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30 Nov 1981, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1982

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (13 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694175

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

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13. Air Cushion Vehicle Unit ORLL

* The 3d Brigade ORLL for the last reporting period covered only two months (May and June) due to the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division. Therefore, this 3d Brigade ORLL will cover four months (July, August, September, and October).
CONV-1I

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96371

AVBB-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

15 November 1969

Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division ATTN: AVIC-MH, APO 96225
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVREG (DE), APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (C) Section I. Significant Operational/Unit Activity
   a. (C) Introduction:

      (1) During the reporting period, 1 July 1969-31 October 1969, the 3d
      Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operations in Long An Province and the
      border areas of the three adjacent provinces; Bau Nghia, Gia Dinh, and Dinh
      Thuong. The brigade headquarters remained located at Tan An. As in the previous
      reporting period, the 3d Brigade continued to participate in Operation Toan
      Thang (Phase III). The objective of Operation Toan Thang III (Complete Victory)
      is to seek out the enemy with aggressive combined operations to prevent his em-
      ployment of men and equipment.

      (2) The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was involved in combat during
      every day (123) of this reporting period.

   b. (C) Organization:

      (1) Due to the redeployment of the 1st and 2d Brigades of the 9th Infantry
      Division, the 3d Brigade was reorganized as a separate brigade on 20 July 1969.
      The following units were relieved from the 9th Infantry Division and assigned
      to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, under the provisions of USARV G0 2434,
      dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969:

      1st Company, 3d Bn, 9th Infantry Division
      2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mechanized)
      6th Battalion, 31st Infantry
      2d Battalion, 60th Infantry
5th Battalion, 60th Infantry
2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery
39th Chemical Detachment
19th Public Information Detachment
19th Military History Detachment
264th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
45th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

United States Army Air Cushion Vehicle Unit, Republic of Vietnam

(2) Additionally the following units were provisionally organized and assigned to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division under the provisions of USARV GO 2434 dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG 3 CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) Additionally, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division was provisionally reorganized under provisions of USARV GO 3:34 dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969. The unit was organized under TOE 77-102T 7AC 2/69. Strength authorization is as follows:

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<tr>
<td>40</td>
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(4) Due to the aircraft configuration (four LOH's and four UH-1H's) a sixteen man augmentation to the Brigade Aviation Section was approved, per USARV letter under TOE 77-102T.

(5) The 3d Battalion 7th Inf, 199 LIB which came under the operational control of the 3d Bde on 2 June 1969, maintained this status when the brigade was re-organized.

(6) On 20 July 1969, the 3d Bde placed the 6th Battalion 31st Infantry under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division.

(7) On 26 July 1969, the 9th Inf Div released operational control of the 3d Bde to the Commanding General, II FFORCEN, who in turn placed the 3d Bde under the operational control of the Commanding General, 25th Inf Division.

(8) On 31 August 1969, 3d Bn, 7th Inf 199 LIB was released from operational control of the 3d Bde and returned to operational control of the 199th BCT within its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).

(9) On 31 August 1969, the 6th Bn, 31st Inf was released from operational control of the 9th Infantry Division and moved from Dong Tam to Can Gioc, Long An Province, where it once again came under the operational control of the 3d Bde.

(10) HHC 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, provisionally reorganized during the period 20 July 69 to 1 Oct 69, was reorganized under the provisions of USARPAC GO 705 dated 24 September 1969, effective 1 October 1969. There were no changes in strength authorization.

(11) Effective 1 October 1969, USARPAC GO 705, dated 24 September 1969 granted authority to activate and organize the following units with manning strengths as indicated:

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SPECIAL: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period
Ending 31 October 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

571st Engineer Company  5  160  165
99th CS Support Bn  42  9  493  544
483d Military Police Platoon  1  39  40
65th Infantry Detach 'Combat Trackers'
Co E (Ranger) 75th Inf  2  59  61
493rd Military Intelligence Det  9  2  21  32
276th Artillery Detach (MPQ-4 Radar)

(12) Organizational Structure - Incl 1
(13) Roster of Key Personnel - Incl 2
(14) Bde TAOI - Incl 3

(C) Personnel and Administration

1. The redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division and the concurrent re-
organization of the 3d Brigade into a separate light infantry brigade increased
the complexity of personnel and administrative procedures. Since the new
organization is so different from the Brigade organization during the previous
reporting period, no attempt has been made to compare statistics.

(2) General Data: See Inclosure 4 for information and statistics concerning
the following:

(a) Maintenance of Unit Strength.
(b) Personnel Management.
(c) Development and Maintenance of Morale.
(d) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(C) Intelligence:

1. Discussion:

(a) General: Enemy activity in Ia Province during this reporting
period continued the decline which marked the two week period immediately fol-
lowing the announcement of redeployment of two brigades of the 9th Infantry
Division. Enemy forces generally carried out scattered, low level attacks by
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

fire against isolated targets of opportunity and conducted sporadic operations aimed at pacification efforts. Infiltration activity reached a peak during the month of August (with the attempted infiltration of the N series units, the 308th Bn and the 267th Bn). Successful interdiction efforts by friendly forces contributed to a subsequent lull in enemy infiltration activity during the month of September.

Captured documents and prisoner of war reports obtained during the latter half of August and the month of September indicated that enemy units had broken down into groups of 20 - 30 men, with some further divided into 3 - 4 man cells. Unit missions were reportedly as follows:

1. Avoid contact.
2. Await resupply and replacements.
3. Conduct limited anti-pacification operations.
4. Prepare for future offensive operations.

During the latter half of October, a significant increase in enemy activity occurred. Intelligence indicators point to possible preparations for a nationwide offensive. Key cadre from enemy units have reportedly been sent to Ba Thu and increased contacts are occurring along known enemy lines of communication. It is anticipated that should such an offensive occur, it would probably be during the middle of November.

(b) July: Activity during the month of July was sporadic and generally of low intensity. On 3 July, D-2/60 engaged elements of the 308th Bn moving into southern Ben Luc District (vic XS 596726). The contact resulted in 17 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 captured. On 21 July, A-5/60, operating vicinity XS 635704, received SA/AW fire from 2-3 VC in a bunker. The contact expanded, eventually resulting in 11 VC KIA (BC). Documents found in the contact area identified the K4 Bn, 1st NVA Regiment.

(c) August: The month of August witnessed increased enemy attempts at unit infiltration into Long An Province. On 3 August, 5/60 elements operating vicinity XS 345943, engaged elements of the 308th Bn. Results of the contact were 25 VC KIA (BC), 4 prisoners of war, and 6 individual weapons captured. On 4 August, Recon 2/47 captured 3 prisoners of war from G2 Co, 267th MF Bn, vicinity XS 490694. The prisoners of war stated G2 Co was infiltrating into Long An Province, and would shortly be joined by the remainder of the battalion. On 16 August, B-5/60 captured 5 prisoners of war in a contact vicinity XS 635726 resulting in 12 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The prisoners identified the G1 Co, N-15 Bn and stated that the unit was withdrawing to Ba Thu because of heavy casualties suffered during the months of July and August.

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On 24 August, Ranger Team 16 engaged an estimated 10 VC, resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC) and 2 individual weapons and documents captured. The documents identified one of the KIA’s as Senior Colonel Hai Tran, Assistant Chairman, People’s Revolutionary Party, Long An Province.

On 31 August, A-2/60 contacted an element of the KL Bn vicinity XS 643696. The engagement resulted in 12 VC KIA (BC).

(d) September: Enemy activity reached its lowest point in this reporting period during the month of September. Again enemy operations were characterized by limited attacks by fire. Infiltration activity appeared to decrease significantly. Intelligence reports from 25th Infantry Division, Inter confirmed by prisoner of war interrogation, located the 267th Bn in Tay Ninh Province. Subsequent reports also located the majority of the 308th Bn in Ba Thu.

On 17 September, A-5/60 supported by B-3/17 engaged an estimated VC squad vicinity XS 665735. The contact resulted in 23 VC KIA (BC) and 3 individual weapons and 3 detainees captured. The detainees identified the KL Bn. On 26 September, A-6/31 engaged an estimated 2 VC platoons of the 520th Bn vicinity XS 746639. Results of the contact were 24 VC KIA (BC) and 3 individual weapons captured.

(e) October: During the month of October there was a marked increase in enemy activity throughout the 3d Brigade TAOI. This increase primarily took the form of increased movement along major lines of communication. This would indicate infiltration and resupply activity. Limited attacks by fire, harassment and anti-pacification operations continued at approximately the same level as during the previous months of the reporting period. However, there were no significant contacts during the month.

During the latter half of the month, intelligence indicated that the enemy may be preparing for a nation-wide offensive, possibly beginning in mid-November.

(2) Enemy Order of Battle:

From 1 July through 31 October, the VC/NVA combat effectiveness deteriorated significantly. In particular, the enemy experienced severe problems in resupply of personnel and equipment to combat units. Generally, Long An Province Rear Service failed to maintain a high level of combat efficiency. The 1st Ind NVA Regiment, specifically the X4 and X6 Battalions, was the most active unit in Long An Province. Local Force Companies in Long An Province continued to employ standard guerrilla tactics and continued to avoid contact.

During early July, enemy initiated activities continued at a relatively low level in spite of indications of major attacks. Documents captured on
8 July in the vicinity of XS 722647 by B-2/60 contained a letter from HQ cadre of the 211th Sapper MF Bn to the C2 Sapper Company telling them to recon Hoch Kien Base Camp and the District Chief's house. The document also contained a recon map of Can Duoc City.

Documents captured in the vicinity of XS 555815 on 12 July identified the 267th MF Bn and stated that C3/267th Bn had participated in the 12 May attack on Thu Thua City and that there would be a summer attack on Thu Thua City. However, after returning to Ba Thu, Cambodia, the 267th MF Bn made a sudden change in AO and since 10 September it has been operating in the vicinity of XS 3316. Since 10 September there have been several contacts with this unit. PWS confirmed that the 267th MF Bn is targeted against FOB Rittgers, which is strategically located along a VC/NVA infiltration route into Tay Ninh Province.

The 308th MF Bn was contacted on 3 August in the vicinity of XS 345943. PWS captured said that they were to find a base camp in Thu Thua District and wait for the rest of the battalion which they were to communicate with by radio. However, the 308th Bn is still held to be in Ba Thu, Cambodia.

The 6th MF Bn, after avoiding contact for a prolonged period, was contacted on 25 August in the vicinity of XS 650909. This was a move slightly to the north for the battalion. Its present AO in the vicinity of XS 65090, is outside of Long An Province and leaves no Main Force unit in the Long An portion of SR2. Documents captured on 25 August and 9 September indicated that the 6th Bn was now armed with 107mm and 122mm rockets with a mission of harassing radar stations by fire.

The subordinate battalions of the 1st Ind NVA Regiment have been greatly reduced in combat effectiveness and are generally avoiding contact. On 17 September, 5/60 contacted the K4 NVA Bn in the vicinity of XS 665735. This contact resulted in 21 NVA KIA (BC) and 2 PWS. On 16 September, 4/50 ARVN Regiment contacted the K6 NVA Bn in the vicinity of XS 63595 killing 14 NVA and capturing 4 PWS.

The 1st Long An MF Bn was contacted frequently through PWS. In its present AO of eastern Can Giuoc (D), the unit encountered severe resupply problems. According to PW interrogations, the battalion was reorganized into six groups, with orders to remain dispersed and to avoid contact.

The 520th MF Bn has been contacted only once significantly. On 26 September, in the vicinity of XS 746639, 6/31 killed 24 VC/NVA who were identified as members of the 520th MF Bn.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

15 November 1969

The Dong Phu, 2d Long An and 265th Battalions are presently understrength and experiencing severe rear service problems. As a result, these Main Force Battalions are dispersed and avoiding contact.

The Local Force Companies of Long An (F) remained out of significant contact with one exception. On 21 August, the 367th RF Company contacted the C1 Can Duoc LFC resulting in 4 VC KIA and 11 PWs. Generally, Local Force Companies were fairly successful in avoiding contact. Because of their low strength, these companies have been relegated to guiding Main Force Units and emplacing booby traps.

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<td>XT 3316</td>
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讨论敌方战术与技术

31st MP Fst.

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<td>31 Aug</td>
<td>Tan Tru (D)</td>
<td>XS 5570</td>
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<tr>
<td>K6 NVA En</td>
<td>200 NVA</td>
<td>13 Oct</td>
<td>Binh Phuoc (D)</td>
<td>XS 6060</td>
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</table>

During this reporting period there has been a significant decrease in the number of enemy initiated incidents over the previous reporting period. Brief periods of enemy initiated incidents did occur throughout the latter half of the reporting period, however, these periods were of a uniformly low level.
and did not significantly affect the overall trend.

The decrease of enemy initiated activity reflected the tendency of enemy units to disperse into 20 - 40 man groups (some were further divided into 3 - 5 man cells), with the missions of avoiding contact and awaiting resupply and replacements.

During the month of September, enemy movement along known lines of communication increased heavily. The size of enemy units contacted along those routes generally varied from 3 - 15 men. This increased movement and the accompanying low level of enemy initiated incidents would tend to indicate that the enemy is in the process of strengthening itself for future offensive actions.

(4) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses:

<table>
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<tr>
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(5) Intelligence Sources and Agencies:

(a) Progress against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) by the CI Sections, 9th MI Det, (now 493th MI Det) has continued. VCI targets, as they were developed, were passed to Brigade Headquarters or other action agencies. The CI passed 41 VCI targets to this headquarters during the reporting period.

(b) The Division Interrogation Section processed a total of 356 detainees during the reporting period. Of this total, 132 were classified Innocent Civilians, 129 were classified Civil Defenders, 67 were classified PIKs, and 27 were classified Ho Chi Minh. In addition, the section processed 117 batches of captured documents, of which 20 were of tactical value. The section also processed approximately 660 pounds of captured material, consisting primarily of captured Viet Cong weapons, clothing, and equipment.
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(6) Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of Aerial Reconnaissance and Ground Sensors:

(a) Aerial Reconnaissance: The Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission, accomplished the following during the reporting period:

1. 201 aerial photographic missions were received, processed and plotted. From these missions, a total of 47 photography interpretation reports were prepared and distributed.

2. A total of 141 Red Flag sorties and 11 SLAR sorties were received, read out and their results disseminated.

3. In response to specific requests, this section prepared 8 photo mosaics, 15 special target overlays, 1 agricultural overlay, 1 trail overlay, 1 population overlay, and flew 4 aerial photographic missions.

4. 121 photographic missions have been cut and packaged with field plots for dissemination to 3d Brigade elements, while 120 other photographic missions with field plots were disseminated to 7th ARVN Infantry Division.

(b) Ground Sensors: The 3d Brigade's Duffel Bag Program, now in its second quarter has increased from 7 strings of 39 sensors to 11 strings of 42 sensors. Authorized strength for the sensor platoon is 1 officer and 17 enlisted men. The platoon is divided into a Headquarters Section of 1 officer and 2 enlisted men and three Monitoring Sections of 7, 4, and 4 men each.

During the reporting period 532 personnel and 7 sampans were detected from 114 target activations. Eighty-six targets were reacted to by artillery elements.

(c) New Techniques: Two new types of sensors are presently being evaluated by 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Sensor Platoon. The Patrol Seismic Intrusion Device is being tested for use by infantry patrols in patrol base or ambush position; The Passive Infrared Intrusion Detector is being tested on waterways. The device is activated when a continuous infra-red beam is broken.

(7) Weather and Terrain: During the reporting period monsoonal rainfalls have dominated the weather picture. While wet weather and soggy terrain has had little adverse effect on either friendly or enemy operations, early morning overcast skies impose some limitations on the Brigade's night and airmobile operations.

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(8) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Possible Courses of Action:

(a) The enemy has the capability to:

1. Conduct attacks on Province and District seats, other major cities, and military installations.

2. Conduct brief attacks by fire, hide his equipment, and withdraw from the area prior to employment of countermortar techniques.

3. Conduct attacks by fire and harassment on towns, villages, hamlets, outposts and other installations.

4. Conduct sniper and terrorist attacks on key bridges, roads, RD projects, and population areas.

5. Defend base areas and positions with local security forces and reinforce within a four kilometer radius.

6. Disperse major units into platoon and squad size elements.

7. Withdraw and disperse easily.

8. Wage political and psychological warfare on the populace and hold control of any area where there is no friendly security at night.

(b) The enemy is vulnerable to:

1. Loss of support of the population.

2. Friendly superior artillery and air power.

3. Interdiction of the Lines of Communication (LOC) and loss of cached supplies.

4. Disclosure or capture of attack plans.

5. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.

6. A breakdown in his infrastructure by aggressive allied actions.

7. A lack of combat effective troops and a low morale due to heavy casualties and desertions.
A loss of logistical support which has resulted in a lack of food and medicine making him vulnerable to hunger, disease, and complication of wounds.

From all appearances it seems the enemy will apparently direct his main effort toward countering the pacification program as it is now developing.

(9) New Techniques: Intelligence reports and contacts during the reporting period indicated that enemy movement during hours of darkness along lines of communications was being conducted in small widely dispersed groups. It was apparent that resupply and replacement activity was being conducted in this manner and that large night operations were not effectively interdicting enemy movement. Consequently, the technique of saturation ambushes was employed during the month of October. Forces were deployed in squad to half platoon size ambush patrols, providing extended area coverage. This technique has been effective in interdicting night movement and has substantially reduced friendly casualties.

e. (C) Operations.

(1) During the reporting period the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation Tuan Thang (Phase III). The 3d Brigade accounted for 1039 enemy killed, 75 Prisoners of War (POW), and 25 Hoi Chansh (Viet Cong) participating in this operation during the last reporting period. The Brigade conducted offensive operations in Long An Provence with five maneuver battalions (2-60 Inf, 5-60 Inf, 2-47 Inf (Koch), 6-31 Inf, and 3-7 Inf), having only four battalions under its operational control at any time.

(2) The level of enemy activity has decreased significantly since the last reporting period. The enemy has continued his resupply and reorganization missions with emphasis on recruiting and winning the support of the local populace in contested areas. In addition to attempting the undermining of GVN pacification efforts, the enemy further intensified his efforts to retain control of those areas which are under his domination. The enemy has been extremely reluctant to enter into decisive engagements with elements of the Brigade and has remained fragmented. The enemy’s offensive activity during this reporting period was characterized by harassment of outposts, mining of roads, and extensive use of supper units.

(3) Jitterbug, Checkerboard, and Bushmaster operations continue to be the Brigade's principle tactics for keeping the enemy on the defensive. The 3d Brigade continues to conduct a large number of combined operations with ARVN and RF units. During October, 500 GVN companies conducted combined operations.
with elements of the 3d Brigade, an increase of 75 percent over September's total. These operations have served as an excellent training vehicle for the GVN forces. Many ARVN and RF units have learned air mobiling techniques and can now conduct these operations well. Previously, ARVN units conducted only company size ambush patrols at night. However, on recent ambush patrols they have been saturating areas at night with platoon size and smaller ambush patrols. In addition, the RF units are now conducting extended operations of 48 to 72 hours. Previously, RF unit operations were of a short duration and close to home. These improvements are important and have been given impetus through the example of combined operations.

(4) During the reporting period the brigade's combined operations program extended into another area. At the end of the reporting period, the 50th Regiment and the 2-60 Inf established a Combined Operations Center at the 2-60 Inf base camp in Tan Tru District. It is hoped that this innovation will result in better coordination in the selection of targets, facilitate the coordination of AOs, aid in the dissemination of intelligence, and accelerate the pacification effort.

(5) In late September and early October it was noticed that night operations within the brigade's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) were becoming more productive. Contacts were increasing and enemy body count was rising. In addition, friendly casualties were significantly less during night operations. The enemy had fragmented, was avoiding contact, and had become extremely elusive. Only air mobile operations were successful during the daytime. It became apparent that US forces must also fragment and place increased emphasis on night operations, for the enemy was moving only at night.

(6) In an attempt to exploit this situation, the brigade decided to employ at least 65 percent of its combat platoons at night. Units were directed to employ no larger than half platoon size ambush patrols. By saturating areas with many small ambush patrols, the probability for contact increased. The results during October were encouraging. Fifty three percent of operations during the month were night operations. However, sixty-one percent of the contacts, sixty-six percent of the body count and sixty percent of the weapons captured were at night. No friendly soldiers were killed at night, and only seventeen percent of the friendly wounded occurred at night. More time is needed before conclusive results can be evaluated, however, it is hoped this favorable trend will continue.

(*) In spite of the shift to night operations, air mobile operations remained at the same level of intensity. The Brigade Commander continued the same level while increasing night operations since both netted the best results in terms of body count and lower friendly casualties. It is significant to note however, that approximately 60 percent of the kills were made by the light fire.
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teams and assault helicopter gunships in support of the ground elements. Following
insertion, the enemy evading from the target area is more easily detected from
the air. Once flushed, he is quickly eliminated by the supporting gunships.

8 The successes in Long An Province during the reporting period have been
largely due to the proper blending of the three techniques emphasized; night
operations, air mobile operations and combined operations.

9) Combat Operations

(a) On 0113294 July, gunships from 240th Assault Helicopter Company (AHC)
operating 1 km North of Ben Luc, vicinity XS 639786 engaged 5 VC with organic
weapons, resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC). At 1345H in the same area, the 240th AHC
accounted for one more VC KIA (BC). At 1235 D/5-60 Inf supported by 240th AHC
engaged 2 VC at the same location resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). The gunships from
the 240th AHC killed 2 additional enemy in the contact area five minutes later.
One 4.79 pistol was captured by D/5-60 Inf. In another contact that day at 2320H
RCON/5-60 Inf engaged an estimated 10-12 VC with organic weapons, vicinity XS
727655. The 4.2 mortar Plt/5-60 Inf provided illumination. This contact result-
et in seven VC KIA (BC) and three AK47’s, one M-16, and six 75mm rounds captured.
On 020205 H July D/2-60 Inf was engaged by an unknown size VC Force with SA, AW,
and 84mm fire, vicinity XS 679653. The contact resulted in four US WIA and one
Tiger Scout WIA. At 1135H vicinity XS 665813, A/5-60 Inf supported by the 240th
AHC and B/3-17 Cavalry (Cav) engaged an unknown size VC Force killing two of the
enemy. The 240th AHC accounted for four VC KIA (BC) while B/3-17 Cav killed
one VC KIA (BC). In addition, 2 AK47s, 2 AK7 magazines, and 1000 rounds AK7
ammunition were captured by A/5-60. On 031235H July, vicinity XS 654826 approx-
norately six km North East of Ben Luc, D/2-60 Inf received SA and AW fire from
an estimated VC platoon. Fire was returned with organic weapons and Tac Air
and a light fire team (LFT) supported. D/2-60 Inf sustained two US KIA and one
US wounded. At 1255H B/3-17 Cav gunships engaged and killed two VC KIA (BC).
The contact continued throughout the afternoon. At 1407H, D Company accounted
for two more of the enemy, and at 1425H, B/3-17 Cav killed an additional three
VC KIA (BC). At 1546H, D/2-60 Inf still in sporadic contact sustained one US
KIA and one US WIA. When the enemy broke contact at 1905H, D/2-60 had killed
four more VC and B/3-17 Cav had killed two more of the enemy. Friendly casual-
ties for the contact totaled three US KIA and two US WIA. Enemy losses were
ten VC KIA (BC) & 8 by B/3-17 Cav, 2 by Tac Air) and seven VC KIA (BC) by D/2-60
Inf. On 051230H July, vicinity XS 411875, B/3-17 Cav engaged with organic
weapons five VC, resulting in five VC KIA (BC). Sporadic contact continued until
1425H with B/3-17 Cav killing seven more VC KIA (BC). Ranger Team 21 was insert-
ed into the contact area at 1325H killing one VC and capturing 10 AK47s, one M1
Carbine, one M2 Carbine, one RPG-2 Rocket Launcher (RL), five RPG-2 rounds, two
RPG-7 rounds, one pair of binoculars, one K-63 Chicom radio, three Chicom gra-
nades, and eight sets of web gear. On 052130H, July vicinity XS 633552, five
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VIN SE of Binh Phouc, Recon/2-47 Inf (M) engaged one VC with organic weapons, resulting in one VC KIA (BC). The contact continued until 2352h with US artillery and a LFT supporting. The results of the contact were one US KIA, one US WIA, and nine VC KIA (BC). Two AX-70s were captured. On 102035 July, vicinity X3 339651 A/5-60 Inf received SA and AW fire from an unknown size VC force. Fire was returned with organic weapons while US Artillery, Tac Air, B/3-17 Cav and 240th AHC gunships supported. One UH-1C was shot down and heavily damaged. When the enemy broke contact at 1500h, friendly casualties were three WIA and enemy losses were unknown. At 1540h, A/5-60 Inf once again came under fire from an unknown number of VC. The VC broke contact at 1600h with unknown enemy losses. At 1712h, vicinity X3 335962, a B/3-17 Cav OH-6A received one R-G-2 round from an unknown number of VC. The aircraft was downed and heavily damaged. There were two US WIA. D/5-60 was inserted into the contact area to secure the aircraft and at 1930h received AW fire from an unknown size VC force. Fire was returned and the VC broke contact immediately. The contact resulted in one US KIA and unknown VC losses. On 11 July at 1215h, D/2-60 Inf engaged two VC in the same area resulting in two VC KIA (BC). At the same location, an airstrike killed three VC at 1135h, while B/3-17 Cav engaged and killed one more VC. Sweeping the contact area D/5-60 Inf found two VC KIA (BC) (by Artillery from the day before) and one damaged 60mm mortar tube. At 1430h, the 240th AHC engaged and killed one more VC KIA (BC). Contact with the enemy continued for one hour, resulting in eight VC KIA (BC). There were no US casualties. On 212200h July, vicinity X3 051750, A/5-60 Inf received SA and AW fire from an estimated 3-4 VC in bunkers. The fire was returned with organic weapons, while US Artillery, Tac Air, B/3-17 Cav, and the 240th AHC gunships supported. The enemy broke contact at 1225h. Friendly casualties were two wounded, while enemy casualties totaled seven VC KIA (BC) and three VC WIA (BC). At 1650h, A/5-60 Inf regained contact and killed two more of the enemy. Captured enemy equipment included one AK-7, two R-G-2 R-Ls, two RPG-2 rounds, and a small amount of documents. On 222130h, vicinity X5 522758, Ranger Team 14 engaged 6-7 VC in sampans resulting in six VC KIA, and two sampans destroyed. One R-G-2RL, one US M26 grenade, one steel helmet, and a small amount of web gear were captured.

(b) On 031200h August, B/3-17 Cav engaged and killed 1 VC (XBA) (BC) vicinity X3 345943. At the same location A/5-60 Inf sustained 2 US wounded at 1204h, when engaged by an unknown number of VC. Sporadic contact continued until 1700h. US casualties totaled 2 WIA. B/3-17 Cav accounted for 16 VC KIA (BC) A/5-60 Inf killed 5 of the enemy and R/5-60 Inf killed 1 VC. In addition, 5 detainees, 5 AK-7s, 2 SKS, 1 R-G-2 RL, 42 RPG-2 rounds, 1 PPD light machine gun (FMG), and 1 Chinese type 63 radio were captured. On 160940h August, vicinity X5 685726, a B/3-17 Cav OH-6A received SA and AW fire from an estimated VC platoon. The fire was returned with organic weapons, resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). At 1035h, B/5-60 Inf working vicinity X5 685735, was engaged by an estimated VC squad. Two fires were returned and the enemy broke contact immediately. There
were no US casualties and enemy losses were unknown. However 2 Ho Chi Minh
rallied to US forces. At 1330H, B/5-60 Inf engaged and killed 5 VC. Sporadic
contact continued until 1545H. Total friendly casualties were 1 Tiger Scout WIA.
Enemy losses stood at 8 VC KIA (BG) and 4 VC KIA (BG). On 101500H August, vicinity
XS 633711, 240th AHC engaged 3 VC with organic weapons resulting in 1 VC KIA
(BG). At 15:30 in the same location, B/3-17 Cav in support of B/5-60 Inf
engaged 4 VC, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BG), and 2 AK47s captured. At the same
time the 5-60 Inf Command and Control helicopter engaged 2 VC vicinity XS 633711,
resulting in 1 VC KIA (BG). On 211002H August, vicinity XS 768567, an airstrike
resulted in 6 VC KIA (BG). At the same location five minutes later, B/3-17 Cav
with organic weapons engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BG). Shortly thereafter
C/3-7 adjusted artillery onto 1 VC in the same location. The results were 1 VC KIA
(BG). At 1345H, C/3-7 Inf operating in the same vicinity adjusted artillery fire
onto an unknown number of VC resulting in 14 VC KIA (BG). On 221003H August,
vicinity XS 363863, B/3-17 Cav engaged 2 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA (BG), Ranger
Team 16 was inserted into the contact area at 1315H and engaged an estimated
squad of VC while B/3-17 Cav supported. The Rangers accounted for 2 VC KIA
(BG) while B/3-17 Cav killed 3 more of the enemy. Five AK47s, one K-54 pistol,
and a small amount of documents were captured. The information contained in
the document along with visual identification confirmed that one of the enemy KIA's was Senior Colonel Hai Tran, Political Commander of SR-3. On
291035H August, vicinity XS 545595, the 240th AHC supporting A and C/2-60 Inf
engaged with organic weapons 5 VC, resulting in 5 VC KIA (BG). At 11:30H, A/2-60
engaged and killed one of the enemy, and captured one K-54 pistol. Five minutes
later G/2-60 Inf accounted for 2 more VC. Sporadic contact continued until 1335H
when the VC broke contact. Results of this contact were 6 VC KIA (BG) and 5 VC
KIA (BG). In another area, vicinity XS 633711, D/2-60 Inf initiated contact at
1235H when they killed 3 VC. Sporadic contact continued until 1600H. In addition
to killing 2 of the enemy, D/2-60 Inf uncovered a sizeable cache. It contained
74 R-6-G rounds, 19 107mm rocket mortars, 2 107mm rocket warheads, 34 RGM-2
boosters, 2 anti-tank mines, and 6500 AK47 rounds. On 311135H August, vicinity
XS 651660, B/2-60 Inf engaged and killed one VC. The 240th AHC in support
of A/2-60 Inf killed one VC in the same area at 1325H. At the same time the C&O
A/2-60 Inf engaged one VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BG). At 1513B vicinity XS 652690
A Company engaged 2 VC with organic weapons. This resulted in 2 VC KIA (BG).
Sporadic contact continued until 1740H. Results for the actions were 8 VC KIA
(BG) and 4 VC KIA (BG).
sites containing 22 VC bodies. Further investigation revealed that on 7 Sep elements of 2-60 Inf and 2-47 Inf contacted an unknown size enemy force in this area with unknown results. Because of the nature of the wounds on the bodies and the locations of the grave site, 2-47 is credited with 11 VC KIA (BC) and 2-60 is credited with 11 VC KIA (BC). On 152001H September, vicinity XS 635715, 2/5-60 Inf with organic weapons, engaged an estimated squad of VC. The enemy immediately returned fire and shortly thereafter broke contact. Friendly casualties were two US WIA and one Tiger Scout WIA. Enemy losses were 11 VC KIA (BC), one RPD, two AK47s, nine RGD5 rounds, 20 0.50cal grenades, three AK47 magazines and a small amount of documents. On 170720H September, vicinity XS 665735, A/3-60 Inf apprehended one male detainee. Seven minutes later the 5-60 Inf 10H engaged two VC resulting in one VC KIA (BC). At 0743H, A/5-60 Inf killed one VC KIA (BC). The contact was supported by artillery and B/3-17 Cav. B/5-60 Inf was inserted into the area and contact continued until 1315H. Results were one US KIA and one US WIA. Enemy casualties totaled 18 VC killed. The 3d Bde suffered the loss of the Brigade Commander, Colonel Dale J. Crittenden that day, when his Command and Control helicopter collided with a Cobra gunship while flying over the 5-60 Inf contact. A total of 12 US were killed in the accident. At 1500H on 18 September, vicinity XS 647710 C/2-60 Inf found 12 VC KIA (BC). These were credited to the Artillery from an earlier contact. On 261540H September, vicinity XS 746639, A/6-31 Inf engaged an estimated two VC platoons. Gunships from 240th AHC fired in support. The VC returned fire with SA and AW. Contact continued until 1750H. A/6-31 Inf sustained two US WIA and three Tiger Scouts WIA. Enemy losses were 24 killed, with one AK47, one M-16, and one BAR being captured.

(d) On 041120H Oct, vicinity XS 612923, the 190th AHC engaged three VC resulting in three VC KIA (BC). A/3-60 Inf was inserted into the contact area and captured two AK47s, four rifle grenades, three unknown type grenades, 40 rounds of AK47 ammunition, and a small amount of documents. At 1330H, while sweeping the same area, A/3-60 Inf engaged and killed an additional three VC. One AK47 was also captured. Sporadic contact continued throughout the afternoon with B/3-17 Cav killing two more of the enemy and A/5-60 accounting for two KIA (BC). On 112045H Oct, vicinity XS 596790, R/3-60 Inf with organic weapons engaged an estimated enemy platoon. Artillery and Navy LIT supported. The VC returned fire with SA and AW breaking contact at 1900H. The results of the contact were nine VC KIA (BC) and a friendly casualty. On 182115H October, C/6-31 Inf engaged an estimated VC squad with organic weapons. The contact was supported by the 3d Brigade aviation element and a Navy LIT. The Navy LIT accounted for one VC KIA (BC) while B/6-31 Inf killed six of the enemy, captured six AK47s, and destroyed two sampans. At 0655H, vicinity XS 676787, Ranger Team 14 engaged nine VC resulting in nine VC KIA (BC). Two of the VC were killed by snipers. At 2052H, vicinity XS 591738, R/5-60 Inf working with the Vietnamese Navy engaged with organic weapons 20 VC. US Artillery supported the contact. Results were nine VC KIA (BC), with the 5/60 Inf snipers.
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Accounting for three of the enemy. Scattered contact throughout the Brigade TA0I that day produced a total of 37 VC KIA (BC), and two VC KBA (BC). On 232200H, October, vicinity XS 639541, B/2-47 engaged with organic weapons an estimated squad of VC. B/3-17 Cav supported the contact. A sweep of the contact area revealed ten VC KIA (BC). There were no friendly casualties. On 230711H Oct, vicinity XS 668228, C/2-47 Inf received small arms and sniper fire from an estimated three VC. The fire was returned resulting in two VC KIA (BC) and one KIA captured. In the same area at 030500H, C/2-47 sustained one US KIA, three US WIA and one Tiger Scout V1A from a claymore mine booby trap. This initiated a sporadic contact that lasted until 1610H. The contact was supported by TAC air. The results - the contact were seven VC KIA (EC) and two VC KBA (EC). In scattered contact throughout the TA0I that day Brigade units killed 33 of the enemy. On 291415H Oct, vicinity XS 700613, B/3-17 Cav in support of D/2-60 Inf engaged and killed one VC KBA (BC). This initiated a sporadic contact that lasted until 1730H. D/2-60 Inf accounted for eight VC KIA (BC), while B/3-17 Cav killed four of the enemy. In addition one PW, one AK47, one M1 carbine, one 9mm pistol and two Chicom radios were captured.

(10) Combat Support Activities

(a) Artillery Support:

1. Brigade Artillery firing elements continued to support brigade operations in Long An, Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, and Dinh Thong provinces. Fire support was also provided for ARVN units, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, and Regional Forces/Popular Forces. During the reporting period a Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) was established. The CFSCC is designed to coordinate all fire support assets within Long An province, provide complete target clearance, evaluate and coordinate all training programs to upgrade ARVN Artillery. The AN/TPS-25 radar was employed as an integral part of the overall Brigade plan to search and detect enemy movement along major infiltration routes and deep into enemy base areas. The AN/TPS-25 was also used as part of a coordinated team designed to seek out and engage the VC at night.

2. Artillery, while under the control of 3d Brigade fired a total of 4,540 missions expending a total of 126,258 rounds during the reporting period.

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support:

1. During the reporting period Troop B/3-17 Cav was in direct support of the brigade, providing an average of seven armed helicopters per day. This support consisted of four AH1G Cobra Gunships, four OH6A LOHs, and three UH1H slicks on a daily basis. Missions included support for 3d Bde units in contact, aerial displacement of supplies, people sniffer operations, defoliation missions screening and blocking operations, aerial reconnaissance, ranger insertions,
ranger parakeet flights and ranger extractions. While in support of the 3d Bde during the reporting period B/3-17 Ca flew 7,813 hours, and accounted for 191 VC KBA (BC).

2. 3d Bde elements also received gunships support from the US Navy located at Pen Luc, Binh Thuy, and Nha Be. The US Navy supported elements of the 3d Bde on a mission basis with a light fire team (LFT).

(c) Tactical Air Support: A chart reflecting ordanance expended and results obtained by Tac Air in support of 3d Brigade units attached as Inclosure 7.

(d) Strategic Air Support: There were no B52 strikes conducted in support of the 3d Bde during the reporting period.

(e) Training:

(1) During the reporting period, the following training was conducted within the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division:

(a) Replacement Training
(b) Battalion Refresher Training
(c) In-Country Specialized Training

(2) Replacement training consists of five days of orientation and intensified training in many of the skills necessary to prepare an individual for combat duty in Vietnam. The Go Devil Academy, a provisional organization within this command, conducted all replacement training during this quarter. The academy completed an organized and well coordinated move from Long Tam to Tan An Airfield during the month of August 1969. New classroom facilities, barracks, and training areas were constructed to house cadre and incoming personnel. Currently, plans have been formulated for construction of a new range facility, which is expected to be completed in the near future. This range will be used for instruction on weapons familiarization, quick kill techniques, grenade throwing, demolitions and explosives training, and instruction on mines and booby traps. Additionally, action is being coordinated to secure a piece of land, adjoining Tan An Base Camp, for use in water safety and river crossing techniques. The following table shows the number of replacement personnel trained during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>PM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(3) Battalion Refresher training continued to be conducted by all subordinate maneuver units of this command. The primary emphasis was placed on training replacement personnel in those subjects of interest to the Battalion Commander. By continuous training and command supervision, all replacement personnel are given periodic practical training in combat related subjects. Commanders are required to conduct such training to give practical experience to those replacement personnel who have been trained in a non-combat MOS.

(4) The Brigade Sniper Training Program continued to produce highly qualified snipers for employment throughout Long An Province. All brigade snipers were trained at the 25th Infantry Division sniper school located at Cu Chi, RVN. During the reporting period a total of 19 personnel were trained as snipers. Additionally, from 26 July 1969 to 31 October 1969, snipers accounted for 47 enemy eliminated in Long An Province. A total of 39 Kills were attained at night utilizing a starlight scope. Presently, the Brigade is authorized 20 sniper weapons, which are allocated on the basis of eight per maneuver battalion and four to the Ranger Company. The brigade sniper program will continue to accelerate as selected personnel are properly trained and utilized during all operations.

(5) Beginning in mid-October allocations for the Combat Leaders Course and several specialist classes were received from the 25th Infantry Division. To date personnel from all battalions and separate companies have sent personnel to the following courses offered at Cu Chi, RVN.

(a) Generator Operator Course
(b) Generator Operator Supervisors Course
(c) Small Arms Course
(d) Moss Management Course
(e) Explosives and Demolitions Course
(f) Helicopter Load Preparation Course
(g) Combat Leadership Course

In addition, several personnel have been sent to the 1st Signal Bde for technical instructions on radar, signal communications, and audio-visual classes. This headquarters has continued to send qualified Ranger personnel to the MACV Recondo School at Nha Tranp and also to the Phoenix Orientation Course (Intelligence gathering) at Vung Tau. It has further been found that consolidation of transportation requirements at Brigade level, will allow for proper scheduling and movement of personnel to and from In-Country school locations.

g. (C) Logistics:

(1) General
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(a) The logistical mission of providing planning, guidance, and support for all organic, attached units, units under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was accomplished by the Brigade S4 during the reporting period. The major tactical units supported were five land based battalions.

(b) When the 3d Brigade was reorganized as a separate brigade on 20 July 1969, a provisional support battalion, later designated the 99th CS Support Battalions, was organized in Dong Tam to support the brigade. During the latter part of August the Support Battalion displaced to the Tan An Airfield and began operations.

(2) Supply:

(a) 3d Brigade units drew supplies from Dong Tam until the Support Battalion began operations at Tan An Airfield. Supplies were then drawn as follows:

1. Class I: All units drew from Class I Point, Tan An Airfield except the 6th Bn, 31st Infantry, which drew from Camp Davis, Saigon.


3. Class III: Retail point at Tan An Airfield.


Repair parts are provided through B Company, 99th CS Support Battalion located at Ben Luc.

(b) A rearm/refuel point for helicopters was established at Rach Kien in order to conserve blade hours. There is an additional rearm/refuel point located at the Tan An Airfield.

(c) Water points operated by the 82nd Engineer Co (Water Supply) are in use at each of the battalion base camps and at Brigade Headquarters located at Tan An Airfield. This has helped to reduce transportation requirements.

(3) Maintenance:

(a) Maintenance operations continued on a high level during the period despite the reorganization of the brigade. The maintenance company at Ben Luc moved into a compound vacated by a redeploying engineer company. This area was
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more suitable and allowed a more efficient operation for direct support maintenance.

(b) Roadside spot checks have not been conducted during the period due to the reorganization. However, each unit received a pre-CMMI in order to help them prepare for the CMMI which will be conducted during the next reporting period.

(c) Throughout the reporting period, 3d Brigade continued to have one of the lower deadline rates in the command. This has been the result of command emphasis on maintenance operations at all levels.

(4) Transportation: Organic transportation has been adequate to meet limited tactical movement and administrative requirements of the Brigade. One incident necessitated the use of non-organic transportation. The bridge in Binh Duc between Tan An and Tan Tru, was destroyed by enemy sappers, cutting off the 2d Bn, 60th Infantry's supply route. The 25th Inf Div furnished CH47 helicopters to air-lift supplies into Tan Tru while the bridge was rebuilt by the 3d Brigade Engineer Company. CH47's were also used two or three days each week in support of major Brigade tactical moves into the Plain of Reeds.

(C) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs:

(1) Psychological Operations:

(a) The 3d Bde PSYOP efforts have been concentrated on supporting the accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) in Long An Province. The objectives of PSYOP during the reporting period have been:

1. To strengthen the GVN image and foster respect for the capabilities of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).

2. To give maximum exposure and credit to the GVN participation in pacification and development in order to identify improvements with the GVN.

3. To impress the civilian population, as well as the enemy, with the combined strength of RVNAF and Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF).

4. To convince the enemy that defeat is near, and that the only alternative to complete defeat is for him to rally to the GVN.

5. To create dissention between the VC and the NVA by exploiting personality differences.

6. To convince the civilian population that the pacification and development program is an expression of the response of the GVN to the needs
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of the people and that their support and cooperation are essential to the success of the program.

(b) The major themes during the period were: Chieu Hoi, GVN image, ARVN image, Third Party Inducement, Voluntary Informant Program (VIP), and family tree. In addition, a large portion of the PSYOP effort was directed toward explaining the secondary road project in Long An and soliciting popular support and cooperation.

(c) Increased emphasis has been placed on conducting PSYOP in conjunction with normal tactical and Civic Action activities. Toward accomplishing this mission, aerial leaflet drops were incorporated into aerial reconnaissance, Command and Control Missions (C&C), and resupply flights. In addition, a compact 500-watt loudspeaker system was devised which can be used from a light observation helicopter. Bullhorns were extremely useful when used in conjunction with normal tactical and military civic action operations.

(d) Summary of PSYOP activities (1 July - 31 Oct 69)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOUDSPEAKER</th>
<th>LEAFLETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>HOURS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUND</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Civil Affairs:

(a) Throughout the reporting period the Brigade's civil affairs efforts have been aimed at complementing and supplementing the GVN pacification and development program. Close coordination and cooperation was maintained with the 55, Long An Province, Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and the 4th Civil Affairs (CA) Platoon. In addition, battalions maintained coordination with the 55's of their respective districts. This intricate coordination was necessary in order to assure a uniform application of civil affairs activities throughout the province, prevent duplication of effort, and place emphasis in specific areas.

(b) The civic action objectives for the period were:

1. To improve the living conditions of the Vietnamese people, thus removing their cause for dissatisfaction, and in turn, providing a foundation for pacification and development.
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To improve the relations between the US armed forces and the civilian population.

2 To gain and maintain the support of the people for the GVN.

(a) Toward meeting the above objectives, increased emphasis was placed on medical treatment of the needy. As a result, during this period over 550 more MEDCAP's were conducted than during the last reporting period. Additionally, 53,000 more people were treated in comparison with the last reporting period. The total number treated was 106,729. The number of MILCAP programs were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NITCAP</th>
<th>ICAP</th>
<th>MEDCAP</th>
<th>DENTCAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Civic action Activities also included construction projects to improve the living conditions and transportation routes within Long An Province. These programs were targeted for short duration - high impact results. Ninety percent of these projects were joint US - Vietnamese ventures, with the US forces supplying materials and technical guidance, and the Vietnamese providing the labor force. The following is a list of projects completed during this period.

PROJECT
1 Dwellings
2 Roads
3 Bridges
4 Schools
5 Other

BUILT OR REPAIRED
29
91 KM
4
5
7 (4 culverts, 1 church, 1 orphanage, 1 hospital)

(a) The following is a list of construction materials distributed throughout Long An Province during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>3,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>462 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>8,015 board feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,796 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(f) During the conduct of MILCAP's, the teams distributed various health items and commodities. The following items were distributed during this period.

1. Health and School kits - 2,059
2. Foodstuffs - 7,155 lbs
3. Soap - 2,174 bars
4. Clothing - 562 lbs
5. Other - 2,007 lbs (to include candy, balloons, rat traps, GVN flags, etc.)

(g) Thirty-two English Pronunciation classes were conducted with a total enrollment of 200 students. Training continues for two female tiger scouts to become nurses' aides to assist with MILCAP's.

(h) Units of this brigade have continued to arrange for corrective surgery for needy children at Cho Ray Hospital and amputees at the National Rehabilitation Institute. The following operations and treatments were performed during the reporting period.

1. Cleft palate corrections - 11
2. Artificial limbs - 5
3. Polio or paralysis treatment - 5

(i) The redeployment of the 1st and 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division and the reorganization of the 3rd Brigade into a separate brigade in July 69 imposed an immediate requirement for massive construction to support the brigade's expansion. A request was submitted for authorization to construct approximately 100,000 square feet of facilities. The request was immediately approved and the project was divided into two phases. Phase one called for the construction of approximately 70,000 square feet of facilities by 25 August 1969. During Phase I the following structures were completed: Ten BEQs, three BOQs, three administrative buildings, one warehouse, one mess hall, and numerous showers and latrines. Phase II construction commenced on 26 August 1969. Since that time, two warehouses, and one BOQ have been constructed. Construction yet to be completed includes two BEQs and two administrative buildings. There is no set completion date for Phase II. As of 31 October 1969, 14,000 square feet of facilities out of the original 100,000 remain to be constructed.
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(2) In addition to the vertical construction requirements, the 20th Engineer Brigade was asked to provide minimum essential requirements (MER) at Tan An Airfield. This MER consisted of Soil Stabilization, hardstands, roads, and adequate drainage. The intense rains of the Southwest monsoon hampered these efforts, but with the approaching dry season this work will proceed rapidly. Several operational support construction tasks were requested and approved prior to the reorganization, and are still scheduled to be accomplished during the dry season. These tasks include obtaining earth fill with which to build a rearm/refuel facility, a hoverlane, aircraft parking areas for both fixed wing and rotary aircraft, with runways, and a berm around northern portion of the perimeter. An operational support mission to construct a 60' x 120' concrete pad, to support the relocation of the Air Cushion Vehicles (ACVs) from Dong Tan to Ben Luc, was approved. However, construction has been continuously delayed and this project is presently scheduled for accomplishments in early November.

(3) During the period the 3rd Brigade and Long An Province officials began to plan for the opening and upgrading of critical secondary roads in Long An Province. This secondary road program was designed to improve tactical operations and support the pacification program. An integrated priority list of roads required was submitted to II Field Forces for approval. The II Field Force then assigned sections of the program to four different construction agencies; the 20th Engineer Brigade, 30th ARVN Engineer Group, the Seabee Detachment, and the 571st Engineer Company, proportionate to their capabilities. Actions were taken to acquire sand, laterite and rock in sufficient quantities to support the construction agencies in their planning and scheduling. In order to solicit local support for the secondary road program, civic action personnel, from the 3d Brigade and Long An Province prepared leaflets in conjunction with the pacification program and additional leaflets describing road maintenance hints for distribution along the secondary roads. Work has begun on nine of the twenty-five roads in the secondary road program and continuous coordination has been made to adjust priorities to meet ever-changing needs within the Province. Current schedules show that the entire program can be accomplished by 15 June 1970.

J. Signal Support:

(1) During the first 20 days of July 1969, the 3rd Brigade was still a subordinate unit assigned to the 9th Infantry Division, thus, the Brigade Signal Officer's only function was to advise the Brigade Commander on signal matters. During this period arrangements were made to establish a Brigade Signal Office, consisting of one Signal Corps Major, one MSG E-6 (MOS 312) and one SP/4 (MOS 72B). On 20 July 1969, the Brigade Signal Office became operational and published the first Brigade SOI to be effective on 26 July 1969. The Brigade Signal Office supervised the upgrading of all radio and telephone
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(2) During August, the Brigade Signal Office continued to supervise the upgrading of communications. The largest effort was the expansion of the Tan An Base telephone system, to include all of the newly assigned staff sections. Plans were also formulated to install a complete telephone system for the 99th Support Battalion located at Tan An Airfield.

(3) During September the telephone systems at Tan An Base and Tan An Airfield were completed with the assistance of the 2nd Signal Group. The 25th Division Signal Officer requested that he be allowed to publish the Brigade SOI using the 25th Infantry Division format. It was agreed that the 25th Inf Div publish the Brigade SOI with the exception of the assignment of frequencies and call signs. This portion of the SOI was the responsibility of the brigade signal officer. Plans were formulated to build a new communications bunker to house VHF, com-center, switchboard, and radio repair sections of the 56th Signal Company. During October the Signal Officer continued to upgrade communications systems throughout the command. Approval was obtained and plans were drawn for a new communications bunker. An SSB back-pack radio set AR/PRC 75, was obtained from the 25th Inf Div Signal Officer for tests with 2/75th Inf. These communications tests will be conducted in November.

(5) Army Aviation: During the reporting period the 3d Brigade's aviation requirements were supported by both II FFORCEN and the Brigade's organic aviation element.

(1) II FFORCEN supported the Brigade with an average of one and half Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) daily. The Brigade was normally supported by the 240th AHC, 190th AHC, 118th AHC, and the 116th AHC. Their missions included air mobile insertions, extractions and resupply. Each AHC provided 84 blade hours daily in support of the 3d Brigade.

(2) The 3d Brigade began operating with its own organic aircraft element on 20 July 1969. This element consists of 4 UH-1H helicopters and 4 OH-6As (A). During the reporting period the aviation element flew 2,779 blade hours in support of the brigade. Their missions included resupply, visual reconnaissance, pursuit flights, sniper missions, psyop missions (leaflet drops and loud speaker broadcasts), night hawk, night hunter, ranger insertions and extractions, and courier flights.

(3) B/3-17 Air Cavalry Troop provided direct support for elements of the brigade.

(4) Brigade requirements for CH-54 helicopters were provided by the 25th Infantry Division on a mission basis.
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1. (C) Chemical Operations: During the reporting period the brigade chemical section continued personnel detection operations, application of riot control agent (RCA), and defoliation in support of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division operations.

   (1) Personnel Detection - XM3 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD)

      (a) During the reporting period there were 569 missions flown for a total flying time of 474 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1. The results of these missions were reported to S2, 3rd Brigade.

      (b) With the wide acceptance of the improved model of the APD, the older XM2 (XPD) detectors are currently being withdrawn from the country.

      (c) Maintenance problems have been reduced to a minimum with the relocation of operations to Tan An Airfield. The detectors are now subject to less transportation and less exposure to rain and dust hazards. Also, with the authorization for two detectors, detailed maintenance can be performed at general support level on one machine, without reducing the mission capability of the section.

      (d) During the reporting period, sniffing results continued to be successful in locating the enemy and denying him the ability to remain undetected. Considerable success has been achieved despite the fact that the enemy has broken down into smaller groups. The only problems experienced in proper utilization of the sniffing device are due to idiosyncrasies in pilot habits in low-level flight and lack of pilot familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of the machine. In addition to determining the speed and direction of the wind, the pilot must maintain a standardized technique of low level flight at 80 knots and make gradual turns to prevent the machine from sniffing the exhaust fumes of the aircraft. Long An Province's dense population makes valid read-outs often difficult to obtain.

   (2) Riot Control Agent Operations:

      (a) During the reporting period there was one mission flown utilizing bulk CS gas. On 24 July 1969, 17 drums of bulk CS were dropped covering the area from coordinates XS 42966 to XS 41566. This represents 4,000 lbs of CS2, 5,363 lbs of CS1 was utilized in the area southwest of VC Island (vicinity XL4772) to prevent enemy infiltration.

      (b) There were 21 E-158 Tactical Clusters expended during the reporting period. These were employed on point type targets developed from sniffing readings and visually sighted potential enemy positions. In one case, four cannisters were employed on preparation of an LZ. A potential application, such as supporting
troops in contact, is being considered and the section can maintain 15 minute reaction time 24 hours a day, to apply CS. A new experimental CS munition is being sought to use in lieu to E-158s when the area coverage offered by the E-158s is not desired. The XM54 is a standard burning type (Beer Can construction) CS grenade with a 12 second delay fuse. This enables the munition to be employed from high altitudes without affecting its burning time on target. 40mm CS rounds for the M-79 grenade launchers are readily available and the section maintains a sufficient amount on hand to supply battalion and smaller units upon request.

(3) Defoliation:

(a) In July 1969, one helicopter spray was completed expending 240 gallons of agent orange covering 33 hectares in the area of the "Eagles Beak", vicinity X3 5877.

(b) Tan Tru, Con Giuoc, and Rach Kien base camps have been supplied with herbicide, along with technical assistance in applying the agent to foliage around their perimeters. 165 gallons of agent white have been expended, with coverage not complete to date.

a. Personnel.

(1) (U) Infantry Unit Working With Air Cushion Vehicle (ACV).

OBSERVATION: Infantry elements with experience in ACV operations obtained better results.

EVALUATION: The greatest success experienced by the ACV Unit during the reporting period was obtained while working with units that had previously conducted operations in conjunction with the ACVs. The relationship between the ACV Commander, crew and the on board Infantry Squad is identical to that relationship between an armored cavalry platoon leader and his organic Infantry squad. Unit operational effectiveness, coordination of support elements, and efficient command and control result from experience and development of standing operating procedures. Infantry elements operating with ACVs for the first time require a 30 minute briefing and a period of practical exercise in communications and command and control before engaging in actual operations.

RECOMMENDATION: Now that each major command in the brigade has small units experienced in ACV operations, if possible, these same platoons should be detailed for future ACV missions. Additionally, organic infantry should be a part of any future ACV organization. The size of this organic infantry element should depend on the number of ACVs in the troop. A ten man squad should be authorized for each ACV.

(2) (C) Replacement Personnel

OBSERVATION: Success of the ACV unit "logistical skills on the job training program" is reflected in increased operational use of vehicles.

EVALUATION: Replacement maintenance personnel (turbine engine, airframe, hydraulic, and avionic repairmen) who have completed Advanced Individual Training can rapidly adapt to the uncommon aspects of ACV maintenance in a 45 day overlap with individuals they are replacing.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Maintenance OJT program be continued and that replacement personnel be assigned for duty at least 45 days prior to the DEROS of the man they are to replace.

(3) (C) Medical Personnel Assignments

OBSERVATION: The Brigade Surgeon's Office advises the Adjutant General's Office on all medical personnel assignments within the Brigade.
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EVALUATION: Coordination between these two offices has played a large role in the accomplishment of the Brigade's mission. It has been determined that medical personnel can be most effectively utilized when the first six months of their tour are spent with a field unit. Supervision of medical personnel assignment has been a function of the Brigade Surgeon's Office.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Brigade Surgeon's Office continue to advise the Adjutant General's Office on the assignment of all medical personnel throughout the Brigade.

b. (C) Operations

(1) (C) Reconnaissance of an Airborne Target.

OBSERVATION: When the C&C helicopter recon a planned air assault target for any length of time, small groups of VC/NVA, forewarned of the impending assault, will attempt to evade.

EVALUATION: The airborne concept of US forces is so familiar to the enemy that by observing the C&C helicopter over an area they are often able to secure a planned air assault target, and escape the target area before the arrival of the escort gunships and assault troops.

RECOMMENDATION: That the C&C helicopter, when possible, recon the planned air assault target with gunships of a Light Fire Team (LFT) on station to destroy these small groups of VC/NVA attempting to elude or evade the C&C aircraft's observation.

2. (C) Enemy Warning Devices

OBSERVATION: The VC/NVA are using noise making warning devices at resting areas and commando liaison routes.

EVALUATION: The VC/NVA, wishing to avoid contact around bunkered rest areas, often use trip wire activated noise making devices, which "pop" like clicking caps, to warn of the presence of US forces. These are used instead of booby traps on access routes into resting areas to minimize endangering VC/NVA troops otherwise unfamiliar with the area.

RECOMMENDATION: When these noise making warning devices are discovered, US troops should be alert to a possible rest area and rapidly advance to prevent enemy escape and to deny him routes out of the area.

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Claymore Mines and Trip Flares

Observation: Claymore mines are often employed by U.S. forces in areas where observation cannot be maintained, thus allowing the enemy to pass through the killing zone before the Claymore is detonated.

Evaluation: Claymore mines can be effectively employed in areas where constant visibility is not possible by placing trip flares within the killing zone. The flare should be tied to a stake. The trip wire must be of sufficient height above the ground to prevent accidental detonation by small animals. Personnel must immediately detonate the Claymore mine when a trip flare is set off.

Recommendation: Trips flares be used in conjunction with Claymore mines in areas of limited visibility.

Skimmer Operation

Observation: The Viet Cong can avoid detection by the larger River Patrol Boats by hiding in thick nipa palm and small canals along the river shores.

Evaluation: The Skimmer is a seventeen foot run-about boat powered by an eighty-five horsepower outboard engine. It is armed with two M-60 machine guns, one M-49 grenade launcher, and four M-16 rifles. The crew consists of four men. This combination of a small, light-weight boat, high powered engine, and automatic weapons makes the Skimmer an ideal vessel for waterborne operations at night. It may be used as security for larger boats, an ambush vessel, and as a reconnaissance boat. The Skimmer has proven to be highly effective in finding and killing the enemy. The Viet Cong often think the Skimmer is a sampan and walk unsuspiciously up to it. It is best employed with reconnaissance units which patrol and ambush along the rivers.

Recommendation: That Skimmer Operations be used more extensively along the major rivers and tributaries.

Nipa Palm Cutting Operations

Observation: Local VC guerrillas are afraid of U.S. units and will not Chieu Hoi until U.S. forces depart the area.

Evaluation: During the reporting period, 2-60th Inf conducted two nipa palm cutting operations in conjunction with District RF and PF forces. In both cases, a targeted village/hamlet area was cordoned by U.S. forces for a
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three day period. During the day, nipa cutting was conducted by US and RF/PP units with local civilians. Chainsaws, "Bush King" saws, and machetes were utilized. At night, the US units withdrew from the cutting area and set up a seal. In both cases, local VC Chieu Hoi to the District forces after US units had left the area. The Hoi Chans stated that they were afraid to surrender to US forces and had hidden in bunkers for three days without food or water. They went on to say that this particular operation and other US operations in the area influenced them to Chieu Hoi.

RECOMMENDATION: That future US operations be followed up by an intensive Psyop Campaign utilizing GVN forces with the emphasis on the Chieu Hoi theme.

(6) (C) The Effect of Air Pressure on the Velocity of Shrapnel.

OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, an Air Cushion Vehicle struck two booby traps during an operation in the Plain of Reeds.

EVALUATION: Although both booby traps did superficial damage to bags, decks, and ballast tanks, there were no casualties on board the ACV (Infantry troops were riding the side docks during both incidents) and the handling and performance characteristics of the vehicle were not impaired. The velocity of the shrapnel after it had passed through the vehicle's thin aluminum skin and bondalite paneling was significantly lower than would be expected. It is felt that the vehicle's down draft was responsible for this significant reduction in velocity.

RECOMMENDATION: That the effects of overpressure and air turbulence be researched as an effective dissipator of shrapnel.

(7) (C) Logistical Capability of the Air Cushion Vehicle Unit.

OBSERVATION: Although the primary role of the Air Cushion Vehicle Unit is reconnaissance, security, and raid operations, its inherent load carrying capacity can lend considerable flexibility to any operation requiring movement of troops, supplies, and equipment.

EVALUATION: During the reporting period, two rifle companies were relocated in multiple lifts covering overland distances of six to eight kilometers. An 81mm mortar, basic load of ammunition, and crew were relocated over six kilometers of marginal terrain in twenty minutes without reducing the ACV operational load. The on board infantry conducted a sweep of the site selected for relocation prior to disembarking the mortar squad.

RECOMMENDATION: That supported commanders continue to challenge and exploit the Air Cushion Vehicle Unit for support in imaginative combat and
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auxiliary combat service support roles.

(8) (C) Tu Dia Signs

OBSERVATION: Tu Dia ("You Die") signs are placed on the perimeter of thickly wooded areas to warn civilians and others of the presence of booby traps.

EVALUATION: The VC use Tu Dia signs in much the same manner the US units use minefield markings; however, in many areas marked by Tu Dia signs no booby traps actually exist. A Tu Dia area could be booby trapped to harass troop movement, protect a cache site, protect a rest area, or provide early warning. If booby traps are located in an area marked with Tu Dia signs, they are generally found within 50 meters of the Tu Dia markers and along existing trails, paths and dikes. Most Tu Dia areas will show signs of recent enemy movement or occupation.

RECOGNITION: Tu Dia areas must be checked closely since in most cases enemy activity does exist or has existed in the area. Valuable intelligence can be gained as to the methods of operation of the VC by determining the actual use of the Tu Dia area by the enemy. These areas should not be avoided merely because of the possibility of booby traps.

(9) (O) Engagement of Night Targets

OBSERVATION: When engaging targets at night with small arms fire, US units consistently fire high.

EVALUATION: It is very difficult at night to determine the actual ground level when engaging a target. Because of the inability of some US troops to do this, they do not have confidence in their ability to engage night targets, and consequently fail to place effective fire on the target.

RECOGNITION: That more night fire training be given to basic trainees and that troops be instructed to mix tracer and ball ammunition in their magazines to improve their control at night.

(10) (C) Enemy Contact on Ambush Patrol

OBSERVATION: In recent operations it has been noted that the enemy will fire on a unit's holding position during the last remaining minutes of daylight.
EVALUATION: The VC will fire on a unit during the last minutes of daylight as it moves from its holding position to the night ambush site. In doing this the VC hope to inflict casualties, cause confusion, and delay the unit's movement to the night ambush site.

RECOMMENDATION: That units delay moving out of daylight holding positions until it is completely dark.

(11) (c) Laying a 4.2" Mortar in Delta Terrain

OBSERVATION: When employing a 4.2" mortar in the Delta, often it will be found that the ground is too soft to form a firm foundation for the baseplate. When firing with this type of base, the baseplate will slide to such an extent as to necessitate the baseplate being dug up and the tube being re-laid frequently. Relaying a tube at night under Delta conditions is often a difficult and lengthy process.

EVALUATION: If mortars are to be employed in a static position, such as a base camp defense, a concrete firing platform can be constructed in two to three days. In the center of the platform should be a recess large enough to hold eight inches of sand and a 2½ truck tire into which the baseplate will be placed. This type of construction will allow at least 500 rounds to be fired per tube without digging up the baseplate and completely prevents any movement of the baseplate during fire missions.

RECOMMENDATION: That other units be made aware of this technique for laying a 4.2" mortar.

(12) (c) Accuracy of the 4.2" Mortar on a Traversing Fire Mission

OBSERVATION: After the 4.2" mortar FDC computes a traversing fire mission, it tells the tube to fire a certain number of rounds on a given deflection and then to traverse the gun, using the traversing hand wheel, a certain number of turns to the left or right and fire again. The number of traverses is dependent upon the size of the target and the number of rounds to be expended. This method is quick but greatly reduces accuracy because the recoil of each round will shift the mortar. Therefore, after the traverse begins, there is no way of knowing exactly how far the gun has been moved by the recoil.

EVALUATION: To insure the rounds impact in the target area the FDC should not send the traverses to the gun in "turns" but instead should plot each...
traverse, compute the firing deflection, and send the set of deflections to the guns. This will ensure that the mortar moves only the desired number of miles each time it is fired.

RECOMMENDATION: That other US units be made aware of this method of plotting a traversing fire mission.

(13) Nippa-Flame Operations

OBSERVATION: Nippa-Flame operations during the wet season have not been successful.

EVALUATION: During the reporting period, 445 gallons of diesel fuel were employed in the Eagle's Peak Area (Vicinity XS 5877) in an attempt to burn off an area. The diesel was delivered by the use of the Agavanco spray unit mounted in a UH-1 helicopter. LWH's followed the spray ship, dropping white phosphorous grenades in an attempt to set the target area afire. The target area was covered with dead nippa palm, but was partially wet due to the constant rain of the Delta monsoon. The ground was also saturated from months of rain. The nippa palm could not be ignited in spite of repeated attempts to do so.

RECOMMENDATION: That if helicopter Nippa Flame operations are to be successful, they must be accomplished at the height of the dry season when the nippa and surrounding terrain has had ample time to dry completely.

(14) Employment of Snipers

OBSERVATION: The brigade sniper program has been very effective during the reporting period.

EVALUATION: In the 3rd Brigade each battalion is authorized 4 sniper teams, each team consisting of two men. These teams are employed as battalion assets and are under the direct control of the battalion commander. The snipers are utilized exclusively in an offensive role and their missions are tailored so that they function in a purely sniper role. This method of employment has worked very well for the brigade and in October the 3rd Brigade snipers accounted for 32 enemy killed. This figure represents a marked increase over results from previous months.

RECOMMENDATION: That other units be made aware of this method of employing their sniper teams.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG5 OSFC-65 (R) (U)

(15) (C) Night Hunter Operations

OBSERVATION: Night Hunter Operations have proven effective in providing immediate reaction to Intelligence Targets at night.

EVALUATION: The Night Hunter Operation was developed to provide rapid reaction and exploitation of targets acquired at night by strategically located Ground Surveillance Radar sets. The Night Hunter team is comprised of the following four elements: An Air Cavalry Light Scout Team consisting of one AH-1G Cobra Gunship and one UH-1B Command and Control helicopter with Xenon Searchlight, crew served, Starlight Scope and a 7.62mm minigun; Artillery Support; Ground Surveillance Radar support provided by the L/TPS-25 and L/PPS-5 radar sets; and an Instant Reaction Force consisting of 6-8 Rangers. When a Night Hunter target (enemy sighting of 5-10 personnel) is picked up on radar, the Ranger team becomes airborne and heads toward the target area. Artillery fire can be placed on the target either before or after the insertion of the Ranger team. The second method is preferred because it preserves the element of surprise. Before the Ranger element inserts, two White Phosphorous rounds are fired to mark the target, and then continuous illumination is fired while the Ranger team is on the ground. The Ranger OIC orbits the area and adjusts artillery for the team. This also allows the Xenon Searchlight to be used in spotting targets in areas not covered effectively by artillery illumination. The Night Hunter has proven to be an extremely effective means of engaging radar sighted targets at night. The success of the Night Hunter Operation depends on the coordinated efforts and reaction time of the four elements of the Night Hunter Team. Average reaction time after notification of scramble to Ranger insertion is twenty minutes.

RECOMMENDATION: That other units be made aware of the techniques involved in the Night Hunter Operations.

c. Training

(1) (C) Sniper Equipment

OBSERVATION: Sniper equipment frequently needs a higher echelon of cleaning and maintenance than the individual sniper is authorized to perform.

EVALUATION: The effects of weather and terrain in the Delta frequently cause the sniper's weapon and sight to become fouled or inoperative. The weapon and sniper then must given a non-scheduled standdown while the equipment is taken to the Division sniper school for maintenance.

RECOMMENDATION: That additional training be given to the individual sniper so that he is able to perform maintenance and repair of his own equipment; or
that a qualified armor be assigned to the Brigade to maintain sniper weapons and equipment.

(2) Replacement Training

OBSERVATION: It has been found that replacements assigned to maneuver battalions often make serious errors while conducting combat operations because they did not understand unit SOP's.

EVALUATION: To combat this problem, mandatory classes were organized for all replacements. These classes were in addition to instruction presented at the Brigade replacement training center. The classes were designed to instruct the replacements in the battalion's operating techniques. These classes were taught by small unit leaders. Subject areas included ambush techniques, airmobile operations, booby traps, prevention of skin disease, and artillery adjustment. Upon completion of the training, the replacements were able to adjust to combat operations more rapidly and effectively.

RECOMMENDATION: That each replacement receive orientation training on the procedures used within the battalion before he participates in combat operations. For the first 48 hours following assignment to a battalion, the new replacement should not be involved in combat operations.

(3) (C) ACV Driver Training

OBSERVATION: Current location and missions of the ACV Unit have seriously hampered the OJT driver training program.

EVALUATION: Although there is no immediate problem in availability of competent ACV drivers, three of the five operators present for duty DEROS in January 1970. Conduct of a basic driver training course in the vicinity of Ben Luc is impossible because of the tactical situation in the area.

RECOMMENDATION: That replacement drivers be trained by the ACV contractor prior to deployment to Vietnam.

d. Intelligence: NONE.

e. Logistics:

(1) (C) M-548 Cargo Carrier

OBSERVATION: The M-548 Cargo Carrier is a more effective recovery vehicle than the M-578 Recovery Vehicle in the marsh and paddy areas of the Delta during the rainy season.
EVALUATION: During the wet season, the Delta is largely a sea of clay mud. The M-578 Recovery Vehicle is virtually useless off the road because of its broad base design and high capability of off road maneuver due to its high off road design.

RECOMMENDATION: That the M-548 Cargo Carrier be made available to mechanized units as augmentation to maintenance recovery sections, particularly in the Delta.

(2) (C) Use of Non-Organic Transportation

OBSERVATION: It has been determined from the recent relocation of the 3d Brigade Supply Point from Dong Tam to Tan An that close and detailed coordination must be effected when non-organic transportation is utilized.

EVALUATION: Because there was a limited amount of non-organic vehicles available for use by the 3rd Brigade, it was necessary to obtain the maximum amount of use from each one. It was determined that in order to move great quantities of supplies in a short period of time, with limited resources, it was necessary to split the trailer assets into three groups, with only one tractor for three trailers. One group was loading, one was unloading, while still another group was on the road. This method resulted in a continuous movement of the trucks, enabling the Brigade to move large amounts of supplies with a minimum of equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: That this management technique be incorporated into instruction at the US Army Transportation School.

f. Organization

(1) (C) Reorganization of the ACV Unit

OBSERVATION: Because of the location and mission of the ACV Unit, a minimum of three commissioned officers (CO, XO, and Maintenance Officer) are essential to sustain unit operations and administration.

EVALUATION: The ACV Unit has all of the administrative, supply, and operational requirements of a separate company. Air Cushion Vehicle maintenance and technical supply activities include a direct support capability. Conduct of on the job training of maintenance and crew personnel programs, property book management, support of remote bases, recovery operations, liaison, coordination, and command and control cannot be realistically vested in one commissioned officer and one maintenance warrant officer as indicated in NTOE 17-109T.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

RECOMMENDATION: That the original recommendation of an authorized MTOE strength of three officers (Commanding Officer, O-4, MOS 1204; Executive Officer, O-3, MOS 1204; and Maintenance Officer, O-2, MOS 1204 be re-evaluated based on current ACV Unit needs.

2. (C) Security of Brigade Headquarters

OBSERVATION: The Separate Brigade TOE does not provide for the security of the Brigade Headquarters.

EVALUATION: The current TOE deletes the rifle platoon from the Brigade Headquarters Company. This element was designed to provide security for the Headquarters. Since the Separate Brigade Headquarters is not normally co-located with one of its maneuver battalions, the security of the Headquarters requires a levy from the maneuver battalions.

RECOMMENDATION: That the TOE be changed to include a rifle platoon for security.

g. Other

1. (C) Dermatologic Diseases

OBSERVATION: The number of man days lost due to dermatologic diseases can be kept at an acceptably low level by limiting the duration of operations in the field, contingent, of course, on the tactical situation.

EVALUATION: The man days lost due to dermatologic diseases throughout the Brigade compared very favorable with the man days lost figures of last year for a unit of comparable size within the 9th Infantry Division. The favorable rate during the height of the rainy season this year was due to vigorous adherence by commanders to the policy of limiting combat operations to 48 hours coupled with the use of griseofulvin prophylaxis and frequent foot inspections by the battalion surgeons.

RECOMMENDATION: That the command policy of limiting operations in paddy areas to 48 hours followed by a 24 hour drying out period be continued as the most important method of preventing dermatologic diseases.

2. (C) AN/MRC-69 VHF Communication Set

OBSERVATION: The AN/MRC-112, VHF Communication Van, 4 channel capability proved insufficient to provide adequate communications to the Brigade and its fire support bases.
CONFIDENTIAL

16 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

EVALUATION: The demand for circuits was too great and a strict limit of these demands would have impaired the Brigade's mission. The reliable AN/WRC-69 was made available to the Brigade from the outgoing 9th Signal Battalion and the 532d Signal Battalion in lieu of the 6 channel AN/WRC-127 authorized by the NCO. Systems were installed in each maneuver battalion as well as the 532d Maintenance Company of the 99th CS Support Battalion. This increased circuit quality and reliability and also provided greater frequency range.

RECOMMENDATION: That the AN/WRC-69 VHF Communication set or equivalent be made available when considering communications requirements for the brigade headquarters and battalion fire support bases.

(3) (C) Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC)

OBSERVATION: The means of coordination and transfer of mission essential data between US and ARVN artillery has been inadequate.

EVALUATION: It has been found in several instances during the reporting period that a means of combined fire support coordination for US and ARVN artillery was completely lacking. This precluded massing of fires, allowed needless duplication of effort, and did not provide for the full use of fire support capabilities within the province. In some cases units were not receiving fire support when such support was available because the proper agencies were not being advised of the request. All of this has been eliminated by the initiation of the Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC). Working directly with Vietnamese fire support agencies and being co-located within the Sector TCC, the CFSCC has provided the necessary link between the allied forces to insure the best utilization of all fire support available throughout the province. In most cases the CFSCC is the first US agency to receive the requirement for additional fire support. This requirement is then passed on to the Vietnamese or US fire support agency capable of providing this support.

RECOMMENDATION: That Combined Fire Support Coordination Centers be initiated throughout South Vietnam in order to provide the best possible fire support for both Vietnamese and US Forces.

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15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William N. Ciccio
LTC, INF
Deputy Commander

13 Inc1

I. 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division
   Organization
   Task Organization and Locations
II. Roster of Key Personnel
III. tactical Area of Interest (TACI)
IV. Personnel and Administration Data
V. Enemy Unit Locations
VI. Combat Statistics
VII. G3 Air Operational Support Chart
VIII. 2nd Battalion 4th Field Artillery ORL
IX. 99th GS Support Battalion ORL
X. 571st Engineer Company ORL
XI. 56th Signal Company ORL
XII. 485th Military Police Company ORL
XIII. Air Cushion Vehicle Unit ORL
Incis 2 - 5 and 8 - 13 wd HQ, DA
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31 October 1969, RCS CJFOR - 65 (R2)

DA: HQ 25th Inf Div, APO San Francisco 96225

THRU: Commanding General, II Force COM, ATTN: AVFSC-RD-H, APO San Francisco 96266
Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHSC(DST), APO San Francisco 96376
Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GP6P-LT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/John L. Harbom
LTC, GS
Acting Chief of Staff
AVFBC-RE-H (30 Nov 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for
the Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPG-65 (R2)

DA, HQ II FORCEN, APO San Francisco 962661 5 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVFSG(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the period
ending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D.G. MACDONALD
ILT. AGC
Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Infantry Units Working With Air Cushion Vehicles", page 30, paragraph 2a(1); concur. Infantry elements experienced in Air Cushion Vehicles (ACV) operations should be detailed for future ACV missions. Additionally, organic infantry should be considered when determining a part of any future ACV organizations. The size of this organic infantry element would depend on the number of ACV's in the troop.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Replacement Personnel", page 30, paragraph 2a(2); nonconcur. Assigning maintenance replacement personnel for duty OJT 45 days prior to the B.getDrawable of his predecessor is considered impractical and uneconomical. The presence of men on board for performance of the same job for 45 days would present a great unit personnel overstrength on one end of the pipeline and a critical personnel shortage on the other. The basic concept is good but the resulting diminishing efficiency due to the prolonged duplication of man-hours on the same job escalates the cost of performing the task. Establishing an accelerated OJT course at the organizational level is highly recommended. Above information has been related to the unit.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "Skimmer Operations", page 32, paragraph 2b(4). Concur with recommendation that skimmer operations be used more extensively along the major rivers and tributaries. Because of its size, high powered engine and fire power, the skimmer is an ideal vessel for waterborne operations and should be used extensively for security of larger boats, an ambush vessel and a reconnaissance boat.

   d. (U) Reference item concerning "Nipa Palm Cutting Operations", page 32, paragraph 2b(5); concur. Existing PSYOP guidance publications recognize the increased effectiveness of messages and operations developed considering the vulnerabilities of a target audience and targeted on that group over general PSYOP campaigns and messages delivered at random. Coordination and planning to broadcast specific appeals under particular conditions allows preparation of recorded messages to fit the situation. The recommendation is included in present PSYOP's policy.
AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, ROS CPOR-65 (R2)(U)

c. (U) Reference item concerning "The Effect of Air Pressure on the Velocity of Shrapnel", page 33, paragraph 2b(6); concur. However, a study is not necessary as it is a well known fact that friction increases as density increases which results in drag on moving objects.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Tu Dia Signs", page 34, paragraph 2b(8); concur. A thorough search for intelligence indicators in a Tu Dia (You Die) marked area should be made during all operations. Timely and accurate reporting of this information will assist the intelligence section in refining the enemy order of battle.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Laying a 4.2" Mortar in Delta Terrain", page 35, paragraph 2b(11); concur. The use of a concrete firing platform to fire the 4.2" mortar in Delta terrain is a good idea. This information will be considered for inclusion in USARV's Battlefield Reports - Tips for Commanders.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Accuracy of the 4.2" Mortar on a Traversing Fire Mission", page 35, Paragraph 2b(12); concur. To insure that the mortar rounds impact in the target area, the FDC should not send the traverses to the weapon in turns, but instead should plot each traverse, compute the firing deflection and send the set of deflections to the mortars. This information will be considered for inclusion in USARV's Battlefield Report - Tips for Commanders.

I. (U) Reference item concerning "Employment of Snipers", page 36, paragraph 2b(14); concur. This item was covered in a USARV Letter, Subject: Employment of Snipers; dated 6 December 1969, which was distributed to the units in the field.

j. (C) Reference item concerning "Sniper Equipment", page 37, paragraph 2c(1); nonconcur. The sniper rifle is a sensitive weapon which can become inaccurate or inoperative if not maintained properly. All higher echelon cleaning and maintenance must be carried out by the qualified gunsmith assigned to the unit.

k. (C) Reference item concerning "ACV Driver Training", page 38, paragraph 2c(3): Concur with suggestion that ACV replacement drivers be trained prior to deployment; however, there is no equipment available to be used for training in CONUS.

l. (C) Reference item concerning "M-548 Cargo Carrier", page 38, paragraph 2c(1); nonconcur.

(1) The M-548 Cargo Carrier was not designed to be used as a primary recovery vehicle. However, it can be used in limited recovery operations for vehicles of the same or smaller weight by use of its front winch.
This principle applies to any vehicle with front and/or rear winches. The 6-ton M-548 vehicle cannot be employed as a substitute for the 27-ton M-578 vehicle. It is highly recommended that the principle of recovering a vehicle with a "like" or "heavier" vehicle be employed utilizing the most suitable vehicle from the existing authorized inventory, especially during light or unusual recovery operations.

(2) Many units have experienced difficulties with the M-578 Recovery Vehicle. Using the M-548, which is basically an M113A1 fitted with a cargo rack, is not a good solution. USARV now has an ENSURE project to convert an M113A1 to a recovery vehicle which is a good solution to this type problem.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of Non-Organic Transportation", page 39, paragraph 2a(2); concur. However, tractor trailers are normally utilized at a two to one ratio by the Army and a four to one ratio by civilian industry. For line haul operations, a two to one ratio is normally ideal for the military. In short haul operations, however, with limited NRMS available and good roads to travel over, a three to one ratio can be advantageous. While this has only limited applications, it adds to transportation flexibility and should be added to the Transportation School's curriculum.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Reorganization of the ACV Unit", page 39, paragraph 2f(1); nonconcur.

(1) At present there are no spaces available within USARV resources to finance the proposed increase of one officer within the platoon.

(2) This headquarters does not feel it appropriate for a platoon size unit of this type to have three officers assigned to it.

p. (U) Reference item concerning "Dermatologic Diseases", page 40, paragraph 2g(1); concur. This item was published in USARV Training Newsletter No. 6-69, cited 19 November 1969.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "AN/MRG-69 VHF Communication Set", page 40, paragraph 2g(2); concur. The Radio Terminal Set AN/MRG-69 is a
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AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG5 GSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

1st Generation Army Communications assemblages that is being replaced by
various 2nd Generation ACOMS equipment. The 3d Brigade, 9th Inf Div is
authorized to retain the AN/AMC-69's on hand until such time the new
equipment becomes available.

r. (C) Reference item concerning "Combined Fire Support Coordination
Center (CFSCC), page 41, paragraph 2g(3); concur. Combined fire support
coordination centers should be initiated throughout South Vietnam for the
purpose of providing the best possible fire support for both Vietnamese
and US forces. This item will be forwarded to MACV for their consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy cln:
3d/9th Inf Div
II FTV
MACV J3-051
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTY
CPT, AGC
Ass AG
CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATION

ASSIGNED UNITS

3d Brigade
6-31 Inf
2-47 Inf (Mech)
2-60 Inf
5-60 Inf
2-4 Arty
65th Inf Det (Combat Tracker)
E/75th Inf (Ranger)
US Army Air Cushion Vehicle Troop, RVN
45th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
19th Mil Hist Det
19th PI Det
39th Chem Det
493d MI Det
99th SP Spt Bn
56th Sig Co
571st Eng Co
483d MP Plt
264th FI Det (Radar)
276th Arty Det (Radar)

ATTACHED UNITS

B/3-17 Cav

Incl 1

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Parent Unit

361st Airfield Control Det. 165th Avn Grp
Weather Det 5th Weather Sqdn
ALO/FAC 19th Tac Spt Sqdn

4th Civil Affairs Plt 2d CA Co
Eng Det (Water Supply) 82d Eng Co
ADA Sec (Quad 50) 5-2d Arty
ADA Stry (40mm) 5-2d Arty (1 Plt)
FA Btry 155mm (SP) (GSR) 5-2d Arty (Mission Basis)
FA Btry 155mm (T) (GSR) B&G/5-42d Arty
A Stry/7-8th Arty (8"/175) (GSR) 335th RR Co
Radio Research Plt 36th and 137th Med Det (KJ), on an area basis
Med Det (Den Svc) 20th FM Unit, on an area basis
Med Det (FM) 44th Med Bde, on an area basis
Med Det (Vet) MACV
Hel Amb Det Allocated by USARV G5
Interpreters
Kit Carson Scouts MACV
NID (14th ARVN)
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TASK ORGANIZATION AND UNIT LOCATION AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1969**

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5-2
A/2-4 Arty
6-31 Inf
   A Co
   B Co
   C Co
   D Co
   E Co
D/2-4 Arty
A/5-42 (155mm)
B/5-42 (155mm)
C/7-8 (8½/175mm)

Rach Kien
Can Giuc
Can Giuc
Can Giuc
Can Giuc
Can Giuc
Can Giuc
Can Giuc
Tan Tru
Thu Thua
Ben Luc

XS 744698
XS 833727
XS 833727
XS 833727
XS 833727
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XS 584702
XS 637767

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**O.P.D. STATISTICS**

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Incl 6
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### WOUNDED IN ACTION

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**S3 AIR OPERATIONAL SUMMARY**

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Inc1 7
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Jul 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division