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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (9 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694203

17 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

Robert E. Lynch
Colonel, ADC
Acting The Adjutant General

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Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. During the period ending 31 October 1969, battalions of the 2d Infantry Division Artillery participated in the following significant activities:

(1) 1st Battalion (HJ), 12th Artillery.
   (a) Eighth Army Technical Proficiency Inspection, 5-7 August 1969.
   (b) CINCUSARPAC Nuclear Surety Survey, 9 September 1969.
   (c) CFX Focus Lens (8th Army)
   (d) FTX's in preparation for annual operational readiness test of firing battery.

(2) 1st Battalion (105mm How), 15th Artillery. One unit at a time, firing batteries of the battalion occupied selected field positions to support DMZ defensive operations (OPERATION KTCHAO) as a part of the contingency plan. Firing batteries in rotation conducted Security and Counterespionage Operations South of the DMZ (SCSST).

(3) 7th Battalion (105mm How), 17th Artillery. One unit at a time, firing batteries of the battalion occupied selected field positions to support DMZ defensive operations (OPERATION LSAFRAC) as a part of the contingency plan.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG 154-65 (12)

(a) Firing batteries in rotation conducted Security and Counterespionage Operations South of the DMZ River (CXL-1).

(b) Participated in eight field training exercises.

(4) 5th Battalion (105mm How), 38th Artillery. One unit at a time, firing batteries of the battalion occupied selected field positions to support DMZ defensive operations (CXL-1, DMZCC) as a part of the contingency plan.

(a) Firing batteries in rotation conducted Security and Counterespionage Operations South of the DMZ River (CXL-1).

(b) Panoramic photographs of firing positions and assembly areas were taken to supplement reconnaissance.

(c) New area time adjustment procedures were used with the 520 WAP fuse.

(d) Annual operational readiness tests of firing batteries, 26-30 October 1959.

(5) 6th Battalion (155mm-8in How), 37th Artillery.

(a) 6th Army Technical Proficiency Inspection, 8 September 1959.

(b) CGPAC/USARPAC Nuclear Surety Survey, 9-11 September 1959.

b. Personnel trained as radar crewmen operated 30-inch Xenon searchlights in support of the DMZ barrier defense.

Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, evaluations, and recommendations

a. Lessons learned for the organic battalions included the following.

(1) 1st Battalion (W), 12th Artillery.

(a) Personnel: None

(b) Intelligence: None

(c) Operations: None

(d) Organization: At present, the battalion is organized under a modified TO which provides for one firing battery headquarters while maintaining the personnel and equipment for two firing batteries with no corresponding reduction in the mission of general support. This places a severe restriction on the command and control system of a nuclear capable battalion.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division Artillery, 
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RSC OS001-65 (32) 

committed in support of the DMZ defensive operations on a very wide front. 
As an interim solution, firing units equivalent to a battery have been oper- 
atlng directly under the command and control of the battalion headquarters. 

(1) Observation: As noted 

(2) Evaluation: Effective command and control system of a nuclear capable 
unit is a vital link in the force structure which should be re-examined on 
a periodic basis. While the personnel strength ceilings impose reduction in 
force structure, it appears prudent to reconstitute the command and control 
elements of HJ batteries organic to infantry division committed in the DMZ 
defensive operations. Assigning KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the US Army) 
personnel to the HJ battalion, thereby allocating US personnel strength 
equivalent to a HJ firing battery headquarters, appears to be a solution which 
would satisfy the requirement. 

(3) Recommendations: That KATUSA personnel be assigned to the HJ 
battalion, allowing for the reconstitution of two firing battery headquarters 
for the effective command and control procedures. 

(a) Training: None 

(b) Logistics: None 

(c) Communications: None 

(h) Material: None 

(4) Others: The battalion was rated SATISFACTORY in the 8th Army TIV 
and for GNUPAC/USARPAC Nuclear Surety Survey. 

- (2) 1st Battalion (105mm How), 15th Artillery. 

(a) Personnel: None 

(b) Intelligence: None 

(c) Operations: None 

(d) Organization: None 

(e) Training: Occupation of field positions in operational commitments 
in support of the DMZ defense provides excellent opportunities for inte- 
graded organizational training in a combat environment.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

(1) Observation: As noted

(2) Evaluation: None

(3) Recommendations: None

(f) Logistics: None

(g) Communications: None

(h) Material: None

(i) Other: None

(3) 7th Battalion (105mm How), 17th Artillery.

(a) Personnel: None

(b) Intelligence: None

(c) Operations: Security and Counterespionage Operations South of the DJIN River (SCCSI).

(1) Observation: In keeping with the secondary mission of field artillery units to fight as infantrymen, elements of the battalion were deployed along a portion of the DJIN River as infantrymen for security and counterespionage operations.

(2) Evaluation: SCOSI commitments provide excellent opportunities for maintaining proficiency in night observation and surveillance. However, the commitment is counter-productive in terms of maintaining field artillery proficiency.

(d) Organization: None

(e) Training: None

(f) Logistics: None

(g) Communications: None

(h) Material: None

(i) Other: None

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969, HUS 38A3 65 (42)

(a) 5th Battalion (105mm How), 38th Artillery.

(b) Personnel: None

(c) Intelligence: Use of panoramic photographs.

(1) Observation: Combat photographers equipped with 200mm lens were used to photograph artillery positions. Enlargement of photographs were used to supplement reconnaissance.

(2) Evaluation: Oblique photographs provide for the re-evaluation of the terrain which could be very valuable in supplementing reconnaissance.

(3) Recommendations: That commanders make wider use of panoramic photographs to supplement their reconnaissance.

(d) Operations: Use of the M564 M75 fuel setting factors for the M20 flame fuze.

(1) Observation: Use of the M564 M75 fuel setting tables published by Fort Sill in adjusting the height of burst of the M20 fuel fuze has proven successful in a limited evaluation. The use of the tables incorporating the area-time adjustment procedures using fuel quick until establishing a 100 meter bracket has significantly reduced the time required to bring effective fire on the target.

(2) Evaluation: Although the M564 M75 fuel has smaller HOB probable error and greater operational reliability, adjustment technique seems applicable to the M20 fuel.

(3) Recommendations: That tests be conducted to evaluate the possible adoption of the M564 M75 fuel delta-fuze setting table for the M20 fuel fuze.

(e) Organization: None

(f) Training: None

(g) Logistics: None

(h) Communications: None

(i) Material: None

(j) Other: None

(5) 6th Battalion (155mm-8in How), 37th Artillery.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969, ROS C:00:35 (U)

(a) Personnel: 155mm howitzer special weapons personnel.

(1) Observation: It is noted that special weapons personnel for the 155mm howitzer batteries are not designated in the TOE. Because these personnel and positions are not identifiable in the TOE, some difficulties have been experienced in meeting requirements of AR 611-15 (Personnel Reliability Program), on a timely basis particularly in the personnel requisition program.

(2) Evaluation: Identifying positions requiring the qualifications of AR 611-15 would greatly enhance the personnel requisitioning system. This problem is very acute in a short tour area with rapid personnel turnovers.

(3) Recommendations: That a system be instituted to correlate the requirements of AR 611-15 and the TOE for 155mm howitzer battery or similar to infantry division.

(b) Intelligence: None

c) Operation: None

d) Organization: None

e) Training: None

(f) Logistics: None

(g) Communications: None

(h) Material: None

(i) Other: None

b. Lessons learned for the 2d Infantry Division Artillery.

(1) Personnel: Searchlight operators.

(a) Observation: Radar crewmen assigned to Division Artillery operated six (6) 30-inch Xenon Searchlights along the LZ barrier fence in addition to the operation of assigned radars. The dual requirement was met by collocating radars & searchlights.

(b) Evaluation: The dual requirement places a disproportionate work load on the radar crewmen for operation & maintenance. Unless personnel trained and qualified in the operation of the searchlight are made available, the dual commitment has been the most feasible solution because of the similarity of the specialized tasks.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969, cassette CSM 0-65 (R2)

(c) Recommendation: That searchlight battery personnel be attached to division artillery units having requirements to provide searchlight support.

[Signature]

COL, FA
Commanding
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RAIDCO-O (4 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG 8 GSPOR-65 (HI)

DA, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, APO 96224 28 NOV 1969

TO: Commanding General, I Corps (Op), ATTN: HACKETT-OAT, APO 96358

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division Artillery.

2. Comments are as follows:

   a. Para 2a(1)(d), page 3 - Concur that two firing battery headquarters should be reconstituted. However, assignment of KATUSA personnel would result in only a temporary solution to the problem. A request for MOE change was submitted through channels by this headquarters on 18 October 1969.

   b. Para 2a(3)(a), page 4 - 2d Infantry Division Artillery units were relieved of the commitment to provide personnel for operations along the DMZ in River by 2d Infantry Division OPORD 7-70 (KICKAPOO).

   c. Para 2a(4)(b), page 5 - Concur.

   d. Para 2a(4)(c), page 5 - Concur.

   e. Para 2a(5)(a), page 6 - Concur.

   f. Para 2b - Non-concur - There are no excess spaces within 2d Infantry Division available for MOE action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT. AGC
ASST AG

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EAGOT-T (4 Nov 69) 2nd Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division Artillery for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters I Corps (Group), APO 96358

TO: Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, ATTN: GACO-MH,  
APO 96330

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Division Artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

EDWARD W. KROLL
Major AGC  
Deputy Adjutant General
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MKOO-NH (4 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division
        Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS QSPOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, APO 96301 28 JAN 70

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
    APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and forwarding
   endorsements. The following comments supplement the report.

2. (U) Reference item concerning 1st Battalion (HJ), 12th Artillery:
    Organization, page 2, para 2a(1)(d). Concur. The Commanding General,
    2d Infantry Division can direct a change of KATUSA allocation and
    assignment from within the Division to satisfy this requirement. The
    reconstitution of the second firing battery headquarters will require
    a MTOE submission which is initiated by the requesting unit. The
    18 Oct 69 submission referred to in para 2a of 1st Ind has not been
    received at this headquarters.

3. (U) Reference item concerning use of panoramic photographs, page
   5, para 2a(4)(b). Concur.

4. (C) Reference item concerning use of the M564 MTSQ fuse setting
    factors for the M520 fuse, page 5, para 2a(4)(c). Nonconcur. Procedure
    if adopted would be of limited value since the M520 fuse is being
    phased out of the inventory. As stocks are exhausted the M564 fuse will
    be issued.

5. (U) Reference item concerning 155mm howitzer special weapons
    personnel, page 6, para 2a(5)(a). Concur. Unit personnel offices,
    in conjunction with unit commanders, may identify Human Reliability
    positions within the 155mm howitzer battery MTOE. This identification
    will allow requisitions to be T-coded with an identification that
    replacements must meet the requirements of AR 611-15.

6. (U) Reference item concerning searchlight operators, page 6,
    para 2b(1). There are not sufficient searchlight operator personnel
    available to support the 2d Infantry Division Artillery requirement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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Copies furnished:
00, I Corps (Gp), APO 96358 (Ind only)
00, 2d Inf Div, APO 96221 (Ind only)
00, 2d Inf Div Art, APO 9622h (Ind only)

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GPO-427 ((4 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 2d Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Ass AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 2d Infantry Division Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 2d Infantry Division Artillery

4 November 1969

N/A

694203

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310