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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 2 May 1975; AGO ltr 2 May 1975

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (6 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694176

11 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

  
ROBERT E. LYNCH  
Colonel, AGC  
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as


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US Army Transportation School



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15. (U) A concerted effort to reduce the number of recurring reports within this headquarters through screening of requirements for individual reports was conducted during the quarter. The program resulted in the elimination of over 50% of these reports.

16. (U) On October 28-30, the command headquarters passed its annual general inspection conducted by the 1st Logistical Command Inspector General.

17. (U) The employment of the Movements Control Center (MCC) within the office of the ACofS, Transportation developed considerably during the quarter, with a field MCC established at Yung Ro Bay. Movement control was also assisted by the utilization of the "hot line" to Pleiku.

18. (C) Tonnages of cargo moved on the highway by motor transport means decreased steadily during this reporting period, largely due to the damage rendered to the highway by the monsoon rains. Rail performance fell considerably short of the tonnages programmed for the quarter.

19. (U) Project "Buddy" was implemented within the command in mid-September. The project implements portions of the ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program. A significant effort was made by all units of the command to provide Vietnamese Army personnel with training in logistical operations.

20. (C) Command enlisted strength showed a continual decline during the quarter. Officer strength remained fairly constant.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON  
APO 96238

AVCA QN-GO-H

19 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned of Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

THRU: Commanding General  
1st Logistical Command  
ATTN: AVCA GO-0  
APO 96384

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief  
United States Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-DT  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington D.C., 20310

The Operational Report, Lessons Learned of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15, USARV Regulation 525-15 and 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-15.

*Theme T. Everton*

THEME T. EVERTON  
COL, QMC  
Acting Commander

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FOR OT UT  
694176  
Inclosure

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SECTION I, OPERATIONS	
Summary of Significant Activities	1
ANNEXES	
A. Command Group	5
B. ACofS, Personnel	7
C. Special Assistant for Combat Security	21
D. ACofS, SP&O, Plans Branch	27
E. ACofS, SP&O, Operations Branch	29
F. Signal Section	31
G. ACofS, Services	33
H. Ammunition, Supply and Retrograde & Disposal	37
I. ACofS, Petroleum	51
J. ACofS, Maintenance	57
K. ACofS, Transportation	61
L. ACofS, Engineer	67
M. Comptroller	69
N. Civil Affairs	71
. Inspector General	73
P. Staff Chaplain	75
Q. Command Judge Advocate	77
R. Staff Provost Marshal	81
S. Public Information Office	83
T. Special Services	85

Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.

Inclosure 1, Significant Enemy Activities	87
Inclosure 2, After Action Report on Soldier Disturbance	93
Inclosure 3, Visitors to USASUPCOM, QN	95
Inclosure 4, Units Assigned or Attached to USASUPCOM, QN	101
SECTION II, Lessons Learned	
Personnel, Intelligence and Operations	103
Organization and Training	104
Logistics and Communications	105
Material and Other	106

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## SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (FOUO) Throughout the 92 days of the reporting period, the United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, continued its logistical operations supporting combat units within the northern half of the II Corps tactical zone. The command was subjected to a number of enemy attacks on installations, in addition to enemy interdictions of supply routes. Toward the end of the quarter, monsoon rains caused a number of substantial problems but at no time was the support command prevented from accomplishing its mission, which is to provide the combat soldier with continuous and effective logistical support.
2. (C) There was a marked increase in sniping incidents and small ambushes. The number of sniping incidents increased 300 per cent over the previous quarter. There was also a definite increase in harrassment activities against the pipeline. The number of sections of pipe damaged or destroyed was almost twice the May-July total. For the most part, the enemy employed tactics which minimized the chance of losses to his own forces.
3. (C) A security problem arose at the ammunition base depot (ABD) at Phu Tai Valley when the Commanding General of the Capital Republic of Korea (ROK) Infantry Division withdrew the company which had been stationed in the ABD area to perform a security mission. The night following the Korean withdrawal, the ABD was subjected to a successful sapper attack. The Korean unit was returned to the area two days later. Later in the quarter, when Korean forces were temporarily withdrawn from a security mission in the vicinity of Pump Station #4, US MP's moved into the area immediately to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the situation.
4. (C) In an effort to further improve the command's security, a number of coordination meetings between US and allied forces were held throughout the quarter. A series of weekly INTEL meetings was begun in September as a means for concerned units and agencies to exchange information. An overall review of logistical security throughout the command was completed on 13 August. Both streng points and weaknesses in the command's security effort were discussed at this time. A series of sapper demonstrations was held during the quarter as another means of upgrading the security effort.
5. (C) Anti-personnel radar was employed for a two week trial period in October and achieved considerable success in directing artillery fire against enemy targets in the upper Qui Nhon bay area.
6. (C) A number of unit moves took place during the quarter, including several activities under Operation Keystone Cardinal. Maintenance standdowns were conducted for the 1/50 Mechanized Infantry Battalion, the 538th Engineer Company and the 73d Engineer Company and support was coordinated for a number of other unit movements within the command's area of operations. The relocation of tactical troops also required significant adjustments in the disposition of support command assets.

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7 (C) The coming of the monsoons in the latter part of the quarter led to the closing of the highway to Tuy Hoa and caused a number of difficulties for transportation operations on other highways. Efforts to repair the roads have been extensive and continuous. With rising waters threatening the temporary by-pass at Bridge # 302 on QL 1 (which had been destroyed by enemy sabotage in January), RMK Inc, a civilian contractor, was charged with repairing the bridge. By 26 October, the permanent bridge was back in place.

8. (C) Weather conditions also caused some problems for transportation operations at sea. The unloading of Class V supplies in the Qui Nhon outer harbor was restricted due to rough seas brought about by the monsoons. There were a number of incidents of damage to ships and unloading facilities brought about by inclement weather, the most significant being the sinking of BARC (Barge, Amphibious Resupply Cargo) 60 between Phu Hiep and Sung Cao on 21 October.

9. (U) POL operations during the quarter were assisted by the regular use of a helicopter to overfly pipelines to locate breaks, apprehend pilferers and assist repair crews. The six inch and eight inch pipelines running between Vung Ro Bay and Tuy Hoa were buried during the quarter; however, a number of difficulties arose with this buried line due largely to mistakes made in the construction of the lines and, to a lesser extent, to enemy sabotage. The command's total POL consumption for the quarter was 47,199,500 gallons.

10. (U) The Qui Nhon Army Airfield was improved during the quarter. The runway was extended and repaved by 15 August and pavement operations on the taxiway and other parts of the field were completed by 1 October.

11. (U) The Qui Nhon cold storage warehouse was completed at the beginning of the reporting period and has greatly improved the command's food service capability. A number of additional improvements at this facility are presently underway.

12. (U) The Headquarters Communications Center was dissolved and its function assumed by the 41st Signal Battalion. The dial telephone exchange system for the command was completed during the quarter and is now operational.

13. (U) "C-Day" operations for the conversion of old series military payment certificates was accomplished on 11 August with minimum difficulty. Also within the scope of Comptroller activities, the command was able to meet its \$1,000,000 cost reduction goal.

14. (U) Following a disturbance between Military Policemen and soldiers in Qui Nhon on 31 July, the city was declared off limits and has remained so throughout the quarter. This extended off limits period has enabled military police to apprehend a number of AWOL personnel who had been living in the city while it was on limits.

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
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20. (C) Command enlisted strength showed a continual decline during the quarter. Officer strength remained fairly constant.

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ANNEX A Command Group

1. (U) Key personnel gains and losses during the quarter are listed in Annex B (ACofS, Personnel).
2. (U) A list of Visitors to the Command is attached at inclosure 3.
3. (U) A list of units attached and assigned to the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon is included at inclosure 4.
4. (U) Organizational Chart, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon.



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ANNEX B ACofS, Personnel

1. (U) Safety: The rates and averages for August 1969 through October 1969 for Army motor vehicle accidents and military injuries are now based on an expectancy rate (FY 69) of 7.9 per 1,000,000 miles of exposure and 35.3 injuries per 1,000,000 man days.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AMV</u>	<u>ARMY MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT RATE</u>	<u>PI</u>	<u>MILITARY INJURIES</u>
August	21	7.96	23	61.16
September	24	9.34	20	60.37
October	<u>36</u>	<u>14.71</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>59.74</u>
AVERAGE		10.58		60.46

2. (U) The 1st Army Postal Unit processed mail and money orders as indicated below:

a. Incoming Mail:

- (1) Peuches: 693
- (2) Sacks: 11,697
- (3) Outside pieces: 10,149
- (4) Average transit time: Airmail 5-6 days, MCM 6-7 days, SAM 5-6 days, Surface mail 35-40 days.

b. Outgoing Mail:

- (1) Peuches: 819
- (2) Sacks: 4,113
- (3) Outside pieces: 5,919

c. Money orders: There were 37,671 money orders sold during this period for a total value of \$2,775,294.71.

3. (C) The command enlisted strength showed a continued decline during the reporting period.

a. Command enlisted strength:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
11,159	10,198	9,786

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b. Number of replacements received:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
478	637	651

c. Number of casualty reports:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
41	11	24

d. E4 through E9 promotions:

	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
August	377	278	8	1	0	0
September	851	280	25	6	0	0
October	419	297	43	4	0	0

e. Arrival and departure of senior enlisted personnel during the period:

### ARRIVALS

August E8- 8, E9 - 6      September E8 - 10, E9 - 5      October E8 -9, E9 -1

### DEPARTURES

August E8--11, E9 - 6      September E8 - 8, E9 - 4      October E8 -8, E9 -2

f. The command officer strength remained relatively constant during the reporting period.

(1) Command Officer Strength:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Officers	535	564	540
Warrant Officers	<u>145</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>145</u>
TOTAL	680	704	685

(2) Officer replacements received:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
General Officers	0	0	0

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	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Field Grade	28	13	14
Company Grade	76	49	39
Warrant Officers	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>19</u>
TOTAL	120	68	72

## (3) Departure of key officer personnel:

### August

LTC Wells, James C. 13th FDS, Fin Acct Off	LTC Busck, Albert A. 184th Ord, CO
LTC Freeman, William C. 27th Trans Bn. XO	LTC Malle, Harry R. USASC QN, IG
LTC Bing, Tom L. 124th Trans Bn. CO	MAJ Urdal, Robert M. USASC QN, Scty to the Gen. Staff
LTC Ellis, Richard J. 5th Trans S-3	MAJ Hirotsu, Masuo, 27th Trans, CO
LTC Moore, Harold L. 593d, Gp XO	MAJ Inman, David P. 394th S-3 Off
LTC Kendrick, James H. 5th Trans, XO	MAJ Montgomery, Budd V. 527th Per Services Co, CO
LTC Owen, Merrill R. 394th TC Bn. CO	

### September

COL Whelan, William J. USASC, Asst to CG	LTC Maga, Fred D. 593d Dir of Per & Admin
COL Lucy, Garland A. 8th Trans Gp, CO	

### October

COL Motes, Marshall M. USASC, Dep Comd Off	LTC Kramer, Stanley H. 593d Comdr An Khe Det
LTC Farrar, Norman C. 593d Chief SP&O	LTC Fernandes, Harry I. USASC, SP Asst to Chief of Staff
LTC Shiver, Ivey M 45th GS Gp, XO	MAJ Caderia, Sherian G. USASC, protocol Off
LTC Davaz, Carl G. USASC, ACofS Maint	MAJ Nerten, Dale F. 5th Maint Bn. XO
LTC Sarber, William R. 54th Trans Bn. CO	MAJ White, Frederick D. 5th Trans XO
LTC Tataschiere, Joseph W. 126 FDS (Saigon)	MAJ Schwarzbauer, Joseph W. 86th Maint XO

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### (4) Arrivals of key officer personnel:

#### August

COL Norris, Charles R. USASC, Chief of Staff	LTC Rackley, Jerry D. 27th TC, Comdr
COL Drumright, William T. 45th GS Gp Comdr	LTC Wilson Jack D. USASC ACofS, SP&O
LTC Grimnes, Stephen H. 5th Trans Dep Term Comdr	LTC Manzo, John M. USASC ACofS, Maint
LTC Armstrong, George A. 62d Maint, CO	LTC Sutton, John E. 394th Trans, Comdr
LTC Boslet, Joseph E. 593d XO	LTC Chaulk, Kenneth G. 45th GS Gp, XO
LTC Kennedy, Billie T. 13th FDS, Fin Acct Off	LTC Anderson, Gordon W. 8th TC, XO
LTC Rackley, Everett W. 54th TC, Comdr	MAJ Jascewsky, Joseph A. 5th Maint, XO
	MAJ Groves, Billie R. USASC CH Opns Br.

#### September

COL Whelan, William J. USASC, Asst to CG	MAJ Groves, John E. 184th Ord, XO
COL Langston, Alex T. 8th TC, Comdr	MAJ Moe, Donald W. 27th TC, XO
LTC Quinn, Raymond W. USASC, CH, ARVN Modernization Planning	MAJ Oliver, Earl D. 62d Maint, XO
LTC Stenger, John E. USASC, ACofS, Supply	

#### October

COL Brockmeier, William E. USAD, Dep Depot Comdr	LTC Meekison, Malcolm V. 5th Maint
LTC Rogers, Jefferson K. USASC SP Asst to CG for Proj Thru-Put	LTC Hendricks, Meredith E. 593d Comdr An Khe Det
LTC Tatasciore, Joseph W. 126 FDS	MAJ Ernst, Patricia S. USASC Protocol
LTC Bertrand, Robert J. 593d CH SP&O	MAJ Jones, Albert S. 394th TC, XO
	MAJ Cockill, Michael J. USASC Dep Adj General

4. (U) The following are statistics pertaining to civilian personnel:

a. US civilian employees (DAC's):

Authorized: 56

Actual: 47

b. Third country nationals:

None authorized

c. Local Nationals (permanent hire):

Authorized: 3,481

Actual: 3,303

d. AIK Funds disbursed:

August 1,140,905 \$VN

September 2,523,437 \$VN

October 914,900 \$VN

TOTAL 4,579,242 \$VN

5. (U) Education:

a. Correspondence courses enrollment: (New Enrollment)

	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	
High School	46	1	0	0	
College	161	19	11	0	
Coop College	35	8	0	0	
Vec-Technical	55	1	0	0	
Army Extension	<u>23</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	
TOTAL	320	29	11	1	= 358

b. Correspondence Courses (Total Active Enrollments)

	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
High School	212	7	0	0
College	566	86	35	0

	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	
Coop College	82	4	9	0	
Vec-Technical	173	1	6	0	
Army Extension	<u>39</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	
TOTAL	1072	100	54	<u>2</u>	= 1228

c. Group Study Enrollments

	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	
High School	160	0	0	0	
College	41	9	2	0	
Spoken Vietnamese	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	
TOTAL	212	19	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	= 233

d. Tests:

	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	
High School	1499	0	0	0	
ACT-CE	379	12	6	0	
J-3 Achievement	212	0	0	0	
SA-FOC	65	20	8	0	
ETS & Psych Corp	2	17	0	2	
Other Non-USAFI	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	
TOTAL	2161	49	14	<u>2</u>	= 2226

e. Interviews:

Enlisted Men . . 2709      Officers . . 280      Warrant Officers . . 45

6. (U) The following charts give further indication of the Command's Personnel and AG activities.


AWARDS  
By Type

	CUM	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
IM	14	2	5	5	2					
SS	2	1	0	0	1					
SM	3	0	1	0	2					
BSM "V"	35	13	4	10	8					
BSM	566	137	121	148	160					
ACM "V"	9	0	2	4	3					
ACM	828	183	199	220	226					
AM "V"	0	0	0	0	0					
AM	8	2	2	4	0					
PH	34	5	6	19	4					
COMMAND	1499	343	340	410	406					

By Command

COMMAND	1499	343	340	410	406					
45TH GS GP	281	60	52	78	71					
593RD GS GP	111	20	19	29	43					
USAD, QN	193	45	46	49	53					
5TH TC	144	56	42	19	27					
8TH TRANS GP	362	52	82	138	90					
240TH QM BN	74	19	9	19	27					
86TH MAINT BN	61	8	15	21	17					
184TH ORD BN	97	40	19	15	23					
HHD, USASC	180	39	42	37	55					
MISC	16	4	7	5	0					


CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES  
RATE PER 1000



J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
51	40	36	51								
4.29	3.31	3.24	4.81								

NUMBER  
RATE PER  
THOUSAND  
TROOPS


CUMULATIVE AWOL RATE PER 1000 MEN  
FY 70



J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
3.03	2.55	2.22	2.33								
36	25	17	24								

QNSC  
QNSC AWOLS

AWOL STATUS FY 70




	COMD	593DGS	45GS	USAD	5TC	8GP	240QM	86MT	184ORD	HHD
OCT	24	3	1	11	0	5	3	0	0	1
CUM TOT	102	15	8	22	25	14	7	3	5	3
AVG MO	26	4	2	5	6	4	2	1	1	1
HIGH	36	5	4	11	10	5	3	2	5	1
LOW	17	3	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
RATE/THOUS	2.26	2.50	0.66	5.42	0.00	2.72	5.29	0.00	0.00	1.08
CUMULATIVE RATE/THOUS	2.33	2.72	1.26	2.55	5.05	1.87	2.82	0.89	1.67	0.77

REENLISTMENT STATUS

DA OBJECTIVE	CAREER RA			1ST TERM RA			AUS		
	%	ELIG	REENL	%	ELIG	REENL	%	ELIG	REENL
	80%			33.3%			6.7%		
COMMAND	100	23	23	42.6	47	20	9.5	63	6
593D GS GP	100	2	2	33.3	9	3	0	9	0
45TH GS GP	100	4	4	40.0	5	2	0	10	0
USAD, QN	100	5	5	100	6	6	50.0	4	2
5TH TC	100	0	0	100	2	2	40.0	5	2
8TH TRANS GP	100	6	6	20.0	5	1	0	7	0
240TH QM BN	100	3	3	33.3	3	1	0	8	0
86TH MT BN	100	0	0	20.0	6	0	0	4	0
184TH ORD BN	100	2	2	71.4	7	5	66.6	3	2
HHD, USASC	100	1	1	0	4	0	0	13	0


COMMAND REENLISTMENT STATUS AUS



PERCENT	11.4	10.8	6.7	9.5								
ELIGIBLE	44	65	60	63								
REENL	5	7	4	6								
1ST LOG	14.3	15.4	NA	NA								


NA=Not Available

COMMAND REENLISTMENT STATUS  
1ST TERM RA



ELIGIBLE	49	55	67	47								
REENL	28	27	24	20								
—% REENL	57.1	49.3	35.8	42.6								
--1ST LOG	65.7	54.3	NA	NA								

NA= Not Available




ELIGIBLE	29	21	26	23								
REENL	28	21	26	23								
—% REENL	96.6	100	100	100								
--1ST LOG	69.4	99.3	NA	NA								

NA=Not Available


MILITARY INJURIES (COMMAND)

RATE PER 1,000,000 MAN DAYS




	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
INJURIES	15	23	20	19								
— MO RATE	40.7	61.4	60.0	59.7								
- - - CUM RATE	40.7	51.1	55.1	56.2								

MILITARY INJURIES  
RATE PER 1,000,000 MAN DAYS




ARMY MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS  
COMMAND

RATE PER 1,000,000 MILES FY 70



ARMY MOTOR VEHICLES ACCIDENTS  
RATE PER 1,000,000 MILES  
(Subordinate Commands)



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## ANNEX C Special Assistant For Combat Security

1. (C) The level of enemy activity against Support Command units in northern II Corps Tactical Zone during the period August-October 1969 remained essentially the same with three exceptions:

a. The number of sniping incidents tripled, rising from 30 during May - July, 1969 to 93 in the past quarter.

b. The number of ambushes increased from 9 to 20. However, the majority of these ambushes were quite small and insignificant in size.

c. The number of pipeline sections damaged rose from 707 last quarter to 1297 in the August-October period.

2. (C) Enemy forces showed a definite tendency to break down into small units which continuously harassed friendly forces. Concentration seemed to be on these activities which minimize the chances of losses to the attacker. Enemy incidents may be broken down by type as follows:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of Incidents</u>
Sniper	93
Ground Attacks	1
Stand Off Attacks	29
Ambushes	20
Sapper	4
Mining	16
Miscellaneous	8

3. (U) A detailed list of significant enemy activities in the support command's area of operations is included at inclosure 1.

4. (C) At the beginning of the quarter, I Field Force, Vietnam (IFFV) made two helicopters available to USASC, QN to be utilized for aerial surveillance of the pipeline. These helicopters were available from 0730 to 1130 hours daily for a two week trial period ending 13 August 1969. On 3 August, use of the two helicopters was discontinued and one helicopter was made available each day for the entire day. Throughout the trial period, the helicopter (UH-1H) was used to insert pipeline repair crews into areas of serious pipeline breaks, to deliver badly needed replacement parts from Qui Nhen to locations where needed, to inspect the pipeline for line separations prior to going "on line" and then to check for pressure leaks when "on line".

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The helicopter was also used to bring fuel samples from the tank farms at An Khe and Pleiku to the laboratory in Qui Nhon for analysis prior to issue. The results of the two week trial justified continuous usage of the helicopter for aerial surveillance of the pipeline. On 24 August 1969, IFFV dedicated the use of one helicopter (UH-1H) to the 240th QM Bn for pipeline surveillance on a daily basis.

5. (C) Initial coordination was made with the 268th Avn Bn, Phu Heip, to utilize "Fire Fly" aircraft for night surveillance of the pipelines running from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat, and from Qui Nhon to Pleiku. When it was learned that these aircraft are committed to area defense of the Tuy Hoa Installation and are not allowed out of that area, coordination was effected to have these aircraft fly the Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa pipeline whenever possible. Efforts were next turned to obtaining "Shadow" aircraft to fly the pipelines running from Qui Nhon. Coordination was effected with G-3 Air, IFFV, who explained that due to tactical requirements and the demand for this aircraft, the command's request could not be filled as a separate mission; however, it would be incorporated into other missions of the aircraft. "Shadow" has since that time provided periodic coverage of the lines running from Qui Nhon but not at the desired frequency.

6. (U) On 5 August, final coordination was effected with the Civil Affairs and Public Information Offices and the Area JUSPAO on having messages broadcast over the Vietnamese Civilian radio network about the hazards of pilfering POL products from the pipelines.

7. (C) On 10 August a population exclusion area/free fire zone was established in the mountainous area behind the 8th Transportation Group compound. Only that portion of the population exclusion area lying inside the Binh Dinh self defense area (BDSDA) is classified a free fire zone. The boundary between the Capital ROK Infantry Division (CRID) and the BDSDA split 8th Trans Gp in half. It has long been the policy of the CRID not to allow free fire zones in their tactical area of operations (TAOR) so that they can have unrestricted movement whenever they deem it necessary.

8. (C) A review of the logistical security system throughout the Qui Nhon Support Command was completed on 13 August. This report discussed the strengths of the present system with regard to fire support, free fire zones, reaction forces, illumination support, and communications. It also discussed the system's weaknesses, such as the geographical location of the separate compounds, non-availability of materiel, lack of alternate power sources, and the numerous disadvantages of locating a logistical installation outside of a US TAOR.

9. (FOUO) A meeting was held on 19 August to acquaint the Commanding General with problems involving railroad security. Two major incidents which prompted this meeting were theft of US supplies from a train enroute to Tuy Hoa by ARVN train guards and an incident on 15 August in which a large quantity of POL products was stolen through the use of a train. This briefing brought out some of the problems experienced by the organizations which

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deal with the Vietnamese Railroad (VNRR). Also discussed at this meeting was the organization of the RR Security Force Bns, the procedures they use and actions which US Forces should take to solve any problems which might arise in this area.

10. (FOUC) Initial coordination was made with 1st Log Comd for a demonstration of sapper tactics and evaluation of the perimeters of several important compounds within the Qui Nhon Installation by Kit Carson Scouts of the 199th Light Infantry Bde. This evaluation/demonstration visit began on 5 September and terminated two days later. While in Qui Nhon, the team evaluated the perimeter defenses of several important compounds from the sapper's viewpoint. On 7 Sep, a demonstration of sapper tactics was held at the QN ABD. The Commanding General USASC, QN and the DCG CRID were present as were representatives of each of the major subordinate commands. In the demonstration, Scouts penetrated the perimeter of the ABD in 90 seconds. The demonstration/evaluation was so effective that coordination is being effected with the 173d Abn Bde to start a similar type program of evaluations/demonstrations on a quarterly basis.

11. (C) A sentry dog survey team arrived in Qui Nhon on 27 August to study the continued utilization of sentry dogs at the POL Tank Farms. A meeting was held between representatives of SACS, USASC, QN, 240th QM Bn, 93d MP Bn, 18th MP Bde and the 1st Log Provost Marshal's Office. At this time, justification for the continued usage of the dogs was presented along with the dog handlers' views and the requirements of USARV, sentry dog teams were withdrawn from Tank Farm #1. The 240th QM Bn was given until 1 November to satisfy the requirements of USARV Reg 190-12 for continued utilization of the dog teams. As of 31 October, the requirements of that regulation had not been met but, pending a decision from USARV, the dogs continue to be used and improvements to satisfy the requirements are in process.

12. (C) On 30 August, a letter from the CG of the Capital ROK Infantry Division informed this command of his intention to withdraw the 8th Company, 26th Regiment from its security mission at the QN ABD, for participation in a division operation. Requests for continuous support by the Koreans made to the CG, CRID and CG, IFFV produced no tangible results and on 9 September the Koreans were withdrawn. On 10 September, the QN ABD was subjected to a successful sapper attack. Materiel damages were moderate and there were no friendly casualties. One VC was KIA as he attempted to withdraw through the perimeter. The ROK 8th Co, 26th Regiment returned 12 September, 1969.

13. (C) A letter was submitted to IFFV on 7 September requesting the use of TPS-25 anti-personnel radar equipment for a one month trial period. The radar was requested in order to give this installation a means of target acquisition. A prime factor dictating the necessity for this request was enemy activity at the north end of the Qui Nhon inner harbor. This area is a crossroads of major enemy supply routes and the small islands in that part of the harbor contain large numbers of bunkers used to store enemy materiel. On 26 September, a reply was received from IFFV dedicating a PPS-5 radar device for a 14 day trial period to the Qui Nhon Installation. The device was received on 7 October, 1969 and was utilized through 20 October.

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During the trial period, the radar was inoperative for seven days for various mechanical failures; however, during the seven operative days, 14 targets were identified. Two of these targets were not cleared for fire. The other twelve were fired upon with 164 rounds 155mm HE. Probable results were: Four sampans destroyed and 37 enemy killed by artillery (KBA). Coordination is now being effected to obtain a similar type radar on a more permanent basis.

14. (U) On 10 September, the first weekly INTEL meeting was held at the support command headquarters compound in Qui Nhon. These meetings, hosted by USASUPCOM, QN are open to all US intelligence agencies or representatives in the Qui Nhon and surrounding areas. Attendance is on a voluntary basis, as is exchange of ideas and information. An appreciable amount of useful information has been exchanged at these informal meetings. A prime objective of the meetings is to identify problems, come up with workable solutions, and execute coordinated plans of action to eliminate the problems.

15. (C) From 30 September to 17 October, due to another withdrawal of Korean troops for divisional operations, the ABD was without external security. On 17 October, the 108th RF Co of Binh Dinh Sector assumed the external security mission and established day and night patrols of the area surrounding the ABD. On 23 October 1969, the Koreans again assumed the external security mission at the ABD.

16. (U) On the night of 8 October, during a heavy rainstorm, an EC-47 crashed in the mountainous area to the south of the 184th Ord Bn. Because of established communications nets, this headquarters assumed control of the initial ground search for this aircraft. Adverse weather conditions prevented organized air searches until 12 October, on which date helicopters located the downed aircraft. SACS, USASUPCOM, QN coordinated all aspects of the ground search until sensitive material and equipment at the crash site removed or destroyed.

17. (C) On 10 October, a message was received from the 4th Infantry Division advising this headquarters of the division's intention to withdraw security forces from bridges along highway QL 19. This highway is a vital link to all US and allied forces in the highlands of Northern II Corps. By 15 October, security had been withdrawn from bridges 23, 29, 31, 33 and 34. An immediate increase in enemy activity in these areas resulted in considerable damage to the pipeline and the destruction of bridge 33 on the night of 26 October. POL pump stations along QL 19 have also felt the effect of this reduction in security, especially PS #9 and PS #10. Until 22 October these facilities were provided security in the form of one track mounted mortar and a tank or APC every night. After that time, the only items of security equipment available to the pump stations were their organic M-16's. The Support Command requested 4th Div assistance to insure security for bridges, pipelines and pump stations in their TAOR. Soon after this message was sent, security forces were reinstated at the pump stations. However, bridge and pipeline security remain in a precarious situation.

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18. (C) On 28 October, ROK security forces were withdrawn from PS #4. The withdrawal was intended to relocate the security force, whose primary mission is security of QL 19, to a more advantageous position for accomplishment of this mission. In doing so, PS #4 was left highly vulnerable to enemy attack. Elements of the 93d MP Bn's D/58 Inf moved in during the night of 28 October to assume the security of this facility until ROK troops are returned or another solution is worked out.

19. (FOUO) Throughout the quarter, numerous coordination meetings were held between US and Vietnamese officials and a quantity of correspondence was dispatched to US, GVN, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) officials dealing with the problems of POL pilferage from pipelines operated by this command. The CG's of IFFV, CRID, ROK White Horse Div, 4th Inf Div, the Province Chiefs of Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces and district chiefs in Tuy Phuoc, An Nhon and Binh Khe have all been requested to assist in lowering the pilferage problem to an acceptable level. Directives from CG, IFFV and CG, ARVN II Corps have directed that tactical organizations shoulder the responsibilities of pipeline security. As of 31 October, the results of these directives have been negligible. The most aggressive efforts to date to stop and /or discourage pilferage have been by elements of this command.

20. (U) A significant change in the operation of the Security Office was brought about when the Commanding General requested that more information on friendly operations be presented in the daily briefings. Relying for source material primarily on the daily and weekly IFFV operational forecasts, a briefing format covering all friendly battalion-sized operations in northern II Corps Tactical Zone was developed.

21. (U) Also established was a program under which two headquarters staff sections per week would be given a counterintelligence inspection by the Security Office. By the end of the quarter, the greater part of this headquarters had been inspected. This program has shown itself to be beneficial, as evidenced by the good ratings received in the security portion of the recent Annual General Inspection conducted by HQ, 1st Log Comd.

22. (U) Intelligence Activities:

a. The following numbers of reports of counterintelligence inspections made by the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment were processed by this office:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number of Inspections</u>
August	13
September	29
October	25

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b. The following numbers of requests for security clearances and validations were processed by this office:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number Processed</u>
August	87
September	116
October	83

23. (U) During this period three security violations were reported. The results are as follows:

a. The investigation of an incident involving the mishandling of CONFIDENTIAL waste disclosed that no compromise had been made. Results of this investigation have been sent to the Staff Judge Advocate for legal review before being sent to the convening authority for final approval.

b. The second incident, involving a possible loss of a SECRET document, is presently under investigation.

c. The third incident, involving possible loss and compromise of an SOI ~~item~~ classified CONFIDENTIAL, is being investigated.

24. (U) The following numbers of war trophies were registered during the quarter:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number Registered</u>
August	14
September	29
October	24

ANNEX D ACoS, SP&O Plans Branch

1. (U) The following organizational change occurred during the quarter: The Office of the Logistical Support Area (LSA) Coordinator was established, effective 5 October 1969, with duty station at Phu Hiep. The office was assigned to the 593d GS Gp.

2. (U) The following operation plans (OPLANS) were published during the quarter:

a. FOUC OPLAN Q103-70, Contingency Plan for Official Visits by Distinguished Visitors.

b. SECRET OPLAN Q69-69, A T-Day Plan for the Redeployment of the US Armed Forces.

3. (U) Training:

a. The concept underlying the Project Skills I Training program is presently being incorporated into USASC, QN Reg 350-1, Education and Training. The program has been expanded to include monthly briefings at HQ, USASC, QN, for newly arrived senior NCO's and officers from throughout the command.

b. A survey of training requirements was conducted in late September to pin-point areas of training desired by the various units throughout the command. The possibility of implementing training programs to fill this survey is currently being researched.

c. Project Buddy, a program to train ARVN logistical personnel, was implemented in mid-September and currently continues without significant problems.

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ANNEX E AcofS, SP&O Operations Branch

1. (U) During the reporting period, this headquarters was heavily committed to the monitoring and coordination of unit moves into and out of the USASUPCOM, QN area of operation. These moves consisted of both 1st Logistical Command units and non-1st Log units.
2. (C) Operation Clear Adjust ordered the relocation of two support command units to replace redeploying units. This involved coordinating the standdown and relocation of the 848th QM Plt to Quang Tri and the 661st ORD Co to Chu Lai during the month of September. During this same month, the 563d Transportation Company was relocated to the Saigon Support Command. The 448th AG Army Postal Unit (APU) redeployed to CONUS on October 16, its functions having been taken over by the 6th AG APU from Long Binh on October 9, as part of Operation Keystone Cardinal. Under this same operation, coordination was effected for the inactivation of the 28th Transportation Platoon on 30 October.
3. (C) Non-1st Logistical Command unit moves requiring action on the part of Headquarters USASUPCOM, QN occurred throughout this quarter. Maintenance standdowns in preparation for unit movements were arranged and monitored for the 1/50 Mechanized Infantry Battalion and the 538th Engineer Co during August. In October, a similar standdown was provided the 73d Engineer Co prior to movement of the unit. Support was also coordinated for the moves of the 172d Preventive Medicine Det, 3/503d Abn Inf Bn, 19th Engineer Bn, and Company B, 5th Special Forces Gp.
4. (C) The Operations Branch of AcofS, SP&O coordinated support for tactical operations of the 4th Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade during the quarter. Due to the shortage of organic transportation within the 4th Division, extensive transportation support was coordinated for movements of 4th Division elements in support of tactical operations. The 1st Bde was moved from Kontum to An Khe with elements going to Bong Song and An Long. The 2d Bde moved from LZ Mary Lou to An Khe. The 3d Bde relocated from Fire Base (FB) Oasis to Camp Enari. On 14 September, Support Command headquarters coordinated a combat essential resupply (CE) of 90mm ammunition in support of tactical operations of the 4th Division.
5. (U) POL tanker support was coordinated for a tactical operation conducted during October by the Capital ROK Infantry Division.
6. (U) Numerous shipments of lumber were made to the 937th Engineer Group at FB Woolly Bully for the rebuilding of Ben Het. This project covered a period of approximately one month starting in September. Vehicles were provided for use by the 937th in the Kontum to Ben Het area in support of this same operation.
7. (U) Road conditions in the support command area of operations caused few serious difficulties during the early part of the quarter. With the advent of heavy rains and the beginning of the monsoons, road conditions

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deteriorated along QL #1 south of Qui Nhon. Highway QL #1 between Qui Nhon and Tuy Hoa was closed due to flooding and a series of bridge failures, washouts, and mudslides. Resupply to Tuy Hoa was accomplished by sea and air while highway repairs were being made by the 84th Engineer Bn.

8. (C) As a result of the relocation of tactical troops deployed in the support command's area of operation, adjustments to the distribution of support command assets were made. The ASP located at LZ Mary Lou has been closed. The 243d Field Service Company was moved from Pleiku to LZ English. The 243d's laundry facility at Oasis was closed and elements of the unit will remain in Pleiku.

9. (U) On 20 August, the Command's Quarterly Logistical Support Conference was held, sponsored by ACofS, Supply and Services and the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon. The theme selected was "Help Us Help You". In addition to topics presented on the agenda, a number of problem areas were discussed in detail.

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ANNEX F Staff Signal Section

1. (U) The activation of the automatic switching network for teletype and telephone circuits negated the necessity for maintaining a Communication Center at the support command headquarters. The last of four circuits was closed down on 15 October 1969. The deactivation of this Communication Center and four others, one at each of the four support command headquarters and one at 1st Log Comd headquarters, is expected to result in a \$500,000.00 annual saving. No appreciable deterioration in message service is expected. Twenty six teletype machines were turned back into supply channels and thirteen enlisted men were released for duty elsewhere.

2. (U) The completion of a dial telephone exchange (DLE) has greatly improved telephone service in the Qui Nhon Area. Some problems have arisen, however, with the tendency on the part of many telephone - users to expect the dial system to eliminate all telephone communication difficulties immediately. The Signal Section of this headquarters is at present working on a fact sheet explaining the telephone system so that it can be understood by anyone.


3. (U) Some problems were experienced in the availability of radios and radio repair parts during the quarter. Lack of trained personnel and of repair parts (particularly modules and transistors) has caused maintenance facilities to require excessive time for the repair of radio equipment, particularly the AN VRC-12 series radio. Such maintenance delays have led to increased cannibalization of radio parts by individual units, which in turn has made repair operations by maintenance facilities more difficult and time consuming

ANNEX G ACoFS, Services

1. (U) The 19th Supply and Service Company and the 243d Field Service Company bakeries had an average monthly production of 610,000 pounds of bread in support of requirements during the quarter.
2. (U) Field laundry production averaged 760,000 pounds per month during August and September, but dropped to 680,000 pounds in October as a result of lost operation time due to the relocation of four laundry units. Two field bath units were received by the command in August and September and were immediately placed into operation, replacing "home made" bath facilities. The requirement for field bath units has declined with the extensive development of base camps. At present, only two shower points remain in operation.
3. (U) A monthly food service news letter was started in September. The newsletter emphasizes lessons learned in the food services area. The first quarterly food service conference was held on September 13th. Major problem areas were discussed in detail, the use of local national labor being one of the key topics.
4. (U) The cantonment mess equipment program made significant progress during the quarter. Ninety per cent of the mess equipment scheduled for installation was in place by the end of October.
5. (U) The refrigerated cold storage warehouse was completed on 1 September 1969. This new facility provides 184,320 net cubic feet of freeze and chill storage space. It greatly simplifies perishable storage operations due to its size, which permits the use of materiel handling equipment, and its capability for accurately controlling temperatures.
6. (U) The Class I facility at the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon (USAD, QN) was given an additional 50,000 square feet of covered storage area, thus reducing the stocks remaining in open storage.
7. (U) Milk plant requirements dropped to 350,000 gallons or 47 per cent of the plant capacity. Ice cream is now packaged in six-ounce Dixie cups in addition to the 3 gallon containers. A half-pint milk container was introduced as an addition to the one quart and six gallon containers. The Qui Nhon ration breakdown section at the depot assumed the Class I mission of the 19th S&S Company on 1 August 1969. No major problems were encountered.
8. (U) The following charts indicate significant aspects of services operations within the command.

ICE PRODUCTION


MILLION POUNDS



— AUTHORIZED	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4								
- - - PRODUCED	6.2	5.8	5.4	5.5								
- · - ISSUED	6.1	5.8	5.4	5.5								

MILK PRODUCTION


HUNDRED THOUSAND GALLONS



— AUTHORIZED	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3								
- - - REQUIRED	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.5								
- · - ISSUED	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.5								

### FIELD BAKERY PRODUCTION


MILLION LBS  
1.00



— TRP AUTH	.45	.45	.45	.45									
- - - TRP REQ	.59	.61	.45	.61									
- - - ISSUES	.59	.61	.45	.61									


### FIELD LAUNDRY PRODUCTION

MILLION LBS




AUTHORIZED	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1									
— PROD CAPBLTY	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.4									
- - - LDRY PROD	.75	.76	.76	.68									

CLASS I DEPOT RECEIPTS & ISSUES



CLASS I CONDEMNATION



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
## ANNEX H Ammunition, Supply and Retrograde & Disposal:

### 1. (C) Ammunition:

#### a. Ammunition statistical data:

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>
Received	20669	17187	31109
Issued	21198	25097	29812
Rewarehoused	<u>30228</u>	<u>22050</u>	<u>16790</u>
TOTAL	72095	64334	77711

#### END OF MONTH AMMUNITION STATUS



b. During the reporting period, the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) at An Khe and the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) at Phu Tai were attacked by enemy sappers. Losses were: An Khe, 16 short tons (\$32,695); QN ABD, 5 short tons (\$6,263). A more detailed account of the attacks is found at inclosure 1.

### 2. (U) Supply:


a. The offices of Supply and Services were joined with Ammunition and Retrograde & Disposal (R&D) for a brief period as the ACoS, Supply and Services. This terminated on 18 September when Services again became a separate staff section.

b. The following charts indicate the command's progress and activities in the field of supply during the quarter.

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## USAD, QN REQUISITION STATUS

THOUSANDS




—	TOTAL RQN	97.6	87.9	81.3	71.9								
- - -	RQN AGST ASL	79.8	71.0	63.7	54.2								
- · - ·	RQN FILLED	57.5	47.6	38.5	37.3								
· · · ·	ASL RQN FILLED	52.3	42.6	31.0	33.0								

## DEPOT SUPPLY PERFORMANCE


GOALS REF LC REG 710-1

PERCENT



—	DEMAND ACCOMODATION	81.0	81.0	78.0	75.0								
- - -	DEMAND SATISFACTION	44.0	38.0	35.0	38.0								
- · - ·	RQN FILLED	65	59.9	48.8	42.1								


**DEPOT REQUISITION STATUS  
PASSED, BACK ORDERS AND DUES OUT**



— RQN PASSED  
 - - - BACK ORDERS ESTABLISHED  
 - · - DUES OUT RELEASED

81.0	84.6	54.4	39.5										
32.3	32.2	35.8	35.9										
24.2	23.1	38.3	26.0										


**LOCATOR ACCURACY AND WAREHOUSE DENIAL RATE**



— PERCENT  
 - - - WAREHOUSE DENIAL RATE

LOCATIONS SURVEYED	5000	14062	-	-									
NUMBER CORRECT	4350	12746	-	-									
PERCENT	87	90.6	-	-									
WAREHOUSE DENIAL RATE	4.4	3.2	4.5	4.1									


INVENTORY ACCURACY



LINES INV	26518	7222	4887	-	**									
PERCENT	74*	73*	77*	78										

\*From Project Count  
 \*\*Project Count Two Completed


IDENTIFICATION OF EXCESS



NO. LINES	1.2	18.0	3.0	12.9									
DOLLAR VAL	3.0	11.7	0.9	0.7									

USAD, ON ASL STATUS

THOUSANDS OF LINES




PERCENT AT 0 BALANCE

	11.8	52.0	51.6	50.0								
— # ASL LINES	64.4	62.3	61.0	61.8								
- - - # ASL LINES AT 0 BALANCE	7.6	32.4	31.5	30.9								

MRO STATUS


THOUSAND



ON HAND BEGINNING  
 RECEIVED  
 PROCESSED  
 ON HAND END


	38.9	10.5	11.6	5.9								
□ RECEIVED	72.0	81.9	80.9	76.6								
▨ PROCESSED	100.4	80.9	86.7	69.2								
— ON HAND END	10.5	11.4	5.9	13.2								

RED BALL REQUISITIONS




PERCENT OF INITIAL ISS	31.1	28.0	30.6	34.7										
REQUISITIONS PROCESSED	3942	4219	2933	2971										
INITIAL ISSUE	1227	1180	898	1033										
REQUISITIONS PASSED	2715	3039	2035	1938										

CLASS II, VII & IX RECEIPTS AND ISSUES (WITH VEHICLES)



RECEIPTS	11.0	14.9	10.8	8.0										
ISSUES	27.3	29.3	22.1	17.5										
ON HAND	82.0	65.3	52.7	42.9										


THOUSAND S/T OH CLASS IV ENGINEER RECEIPTS AND ISSUES THOUSAND S/T R



RECEIPTS	5.8	1.8	10.5	5.7										
ISSUES	14.6	18.9	20.4	12.5										
ON HAND	129.0	91.3	81.5	74.2										

\*Adjusted by 20,513 due to "wall to wall" inventory in locations 39 and 42.


HIGH PRIORITY REQUISITIONS (02-05)



NO. RECEIVED	64.4	51.5	46.6	38.5										
NO. FILLED	30.8	28.7	17.7	19.2										

VINNEL CORPORATION - CARE AND PRESERVATION  
CONTRACT COST\*

PERCENT & DOLLARS




— LABOR %	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.2										
--- MATERIAL %	1.4	0.7	0.5	0.7										
--- COST OF ITEMS RECOVERED (MILLIONS)	4.4	5.6	3.9	4.9										

\*Cost is shown as % of cost items processed

TONS & LINES  
10,000


TONNAGE HANDLED & LINE ITEMS PROCESSED



— NO. TONS	2177	7722	8472	2393										
--- NO. LINE ITEMS	2429	4730	7485	1734										

PHILCO FORD CORPORATION  
RECEIVE, ISSUE, REWAREHOUSE (RIR)  
(Engineer Construction Yard)

THOUSAND S/T




— RIR OBJ	88.3	NA	88.3	88.3								
- - - RIR PERF	24.4	NA	28.6	18.7								

NA=Not Available

REPACKAGE AND PRESERVATION

THOUSAND S/T



— R&P OBJ*	2.4	NA	2.8	1.9								
- - - R&P PERF	4.1	NA	3.8	2.6								

\*R&P objective is 10% of RIR performance  
NA=Not Available

3. (U) Retrograde and Disposal:


a. During the reporting period, 38,003 Short Tons (S/T) of retrograde cargo were shipped by this command. Of this total, 12,638 S/T were unserviceable repairables. Other categories of retrograde cargo included excess depot materiel, stop-see cargo, suspended ammunition, ammunition components, and marine cargo.

b. Sea/Land vans have been used to ship depot excess serviceable items to Okinawa. RO/EO trailers have also been used for the retrograde of large quantities of ECMY materiel to Okinawa. This has proven very satisfactory and time saving due to the capability for prestaging Roll-on, Roll-off (RO/RO) equipment at Qui Nhon Port.

c. The property disposal activity has 7860 S/T of scrap and 1487 S/T of usable scrap on hand as of 1 November 1969. This on hand amount will be continually reduced due to command emphasis. The property disposal office has received and is operating a 40 ton crawler crane with electric magnet, metal bailer and alligator shears. An "aluminum sweater," a furnace capable of melting aluminum as well as copper and brass, has been received but is not operational at the present time.

d. The following charts give further indication of the command's activities during the quarter.


RETROGRADE OF CLASS V



MONTHLY	552	581	1227	589	
CUMULATIVE (000's)	0.6	1.1	2.3	3.0	

RETROGRADE OF REPARABLES


THOUSAND S/T



	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
— TOTAL AVAIL FOR RETRO	4.9	6.5	6.5	6.3								
- - - AMT OFFERED NOT SHIPPED	1.4	1.3	1.6	2.4								
- · - AMT IN PROC	.04	.09	.06	.09								
· · · AMT SHIPPED	3.4	5.1	4.8	3.7								

RETROGRADE OF REPARABLES  
(ON HAND BALANCE)


THOUSAND S/T



	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
□ RECEIVED	4.9	4.9	5.1	4.5								
▨ SHIPPED	3.4	5.1	4.8	3.7								
— ON HAND	1.5	1.4	1.7	2.5								


RETROGRADE CARGO SHIPPED

THOUSAND S/T




RETROGRADE CARGO SHIPPED

THOUSAND S/T



PROPERTY DISPOSAL  
SCRAP AND WASTE

THOUSAND S/T



QUANTITY AVAIL  
FOR DISPOSAL


REMOVALS  
SOLID PENDING  
REMOVAL

IFB  
PRE IFB  
PROCESSING

11.7	10.9	8.9	8.0												
1.3	2.1	2.4	1.1												
11.2	9.3	8.2	7.9												
0	0	0	0												
0	0	0	0												

SCRAP AND WASTE

THOUSAND S/T



END OF MONTH  
INVENTORIES


RECEIPTS

REMOVALS

11.3	10.6	8.2	7.9												
1.7	1.4	1.3	0.7												
1.1	1.7	2.4	1.0												

PROPERTY DISPOSAL  
USEABLE PROPERTY

THOUSAND S/T



	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
— END OF MONTH	1.3	1.3	1.9	2.8								
□ INVENTORIES	.4	.3	.7	1.0								
▨ RECEIPTS												
▩ REMOVALS	.2	.4	.03	.1								

ANNEX I ACoFS, Petroleum

1. (U) The project for burying the Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa pipeline, which began in June, was completed on 2 September. Testing of the buried line remains to be accomplished.
2. (U) The 240th QM Bn began flushing the 8" line from Vung Ro to Tuy Hoa on 4 September, finishing two days later. Product was pumped into the line beginning on 8 September. During the first week of operation, a number of problems were encountered. Excessive back pressure was experienced at the pump station resulting from obstructions in the line. As a result, numerous leaks and breaks occurred. Complicating the situation was the fact that many couplings had not been sufficiently tightened and many gaskets were improperly seated at the time the line was being installed. Mechanical losses for the first week's operation accounted for 90% of the total loss. The receiving tank farm at the Tuy Hoa Air Force Base received at a rate of only 16,000 gallons per hour at 3-4 PSI, as compared to a normal rate of 63,000 gallons per hour at 16 PSI.
3. (U) Efforts to locate obstructions by the use of pressure gauges strategically located along the line met with limited success. Some obstructions, including 2" x 4" and 4" x 4" timbers, beer cans and rocks, were removed from the line, increasing the flow rate. However, the line still operated at less than full capability. Losses due to mechanical failures for this period were in excess of 95% of the total loss.
4. (U) As a result of the critical level of JP-4 on-hand at the Tuy Hoa Air Force Base, an all out effort was made on 18 October to locate the remaining obstructions in the line. Pressure gauges were installed along the line in an effort to isolate the obstruction. On 22 October, the obstruction was located near the Air Force Base. Debris, much the same as was removed previously, was removed from the line. The subsequent ship discharge operation proved to be more successful than any previous operation. The rate of flow increased to its maximum level. The Air Force began receiving and continued to receive at the rate of 63,000 gallons per hour. When the ship had been completely discharged, a total of 2,741,100 gallons had been moved with no losses caused by mechanical failures.
5. (U) POL consumption statistics (figures are in gallons):

a. Received at Qui Nhon:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
10,708,700	14,040,100	13,383,000

b. Received at Tuy Hoa:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
6,040,700	2,974,200	7,205,400

c. Product shipped to An Khe by pipeline:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
2,145,000	6,247,000	5,640,000

d. Product shipped to Pleiku by pipeline:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
1,113,000	2,024,000	2,785,000

e. Product shipped to Phu Cat by pipeline:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
3,483,800	2,782,000	2,507,000


f. TOTAL Command Consumption:

47,199,500

6. (U) Further information on POL operations within the command can be found in the following charts.

POL PORT OPERATIONS  
Resupply QN


MILLIONS OF GALLONS



— REQUIRED	14.1	13.3	15.7	15.0									
- - - ACTUAL	13.2	22.2	14.1	14.8									
% EFFECTIVE	93.6	166.9	89.8	98.7									


Resupply Tuy Hoa

MILLIONS OF GALLONS




— REQUIRED	5.7	4.9	5.4	4.9									
- - - ACTUAL	9.0	5.7	3.0	8.3									
% EFFECTIVE	157.9	116.3	55.6	169.4									


Q1 STORAGE FOR BULK POL  
ON HAND BALANCE




AN KHE STORAGE FOR BULK POL  
ON HAND BALANCE



PLEIKU STORAGE FOR BULK POL  
ON HAND BALANCE




TUY HOA STORAGE FOR BULK POL  
ON HAND BALANCE




\* Excludes Army steel tankage not in service

PPD QN REQUISITION STATUS



PACKAGED POL SUPPLY PERFORMANCE



ANNEX J ACofS, Maintenance

1. (U) During the quarter, the command's Artillery Repair and Return (R&R) program was effectively utilized despite several problems. Increased fire missions, inaccessibility of some fire bases, and a critical shortage of artillery repairmen precluded the return of some pieces on schedule, but the program continued to be effective. Under Phase III of the program, increased command emphasis was exerted, new quotas were established for the Direct Support Units (DSU), and firm schedule dates were given to supported artillery units. These have helped to increase the pace of the Artillery R&R Program, but the problems mentioned above continue to hamper operations.
2. (U) Under the Artillery Phase II Product Improvement Program (PIP), a total of fourteen M107/M110 chassis have been completed. Of these, eight belonged to depot stocks and six to elements of the 41st Artillery Group. Of the depot stocks, seven M107/M110 chassis have been issued to firing units in exchange for retrograded weapons. Nine chassis remain to be completed.
3. (U) The Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) Modernization and Improvement Program is continuing in the form of Project Buddy. ARVN and US planners determine, among other things, the training needed in the effort to bring ARVN forces up to the level of proficiency required for maximum effectiveness. ACofS, Maintenance, upon determining (in conjunction with ARVN and through MACV) what maintenance training was required, tasked units of USASUPCOM, QN to provide maintenance training for Vietnamese troops. At present, training activities are concentrated at the 45th General Support (GS) Group, 593d GS Gp, 86th Maint Bn (GS) and the 184th Ord Bn (Ammo).
4. (U) An engine diagnostic testing course has been initiated at the 86th Maint Bn (GS) in Cha Rang. The duration of the course is five days. It is scheduled once each month. Each major subordinate command of the Qui Nhon Support Command is levied for one student for each class. In addition, the 4th Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade are invited to participate in the program. The only prerequisite is that the student must be a qualified automotive mechanic actually performing in that capacity. The course has proven to be quite successful, and is the only one of its kind in RVN.
5. (U) During the past quarter one maintenance standdown was performed at the 86th Maint Bn. The supported unit was the 1/50 Infantry (Mech), which is now located in the Cam Ranh Bay area. Extensive planning and coordination between the 86th Maint Bn. and the supported unit took place before the standdown began. Lists of requirements, including repair parts and Prescribed Load List (PLL) shortages were compiled and submitted to this office. The Command's Materiel Release Expediter (MRE) team then located and released the required supplies to the 86th Maint Bn for use by supporting and supported personnel. The 86th Maint Bn provided technical assistance personnel to 1/50 Inf. for correction of organizational deficiencies, and performed all direct support (DS) maintenance required for the organization's equipment.

6. (U) The Qui Nhon Support Command Maintenance Management Assistance (CMA) team continued to function in its organizational maintenance management assistance role during the last quarter. In addition, the team performed seven CMI inspections for the 1st Log Comd CMI team. The team also performs an average of 220 roadside spot check inspections each month. Safety is emphasized in these inspections, and the team will deadline and hold any vehicle found unsafe to operate. When this occurs, the owning unit is notified of the situation and must retrieve the vehicle from the RSSC area.


7. (U) The Supply and Maintenance Instruct and Advise (I&A) team has been providing valuable assistance to the support command's Direct Support and General Support Units (DSU/GSU). The team is mission oriented, and instructs and advises DSU/GSU personnel on the proper procedures for the accomplishment of their missions. Periodically, the ACofS Maintenance has received requests from support command units for assistance with specific unit problems. The I&A team will alter its schedule in these cases and render whatever assistance is required. The team covers all aspects of DSU/GSU operations and is especially knowledgeable and helpful in the area of technical supply and the NCR 500 system operations.

8. (U) In June 1969, the ACofS, Maintenance of this headquarters was assigned to the Logistical Review Advisory Committee on Maintenance by 1st Log Comd. In this capacity he was directed to conduct a survey of the maintenance organizations assigned to the USASUPCOM, QN to determine the effects of various factors on the units' abilities to accomplish their maintenance missions. Reports were received from the 45th GS Group, 593d GS Group, and the 86th Maint Bn (GS) and were forwarded after review by the ACofS Maintenance to the Logistical Review Board at 1st Log.

9. (U) The Office of the ACofS, Maintenance has been reorganized to create two distinct sections: materiel and supply. The mission of the materiel section remains unchanged. The supply section will exercise staff supervision over DSU/GSU and lower repair parts supply operations, and will operate a Command Maintenance Management Assistance (CMA) team, a Maintenance and Supply I&A team, and will supervise the activities of the support command's materiel release expeditors (MRE).

ARTY R&R  
(M107/ML10)

WEAPONS



PROGRAMMED MONTH

COMPLETED MONTH  
CUMULATIVE


PROGRAM QTR  
CUMULATIVE

COMPLETED QTR

10	10	8	12																
5	7	9	6																
10	20	28	12																
5	12	21	6																

ARTY R&R  
(M108/ML09)

WEAPONS



PROGRAMMED MONTH

COMPLETED MONTH  
CUMULATIVE

PROGRAM QTR  
CUMULATIVE

COMPLETED QTR

4	4	4	4																
2	5	2	1																
4	8	12	4																
2	7	9	1																

# CONFIDENTIAL

## ANNEX K ACoS, Transportation

1. (U) The 54th Transportation Battalion of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) was issued 237 of its authorized 240 M54A1C five ton cargo trucks. These dropside vehicles significantly increased the capability of the 54th Bn. Prior to this time, the unit had only fixed side five ton cargo trucks and 2½ ton cargo trucks on hand. The dropside configuration makes loading and offloading with forklifts easier and more rapid.

2. (U) The Movements Control Center (MCC) of ACoS, Trans showed considerable development during the quarter.

a. A field MCC in the Phu Hiep area was established to serve USARV shippers and coordinate the efforts of the Vung Ro Bay outport, the 545th Trans Co (Lt Trk, 5 ton) and the supported units in the Vung Ro, Tuy Hoa, Phu Hiep logistical area. The MCC consists of one officer, one NCO, and one EM.

b. The main MCC in Qui Nhon is now equipped with a "hot line" to Pleiku, the ACoS, SP&O at 1st Log Comd and other users, through the switch board in the USASUPCOM, QN Logistical Operations Control Center (LOCC). This line has been particularly valuable in coordinating line haul requirements with the Pleiku field MCC.

3. (C) During the last part of October, 1969, rough weather and monsoon winds restricted Class V vessel discharge in the Qui Nhon outer harbor. The inner harbor anchorage cannot be used due to the proximity of enemy sapper units.

4. (U) As a result of monsoon rains, QL 19 to Pleiku was closed or restricted for use during the last part of the quarter. QL 1 south to Tuy Hoa was closed for most of the month of October as a result of bridge washouts and submerged bypasses.

5. (U) The land fill areas at the De Long pier and causeway access roads in Qui Nhon are severely eroding due to the monsoon rains. This erosion is augmented by strong tides in the inner harbor. There had been no provisions made to prevent erosion during the construction of the land fill and causeways.

6. (U) The rail line of communication (LOC) to Tuy Hoa has been repeatedly blocked by the weather and enemy action. There was no rail traffic at all during the month of October. The original concept of operations to the Tuy Hoa logistical area was to use rail as the primary LOC.

7. (C) Highway tonnage performance figures for the quarter were:

a. Aug	232,985 Short Tons (S/T)
b. Sep	207,671 S/T
c. Oct	197,474 S/T

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

8. (C) Figures for total cargo handled through the port of Qui Nhon were:

a. Aug	118,556 S/T
b. Sep	103,790.71 S/T
c. Oct	128,117 S/T

9. (C) Figures for cargo handled through the port of Vung Ro Bay were:

a. Aug	Discharge	11,672 S/T	Outload	902 S/T
b. Sep	Discharge	8,583 S/T	Outload	1,522 S/T
c. Oct	Discharge	9,976 S/T	Outload	1,536 S/T

10. (C) Rail performance figures for the quarter were:

a. August

Tuy Hoa Programmed	1,600 S/T
Tuy Hoa Moved	590 S/T
Phu Cat Programmed	2,300 S/T
Phu Cat Moved	1,219 S/T
TOTAL Moved	1,809 S/T

b. September

Tuy Hoa Programmed	2,300 S/T
Tuy Hoa Moved	675 S/T
Phu Cat Programmed	700 S/T
Phu Cat Moved	0 S/T
TOTAL Moved	675 S/T

c. October


Tuy Hoa Programmed	1,400 S/T
Tuy Hoa Moved	0 S/T
Phu Cat Programmed	3,000 S/T
Phu Cat Moved	42 S/T
TOTAL Moved	42 S/T

11. (U) The following charts give further information on Transportation operations within the command.

# CONFIDENTIAL

CARGO HANDLED THROUGH QUI NHON PORT


THOUSAND S/T



	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
MILITARY DISCHARGE SEALAND	91.6	68.2	52.5	76.3								
MILITARY DISCHARGE	7.9	7.0	8.5	14.4								
MILITARY OUTLOAD SEALAND	24.7	41.1	37.5	32.4								
MILITARY OUTLOAD	2.0	2.0	3.6	4.9								
USAID HANDLED	2.7	0.1	1.4	0.1								


CARGO HANDLED THROUGH VUNG RO PORT

THOUSAND S/T



	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
MILITARY DISCHARGE	10.4	11.7	8.5	10.0								
MILITARY OUTLOAD	1.7	0.9	1.5	1.5								


VESSEL TURNAROUND TIME  
General Cargo



TOTAL NO.  
VESSELS  
TURNAROUND  
TIME

	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
TOTAL NO. VESSELS	38	32	31	31								
TURNAROUND TIME	3	2.4	2.5	2.4								

VESSEL TURNAROUND TIME-AMMUNITION




TOTAL NO  
VESSELS  
TURNAROUND  
TIME

	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
TOTAL NO. VESSELS	7	6	5	6								
TURNAROUND TIME	4.6	4.4	3.0	5.0								

### RAIL PERFORMANCE


THOUSAND S/T



TUY HOA PROGRAMMED	2.5	1.6	2.3	1.4								
TUY HOA MOVED	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.0								
PHU CAT PROGRAMMED	2.5	2.3	0.7	3.0								
PHU CAT MOVED	0.0	1.2	0.0	.04								
TOTAL MOVED	0.7	1.8	0.6	.04								

### AIRLIFT (OUTBOUND)


THOUSAND S/T



— INTRA-RVN	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8								
--- MAC	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2								
- - - TOTAL	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0								
CE	.007	0.0	.003	.004								

MOTOR TRANSPORTATION PERFORMANCE  
MILITARY & COMMERCIAL


MILLION TON MILES



— REQUIREMENT	5.5	3.9	6.3	3.6									
- - CAPABILITY	5.5	4.0	6.5	4.0									

HIGHWAY TONNAGE PERFORMANCE  
MILITARY & COMMERCIAL

THOUSAND S/T



— LINE HAUL	70.5	53.5	40.5	41.0								
- - LOCAL HAUL	126.0	123.6	125.7	113.9								
.. P&B CLEAR	61.0	55.9	41.3	42.6								
TOTAL	257.5	233.0	207.6	197.5								

ANNEX L ACoS, Engineer

1. (U) LTC Kenneth L. Winter, ACoS, Engineer and MAJ Elwood B. Nichols attended an engineer conference held by Engineer Services Division of the office of the ACoS, Services, at Headquarters, First Logistical Command on 3 August.
2. (U) A diver team from the 497th Engineer Company (PC) was assigned the mission of replacing broken sections of the Vung Ro Bay flexible submarine POL hose line. These repairs were completed on 21 October. On 23 October, the divers returned to Vung Ro Bay to repair a leaking coupling in the submerged flexible line.
3. (U) A platoon from the 497th Engineer Company (PC) moved to Qui Nhon on 17 October to construct protective dolphins for the POL jetty. Work was started on 27 October. Also during this period, two housetrailer were moved from the USASUPCOM, QN; one was moved on 31 October to Phu Hiep and the other went to LZ English to replace the one used by the CG, 173d Airborne Brigade.
4. (U) In August, command emphasis on the curtailment of construction resulted in re-evaluation of the construction program. This resulted in the requirement for all requests for new work costing over \$500.00 (with exception of certain specific types of projects) to be forwarded through command channels for approval. All job order requests for the Qui Nhon area were forwarded on 4 September to CG, 1st Log Comd. A project review board was organized at USARV level, to evaluate all such projects. Members of the board visited Qui Nhon on 1 October for an on-site appraisal of requirements.
5. (U) A request for security lighting at the Qui Nhon Army Airfield was submitted as a MCA (Military Construction, Army) project on 28 September.
6. (U) The ship M.S. Henetia broke loose from moorings on 29 October and drifted into the 497th Engineer Detachment work barge, forcing it against the POL jetty. Damages to the POL lines were repaired on the same day. Damage to the jetty substructure is unknown. A request for repair of the jetty substructure was sent to CG, IFFV on 29 October.
7. (U) Paving of the Qui Nhon Army Airfield runway was completed by Raymond, Morrison, and Knudson Inc. (RMK) on 15 August. Paving of the west side of the airfield (taxiway and parking aprons) was completed on 1 October. The project to pave the hardstand area around the cold storage warehouse, started on 24 July, was delayed by heavy rain in October and was still incomplete at the close of the reporting period.
8. (U) RMK repaired bridge #302 on highway QL #1, opening it to two-way traffic on 26 October. The bridge had been closed by enemy action in January 1969 and a temporary by-pass employed until monsoon rains necessitated restoration of the concrete bridge. Repair was accomplished by raising the

two spans which had been dropped into the gap and driving H-beam piles through the bridge deck to refusal. The spans were then rested on an H-beam cap, which was welded to the piles.

9. (U) The 84th Engineer Battalion completed the project of burying a six inch and an eight inch coupled POL pipeline from Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa on 10 September. Considerable difficulty was experienced in getting these lines into service as a result of debris clogging the pipe. Some of the debris appeared to have been placed in the pipe as an act of sabotage during construction.

10. (U) The 84th Engineer Battalion started work, on 25 October, to construct a connecting dock at the Cold Storage Warehouse. This dock will connect the work docks at the center of the building, permitting electric forklifts to move under their own power from one end of the building to the other.

11. (U) EMK has been selected to construct 22 miles of six inch welded, buried, cathoded, wrapped POL pipeline from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat Air Force Base. This project has not been started although RMK began setting up a prefabrication plant on 15 October.

12. (U) The 937th Engineer Group has continued to provide emergency repair for lines of communication throughout the USASUPCOM, QN area of operations.

13. (U) On 25 October the 299th Engineer Battalion completed repair of the bridge on the RVN by-pass road where it intersects with highway LTL #440, near Qui Nhon.

(U) The ACoS, Engineer provided coordination of facilities to complete the following unit moves during the period 1 August to 1 November 1969:

- a. The 90th HMS Co. relocated from location 39, Cha Rang, to the Class Depot area, Qui Nhon.
- b. The 17th Field Hospital moved from Phu Tai to An Khe.
- c. The 51st Ambulance Company moved from Phu Tai to Qui Nhon.
- d. The ROK Military Police moved from the 299th Engineer Battalion's area to Qui Nhon Army Airfield.

ANNEX M ACofS, Comptroller

1. (U) On 11 August 1969, the Qui Nhon Support Command implemented C-Day (Conversion Day) Procedures, requiring all personnel to turn in all old series Military Payment Certificates (MPC) and receive the new series. The old series MPC became immediately worthless, thus damaging the operations of black market personnel since only authorized possessors may exchange old series MPC for new. Both the 13th Finance in Qui Nhon and the 126th Finance Section in Pleiku worked straight through until conversion was completed, enabling C-Day procedures to function smoothly. Both units received letters of appreciation from the Commanding General. Some minor difficulties were encountered on C-Day but were quickly overcome. The solutions have been included in change I to USASUPCOM, QN Reg 37-10 which will be incorporated, pending revision of higher headquarters' regulations.
2. (U) A total of 97 special conversions were processed through the ACofS, Comptroller by the support command Board of Review for Special Conversion. Applications for special conversion were submitted by personnel who, for various reasons, could not convert their MPC on C-Day.
3. (U) In the area of interservice support to non-Army customers, it was noticed that line haul operations for the removal of PDO property are reimbursable when such property is released under the Military Assistance Program (MAPEX) or to civilian contractors. Extensive planning is underway to establish billing procedures. The Comptroller's office is also undertaking a complete vertical review of interservice support agreements (ISSA's) to determine possible alterations of future ISSA's.
4. (U) In the reporting period, 22 of 38 recurring reports required by USASUPCOM QN staff sections were eliminated. Another report was reduced in frequency from monthly to quarterly.
5. (U) In mid-September, a cost reduction goal of \$1,000,000 was placed upon the USASUPCOM, QN by 1st Log Comd. Plans had to be submitted to 1st Log by 25 Sept. The command met its goal through support from subordinate units and headquarters staff sections. Among the subordinate units, the largest contributions came from the 184th Ordnance Bn, the 86th Maintenance Bn, and the 240th Quartermaster Bn. The staff sections submitting cost reduction plans were Transportation, SP&O, and POL.
6. (U) In the redeployment of automatic data processing equipment, USARV authorized the support command to transfer one NCR-500 system from the 160th HEM Company to the 19th S&S Company.
7. (U) The following audits were performed by the Internal Review Branch:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Name of Fund</u>	<u>Date Completed</u>
Annual	Pleiku Central Post Fund	14 August 1969

Annual	Tuy Hoa Chaplain's Fund	25 August 1969
Annual	Pleiku Officer's Open Mess	9 September 1969
Dissolution	661st Ord Co VLF	22 September 1969
Unit Fund	13th Finance Section (DISB)	23 October 1969

a. The following visits were made to Open Messes by the Internal Review Branch:

- (1) During the period 31 July to 3 August, a visit was made to Tuy Hoa to discuss the transfer of the Officer's Open Mess to the 268th Aviation Bn.
- (2) On 12 and 13 August, a pre-IG inspection of all NAF activities was made on the 394th Trans Bn and the 5th Trans Command.
- (3) On 2 September, a pre-IG inspection of all NAF activities was made on the 45th General Support Group.
- (4) On 15 - 18 October, a visit was made to Pleiku to determine the source of an indebtedness assumed during the annexation of the MACV Open Mess on 26 June 69.

b. The following follow-up audits were performed:

- (1) July - Qui Nhon Chaplain's Fund and AER.
- (2) August - Qui Nhon Central Post Fund.
- (3) September - Pleiku Chaplain's Fund and NCO Open Mess.
- (4) October - Qui Nhon NCO Open Mess.

The following forms were devised and distributed to the various Open Messes:

- (1) USASC, QN Form 201, 19 August 69, to record cash and slugs count and reconcile with amounts on hand.
- (2) USASC, QN Form 209, 14 October 69, to record acknowledgment of briefings to Open Mess Personnel upon assumption of duty and every six months thereafter.

Periodic reproduction and Command-wide distribution continued to be made of the following directives:

- (1) Appendix I, USARV Cir 230-1, Open Mess Check List for Commanders.
- (2) Appendix II, USARV Cir 230-1, Open Mess Check List for Boards of Governors Members.
- (3) Appendix III, USARV Cir 230-1, Open Mess Check List for Custodians.
- (4) Appendix VII, USARV Cir 230-1, "What gets a Mess into Trouble."

The newly published regulation, USARV 230-2, pertaining to Vietnamese labor funds, classifies these activities as sundry funds under the provisions of Paragraph 1-20, AR 230-1. Accordingly, these funds are subject to annual audits and an audit schedule is being established to insure that these funds are audited at least once a year. Attempts are being made to facilitate these scheduled audits during November, 1969.

During the quarter, the ACofS, Comptroller received a total of 38 staff reports of which 10 were from USARV, 22 from 1st Log Comd and six from other commands.

ANNEX N Civil-Military Operations

1. (U) The name of the USASUPCOM, QN Office of Civil Affairs was changed to Office of Civil-Military Operations in accordance with Change 1, FM 101-5.
2. (U) In reply to a request from Colonel Clayton Gompf, Binh Dinh Province Senior Advisor, the Office of Civil-Military Operations has shifted the bulk of its civic action assistance efforts to support the "Back-to-Hamlet" program. The program is aimed at returning refugees to their homes, repairing damaged villages and re-establishing agriculture in areas abandoned by the refugees. USASUPCOM, QN units are supporting the "Back-to-Hamlet" program with construction materials, transportation and technical assistance.
3. (U) The "Big Brother" program which sponsors a party each month for one of the local Vietnamese orphanages has proven quite successful. Co-sponsored by the Red Cross Recreation Center and the Office of Civil-Military Operations, the program enables various USASUPCOM, QN units to "adopt" individual orphanages as a means of participation in the civic action program.
4. (U) As part of its community relations program, the Civil-Military Operations office bought toys for 2,500 children to help celebrate the Mid-Autumn Festival. Five hundred gifts were distributed at a party sponsored by the 27th Trans Bn for children of the 884th Regional Forces (RF) Company. Two thousand toys were given to the Province Chief for distribution by his headquarters.
5. (U) A Montagnard Handicraft Sales Area will soon open at the Qui Nhon USO. This project is a response to many requests by US military personnel for Montagnard-made souvenirs. The project was coordinated through the Office of Civil-Military Operations with USO personnel, the Binh Dinh Refugee Service and the Ethnic Minorities Service. The Ethnic Minorities Service will gather and price the handicrafts, the USO will sell them and the Refugee Service will distribute the returns back to the Montagnards in the form of money and supplies.

ANNEX O Command Inspector General

1. (U) The IG conducted 17 annual general inspections (AGI's) during the quarter. All units were rated satisfactory. A revised AGI schedule for the second and third quarters of Fiscal Year 1970 was published and distributed to the units concerned.

2. (U) The support command IG conducted courtesy AGI's in the following units to assist them in preparing for the AGI conducted by the 1st Logistical Command IG:

- (1) HHC, 5th Transportation Command.
- (2) HHD, 394th Transportation Battalion.
- (3) HHC, 45th General Support Group.
- (4) HHD, USASUPCOM, QN

All of these units were inspected during the reporting period and were rated satisfactory by the 1st Logistical Command Inspector General.

3. (U) During the reporting period, the IG office processed 12 justified complaints, 34 unjustified complaints, and 118 requests for assistance.

4. (U) Eight visits were made by Inspectors General of the IG office to areas and compounds outside the Qui Nhon area. These visits were for the purpose of hearing complaints and requests for assistance from command personnel. Visits were made to USASC, QN units in An Khe, Tuy Hoa, Vung Ro Bay, Pleiku, LZ English, Dak To, Long My, Cha Rang and Phu Tai.

ANNEX P Staff Chaplain

1. (U) Qui Nhon Support Command chaplains continued to support assigned units in the field with a slight increase in necessary administrative operations and supply activities. During the quarter, visits were made by Chaplain (COL) Ray M. Rowland, 1st Log Comd Chaplain; Chaplain (LTC) John M. Gremillion, Deputy 1st Log Chaplain, and Chaplain (MAJ) James R. Linderman, all in August. In September Chaplain Rowland, visited again and assisted in the dedication of the Camp Granite Chapel. In October, the command was visited by chaplains of various commands in the II Corps area.
2. (U) Chaplains training conferences were conducted in August by chaplains of the 8th Transportation Group at Camp Vasquez. In September, the 593d GS Gp sponsored the training conference at Camp Granite. In October, the conference was held at the Long My, Depot, under the supervision of the depot chaplains. Visitors from the 1st Log Comd chaplains office attended all of these conferences.
3. (U) During this period, two new chapels were dedicated, the Port Chapel in the 5th TC area at the De Long Pier and the Camp Granite Chapel of the 593d GS Gp. Both chapels were constructed through concentrated self-help programs.
4. (U) Arrangements were made to improve Catholic and Protestant coverage in the support command area by flying chaplains each Friday to Song Cau (MAOV), Dong Xoan (MACV), Dong Tre (6/32d), and Cung Son (6/32d). Flights were set up by IFFV. Catholic coverage has been provided by the staff chaplain, (LTC) John F. Russell; protestant coverage has been supplied by the 5th TC Chaplain, (MAJ) Robert D. Parker.
5. (U) Attendance at all services showed a slight decrease in September and October, believed to be due to the corresponding decrease in troop strength. Chaplains continue to conduct more than the four services per week required by USARV. Regular Sunday and additional weekday services were conducted by all chaplains in the command. Evening devotionals are also being conducted by many of the chaplains and increased interest is being shown in morning devotional services.
6. (U) Eighteen chaplains are assigned to USASC, QN and there are eight other chaplains in the Qui Nhon area who are assigned to non-support command units. The following indicates support command chaplains activities:

Total attendance at all services -----	56,324
Total number of services conducted -----	3,333
Total number of attendance at C.G. Classes -----	28,920
Number of visits made to the hospitals -----	950

Number of counsels and interviews ----- 5,650

Community relations (meetings, services, etc.) ----- 312

Other parish administrations ----- 1,600

Statistics on money received and disbursed through the Consolidated Chaplains' Fund for civic actions are as follows:

For Churches ----- \$1,679.36

For Schools and Orphanages ----- \$2,103.27

Miscellaneous and Charitable Causes ----- \$3,096.22

ANNEX Q Staff Judge Advocate

1. (U) Since assuming general court-martial jurisdiction on 1 June 1969, in accordance with DA General Order 34, dated 27 May 1969, eight cases have been tried by general courts-martial convened by the CG, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon.

2. (U) The following statistics are submitted:

	Special Courts-Martial	Summary Courts-Martial	General Courts-Martial
Aug	4	16	3
Sep	8	10	3
Oct	15	1	0

(Beginning in October, Da Nang, 41st Signal Battalion, & 241st Trans Co. figures were included in the HQ, USASUPCOM, QN Military Justice reports.)

	Articles 15	US Claims Filed	US Claims Forwarded	US Claims Paid
Aug	374	33	1	12
Sep	391	34	1	6
Oct	487	20	3	22


13 Courts-Martial involved use of drugs

45 Articles 15 involved use of drugs


3. (U) On 1 October 1969, a foreign claims commission was established within the Staff Judge Advocate's Section. A total of 386 foreign claims were filed during the month, including claims from the Qui Nhon area which were sent to Saigon (before the establishment of the foreign claims commission) but not acted upon there and returned to Qui Nhon for filing and action. An additional 26 cases were filed and then withdrawn.

4. (U) The following charts give some indication of military justice activities within the command.

GENERAL COURTS MARTIAL




SPECIAL COURTS MARTIAL




LEGAL ASSISTANCE

NUMBER CASES




CLAIMS PROCESSED..

NUMBER CLAIMS



SUMMARY COURTS MARTIAL



	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
TOTAL	26	16	10	1								
NOT GUILTY	0	0	1	1								

ANNEX R Staff Provost Marshal

1. (U) The Staff Provost Marshal continued to maintain close liaison with Military Police (MP) Provost Marshals and Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Officers in coordinating the command's requirements for MP support. During the quarter, the Staff Provost Marshal's Office processed and monitored CID and MP reports, armed forces traffic tickets, serious incident reports (SIR's), physical security surveys, and Project 525 inspections.
2. (U) A disturbance occurred in the city of Qui Nhon between 1530 hours and 1730 hours on 31 July 1969. During an attempted apprehension of one soldier, approximately 150 soldiers became involved with the Military Policemen who were trying to effect the apprehension. A detailed investigation of the incident was conducted and selections from the subsequent after-action report are attached at Inclosure 2. The city of Qui Nhon was immediately placed off limits by the Commanding General, USASUPCOM, QN, and remains off limits to this date by direction of the Deputy Commanding General, USARV.
3. (U) The first quarterly report of voluntary turn-in of unauthorized weapons and ammunition was conducted for USASUPCOM, QN, compiled, and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command. Over 50 suspected unauthorized weapons were turned in, including 17 firearms, 17 edged weapons and 21 other weapons. More than 150 rounds of ammunition were also turned in. The decision as to which weapons were actually unauthorized is to be made by 1st Logistical Command.
4. (U) The Traffic Accident Program, initiated last quarter (in conjunction with the Staff Safety Office), has proven itself an asset in recognizing problem areas in order for commanders to take necessary action to prevent further accidents. Additionally, a program ("Maverick") has been initiated to eliminate unauthorized vehicles from traveling the streets of Qui Nhon. This program is designed to confiscate all unauthorized vehicles being utilized in the USASUPCOM, QN area. The program applies to vehicles being utilized by 1st Log as well as non-1st Log personnel.
5. (U) A revised traffic circulation plan was published 25 Sep 69 in the form of Installation Coordinator Regulation 210-2: Traffic Regulations and Rules of the Road.

ANNEX S Public Information Office

1. (U) The most significant event in the Information Office during the quarter was the introduction of a commercially printed unit newspaper, The Logman, representing a change from the six page multilith product which was produced in August and September. The Logman is a USARV approved publication, funded by the 593d Central Post Fund.

2. (U) The paper is printed in Tokyo by Pacific Stars and Stripes. At present, editorial material is hand carried each month to Tokyo. A new operation in Saigon, scheduled to begin in January, will alleviate the TDY requirement, enabling copy material to be processed in Saigon, with final printing in Tokyo.

3. (U) The publication is intended to assist the Command Information program, and provide the men of the support command a publication with which they can identify. Emphasis is placed on mailing the paper to families in the United States to help publicize the importance of logistical support, a point often neglected in other publications.

4. (U) Overall news and photo production was increased, with the result that news articles and photographs produced by the information office have been increasingly utilized by other media. During the last week of the quarter, Qui Nhon releases appeared in the USARV Reporter, the MACV Observer, and Stars and Stripes.

5. (U) Specific production figures follow:

Hometown Releases	August	September	October
	263	323	207
News Releases	17	27	17

The September increase in news releases was due to production for the first Logman. A large number of releases were logged on the last two days of the month, but were not utilized until October.

ANNEX T Special Services

1. (U) The 13th Interservice Photography Contest was conducted during this quarter. Personnel from Northern II CTZ won eighteen of the forty nine awards.

2. (U) A "Crafts by Mail" program was initiated to send model kits to isolated units by mail. Kits consisted of leathercraft, plastic models, fine arts equipment and casting resins. Also during the quarter, a multi-craft shop was opened at Long My Depot.

3. (U) The Qui Nhon Support Command Invitational Volleyball Tournament was held during this reporting period. Eleven teams from the Northern II Corps area participated. With monsoon rains in the latter part of the quarter, there was a need to reduce the number of outdoor sporting events.

4. (U) There was an increase in the number of entertainment events during this reporting period. A breakdown of shows presented is as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>
5	Command Military Touring Shows
12	Area Military Touring Shows
7	Area Military Shows
18	USO Shows - Variety & Handshake Units
6	Commercial Shows

5. (U) Two command contests were conducted during this period, a "Battle of the Bands" and the 1969 Vietnam Entertainment Contest.

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### LESSONS LEARNED

A. Personnel: None

B. Intelligence: None

C. Operations:

1. (C) Use of Sentry Dogs:

a. Observation: On 10 Sept 1969 the QN ABD perimeter was penetrated by sappers who made their way around sentry dog teams patrolling the area.

b. Evaluation: On the night of the penetration, seven sentry dog teams were being used to patrol various areas of the ABD. One of the posts being patrolled was in the area of the enemy penetration. The post is located near the perimeter road and is in close proximity to an area being utilized by Korean contract employees. Sentry dogs are trained to alert to the smell of foreigners and the close proximity of foreign contract employees had caused the dogs to falsely alert several times that evening prior to the time of penetration. After being restrained from following the Korean scent, the dogs became less effective. In addition, the perimeter road is used extensively 24 hours a day. The constant movement of vehicles also tends to distract the dogs and diminishes the effectiveness of their senses.

c. Recommendations: All personnel not considered mission essential should be kept as far from the areas where dogs are being utilized as possible. Also, the use of perimeter roads should be limited to mission essential traffic.

2. (C) Helicopter Observation of Pipeline Systems:

a. Observation: On 24 August 1969, a "dedicated" helicopter was made available to this command to conduct aerial observation of pipeline systems in an effort to reduce pipeline losses to an acceptable level. The helicopter (a UH-1H or similar model) is available on a daily basis.

b. Evaluation: Operational control of this helicopter was given to the 240th QM Bn to conduct aerial observation of the pipeline system operated by that unit. A normal observation crew, in addition to the helicopter crew, consists of an observer, a US Military Policeman and a Vietnamese military or civilian police official. On occasion, this helicopter is used to ferry critical repair parts and/or technicians to the scene of pipeline repair. Its primary mission is the early detection of line separations or leaks and the direction of repair crews to the location of damage so as to expedite the return of the pipeline to operational status. The purpose of the US and GVN police officials is to give some measure of authority to the helicopter crew to destroy pilfered goods and apprehend pilferers when possible. The use of this helicopter, in addition to allowing faster repairs to the pipeline systems, is both a real and psychological deterrent to pilferers. Usually the apprehension of pilferers is a dramatic event, generally witnessed by large numbers of persons. Because of the helicopter's limited carrying capability, only one or two persons can be apprehended at any one time. Also, during the time of

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apprehension, the helicopter is highly vulnerable to enemy fire. A tactical type reaction force, responsive to the direction of the observer in the helicopter, could enter an area of heavy pilferage activity, cordon off the area, and make mass apprehensions of pilferers. Such a capability would contribute much to the reduction of POL losses. At present, there are no tactical forces in this area available to undertake such a mission.

c. Recommendation: That steps be taken to make such tactical forces available to respond when large numbers of pilferers are sighted.

D. Organization: None

E. Training:

1. (U) English classes for Vietnamese personnel:

a. Observation: Twelve members of USASC, QN units are engaged in teaching English classes to Vietnamese Nationals in Qui Nhon. The classes are conducted at the Normal School (Teachers College), several public schools, and a Catholic Seminary. The response from Vietnamese attending the classes has been overwhelming. There are more people wanting to take the courses than there are teachers and facilities available. The majority of these Vietnamese work with or for US military personnel.

b. Evaluation: Problems have arisen with this program due to the great demands made on the volunteer military teachers who teach two hours each evening, six evenings per week, in addition to their normal military duties.

c. Recommendation: Because this program benefits US units by easing the language barrier between employers and employees, units should encourage volunteer teachers by giving them some relief from their normal work load and considering the two hours as part of regular military duties. The encouragement should be emphasized to help ensure a more constant flow of replacement volunteers when vacancies arise.

2. (U) Vietnamese - American relations:

a. Observation: Incidents involving unwitting offenses to Vietnamese nationals have occurred during the past quarter. In one case, US personnel burying pipeline in the vicinity of a cemetery cut through and damaged 200 graves. Some of the families whose plots were disturbed believed the action forced the spirits of their dead relatives to wander aimlessly on the earth until the remains could be properly and ceremoniously re-interred.

b. Evaluation: Such incidents generate considerable ill feeling and frequently require substantial outlay of US time and money in attempts to repair the damage. The vast majority of these incidents could be prevented with a little courtesy and consideration for the Vietnamese on the part of US personnel.

c. Recommendation: More instruction at the unit level is needed to inform US personnel of the customs and traditions of the Vietnamese people. Increased

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knowledge of their particular habits would lessen the number of unintentional incidents and diminish the ill will caused by needless violations of Vietnamese traditions and customs.

F. Logistics:

1. (U) Difficulties with buried coupled pipelines:

a. Observation: A number of technical problems have arisen with the buried coupled pipelines employed by the command. The line is also difficult to inspect and repair.

b. Evaluation: POL pipelines in the USASC, QN area were buried in an attempt to reduce the losses brought about by sabotage and accidental damage to the pipe. Although the incident rate decreased, there was still a significant number of leaks due to faulty couplings. Repair operations on buried pipeline are quite complicated and time consuming, often requiring a full day to accomplish one repair. These problems would be less likely to arise if welded pipe were employed for buried lines.

c. Recommendation: In areas where pipeline burial is required, welded pipeline should be used instead of coupled pipe.

2. (U) Repair of buried coupled pipelines:

a. Observation: Many of the problems which have arisen with buried pipeline couplings could have been avoided had greater care been taken when the line was installed. Repair operations on buried lines have been greatly facilitated through use of the Gradall bucket-type trenching machine.

b. Evaluation: When coupled pipelines are installed or repaired, care should be taken to check each section carefully for debris and to place pipe into the trench in such a way that the gaskets are not pinched. When digging up lines for repairs, the use of Gradall trenching equipment can reduce digging time from a full day to two hours.

c. Recommendation: That crews installing and repairing buried coupled lines devote particular attention to insuring that pipes are clear of debris and that gaskets are not pinched when the pipe is placed in the trench. To facilitate and speed digging operations when repairing damaged buried lines, Gradall bucket-type trenching machines should be made available whenever possible to units operating buried coupled lines.

G. Communications:

1. (U) Reports Control:

a. Observation: A concentrated effort to eliminate non-essential reports can be quite successful. Over 50% of the USASUPCOM, QN recurring reports have been eliminated through careful evaluation of each.

b. Evaluation: The method was simply to define an "essential report" and eliminate those which do not meet the criteria established.

c. Recommendation: None.

2. (U) C-Day Operations:

a. Observation: Notification of C-Day was relayed to subordinate units through the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) with considerable speed and efficiency.

b. Evaluation: The TOC provides an excellent means for immediate dissemination of information on subjects such as C-Day to subordinate units.

c. Recommendation: None.

3. (U) Direct Dialing System:

a. Observation: The recent switch to a long distance direct dial system alleviated many problems, however, it created several new ones.

b. Evaluation: Many personnel seem to think that the dial system should solve all problems and enable the telephone user to pick up the phone anytime and dial anywhere in country immediately, presuming that the military dial system is the same as the large, well established, commercial system in CONUS. However, the only difference between the "Operator System" and direct dial is the speed and efficiency with which a call can be handled. There are still only a certain number of available lines to any given place and with the simpler procedures of the dial system, these few lines are more likely to be busy.

c. Recommendation: A comprehensive information program should be initiated to explain the army communications program. Everyone uses the communications system but few people understand the limitations involved due to the number of available frequencies and channels employed in a communications system where long distance cables and lines cannot be used.

4 (U) Radio Maintenance:

a. Observation: The large amount of time needed by support maintenance facilities to repair radio equipment (i.e., AN/VRC-12 series radios) has greatly hampered unit missions.

b. Evaluation: Lack of trained personnel and available repair parts (i.e., modules, transistors) has been the primary setback. This, in itself, has caused other problem areas. Units are tempted to cannibalize radios to keep other radios operating. This serves to defeat the supply and demand system as it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain sufficient radios.

c. Recommendation: Increased effort should be made to make qualified radio repair personnel and adequate radio repair parts available at radio maintenance facilities.

H. Materiel: None.

I. Other:

1. Arts and Crafts Program:

a. Observation: A "craft by mail" program was set up by the Special Services office at this headquarters. The program was quite successful, and many units participated.

b. Evaluation: "Craft by mail" provides a valuable morale boost to troops in the field.

c. Recommendation: "Crafts by Mail" should be made a permanent part of the Special Services program.

2. Entertainment personnel:

a. Observation: At present, personnel performing with area military touring shows are assigned for special duty with Special Services for 30 days.

b. Evaluation: Thirty days generally tends to be insufficient as it does not provide musical groups with sufficient rehearsal and practice time before beginning performances.

c. Recommendations: That personnel performing with area military touring shows be assigned to Special Services for 60 days periods.

AVCA GO-MH (19 Nov 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command,  
Qui Nhon for period ending 31 Oct 69 RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 4 DEC 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon for the quarterly period ending 31 Oct 69 is forwarded.

2. (U) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning sentry dogs, page 103, paragraph C 1. Concur. USAEV Regulation 190-12 stipulates in paragraph 6a that sentry dog posts must be isolated because the dog is trained to alert on and seek out intruders on or near his post. Since the dog cannot discern between authorized personnel and unauthorized intruders, he alerts on all personnel in the area. If there is excessive vehicular traffic or personnel traffic on or near the post the dog will constantly make alerts. These distractions will reduce the dog's effectiveness and initiative to alert.

b. Reference item concerning helicopter observation of pipeline system, page 103, paragraph C2. Nonconcur. Tactical forces should not be assigned this mission. Apprehension of pilferers is the responsibility of local police forces and their employment in the manner described should be coordinated at the support command level.

c. Reference item concerning Vietnamese - American Relations, page 104, paragraph E2. Concur. Customs and traditions of the Vietnamese people should be a part of all unit briefing brochures for incoming personnel and at least monthly the subject of customs and traditions should be included as a C-I topic to keep personnel aware of their responsibilities in regards to this subject.

d. Reference item concerning difficulties with buried coupled pipelines, page 105, paragraph F1. Concur. Only API STD 5L pipe should be used for buried pipelines and should be of welded construction. These pipelines should also be coated and wrapped to inhibit corrosion. Lightweight tubing should not be used.

AVCA GO-MH (19 Nov 69) 1st Ind

DEF 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command,  
Qui Nhon for period ending 31 Oct 69 RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

e. Reference item concerning repair of buried coupled pipelines, page 105, paragraph F2. Concur in part. The 240th QM Battalion is responsible for the maintenance of buried pipelines in Qui Nhon Support Command but they do not have the necessary equipment authorized or on hand to repair buried pipelines. The Qui Nhon Support Command has been directed to submit an MTOE for the necessary excavation equipment so they will have this capability. The recommendation made by the Qui Nhon Support Command, if followed when future installation and repair of buried pipelines takes place, would enhance the operations of these buried lines. These lessons learned will be brought to the attention of units doing the work.

f. Reference item concerning direct dialing system, page 106, paragraph G3. Concur with observation and evaluation, however, the first 20 pages of the US Government Agencies, Vietnam, telephone directory, Sep 69 expressly deals with explaining the limitations of and procedures required in using the automatic telephone system. Amplification of existing instructions is considered unnecessary.

g. Reference item concerning "craft by mail", page 107, paragraph I1. Concur. The "craft by mail" program should be adopted as a permanent part of the Special Services program for isolated areas. This program has been well received by the troops in isolated areas and gives them something to do in free time where there are no organized recreational facilities.

h. Reference item concerning entertainment personnel, page 107, paragraph I2. Concur, with the reservation that individuals assignment for a 60 day period is consistent with the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

CF:  
USASUPCCM, QNH

*Thomas P. High*  
For C. D. STAFFORD  
1Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

AVHGC-DST (19 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 0 JAN

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Difficulties with buried coupled pipelines", page 105, paragraph F1 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2d; concur. The burial of portions of pipeline in the Qui Nhon area was accomplished on an expedited basis without availability of equipment or properly trained personnel to accomplish welding of pipeline; thus coupled line was buried. Welded and buried pipeline is being laid from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat Airbase. An important consideration in utilization of welded pipeline is that operating units are not authorized trained personnel, welding equipment, or mechanical digging equipment to effect repairs on welded buried pipeline. Thus, this capability must exist in a supporting engineer unit or be added to the operating units' TOE. 1st Log Cnd has initiated a request for temporary loan of necessary equipment to maintain the Qui Nhon - Phu Cat pipeline, which will be followed by an MTOE submission.

b. Reference item concerning "Repair of buried coupled pipelines", page 105, paragraph F2 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2e. The recommendation that Gradall bucket-type entrenching machines be authorized to units operating buried coupled pipelines for purposes of facilitating the repair of pipelines appears to have merit. Headquarters, 1st Log Cnd has stated in their 1st Indorsement that the Qui Nhon Support Command has been directed to submit an MTOE for entrenching machines. Upon receipt of the proposed MTOE, this headquarters will evaluate and process the document in accordance with established procedures. However, in view of the Headquarters, USARV moratorium on submission of TDA, MTDA and MTOE actions, Qui Nhon Support Command should not submit a proposed MTOE unless critical circumstances exist to justify the action.

c. Reference item concerning "Radio Maintenance", page 106, paragraph G4; concur. It is recognized by CG, USAECOM, CINCUSARPAC, and this Headquarters that a severe shortage of AN/VRC-12 radio modules and transistors exists. Command emphasis has recently been directed by this Headquarters to all USARV Army Commands on the rapid evacuation of these items to Sacramento Army Depot for repair and return to stock IAW procedures contained in USARV Reg 750-31.

AVHGC-DST (19 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

A problem for some has been the failure of units to promptly evacuate these items, meanwhile requisitioning like replacements, with the result that stock availability of these items is now critical. Concur with the recommendation that qualified radio repair personnel should be available at maintenance facilities. Shortages of radio repairmen by MOS should be referred to the unit's higher headquarters for assistance. In-country capability exists to train radio repairmen, and no problem should be experienced by any unit who obtains the necessary training quotas.

d. Reference item concerning "Arts and Crafts Program", page 106, paragraph I1 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2g; concur. This is presently an active program in the ~~USARV~~ Special Services activities. Budgeting for FY 71 includes \$280,000.00 for crafts by mail in isolated areas.

e. Reference item concerning "Entertainment personnel", page 107, paragraph I2 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2h; concur. Determination of the time frame for personnel to be attached to Special Services for Military Touring Shows should be made at the unit level depending on availability of personnel. Sixty days is reasonable in view of the circumstances.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
L. D. MURRAY  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furn:  
USA Sup Cnd, Qui Nhon  
1st Log Cnd

GPOP-DT (19 Nov 69) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon for  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. I. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Ass AG

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(C) SIGNIFIANT ENEMY CONTACTS WITHIN THE US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON  
1 August - 31 October, 1969

1. (C) Sometime during the night of 3 Aug 1969 (BR847344) W of bridge #6 on highway #19, two sections of pipe were blown up by satchel charges. At BR904324, near bridge #5 on highway #19, the pipeline was uncovered by local nationals, was broken open, and fuel was obtained from subsequent leaks. The operation could be observed from Korean guard towers in the area.
2. (C) At 120020H Aug (GR037244) in QN, the POL package yard received four rounds of B-40 rocket fire with no casualties or damage. Tank Farm #2 received 4-6 rounds of small arms fire and the Han Jin compound received two rounds of B-40 rocket fire; all with negative casualties or damage. Units returned fire with M-79, M-60, and .50 caliber machine guns with unknown results. At 0055H, the Han Jin compound received 4 rounds of B-40 rocket fire, hitting the mess hall, medical buildings and one barracks (all received slight damage), resulting in 3 Korean civilians wounded in action (WIA). At the same time, Tank Farm #2 received five rounds of small arms fire but suffered no casualties or damage and the 84th Engineer compound (GR055226) received 3-4 rounds of B-40 rocket fire, also without damage. Some telephone lines were knocked down.
3. (C) At 120130H Aug (BR935315) in QN, Co E, US Army Depot (USAD) received two rounds of 60mm mortar fire, one round of B-40 rocket fire and an unknown amount of small arms and automatic weapons fire. Results were one US WIA, one barracks damaged and an unconfirmed two VC WIA.
4. (C) At 120910H Aug (BR848342) 13½ km west of highway junction QL #19 and QL #1, a 240th QM Bn pipeline repair crew, while replacing pipe sections, detonated a pressure type mine, resulting in three US killed in action (KIA) and two US WIA who were medevaced to the 67th Evac Hospital in QN.
5. (C) At 121145H Aug (BR243492) 24 km W of An Khe on highway #19, Pump Station #3 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, with six rounds impacting inside the perimeter. The station also received an unknown amount of small arms fire. There was no damage to equipment, but four US soldiers were WIA (all slight).
6. (C) At 121118H Aug (BR287454) 19 km W of An Khe on highway #19, an 8th Trans Gp convoy was westbound in the Mang Giang Pass when it was ambushed by an unknown size NVA force employing mortar, B-40 rocket, small arms and automatic weapons fire from the North and South sides of the road. The convoy was supported by 4th Inf Div troops in the area who engaged the enemy. Results were three US WIA, one gun truck damaged, four bobtails damaged, and two Han Jin reefers destroyed.
7. (C) At 122250H Aug (BR745387) 8 km E of Binh Khe on highway #19, Pump Station #3 received one round of unidentified explosive fire which hit the radio shack resulting in two US WIA (one serious, one slight). ROK security returned fire with unknown results.

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8. (C) At 150215H Aug (ZA208537) Pleiku Log Center, the 88th S&S Bn reported that an estimated 15 enemy approached their perimeter on the North side. The enemy force was repelled with M-79 and .50 cal MG fire. There were no friendly casualties or damage. Enemy casualties were unknown.

9. (C) At 180115H Aug (CRO218) in QN, the ROK security force at the 184th Ord Bn Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) spotted some lights near their ambush point and employed claymores and small arms fire with unknown results. There was no return fire. A sweep was made at first light with negative results.

10. (C) At 181945H Aug (CRO67217) in QN, the Compound Complex I Water Point received 75-100 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire and one round of unidentified high explosive fire from the vicinity of CRO68218. The enemy force was estimated to be 5-6 men. Fire was returned with small arms, M-79, and M-60 with unknown results. At 2015H, MP's sent a reaction force which, at 2359H, received 5-6 rounds of unidentified high explosive fire and more small arms fire from the vicinity of CRO68218. Fire was again returned with unknown results. At 0105H, a second reaction force was sent out to the water point from the 41st Sig Bn. Contact terminated at 0230H. A sweep was made at first light with negative results. Results: Friendly - two US WIA (slight, both 41st Sig); Enemy, unknown. Damage to water point was negligible.

(C) At 182350H Aug (CRO03247) at Phu Tai, the 8th Gp Ice Plant received four rounds of B-40 rocket fire. Three rounds were direct hits on the Ice Plant and damaged compressor, an ice chamber, and made a hole in the building. Damage was slight. One round hit an unoccupied bunker. The area also received approximately 40 rounds of small arms fire at MP Checkpoint #3 resulting in one US WIA (slight), one jeep with flat tires and one jeep with a broken windshield. Two APC's went to recover the jeeps and received two rounds of small arms fire. Fire was returned with .50 cal MG with unknown results.

(C) At 191145H Aug (BR878324) 21 km W of QN on highway #19, an explosion on pipeline valve wounded two US personnel from the 240th QM Bn. Another unexploded charge was found at BR878324.

(C) At 202121H Aug (CRO35255) in Qui Nhon, a Han Jin convoy was ambushed by an estimated VC platoon. An MP reaction force was sent to the scene. Results were one US KIA, two US WIA, and 11 Koreans WIA. One gun truck and seven cargo trucks received minor damage, while one cargo truck and one gun truck were damaged heavily.

(C) At 231045H Aug (BR323463) 16 km E of An Khe, a westbound 20 vehicle convoy from the 27th Trans Bn and an eastbound 23 vehicle convoy from the 27th Trans Bn were ambushed by an estimated 30-35 NVA from both sides of the road using small arms, B-40 rocket and mortar fire. Convoys returned fire with small arms, M-79, M-60 MG and .50 cal MG fire. The 27th Trans convoy sustained the following damage: one 5000 gallon tanker (empty) received two B-40 rounds which resulted in two large holes in the vehicle, three 5000 gallon tankers received small arms fire three 5 ton tractors were damaged by small arms fire. Three US soldiers were WIA. The reaction force from the 1/8th of the 27th Cavalry engaged the enemy with unknown results.

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21. (C) At 181845H Sep (CQ263245) 1 km N of Vung Ro Bay, three US personnel traveling between Vung Ro Bay and Tuy Hoa were ambushed by an estimated 10-15 VC. Small arms fire was exchanged and support was provided by a gun truck and ROK mortar team. The VC fled. Results were 3 US WIA (slight).

22. (C) At 021800H Oct (BR888573) 8 km N of Phu Cat on highway #1, three 5 ton bobtails and one 5000 gallon tanker broke down. An 8th Gp guntruck was at the scene for security. At 1805H, fire was received from an estimated 15 man enemy force. MP's called for air cover, dust off, and gunships. ROK's sent reaction force of two V-100's, two guntrucks, and three gunjeeps. The MP's took 8th Gp personnel back to QN. One MP was WIA. ROK's provided night security for the empty vehicles.

23. (C) At 091828H Oct (BR862322) 23 Km NW of QN, an eastbound 54th Trans Bn convoy of 23 vehicles on highway #19, was ambushed by an estimated two platoons to one company of enemy personnel employing small arms and automatic weapons fire from 250m, N and S of the road. The ambush position was on the edge of a village and rice paddy and employed prepared positions. 669th Trans Co guntrucks engaged the enemy with M-60 with unknown results. MAT Tm 249 and the 109th RF Co reacted and pursued the enemy. Results were one US (Log) WIA (minor), one RF WIA, and three RF KIA. Enemy casualties were unknown.

24. (C) At 181145H Oct (CQ264245) 3 km N of Vung Ro Bay, elements of the 545th Trans Co spotted a bag of AK-47 ammo, moved up the road and contacted their unit, called 6/32d Arty for permission to return through the area and draw fire. One gunjeep and one guntruck returned and received small arms fire. They returned until the enemy fire ceased. The vehicle then left the area and artillery fired 48 rounds of 105mm HE into the enemy position. The gunjeep and guntruck then returned to the area and again received small arms fire. When fire was returned, one round in an M-60 exploded burning a man's hand (minor). The vehicles returned back at 1300H. A gunship was called in and expended all of its ammunition in the area with unknown results. The road was opened again at 1400H.

(C) At 192130H Oct, (CR002254) at the junction of QL #1 and highway #440 in QN, a 54th Ord Bn EOD 3/4 ton truck, traveling S on QL #1, received five rounds of small arms fire. One VC threw a handgrenade (HG) into the back of the truck. A GI picked up the HG and threw it back, causing it to explode harmlessly. Fire was returned with M-16 with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties.

(C) At 211645H Oct (BR155525) 34 km W of An Khe on QL #19, a westbound, 31 vehicle, 54th Trans Bn convoy was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force from both sides of the road, using small arms and automatic weapons fire and B-40 rocket fire. Two 5 ton trucks were damaged, one was disabled by a B-40 rocket inside and was left at the Strong Point at Bridge #30, the other damaged truck arrived at An Khe. Results: One US (512th TC Co) WIA (seriously). At 211655H Oct (BR167518) A and C/1/69th Arty reacted, engaged an estimated 15 VC. Results: no friendly casualties, 10 enemy KIA.

(C) At 230830H Oct (BR032514) 11 km E of Le Trung, a V-100 from the 504th MP hit a mine while in an eastbound convoy near bridge #33 on QL #19. The convoy was held up for half an hour. The V-100 was a total loss and was left at the scene. There were no casualties.

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Gunships were also on station. At the same time, 4½ km E, LZ Schuler received a standoff attack of approximately 25 rounds of mixed 82mm and 60mm mortar, B-40 rocket and small arms fire. 17 rounds of 82mm mortar fire impacted inside the perimeter resulting in two US WIA. Strong Point #5 (APC) also was attacked by 60mm mortar and B-40/41 RPG and small arms fire. One round of 60mm mortar fire hit the rear ramp, came into the truck and exploded, resulting in five US WIA.

15. (C) At 290035H Aug (BR445445) in An Khe, the ASP underwent a sapper attack. Two satchel charges detonated in the small arms ammunition sheds, the first at approximately 0030H, the second at approximately 0045H. The charges were set on sheds #1 and #2. Shed #1 contained M-60 ammunition. The explosion and fire caused damage to 14 pallets of ammunition. Shed #2 contained illumination rounds of which eight B404 and some 155mm illumination rounds were damaged. There were 112 rounds of 155mm involved. At 0115H, the first of two charges detonated. The explosion and resulting fire damaged eight 80 lb drums of CS and eight 50 lb CS duster bombs. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) found evidence of four satchel charges which were estimated to have contained 2½ - 4½ lbs of unidentified explosive. Sappers gained entrance to the ASP by burrowing under the fence along the NW and SW perimeter. Foot prints of two persons were found leading up the mountain from the NW. Dogs followed them approximately ¾ of the way up, then lost the scent.

16. (C) At 090110H Sep (CRO07186) QN Compound Complex F, the 184th Ordnance Bn, received six rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Two rounds landed outside the perimeter and four rounds impacted inside. One round hit a 1000 gallon water truck, destroying a water pump and damaging a gas tank. One round hit near the 299th Engineer Bn mess hall causing no damage. There were no casualties. The suspected enemy position was CRO017. Fire was not returned.

17. (C) At 102345H Sep (CRO28168) QN Compound Complex F, the 184th Ord Bn ABD underwent a sapper attack with three satchel charges exploding in Pads #62 and #63. There were two explosions at #62 and one explosion at #63. The fire which the explosions started was extinguished by 110015H. Pad #62 had 720 rounds of (C-445) 105mm HE in or near the fire. There were no friendly casualties. The enemy suffered one VC KIA and one pistol captured in action (CIA).

18 (C) At 110135H Sep (CRO56224) in QN, the POL package yard received two rounds of B-41 rocket fire. At 0240H, they received one round of B-41 rocket fire. There were no casualties. Three 55 gallon drums of OE-30 oil and nine 55 gallon drums of OE-10 oil were damaged. A sweep at 0630H disclosed a cave at CRO53218 and two shipping cartons for B-41 rocket fin sections were found.

19. (C) At 110955H Sep (BR867327) 21½ km WNW of QN in the vicinity of valve #33, a man from an EOD team with the 240th QM Bn pipeline crew stepped on a 24 lb pressure type booby trap which blew his foot off. Another EOD man, who had been probing at the time of the explosion, received fragmentation in the face and chest. Three sections of pipeline were destroyed.

20. (C) At 111900H Sep (CRO56224) in QN, the POL Package Yard received one round of B-40 rocket fire, damaging nine drums of OE-50 oil. At 1925H, the second round of B-40 rocket fire was received, damaging 18 more drums of oil. The fire came from CRO53218. Fire was returned with Duster, M-79, M-60, and small arms fire, with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties. Total damage was 27 drums of OE-50 oil.

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28. (C) At 231251H Oct (BR640455) 4 km NW of Binh Khe, a 2½-ton truck from a pipeline crew of the 240th QM Bn detonated a mine on QL #1 between PS #3 and #4. The front end of the vehicle was heavily damaged. One US soldier was WIA.

29. (C) At 271050H Oct (BR654446) 3½ km NW of Binh Khe, an eastbound 14 vehicle 27th Trans Bn convoy received small arms fire and B-40 rocket fire from an unknown size enemy force on the south side of QL #19. The convoy returned fire with small arms, .50 cal MG, M-60, and Minigun (7.62mm) MG fire, with unknown results. Gunships were on station but did not return fire because ROK reaction force were in the area. Results: One 5-ton truck received one small arms round in bottom left door and one 5-ton truck received one small arms round in the engine block, totally destroying the engine. There were no friendly casualties. The ROK Cavalry unit reacting to the ambush in conjunction with local RF/PF forces engaged an estimated NVA platoon armed with AK-47's and dressed in green fatigues. Results were five NVA KIA and one NVA PW (WIA); one AK-47, and one belt with five AK magazines captured in action.

30. (C) At 290305H Oct (ZA215542) Pleiku Log Center, Tower #12 of the 88th S&S Bn observed an estimated seven individuals in between the first and second strands of perimeter wire, and employed small arms fire. Five bursts of AK-47 fire were returned by enemy with no casualties or damage. The searchlight on artillery hill and mortars from the artillery Bn and the 88th S&S Bn provided support with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties or damage. Enemy casualties are unknown.

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### AFTER ACTION REPORT - SOLDIER DISTURBANCE (Significant Excerpts)

1. Purpose: To provide a detailed after action report on the alleged racial disturbance in Qui Nhon on 31 July 1969.

2. Scope: This incident occurred between 1530 hours and 1730 hours on 31 July 1969. The incident involved PFC Samuel J. Ford, Negro, from the 304th S&S Company and five (5) other Negro soldiers from the 160th H&M Company. During an attempted apprehension of PFC Ford approximately 150 Negro soldiers became involved with military policemen, Caucasian, who were trying to effect the apprehension.

3. Background:

a. (List of individual suspects (S's) and Victims (V's).)

b. At approximately 311535 Jul 69 (S) Ford was observed drinking on the sidewalk of Tran Cao Van Street, QN, by MP Patrol McDaniel and Matthews. Ford was approached for routine check by McDaniel and Matthews during which time he became very loud and belligerent. A crowd of 100 to 150 Negro soldiers gathered from nearby bars and began threatening MP's raising fists, and shouting Black Power Slogans. MP's attempted to apprehend Ford but were grabbed and held by crowd. Ford escaped into the crowd. The MP's, once freed from the crowd, requested assistance. All MP Patrols responded as did the reaction force from the 127th MP Co. The street was placed OFF LIMITS and the crowd dispersed. A group of about 100 Negro soldiers moved along Hai Ba Trung Street to Vo Tanh Street and then to Nguyen Hue and Nguyen Huu Loc Street. On Nguyen Huu Loc Street (CROBO220) members of the crowd pulled (V)'s Sletwick, Fridley, and Groove from passing vehicles and assaulted them. The crowd was dispersed by 311730 Jul 69. The Commanding General, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, placed the city of Qui Nhon OFF LIMITS to all US personnel effective 1 August 1969 for an undetermined period. The city is now clear of US personnel and quiet. Ford was apprehended shortly after his escape and the other (S)'s were apprehended later on Nguyen Huu Loc Street while causing a disturbance by stopping traffic and harassing military personnel.

4. Actions Taken: Immediately following the incident, the CG, USASUPCOM, QN took the following actions:

a. He notified all commands in the Qui Nhon area that Qui Nhon would be off limits to all US personnel for an indefinite period of time effective 1 August 1969 at 0001 hours.

b. Met with II Corps Zone (North) PM, Area PM, Staff PM, and CID to discuss the incident in detail and make a preliminary investigation to analyze the cause, actions taken during the incident, and preventive measures to be taken to preclude a recurrence of this type incident.

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c. Held a conference with the Sergeants Major of all command units in the Qui Nhon Area. The discussion included closer supervision, getting more involved in the know your man concept, leadership, discipline, and other preventive measures to preclude recurrence of incidents of this nature.

d. Held a conference with all major subordinate commanders in QNSC and staff personnel to discuss all items mentioned in the previous paragraph.

e. Interviewed SSG Reed and SSG Prior, QN, USAD, two Negro NCO's who were instrumental in aiding the Military Police in clearing the city during and after the incident.

f. Coordinated necessary action between the Area PM, Province Chief, and National Police in planning and formulating multiple cordon and sweep operations through the problem areas in the city of Qui Nhon. This plan will take effect immediately and involve an immediate sweep and unannounced combined police operations.

5. Problem Areas and Lessons Learned: Preliminary investigation and discussions revealed that there are numerous AWOL's and deserters living in the city of Qui Nhon. These individuals are primarily non Logistical Command troops. It has been revealed that these individuals have been responsible for many previous minor incidents. The Commanding General intends to root out and clear the area of many of these personnel by the aforementioned sweep operations and close scrutiny of strange personnel entering local compounds in search of food, money, and temporary shelter. Pvt Ford who was being apprehended at the start of this incident has been AWOL since 16 July 1969, and is pending a Court Martial for previous offenses. Discussion with SSG's Reed and Prior revealed that this was not strictly what can be described as a racial incident. The facts remain that the incident did take place in the section of town where Negroes primarily congregate, but being day or night it would have been possible for this incident to occur in any part of Qui Nhon. SSG's Reed and Prior know or work with most of the people who were in the area of the incident and revealed that there have been no racial movements or undertones that would indicate present or future racial incidents. They also indicated that they were not being harrassed or incited by the MP's before or during this incident. A thorough study is being conducted at this time of present pass policies and personnel control measures. Steps will be taken to insure that all personnel will be accounted for and a minimum number will be allowed on pass at any one time when the city of Qui Nhon is on limits.

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UNITS ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON (AS OF 31 OCT 1969)

HQ, USASC, QN  
APO 96238

HHD, USASC, QN  
30th Mil Hist Det  
527th, Pers Svc Co

US ARMY DEPOT, QN  
APO 96238

USAD, QN  
Security Guard Co  
90th Hvy Mat Sup Co

5th TRANSPORTATION COMD  
APO 96238

HHC, 5th Trans Comd  
HHD, 394th Trans Bn  
119th Trans Co  
264th Trans Co (Tml Svc)  
272d Trans Det (Tug)  
274th Trans Det (Tug)  
285th Trans Co (Tml Svc)  
337th Trans Co (Tml Svc)  
396th Trans Det  
540th Trans Det  
555th Trans Det (Tug)  
566th Trans Plt  
585th Trans Det  
632d Trans Det (Tug)  
854th Trans Co (Tml Svc)  
1098th Trans Co (Med Boat)

8th TRANSPORTATION GROUP  
APO 96238

HHD, 8th Trans Gp  
HHD, 27th Trans Bn  
2d, Trans Co (M Trk)  
88th Trans Co (M Trk)  
444th Trans Co (L Trk)  
505th Trans Det (Trlr-Trnfr)  
597th Trans Co (M Trk)

HHD, 54th Trans Bn  
512th Trans Co (L Trk)

523d Trans Co (L Trk)  
545th Trans Co (L Trk)  
669th Trans Co (L Trk)

HHD, 124th Trans Bn  
64th Trans Co (M Trk)  
359th Trans Co (POL)  
520th Trans Det (Trlr-Trnfr)  
541st Trans Co (L Trk)

45th GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP  
APO 96238

HHC, 45th Gen Spt Gp  
Pleiku Sub Area Comd (Prov)  
126th Fin Det (Disb)  
566th APU

HQ & Maint Co, 62d Maint Bn  
149th Maint Co  
484th Sig Det (Rdr Rep)  
510th Engr Co (Mds)  
618th Hvy Eq Maint Co (CS)  
861st Sig Det

HHD, 88th Sup & Svc Bn  
3d QM Det  
243d Fld Svc Co (CS)  
385th QM Det  
561st Gen Spt Co (CS)  
573d Sup & Svc Co (CS)

86th MAINTENANCE BATTALION  
APO 96238

HHD, 86th Maint Bn  
98th Maint Co (LEM)  
160th Maint Co (HMS)  
554th Maint Co (CS)  
865th Engr Det (CS)

184th ORDNANCE BATTALION  
APO 96238

HHC, 184th Ord Bn  
Security Guard Co (Prov)  
188th Ord Co

50th Ord Det (Ammo Renov)  
630th Ord Co  
820th Ord Co

240th QUARTERMASTER BATTALION  
APO 96238

HHD, 240th QM Bn  
79th QM Plt (POL Opns)  
134th QM Co (Petr Sup)  
514th QM Co (Petr Sup)  
647th QM Co (POL Opns)  
959th QM Det (Petr Sup)

593d GEN SPT GP  
APO 96238

HHC, 593d Gs Gp  
QN Sub Area Comd (Prov)  
An Khe Det (Prov)  
QN Army Airfield (Prov)  
1st APU (Type U)  
6th APU (Type Y)  
13th Fin Sec (Disb)  
19th S&S Co  
291st QM Det  
304th S&S Co  
4th Engr Det  
579th QM Det  
857d Sig Det

Hq & Maint Spt Co, 5th Maint Bn  
552d Lt Maint Co (LM)  
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