para 1h(2): The average number of aircraft per day used in support of the division should be 30 UH-1H, 12 UH-1G/AH-1G, 11 CH-46, 4 CH-47, and 1 CH-54. These figures represent the average daily aviation support actually received and flown. They do not include support rendered by OPCON elements of the 7/17th Cavalry Squadron which supported continuously with two air cavalry troops and the headquarters and Headquarters Troop.

4. (C) Reference para 2C(4)(c): Nonconcur. The restriction of the authority to "check fire" being limited to senior ground commanders is contrary to sound safety procedures. Any person who observes a condition which could result in the injury or death of friendly personnel or non-combatants must have the authority to call for a "check fire". All personnel must be trained in calling for and adjustment of artillery fire, particularly in adjusting fire within close proximity to friendly or civilian elements.

5. (U) Reference para 2e(4)(c): Nonconcur. The recommendation as stated does not present the ultimate solution to this problem. This headquarters recommends that USAV conduct a review of US equipment planned for transfer to AIV from the human engineering standpoint and determine the modifications necessary due to US-VN anthropometric differences. Modifications developed without a thorough analysis from the human engineering standpoint can result in a degradation of the operator's capabilities with a resultant reduction in equipment capability.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GR-HIST (4 Dec 69) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

6. (U) Reference para 2h(2)(b): Nonconcur. The M113A1 bilge pump is not designed to pump combustible liquids and its use for this purpose constitutes a fire hazard. The unit has been advised to request authorization for manually operated transfer pumps.

7. (U) Reference para 2h(3)(c): Nonconcur. This is an unauthorized modification. Unit has been advised to submit an EIR.

8. (U) Reference para 2h(6)(c): Nonconcur. Inadequate explanation and information is provided. It is not clear whether the heads of the plug are being damaged or the threads stripped. No reason is given for not having the proper wrench. This headquarters is in the process of checking the problem with supporting maintenance and will advise the unit of the results.

9. (U) Reference para 2h(7)(c): Nonconcur. Information concerning this problem has been disseminated to the field in maintenance publications. The problem is correctly stated and instructions have been disseminated for accomplishing the modification; however, the modification is only authorized to be performed at general support level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
1LT AGO
ASST AG

CF:
2 - AGSFOR, DA
1 - CG, 4th Inf Division
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) His headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned, for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning “R&R Standby Lists”, page 54, paragraph 2a(1); concur. The recommendation made by the 4th Inf Div in paragraph 2(a)(c) appears to be a sound procedure; however, it would not be feasible for all commands due to dispersion of subordinate units. Commands with units widely dispersed would find this proposal to be an administrative burden.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning “Tape Recorders and Interrogation”, page 55, paragraph 2b(1); concur. The IPW section is already authorized six tape recorders (AN/UNH-10) by MTQE 30-17G. The idea of utilizing tape recorders during interrogation has merit; however, tactical military intelligence companies (MICs) should direct efforts toward acquiring information for immediate tactical value, i.e., local VCI, OB and enemy unit locations. Detailed interrogation of highly knowledgeable PWs should be conducted at the CTZ interrogation centers or the Combined Military Interrogation Center.

   c. (U) Reference item concerning “Close Artillery Support”, page 58, paragraph 2c(4), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 4. Concur with the recommendation, nonconcur with 1st Indorsement. Ground Commanders must retain authority to direct “check fire”. Any attempt to allow “any person” to call for “check fire” as described in 1st Indorsement, paragraph 4, will negate artillery responsiveness and put enemy deceptive radio stations in a position of stopping US supporting fires by near unchallenged calling for “check fires”.

   d. (U) Reference item concerning “Hipshoot”, page 60, paragraph 2c(7); concur. The hipshoot as described is a simple adaptation of standard procedures used by howitzer batteries of Armored Cavalry Squadron organic to Armored Cavalry Regiments.

   e. (U) Reference item concerning “Monsoon Supply Preparation”, page 65, paragraph 2f(1); concur. Supply routes should be upgraded prior to monsoon rains and stocks of Class I, III, IV, and V should be built up on fire support bases whenever possible.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHOC-DST (4 Dec 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division Period
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Field Shower Units", page 67, paragraph 2f(3); concur. However, the S&T Bn is authorized nine Bath Unit Portable: Gasoline engine driven, eight shower heads. The units authorized are portable only and not truck mounted as indicated in the ORLL. The three truck mounted shower units must be locally fabricated as only the portable unit is available as a standard item. The truck mounted shower unit idea has merit; therefore, recommend submission of idea to US Army Combat Development Command IAW AR 71-1 or fabricate six additional truck mounted shower units to satisfy the requirement.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Filler Plug Removal", page 70, paragraph 2h(6), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 8; nonconcur. There is a standard filler plug retainer wrench in the supply system (Part 56103723, Ref page 30, fig 14, TM 9-3007 Oct 53). If missing, the wrench should be requisitioned by the unit. The organizational mechanic tool kit also contains a suitable wrench for removing the plug. Using an improper tool will strip the head of the plug but should not affect the condition of the plug threads; however, if the threads become damaged, the recommendation at hand would be an acceptable field expedient.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "M-60 Receiver Rivets", page 71, paragraph 2h(7), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 9; concur. Keeping the M-60 machine gun receiver rivets tight has been a constant problem, recognized by change 2 to TM 9-1005-224-25, which provides instructions for using electric welds on the front rivets only. If the rear rivets are likewise presenting problems, the using unit should submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) to USAHEC. This headquarters can not approve the welding as recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
4th Inf Div
I FFV

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (6 Dec 69) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
1. **Task Organization as of 31 July 1969 with supporting forces:**

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<th>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-14 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-35 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-35 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2-1 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-9 Arty DS</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/3-6 Arty GS</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/5-27 Arty GS</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>A/6-16 Arty GS</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/5-16 Arty GS 2-9 Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/4 Sngr</td>
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<td>B/704 Maint</td>
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<th>173d Abn Bde</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/7-17 Cav (OPCON)</td>
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2. **Task Organization change as noted in significant events 5 Aug 69:**

**Inclusion 1**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.**

**DOD DIX S200.10**
3. (C) Task Organization change as noted in significant events 6 Aug 69:

1st Bde 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: B/7-17 Cav

4. (C) Task Organization change as noted in significant events 12 Aug 69:

1st Bde 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: B/7-17 Cav

5. (C) Task Organization change as noted in significant events 14 Aug 69:

1st Bde 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: B/7-17 Cav

6. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 88-69 effective 18 Aug 69:

2d Bde 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: TACCP/A/B/1-22 Inf

3d Bde 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: 2-35 Inf

7. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 93-69 effective 31 Aug 69:

3d Bde 4th Inf Div

1. Constitute TF FIGHTER Hqs.
2. Move TF FIGHTER Hqs, one Inf Co and B/7-17 Cav to BMT OPCON TF FIGHTER.
3. Be prepared on order to move one Inf w/DS Arty to TF control.

7-17th Cav

1. Move one air cavalry troop to BMT E OPCON TF FIGHTER.

8. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 95-69 effective 2 Sep 69:

1st Bde 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: Plat/1-69 Armor

2d Bde 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: Plat/1-69 Armor
CONFIDENTIAL

9. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 96-69 effective 5 Sep 69:

2d Bde 4th Inf Div
RcCnVls: 1-22 Inf

10. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 93-69 effective 9 Sep 69:

2d Bde 4th Inf Div
RcCnVls: 1-22 Inf

11. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 102-69 effective 20 Sep 69:

1st Bde 4th Inf Div
RcCnVls: elements/1-69 Arm
173d Airborne Bde
RcCnVls: 1 Bn w/3d Arty

12. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 107-69 effective 12-16 Oct 69:

1st Bde 4th Inf Div
RcCnVls: 1-10 Cav
RcCnVls: 1-69 Armor (-)
3d Bde 4th Inf Div
RcCnVls: elements/1-69 Armor

13. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 103-69 effective 13 Oct 69:

1st Bde 4th Inf Div
RcCnVls: 3-12 Inf

14. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 112-69 effective 23 Oct 69:

1st Bde 4th Inf Div
RcCnVls: 3-3 Inf
RcCnVls: 1-14 Inf
173d Airborne Bde
RcCnVls: 1-12 Inf

15. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 113-69 effective 31 Oct 69:

3d Bde 4th Inf Div
RcCnVls: 1-14 Inf

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16. (C) Task Organization as of 31 October 1969 with supporting forces.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-13 Inf
1-3 Inf
6-29 (-) Arty D3
A/2-17 Arty D3
A/2-17 Arty D3
C/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29 Arty
A/6-29 Arty
D/5-16 Arty
B/4-17 Arty
A/2-17 Halnt
A/3-12/4 Sig
E/nt/4 HP Co
A/4 MEd
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty D3
C/4-17 Arty
C/704 Halnt
A/4 Med
Plat/3/124 Sig
Plat/4 MP Co
TACP

TaSK FOICe FIGURES

B/2-35 Inf
B/7-17 Cav
D/7-17 Cav

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3-13 Inf
1-14 Inf
1-35 Inf
2-35 Inf
2-9 Arty D3
A/3-16 Arty GSR 2-9 Arty
B/3-16 Arty GS
A/1-35 Arty GS
A/6-14 Arty GS
B/6-29 Arty GS
C/7-15 Arty GS
C/6-14 Arty GS
A/4 Med
B/704 Halnt
A/4-42 Arty
Plat/3/124 Sig
Plat/4 HP Co
TACP

Division Troops

2-6 Inf
1-69 Armor
1-10 Cav
7-17 Cav (-)
4-42 Arty (-)
A/3-6 Arty GS
C/3-6 Arty GS
B/6-14 Arty GS
B/1-35 Arty GS
A/4-42 Arty
704 Halnt (-)
A/4 Med (-)
124 Sig (-)
Plat/4 MP Co
K/75 Inf (Ranger)
4 MI Det
4 Avn
TACP
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 4th Infantry Division**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CG, 4th Infantry Division

4 December 1969

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**Sponsoring Military Activity**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Supplementary Notes**

N/A

**ABSTRACT**

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