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
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


MACV SEER REPORT

A SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF.

PART I.

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN),
VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC),
VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN).



4 th QTR, CY 69 (1)

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MACJ3-051

30 March 1970

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1. This report is prepared quarterly to provide COMUSMACV, MACV staff agencies and advisors with an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).
2. The content of the USMACV SEER Report is derived from operational statistics and responses to quarterly questionnaires submitted by senior advisors as a part of the MACV System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER). This part of the report contains ARVN/VNMC and VNN evaluations. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of this report is published under separate cover as Part II.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
USMACV SEER Report, Part I,
4th Qtr CY 69

J. F. Harris
J. F. HARRIS
Major, USA
Asst AG

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PART I: ARVN/VNMC AND VNN FORCES

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- A. Enemy Contacts and Results Per Battalion.
- B. Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results.
- C. Effort, Results and Caches Discovered.
- D. Advisors' Assessments Tables.
- E. Combat Support Received.

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1. (U-FOUO) INTRODUCTION.

a. Coverage. This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) during 4th Qtr CY 69. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of the report is published as Part II. The status and performance of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) are covered in separate reports, the most comprehensive of which is the MACCORDS Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) Monthly Evaluation Summary Report.

b. Data and Information Sources. Operational statistics are derived from the SEER Monthly Operational Statistics Reports submitted to MACV by US advisors assigned to ARVN/VNMC units. Significant problem areas are reported quarterly by corps senior advisors. Assessments of effectiveness of each ARVN and VNMC unit are derived from advisors' responses to the SEER quarterly questionnaire. Environmental data is obtained from MACJ2 and friendly force strength data from MACJ1. Input for the naval forces portion of this report is received from the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, and the Senior Naval Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, in the form of monthly and quarterly reports.

c. Factors Influencing Performance. Many factors, such as differences in terrain, size of areas, enemy/friendly density, level of activity, weather, and tactics employed by opposing forces affect the results as shown in this report.

2. (C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE.

a. Effectiveness.

(1) Allocation of Effort. The level of effort devoted to combat operations has doubled since early 1968, reaching a high of 50 percent by the end of 1969. Time spent on combat operations during the quarter increased while time on security decreased. Training time has shown a significant increase from 3.1 percent in the third quarter to 6.8 percent in the fourth quarter. In November, JGS placed major emphasis on reducing pacification operations by ARVN organizations in II, III, and IV Corps, with replacement by RF/PF units. Initial improvement has been noted.

(2) Contacts and Enemy Initiated Incidents. Country-wide enemy contacts remained considerably lower than in early 1969 and below second and third quarter levels. The proportion of contacts with enemy units of platoon and smaller size continued high as the enemy remained fragmented. Contacts with battalion-size units, which were high in IV Corps last quarter, decreased. A substantial increase in battalion-size contacts occurred in II Corps during the Bu Prang/Duc Lap engagements. Enemy initiated incidents declined during the year, with the third and fourth quarters at about the same level.

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(3) Operational Results. Results in the fourth quarter in terms of enemy killed increased over the third quarter, with II Corps showing significant improvement. Enemy captured and surrendered decreased slightly. I Corps kills dropped due to the 51st Regiment and 1st Division, while the 2d Division continued highest in-country. The Marines showed the greatest improvement in enemy eliminated in the fourth quarter. The ARVN maneuver battalion kill ratio decreased slightly from 4.7 to 4.5. Cache finds of weapons decreased from the previous quarter to 902--a low for the year. Amounts of food and ammunition discovered increased, with best results in III Corps and by the Airborne Division.

(4) Effectiveness. US advisors' assessment of ARVN/VNMC operational effectiveness increased gradually during 1969. I Corps units have been rated particularly high for the past four quarters, as have some special units (Airborne and Marines).

(5) Training. The total time spent by ARVN battalions on in-place training increased slightly during 1969 but still remains low. During the fourth quarter, 53 percent of the advisors in the field evaluated training conducted to improve combat skills as effective; only seven percent rated it as ineffective. There has also been a gradual increase in the average and above average category ratings of the training of company grade officers and unit NCOs. During 1969 over one-third of the ARVN/VNMC battalions received refresher training meeting the JGS requirements. An accelerated program to provide increased refresher training in 1970 is planned.

(6) Unit Performance. Highlighted during the quarter as top performance units were the 2d, 25th, 9th, 1st, and Marine Divisions.

b. Problem Areas.

(1) Leadership. Although ARVN's effectiveness continues to show steady improvement, the chronic shortage of competent leaders limits the rate of progress. Forty-two percent of advisors to ARVN battalions reported weak officer/NCO leadership in their units during the fourth quarter. This deficiency reveals itself in many ways, the most serious of which is the lack of aggressiveness demonstrated by many organizations. For example, during fourth quarter advisors to 27 of ARVN's 133 infantry battalions reported that the units were not aggressive when in contact with the enemy. Leadership improvement is receiving priority attention from advisors, and the emphasis on quality rather than quantity during Phase III I&M should provide the personnel stability needed to raise the quality of ARVN's officers and NCOs. The "New Horizons" training program to improve administration, logistics, leadership, and political warfare techniques in ARVN units should produce improvement in the less effective units.

(2) Maneuver Battalion Strength. Despite the overall increase in the assigned strength of ARVN during the year little improvement has been noted in the understrength conditions of maneuver battalions. The assigned

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strength of ARVN infantry battalions increased by 5,188 in the fourth quarter, but is still below authorized levels. The shortage in maneuver units amounts to a deficit of approximately 23 infantry battalions. Related to the strength problem are ARVN desertion rates which were down from 1968, but still high at 14.9 per 1000 per month in 1969.

(3) Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps. Approximately 30 percent of ARVN/VNMC casualties during the last three quarters were caused by mines and booby traps.

(4) Logistics. Problems are being solved rapidly but some items, such as water trailers and heavy engineer equipment, remain in short supply. Helicopter support is inadequate for large scale RVNAF airmobile operations. The quality and quantity of dependent housing continues to be a major problem not subject to rapid solution. The dependent housing self-help program still lacks construction material. Twenty-eight percent of advisors assess ARVN dependent housing worse than that provided in the Chieu Hoi Program. Stock shortages continue to limit the effectiveness of the commissary system.

(5) Training. Extra attention is still needed toward all aspects of training so that the maximum qualitative improvement in ARVN/VNMC forces can be realized. Advisors report that the analysis of the training situation by division, regimental, and battalion G3/S3 sections and the training programs they develop and implement are a major problem area. Some gradual improvement is indicated in the on-site training being conducted. Approximately seven hours of in-place training per week is prescribed for ARVN battalions but only 23 percent of the advisors reported that the units achieved this standard during the fourth quarter.

(6) Ineffectiveness Within Division, Regimental and Battalion Staffs. A considerable number of advisors report G2/S2 and G3/S3 functions ineffective, but considerable improvement has been reported in preparation of training programs and in operations planning in infantry battalions. A greater percentage of advisors report ineffectiveness within battalion staffs than within regimental and division staffs.

(7) Intelligence. ARVN battalions have not displayed effective effort in collecting intelligence information. This function is critical to effective combat action, and reflects a major problem requiring increased attention. The intelligence functions at all staff levels are reported as a major staff problem.

(8) Unit Performance. The 42d and 51st Regiments and the 18th and 7th Divisions displayed low performance during the fourth quarter. The major problem in the 51st and 42d Regiments are operational employment. The recent employment of the 51st Regiment on extensive combat operations is an indication of possible improvement in this regiment.

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3. (C-NOFORN) ARMY AND MARINE FORCES EVALUATION.

a. Environmental Aspects. On the following pages are environmental conditions and characteristics for each corps. These conditions are considered important in analyzing results and performance of ARVN/VNMC units. Charts 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the average numbers of enemy and friendly maneuver battalions present in the DTA during the fourth quarter, relative strengths of maneuver elements, and enemy and friendly density in each DTA. ^{1/} Friendly strengths are subdivided to show FVMAF, ARVN, and RF/PF. Enemy strengths are subdivided to show NVA/VC infantry and guerrilla elements. Arrows indicate previous quarter strengths. Enemy strength is computed to include all enemy maneuver elements less headquarters.

^{1/} Maneuver battalions include ARVN armored cavalry squadrons.

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

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I CORPS
FRIENDLY/ENEMY DENSITY, STRENGTH, AND NUMBER OF MANEUVER UNITS

CHART 1



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I CORPS ENVIRONMENT

CONDITIONS

CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain The Chaine Annamitique Mountains dominate the area. Rain forests covering the mountains offer refuge to the enemy. In the west, the Chaine Annamitique grades into rolling upland plains, with altitudes between 1500 and 3000 feet above sea level. In the east, the mountains drop off sharply to narrow coastal plains.

Weather The onset of the northeast monsoon brought about a general increase in cloudiness during the quarter. Several stations experienced very heavy rainfall during October with Hue/Phu Bai recording 21.65 inches in a 24 hour period on 5 Oct and a total of 75.06 inches for the month. Both November and December were marked by mostly cloudy skies which were accompanied by fog and extended periods of light rain or drizzle. Flying conditions were good for 31 days, marginal for 13 days and poor for 48 days.

Population About 2,998,200 (17.0% of the national population)

GVN Control Relatively secure: Hamlets 87.3%; Population 92.3%

<u>Enemy Forces</u>	<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>AVG NO. OF BNS</u>	<u>CHANGE IN AVG NO. OF BNS FROM LAST QTR</u>
	NVA	63	+7
	VCMF	7	-1
	VCLF	7	0
	Sappers	<u>21</u>	<u>+2</u>
		98	+8



The total enemy strength increased about three percent from last quarter. The 11th DTA has the highest enemy density in-country

Friendly Forces The total friendly strength decreased slightly from the third quarter. A new ARVN artillery battalion was deployed. FWMF battalions decreased by nine from last quarter reflecting the redeployment of US forces. Regional Forces and Popular Forces increased by 3097 and ARVN increased by 1744, which nearly offset the US reduction.

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**II CORPS
FRIENDLY/ENEMY, DENSITY, STRENGTH, AND NUMBER OF MANEUVER UNITS**

CHART 2



NUMBER OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS

FWAF
 ARVN/AC
 RF/PF
 INF
 GUERRILLA

AREAS/ZONES	FRIENDLY		ENEMY				TOTAL
	FWAF	ARVN/AC	INF	RF/PF	GUERRILLA	SUPER	
22d DTA	25	12	5	1	4	2	37
23d DTA	8	15	9	3	5	4	25
24th STZ	5	7	8	0	5	5	10
TOTALS	36	34	22	4	12	9	70

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II CORPS ENVIRONMENT

CONDITIONS

CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain The largest of the corps areas, II Corps, is characterized by very diverse features consisting of coastal plains, highland plateaus, mountains and dense jungles. The area is, for the most part, sparsely populated and underdeveloped.

Weather Coastal II Corps experienced the same general weather pattern as I Corps, although rainfall was slightly more erratic in nature. The highlands saw an overall decrease in cloudiness and rain-showers. Precipitation decreased to negligible amounts during the last two months. Fog and stratus were frequently observed in valleys during the early morning hours. Flying conditions on the coast were good for 36 days, marginal for 16 days, and poor for 40 days. In the highlands conditions were good for 75 days, marginal for two days and poor for 15 days.

Population The majority of the population of about 3,080,400 (17.6% of the national total) is settled along the coast. Qui Nhon and Nha Trang are the major cities of the coastal area. The population inland is largely Montagnard.

GVN Control Relatively secure: Hamlets 88.8%; Population 94.6%

<u>Enemy Forces</u>	<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>AVG NO. OF BNS</u>	<u>CHANGE IN AVG NO. OF BNS FROM LAST QTR</u>
	NVA	22	+1
	VCMF	4	0
	VCLF	12	-1
	Sappers	<u>9</u>	<u>+2</u>
		47	+2


The total enemy strength increased about 27 percent from last quarter, but the 23d DTA continues to have the lowest enemy troop density of all the DTAs and STZs.

Friendly Forces The 24th STZ has the lowest friendly troop density of all the DTAs and STZs. The total friendly strength increased about two percent from last quarter. Popular Forces and Regional Forces increased by 2,371. ARVN/VNMC forces increased slightly, but still remained lowest of all Corps. FWMAF showed little change.


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III CORPS
FRIENDLY/ENEMY, DENSITY, STRENGTH, AND NUMBER OF MANEUVER UNITS

CHART 3



FRIENDLY—STRENGTHS—ENEMY



FMAF
 ARVN/AC
 RE/PF
 INF
 QUERRILLA

NUMBER OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS

AREAS/ZONES	FRIENDLY		ENEMY				TOTAL
	FMAF	ARVN/AC	INF	QUERRILLA	SAUTER		
31st DTA	18	17	15	16	2	5	56
32d DTA	21	15	17	10	2	6	53
33d DTA	13	15	7	7	2	5	19
OMD	0	15	0	0	0	0	15
TOTALS	52	60	37	33	6	14	112

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III CORPS ENVIRONMENT

CONDITIONS

CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain The III Corps area is one of transition. The southern portion consists of rich, flat lands which flood during the rainy season. In the eastern regions, there are mangrove swamps, dense forests, and rubber plantations. In the northwestern areas the terrain becomes mountainous with elevations up to 1500 feet.

Weather October produced typical southwest monsoon rainshowers and thunderstorms over the Corps. November brought a marked decrease in cloudiness and precipitation though scattered light rainshowers and isolated thunderstorms did occur on several days. Flying conditions were good for 87 days, marginal for four days and poor for one day.

Population About 5,561,400 (31.7% of the national total)

GVN Control Relatively secure: Hamlets 90.7%; Population 97.8%

Enemy Forces

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>AVG NO. OF BNS</u>	<u>CHANGE IN AVG NO. OF BNS FROM LAST QTR</u>
NVA	37	-1
VCMF	33	+1
VCLF	6	-1
Sappers	<u>14</u>	<u>0</u>
	90	-1

The total enemy strength decreased about four percent from last quarter although the total number of battalions increased by one.



Friendly Forces

The total friendly strength increased about five percent from last quarter (Friendly strength in the 33d DTA was adjusted from 48,706 to 43,620 as previously reported in the 3d Qtr CY 69 MACV SEER Report). Two additional ARVN artillery battalions and the 18th Cavalry Squadron were deployed during the quarter. FWMAF battalions decreased by three reflecting the redeployment of US forces. The Regional Forces and Popular Forces increased by 3,591 and ARVN/VNMC forces increased by 2,376. FWMAF remained relatively constant.

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IV CORPS
FRIENDLY ENEMY DENSITY, STRENGTH AND NUMBER OF MANEUVER UNITS

CHART 4



FVMAF ARVN/AC RE/PF ENEMY ENEMY BATTALIONS

AREA/ZONES	FRIENDLY		ENEMY			TOTAL
	FVMAF	ARVN/AC	NVA	VCL	SAPPER	
TG DTA	0	14	0	5	2	14/15
41st DTA	0	14	0	1	0	14/4
42d DTA	0	20	0	6	1	20/17
44th SIZ	0	3	3	1	4	3/10
TOTAL	0	51	3	20	16	51/44

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IV CORPS ENVIRONMENT

CONDITIONS

CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain IV CTZ includes the Delta of the Bassac and Mekong Rivers. The area is covered almost entirely with swamps, marshes and rice fields. The shoreline is marked by long stretches of mangrove swamps, beyond which mud flats stretch for some distance at low tide. Nearly all of the Delta is less than 10 feet above sea level and the rise and fall of the tide is noticeable in the rivers and canals throughout the area. The unimproved areas of swamps, mangrove forest and jungle afford sanctuary to the enemy.

Weather The southern Corps weather pattern was characterized by continuing rainshower and thunderstorm activity during October. A significant decrease in both rainfall and cloudiness produced basically good weather over the area during the last two months of the year. Flying conditions were good for 87 days, marginal for four days and poor for one day.

Population About 5,911,500 (35.75% of the national total)

GVN Control Relatively secure: Hamlets 77.9%; Population 87.1%

Enemy Forces

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>AVG NO. OF BNS</u>	<u>CHANGE IN AVG NO. OF BNS FROM LAST QTR</u>
NVA	3	+2
VCMF	20	+2
VCLF	16	-2
Sappers	<u>5</u>	<u>+2</u>
	44	+4

Although enemy battalions increased by four there was an increase of only 3.3 percent in total enemy strength since last quarter. There was an increase in infiltration by NVA forces.

Friendly

The Tien Giang DIA (7th Division) continues to have the highest friendly troop density of all the DTAs and STZs. The total friendly strength increased 6.7 percent from last quarter. (Friendly strength in the 44th STZ was adjusted from 11,809 to 22,051 as previously reported in the 3d Qtr CY 69 MACV SEER Report.) Two additional ARVN artillery battalions were deployed. FWMF battalions have been reduced to zero in the CTZ. RF and PF increased by 7,369 and ARVN increased by 3,252.

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b. Enemy Initiated Incidents. There has been a general decrease in enemy initiated incidents throughout the year (Chart 5). Charts 6 through 9 illustrate the number and type of incident directed against ARVN/VNMC units, by corps, during each quarter of 1969. As the number of incidents declined, night-time incidents, as a percentage of all incidents, increased. Corps assessments are as follows:

(1) I Corps. After the Tet-associated attacks of the first quarter, incidents declined radically throughout the year. This trend follows the general drop in all enemy activity in the corps, particularly in the northern two provinces.


(2) II Corps. Though other types of incidents declined throughout the year, attacks by fire increased after the first and second quarter drop. These incidents are generally due to activity against friendly units in Quang Duc Province in the 23d DTA.

(3) III Corps. After experiencing the greatest number of incidents in the first quarter, incidents in III Corps dropped to almost the lowest at the end of the year. Activity in the 32d DTA accounted for the higher number of attacks by fire in the third quarter.

(4) IV Corps. While activity has dropped throughout Vietnam, the IV Corps incident level has generally remained high. Daylight attacks still comprise a large proportion of the incidents while the tendency in other corps is toward night activity. Incidents have been about equally distributed among the three divisions of the corps.

(5) Annex B contains a more detailed tabulation of enemy initiated incidents.

Chart 5



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Chart 7

I CORPS ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS




Chart 8

II CORPS ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS




Chart 9

III CORPS ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS





Chart 10


IV CORPS ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS



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c. Contacts. Country-wide, ARVN infantry units experienced a decrease in enemy contacts from 2,202 in the third quarter to 1,843 in the fourth quarter (Chart 10). The number of contacts with enemy units of platoon and smaller size continued relatively high, as the enemy remained fragmented, but decreased slightly. The country-wide total of battalion size contacts changed very little from the third quarter, but the location shifted. I Corps battalion size contacts doubled with all reported by the 2d Division. The BU PRANG/DUC LAP operation accounted for most of the II Corps contacts. Total contacts in IV Corps decreased by only 20 percent, but battalion size contacts dropped by 60 percent to 33. The 9th Division, which conducted extensive operations in IV Corps, reported only four battalion size contacts.

Chart 10



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d. Effort.

(1) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Country-wide. Chart 11 on the next page shows the average battalion effort on missions country-wide for ARVN/VNMC organizations during the past four quarters and Chart 12 shows trends since 1968. The level of effort devoted to combat operations has doubled since early 1968, to a high of 50 percent by the end of 1969. Time spent on combat operations increased in the last quarter of 1969, but showed little change over the year. Time spent on security missions decreased slightly for the year. Time spent on reserve, training and rehabilitation increased, with 6.8 percent devoted to training, a significant increase over the 3.1 percent for the third quarter. The Combined Campaign Plan, AR 145, specifies that the main force for supporting RD is RF/PF units. In November 1969 emphasis by JGS was placed on reducing pacification effort by ARVN forces and assigning these missions to RF/PF units. This primarily involved II, III, and IV Corps where 23 battalions were conducting pacification. This emphasis has been successful with reductions in all three corps.

(2) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Within Each Corps. Chart 13 on the next page shows a comparison of time spent on each mission, with an indication of the change since last quarter.

(a) I Corps. Time spent on combat operations remained highest in country, although it declined considerably since last quarter because of the restrictive weather conditions. The time spent on combat operations by the 51st Regiment was the second lowest in-country at 23 percent. The 51st Regiment spent the most time on security (70 percent) of any ARVN organization. No pacification effort was indicated; however, some of the combat operations were closely allied to the pacification effort. I Corps units are not normally placed under sector control which is a current requirement under the pacification definition. (The definition has been changed to eliminate this requirement in 1970.)

(b) II Corps. Major command attention in II Corps continued on pacification effort. Significant results were produced with II Corps reaching its population security goals in the third quarter, one month earlier than outlined in the 1969 accelerated pacification campaign plan. However, time spent on pacification declined significantly during the fourth quarter due to the de-emphasis of pacification missions directed by JGS. II Corps units, particularly the 22d Division, spent considerably less time on combat operations than other corps units. The 42d Regiment placed emphasis on training during the quarter devoting 17 percent of its time to this effort.

(c) III Corps. Time spent on combat operations increased for the fifth consecutive quarter. Time on pacification decreased during the quarter. The 5th Division recorded the most time spent on combat operations (76 percent) of all major organizations.

(d) IV Corps. Time spent on combat operations increased again this quarter. The divisions averaged 10 percent of their time on training, considerably more than any other corps.

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



Chart 12




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(3) Comparison of Time Spent on Missions by Division or Regiment.
 The table below shows the major organizations with the most or least time on each mission. Complete data indicating time spent on each mission is contained in Annex C.

TABLE 1

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>MOST TIME</u>		<u>LEAST TIME</u>	
Combat Operations	5th Div	(76%)	22d Div	(10%)
Security	51st Regt	(70%)	9th Div	(1%)
Pacification-Active	25th Div	(40%)	18th Div & 51st Regt	(0%)
Pacification-Static	22d Div	(52%)	1st, 5th, 18th Div & 51st Regt	(0%)
Reserve	2d Div	(12%)	51st Regt	(0%)
Training	42d Regt	(17%)	22d Div	(2%)
Rehabilitation	9th Div	(9%)	22d Div, 51st & 42d Regt	(0%)


Chart 13



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
Chart 14

COMBINED AND UNILATERAL OPERATIONS




COMBINED OPNS
 UNILATERAL OPNS

Chart 15



COMBINED OPNS
 UNILATERAL OPNS

Chart 16



COMBINED OPNS
 UNILATERAL OPNS

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(4) Combined and Unilateral Combat Operations.

(a) Effort (Chart 14).

1 ARVN spent approximately the same proportion of time on combined (ARVN and US) and unilateral combat operations in the fourth quarter as in the previous quarters of 1969. ARVN spends little of its total combat time on combined operations except in III Corps where it increased in the third and fourth quarters. Most of the III Corps increase can be attributed to the efforts of the corps commander in emphasizing the DONG TIEN (Progress Together) Program in the 5th and 25th Divisions.

2 In I Corps only the 51st Regiment reported an increase in combined operations, while the corps total decreased due partially to the redeployment of US forces and the reduced activity of the 1st and 2d Divisions.

3 In II Corps the 22d Division and 42d Regiment began to operate with US units in the fourth quarter.

(b) Results (Charts 15 and 16).

1 In I Corps the 51st Regiment obtained nearly all its kills and an excellent kill ratio while on combined operations. This regiment was the only I Corps unit devoting comparable time to combined and unilateral operations and it produced better results on combined operations than unilateral.

2 The 5th and 25th Divisions in III Corps also obtained a high proportion of their kills and high kill ratios while on combined operations. In general, during the fourth quarter, ARVN units operating with US units in III Corps obtained better results per battalion day of effort than on unilateral operations.


3 ARVN units continued to benefit from operations with US units although the kill results obtained on these operations are not always pronounced. Advisors report that benefits from these operations have important long-range effects in improving leadership, combat operations and employment of combat support.

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Chart 17


ARVN/VNMC AVERAGE BN RESULTS-COUNTRY-WIDE

ENEMY ELIMINATED



ENEMY CAPTURED/SURRENDERED
 FRIENDLY KIA
 ENEMY KIA

WEAPONS



CAPTURED
 FRIENDLY LOSS


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e. Results.

(1) Enemy Eliminated, Weapons Captured and Ratios. Chart 17 shows the country-wide average battalion results attained by ARVN/VNMC in terms of enemy eliminated (killed, captured, and surrendered), and weapons captured (excluding caches). In addition, friendly KIA and weapons lost are indicated and the ratios of enemy KIA to friendly KIA and enemy weapons captured to friendly weapons lost. Enemy eliminated per battalion declined in each quarter of 1969, while the kill ratio remained relatively constant except for a drop in third quarter. The 2d Division and Marine Division obtained the highest number of enemy eliminated and KIA during the quarter while the 1st and 2d Divisions captured the most weapons. The number of enemy weapons captured per battalion also declined each quarter in proportion with the lessened intensity of the conflict. Chart 19 on the next page shows the enemy KIA figure per battalion for the corps and major organizations.


(2) US and GVN Regular Forces (ARVN/VNMC, VNAF, and VNN) Kill Ratio. A comparison of US and GVN forces kill ratios, based upon country-wide statistics (Measurement of Progress Data) is shown on Chart 18. The ratio depicted by this chart for all GVN forces (5.8:1) is higher than the ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalion kill ratio shown on Chart 14 (4.5:1). Both the US and GVN ratios have increased steadily since 3d Qtr CY 68, reaching a high in the 4th Qtr CY 69.

Chart 18



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CLASS 12



▼ PREVIOUS QTR



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(3) Caches. Chart 20 indicates caches of weapons, food and ammunition found by ARVN/VNMC organizations country-wide during 1969. Cache finds of weapons decreased throughout the year. Amounts of food and ammunition discovered were also low in late 1969, but increased slightly in the fourth quarter. The largest find of weapons was in IV Corps by the 7th Division and ranger units. The 1st Division found 34 percent of all the ammunition while the 18th Division found 27 percent of all the food. The Airborne Division did very well in both categories by finding 30 percent of the total.

CHART 20

CACHES



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CHART 21





CHART 22



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(4) Ambushes.

(a) Chart 21 shows a comparison of corps results of friendly ambushes, in terms of enemy KIA per standard battalion, during 1969. I Corps results were high all year, but showed a down-trend in the third and fourth quarters, which was caused by the low results of the 51st Regiment. II Corps' peak in the second quarter was due to the 42d Regiment in the Ben Het/Dak To Campaign. II Corps has shown a decline since that time and was lowest among corps in the fourth quarter. III Corps showed steady improvement throughout the year becoming ARVN's second highest in the fourth quarter, while IV Corps results, except for a drop in the second quarter, remained relatively the same throughout the year.

(b) Chart 22 depicts the number of ambushes conducted by organizations within each corps during the fourth quarter and results achieved, in terms of enemy KIA per standard battalion.

1 I CTZ. The 2d Division with relatively few ambushes killed 30 enemy per battalion. The division's total was 272 killed by ambush, the most achieved by any ARVN division and almost one-third of the 2d Division's total kills for the quarter. The 1st Division and 51st Regiment were below the ARVN average in both the number of ambushes conducted and enemy KIA.

2 II CTZ. The 22d Division conducted over 1,500 ambushes per battalion, the highest in-country, but killed fewer than the infantry average. The 23d Division also conducted an above average number of ambushes and achieved a below average number of kills, while the 42d Regiment was below average in the number of ambushes conducted and enemy KIA.

3 III CTZ. The 5th Division achieved almost half of the total division kills with ambushes. The number of ambushes conducted and results achieved were above the ARVN average. The 25th Division conducted about 1,200 ambushes per battalion and achieved 10.7 kills per battalion (second highest in-country), while the 18th Division conducted an above average number of ambushes and achieved a below average number of kills.

4 IV CTZ. IV Corps units conducted the least number of ambushes during the fourth quarter. The 7th and 9th Divisions were below the ARVN average in number of ambushes conducted and enemy kills (the 9th Division was lowest in-country in each category). The 21st Division was below average in the number of ambushes conducted, however, the number of kills achieved per battalion was third highest in-country.

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f. Combat Support.

(1) Country-wide. Chart 23 on the next page depicts combat support provided to the ARVN/VNMC battalions over the last four quarters as reported by battalion advisors. Tactical air and gunship support increased with a proportionate increase in the amount provided by RVNAF resources. Helicopter/fixed wing lift, MEDEVAC and aerial resupply support decreased during the quarter; however, the proportionate share provided by RVNAF also increased during this period. The majority of artillery support continued to be provided from within ARVN's own resources increasing to a high of 83 percent in the fourth quarter. Annex E provides complete combat support data for major organizations and a per battalion share for each organization.

(2) Corps. Chart 24 shows the combat support provided to the ARVN battalions in each corps.

(a) I CTZ. Combat support employed by I Corps battalions decreased from the previous quarter, in each category, as shown by the chart. RVNAF resources provided 89 percent of the artillery, 27 percent of the tactical air support, and ten percent of the MEDEVAC support. Within the corps, the 1st Division received the most artillery support, with the 2d Division receiving the greatest amount of support in all other categories.

(b) II CTZ. There was an increase in the artillery support provided II Corps battalions during the fourth quarter. Within the corps, the 23d Division and elements of the 47th Regiment received the greatest proportion of this increase due to the Bu Prang/Duc Lap campaign. RVNAF resources provided 73 percent of the artillery (an increase from the previous quarter) and 15 percent of the helicopter lift. RVNAF provided 5 percent of the tactical air support. Although this represents a decrease in the percentage of tactical air support provided by RVNAF during the previous quarter, the actual number of sorties flown, on a per battalion basis, increased by over 200 percent.

(c) III CTZ. Combat support employed by III Corps battalions decreased in each category from the previous quarter. There was a substantial increase in the amount of artillery support used by the 5th Division and a decrease in the amount provided to the 18th and 25th Divisions. Tactical air and helicopter lift support for the 25th Division almost doubled over the previous quarter and reflected the high number of troop insertions made by the 25th Division units. RVNAF resources provided 61 percent of the artillery (an increase of 13 percent) and 36 percent of the tactical air support (an increase of 6 percent). The artillery percentage, however, was lowest among the corps.


(d) IV CTZ. There was a substantial increase in the amount of artillery and tactical air support used by IV Corps battalions in the fourth quarter. Except for tactical air support, IV Corps battalions received more support than any other corps. Helicopter lift support was down 50 percent from the previous quarter but still remained highest in-country. Within the

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corps, the 9th Division received the greatest amount of artillery support (highest in-country) while the 7th Division received the greatest amount of helicopter lift support. RVNAF resources provided all of the artillery and 85 percent of the tactical air support, highest in-country for each of these categories.

CHART 23


COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED ARVN/VNMC (PER BN)



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
COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED ARVN INF (PER BN)

I CTZ




NOTE: FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR SPECIAL UNITS.

II CTZ




NOTE: FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR SPECIAL UNITS.

III CTZ



NOTE: FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR SPECIAL UNITS.

IV CTZ



NOTE: FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR SPECIAL UNITS.


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g. Operational Effectiveness Assessments.

(1) The country-wide average of advisors' assessment of operational effectiveness rose for the fourth consecutive quarter. Chart 25 shows the trend in the ARVN/VNMC average since the first quarter 1968.


(2) Significant factors in the fourth quarter increase were the improved assessments awarded to the 9th, 23d, and 25th Divisions as shown by Chart 26. The advisors' assessment of the 25th and 9th Divisions rose from below average during the previous quarter and became ARVN's second and third highest, respectively, among the ARVN infantry divisions. The percent of increase in the 9th Division's assessment was second highest in-country. Several organizations showed regression during the quarter. They were the 2d, 7th, 18th and 22d Divisions, and the 42d and 51st Regiments. Among ARVN special organizations, ranger and marine units improved over the previous quarter, while armored cavalry and airborne units regressed slightly. Advisors' assessment of airborne units, however, remained highest in-country.

Chart 25



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Chart 76



▼ PREVIOUS QTR

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
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h. Division and Regimental Staff Element Evaluations.

(1) Chart 27 compares the effectiveness of division and regimental staff functions among the four corps on a percentile scale. Responses to specific staff questions were grouped by functions (command and control, G1, G2, G3, G4) and ratings computed. The command and staff average column shows the combined ratings. A staff element such as G1 can be compared among corps because advisors answered the same set of questions. Different staff elements cannot be directly compared because the ratings are based upon a different set of questions.

(2) In the fourth quarter, I Corps staffs received the highest ratings, but showed a decline in each area from the previous quarter. II Corps staffs were rated below average in each area and showed a decline from the previous quarter. There was improvement shown in III Corps command and control, G1/S1, and G4/S4 staff functions, and a slight decrease in the rating awarded to the G2/S2 element. IV Corps was below average in each staff area except G4/S4, however, improvements were shown from the previous quarter in each area, except G1/S1 and G2/S2 which decreased slightly.

Chart 27



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i. Summary of ARVN Infantry Effectiveness Indicators.

(1) ARVN's ten divisions and two separate regiments are depicted on Chart 28. The comparative standing of the organizations according to six selected indicators is shown. The chart does not consider all of the ramifications involved in a total evaluation. The organizations are considered in three groups (top/middle/bottom) in discussing their relationship on the chart.

(2) ARVN's four divisions in the top group during the 4th Qtr CY 69 were the 2d, 25th, 9th and 1st. The 2d Division is in the top position in three of the six ARVN infantry effectiveness indicators and above average in the others. It eliminated the most enemy and captured the greatest number of weapons during the fourth quarter. The 25th Division is above average in five of the six effectiveness indicators and has the highest kill ratio in-country. The 9th Division was also above average in five of the six effectiveness indicators, and acquired a vast amount of experience and confidence during its fourth quarter movements. The 1st Division was above average in four of the six indicators and in the top position in two: the number of enemy KIA per hour of contact, an important aggressiveness indicator, and in the assessment of operational effectiveness.

(3) ARVN's four organizations in the bottom group were the 42d and 51st Regiments and the 18th and 7th Divisions. The 42d Regiment was below average in all ARVN infantry effectiveness indicators during the fourth quarter, and was in the bottom position in five of the six. The 51st Regiment was below average in five of the six effectiveness indicators, achieving an above average status in only the advisor's assessment. The 18th Division was also below average in five of the six indicators, with only its kill ratio being above average. The 7th Division was below average status in the enemy and weapons captured categories.

(4) The other four ARVN divisions, the 5th, 21st, 22d, and 23d, were in the middle group.

j. Evaluation of Operational Effectiveness of Infantry Divisions, Separate Regiments and Special Organizations.

(1) General. The foregoing evaluations were primarily at corps or country-wide level. In order to provide a more detailed evaluation of the operational effectiveness of ARVN and VNMC units, the following pages present charts and texts for each of the divisions, separate regiments and special organizations (airborne, ranger, armored cavalry and marines).


(2) Techniques. The evaluations are based primarily on fourth quarter and yearly trends in operational performance data. For each organization's evaluation the discussion is organized in terms of environment, effort, combat support, results, operational effectiveness/leadership, and trends. Enemy density is based on the total estimate of maneuver unit

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strength plus guerrilla strength. In order to compensate for substantial differences in the number of battalions in a division or regiment and in infantry battalion strengths, "standard battalion" figures are used for some indicators. The number of standard battalions per division is obtained by dividing the average quarterly strength of all the battalions of the division by the authorized strength of an ARVN infantry battalion.

(5) Charts. The evaluation of each organization is illustrated by charts containing combat support received, opportunity, results, and operational assessments. In addition, yearly trends are depicted for enemy eliminated, kill ratio, advisors assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership, and percent of effort on all missions.


Chart 28




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
Chart 29



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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1ST DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 1st Division's DPA was the highest in Vietnam and includes a high proportion of NVA troops. The density includes enemy units in areas contiguous to Vietnam which maneuver between Laos, the DMZ and Vietnam. The redeployment of the 3d Marine Division caused the friendly density to drop. Most enemy forces were located along the DMZ and western border while the division was located in the plains region during the monsoon season.

Effort. Although the 1st Division's effort was virtually all devoted to combat operations, time on combat was lower in the fourth quarter due to the monsoon conditions.

Combat Support. Generally, the 1st Division conducts battalion sweeps with US Forces, using considerable artillery support. During the fourth quarter, less artillery support was used--a reflection of the decreased activity and enemy contact. Combat air support also decreased due to the lower level of activity and poor weather.

Results. Enemy initiated incidents fell 70 percent since the second quarter and contacts were greatly reduced. Enemy eliminated was very low, and weapons captured was average, reflecting the reduced activity. Country-wide, about three enemy were eliminated per battalion hour of contact. The 1st Division's 4.2 enemy eliminated per hour of contact was well above this average. Country-wide, only one weapon was captured for every four enemy eliminated. These measures indicate that the 1st Division remained aggressive in the fourth quarter. The 1st Division's kill ratio (8.8:1) shows the high degree of skill with which its operations were conducted.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness for the 1st Division reached a yearly high in the fourth quarter and was well above the ARVN average. The division, regimental and majority of the battalion commanders were outstanding.

Trends. The 1st Division was above average only once during the year in total enemy eliminated. This is largely due to the small number of enemy captured and surrendered, a reflection of the high proportion of NVA soldiers, proximity of North Vietnam, and lack of local VC. The 1st Division had the highest kill ratio among the ARVN infantry divisions and separate regiments during most of 1969, Operational effectiveness and leadership was high and increased during third and fourth quarter. The 1st Division although down from the previous quarter continued to be one of ARVN's best performers.


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Chart 50


2D DIV - 4TH QTR CY 69



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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2D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density was virtually unchanged from 3d Qtr CY 69 at 1.16 per square kilometer. In this traditionally VC area, NVA replacements are now being assigned to VC main force units. The slight increase in friendly density over last quarter reflected gains in RF/PF strength.

Effort. Combat operations time dropped from 69 percent to 57 percent in the fourth quarter. The shift was toward security operations and increased time spent in reserve status.

Combat Support. Helicopter lift support tripled over last quarter and was by far the highest in I Corps--a reflection of the mobility used to pursue the VC in the plains area during rice denial operations.


Results. The 2d Division's hours of enemy contact decreased in the fourth quarter but were still well above average and the third highest in ARVN. The number of enemy eliminated was the highest in-country (134 per battalion) and well above that of other units. The number of weapons captured figure was also the highest in-country (30 per battalion). In spite of the highest mine and booby trap losses outside of the Delta, the 2d Division reported the third highest kill ratio among ARVN units (7.6:1).

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness was above average in 4th Qtr CY 69, but down from the previous quarter. Although the 2d Division generally has outstanding leadership and was a high performer during the quarter, one of its battalion commanders does not measure up to acceptable standards.


Trends. Throughout the year, the 2d Division eliminated the highest number of enemy per battalion, although a slight down-trend reflected reduced hours of contact. The aggressiveness of the 2d Division is excellent and is supported by its record of weapons captured. The 2d Division began the year with an above average kill ratio, and increased this skill indicator in each successive quarter. After receiving the lowest assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership in 3d Qtr CY 68, operational effectiveness and leadership increased sharply in early 1969 and remained about the same through the fourth quarter. The division spends a high proportion of its time on training and during 1969 eight of its battalions conducted 30-day refresher training courses. The 2d Division, considered a problem unit in early 1968, was probably ARVN's most improved organization during 1969, and obtained outstanding results during the fourth quarter.

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
Chart 31



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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51ST REGIMENT

Environment. Both enemy and friendly densities increased slightly over third quarter figures, with the friendly figure the fourth highest in-country. US density in the regiment's area of operations was the highest in Vietnam.

Effort. The 51st Regiment spent 70 percent of its time on security during the 4th Qtr CY 69. A 25 percent drop in combat operations time during the fourth quarter gave the 51st Regiment the lowest proportion of time on offensive operations.

Combat Support. The 51st Regiment was the lowest in-country in all three combat support categories.

Results. All of the regiment's results were below average and down from the previous quarter. Contacts were also low and down from the previous quarter. The regiment's aggressiveness indicators were average.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of the regiment's operational potential, although rated high, decreased from the third quarter. The regimental and battalion commanders are considered excellent leaders.

Trends. The number of enemy eliminated by the 51st Regiment showed a steady decline during 1969. Starting with one of the highest figures for enemy eliminated in the first quarter, the regiment's results declined to well below average in the fourth quarter. The 51st Regiment's kill ratio also declined, although not as drastically. These decreases were probably due more to employment in unproductive assignments rather than to deterioration in unit capability, as evidenced by the above average assessment of operational effectiveness. In an effort to improve operational performance, two battalions of the 51st Regiment moved into the field on 18 Feb 70 and are conducting extensive combat operations with a US marine battalion.


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Chart 32


22ND DIV - 4TH QTR C.Y. 69



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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22D DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density of .47 per square kilometer does not reflect the recent movement of the 3d NVA Division elements and the 2d VC Main Force Regiment into Binh Dinh Province during the fourth quarter. A decrease in friendly strength resulted from the movement of two battalions and the headquarters element of the 47th Regiment into the 23d DTA at Bu Prang/Duc Lap.

Effort. The 22d Division spent 85 percent of its time on pacification during 4th Qtr CY 69 with 52 percent being static pacification. This is indicative of the high effort on pacification which started in early 1969. Partially as a result of these efforts, impressive gains in population security were made in the 22d DTA. 47th Regiment fighting in Bu Prang/Duc Lap increased the division's percent of combat time slightly.

Combat Support. Division combat support increased, but still remained below average. Most of the increase in helicopter support was for the Bu Prang/Duc Lap operation. Of the enemy killed by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 47th Regiment, it is estimated that two-thirds were killed by tactical air and helicopter gunships.

Results. The division obtained the second highest enemy eliminated figure in the country (81 per battalion). The high kills were primarily attributable to the 400 enemy kills attained by elements of the 47th Regiment. The division captured only one weapon for every ten enemy eliminated--a general indication of lack of aggressiveness. The two battalions at Bu Prang/Duc Lap captured only one weapon for every 16 enemy eliminated. The division kill ratio was above average, increasing to 5.9:1. Hours of contact increased, mostly a result of the Bu Prang/Duc Lap operation.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The Division's below average operational effectiveness decreased in the fourth quarter. Of the two battalions which took the brunt of the enemy's ground offensives, a senior advisor to the 47th Regiment stated: "The leadership, imagination, and initiative of the Task Force Commander and his battalion commanders were challenged throughout Phase II of the operation. With few exceptions these key commanders failed to live up to this challenge."

Trends. The enemy eliminated trend was favorable during the year, but the weapons captured trend was below average in 1969. The 22d Division's weapons captured/weapons lost trend was also below average all year. The high 22d Division kill ratio must be tempered by the high kills achieved by tactical air and helicopter gunships. Overall operational effectiveness and leadership has been below average during the year.


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Chart 33


230 DIV - 4TH QTR CY 69



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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23D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density almost doubled in the fourth quarter with the presence of two enemy regiments near Bu Prang/Duc Lap. Friendly density also increased slightly due to the movement of two battalions from the 22d Division and elements of the 2d Ranger Group into the DTA.

Effort. During the fourth quarter, the 23d Division reversed a year-long trend toward increased pacification support and responded to an enemy build-up in the Bu Prang/Duc Lap area with combat operations increasing by 30 percent, and was the highest in II Corps. The 45th and 53d Regiments were committed in the Bu Prang/Duc Lap campaign.

Combat Support. Combat support increased generally, with the greatest increase in artillery, and tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties. Throughout the campaign, the support given the 23d Division was excellent.


Results. Division hours of enemy contact increased and were slightly above average. Enemy eliminated increased substantially, but remained below the national average. While the weapons captured per battalion figure was below average, the weapons captured per enemy eliminated results were about average. The 23d Division's kill ratio increased to 2.6:1 but was still third from the lowest among the infantry divisions and separate regiments.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 23d Division showed improved effectiveness, and, in the stress of the fighting at Bu Prang/Duc Lap, the division commander did an excellent job. The 45th Regiment had excellent leaders while the 53d Regiment was generally rated average to poor. Both organizations gained a great deal of confidence.


Trends. The 23d Division's increase in enemy eliminated though encouraging in view of its previous low totals, was not matched by increases in number of weapons captured per battalion. The latter has been below average all year. The 23d Division has been below average all year in its ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost. The division's kill ratio decreased from the first through third quarters, and its fourth quarter increase was still below average.

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
Chart 34



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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42D REGIMENT

Environment. There was little change in the conditions under which the 42d Regiment operated. Enemy density remained at .49 per square kilometer and friendly density increased slightly to 1.34 per square kilometer.

Effort. Though the regiment spent 38 percent of its time performing combat operations (up from 10 percent during the third quarter) it still devoted the second lowest percent of time on combat operations of any ARVN organization during the past six months. It spent 33 percent on security and 17 percent on training--the highest figure for that activity in-country.

Combat Support. Even with increases in all combat support categories, the regiment's use of combat support was still below the country average.


Results. Hours of enemy contact rose from the near-zero figure of the third quarter to almost half of the infantry average. In spite of greater contact and improvements in combat support, the 42d Regiment still achieved the lowest results in the entire country. There were 0.3 enemy eliminated per hour of contact and the kill ratio was 1.3:1. Both figures were national lows.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness and results attained by the 42d Regiment, which were among ARVN's best in early 1969, dropped sharply in the second quarter following the Ben Het/Dak To operations. Three of the four battalions lacked aggressiveness during enemy contacts. Though the regimental commander was an excellent leader, his battalion commanders were rated poor to above average.


Trends. The 42d Regiment is at or near the bottom by most measures of unit effectiveness. The regiment eliminated only 11 enemy during the entire fourth quarter. Its kill ratio, though improved from the negative figure of third quarter, was far below the first quarter high and the respectable second quarter figure. During the Ben Het/Dak To battle in 2d Qtr CY 69, the regiment achieved excellent results in enemy eliminated per battalion. These results have been practically nil for the last half of the year.

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
Chart 35



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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5TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density increased slightly to 1.08 per square kilometer. Friendly density rose to 4.54 per square kilometer because of the activation of the 18th Cavalry Squadron and the movement of three airborne battalions into the DIA.

Effort. The time spent on offensive operations by the 5th Division increased steadily during the year to highest in ARVN--80 percent. Time on combat operations rose from 56 percent to 76 percent in the fourth quarter. Most of this time was spent on operations along the Phuoc Vinh/Song Be road and on combined operations in the Trapezoid and at Bo Duc.

Combat Support. Although artillery support increased, and was above average, other combat support fell off during the quarter.

Results. Hours of contact decreased and this fact is reflected in the low number of enemy eliminated--below average this quarter. Of the enemy eliminated, 27 percent were killed by the 8th Regiment's effective employment of claymore mines. In the use of mines one weapon was captured for every two enemy eliminated--a fact which must weigh against using this measure as an aggressiveness criterion. The 5th Division's kill ratio was a respectable 7:1.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The division's operational effectiveness remained the lowest in-country. In the fourth quarter, five of the 12 battalion advisors reported that their organizations were not aggressive in contact with the enemy. The commander of the battalion that received the lowest assessment was replaced during the quarter, but the ineffective commander of the 7th Regiment remains.

Trends. The 5th Division performed erratically in terms of enemy eliminated per battalion, and only at its third quarter peak did it exceed the ARVN infantry average. The kill ratio showed a strong above average trend from its low in the first half of the year. The operational effectiveness and leadership remained lowest in ARVN all year. Some battalion commanders have been replaced and leadership is improving, but there is still weakness at lower levels with many of its commanders still reported as not aggressive in combat.


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Chart 36


18TH DIV - 4TH QTR CY 69



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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18TH DIVISION

Environment. The 18th Division's DTA remained the most pacified in-country. There was a slight drop in enemy density to .5 per square kilometer and a slight decrease in friendly density to 3.6 per square kilometer.

Effort. The 18th Division's percent of time on offensive operations fell from 64 percent to 46 percent in the fourth quarter; an excessive amount of time (45 percent) was spent on security--second only to the 51st Regiment.

Combat Support. The decreases in all combat support provided reflect the decreased enemy contact in the quarter.


Results. The number of enemy eliminated fell with the decreased contact and was the second lowest per battalion, but weapons captured stayed about the same. The 18th Division's kill ratio decreased but was still very respectable at 5.8:1.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. In the 4th Qtr CY 69, the division fell below average in effectiveness from its all-time high in the third quarter. Some of the battalion commanders were still rated low in leadership and indecisive in combat.


Trends. The 18th Division remained below average throughout 1969 in enemy eliminated as well as weapons captured. Though the division was above average in kill ratio, the fourth quarter drop from the third quarter's high was substantial, reversing the previous favorable trend. Operational effectiveness and leadership, which improved in the third quarter, dropped again to below average. A major problem is the personnel turbulence caused by an extremely high desertion rate--6000 desertions in 1969. There were, however, signs of improved effectiveness in 1969 over results obtained in the latter part of 1968.

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
Chart 57



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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25TH DIVISION

Environment. There was a slight drop in enemy density in the DTA. Significant numbers of NVA fillers were reported in VC units. In comparison to the VC soldier, the lack of familiarity of NVA with their combat areas was reflected in the frequency of their exposure to friendly fires. Friendly strength increased to 7.35 per square kilometer with the movement of a ranger and an airborne battalion into the DTA.

Effort. Time on offensive operations remained well above the average at 76 percent with combat operations increasing from 24 to 36 percent of all effort. The division conducted a large percentage of its offensive operations with US forces. Half of the battalions, however, were still committed to pacification support.

Combat Support. Tactical air, and helicopter gunship support increased substantially. The division used more helicopter lift sorties for multiple insertions of small units, following the enemy pattern of breaking down to squad-size or smaller elements. Greater emphasis on night ambushes reduced the need for artillery in fourth quarter.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated was the highest in the corps at 68 per battalion. The division obtained these good results by use of a number of unplanned landing zones for its insertions, seldom taking the area under fire prior to landing, thereby surprising the small enemy units. Such contacts were often of short duration and highly effective. The kill ratio improved in each of the last three quarters to become ARVN's highest during the fourth quarter at 9.6:1.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The imagination and aggressiveness of the division caused its operational effectiveness to rise sharply to among the highest in ARVN. The battalion commanders except two were considered excellent in the fourth quarter. The sheer number of small unit operations--1270 in December--helped to develop leadership. The confidence and aggressiveness of the division increased correspondingly.

Trends. The increase in enemy eliminated was steady throughout 1969 and the best achieved by any III Corps organization. The KIA ratio increased throughout the year, and most dramatically in the fourth quarter. The division's operational effectiveness and leadership increased in each quarter of 1969 reaching an impressive high in the fourth quarter. Leadership is improving and is high due to the extensive small unit operations.


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Chart 58


7TH DIV - 4TH QTR CY 69



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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7TH DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density, 2.24 per square kilometer, is the second highest in country. It increased slightly during the third quarter with addition of one sapper battalion. Friendly density in the division's DTA was the highest in country at 10.78 per square kilometer, increasing with the growth of RF/PF and the deployment of the 9th Division into Dinh Tuong Province in December 69.

Effort. The percent of time devoted to offensive operations decreased to 45 percent, the fourth lowest in country. An excessive amount of the division's time was spent on security (30 percent) and reserve (9 percent).

Combat Support. The number of artillery rounds fired in support of the infantry battalions almost doubled from that of the previous quarter and was above average. The amount of helicopter lift decreased but was still the greatest in-country.

Results. The large number of helicopter lift sorties, employed in a area where the enemy density was high, produced only an average amount of contact (18.8 hours) which in turn yielded a below average number of enemy eliminated (48 per battalion) and an extremely low kill ratio (1.9:1). A principal cause of the low kill ratio was the heavy loss incurred by the 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment, during an airmobile operation in November. In this engagement the battalion lost 66 men in one day, which was one-third of the 7th Division losses for the quarter. The number of weapons captured was slightly above average (14.7 per battalion).

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness was below average and reduced from the previous quarter, primarily due to the poor performance by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 11th Regiment. The division received a new commander in January 1970 who is making a favorable initial impression.


Trends. The number of enemy eliminated, after being above average for the first three quarters, dropped below average during the fourth quarter. The 7th Division's kill ratio has been below average and declining throughout 69. This division has consistently suffered from a high rate of casualties caused by mines and booby traps. The operational effectiveness and leadership trends were below average, with the operational effectiveness dropping in the fourth quarter.

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
CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 39


9TH DIV - 4TH QTR CY 69



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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9TH DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density increased slightly to 1.12 per square kilometer with the movement of a VC battalion into the 9th Division's DTA. Even though the 9th Division left the DTA at times, friendly density remained unchanged at 7.17 per square kilometer due to RF/PF gains.

Effort. The time on combat operations during fourth quarter increased from 44 percent to 59 percent. During the quarter the division conducted two major operations out of its DTA. The first occurred in November, in a portion of the 21st Division's DTA near the U-Minh forest; the second, in December, in an enemy base area in the 7th Division's DTA.

Combat Support. The 9th Division used the most artillery support in-country and a large quantity of tactical air and helicopter support.


Results. The 9th Division's hours of contact were slightly above average and the number of enemy eliminated (72.8 per battalion) was well above average. The larger portion of the enemy eliminated came from combat operations conducted in November. During this campaign, troops advanced aggressively and fought the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. Three out of four enemy eliminated were NVA. The NVA soldiers in this area were not as adept as the VC in effectively breaking contact when the situation was not to their advantage. The kill ratio (3.7:1) increased but was still below average, largely due to the 49 percent of the 9th Division's losses from mines and booby traps. During the December operation the VC scattered when they found the 9th Division had moved into the area, but because it was a VC base area, it was well mined and booby trapped causing significant casualties. The number of weapons captured increased and was above average.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 9th Division increased in confidence as it successfully executed large-scale moves operating under division control. The majority of the 9th Division's commanders are excellent leaders.


Trends. The number of enemy eliminated increased substantially during the fourth quarter after a general decline for the first part of the year. The kill ratio has improved steadily since the second quarter. Operational effectiveness and leadership increased to a very impressive above average in the fourth quarter after being among ARVN's lowest in the first three quarters. However, the most encouraging development during the latter months of the year was the improvement in aggressiveness, flexibility and operational results shown by the 9th Division when it moved from its own tactical area. The results attained during these operations were the best achieved by the 9th Division since Tet 68. Desertions still remain a serious problem as the rate rose during the fourth quarter to one of ARVN's highest (56.3 per 1000 per month).

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
Chart 40



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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21ST DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density remained unchanged from the third quarter, at .78 square kilometer. The friendly density increased to 3.06 per kilometer, reflecting the 9th Division's movement into the 21st Division's DTA in November.

Effort. The amount of time spent on combat operations increased by 17 percent during the fourth quarter to 56 percent, with total time on offensive missions reaching 65 percent.

Combat Support. The increased artillery, tactical aircraft and helicopter gunship support reflects the increased time spent on combat operations and the resultant increase in hours of contact with the enemy.


Results. The 21st Division eliminated the largest number of enemy in IV Corps; although above average, this was only fifth highest in-country. The increased hours of contact reflect the increased attention of the division commander to combat operations and extensive probes into VC areas. The reduction in enemy eliminated was due to a lack of aggressiveness on the part of several battalions which failed to overrun enemy positions when in contact. As with the other IV Corps units, the number of weapons captured (22.1 per battalion) is above average. The kill ratio (3.7:1) dropped and is below the ARVN infantry average, with heavy losses due to mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Although below average operational effectiveness and leadership has increased. The division commander is an outstanding leader and all but one of the battalion commanders are considered excellent.




Trends. The enemy eliminated was above average during the year, but showed a gradual decrease in the fourth quarter. The division kill ratio remained below average during the entire year. The operational effectiveness and leadership remained below average during most of 1969, but increased slightly in the fourth quarter.

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


Chart 41



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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AIRBORNE DIVISION

Environment. In October and November, the majority of the airborne battalions were located in the Capitol Military District (CMD), where the enemy density was extremely low. In early December, the division headquarters and three battalions deployed to Phuoc Long Province and three battalions deployed to Tay Ninh Province. In Phuoc Long, extensive airmobile operations were conducted with elements of US 1st Cavalry Division (AM) along the Cambodian border.

Effort. The percent of time on combat operations increased in the fourth quarter to the highest of the year. This resulted from the tactical redeployment of the Saigon battalions from reserve and security missions.

Combat Support. There were general increases in combat support, particularly in artillery and tac air/helicopter gunship sorties. The latter support was far above the ARVN infantry average, paralleling the greater than twofold increase in hours of contact per battalion, as the airborne units' time on combat operations increased.

Results. The low kill ratio of the division (2.2:1) was the result of heavy losses suffered during December. The number of enemy eliminated was also below average and lower than third quarter. Airborne battalions suffered from lack of familiarity with their new AO in Phuoc Long Province. They often approached organized bunker complexes along routes anticipated by the enemy and were then too aggressive when in contact. Responding to this deficiency, the division has organized a school and has been cycling through a company at a time. Almost all of the division's offensive operations were small unit and many were sustained; i.e., single companies on extended combat operations. The large number of helicopter sorties per battalion illustrate the extensive airmobile operations.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of the Airborne Division's operational effectiveness and leadership remained the highest in Vietnam for the third consecutive quarter. Most of the commanders of the airborne battalions were regarded as excellent leaders.

Trends. Only in the second quarter was the number of enemy eliminated per battalion above the ARVN infantry average. In the third and fourth quarters the trend was downward. The same was true of the aggregate kill ratio. Only the weapons captured per battalion showed an increase in the fourth quarter. Operational effectiveness and leadership evaluations increased during 1969 and were the highest of all organizations, although results continued below those of ARVN infantry battalions. During 1969, the Airborne Division did not achieve results commensurate with its potential, primarily due to its employment.

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Chart 43


ENEMY KILLS BY AIRBORNE BATTALION 4TH QTR CY 69



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Chart 42

ENEMY KILLS BY
ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON
(4TH QTR CY 69)




▲ PREVIOUS QTR (THE 18TH CAV SQDN IS A NEW UNIT AND THEREFORE HAS NO PREV QTR ARROW)

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
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Chart 44


CAVALRY - 4TH QTR CY 89



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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CAVALRY SQUADRONS

Environment. The 17 cavalry squadrons were deployed from the DMZ to the Delta during the fourth quarter. One squadron is organic to each of the divisions, and the rest operate under corps control. Conditions under which the cavalry squadrons operated varied widely.

Effort. Combat operations continued to occupy only a small proportion of the squadrons' total time, with many units continuing to perform extensive security and reserve missions. II Corps squadrons devoted 98 percent of their effort to route security operations. However, these operations were mobile rather than static.

Combat Support. Though tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties increased slightly during the 4th Qtr CY 69, the level remained low. Few helicopter lift sorties were used. The level of combat support reflected the relatively small proportion of time devoted to combat operations (42 percent) and the below average hours of contact.


Results. The number of enemy eliminated by the cavalry squadrons doubled from the third quarter, primarily because of the improvement in the 4th and 8th Squadrons' results: 240 and 132 eliminated, respectively. Cavalry squadron results remained below the infantry average since nine of the 17 squadrons eliminated fewer than 20 enemy during the quarter. Paradoxically, the II Corps squadrons, the 3d, 8th and 14th, with 98 percent of their time spent on security, accounted for 36 percent of country-wide enemy KIA by cavalry squadrons. The number of weapons captured doubled over the third quarter, but remained only two-thirds of the ARVN infantry battalion average. The KIA ratio improved over third quarter and was extremely high.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The decline in overall operational effectiveness in the cavalry squadrons was due to the very low effectiveness of the 5th, 18th, and 15th Squadrons in III Corps and the 9th Squadron in IV Corps. The 5th Squadron continually lacked aggressiveness when in contact with the enemy. Approximately half of the cavalry squadron commanders were considered excellent leaders while two squadrons were commanded by below average leaders.




Trends. The trend in enemy eliminated was downward until the slight improvement of the fourth quarter, which still left cavalry squadrons below the ARVN infantry battalion average in the last three quarters. The cavalry's kill ratio fell in 3d Qtr CY 69, but increased again in the fourth quarter. The deployment of new squadrons in 1969 coincided with a decrease in operational effectiveness. The squadrons appear to have steadied, but at a lower level of effectiveness. Leadership trends were consistently high.

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


Chart 45



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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MARINE BATTALIONS

Environment. Three battalions normally operated as part of ATF 211 during the fourth quarter, under operational control of the 21st Division. During October and November, they operated primarily in Kien Giang and An Xuyen Provinces (in the U Minh Forest) and during December, in Chuong Thien Province in the Twin Rivers area. These three provinces were among the ten least pacified in Vietnam, and operations were in the heart of long-recognized enemy base areas.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations (69 percent) was well above the ARVN infantry average and by far the highest of the year for the marines. Marine battalions were heavily committed to combat operations rather than security as in prior quarters.

Combat Support. Increases in tac air, helicopter gunship and heli-lift sorties correlated with the increase in marine combat operations in fourth quarter, although categories of support remained below the infantry battalion average. Artillery support was down from the previous quarter, but still above average.

Results. Enemy eliminated and KIA ratio improved considerably in the fourth quarter---the best marine figures of the year, and above the ARVN infantry averages. The majority of these results were achieved in October and November in the U Minh Forest. After the battalions returned to Chuong Thien in December (where they also operated during 3d Qtr CY 69), mine and booby trap losses increased: 14 of 29 friendly KIA in December. After the move to Chuong Thien, contacts fell off to the low level of the previous quarter. Weapons captured per battalion doubled in the fourth quarter, but still lagged behind the infantry average.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness and leadership remained extremely high in the quarter. All of the marine battalions were commanded by excellent officers.

Trends. After falling below the ARVN infantry average for enemy eliminated in third quarter, marine battalions returned to their first quarter level at the end of the year---well above the average. The kill ratio trend was unfavorable for the first three quarters of the year, but rose in the fourth quarter to surpass the ARVN infantry battalion average. The trends in both operational effectiveness and leadership were favorable in 1969. Each improved substantially from July through September and was unchanged in the fourth quarter. The improved employment of marine battalions during the fourth quarter was evident in the results achieved.

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Chart 46


ENEMY KILLS BY MARINE BATTALION 4TH QTR CY 69



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Chart 47

**ENEMY KILLS BY RANGER BATTALION
(4TH QTR CY 69)**




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
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Chart 48


RANGERS - 4TH QTR CY 69



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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RANGER BATTALIONS

Environment. The 20 ranger battalions are scattered throughout the four corps tactical zones. Nine of the battalions are in III Corps, with the majority of their time spent in the Capitol Military District.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations remained low due to the predominance of security operations among the battalions situated in the Capitol Military District.

Combat Support. Generally, combat support employed by the rangers increased, reaching the ARVN infantry average during the 4th Qtr CY 69. Operations varied widely; among the more notable was the 22d Ranger Battalion's participation in the Bu Prang/Duc Lap campaign.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated increased slightly over third quarter, but remained very low. The nine III Corps battalions killed a total of only 19 enemy during the fourth quarter. Improved operations by I and II Corps ranger organizations caused the aggregate enemy eliminated figure to rise. I Corps battalions achieved good results while operating with the 1st Armor Brigade in Quang Tin during November and December: 71 of the 81 I Corps KIA for 4th Qtr CY 69 were accounted for during those operations. In II Corps, the 22d Battalion killed 127 near Ban Me Thuot in November---of a quarterly total of 140. During that same operation, however, the 22d lost 74 weapons. The low kill ratio (2.6:1) reflected the large number of friendly KIA in III and IV Corps. III Corps battalions killed 38 and lost 44, with 12 killed by mines and booby traps. IV Corps battalions had a 2.1:1 kill ratio, killing 146 and losing 67. Nearly half (32) of these friendly deaths were due to mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. In spite of the large proportion of ranger battalion time expended on static missions, operational effectiveness increased slightly during the fourth quarter and was slightly higher than that of the ARVN infantry units. Approximately three-fourths of the ranger battalion commanders were considered excellent leaders.

Trends. For the first three quarters of 1969, the trend in enemy eliminated was unfavorable, with a sharp drop from second to third quarter. The fourth quarter only barely reversed this trend. The ranger kill ratio pattern was the same, except that the trend dropped slightly in the fourth quarter as well. In operational effectiveness and leadership the trend was down during the first half of the year and improving in the second half.

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



Chart 50



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4. (C-NOFORN) ARVN/VNMC Problem Areas.

a. General. Major objectives of SEER are to identify weaknesses and problem areas which reduce combat effectiveness and through analytical methods determine courses of action by which RVNAF, with MACV assistance, may increase the effectiveness of their forces. This section contains major problem areas reported by senior advisors to ARVN units and MACV staff actions taken to assist in resolving the problems. In addition this section contains major problems highlighted in the analysis of ARVN/VNMC organizations.

b. Maneuver Battalion Strength. Chart 49 presents a comparison of the average assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions and the authorized strength. The average strength increased by 3,188 during the fourth quarter, but is still considerably below authorized levels. The overall shortage in assigned strength to authorized in the fourth quarter was 16 percent with the 21st Division lowest at 25 percent and the 25th Division highest with five percent. Shortages were approximately 10 percent in late 1968 and first quarter 1969.

c. Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps.

(1) Mine and booby trap casualties continue to be a serious problem in ARVN/VNMC. In the fourth quarter deaths from mines and booby traps declined slightly, and since total friendly KIA also increased in the fourth quarter a resulting decrease in percent of total casualties due to mines and booby traps resulted. Chart 50 depicts the magnitude of the problem during the year. In the fourth quarter 1968 casualties due to these devices were 278 and accounted for only 22 percent of the total.

(2) Chart 51 on the next page presents data on this problem for each major organization. The problem has been particularly acute in the 51st and 42d Regiments and 7th and 9th Divisions.

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Chart 51

PERCENT OF FRIENDLY KIA/FROM MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS 4TH QTR CY 69			
UNIT	KIA MINES BOOBY TRAPS	TOTAL KIA	PERCENT OF TOTAL
			0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
I CORPS	84	206	40.8%
1st Div	20	53	37.7%
2d Div	51	128	39.8%
51st Regt	13	25	52.0%
II CORPS	34	307	11.1%
22d Div	29	117	24.8%
23d Div	2	182	1.1%
42d Regt	3	8	37.5%
III CORPS	25	123	20.3%
5th Div	3	33	9.1%
18th Div	5	39	12.8%
25th Div	17	51	33.3%
IV CORPS	187	474	39.5%
7th Div	61	181	33.7%
9th Div	77	156	49.3%
21st Div	49	137	35.8%
INF TOTAL	330	1110	29.7%
RANGER	46	152	30.3%
ARMD CAV	16	52	30.8%
AIRBORNE	8	119	6.7%
MARINES	28	94	29.8%

▼ PREVIOUS QTR AVG

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d. Battalion Problem Areas.

(1) During the fourth quarter advisors to the 185 ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions and armored cavalry squadrons submitted responses to questions contained in the SEER questionnaire which indicated potential problem areas. Chart 52 on the next page contains the questions which were indicated by a high frequency of unsatisfactory responses. The percentages are based on the frequency of responses from approximately 370 questionnaires. The previous quarter's analysis was based on number of responses from approximately 500 questionnaires and included an average of corps, divisions, regiments and maneuver battalions. SEER problem area evaluations include only battalions this quarter since the areas of concern are based on problems which exist primarily at that level. Certain problems show noticeable differences between ARVN infantry battalions and special units (airborne, marines, cavalry and rangers) and while not indicated on the chart these are noted in the comments below. The problem areas in the order they appear on Chart 52 are as follows:

(2) Inadequate Dependent Housing. Dependent housing has been a continual concern of ARVN and major efforts to improve its quality and quantity are being made. A third quarter analysis of ARVN housing compared to the Chieu Hoi program housing indicated that progress was being made, but approximately 20 percent of advisors still consider ARVN housing inferior to that provided Chieu Hoi. This quarter the analysis was expanded to include the quantity of housing and 62 percent of advisors indicated it to be inadequate with only slight improvement during the year. The quality of ARVN dependent housing as compared with community standards was reported as poorer by 37 percent of advisors although an improvement over the year was indicated. Special units report more problems in dependent housing than ARVN infantry, probably due to the greater movement of special units and their frequent assignment as OPCON to other ARVN divisions.

(3) Intelligence. The intelligence function in ARVN battalions has presented major problems as indicated by the responses concerning timeliness, collection efforts, and security leaks. The intelligence received by the unit was untimely in 29 percent of the cases during the 4th Qtr CY 69. Although still a major problem, there has been a gradual improvement during the year. The units' efforts to collect intelligence was judged marginal or ineffective 41 percent of the time, but also improved during the year. While not displayed on the chart it is noted that advisors reported most units as reacting appropriately to available intelligence, with only 11 percent still reporting it as a problem. There is reason to believe that the enemy is being forewarned of the units' combat operations by security leaks. No trend has been established. Approximately 14 percent of the advisors reported this area as a continuing problem. Intelligence functions are less of a problem in special units.


(4) Leadership. NCO leadership capability is reported as a greater problem than officer leadership with 41 percent reporting a problem in the

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Chart 52 - I

BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS

PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS:



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fourth quarter. An improvement has been shown during the year. Company grade officer leadership ability was reported as weak by 34 percent of the advisors during the fourth quarter. Only slight improvement has been shown during the year. The leadership problem is greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in the special units.

(5) Aggressiveness. Advisors reported that units fought aggressively when in contact one-half or less of the time, with improvements made during 1969. This problem is slightly greater in ARVN infantry battalions than special units.

(6) Indecisive Actions. Some unit commanders fail to take decisive action when the opportunity arises. No trend has been established. Approximately 14 percent of the advisors have reported this in the fourth quarter, with the problem slightly greater in ARVN infantry battalions than special units.

(7) Employment. Considering their capabilities, units were reported underemployed in nine percent of the cases. Although no clear trend exists, the number of units considered underemployed decreased in the fourth quarter 1969. The problem is greatest in special units.

(8) Supplies. A lack of supplies was reported by 17 percent of advisors as sometimes degrading the unit's capability. Only one percent reported a lack of supplies as degrading the unit's capability all of the time. Further analysis of ARVN/VNMC major equipment status indicated that general shortages exist in the following items of equipment.

- (a) 1-ton (3/4-ton) trucks.
- (b) Water trailers.
- (c) Machine guns.
- (d) Grenade launchers.
- (e) 20 ton truck-mounted cranes.

Authorizations for machine guns and grenade launchers were substantially increased for all ARVN divisions and separate regiments (except the Airborne Division) late in the 4th Qtr CY 69. Prior to these increases all units were at or near authorized levels. The 2d Division was authorized an additional battalion of artillery in late 1969. Material to equip this battalion will be obtained from US assets during 1st Qtr CY 70.

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
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Chart 53

G2/S2, G3/S3 STAFF FUNCTIONS PROBLEM AREAS

PERCENTAGE OF ADVISORS REPORTING INEFFECTIVE:

0 10 20 30 40 50



..... REGIMENT/DIVISION/CORPS STAFF
—— BATTALION STAFF⁸⁰

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e. G2/S2, G3/S3 Problem Areas.

(1) Chart 53 on the opposite page covers selected staff functions reported as ineffective in the SEER Questionnaire by advisors to ARVN/VNMC battalions, regiments, divisions, and corps. The problem area functions are grouped separately by battalion staffs and by regiment, division, and corps staffs, since battalions have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than regiments, divisions, and corps.

(2) G2/S2 Functions. The intelligence function for all staffs has shown only slight improvement during 1969 with no positive trends established. Chart 53 presents the percentages of ineffective ratings in the following categories:

(a) The G2/S2 section supervises, coordinates, and plans intelligence collection activities.

(b) The G2/S2 section processes intelligence information through recording, evaluation, and interpretation, and disseminates intelligence.

(c) The G2/S2 section plans and supervises counterintelligence activities.

(3) G3/S3 Functions. The operations function shows no improvement in regiment, division or corps staffs, but improvement in battalion staffs was noticeable in all areas. The establishment of effective training programs stands out as the major G3/S3 problem for corrective action by all staffs. Chart 53 presents the percentages of ineffective ratings in the following categories:

(a) The G3/S3 section analyzes missions, recommends priorities for utilization of manpower and equipment, and recommends requirements for tables of equipment and organization.

(b) The G3/S3 section analyzes the training situation and proposes and implements training programs.


(c) The G3/S3 section analyzes the tactical situation, develops courses of action, and makes recommendations to the commander for operations.

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f. Training Assessment. Training programs continue to receive emphasis in developing ARVN/VNMC effectiveness. Indicators of progress available within SEER were reported last quarter and are updated in this report. The advisors' assessment of training effectiveness has been added to provide more depth.

(1) Training Effectiveness. Training effectiveness, illustrated in Chart 54, is a new indicator based on advisor responses to questions on frequency of training programs conducted, results from training programs, and the manner in which training programs are conducted. I Corps organizations have remained high during the year in all aspects. II and IV Corps are showing an upward trend and III Corps, which was above the average at mid-year, declined sharply in the fourth quarter.

Chart 54



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(2) Training taken to Reduce Casualties and Improve Combat Skills (Chart 55). In the fourth quarter the number of advisors reporting on training to improve combat skills and reduce casualties increased slightly showing a favorable yearly trend. The "marginal" training has declined, but the "ineffective" has remained constant and is an unfavorable condition. The "ineffective" training may be related to the continuing problem of mine and booby trap casualties which are still a serious problem. Advisors report that improving the effectiveness of this training should reduce casualties and improve combat skills, thereby reducing mine and booby trap casualties.

(3) Training of Officers and NCOs (Chart 55). The evaluation of the level of training of company grade officers and unit NCOs has shown a gradual increase in the "average" and "above average" category during the year. However, the "below average" training category remains very high at 31 percent for officers and 47 percent for NCOs.

(4) Time Spent on Training by ARVN/VNMC Battalions.

(a) Joint General Staff (JGS) training doctrine currently requires that ARVN maneuver battalions receive four weeks (30 days) of refresher training at one of the national training centers every three years. During 1969 63 ARVN battalions received refresher training at training centers and with US and Australian Forces. This number represents slightly over one-third of the ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions and meets the 1969 JGS requirement. However, in January 1970 24 percent of ARVN/VNMC battalions were still overdue their annual refresher training. An accelerated plan to provide training for 71 battalions is planned for 1970. During 1969 nine battalions of the 18th Division and eight battalions of the 2d Division conducted 30-day refresher training; this represents a high number for divisions continuously committed to combat operations. In addition, 127,000 newly-inducted men received recruit training and more than 89,000 completed courses in military schools. It is planned that the training output for 1970 will increase. English language instruction was given to 10,200 Vietnamese in 1969 and 10,800 more are scheduled for training in 1970. A formal on-the-job training program was established, which will result in an increasing amount of technical training for Vietnamese at US units and installations. The first classes graduated from the National Defense College and from the four-year course at the Vietnamese National Military Academy. The Vietnamese have put into effect two programs in the training field which will result in improvements in the immediate future. First, combat experienced NCOs will be used as a source of officer candidates. In 1970, 30 percent of the officers will come from this source. Second, a much-needed effort is being made to reduce "homesteading" at schools and training centers. There is now a program to replace officers who have served four years as instructors with combat experienced officers.

(b) Time spent by ARVN/VNMC organizations on training has increased since last quarter. This reflects total time devoted by battalions on training and provides for combining the time spent by smaller units into battalion-days. Time on major training programs such as national and division level training is also included. Table 2 reflects an increase in

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ADVISORS' ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING

PERCENTAGE OF APPROXIMATELY 500 ADVISORS WHO WERE IN A POSITION TO JUDGE THE:

Chart 55

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total time spent on training during the fourth quarter, and a favorable trend during the year. There was, however, considerable variation in the time reported by each organization, with a low 1.6 percent reported by the 22d Division and a high 12.7 in the 9th Division and 17.4 in the 42d Regiment.

TABLE 2

TIME SPENT ON TRAINING BY ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS

CY 69

<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
3.2%	3.4%	6.5%	6.9%
380 Bn Days	417 Bn Days	786 Bn Days	844 Bn Days

(c) Most short term unit on-site training is not included in the time spent on training by ARVN battalions indicated by Table 2. A partial indication of unit on-site training is provided from the SEER questionnaire and is depicted by Chart 55. In the fourth quarter 82 percent of the troops received at least four hours of on-site training per month, and the percent receiving the required seven hours is increasing. The present questionnaire is not sensitive enough to determine trends in the middle range reported. This range (57-60 percent) covers a span of one to six hours per week or four to 24 hours a month. The indicators of an upward trend in training seen elsewhere could be hidden in this 20 hours per month range. The SEER Questionnaire is presently being rewritten to be more definitive with initial reporting anticipated in the 1st Qtr CY 70.

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g. Action on Third Quarter Problem Areas. Problems noted below were reported during the past quarter to MACV staff agencies. Actions taken to assist in resolving these problems are indicated.

(1) Recruiting.

(a) Problem: II Corps regular force units failed to meet JGS recruiting quotas. The Mobilization Act of 1968 allows 16- and 17- year old males to volunteer for RF/PF, while 18- through 20-year old males must volunteer for regular force duty.

(b) Comments: The failure of II Corps units to meet JGs recruiting quotas is consistent with experience of all ARVN units, and the situation has been aggravated by the accelerated program to activate RF/PF units. Current MOND estimates indicate that manpower resources in FY 70 are adequate to meet both regular and paramilitary requirements. JGS is taking action to insure that draft age males are transferred from RF/PF and PSDF to the regular forces.

(2) Desertions.

(a) Problem: This chronic problem continues to exist in all ARVN units and is a major drain on ARVN fighting strength. JGS has been urged to approve without delay the following proposal of the II Corps Commander:

1 Increase the cost of living allowance for duty in the Central Highlands.

2 Allocate more funds and resources to II Corps for dependent housing.

3 Increase the flow of commissary supplies.

4 Award a special campaign medal for service in the Central Highlands.

(b) Comments: A study which included recommendations on each of the II Corps Commander's proposals was submitted to the Chief of Staff, MACV, and subsequently to JGS during December 1969. Improvements in military service in the highlands may assist in reducing the desertion problem, but it is too early to determine at this time.

(3) Shortage of Field Grade Officers.

(a) Problem: A shortage of field grade officers weakens combat effectiveness. The promotion system has failed to keep pace with the increase in the force level. It is recommended that outstanding officers be promoted ahead of their contemporaries and below the normal zone of consideration.

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(b) Comments: As of 30 Sep 69, 103 percent of the officer spaces in ARVN were filled. Field grade officer spaces were 71 percent filled. The overall officer assigned strength has shown a marked improvement. However, a grade imbalance still exists. Current JCS promotion directives allow for the promotion of outstanding officers through special battlefield promotions which require six months time in grade and three months time in position. For recognition of personnel in non-combat situations there are special non-battlefield promotions which require one year in grade and six months time in position for promotion to the grade of First Lieutenant and above and six months time in grade and three months time in position for promotion to the grade of Second Lieutenant from Aspirant.

(4) Helicopter Support.

(a) Problem: The shortage of aviation assets available to I FFV has adversely affected its program to up-grade ARVN air mobile operations. II Corps recommends that action be taken to provide the 215th VNAF Helicopter Squadron with effective maintenance capability in order that it can be stationed at Pleiku.

(b) Comments: Based on a study of this problem it was decided to relocate eight helicopters to Pleiku in December 1969. Local coordination and employment problems have occurred and are being resolved. An overall improvement in air support is expected from this action.

(5) Assigned Strength of the 7th, 9th and 21st Divisions.

(a) Problem: The assigned strength of the 7th, 9th and 21st Divisions has declined since the first of the year. JCS replacements to the 7th Division should be increased in order to provide a minimum of 100 percent of authorized strength and replacements to the 9th and 21st Divisions should be increased to provide the minimum established satisfactory level of 95 percent of authorized strength.

(b) Comments: JCS program of replacements to IV Corps divisions forecast the ratio of assigned to authorized strengths on 30 Nov 69, as indicated below (this was not met; see subparagraph h(4)(a):

	<u>7th Division</u>	<u>9th Division</u>	<u>21st Division</u>
Officers	105%	100%	100%
NCOs	103%	99%	100%
EM	101%	94%	93%
Overall	102%	95%	94%

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(6) In-place Training.

(a) Problem: II Corps recommends that MACV Training Directorate study the feasibility of instituting formal unit training programs for all ARVN units during stand-down periods and encourage JGS to place maximum command emphasis on this vital subject. ARVN commanders have not shown great interest or initiative in initiating unit training programs during stand-down periods.

(b) Comments: Current guidance for in-place training is prescribed by JGS/CTC Memorandum 3737, 26 Jun 67 and 1493, 18 Mar 67. These memorandums outline the policies and procedures to be followed in the preparation and conduct of unit in-place training programs. Responsibilities are outlined for commanders at all echelons. The general concept is to take advantage of all available stand down time to correct known deficiencies and increase combat effectiveness. Certain mandatory subjects are prescribed by JGS. Commanders are urged to direct special emphasis on subjects in which deficiencies have been noted in recent operations. MACV Training Directorate has recommended that JGS Central Training Command update these directives with a view toward strengthening the provisions thereof and establishing better monitoring procedures. This is now being accomplished.

(7) Battalion Refresher Training Conducted at the Division Training Center versus National Training Center.

(a) Problem: The 23d Division was conducting battalion refresher training at the Division Training Center facility. The training center did not have sufficient qualified cadre to conduct the training of staff and leaders prescribed under the program. The Division had solved the problem in the past by augmenting the training center cadre with instructor personnel from the division staff. Due to increased operational commitments the division could not continue this course of action.

(b) Comments: MACV Training Directorate has recommended to JGS Central Training Command that the 23d Division be relieved from the responsibility of conducting battalion refresher training and that this training be programmed into Lam Son National Training Center where adequate cadre and facilities are available. This has now been accomplished.

(8) Specialist Training.

(a) Problem: Branch commands allocate school quotas directly to Corps units without notifying Corps headquarters. It is recommended that JGS Central Training Command have branch commands make timely distribution of quotas directly to the operating units.

(b) Comments: The JGS Military Training Directive, published in 1965, establishes the current procedures for allocation of service school quotas. JGS Central Training Command plans to publish a new directive. The Training Directorate has recommended that CTC revise the current

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procedure to insure that Corps have the responsibility to sub-allocate all service school quotas for units within the Corps Tactical Zone except for Area Logistics Command, Air Force, Navy and General Reserve Units.

(9) Shortage of M113 APC Track Shoes. Comments: The 20th Ordnance Storage Base Depot released 1,112 ea track shoe assemblies and 3,285 ea track pads on 17 Oct 69, to the 220th Ordnance Medium Support Battalion, II ALC. On 28 and 29 Oct, the requirement to transport the aforementioned items by air to the 220th OMSB was placed on VNAF. The track shoe assemblies were moved on 2 Nov 69 and the track pads were moved on 3 Nov 69.

(10) Non-availability of Equipment for LRRP Platoons. Comments: A JGS decision has not been reached on the II Corps request for equipment because J3, JGS is considering a plan to authorize a reconnaissance company in each of the six ranger groups. At present, only the 5th Ranger Group in the Saigon area has a reconnaissance company.

(11) Shortage of Ponchos.

(a) Problem: The 2d Ranger Group reported a critical shortage of ponchos and action on requisitions had not been taken.

(b) Comments: The 2d ALC was contacted on 10 November to determine the status of ponchos for the 2d Ranger Group. On 7 November 1969 the 122d QM Field Depot issued 226 ponchos to the Group, based on a valid depot due-out. No other requisitions have been received from the organization. Status of ponchos within the ALC on 7 Nov 69, as reflected by the 121st Depot stock records, was as follows:

On Hand	9,194
Due Out	23,290

Records of the QM National Inventory Control Center in Saigon show 18,509 ponchos due in to 2d ALC in December. The criticality of ponchos throughout the country is well known by CLC/JGS, MACV and OCQM. Every effort has been made to expedite shipment of these items from CONUS; however, excessive procurement and production lead times on the special lightweight ponchos have caused unavoidable delays. Only during the past month have substantial numbers of ponchos begun to arrive in-country. For example over 30,000 were received at the 10th QM Base Depot in Saigon during the past week. Equitable distribution is being directed by OCQM. The supply position should continue to show improvement in the coming months.

(12) Shortage of Slings for Airmobile Operations. Comments: No request for additional sling equipment has been received by CLC from

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Vietnamese Corps or artillery units. CLC will not initiate action to change TOE based solely on advisory recommendation. It appears favorable consideration will be given properly justified unit requests through RVNAF channels. Recommend counterparts at corps and unit level be advised to submit requests for change to TOE.

(13) POLWAR Equipment Remains in Short Supply. Comments: The reason for this shortage is the low priority of POLWAR equipment and spare parts in the funding program. The Chief of General Political Warfare Department is working with JGS to solve the problem of priorities. Some relief is anticipated during this reporting period, but it is doubtful if the problem will be resolved prior to late 1970. The release of funds for the purchase of non-MAP items on the POLWAR units' TOE has been disapproved for FY 69 and FY 70 by the Ministry of Finance. There is no "POLWAR EQUIPMENT" in the ARVN Logistics System. Quartermaster, engineer, ordnance, signal, and medical items comprise the five categories of equipment which are delineated on a unit's TOE. Emphasis must be placed on considering a unit's shortage of 32 of the 37 authorized TOE items (audio visual units, for example) as a logistics problem rather than a PSYWAR operations problem.

(14) Shortage of Airborne Personnel Detector (People Sniffer). Comments: Airborne Personnel Detector Equipment is not authorized for ARVN units. Equipment in question are assets on loan to ARVN. Current status is as follows:

(a) A message was received from the Department of the Army on 2 Jul 69 advising that support for the XM-2 and XM-3 prototype models would no longer be available. USARV dispatched a letter to all using activities advising them of this action and what impact this could have. All using activities replied that they felt that the XM-3 improved model would be sufficient to do the job required. The using activities were advised that they could retain the XM-2 and XM-3 prototype models but maintenance and supply support would not be available. Some units did retain some of the older models.

(b) Reports from the using activities rate the maintenance and logistic support for the XM-3 improved model from excellent to outstanding. A six month supply of parts is on hand at this time. Requests for parts not on hand are immediately processed and the parts are flown in to fill the requirement (Push Package Support).

(c) The maintenance for these units is performed by the 147th Light Equipment Maint Co and the 578th Light Equipment Maint Co which are located at Long Binh. They are assisted and advised by two GE Technical Representatives.

(d) On 27 Oct 69 all XM-3 improved models were operational.

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(e) At the present time no problem exists with maintenance and logistic support of the XM-3 improved model.

(f) A total of 71 XM-3 improved models are to be received for use by US units. No program has been established to provide ARVN units with the detectors.

(g) The only solution to the problem appears to be that ARVN units turn-in the XM-2 and obtain the loan of the XM-3 improved model if available. There is no plan to authorize ADP equipment for issue to ARVN.

(15) Shortage of Water Trailers. Comments: Water trailers are in short supply country-wide. Forecasts of incoming assets indicate that by December 1969 the availability of water trailers will be substantially improved. Against a total requirement of 2,903, 2,781 water trailers are programmed to be in country by December 1969.

(16) Shortage of 20-Ton Cranes. Comments: Truck-mounted cranes continue to be an item in critical short supply. Against an authorization of 274 there were 159 on hand, including 17 substitutes. A quantity of 210 are currently due in. Fifteen (15) cranes recently arrived at the 40th EED and are being deprocessed. This is initial shipment of 67 rebuilt US assets diverted for RVNAF. Remainder of the shipment is due in the next two months. Forty (40) Harnischfeger cranes were due to be released from new procurement on 7 Nov 69. Additional procurement shipments to fill remaining shortfall are scheduled for delivery in 3d and 4th quarter FY 70. Present top allocation priority as established by OCE, RVNAF, is to I Corps Tactical Zone.

(17) Delay in Construction of Dependent Housing and Material Shortage.

(a) Problem: ARVN Dependent Housing Self-Help Program in II and III Corps is encountering difficulties due to a lack of available materials.

(b) Comments:

(1) A total of seven projects (440 units) have been cancelled from the CY 69 commodity support program in II CTZ, due to unsuccessful bids after several attempts or another facility being available (US cantonment). The total program in the CY 69 GVN Defense Budget now consists of 1820 units, all of which are under contract with construction begun on 1,170 of these units.

(2) A total of 10 projects (1,270 units) have been cancelled from the CY 69 commodity support program in III CTZ. Of the remaining program of 1,510 units, 10 units were completed, 1,210 units are under construction and 290 units are under contract awaiting US furnished materials. In the 50 percent GVN/JCS credit portions of the CY 69 RVN Defense Budget, six projects (270 units) have been cancelled, 960 units remain in the program with status as follows: 240 are completed, 380 are under construction, and

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340 are under contract. The III Corps Self-Help Dependent Housing Program as of 1 Nov 69 had 210 units under construction. USARPV Engineers have housing now in various stages of construction.

(18) Commissary Shortage.

(a) Problem: II Corps indicates that long-term stock shortages reduced the effectiveness of the commissary system. GVN-imposed import restrictions cause this problem and efforts to resolve import restrictions do not appear to be meeting with any success.

(b) Comments:

(1) Since the establishment of the RVNAF Commissary Department in 1956, food and sundry items that are distributed by the Commissary Department have been based on military personnel strengths. The long-term stock shortages which have been reported do, in fact, reduce the effectiveness of the RVNAF Commissary System. The GVN has approved only \$11.5 million worth of import requests since September 1968, while importation of approximately \$10.0 million in food items per quarter is required. Consequently, most imported items are rationed.

(2) To alleviate the problem, it is necessary for the Minister of Economy (MOE) to issue import permits for the Commissary Department to procure off-shore those food items which are not available in-country in sufficient quantities to meet minimum requirements. USAID is working closely with the GVN in an attempt to gain additional releases of import permits. The Commissary Department continues to make the best possible use of available import credits and in-country sources of supply. Beyond this, any substantial improvement in the commissary stockage situation is dependent upon favorable action by the MOE on the request by the Minister of National Defense for additional import permits.

(19) Relocation of the 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron.

(a) Problem: The 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron (-) has been operating in the 24th STZ since June 1969. It has been recommended to JCS that the squadron be permanently assigned to the 24th STZ in Kontum Province, and the 3d Troop, 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron also be relocated.

(b) Comments: MACV representatives visited Armored Command and the JCS Deputy JS and discussed the advisability of moving the 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron to Pleiku. A recommendation has been made to JCS to approve the relocation. However, as of 25 January 1970 a final decision has not been made by JCS. This is currently an on-going action which will be monitored by MACV.

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h. Current Problem Areas Reported by Senior Advisors. The problems indicated below have been reported to MACV staff for appropriate assistance. Actions taken during the quarter to resolve these areas will be reported in the 1st Qtr CY 70 MACV SEER Report. While not covered in detail, of major importance is the effort being conducted in each corps to correct these problems.

(1) Rotation System for Commanders. III Corps feels that the establishment of a rotation system for commanders after they complete a predetermined amount of time in command is desirable.

(2) Quality of US Advisors to ARVN Units. While this is reported as a III Corps problem area it generally exists country-wide. A serious imbalance exists in the branch and grade distribution of officers assigned to the III Corps Advisory Group. Moreover, there are qualitative deficiencies which have resulted in many officers with inadequate training being assigned to advisory teams. This can be rectified by granting an assignment priority to the advisory structure at least equal to that for US combat units in-country.

(3) Quality of ARVN Replacements from National Training Centers. The physical condition of personnel received from the NTC is occasionally unsatisfactory. It is recommended that physicals be conducted at the NTC prior to transfer.

(4) Assigned Strength of ARVN Divisions.

(a) Although there has been continuing improvement in the assigned strength of ARVN units in IV CTZ, the strength of the three divisions, which is currently 91 percent of authorized, is still below the minimum satisfactory goal of 95 percent of authorized as established by JGS. Replacements from recruiting and inductees equaled only 59 percent of the established combined quotas.

(b) A contributing factor to the unsatisfactory strength is the fact that, although each division is given a monthly recruiting quota, no funds are authorized to the divisions to support a recruiting program.

(c) An additional factor to the unsatisfactory strength levels is the fact that volunteers for the recruiting program are required to have birth certificates and ID cards, while inductees are not required to have these documents.

(5) Desertions. A problem with desertions continues to exist in the 2d Division and 51st Regiment. Factors reported as contributing to the high rate are:

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(a) Fear of mines and booby traps, particularly by the 51st Regiment in Quang Nam Province, which has the highest density of mines and booby traps in country.

(b) Use of Class B personnel as replacements. In the past nine months the 51st Regiment received 1143 Class B replacements and 735 have deserted.

(c) Lack of a relatively secure stand down area for the unit and a permanent, secure location for dependents. Battalion stand down areas are being prepared by use of the Self-Help Program and a permanent base will be selected in the near future. A lack of prompt administrative and logistical support (see problem (7) below on the Quang Da Special Zone (QDSZ) Headquarters).

(6) Shortage of Qualified Leaders. Shortages of qualified leaders exist at battalion, company, and platoon levels. The officer program has insufficient motivating factors, such as rewards and punishments, to improve performance. Emphasis is being placed on training programs at all levels to alleviate this problem.

(7) Lack of a Headquarters in QDSZ. Command and control continues to be weak and administrative and logistical support inadequate due to lack of a headquarters. A report has previously been made of this problem to MACV and JGS.

(8) Command and Control in the 44th Special Tactical Zone. The 44th has a serious problem area in command and control. The 44th STZ is a division level headquarters which, due to the varied forces operating in the 44th STZ, has direct command of no forces. The 44th STZ has OPCON of special forces and artillery units working in the zone, and temporary control of special units such as ranger battalions and armored cavalry squadrons when they are assigned by IV CTZ for operations. In addition, USN and VNN elements operate in the 44th STZ independently of 44th STZ control, and Province Chiefs take their orders directly from IV CTZ with direct access to Saigon. Their concurrence is required in order to utilize their organic RF/PF troops for tactical zone operations.

(9) Increase Infantry Battalions to Four Rifle Companies. III Corps recommends that consideration be given to adding an additional rifle company to the presently authorized three in infantry battalions.

(10) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Operations. Advisory teams are not provided the equipment or personnel to carry out APD operations. In view of Vietnamization, it is desirable that ARVN develop APD capability, to include organic equipment and personnel.

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(11) Employment of the 4th Arm r Brigade.

(a) Direct orders have been issued to eliminate severe damage or destruction of M113 and other APCs. Commanders are to be less aggressive in closing with and destroying the enemy by ground combat. Emphasis is placed on finding and fixing the enemy, then destroying him with tactical air, gunships, and artillery. This is in direct contravention of General Vien's directive #310-13/JCS/J3, dated 3 November 1969, subject: Employment of Armor.

(b) Cavalry troops have been employed as a means to transport and provide fire support to infantry units.

(c) Commitment of cavalry troops has been piecemeal.

(d) Armored cavalry squadrons are infrequently deployed as complete units, with infantry and artillery attached, in an offensive role.

(e) Inadequate time and facilities are provided for maintenance.

(12) Publishing New TOE by JCS. In the past increases have been approved in unit strength without publication of a new TOE. This precludes JCS and corps G3 from coordinating for personnel replacements in the proper grade and MOS.

(13) Inadequate Artillery Resources.

(a) The 42d DTA is allocated seventy-two 105mm howitzers and eight 155mm howitzers. Only three battalions are available to support the 21st Division during operations and several strategic hamlets and villages are not provided artillery support for territorial security.

(b) There are inadequate artillery personnel available to the 44th STZ to provide necessary command and control of artillery assets.

(14) Communications/Engineer and Reconnaissance Support. The Airborne Division reports a lack of adequate communications, engineer and reconnaissance support. Signal, engineer and reconnaissance units of the division are not large enough to adequately support the division when it is committed to multi-brigade operations in remote jungle terrain.

(15) Logistics/Supply Shortages.

(a) A shortage of protective masks continues to exist in II Corps.

(b) The readiness condition of M113 track vehicles in both the 3d and 14th Armored Cavalry Squadrons has improved, but a continuation of emphasis to achieve a steady flow of assemblies and major components is necessary.

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(c) The 27 December 69 deployment date for the 25th Artillery Battalion was not met due to a shortage of seven 105mm howitzers.

(d) Tables of organization should be amended to reflect an authorization of six sling sets per artillery battalion to provide simultaneous air lift of one battery. Current authorization allows for the air lift of only one platoon.

(e) Critical shortages still exist in repair parts and it is recommended that ALC depot stockage levels be based on density of equipment supported and filled on a one time "push" basis.

(f) The present ARVN combat boot is reported as unsatisfactory for tropical use and long lead times exist in obtaining an acceptable replacement.

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5. (C-NOFORN) Vietnamese Naval Forces Evaluation.

a. Introduction.

(1) This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). The report is based on the Naval Forces Evaluation System (NFES), a subsystem of SEER.

(2) In measuring the operational effectiveness of the VNN there are three major areas of interest:

- (a) Improvement and Modernization.
- (b) Operational Performance.
- (c) Operational Results.

(3) Although unquantifiable results frequently overshadow the quantifiable ones, a general feel for the situation can be obtained by examining the factors that make up these areas.

(4) A glossary of acronyms is included at the end of the section.

b. Summary of Performance.

(1) Effectiveness.

- (a) Craft turnovers are on schedule.
- (b) Supply center performance is satisfactory.
- (c) Craft employment, a measure of VNN level of effort, is satisfactory. The performance indicators, which depict effective employment of craft, show aggressiveness by VNN operating forces.
- (d) Viewed together, the indicators tend to show satisfactory progress in improvement and modernization during the first full year of the Vietnamization program. Additionally, with the first increment turnovers in June (RAC) and October (PCF/PBR), VNN utilization of turnover assets has been in combined commands and has shown signs of aggressiveness in prosecuting the naval war and in relieving the USN of its naval mission.
- (e) The Vietnamese are gaining valuable operational experience working with US units in combined operations. The assignment of operations are such that US personnel can be phased out as the Vietnamese demonstrate the ability to handle the effort.

(2) Problem Areas.

- (a) Forces are short of officers and petty officers because of the rapid expansion of the VNN. Corrective programs will alleviate the officer shortage by about December 1970. Implementation of additional programs to eliminate the petty officer shortage is expected in early 1970.

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(b) Inefficient supply transportation practices have been identified in the area of craft employment and short term corrective measures have been urged pending the formation of the planned DELTA/ESSZ Resupply System.

(c) Fluctuation in craft availability throughout the year has been caused by poor maintenance practices, supply support problems and battle damage resulting from operations in the U Minh Forest. Poor maintenance practices resulted from trained personnel being drawn from operating units to support turnover programs and untrained personnel being used as replacements. The expanded training program is now providing trained personnel for the maintenance jobs.

c. Improvement and Modernization.

(1) Improvement and modernization will be measured by examining:

- (a) Craft Inventory.
- (b) Personnel Strengths.
- (c) Training.
- (d) Logistics.

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(2) Craft Inventories.

(a) Actual and planned VNN combat and logistics lift craft inventories are shown in Table 3. Craft assets are made available to VNN through Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) deliveries and through turnover of in-country USN assets.

TABLE 3

ACTUAL AND PLANNED VNN CRAFT INVENTORIES

CATEGORY	END CY 68	PROGRAMMED CY 69	ON-HAND 31DEC69	ULTIMATE
Coastal Surveillance				
PC, PCE, PGM, MSC	30	30	30	32
PCF, WPB	10	42	41	95
JUNKS	264	226	226	240
DER/WHEC	0	0	0	4
River Security/Interdiction				
PBR	17	90	88	250
MLMS, LCMM	16	16	16	16
LSSL, LSIL	11	11	11	11
ESCORT CRAFT	28	28	28	28
River Assault/Interdiction				
RAG CRAFT	202	202	202	202
RAID CRAFT	0	109	108	189
Logistics Lift				
LST, LSM, LCU, YOG, AKL	<u>18</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>30</u>
Total Craft	596	774	770	1097

(b) Craft turnover is on schedule. Temporary training program shortfalls caused one WPB turnover to slip to CY 70, and caused minor alterations in the CY 70 schedule. In 1970, the "Coastal Raider" program (craft constructed of ferro cement) will begin replacing the aging junk force. Two PBRs have been surveyed due to battle damage. One RAID craft was also surveyed.

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(3) Personnel Strength. Chart 56 shows the increase in the VNN personnel strength during CY 69. The authorized strength also increased periodically and on the last day of CY 69 it was increased to 33,122 personnel. This allowance is composed of 3,001 officers, 10,127 petty officers and 19,994 enlisted.

(a) Ship, craft, and support activity personnel manning levels are displayed in Table 4 below as percentages of TO&E allowances.

TABLE 4

PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS

<u>CATEGORY</u>		<u>AS OF 31 DEC 69</u>
Coastal Surveillance	Officer	45%
	PO	39%
	Enlisted	107%
	TOTAL	78%
River Security/ Interdiction	Officer	46%
	PO	18%
	Enlisted	92%
	TOTAL	62%
River Assault Interdiction	Officer	60%
	PO	38%
	Enlisted	96%
	TOTAL	78%
Logistic Lift	Officer	89%
	PO	48%
	Enlisted	106%
	TOTAL	87%
Support Activities Including Training Facilities	Officer	80%
	PO	103%
	Enlisted	178%
	TOTAL	148%
Civilian Repair		53%


(b) The year was characterized by an increase in the "Support Activities" category, reflecting the massive training effort conducted by the VNN, partially at the expense of the operational forces. In all categories, enlisted personnel strength is significantly higher than officer or petty officer strengths. This reflects the fact that the output of the training programs is composed primarily of new recruits received in the great personnel expansion of the VNN. The VNN accomplished this expansion with volunteers. This allowed the VNN to be selective. The required education standard for recruits dipped to 5 years in July and August, was 7 years for a period, and at year's end was back up to 9 years.

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CHART 56

VNN
PERSONNEL EXPANSION



- PIPELINE-TRAINING/SCHOOL/HOSPITAL
- ASSIGNED STRENGTH
- AUTHORIZED CEILING

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(c) Officer strength will be satisfactory by the end of 1970, through the implementation of programs for the orientation of graduates of the ARVN OCS and for the training of VNN officer candidates at the U.S. Navy OCS in Newport, Rhode Island. The relatively greater number of officers assigned to the logistic lift category is not significant. This category is composed of 20 ships, is the training ground for many new officers; and normally has only 100 officers assigned. Proposed programs to alleviate the petty officer shortage include expansion of the petty officer school, transfer of selected ratings between branches, and reduction of time-in-grade requirements for exceptional personnel. Implementation is expected in early 1970.

(d) Civilian repair facility and shipyard strength has remained well below the satisfactory level. The actual number of personnel in these facilities has increased but, with increased repairs and maintenance needs, the personnel allowance has increased also. Over three thousand workers are authorized for repair facilities and the shipyard. The VNN shipyard operation continues to be restricted by a shortage of skilled civilian personnel, who are being hired away by civilian contractors. Proposed solutions are to hire 18-25 year olds with accompanying draft exemptions, and to permanently assign an additional one thousand Navy personnel to the shipyard.

(4) Training. Training programs to support asset turnover and to upgrade the competence level of the VNN are on schedule, and current deviations are within acceptable limits. Since inputs to training programs may be controlled, the cumulative inputs to these programs, expressed as a percentage of programmed inputs, is a measure of VNN effort to meet training milestones and a measure of progress in improvement and modernization.

TABLE 5

TRAINING


<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE CY 69 PERCENT INPUT</u>
Recruit	101%
Basic Specialist	98%
Advanced Specialist	53%
Petty Officer	112%
Midshipman (Naval Academy)	100%
Warrant Officer	99%
English Language Training	99%
Combat Craft Orientation School	103%
On-the-Job Training, Crew	98%
On-the-Job Training, Other than Crew	104%
Off-Shore (outside the country)	98%

Selected data is displayed graphically in Chart 57.

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CHART 57

**CUMULATIVE PERCENT OF PROGRAMMED
INPUTS TO NEW TRAINERS
CY 68**



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(a) Advanced specialist shortfalls were caused early in the year by unrealistic programming and a shortage of VNN instructors and qualified VNN students, who are not being utilized in other programs. Although re-programming occurred in the second quarter, the student/instructor shortage continued. Since this category contains courses similar to those given as a part of petty officer school, the shortfall is not significant. Accordingly, a smaller input to this category is being considered for the 1970 training program.

(b) The 1 October low point in crew on-the-job training reflected the shortfall in WPB program inputs. The upward trend in subsequent months reflected corrective measures. One WPB turnover was slipped to 1970, and minor changes were necessary in the 1970 program.

(c) Prior to 1 July, the on-the-job training (except crew) category represented individual supply and maintenance training. Difficulties encountered in detailing the initial increment of 359 ACTOVLOG trainees in June accounted for the 1 July shortfall. At year's end, recovery was complete. The data is deceptive, however, since the programmed figures were increased by about 1000 over the initial plan. Additionally, considerable slack exists between planned and actual attrition. Thus, ACTOVLOG training is actually close to original expectations.

(5) Logistics.

(a) Logistics performance will be measured by examining:

- 1 Supply Center Performance.
- 2 Transportation Performance.
- 3 Craft Availability.

(b) Supply Center Performance. VNN Supply Center effectiveness data and standards established for RIMMS are listed in Table 6. Customer satisfaction is a measure of the number of requisitions filled. Stockage satisfaction is a measure of the number of items in stock when required. Demand accommodation is a measure of the number of requisitions received for items on the Supply Center's Load List. Rejection rate is the percent of requisitions received which were incomplete or improperly submitted and therefore rejected. The fluctuations do not appear to show any significant trends. The four supply indicators, viewed together tend to show that the center has a valid load list and is able to meet customers demands.

TABLE 6

SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Desired</u>	<u>Satisfactory</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
Customer Satisfaction	70%	60%	69%	72%	72%	71%
Stockage Satisfaction	85%	75%	85%	90%	87%	89%
Demand Accomodation	90%	75%	84%	81%	82%	81%
Requisition Rejections	10%	15%	1%	6%	6%	8%

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(c) Transportation Performance. The number of tons of cargo and POL lifted by the logistics flotilla and the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization System standard are displayed below:

	<u>Desired</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
Tons lifted	42,000	32,240	23,772	27,933	31,063

The desired standards are based on average capacities and a 70% utilization of craft. In September 1969 the desired standard was raised from 39,000 tons to 42,000 tons due to addition of an LST to the Logistic Lift. Although craft availability and employment have been high, inefficient scheduling and cargo handling have resulted in the standards not being met. The Joint General Staff (JGS) has been assigned scheduling control of most of the VNN logistic craft. The VNN Logistic Flotilla Commander notifies the JGS when a craft is available for a mission. JGS then schedules a cargo lift mission. This short-notice practice has resulted in inefficient utilization of assets, short loading, and no backloading of cargo for the return trip to Saigon.





(d) Craft Availability. Availability is a gross measure of VNN ability in craft maintenance and supply of spare parts. Since the USN and VNN presently have a single logistic tail, and USN facilities are responsible for the support of VNN craft until the turnover of all repair facilities in FY 72, the indicator is currently a measure of the combined effort to maintain PCFs, PBRs and RAC. Since VNN facilities maintain the older craft, the indicator is a truer measure of strictly VNN capability for those craft.

1 If a craft is capable of getting underway, it is considered available. The indicator does not measure the operability of armament, communications equipment, or ancillary engineering equipment. A qualitative advisor input is being sought to aid in the interpretation of this indicator.

2 The standards for availability were based, for older craft, upon past VNN performance, and for newer assets, such as PCF, PBR and RAC, on past USN performance.

3 Chart 58 is a display of the VNN craft assets during CY 69, broken down into their four major groupings. The average number of craft assigned, operational and employed per month is shown for each major group. From this chart it is significant that while assigned craft have generally increased, the VNN has been able to maintain or increase the proportion of operational and employed craft. A more detailed availability of selected types of craft is shown on Chart 59, 60, 61, 62 and 63. This selected group of craft is indicative of the greatest VNN activity.






VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT ASSETS



..... ASSIGNED ■ OPERATIONAL ▨ EMPLOYED
 NOTE: FIGURES SHOWN ARE QUARTERLY AVERAGES

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**CRAFT AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT
CY 69**



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4 PCF/WPB availability is displayed on Chart 59. In April, the An Thoi squadron had 75% of the boat assets. A lack of spare parts, rotatable components, and consumable items existed because of the excessive amount of time for requisitions to be filled and material to be transported to An Thoi. Additionally, special tools and equipment for the hull and engine shops had not yet arrived, and therefore the shops were utilized only to a limited extent. From 1 May to 1 September, craft availability decreased as the craft material condition deteriorated, and as an accelerated boat overhaul program was implemented to correct the situation. In September availability rose again with the turnover of 13 craft in excellent material condition. Recent unannounced material inspections by CTF 115 and a USN/VNN inspection team have shown that VNN PCF crews are equal to their USN counterparts in preventive maintenance. The An Thoi squadron, which was the first effort to fully Vietnamize an operational area, craft and maintenance facilities provided valuable experience.

5 PBR availability displayed on Chart 60 dropped on 1 April 1969 as a result of initial VNN maintenance difficulties. During the summer and fall, the two Saigon-based river patrol groups brought the availability of their craft back to the desired level. In October 1969 the availability rose with the turnover of recently overhauled assets. As the newly acquired assets are deployed throughout the Delta, a more realistic availability level will be observed than was recorded in mid 1969 when the craft were operated only in the vicinity of Saigon.

6 RAID craft availability displayed on Chart 61 dropped sharply in April, when maintenance and support problems occurred. Vigorous corrective measures, implemented by advisors, brought the availability back to the desired level. The November drop was caused by extensive battle damage inflicted during the U Minh Forest operations.

7 During the first five months of 1969, the availability of the older river assault group (RAG) boats declined gradually as displayed on Chart 62. An above average number of operations of extended duration away from the RAG bases, low water level in the Delta resulting in bottom damage, some heavy battle damage requiring lengthy repair, and the inability of the Western Repair Facility to absorb the workload because of civilian worker shortages contributed to this decline. The RAG availability decline also signalled the fact that experienced maintenance personnel had been drawn from operating forces to support turnover programs and had been replaced with less highly skilled men. There were indications that routine preventive maintenance was falling below standards previously maintained. Repairs which had been accomplished by unit mechanics required completion by repair facilities or the Naval Shipyard. This led to an investigation of the lowering of the overall VNN experience level caused by the drawdown of experienced personnel. The drawdown was perhaps a cause of an increase in waterway incidents during the second quarter. VNN Headquarters investigations concluded that the majority were attributable to inexperienced boat coxswains. As a result, COMNAVFORV determined that the VNN had about reached the limit on how far drawdown of older forces could be effected for further turnover programs. Fortunately, the expanded training programs began to graduate personnel to man future turnover craft, and further drawdown was not necessary.

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8 Logistics lift craft availability is indicated on Chart 63. These figures are inflated since logistic lift craft are available if capable of loading/unloading as well as getting underway. Additionally, when logistic craft return to Saigon after a mission, they routinely commence an upkeep period until made available to the JCS for scheduling. This lack of firm employment and upkeep schedule adversely influences the indicator as a true measure of ability to meet that schedule.

d. Operational Performance.

(1) Operational performance will be measured by examining:

- (a) Craft Employment.
- (b) Performance Indicators.

(2) Craft Employment. Employment is a measure of the VNN level of activity. A craft is employed if it gets underway. A Fleet Command Ship, however, is considered employed the entire time it is deployed from Saigon, even if in port. The indicator does not reveal whether or not the unit was gainfully employed. It must be used in conjunction with advisor reports and performance indicators.

(a) The standards for employment for older craft are based on past VNN performance, and for newer assets, such as PCF, PBR and RAC on past USN performance.

(b) PCF/WPB employment is displayed on Chart 59. Employment rose above the desired level in early April when the VNN PCFs assumed greater Market Time responsibilities in the Fourth Coastal Zone. Employment declined significantly only once, in July, when low availability temporarily forced employment down.

(c) PBR employment is displayed on Chart 60. There were no significant fluctuations until November; the craft were employed mostly in the vicinity of Saigon in Game Warden type missions. 1970 data will show the employment pattern for interdiction operations.

(d) RAID employment is displayed on Chart 61. Employment reached its peak during the late spring and early summer, when the craft were employed in the Giant Slingshot interdiction operation. The craft were not utilized as heavily in the following months, which was the formative period for CTF 211 and the lull before the U Minh operation. In October utilization peaked in the U Minh effort. In November employment was forced down by the large number of craft undergoing repairs for extensive battle damage.

(e) RAC employment was the same as availability (Chart 62) for the last three months of CY 69. Earlier data are not available.

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(1) A logistic craft is employed if it is loading, unloading, or underway. Similar to logistic craft availability in the absence of a firm employment schedule, the indicator is somewhat inaccurate as a true measure of the ability to meet that schedule. Data is shown on Chart 63.

(3) Performance Indicators. The four indicators listed in Table 7 have been developed to give an indication of the performance and readiness of the three major VNN operating groups. These indicators have been normalized (averaged over all craft in a specific group). Bias still remains; for example, one division of boats operating in a high risk area versus one in a low risk area. As a result the numbers have meaning only when compared to a standard. The standard values were computed from historical data obtained on USN units operating in the three major operating groups. An expanded data base is being compiled to give more meaningful standards considering present operations. All four indicators must be used conjointly and subjected to a value judgement to obtain a relative picture of VNN performance and readiness. The data is taken from VNN operational summaries, USN spot reports, and advisor spot reports. Although these indicators were chosen as possible comparison measures they often have little meaning because the VNN craft in Market Time, for example, have had ~~less than~~ one percent of the opportunity to get in firefights that USN PCF in river operations have had. In operations such as Giant Slingshot, where VNN river patrol groups are integrated with USN river divisions, it is difficult to see any differences in readiness and training of the two navies.

TABLE 7
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Standard</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
<u>Coastal Divisions</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.03	0	0	.02
Incidents per Unit	.54	0	.03	.02
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.10	0	0	.07
Enemy KIA per Unit	.26	.03	0	0
<u>River Patrol Groups</u>				
Boat Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.37	0	0	.05
Incidents per Unit	.85	.09	.14	.27
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.15	0	0	.04
Enemy KIA per Unit	.52	.1	.26	.38
<u>River Assault & Interdiction Divisions</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.10	.05	.27	.04
Incidents per Unit	.45	.13	.17	.19
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.27	.26	.27	.20
Enemy KIA per Unit	.22	.09	.22	.09

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(a) Coastal Divisions. The VNN presently has one coastal squadron divided into the equivalent of two US Coastal Divisions. Divisions are deployed on Market Time patrols. The VNN controls 29 of the 58 coastal surveillance stations as indicated on Chart 64. The changes in the USN/VNN responsibility is also shown for the four quarters of 1969. Market Time patrol operations are relatively quiet in comparison to SEA LORDS interdiction operations. Inasmuch as only a few VNN PCFs are assigned to SEA LORDS the readiness and performance indicators show a large disparity from the arbitrary standard, which is based on all PCF operations. In the future VNN PCFs will be playing a larger part in interdiction type operations and a better picture will be presented by the readiness and performance indicators.

(b) River Assault and Interdiction Division. There are six RAIDs consisting of approximately 18 boats per division. Four RAIDs are part of ATF 211 and have been operating in the U Minh and lower delta regions. The remaining two RAIDs are employed in the Giant Slingshot area of operations. In November, enemy initiated attacks in the U Minh area caused a rise in RAID activity, as measured by number of incidents per unit, and enemy KIA per unit. In December operations were on a smaller scale than previous months. RAID activity, as measured by the number of incidents per unit, has continued to rise. This rise can be attributed to more use of night waterborne guard post tactics. Although the overall VNN readiness and performance is not up to arbitrary standards it is significant to note that for a small number of incidents the enemy KIA is high.


(c) River Patrol Groups. There are four VNN River Patrol Groups (RPG), with approximately 20 PBRs per group. RPG 51 and 52 are employed primarily in Rung Sat Special Zone and Soi Rap River with the vital job of protection of shipping. RPG 53 is employed in the Giant Slingshot interdiction operation and RPG 54 operates 10 boats on the Bassac River and 10 boats in the Tran Hung Dao barrier operation. The level of activity is less than the arbitrary standard due to the nature of the above operations, i.e., a large amount of pure patrolling. However, based on this level of activity the enemy KIA per unit is very high and points to aggressive operations by VNN RPG.

(d) Area of Operational Responsibility. Chart 65 shows the locations of various naval operations and those that are USN controlled as well as those that are VNN/USN combined operations. These combined operations join USN and VNN personnel in the same staff and fighting effort with the VNN eventually assuming the total control of these operations. All naval operations will become combined operations early in CY 70.

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CHART 64


MARKET TIME SURVEILLANCE STATIONS 4TH QTR CY 69



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
e. Operational Results.

(1) Operational results for the VNN during the four quarters of CY 69 are displayed in Charts 66 and 67. Improvements are noted in the results of attacks on enemy personnel and craft. Fewer VNN KIA as well as a higher enemy KIA contributed to the improved KIA ratio. The increased number of VNN craft damaged is due to the increased engagement of naval assets. The high numbers of craft searched indicates the effort devoted to coastal and inland waterway security.

(2) Chart 68 is a comparison of USN and VNN results for the 3d and 4th Qtr of CY 69. High US results include the efforts of US air support of USN and VNN waterborne operations. This display indicates the total effort necessary on the part of the Vietnamese, assuming the current level of fighting continues.


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VIETNAMESE NAVY RESULTS







* PREVIOUS QUARTER DATA NOT AVAILABLE

VIETNAMESE NAVY ENEMY-FRIENDLY KIA



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VNN - USN RESULTS COMPARISON

CHART 68

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACTOVLOG	Accelerated Turnover Logistics Program
AKL	Attack Cargo, Light
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
ATG	Amphibious Task Group
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CZ	Coastal Zone
DER	Destroyer Escort, Radar
JCS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
LCMM	Landing Craft, Mechanized, Minesweeper
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCM-8	Landing Craft, Mechanized Mark 8 (Large LCM)
LCU	Landing Craft, Utility
LSTL	Landing Ship, Infantry, Large
LSSL	Landing Ship, Support, Large
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
MAST	Military Assistance Service Funded
MLMS	Motor Launch Mine Sweeper
OJT	On the Job Training
PBR	Patrol Boat River
PC	Patrol Craft
PCE	Patrol Craft, Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast
PCM	Patrol Motor Gunboat
RAC	River Assault Craft
RAG	River Assault Group
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division
RPG	River Pat 1 Group
RSSZ	Ring Sat Special Zone
TF	Task Force
TG	Task Group
WHEC	High Endurance Coast Guard Cutter
WPB	Coast Guard Patrol Boat
YOG	Coastal Oiler
YTL	Medium Yard Tug

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ANNEX A

Enemy Contacts and Results Per Bn

Results per battalion in terms of hours of contact and enemy KIA per hour of contact are shown in this annex for each major organization, by mission. For hours of contact all contacts were converted to contact with the equivalent of an enemy platoon, by multiplying company contacts by three and battalion contacts by nine. Where mission headings are omitted, there were no enemy contacts while on that mission.

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I CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN PLT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
01 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	147	3.09
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	10	1.50
TOTAL	157	2.99
02 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	690	1.32
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	1	5.00
PACIFICATION STATIC	3	0.33
SECURITY	45	1.24
TOTAL	739	1.32
51 REG		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	32	2.16
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	14	1.29
TOTAL	46	1.89

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II CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN PLT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
22 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	1116	0.37
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	324	0.42
PACIFICATION STATIC	120	1.21
SECURITY		
TOTAL	1560	0.44
23 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	466	0.96
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	5	0.40
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	46	0.57
TOTAL	529	0.90
42 REG		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	73	0.14
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	8	0.13
TOTAL	81	0.14

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III CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN PLT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
05 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	340	0.69
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	15	0.00
TOTAL	356	0.65
18 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	297	0.66
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	32	0.97
TOTAL	330	0.69
25 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	54	4.52
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	59	3.83
PACIFICATION STATIC	8	2.00
SECURITY	6	0.83
TOTAL	127	3.87

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IV CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	ENEMY EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	ENEMY KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
07 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	753	0.38
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC	36	0.64
SECURITY	31	1.29
TOTAL	820	0.42
09 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	425	1.34
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	3	0.67
PACIFICATION STATIC	14	0.86
SECURITY		
TOTAL	442	1.32
21 DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	1817	0.27
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	8	2.38
PACIFICATION STATIC	4	1.50
SECURITY	4	0.00
TOTAL	1833	0.28

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ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN 9LT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
CV TOTALS		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	487	0.99
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	3	2.00
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	37	2.38
TOTAL	528	1.09
RN TOTALS		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	787	0.50
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC	2	0.00
SECURITY	19	0.63
TOTAL	809	0.50
AB DIV		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	630	0.42
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY		
TOTAL	630	0.42
VNMC		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	231	1.94
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY		
TOTAL	231	1.94

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ANNEX B

Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results

Shown in this annex by division and separate regiment are the numbers of enemy initiated incidents by type, whether day or night, and the resulting numbers of friendly or enemy KIAs; friendly WIA, MIA or captured; and weapons captured or lost.

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I CORPS										
	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA	MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT
1ST DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	1	0	0	0	2	6	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2D DIV										
ASSAULT	1	0	0	0	4	0	8	0	2	0
AMBUSH	3	1	5	13	2	1	8	0	0	5
ATTACK BY FIRE	5	11	0	0	1	1	12	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	6	0	1	0	2	0	11	0	0	1
51ST REGT										
ASSAULT	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
AMBUSH	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	3	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	1	0	4	2	0	0	2	0	0	0

II CORPS										
	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA	MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT
22D DIV										
ASSAULT	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
AMBUSH	5	1	7	0	12	0	15	0	2	2
ATTACK BY FIRE	21	20	0	19	1	12	65	0	9	5
TERR/SABOTAGE	2	3	16	0	4	2	18	0	0	9
HARASSMENT MIL	3	0	0	0	3	0	6	0	0	0
23 DIV										
ASSAULT	0	4	0	4	0	7	12	0	0	2
AMBUSH	4	3	29	2	16	3	32	0	11	14
ATTACK BY FIRE	7	15	2	0	0	0	15	0	3	1
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	3	2	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
42D REGT										
ASSAULT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	4	0	0	0	0	0	10	3	4	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	6	10	0	0	1	1	16	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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III CORPS										
	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA	MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT
5TH DIV										
ASSAULT	1	0	0	0	3	0	10	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	4	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	2
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	1	2	0	0	2	0	8	0	0	0
25TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	8	0	12	0	2	13	0	0	5
AMBUSH	1	3	0	0	3	4	7	0	4	1
ATTACK BY FIRE	2	9	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	4	2	0	0	1	1	10	0	0	0

IV CORPS										
	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA	MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT
7TH DIV										
ASSAULT	1	2	19	6	1	0	18	0	0	6
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	29	0	0	0	2	15	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
9TH DIV										
ASSAULT	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
AMBUSH	4	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	14	7	7	1	4	1	28	0	0	1
TERR/SABOTAGE	1	1	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	1	8	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
21ST DIV										
ASSAULT	1	3	2	0	0	2	6	0	0	0
AMBUSH	1	1	1	3	2	0	5	0	0	2
ATTACK BY FIRE	14	1	15	0	10	3	26	0	0	8
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

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	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA	MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT
AIRBORNE										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAVALRY										
ASSAULT	2	2	4	6	0	3	3	0	0	5
AMBUSH	9	0	70	0	5	0	29	0	0	33
ATTACK BY FIRE	28	10	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	4	2	0	4	0	0	2	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	15	4	1	0	0	0	19	0	0	3
RANGERS										
ASSAULT	4	2	0	0	0	7	8	0	0	2
AMBUSH	7	5	10	0	7	3	42	0	0	4
ATTACK BY FIRE	9	9	2	1	6	3	16	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1

	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA	MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT
MARINES										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SABOTAGE										
HARASSMENT MIL										
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SABOTAGE										
HARASSMENT MIL										

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ANNEX C

Effort, Results and Caches Discovered

1. Distribution of effort as shown in this annex is the percent of time spent on the different types of operations by divisions and separate battalions. Distribution of effort is based on the actual number of battalion days spent on each type of operation, against the number of battalion days available. The following definitions apply to the operations as used in this annex:

a. Combat Operations. Operations conducted to find, fix and destroy enemy forces, and to find and destroy his equipment, base areas and lines of communications.

b. Security Operations. Operations conducted to deny enemy access or damage to friendly political, economic, and military resources and installations, other than those specifically designated with the pacification program.

c. Pacification Active. Operations conducted by a unit under OPCON of a sector commander for support of pacification, to seek out and destroy or neutralize enemy forces which threaten the population or resources of the assigned pacification area. (Includes reconnaissance in force, direct attack against located enemy forces, cordon and search operations, long range patrols and ambushes.)

d. Pacification Static. Operations conducted by a unit under OPCON of a sector commander for support of pacification, to deny enemy access to protected areas where pacification is in progress, and to prevent enemy action against the population or resources within the pacification areas. (Includes outposts, patrols, and strong points within or in the immediate vicinity of protected areas.) This category also includes reserve, training and rehabilitation while the unit is formally assigned in support of pacification.

e. Reserve. (Other than support of pacification.) Maneuver units, including alerted but not committed reaction forces, are in reserve when so designated by the appropriate commander and not otherwise employed.

f. Training. Those missions in which forces are involved in training.

g. Rehabilitation. Time spent restoring a unit's physical and mental strength with rest and resupply.

2. Pages C-1 to C-18 contain tabulations for distribution of effort (combat, security, pacification active, pacification static, reserve, training, and rehabilitation), friendly and enemy KIAs, enemy captured or surrendered, weapons captured versus lost, and caches, as reported by all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Page C-19 contains tabulations for distribution of effort for the 3d and 4th Qtr CY 69 by major ARVN/VNMC organizations.

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1 CORPS 01 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES							
	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FOOD	100 LBS	100 LBS AMMO		
INF REGT RATINGS														
01 REGT	87.77	10.33	.00	.00	262	21	12.5/1	3	0	125	1	30	20	467
02 REGT	65.43	21.52	.00	.00	84	21	4.0/1	1	0	31	0	12	11	117
03 REGT	71.20	7.61	.00	.00	68	4	17.0/1	0	0	49	0	0	3	1
54 REGT	71.74	27.45	.82	.00	55	3	18.3/1	2	0	43	0	5	7	11
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 01 REGT	86.96	13.04	.00	.00	22	2	11.0/1	0	0	12	0	0	2	4
002 BN 01 REGT	93.48	6.52	.00	.00	24	4	6.0/1	0	0	17	1	2	3	400
003 BN 01 REGT	90.22	9.78	.00	.00	101	11	9.2/1	0	0	47	0	0	2	5
004 BN 01 REGT	80.43	11.96	.00	.00	115	4	28.8/1	3	0	49	0	28	13	58
001 BN 02 REGT	48.91	31.52	.00	.00	2	6	0.3/1	0	0	1	0	2	1	3
002 BN 02 REGT	61.96	27.17	.00	.00	4	2	2.0/1	0	0	2	0	0	0	52
003 BN 02 REGT	79.35	.00	.00	.00	66	7	9.4/1	1	0	16	0	1	4	35
004 BN 02 REGT	78.26	17.39	.00	.00	9	6	1.5/1	0	0	8	0	8	2	6
005 BN 02 REGT	58.70	31.52	.00	.00	3	0		0	0	4	0	1	4	11
001 BN 03 REGT	60.87	.00	.00	.00	19	0		0	0	6	0	0	0	0
002 BN 03 REGT	84.78	9.78	.00	.00	7	1	7.0/1	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
003 BN 03 REGT	73.91	17.39	.00	.00	15	2	7.5/1	0	0	12	0	0	1	0
004 BN 03 REGT	65.22	3.26	.00	.00	27	1	27.0/1	0	0	25	0	0	2	1
001 BN 54 REGT	79.35	20.65	.00	.00	26	0		0	0	17	0	0	0	0
002 BN 54 REGT	73.91	26.09	.00	.00	1	0		1	0	1	0	2	2	1
003 BN 54 REGT	65.22	31.52	3.26	.00	14	3	4.7/1	0	0	12	0	2	1	6
004 BN 54 REGT	68.48	31.52	.00	.00	14	0		1	0	13	0	1	4	4
AVERAGE	73.52	17.00	.19	.00	27.5	2.8	9.57/1	.3	.0	14.5	.0	2.7	2.6	34.4

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1 CORPS 02 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES					
	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	100 LES FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS												
04 REGT	53.26	31.79	.00	3.53	422	29	14.6/1	78	8	146	3	24
05 REGT	61.41	18.48	.00	1.09	277	42	6.6/1	46	43	65	0	22
06 REGT	56.52	5.71	2.45	.00	279	48	5.8/1	47	12	61	2	9
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 04 REGT	65.22	20.65	.00	14.13	59	7	8.4/1	11	1	13	0	0
002 BN 04 REGT	13.04	41.30	.00	.00	33	11	3.0/1	11	0	10	3	0
003 BN 04 REGT	73.91	26.09	.00	.00	160	8	20.0/1	33	7	59	0	0
004 BN 04 REGT	60.87	39.13	.00	.00	170	3	56.7/1	23	0	64	0	7
001 BN 05 REGT	50.00	44.57	.00	.00	68	13	5.2/1	1	4	14	0	0
002 BN 05 REGT	85.87	.00	.00	.00	90	10	9.0/1	17	12	22	0	0
003 BN 05 REGT	31.52	29.35	.00	4.35	83	8	10.4/1	21	25	14	0	8
004 BN 05 REGT	78.26	.00	.00	.00	36	11	3.3/1	7	2	15	0	1
001 BN 06 REGT	60.87	18.48	3.26	.00	51	2	25.5/1	18	1	12	2	8
002 BN 06 REGT	44.57	.00	.00	.00	57	16	3.6/1	10	0	15	0	0
003 BN 06 REGT	55.43	.00	6.52	.00	114	11	10.4/1	6	1	16	0	0
004 BN 06 REGT	65.22	4.35	.00	.00	57	19	3.0/1	13	10	18	0	0
AVERAGE	57.06	18.65	.81	1.53	81.5	9.9	8.22/1	14.2	5.2	22.6	.4	4.5
												8.3
												1.3

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1 CORPS 51 INFANTRY REGIMENT

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES				
	PCT TIME GBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATL	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LDST	WEAPONS	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS												
51 REGT	23.37	69.57	.00	.00	87	21	4.1/1	36	6	33	0	11
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 51 REGT	15.22	84.78	.00	.00	8	5	1.6/1	2	2	2	0	3
002 BN 51 REGT	19.57	80.43	.00	.00	18	10	1.8/1	5	0	7	0	0
003 BN 51 REGT	29.35	70.65	.00	.00	19	1	19.0/1	4	4	14	0	3
004 BN 51 REGT	29.35	42.39	.00	.00	42	5	8.4/1	25	0	10	0	0
AVERAGE	23.36	69.56	.00	.00	21.7	5.2	4.14/1	9.0	1.5	8.2	.0	2.7

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2 CORPS 22 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CAUSES					
	PCT TIME CST OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FOOD	LBS LBS	LBS AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS													
40 REGT	1.34	.00	48.64	47.28	179	28	6-6/1	72	25	26	1	6	13
41 REGT	2.17	.00	2.99	94.84	57	21	2-7/1	18	9	24	5	4	11
47 REGT	26.63	11.96	40.22	13.86	456	57	8-0/1	6	0	36	36	29	4
INF BN RATINGS													
001 BN 40 REGT	.00	.00	33.70	66.30	20	6	3-3/1	22	6	6	0	4	0
002 BN 40 REGT	.00	.00	66.30	33.70	57	10	5-7/1	24	1	8	1	2	1
003 BN 40 REGT	.00	.00	33.70	55.43	57	9	6-3/1	14	14	7	0	0	2
004 BN 40 REGT	5.43	.00	50.87	33.70	45	3	15-0/1	12	4	5	0	12	0
001 BN 41 REGT	8.70	.00	.00	91.30	23	10	2-3/1	7	5	7	2	0	0
002 BN 41 REGT	.00	.00	11.96	88.04	5	4	1-3/1	1	1	2	2	0	0
003 BN 41 REGT	.00	.00	.00	100.00	6	3	2-0/1	3	0	1	1	4	0
004 BN 41 REGT	.00	.00	.00	100.00	23	4	5-8/1	7	3	14	0	1	1
001 BN 47 REGT	38.04	18.48	27.17	7.61	258	14	18-4/1	2	0	13	17	13	2
002 BN 47 REGT	45.65	8.70	45.65	.00	160	26	6-2/1	2	0	13	10	13	2
003 BN 47 REGT	8.70	13.04	44.57	33.70	22	13	1-7/1	1	0	7	9	0	0
004 BN 47 REGT	14.13	7.61	43.48	14.13	16	4	4-0/1	1	0	3	0	3	0
AVERAGE	10.05	3.98	30.61	51.99	57.6	8.8	6.53/1	8.0	2.8	7.1	3.5	3.2	2.3

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2 CORPS 42 INFANTRY REGIMENT

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES				
	PCT TIME CMT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	EMERY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	EMERY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	AMMO
42 REGT	37.77	33.42	4.08	5.16	11	7	1.6/1	0	3	5	0	21
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 42 REGT	22.83	14.13	.00	2.17	0	1	4.0/1	0	0	0	0	0
002 BN 42 REGT	51.09	32.61	16.30	.00	4	1	1.0/1	0	0	0	0	0
003 BN 42 REGT	39.13	33.70	.00	18.48	3	3	1.0/1	0	2	0	0	0
004 BN 42 REGT	38.04	53.26	.00	.00	4	2	2.0/1	0	1	5	0	21
AVERAGE	37.77	33.42	4.07	5.16	2.7	1.7	1.57/1	.0	.7	1.2	.0	5.0

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3 CORPS 05 INFANTRY DIVISION				EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES			
UNITS	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	LBS	LBS	AMMO		
	CBT OPS	SECURITY	PAC ACTIVE											PAC STATIC	WEAPONS
INF REGT RATINGS															
07 REGT	81.25	1-36	11.68	55	6	9.2/1	23	35	45	3	0	7	8		
08 REGT	75.89	9.24	.00	99	14	7.1/1	19	35	53	3	70	3	13		
09 REGT	66.03	13.59	.00	79	8	9.9/1	2	3	37	0	0	3	12		
INF BN RATINGS															
001 BN 07 REGT	97.83	2.17	.00	22	4	5.5/1	8	3	14	2	0	1	0		
002 BN 07 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	17	1	17.0/1	15	0	20	0	0	5	8		
003 BN 07 REGT	53.26	.00	46.74	0	0		0	30	0	0	0	0	0		
004 BN 07 REGT	73.91	3.26	.00	16	1	16.0/1	0	2	11	1	0	0	0		
001 BN 08 REGT	92.39	.00	.00	11	1	11.0/1	0	3	4	0	6	2	1		
002 BN 08 REGT	92.39	.00	.00	20	4	5.0/1	6	1	11	2	0	0	0		
003 BN 08 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	67	5	13.4/1	13	31	28	1	64	1	12		
004 BN 08 REGT	36.78	.00	.00	1	0	0.3/1	0	0	10	2	0	0	0		
001 BN 09 REGT	69.57	19.57	.00	61	3	20.3/1	2	0	22	0	0	0	12		
002 BN 09 REGT	52.17	20.65	.00	0	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
003 BN 09 REGT	52.17	11.96	.00	3	1	3.0/1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0		
004 BN 09 REGT	90.22	2.17	.00	15	3	5.0/1	0	0	14	0	0	0	0		
AVERAGE	75.72	8.06	3.89	19.4	2.3	8.33/1	3.6	6.0	11.2	.5	5.8	.8	2.7		

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3 CORPS 18 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES				
	PCI TIME CMT OPS	PCI TIME SECURITY	PCI TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FLOOD	LBS FOOD	LSS AMMO
43 REGT	33.15	60.60	.00	.00	59	14	4.2/1	0	1	20	4	8
48 REGT	60.05	39.95	.00	.00	68	11	6.2/1	0	0	18	0	3
52 REGT	45.38	35.33	.00	.00	101	14	7.2/1	1	3	21	0	7
INF REGT RATINGS												
001 BN 43 REGT	32.61	56.52	.00	.00	2	0		0	0	0	0	0
002 BN 43 REGT	29.35	68.48	.00	.00	29	0		0	0	10	0	1
003 BN 43 REGT	29.35	64.13	.00	.00	6	4	1.5/1	0	0	4	0	7
004 BN 43 REGT	41.30	53.26	.00	.00	22	10	2.2/1	0	1	6	0	0
001 BN 48 REGT	65.22	34.78	.00	.00	7	0		0	0	4	0	0
002 BN 48 REGT	73.91	26.09	.00	.00	27	5	5.4/1	0	0	3	0	0
003 BN 48 REGT	51.09	48.51	.00	.00	9	4	2.3/1	0	0	3	0	3
004 BN 48 REGT	50.00	50.00	.00	.00	25	2	12.5/1	0	0	8	0	700
001 BN 52 REGT	41.30	58.70	.00	.00	25	0		0	1	13	0	0
002 BN 52 REGT	33.70	45.65	.00	.00	52	10	5.2/1	0	0	7	0	3
003 BN 52 REGT	59.78	28.26	.00	.00	6	3	2.0/1	1	2	2	0	0
004 BN 52 REGT	46.74	8.70	.00	.00	18	1	18.0/1	0	0	2	0	1
AVERAGE	46.19	45.28	.00	.00	19.0	3.2	5.84/1	.0	.3	4.9	.3	55.2

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3 CORPS 25 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES				
	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FOOD	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
46 REGT	31.52	8.70	33.15	19.57	139	15	9.3/1	23	55	53	2	23
49 REGT	62.50	7.07	30.43	.00	194	16	12.1/1	82	45	106	2	28
50 REGT	12.77	.00	56.25	21.74	158	17	9.3/1	31	47	55	0	25
INF REGT RATINGS												
001 BN 46 REGT	26.09	5.43	26.09	22.83	15	0	7.3/1	10	51	4	0	0
002 BN 46 REGT	22.83	.00	51.09	26.09	51	4	12.0/1	12	4	11	0	8
003 BN 46 REGT	28.26	2.17	46.74	22.83	48	3	5.0/1	0	0	5	0	14
004 BN 46 REGT	45.90	24.59	13.11	9.84	15	1	10.0/1	0	0	2	0	0
001 BN 49 REGT	54.84	32.26	.00	.00	10	8	10.0/1	42	16	47	2	13
002 BN 49 REGT	83.70	16.30	.00	.00	80	1	44.0/1	19	24	27	0	4
003 BN 49 REGT	60.87	1.09	38.04	.00	44	5	12.6/1	17	2	24	0	7
004 BN 49 REGT	56.70	4.35	36.96	.00	63	2	3.5/1	4	3	8	0	4
001 BN 50 REGT	46.74	6.52	46.74	.00	7	12	8.8/1	10	12	30	0	0
002 BN 50 REGT	.00	.00	72.83	27.17	81	2	15.5/1	11	1	5	0	0
003 BN 50 REGT	.00	.00	71.74	28.26	31	3	5.0/1	5	1	9	0	0
004 BN 50 REGT	30.43	.00	30.43	2.17	15	0						
AVERAGE	35.59	5.25	39.94	13.76	37.7	3.6	10.23/1	10.4	11.3	16.4	.3	5.8

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4 CORPS 07 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES				
	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FOUND	LBS LHS	LBS AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS												
10 REGT	47.28	36.41	.00	6.25	103	19	5.4/1	42	33	79	3	5
11 REGT	35.60	25.00	1.63	.00	80	102	0.8/1	26	31	3	1	6
12 REGT	48.91	29.62	.00	.00	164	58	2.8/1	28	73	39	5	14
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 10 REGT	23.91	38.04	.00	25.00	29	6	4.8/1	0	5	61	0	5
002 BN 10 REGT	44.57	55.43	.00	.00	28	5	5.6/1	22	4	0	0	0
003 BN 10 REGT	68.48	31.52	.00	.00	21	5	4.2/1	7	9	0	0	0
004 BN 10 REGT	52.17	20.65	.00	.00	25	3	8.3/1	13	15	18	0	0
001 BN 11 REGT	52.17	.00	.00	.00	12	4	3.0/1	0	8	0	0	1
002 BN 11 REGT	22.83	40.22	6.52	.00	55	79	0.7/1	11	14	73	1	3
003 BN 11 REGT	29.55	40.22	.00	.00	7	6	1.2/1	5	6	0	0	0
004 BN 11 REGT	38.04	19.57	.00	.00	6	13	0.5/1	10	3	1	2	2
001 BN 12 REGT	52.17	22.83	.00	.00	32	13	2.5/1	18	16	0	13	0
002 BN 12 REGT	56.52	34.78	.00	.00	60	29	2.1/1	6	27	15	2	0
003 BN 12 REGT	36.96	16.30	.00	.00	16	8	2.0/1	3	10	0	0	0
004 BN 12 REGT	50.00	44.57	.00	.00	56	8	7.0/1	1	23	0	6	3
AVERAGE	43.93	30.34	.54	2.08	28.9	14.9	1.93/1	8.0	11.4	10.0	.5	2.0

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4 CORPS 09 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES								
	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO				
INF REGT RATINGS																
14 REGT	57.88	.54	6.52	.27	.27	232	78	3.0/1	40	15	73	8	11	1	14	
15 REGT	71.20	3.26	.00	7.34	7.34	198	30	6.6/1	2	1	45	6	6	0	60	
16 REGT	47.01	.00	.00	25.00	25.00	153	44	3.5/1	24	13	36	0	3	128	17	
INF BN RATINGS																
001 BN 14 REGT	61.96	.00	18.48	.00	.00	35	31	1.1/1	7	13	17	0	0	0	0	6
002 BN 14 REGT	63.04	2.17	4.35	1.09	1.09	88	25	3.5/1	4	0	19	0	0	0	0	0
003 BN 14 REGT	32.61	.00	3.26	.00	.00	51	8	6.4/1	4	1	13	7	0	1	2	2
004 BN 14 REGT	73.91	.00	.00	.00	.00	58	14	4.1/1	25	1	24	1	11	0	0	6
001 BN 15 REGT	81.52	.00	.00	.00	.00	121	9	13.4/1	2	1	37	0	0	60	4	4
002 BN 15 REGT	81.52	.00	.00	.00	.00	42	4	10.5/1	0	0	6	0	0	0	5	5
003 BN 15 REGT	80.43	.00	.00	.00	.00	28	5	5.6/1	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1
004 BN 15 REGT	41.30	13.04	.00	29.35	29.35	7	12	0.6/1	8	10	1	0	0	0	0	0
001 BN 16 REGT	.00	.00	.00	100.00	100.00	8	6	1.3/1	4	0	9	0	2	0	0	6
002 BN 16 REGT	63.04	.00	.00	.00	.00	44	13	3.4/1	9	1	14	0	1	128	2	6
003 BN 16 REGT	70.65	.00	.00	.00	.00	62	6	10.3/1	3	2	12	0	0	0	0	5
004 BN 16 REGT	54.35	.00	.00	.00	.00	39	19	2.1/1	3	2	12	0	0	0	0	5
AVERAGE	58.69	1.26	2.17	10.86	10.86	48.5	12.6	3.83/1	5.5	2.4	12.8	1.1	1.1	15.7	3.5	3.5

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4 CORPS 21 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPID SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LDST	WEAPONS	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS												
31 REGT	57.61	2.72	9.24	25.54	67	36	1.9/1	29	2	64	0	21
32 REGT	58.70	.00	9.78	5.71	336	54	6.2/1	23	8	77	0	27
33 REGT	50.54	12.23	9.24	6.52	106	38	2.8/1	19	0	54	3	1
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 31 REGT	.00	.00	36.96	61.96	4	3	1.3/1	0	0	2	0	0
002 BN 31 REGT	92.39	2.17	.00	.00	21	21	1.0/1	26	2	21	0	0
003 BN 31 REGT	85.87	5.43	.00	.00	37	5	7.4/1	3	0	41	0	16
004 BN 31 REGT	52.17	3.26	.00	40.22	5	7	0.7/1	0	0	0	0	5
001 BN 32 REGT	91.30	.00	.00	.00	65	5	13.0/1	4	4	26	0	18
002 BN 32 REGT	83.70	.00	.00	.00	213	25	8.5/1	15	4	40	0	21
003 BN 32 REGT	18.48	.00	39.73	22.83	26	7	3.7/1	4	0	5	0	0
004 BN 32 REGT	41.30	.00	.00	.00	32	17	1.9/1	0	0	6	0	6
001 BN 33 REGT	48.91	18.48	.00	26.09	4	9	0.4/1	0	0	3	0	100
002 BN 33 REGT	16.30	30.43	.00	.00	13	4	3.3/1	0	0	4	0	0
003 BN 33 REGT	45.65	.00	36.96	.00	31	22	1.4/1	3	0	14	0	0
004 BN 33 REGT	91.30	.00	.00	.00	58	3	19.3/1	16	0	30	0	2
AVERAGE	55.61	4.98	9.42	12.59	42.4	10.6	3.97/1	5.9	.8	16.2	.2	4.0
											10.4	23.8

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INFANTRY DIVISIONS			RESULTS										CACHE		
UNITS	PCT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	EFFORT			EMEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	EMEMY CPTD SUAR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	LBS FOOD	LBS AMMO		
			PCT TIME PAK ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAK STATIC	PCT TIME									KIA RATIO	CPTD SUAR
INF DIV RATINGS															
01 INF DIV	71.56	15.35	.56	.00	1113	55	20.2/1	12	0	274	50	42	636		
02 INF DIV	56.31	17.68	1.20	1.89	1613	126	12.8/1	288	63	289	56	106	16		
05 INF DIV	76.34	7.86	3.60	.00	248	35	7.1/1	47	73	146	76	10	37		
07 INF DIV	41.97	31.19	.50	1.92	390	182	2.1/1	96	2	137	121	7	25		
09 INF DIV	57.02	2.93	3.09	10.03	757	152	5.0/1	67	29	155	14	189	42		
18 INF DIV	45.74	44.48	.08	.00	230	40	5.8/1	1	4	61	9	712	39		
21 INF DIV	59.03	4.60	8.70	11.62	797	131	6.1/1	85	13	205	58	130	289		
22 INF DIV	10.05	3.99	30.62	51.99	692	106	6.5/1	96	34	86	39	28	30		
23 INF DIV	43.48	24.16	10.12	9.36	771	117	6.6/1	28	1	132	109	9	14		
25 INF DIV	38.04	7.36	36.87	12.71	517	55	9.4/1	139	147	227	43	41	76		
AVERAGE	51.24	16.01	8.97	9.19	712.8	99.9	7.13/1	85.9	36.6	171.2	57.6	127.4	120.4		

FOR INFANTRY DIVS
NOTE: INFANTRY DIV FIGURES INCLUDE HQ RECON UNITS AND CAVALRY UNITS AS WELL AS MANEUVER BNS

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UNITS	AIRBORNE DIVISION			EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES		
	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO	
001 ABN BN	73.91	15.22	.00	.00	0	4	2.7/1	0	0	30	0	98	
002 ABN BN	88.04	.00	.00	.00	49	18	3.4/1	0	0	10	15	12	
003 ABN BN	92.39	.00	.00	.00	41	12	3.4/1	5	0	23	910	202	
005 ABN BN	15.22	28.26	.00	.00	0	3	3.2/1	0	0	0	0	0	
006 ABN BN	90.22	.00	.00	.00	81	25	2.3/1	1	0	24	0	1	
007 ABN BN	54.35	22.83	.00	.00	36	16	2.3/1	0	0	0	1	3	
008 ABN BN	89.13	.00	.00	.00	0	2	1.8/1	0	0	6	0	0	
009 ACM BN	57.61	33.70	.00	.00	9	5	3.3/1	5	0	0	30	2	
011 ABN BN	92.39	.00	.00	.00	46	14	3.3/1	5	0	7	4	3	
AVERAGE	72.58	11.11	.00	.00	29.1	11.0	2.64/1	1.2	.0	12.6	11.3	106.6	
												35.6	

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ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

EFFORT

RESULTS

CACHES

UNITS	PCT TIME CBT DPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENERGY	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	CACHES			
											LBS	FOOD	AMMO	
001 CAV SQDN	83.70	5.43	.00	.00	15	7	2.1/1	3	0	11	6	3	4	
002 CAV SQDN	36.96	22.83	14.13	.00	1	0		1	0	1	0	3	0	
003 CAV SQDN	.00	100.00	.00	.00	62	7	8.9/1	1	0	25	0	3	0	
004 CAV SQDN	31.52	.00	13.04	5.43	123	3	41.0/1	117	0	17	0	3	0	
005 CAV SQDN	40.22	34.78	1.09	.00	2	0		0	0	2	0	1	27	
006 CAV SQDN	18.48	41.30	.00	.00	0	0		0	0	0	0	3	0	
007 CAV SQDN	94.57	5.43	.00	.00	64	5	12.8/1	6	0	25	3	1	50	
008 CAV SQDN	5.43	94.57	.00	.00	129	9	14.3/1	2	1	1	0	3	3	
009 CAV SQDN	100.00	.00	.00	.00	22	1	22.0/1	14	7	10	0	3	3	
010 CAV SQDN	67.39	32.61	.00	.00	13	1	13.0/1	3	7	13	6	3	0	
011 CAV SQDN	35.87	27.17	.00	.00	1	0		0	0	0	0	3	0	
012 CAV SQDN	44.57	27.17	.00	.00	15	0		0	0	0	0	3	0	
014 CAV SQDN	.00	100.00	.00	.00	18	3	6.0/1	0	0	15	0	3	0	
015 CAV SQDN	50.00	22.83	5.43	.00	0	0		0	0	0	0	3	0	
016 CAV SQDN	6.70	25.00	21.74	17.39	21	1	21.0/1	0	0	4	0	1	1	
017 CAV SQDN	51.09	40.22	1.09	7.61	36	3	12.0/1	40	0	12	0	3	0	
018 CAV SQDN	34.96	20.65	.00	.00	54	3	18.0/1	1	64	10	0	3	0	
AVERAGE	41.49	33.82	3.32	1.79	33.8	2.5	13.44/1	11.0	4.0	9.8	.0	3.3	1.3	5.0

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RANGER BATTALIONS

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME C&I OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FOOD	LBS FOOD	LBS AMMO
011 RANGER BN	54.35	.00	.00	34.78	10	3	3.3/1	3	0	0	1	1
021 RANGER BN	34.96	48.91	.00	.00	48	7	6.9/1	31	2	11	0	0
022 RANGER BN	32.61	4.35	.00	18.48	130	20	6.5/1	1	0	3	0	0
023 RANGER BN	11.96	14.30	.00	.00	0	2		0	0	0	0	0
030 RANGER BN	44.57	48.91	.00	.00	9	1	9.0/1	3	0	7	2	3
031 RANGER BN	8.70	41.30	.00	.00	0	0		6	0	2	8	0
032 RANGER BN	70.65	6.52	.00	.00	24	10	2.4/1	6	0	3	0	15
033 RANGER BN	65.22	27.17	.00	.00	3	7	0.4/1	5	0	3	6	10
034 RANGER BN	.00	100.00	.00	.00	3	1	3.0/1	0	0	3	0	2
035 RANGER BN	13.04	84.78	.00	.00	0	3		0	0	1	0	0
036 RANGER BN	59.78	40.22	.00	.00	3	5	0.6/1	0	0	2	1	3
037 RANGER BN	41.30	36.96	.00	.00	28	2	14.0/1	45	0	5	0	0
038 RANGER BN	57.61	31.52	.00	.00	17	10	1.7/1	5	0	15	0	5
039 RANGER BN	21.74	33.70	.00	.00	5	1	5.0/1	0	0	0	0	0
041 RANGER BN	63.04	29.35	.00	.00	31	9	3.4/1	7	0	5	0	0
042 RANGER BN	60.87	2.17	.00	.00	40	12	3.3/1	6	0	10	0	1
043 RANGER BN	52.17	47.83	.00	.00	38	26	1.5/1	7	2	9	0	4
044 RANGER BN	60.87	.00	.00	.00	13	10	1.3/1	4	0	5	0	101
051 RANGER BN	10.87	89.13	.00	.00	0	2		0	1	0	1	0
052 RANGER BN	15.22	84.78	.00	.00	3	7	0.4/1	0	0	0	0	0
AVERAGE	39.07	38.69	.00	2.66	20.2	6.9	2.93/1	6.4	.2	4.3	4.2	7.2

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UNITS	VIETNAMESE MARINE DIVISION			EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME CMT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LDST	WEAPONS	FOOD	AMMO
001 MARINE BN	55.43	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	28	8	3.5/1	0	33	9	0	0
002 MARINE BN	79.35	2.17	.00	.00	.00	.00	8	7	1.1/1	11	0	4	0	0
003 MARINE BN	34.78	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	4	2	2.0/1	12	0	0	0	0
004 MARINE BN	80.43	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	124	19	6.5/1	16	12	34	0	20
005 MARINE BN	89.13	3.26	.00	.00	.00	.00	93	11	8.5/1	44	26	8	0	6
006 MARINE BN	72.83	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	191	11	17.4/1	17	0	23	0	2
AVERAGE	68.65	.90	.00	.00	.00	.00	74.6	9.6	7.72/1	15.0	11.3	13.0	.0	4.3 24.5 5.5

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DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT FOR 3RD & 4TH QTR CY 69

ORGANIZATION	PCT TIME ON COMBAT OPS		PCT TIME ON SECURITY		PCT TIME ON PAC ACTIVE		PCT TIME ON PAC STATIC		PCT TIME ON RESERVE		PCT TIME ON TRAINING		PCT TIME ON REHABILITATION	
	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	3RD QTR	4TH QTR
01 DIV	83.69	73.53	10.43	17.01	.00	.19	.00	.00	.51	4.99	4.41	3.58	.95	.71
02 DIV	68.84	57.07	11.41	18.66	1.90	.82	.00	1.54	5.62	12.23	9.96	7.70	1.27	1.09
51 REG	48.37	23.37	41.85	69.57	.00	.00	.00	.00	2.99	.00	6.52	7.07	.27	.00
I CTZ	74.37	61.46	14.60	23.98	.69	.40	.00	.56	2.67	7.02	6.69	5.50	.99	1.59
22 CIV	6.70	10.05	1.09	3.99	62.86	30.62	27.90	51.99	1.45	1.72	.00	1.63	.00	.00
23 DIV	10.76	46.85	16.03	18.30	11.68	10.96	39.40	10.14	6.88	5.07	9.06	8.06	.18	.82
42 REG	10.05	37.77	45.11	33.42	3.53	4.08	28.46	5.16	4.35	2.17	9.51	17.39	2.99	.00
II CTZ	11.49	29.70	13.78	14.32	32.45	18.40	32.34	27.37	4.19	3.22	5.24	6.64	.50	.35
05 DIV	55.64	75.72	9.27	8.06	24.45	3.89	3.73	.00	1.78	3.35	5.09	8.33	.09	.63
18 DIV	56.07	46.20	22.92	45.29	7.97	.00	.00	.00	4.89	3.62	7.16	3.80	1.00	1.09
25 DIV	23.84	35.60	5.44	5.25	53.85	39.95	15.14	13.77	1.48	.27	.18	4.71	.09	.45
III CTZ	45.18	52.51	12.55	19.54	28.76	14.61	6.29	4.59	2.69	2.42	4.14	5.62	.39	.72
07 DIV	51.09	43.93	24.00	30.34	5.98	.54	4.53	2.08	9.15	9.06	3.62	9.51	1.63	4.53
09 DIV	43.84	58.70	3.99	1.27	8.97	2.17	12.77	10.87	12.41	4.89	16.30	12.68	1.72	9.42
21 DIV	39.00	55.62	9.33	4.98	11.37	9.42	12.57	12.59	7.02	5.16	8.69	7.16	12.01	5.07
IV CTZ	44.68	52.75	12.46	12.20	8.75	4.05	9.94	8.51	9.54	6.37	9.54	9.78	5.08	6.34
INF TOTALS	45.19	49.99	13.29	17.55	17.17	9.82	11.21	9.45	4.85	4.80	6.46	6.93	1.83	2.25
CV 1 CTZ	65.28	53.26	24.93	11.96	3.26	3.53	.00	.00	6.53	23.91	.00	4.08	.00	.00
CV 2 CTZ	2.90	1.81	95.29	98.19	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.81	.00	.00	.00
CV 3 CTZ	53.80	55.65	27.72	23.26	.00	1.30	3.53	.00	3.80	9.57	5.43	5.43	5.71	4.78
CV 4 CTZ	41.96	41.74	27.04	23.26	.00	7.17	1.63	3.48	20.98	15.43	3.03	7.63	5.36	1.09
CV TOTALS	42.98	41.50	40.07	33.82	.78	3.32	1.62	1.79	8.94	12.98	2.70	4.86	3.12	1.73
RN 1 CTZ	49.28	33.33	34.06	39.86	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	3.99	4.71	18.12	11.96	4.71
RN 2 CTZ	23.55	32.97	23.55	6.88	.00	.00	17.03	17.75	23.19	26.81	10.87	14.49	1.81	1.09
RN 3 CTZ	40.58	30.56	58.45	60.87	.00	.00	.00	.00	.72	.36	.24	7.00	.00	1.21
RN 4 CTZ	39.35	61.52	25.00	17.17	.43	.00	.00	.00	20.22	21.30	15.00	.00	.00	.00
RN TOTALS	39.02	39.08	41.20	38.70	.11	.00	2.55	2.66	8.96	10.11	6.20	8.04	2.07	1.41
AB DIV	69.12	72.58	11.10	11.11	.00	.00	3.74	.00	10.01	3.50	5.13	5.07	.94	7.73
VNMC	56.52	68.66	14.49	.91	.00	.00	.00	.00	16.12	19.02	5.94	7.07	5.88	4.35
SPEC UNITS	47.70	49.08	32.28	27.97	.28	1.09	2.12	1.61	9.95	10.93	4.32	6.38	2.74	1.35
AKVN/VNMC	45.88	49.74	18.52	20.48	12.52	6.79	8.71	7.24	6.25	6.57	.00	1.77	2.74	1.45

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ANNEX D

Advisors' Assessment Tables

These tables depict the advisors' assessment of divisions, separate regiments, and special organizations as derived from responses to the Quarterly Effectiveness Report (SEER Questionnaire). Battalion ratings are derived from the combination of battalion and regimental advisors' assessments. The regimental ratings are derived from the combination of regimental and division advisors' assessments.

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1 CORPS 01 INFANTRY DIVISION				1 CORPS 02 INFANTRY DIVISION			
ORGANIZATION		OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS		PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	
INF REGT RATINGS				INF REGT RATINGS		INF REGT RATINGS	
01 REGT	94.21	93.33	94.29	92.31	94.29	91.28	77.14
02 REGT	87.78	85.33	93.33	100.00	93.33	90.26	71.43
03 REGT	96.84	87.22	90.00	84.29	88.57	94.50	76.92
54 REGT	91.58	87.78	88.57	85.38			
INF BN RATINGS							
001 BN 01 REGT	95.33	90.00	91.43	96.00	79.44	86.11	70.00
002 BN 01 REGT	90.77	85.00	82.86	85.60	62.07	58.82	73.85
003 BN 01 REGT	98.82	90.29	95.71	85.60	83.33	91.25	82.86
004 BN 01 REGT	96.25	88.14	85.71	86.09	82.35	85.71	85.71
001 BN 02 REGT	83.08	88.75	82.86	88.18	75.38	50.00	58.46
002 BN 02 REGT	67.50	79.41	91.43	87.50	85.00	85.00	91.74
003 BN 02 REGT	92.67	90.29	80.00	80.00	64.44	73.12	75.45
004 BN 02 REGT	83.64	85.56	75.71	83.33	73.94	83.53	76.00
005 BN 02 REGT	83.70	75.00	82.86	82.31	93.89	95.79	93.08
001 BN 03 REGT	83.03	86.11	90.00	80.83	94.44	95.00	88.57
002 BN 03 REGT	90.40	81.33	94.29	93.33	94.44	95.00	93.08
003 BN 03 REGT	77.33	86.67	88.57	80.00	85.00	92.63	85.71
004 BN 03 REGT	86.67	95.56	94.29	83.85	93.33	96.84	85.71
001 BN 54 REGT	100.00	91.67	87.14	83.85			
002 BN 54 REGT	78.79	80.62	84.29	85.60			
003 BN 54 REGT	85.56	87.78	82.86	84.62			
004 BN 54 REGT	97.14	88.89	94.29	90.77			
AVERAGE				87.68	86.76	82.83	77.67
AVERAGE				86.23	86.72		84.69

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2 CORPS 22 INFANTRY DIVISION

I Corps - 51st Infantry Regiment

ORGANIZATION		OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	ORGANIZATION		OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS
INF REGT RATINGS					INF REGT RATINGS				
51 REGT		86.49	76.67	74.29	80.00	40 REGT	74.74	78.13	80.74
						41 REGT	48.21	48.97	73.60
						47 REGT	50.53	46.90	74.40
INF BN RATINGS									
001 BN 51 REGT		81.62	80.00	71.43	81.54	001 BN 40 REGT	87.37	81.71	88.57
002 BN 51 REGT		88.24	83.89	71.43	77.68	002 BN 40 REGT	87.37	86.06	84.62
003 BN 51 REGT		90.00	80.00	80.00	82.31	003 BN 40 REGT	85.88	85.56	80.00
004 BN 51 REGT		84.21	80.56	78.57	79.23	004 BN 40 REGT	93.10	88.97	90.00
						001 BN 41 REGT	78.34	80.00	73.33
						002 BN 41 REGT	43.20	60.00	71.43
						003 BN 41 REGT	55.00	61.25	71.43
						004 BN 41 REGT	90.53	81.11	77.14
						001 BN 47 REGT	40.00	38.67	60.00
						002 BN 47 REGT	78.82	83.33	62.86
						003 BN 47 REGT	70.53	76.67	68.57
						004 BN 47 REGT	76.84	73.85	85.71
AVERAGE		86.01	81.11	75.35	80.19	AVERAGE	73.24	74.76	82.76

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2 CORPS 23 INFANTRY DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	LOGISTICS
44 REGT	74.74	57.22	75.71	86.63
45 REGT	91.00	89.44	94.29	93.79
53 REGT	63.16	66.67	74.29	78.52
INF REGT RATINGS				
001 BN 44 REGT	70.53	67.06	71.43	84.62
002 BN 44 REGT	76.84	67.06	82.86	87.59
003 BN 44 REGT	70.53	64.71	77.14	84.00
004 BN 44 REGT	41.05	42.35	71.43	80.00
001 BN 45 REGT	97.00	92.22	100.00	103.08
002 BN 45 REGT	97.00	93.33	94.29	107.69
003 BN 45 REGT	93.68	92.22	94.29	106.43
004 BN 45 REGT	95.79	90.00	97.14	103.95
001 BN 53 REGT	61.11	78.89	80.00	81.43
002 BN 53 REGT	72.00	44.00	68.57	58.15
003 BN 53 REGT	72.00	58.75	80.00	92.86
004 BN 53 REGT	75.79	75.29	68.57	83.08
INF BN RATINGS				
AVERAGE	77.92	72.15	82.14	84.40

II Corps - 421 Infantry Regiment

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	LOGISTICS
42 REGT	78.62	80.00	82.86	93.08
INF REGT RATINGS				
001 BN 42 REGT	77.22	85.14	90.00	88.80
002 BN 42 REGT	71.35	78.89	72.86	85.00
003 BN 42 REGT	62.70	70.00	70.00	82.22
004 BN 42 REGT	73.14	71.43	72.86	85.93
AVERAGE	71.10	76.36	73.93	85.48

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3 CORPS 05 INFANTRY DIVISION				3 CORPS 18 INFANTRY DIVISION			
ORGANIZATION		OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	ORGANIZATION		OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP
INF REGT RATINGS				INF REGT RATINGS			
07 REGT	62.11	70.59	72.31	43 REGT	81.11	84.44	83.67
08 REGT	81.05	90.00	87.69	48 REGT	76.76	90.00	87.50
09 REGT	77.89	88.00	86.21	52 REGT	71.58	66.11	93.08
INF BN RATINGS				INF BN RATINGS			
001 BN 07 REGT	62.86	70.00	85.19	001 BN 43 REGT	75.29	85.16	95.93
002 BN 07 REGT	97.74	63.64	66.67	002 BN 43 REGT	78.24	74.71	84.80
003 BN 07 REGT	42.86	39.39	77.50	003 BN 43 REGT	60.00	53.48	71.43
004 BN 07 REGT	81.11	78.00	62.40	004 BN 43 REGT	70.81	72.57	88.46
001 BN 08 REGT	77.06	90.74	94.35	001 BN 48 REGT	93.51	90.00	90.77
002 BN 08 REGT	93.33	90.00	86.87	002 BN 48 REGT	84.71	87.50	80.00
003 BN 08 REGT	88.65	81.11	85.71	003 BN 49 REGT	73.57	72.00	85.80
004 BN 08 REGT	30.53	30.00	70.77	004 BN 48 REGT	58.86	68.00	83.85
001 BN 09 REGT	74.12	78.82	97.69	001 BN 52 REGT	95.56	80.00	89.23
002 BN 09 REGT	77.14	88.75	84.52	002 BN 52 REGT	79.39	70.00	80.77
003 BN 09 REGT	73.75	77.50	76.67	003 BN 52 REGT	85.00	76.11	84.82
004 BN 09 REGT	59.35	60.56	83.08	004 BN 52 REGT	55.15	45.29	89.20
AVERAGE	69.87	68.87	78.28	AVERAGE	75.00	73.13	84.35

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3 CORPS 25 INFANTRY DIVISION

4 CORPS 07 INFANTRY DIVISION

OPER EFFEC TIVENESS
ORGANIZATION
INF REGT RATINGS

PERSONNEL LOGISTICS

LEADER SHIP

PERSONNEL LOGISTICS

OPER EFFEC TIVENESS
ORGANIZATION
INF REGT RATINGS

LEADER SHIP

PERSONNEL LOGISTICS

46 REGT 85.26
49 REGT 87.37
50 REGT 78.13

88.57 76.15
88.57 76.92
85.71 68.80

77.93 80.00
61.18 74.29
71.33 66.67

87.23 81.38
81.38 81.38

INF BN RATINGS

INF BN RATINGS

001 BN 46 REGT 71.52
002 BN 46 REGT 86.32
003 BN 46 REGT 80.00
004 BN 46 REGT 93.33
001 BN 49 REGT 94.44
002 BN 49 REGT 87.37
003 BN 49 REGT 85.24
004 BN 49 REGT 94.12
001 BN 50 REGT 96.00
002 BN 50 REGT 98.67
003 BN 50 REGT 77.60
004 BN 50 REGT 80.56

78.46 76.67
82.86 84.62
88.57 85.83
94.29 72.31
91.43 84.62
88.89 75.83
88.57 83.08
95.71 90.40
80.00 73.33
88.57 90.00
80.00 79.09
88.57 80.00

89.33 83.87
64.35 71.33
83.70 73.33
86.43 74.29
76.36 82.35
67.27 49.88
63.75 64.71
71.52 75.88
55.86 57.78
90.00 82.58
85.33 76.92
82.14 82.40

85.40 91.43
87.69 69.09
90.77 88.57
88.33 82.86
88.80 73.85
84.17 77.14
87.69 68.57
86.92 84.29
19.20 66.15
86.67 87.14
84.76 81.82
88.80 92.31

AVERAGE

62.79

81.31

AVERAGE

72.61

76.33

80.26

80.26 80.26

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AIRBORNE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	1
001 ABN	BM	93.33	97.14	84.62
002 ABN	BM	93.33	100.00	90.77
003 ABN	BM	98.89	100.00	90.00
005 ABN	BM	81.82	90.00	83.33
006 ABN	BM	92.78	95.71	86.92
007 ABN	BM	93.89	89.71	83.85
008 ABN	BM	94.44	100.00	89.29
009 ABN	BM	93.33	94.29	89.23
011 ABN	BM	85.56	88.57	89.23
AVERAGE				87.47

INFANTRY DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	1
01 INF DIV	89.50	81.67	90.00	90.00
02 INF DIV	84.50	75.96	81.43	81.25
05 INF DIV	69.23	71.72	80.00	71.03
07 INF DIV	61.00	74.12	71.43	86.87
09 INF DIV	82.00	78.89	77.14	86.25
18 INF DIV	69.00	74.48	75.56	78.67
21 INF DIV	74.00	87.14	74.29	85.00
22 INF DIV	55.50	61.14	56.92	70.62
23 INF DIV	76.22	73.33	78.46	84.83
25 INF DIV	77.00	76.55	84.00	77.14
AVERAGE				81.16

NOTE BASED ON DIVISION AND CORPS SENIOR ADVISOR AS

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VIETNAMESE MARINE DIVISION

ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	1	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	LEADER SHIP	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	ORGANIZATION	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS
001 CAV SQDN	100.00	85.56	97.14	88.00	88.00	91.67	89.44	001 MARINE BN	92.31
002 CAV SQDN	87.37	88.89	91.43	86.25	86.25	94.44	87.06	002 MARINE BN	88.44
003 CAV SQDN	82.42	85.88	84.29	86.00	86.00	97.22	96.25	003 MARINE BN	94.07
004 CAV SQDN	83.33	80.00	91.43	80.00	80.00	93.33	93.14	004 MARINE BN	92.31
005 CAV SQDN	60.00	78.89	85.71	89.37	89.37	93.33	98.75	005 MARINE BN	94.40
006 CAV SQDN	60.00	87.50	77.14	83.08	83.08	91.67	92.26	006 MARINE BN	90.71
007 CAV SQDN	93.51	87.65	98.57	96.67	96.67				
008 CAV SQDN	81.54	81.18	85.71	94.67	94.67				
009 CAV SQDN	62.14	55.83	69.09	75.17	75.17				
010 CAV SQDN	64.57	70.56	80.00	77.33	77.33				
011 CAV SQDN	80.00	77.86	95.71	91.03	91.03				
012 CAV SQDN	69.33	60.00	77.14	91.25	91.25				
014 CAV SQDN	88.75	92.73	87.14	85.52	85.52				
015 CAV SQDN	62.67	59.71	74.29	94.29	94.29				
016 CAV SQDN	77.42	71.18	72.86	82.58	82.58				
017 CAV SQDN	70.00	85.45	83.08	87.33	87.33				
018 CAV SQDN	88.67	75.56	94.29	91.43	91.43				
AVERAGE	77.16	77.67	85.00	87.05	87.05		92.81	AVERAGE	92.05

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RANGER BATTALIONS				ARTILLERY BATTALIONS			
ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS	ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	LEADER SHIP	PERSONNEL LOGISTICS
011 RANGER BN	65.83	68.00	70.91	011 ARTY BN	100.00	90.00	94.29
021 RANGER BN	79.23	90.30	82.86	012 ARTY BN	100.00	95.00	94.29
022 RANGER BN	84.62	88.48	80.00	021 ARTY BN	85.00	92.86	91.43
023 RANGER BN	61.33	61.29	94.29	022 ARTY BN	82.50	82.22	85.71
030 RANGER BN	94.12	87.22	81.43	030 ARTY BN	85.00	81.43	95.71
031 RANGER BN	94.71	94.44	91.43	031 ARTY BN	81.82	59.05	75.38
032 RANGER BN	87.00	90.00	94.29	032 ARTY BN	90.00	86.67	91.43
033 RANGER BN	80.00	72.90	77.14	033 ARTY BN	100.00	90.00	72.31
034 RANGER BN	97.78	96.89	94.29	034 ARTY BN	73.85	65.93	77.06
035 RANGER BN	93.14	90.56	85.71	035 ARTY BN	60.00	85.45	83.33
036 RANGER BN	76.67	86.11	87.14	036 ARTY BN	81.82	73.85	78.57
037 RANGER BN	70.00	70.53	82.86	037 ARTY BN	87.27	74.00	69.23
038 RANGER BN	62.22	58.89	85.71	038 ARTY BN	100.00	93.85	94.29
039 RANGER BN	75.86	80.69	81.43	039 ARTY BN	80.00	73.33	76.00
041 RANGER BN	78.67	76.97	82.86	047 ARTY BN	70.91	56.55	79.25
042 RANGER BN	78.67	80.35	82.86	051 ARTY BN	96.92	76.15	88.57
043 RANGER BN	88.24	84.71	82.86	052 ARTY BN	97.65	81.43	90.00
044 RANGER BN	88.24	84.71	82.86	053 ARTY BN	97.65	81.43	97.14
051 RANGER BN	74.44	80.00	82.86	061 ARTY BN	80.00	78.57	91.43
052 RANGER BN	88.33	92.78	95.71	062 ARTY BN	100.00	90.00	94.29
				063 ARTY BN	96.36	91.87	92.86
				067 ARTY BN	92.73	78.13	85.71
				071 ARTY BN	96.00	77.50	91.43
				072 ARTY BN	88.89	70.00	92.86
				073 ARTY BN	84.62	70.34	83.33
AVERAGE	80.95	81.99	84.97	091 ARTY BN	100.00	95.38	100.00
				092 ARTY BN	92.00	71.67	82.86
				093 ARTY BN	78.18	70.00	74.29
				181 ARTY BN	81.25	72.31	85.71
				183 ARTY BN	78.75	76.92	88.57
				211 ARTY BN	88.89	85.33	97.14
				212 ARTY BN	80.00	74.00	83.33
				213 ARTY BN	94.29	79.41	72.86
				221 ARTY BN	76.00	56.52	70.91
				222 ARTY BN	84.00	54.78	70.91
				231 ARTY BN	96.67	65.71	80.00
				232 ARTY BN	86.67	74.00	85.71
				233 ARTY BN	86.67	54.29	80.00
				251 ARTY BN	93.33	87.69	94.29
				252 ARTY BN	90.00	87.69	90.77
				253 ARTY BN	83.33	84.62	89.23
				AVERAGE	87.51	76.67	85.65
							85.44

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ANNEX E

Combat Support Received

This annex presents the totals of various types of combat support received by maneuver battalions, as reported by battalion advisors. Also presented is the "per battalion share", or the total for the major organization divided by the number of maneuver battalions in that organization.

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ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED										4TH QTR CY 69	
	ARTY ROUNDS	MANAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	FXD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES	FXD WING LIFT SORTIES	HEL MED EVAC SORTIES	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES			
1ST DIV	45,300	1,240	103	0	142	1,473	0	135	1,034			
2D DIV	16,780	0	169	5	72	1,367	8	177	426			
51ST REGT	2,600	0	10	2	4	147	0	43	61			
I CORPS	64,680	1,240	282	7	218	2,987	8	355	1,521			
22D DIV	8,890	30	116	12	141	456	31	216	379			
23D DIV	17,860	0	153	9	122	363	0	64	106			
42D REGT	7,160	0	54	2	31	374	26	26	135			
II CORPS	33,910	30	323	23	294	1,193	57	306	620			
5TH DIV	27,580	0	149	4	57	1,583	14	124	100			
18TH DIV	14,480	0	204	13	74	1,913	0	67	161			
25TH DIV	20,700	0	1,403	3	19	5,012	0	178	105			
III CORPS	62,760	0	1,756	20	130	8,508	14	369	366			
7TH DIV	21,340	120	298	8	12	5,066	0	248	266			
9TH DIV	29,120	240	966	19	4	5,046	0	390	215			
21ST DIV	25,800	10	275	25	107	1,183	6	168	239			
IV CORPS	76,260	370	1,529	52	123	11,295	6	806	720			
INF TOTAL	237,610	1,640	3,890	102	765	23,983	85	1,836	3,227			
CV	19,620	70	141	5	49	45	4	170	94			
RV	42,140	10	619	33	159	4,821	40	277	436			
AB	38,020	30	602	11	471	2,346	10	138	944			
VNMC	17,350	160	173	27	58	1,428	38	130	79			
ARVN/VNMC TOTAL	354,740	1,910	5,425	178	1,502	32,623	177	2,551	4,780			

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ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED										PER EN 4TH QTR CY 69	
	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	FXD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES	FXD WING LIFT SORTIES	HEL MED EVAC SORTIES	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES			
1ST DIV	2664.7	72.9	6.1	0	8.4	86.6	0	7.9	60.8			
2D DIV	1398.3	0	14.1	.4	6.0	113.9	.7	14.8	35.5			
51ST REGT	650.0	0	2.5	.5	1.0	36.8	0	10.8	15.3			
I CORPS	1960.0	37.6	8.5	.2	5.6	90.5	.2	10.7	46.0			
22D DIV	740.8	2.5	9.7	1.0	11.8	38.0	2.6	18.0	31.6			
23D DIV	1488.3	0	12.8	.8	10.2	30.3	0	5.3	8.8			
42D REGT	1790.0	0	13.5	.5	7.8	93.5	6.5	6.5	33.8			
II CORPS	1211.1	1.1	11.5	.8	10.5	42.6	2.0	10.9	22.1			
5TH DIV	2298.3	0	12.4	.3	5.1	131.9	1.2	10.3	8.3			
18TH DIV	1206.7	0	17.0	1.1	6.2	159.4	0	5.6	13.4			
25TH DIV	1725.0	0	116.9	.3	1.6	417.7	0	14.8	8.8			
III CORPS	1743.5	0	48.7	.5	5.6	236.3	.3	10.2	10.1			
VII DIV	1778.3	10.0	24.8	.7	1.0	422.2	0	20.7	22.2			
9TH DIV	2426.7	20.0	80.5	1.6	.3	420.5	0	32.5	17.9			
21ST DIV	2150.0	.8	22.9	2.1	8.9	98.6	.5	14.0	19.9			
IV CORPS	2118.3	10.3	42.4	1.4	3.4	313.7	.1	22.3	20.0			
INF TOTAL	1786.5	12.3	29.2	.7	5.7	163.3	.6	13.8	24.2			
CV	1154.1	4.1	8.2	.2	2.8	2.6	.2	10.0	5.5			
BN	2107.0	.5	30.9	1.6	7.9	241.0	2.0	13.8	21.8			
AB	4224.4	3.3	66.8	1.2	52.3	260.6	1.1	15.3	104.8			
VNMC	2891.7	26.7	28.8	4.5	9.6	238.0	6.3	21.6	13.1			
ARVN/VNMC TOTAL	1917.5	10.3	29.3	.9	8.1	176.3	.9	13.7	25.8			

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